Kaseya BYOD Gateway 7.0.2 SSL Certificate Validation / Redirection

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presents..  
  
Kaseya BYOD Gateway Multiple Vulnerabilities  
Affected Versions: Kaseya BYOD Gateway 7.0.2  
  
PDF:  
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/Kaseya_BYOD_Gateway_Multiple_Vulnerabilities.pdf  
  
+-------------+  
| Description |  
+-------------+  
  
This advisory details multiple vulnerabilities found within the Kaseya BYOD  
Gateway software. By chaining a combination of lacking SSL verification, poor  
authentication mechanisms and arbitrary redirection vulnerabilities, a  
malicious entity may potentially compromise any Kaseya BYOD installation.  
  
The Kaseya BYOD Gateway software uses a redirection feature, wherein users are  
redirected to their local Kaseya installation via Kaseya’s hosted servers. The  
update request from the BYOD Gateway software to the Kaseya hosted servers was  
not found to verify SSL certificates and fails to implement any form of  
authentication, instead relying on the length of the gateway identifier to  
provide security. Thus, the security of the solution depends on an attacker’s  
ability to enumerate the gateway identifier. Once a malicious user enumerates  
the Gateway identifier, then they may update the redirect rule for that  
customer in Kaseya’s hosted servers, redirecting customers to a malicious  
Kaseya BYOD Gateway.   
  
+--------------+  
| Exploitation |  
+--------------+  
  
--[ Lack of SSL Certificate Validation  
  
The Kaseya BYOD Gateway was not found to validate SSL certificates when  
contacting the Kaseya hosted servers. Requests were found to be made to the  
Kaseya hosted servers when updating redirection information (for  
local-network-only instances of Kaseya) and when submitting licensing  
information. This allows a malicious entity with network access somewhere  
between the BYOD Gateway and Kaseya’s servers to perform a Man-In-The-Middle  
attack.  
  
--[ Arbitrary Redirection  
  
By intercepting and replaying the request below, a malicious entity may  
specify an arbitrary ‘url’ parameter within the ‘siteinfo’ XML tag. The Kaseya  
provisioning relay server then updates the BYOD Gateway redirect with the URL  
specified. The redirection takes place when a user queries  
https://provision.relay.kaseya.net/siteinfo/<code> (where code is the  
installation’s 6 digit access code). The  
https://provision.relay.kaseya.net/siteinfo/<code> page is queried during the  
Kaseya BYOD mobile applications’ start up process in order to determine the  
location of the BYOD Gateway.  
  
POST /checkin/gateway/rq-be9781109e7111e3afa822000ab9104f HTTP/1.1  
Accept-Encoding: identity  
Content-Length: {content length}  
Host: provision.relay.kaseya.net  
Content-Type: text/xml  
Connection: close  
User-Agent: Kaseya-Tetra/7.0.2 (CL 7)  
  
<checkin><gateway version="7.0.2" clevel="7" appname="Kaseya-Tetra"/><platform  
kind="windows" version="6.2.9200"/><users owner={email address}"  
active="3"/><devices active="0"/><siteinfo url={site url}"/><connectors><connector version="1.1" id="ProxyConnector"/><connector version="1.1" id="DirConnector"/><connector version="1.1" id="FileConnector"/><connector version="1.0" id="HomeConnector"/><connector version="1.0" id="LinkConnector"/><connector version="1.1" id="MenuConnector"/><connector version="1.2" id="StaticSiteConnector"/></connectors></checkin>  
  
Once an installation’s Gateway Identifier is known  
(rq-be9781109e7111e3afa822000ab9104f in the example above), a malicious entity  
may control the redirection and send users to their own malicious Kaseya BYOD  
Gateway. This code was found to be disclosed in a number of locations,  
including device logs, in the Kaseya BYOD Gateway’s pages or by Kaseya’s  
hosted relay servers. The installation gateway identifier is disclosed during  
the sign up process. Thus, an attacker that can enumerate the customer's six  
digit numeric registration code can step through the registration process,  
retrieve the gateway identifier and hijack the installation.  
  
+----------+  
| Solution |  
+----------+  
  
No official solution is currently available for this issue.  
  
+---------------------+  
| Disclosure Timeline |  
+---------------------+  
  
03/10/2014 - Initial contact with Kaseya Support  
09/10/2014 - Established Kaseya security contact  
13/10/2014 - Advisories sent to Kaseya  
21/10/2014 - Additional information sent to Kaseya  
22/11/2014 - Update from Kaseya  
29/01/2015 - Advisory Release   
  
+-------------------------------+  
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+-------------------------------+  
  
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