PayPal Arbitrary Code Execution

`Document Title:  
===============  
PayPal Inc - Filter Bypass & Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability  
  
  
References (Source):  
====================  
http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=936  
  
Video: http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1275  
  
Vulnerability Magazine: http://magazine.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2014/11/05/paypal-inc-fixed-filter-bypass-profile-code-execution-during-infrastructure  
  
  
Release Date:  
=============  
2014-11-05  
  
  
Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID):  
====================================  
936  
  
  
Common Vulnerability Scoring System:  
====================================  
9.1  
  
  
Product & Service Introduction:  
===============================  
PayPal is a global e-commerce business allowing payments and money transfers to be made through the Internet. Online money   
transfers serve as electronic alternatives to paying with traditional paper methods, such as checks and money orders. Originally,   
a PayPal account could be funded with an electronic debit from a bank account or by a credit card at the payer s choice. But some   
time in 2010 or early 2011, PayPal began to require a verified bank account after the account holder exceeded a predetermined   
spending limit. After that point, PayPal will attempt to take funds for a purchase from funding sources according to a specified   
funding hierarchy. If you set one of the funding sources as Primary, it will default to that, within that level of the hierarchy   
(for example, if your credit card ending in 4567 is set as the Primary over 1234, it will still attempt to pay money out of your   
PayPal balance, before it attempts to charge your credit card). The funding hierarchy is a balance in the PayPal account; a   
PayPal credit account, PayPal Extras, PayPal SmartConnect, PayPal Extras Master Card or Bill Me Later (if selected as primary   
funding source) (It can bypass the Balance); a verified bank account; other funding sources, such as non-PayPal credit cards.  
The recipient of a PayPal transfer can either request a check from PayPal, establish their own PayPal deposit account or request   
a transfer to their bank account.  
  
PayPal is an acquirer, performing payment processing for online vendors, auction sites, and other commercial users, for which it   
charges a fee. It may also charge a fee for receiving money, proportional to the amount received. The fees depend on the currency   
used, the payment option used, the country of the sender, the country of the recipient, the amount sent and the recipient s account   
type. In addition, eBay purchases made by credit card through PayPal may incur extra fees if the buyer and seller use different currencies.  
  
On October 3, 2002, PayPal became a wholly owned subsidiary of eBay. Its corporate headquarters are in San Jose, California, United   
States at eBay s North First Street satellite office campus. The company also has significant operations in Omaha, Nebraska, Scottsdale,   
Arizona, and Austin, Texas, in the United States, Chennai, Dublin, Kleinmachnow (near Berlin) and Tel Aviv. As of July 2007, across   
Europe, PayPal also operates as a Luxembourg-based bank.  
  
On March 17, 2010, PayPal entered into an agreement with China UnionPay (CUP), China s bankcard association, to allow Chinese consumers   
to use PayPal to shop online.PayPal is planning to expand its workforce in Asia to 2,000 by the end of the year 2010.  
  
(Copy of the Homepage: www.paypal.com) [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PayPal]  
  
  
Abstract Advisory Information:  
==============================  
The Vulnerability Laboratory Research Team discovered a persistent script code injection web vulnerability in the official PayPal Inc core application.  
  
  
Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:  
==================================  
2013-04-25: Researcher Notification & Coordination (PayPal Inc - Bug Bounty Program)  
2013-04-26: Vendor Notification (PayPal Inc - Bug Bounty Program)  
2013-05-01: Vendor Response/Feedback (PayPal Inc - Bug Bounty Program)  
2013-09-12: Vendor Response/Feedback (Ebay Inc - Bug Bounty Program)  
2014-10-01: Vendor Response/Feedback (Ebay Inc - Bug Bounty Program)  
2014-10-12: Vendor Fix/Patch (PayPal Inc - Developer Team)  
2014-11-04: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory)  
  
  
Discovery Status:  
=================  
Published  
  
  
Affected Product(s):  
====================  
PayPal Inc  
Product: Core Application 2013 Q1  
  
  
Exploitation Technique:  
=======================  
Remote  
  
  
Severity Level:  
===============  
Critical  
  
  
Technical Details & Description:  
================================  
A system specific arbitrary code execution vulnerability has been discovered in the official in the official PayPal Inc Web-Application & API.   
A filter bypass and persistent bug has also been revealed during the tests in the same vulnerable parameter location.  
  
The system specific arbitrary code execution vulnerability is located in the developer api portal with connection and account access to the   
paypal portal api. First the attacker registers an user account and includes to the `cardholder confidential` and `accountSelName` value own   
malicious persistent script codes or local web-server files. To attack, the help center data of the malicious profile requires a second   
registration to the developer api portal with same credentials (connected). The accountSelName and the confidential values are not limited   
on input. The attacker is able to load script codes but can also remotly execute arbitrary codes to access local web-server files or configs.  
  
The filter bypass occurs during the execution onclick by opening the profile. The trusted context of the dev api user account will be streamed   
through the help center link on GET method requests. The regular filter of paypal prevents the external inject of frames to other websites but   
in case of this issue the trusted context is directly executed on top of the profile. The execution and inject can occur remotly by attackers   
and the attack typus is pending from persistent xss to arbitrary code execution and local web-server file request through the profile. The web-server   
and misconfiguration allows the attacker to for example include a frame with a local request through the trusted context to capture unauthorized data   
of the system. A webshell inject could also be possible during the execution point of the paypal users profile.  
  
The attack vector is on the application-side of the paypal service and the injection request method is POST (dev api & help center). The security risk   
of the local command/path inject vulnerability is estimated as medium with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 9.1.  
  
Exploitation of the system specific code execution vulnerability requires a low privileged paypal inc account with restricted access and no user interaction.   
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability results in unauthorized execution of system specific codes, webshell injects via POST method, unauthorized path/file   
value requests to compromise the application or the connected module components.  
  
Request Method(s):  
[+] POST  
  
Vulnerable Module(s):  
[+] helpcenter/home/ ( https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/ )  
[+] developer.paypal.com ( https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support )  
  
Vulnerable Parameter(s):  
[+] accountSelName confidential  
[+] confidential  
  
Affected Module(s):  
[+] PayPal Inc – Profile User Index (Main) – Execution through >  
https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support )  
  
  
Proof of Concept (PoC):  
=======================  
The system specific code execution and persistent issue (filter bypass) can be exploited by remote attackers with low privileged application user account.   
For security demonstration or to reproduce the security vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue.  
  
Manual Steps to reproduce the vulnerability ...  
1. First register and account to the developer portal api  
2. Second connect the paypal account to the help center by registration (2. to 1. also possible)  
Note: On registration it`s required to include own payloads (code execution [path|file|config]or script code[html|php|js]) to the AccountSelName & cardholder confidential input.  
3. Save the payload to your profile  
4. Open the dev webportal & include the same data (payload) to your dev api profile values.  
Note: On our tests we did but we are not if this is a requirement for a successful test.  
5. Now surf to the following internal dev websitehttps://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support )  
Note: On bottom of the page is now the paypal support link with the malicious injected code  
6. Click the "Visit PayPal Support" link  
7. The website redirect to the local paypal profile with the new api template theme. The system specific code execution occurs directly in the middle were the streamed data   
of the helpcenter through dev api portal will become visible. The vulnerable executable values are `AccountSelName` and cardholder `confidential` account data.  
Note: If you injected script code the script code execution on the main profile request throught the dev api service or a local config/file of the web-server will be loaded.  
8. Successful reproduce of the remote vulnerability in the paypal infrastructure!  
Note: DETAILS $ PAYPAL TO AUTHORIZED USAGE  
  
  
Reference(s):  
>From < https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support  
Through API > https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/  
To < https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/a [ARBITRARY CODE EXEUCTION!]  
  
  
PoC: Help Center Index - confidential & accountSelName confidential  
  
<div class="nav product merchant">  
<div class="wrapper">  
<div class="column_8_16" style="clear:both">  
<div class="one column">  
<div class="accountSelName confidential">  
<div class="confidential" tabindex="0">%20>>"<<x>%20%20%20%20"><i... #[SYSTEM  
SPECIFIC CODE EXECUTION OR PERSISTENT SCRIPT CODE!]  
</div>  
</div>  
  
  
Note: Code snippet poc shows the execution of the code after the inject of the test payloads  
  
--- PoC-Session Logs [GET] (Vulnerable Service) ---  
22:28:56.757[1073ms][total 1933ms] Status: 200[OK]  
GET https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/support Load  
Flags[LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI ] Content Size[2841]  
Mime Type[text/html]  
Request Headers:  
Host[developer.paypal.com]  
User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0]  
Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8]  
Accept-Language[en-US,en;q=0.5]  
Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] DNT[1]  
Referer[https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/dashboard/test]  
Cookie[cookie_check=yes; analytics=npXj01hCUWhDymxVPXy6hvRAO8mp6Vab7grsAxepOdYMdbZuOAokBTznGTV664Cfp6JTxQWQSk;  
s_sess=%20c_m%3DNatural  
%2520Searchpaypal%2520bug%2520bountywww.google.de%3B%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_ppv  
%3D0%3B%20tr_p1%3Ddeveloperspartaweb%252Fweb-inf%252Ftmpl%252Fdust  
%252Fdashboard%252Ftest.dust%3B%20v31%3Ddeveloperspartaweb%252Fweb-inf%252Ftmpl  
%252Fdust%252Fdashboard%252Ftest.dust%3B%20lt%3DSupport%255Edeveloperspartaweb  
%252Fweb-inf%252Ftmpl%252Fdust%252Fdashboard%252Ftest.dust%3B%20s_sq  
%3Dpaypalglobal%253D%252526pid%25253Ddeveloperspartaweb%2525252Fweb-inf  
%2525252Ftmpl%2525252Fdust%2525252Fdashboard%2525252Ftest.dust%252526pidt  
%25253D1%252526oid%25253Dhttps%2525253A%2525252F%2525252Fdeveloper.paypal.com  
%2525252Fwebapps%2525252Fdeveloper%2525252Fsupport%252526ot%25253DA%3B; s_pers=  
%20gpv_p23%3Dmain%253Amktg%253Afinancing%253A%253Aunauthhome  
%7C1367009015468%3B%20s_fid%3D1C1953F2CF9A8631-0C78EF476327828D  
%7C1430080136714%3B%20gpv_c43%3Ddeveloperspartaweb%252Fweb-inf%252Ftmpl  
%252Fdust%252Fdashboard%252Ftest.dust%7C1367009936721%3B%20gpv_events%3Dno  
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consumer_display=USER_HOMEPAGE%3d0%26USER_TARGETPAGE  
%3d0%26USER_FILTER_CHOICE%3d0%26BALANCE_MODULE_STATE  
%3d1%26GIFT_BALANCE_MODULE_STATE%3d1%26LAST_SELECTED_ALIAS_ID  
%3d0%26SELLING_GROUP%3d1%26PAYMENT_AND_RISK_GROUP  
%3d1%26SHIPPING_GROUP%3d1%26HOME_VERSION%3d1%26USER_GROUP  
%3d4294967295%26FORGOT_BUTTON_ROLE%3d56;  
Apache=10.74.8.156.1367005659167493;  
__utma=263370009.199482976.1367005657.1367005657.1367005657.1;  
__utmb=263370009.14.10.1367005657; __utmc=263370009;  
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hD9krQVnGZvKKxHBuZd  
hDMHGcgesSeWG; login_email=x01445%40gmail.com; LANG=en_US%3bDE; Gws4LBnVhSMuyYhD0wXzh01SEK=  
jy0DcLqW37pTQNCEhLbqhA3QX00BcwiDqqaD7U13i0aMo  
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iJtY1GnpzN4Y-sixGy7BQ; navcmd=xpt%2fCustomer_Profile%2faccount%2fprofile  
%2fSellerPreference;  
pNTcMTtQfrJuaJiwEnWXQ6yNxfq=GXKuXCGNvT1bsc_jz_Rx9E7VwmZZ8o3dbnxOVVVp9A  
axiyWkodDxxKi4R67QRG1M5Y9fj-Wu7wfuRhtJ7-4rEJoEX8JKpG40P-  
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navlns=0.0; INSIDE_SEARCH_PARAMS=2%3bDE%3ben_US%3bEurope%2fBerlin;  
SPARTAJSESSIONID=b469ade995520]  
Connection[keep-alive]  
  
Response Headers:  
Date[Fri, 26 Apr 2013 20:29:00 GMT]  
Server[Apache-Coyote/1.1]  
X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN]  
Cache-Control[must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate, no-cache]  
Content-Type[text/html;charset=utf-8]  
Content-Language[en-US] Set-Cookie[SPARTAJSESSIONID=b469ade995520;  
Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly  
HaC80bwXscjqZ7KM6VOxULOB534=NeCv0LpChVSb1LUO7ACci9QljSszvP1vnFucjnzDEhQA  
aIJwnTGse_O1jK-v1Ix3xMf37CJzCo7mhHFiUqc_jGQ3TZCkyKw7bqsFSXjVmp1At-  
QfPpYWWvNBLJ-jwrRCxbkqbW; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly  
analytics=WlpqNFIvc5KQfH.5mTE.EHaym1WQXGmbYji.0XQm-  
CqpTh.7j5T5WuK2VeQdeoFYVDMJ0N41Q6M; Max-Age=631138519; Expires=Tue, 26-Apr-  
2033 16:44:19 GMT; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly  
SPARTAJSESSIONIDV2=vsEpz8V5yOevktiKlA9Pf7Y6Dqji8U9YEYTL.  
2fIuBwSPPV1H3jNv3FOduHGSyqmykhcIaPtx0;  
Max-Age=0; Expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:10 GMT; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure;  
HttpOnly]  
Vary[Accept-Encoding]  
Content-Encoding[gzip]  
Content-Length[2841]  
Keep-Alive[timeout=5, max=100]  
Connection[Keep-Alive]  
  
Note: The session log above with the GET method request shows the request which leads to the  
execution in the next session-log. The server accepts the malicious and manipulated request and  
redirects via referer and non expired session to the paypal.com portals were the execution occurs.  
  
--- PoC Session Logs [GET] (Execution) ---  
22:29:06.862[3380ms][total 3380ms] Status: 200[OK]  
GET https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/a Load  
Flags[LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI ] Content Size[5225] Mime Type[text/html]  
Request Headers:  
Host[www.paypal.com]  
User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0]  
Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8]  
Accept-Language[en-US,en;q=0.5]Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] DNT[1]  
Referer[https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/]  
Cookie[Apache=10.73.8.62.1367005517929267; cookie_check=yes;  
analytics=YOCH0Lef0Klib5IKj7VGth-  
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%252Foverview.dust%3B%20lt%3D%3B%20s_ppv%3D93%3B%20v31%3Ddeveloperspartaweb  
%252Fweb-inf%252Ftmpl%252Fdust%252Fsupport%252Foverview.dust%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B;  
s_pers=%20gpv_p23%3Dmain%253Amktg%253Afinancing%253A%253Aunauthhome  
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%3d0%26SELLING_GROUP%3d1%26PAYMENT_AND_RISK_GROUP  
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Q6YP1NY0Dp0B1531BjYZBrZbOAUh8m0X3_Z1-  
_RddBXIrU4vnShqZgZworf2okBA7IvMfzWfyv0OfB3aLkd8xtrLCFDgdNBVERHwWHYb7_Mf  
EUNJ-6JqM4koqIvLZvDDo9_DCdpfKdwTRu9vQtiB3GaRx7DgVqkOMEtxSJljmPz1HDDtC15cW;  
HaC80bwXscjqZ7KM6VOxULOB534=HP6WwQ0eXaRr2anoOsYKF7CGBw6-  
5KhwiYVS1vwLn1Dh9NqoyWEOUWyUHVFtxavpSES_UYk7occE4X3uNtyj7nWnajz1VULGuV06AmM3jy13bLcpDK959inyPjrla7w1z-  
Ehm; login_email=x01445%40gmail.com;  
LANG=en_US%3bDE; Gws4LBnVhSMuyYhD0wXzh01SEK=  
jy0DcLqW37pTQNCEhLbqhA3QX00BcwiDqqaD7U13i0aMo  
BtISTVSGbl4WlJ-_eEVAsOLl501In5N_1HJBq88q1hBV5S;  
SEGM=bRdV1vB0ebq9RKdAb3xSHowCi6QnnlCiDOLNk8i1mAuLl1vTbzHQwWajSsMe8mvoW  
iJtY1GnpzN4Y-sixGy7BQ; X-PP-SILOVER=name%3DLIVE6.WEB.1%26silo_version  
%3D880%26app%3Dslingshot%26TIME%3D2430368337; navcmd=xpt%2fCustomer_Profile  
%2faccount%2fprofile%2fSellerPreference;  
pNTcMTtQfrJuaJiwEnWXQ6yNxfq=GXKuXCGNvT1bsc_jz_Rx9E7VwmZZ8o3dbnxOVVVp9A  
axiyWkodDxxKi4R67QRG1M5Y9fj-Wu7wfuRhtJ7-4rEJoEX8JKpG40P-  
26PMeKw49jPMtad4WGiZRQSoayGXMsc582PVSkcKSwR6h6qIuMqseWjoOmQyUcBhGpGD  
MpZCtdFnUeh7VG8LcUYDbLPeIrziGR7A8uFYcl2UoCzOmLGW9tjXHo849pblqKbUdA9GfnC6mXONIJL7SrRz7cZV2DeIRAUlytDT3bwKroKutZtMwkh9QxWAqJPu  
Y2l18_FhlA9bLZKcbu7Hwv7-CKt4s9rk2RAfVkMUxcdUC6BxHn-5nAixQTO8fJ1Sxvm;  
navlns=0.0; INSIDE_SEARCH_PARAMS=2%3bDE%3ben_US%3bEurope%2fBerlin;  
tcs=main:identity:::newsso|_eventId_submit; SPARTAJSESSIONID=4381770a8d243;  
SPARTAJSESSIONIDV2=mFJuF3Td8YChLS8hsTBEDYCDlaan6SxOcEV8wCFmUQ37xGuQDc  
I25.tBKhyY-IJNPQ0A8Vw-GVXFZfQAHzqpFA;  
aksession=1367008449~id=cookievC+wdkyRC0UzSZWXkhBPD6dcl2wC6MkrXhAyCF24bXEAq  
a0oGE8xfvt3ph8bjykqTbPzZj330+q7qNHyIj42OcCxIikuXUl0QW1dPeeycH75828YbSSh5/VWmI  
MknMhGOK1SQUIF9uQ=] Connection[keep-alive]  
  
Response Headers:  
Server[Apache-Coyote/1.1]  
X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN]  
Cache-Control[must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate, no-cache]  
Content-Type[text/html;charset=UTF-8]  
Content-Language[en-US]  
Content-Encoding[gzip]  
Content-Length[5225]  
Date[Fri, 26 Apr 2013 20:29:12 GMT]  
Connection[keep-alive]  
Vary[Accept-Encoding]  
Set-Cookie[SPARTAJSESSIONID=4381770a8d243; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure;  
HttpOnlySPARTAJSESSIONID=4381770a8d243; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly  
HaC80bwXscjqZ7KM6VOxULOB534=67pQ_SbY9KcYXIZwvXf41F1UDHSPOlpuWZWBr5Syc  
RDYDMkpDjL9wnHZibXjZxPWxipETeT9OLSEDymNqzEsfdBbL_pDE1cnTJ2yiEUV1isdJqbcfq_  
FgpHVutAELsNqqk7uG; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly  
analytics=0-AAbZ6STFaFViK65yobUytJf35vDfg1mxCQbONr6nxMY3v8tY97GBmh.  
rm.LWF9zJC4dJEEJs; Max-Age=631138519; Expires=Tue, 26-Apr-2033  
16:44:31 GMT; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly  
SPARTAJSESSIONIDV2=wVm2OLjyw5F9VbwqocGR0TgDSghsfPAZXvCq1e1Aaap7fuaNiRX  
WFyBQE14Y1Em66vpfwGMDIo5ncV1LCDFYow; Domain=.paypal.com; Path=/; Secure;  
HttpOnly]  
  
Note: The session logs above shows that the server accepted (200OK) the request and answers with the malicious code execution (GET) as response to me as user.   
The service runs under the same origin policy which returns in the result of the dev through the help center. The execution can also be watched in the recorded   
research video for the paypal bug bounty issue #88.  
  
--- [ACCESS FOR PAYPAL]  
Sandbox to Live Help Center Service > Account: ***********@gmail.com password: merlin23  
  
  
1.png  
The first image explains were the vulnerable location link has been placed after the inject for the  
further execution of the code during the exploitation-phase. The system specific code execution or  
persistent issue can be exploited by clicking the "Visit PayPal Support" link.  
  
  
2.png  
The second images shows were the code execution occurs inside of the paypal inc webapps core  
and api. The code execution can be triggered by two vulnerable values via POST inject. To test we  
injected two payloads own frame and one local request of a web-server config file. The execution of  
the code occurs obviously next to the main user profile on index after the redirect to the referer.  
  
3.png  
The third picture shows were the code execution and persistent issue with filter bypass is located.  
The vulnerable values are `confidential` and `accountSelName confidential`. Both values will be  
taken through the filter via referer on a redirect request with the same origin policy setup. The  
execution does not only allows to inject scipt codes for xss, the issue also allows an attacker to  
request local web-server files by the trusted same origin policy context request.  
  
4.png  
The 4th image shows the session tamper details next to processing to clicking the link of the  
developer portal (api) to paypal.com (paypal). The tampered session through moziall shows that the  
server accepted the GET request with the further visible trusted context. The server responds with  
200OK and directly executes the code through the paypal.com domain in the profile user top  
section.  
  
5.png  
The 5th image shows were the code execution appears to become visible in the live session tamper.  
The domain https://www.paypal.com/webapps/helpcenter/home/a shows that the malicious inject  
was successfully because after the path ./helpcenter/home/[x] the code execution occurs after the  
filter bypass through the other services.  
  
6.png  
The 6th images only shows that the attack vector of the issue in located on the application-side of the  
paypal inc online service. Proof for check was multiple GET requests during the test from the  
paypal database as user.  
  
  
Solution - Fix & Patch:  
=======================  
A solution to fix the issue could be to parse all incoming values through the same origin policy configuration of the connected   
portal with the same api. The vulnerable accountselname confidential and confidential values needs to be encoded even if transfered   
through andother service location. Restrict the input for registration and disallow specialchars to prevent script code injects  
and code execution payloads with unauthorized file requests through the trusted paypal home webapps context.  
  
Note: The issue should be checked by the dev team to review also the backend effect of the issues. Issue is already marked as patched 2014Q4.  
  
  
Security Risk:  
==============  
The security risk of the of the arbitrary code execution in the confidential account value GET method request is estimated as critical. (CVSS 9.1)  
Attacker can request local path values by implementation of privileged context reuqest in the referer which results in a system compromise because of   
attackers are able to access unauthorized server local files.  
  
  
Credits & Authors:  
==================  
Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri ([email protected])  
  
  
Disclaimer & Information:  
=========================  
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`