Conceptronic CIPCAMPTIWL 21.37.2.49 Cross Site Request Forgery

2014-01-10T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:124747
Type packetstorm
Reporter Felipe Molina
Modified 2014-01-10T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            `Hello List,  
  
Here I inform you about an easily exploitable CSRF discovered in  
Conceptronic cameras CIPCAMPTIWL.  
  
**General Details**  
  
Affected Product: Conceptronic camera CIPCAMPTIWL  
Tested Firmware: 21.37.2.49  
Tested Web UI Firmware: 0.61.4.18  
Assigned CVE: CVE-2013-7204  
CVSSv2 Base Score: 5.8 (AV:N/AC:M/AU:N/C:P/I:P/A:N)  
Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Request Forgery [CWE-352]  
Solution Status: Not Fixed  
Vendor Notification Timeline:  
- 23/12/2013: Contacting with technical support through their web  
form http://www.conceptronic.net/supcon.php?action=init  
- 23/12/2013: Contacting with general information email addres  
(info@conceptronic.net) to inform about the vulnerability and request  
suitable security or technical contact to send the complete details of  
the CSRF.  
- 25/12/2013: Contacting with public twitter accounts  
@conceptronic and @conceptronic_es to request suitable security or  
technical contact to send the complete details of the CSRF.  
- 28/12/2013: Recontacting the technical support.  
- 28/12/2013: Recontacting general information address  
info@conceptronic.net.  
- 02/01/2014: Trying to conntact with security@conceptronic.net y  
vulnerabilities@conceptronic.net but they are non existent addresses.  
- 03/01/2014: Involve Inteco CERT in the notification proccess.  
- 08/01/2014: Inteco confirms that there is still no response from  
Conceptronic.  
  
None of the comunication atempts with the vendor received a response,  
so I'm publishing the advisory to warn users and confirm the  
vulnerability with you.  
  
**Vulnerabilitty details**  
  
The CSRF is present in the CGI formulary used to create and modify  
users of the web interface of the camera (/set_users.cgi). This CSRF  
would allow a malicious attacker to create users in the camera web  
interface (including administrator users) if he is able to lure the  
legitimate administrator of the camera to visit a web controlled by  
the attacker.  
  
An example of the process to exploit this vulnerability:  
  
1- A webcam administrator is already logged in the camera web interface.  
  
2- A malicious user knows it and send a link to this administrator  
pointing to a web controlled by this attacker  
(http://example.com/conceptronic_csrf.html). In this web, the attacker  
placed an image with the following code:  
  
<img alt="csrf image"  
src="http://<victim_camera_server>/set_users.cgi?next_url=rebootme.htm&user1=attacker&pwd1=attacker&pri1=2&user2=&pwd2=&pri2=0&user3=&pwd3=&pri3=0&user4=&pwd4=&pri4=0&user5=&pwd5=&pri5=0&user6=&pwd6=&pri6=0&user7=&pwd7=&pri7=0&user8=&pwd8=&pri8=0">  
  
3- The webcam administrator visit the link.  
  
4- The page http://example.com/test_csrf.html tries to load the image  
by making a GET request to the pointed URL, thus, making the  
legitimate administrator to create a new user identified by "attacker"  
and password "attacker".  
  
A video was uploaded to youtube showing this behaviour:  
  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URXEe_VRc74  
  
This issue can be fixed by adding an additional step to the user  
creation CGI, either requesting the administrator password again  
before creating/modifying any user or creating a hidden random token  
for each form (https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)  
  
--   
Felipe Molina de la Torre  
`