backoffice.installer.txt

`Date: Thu, 18 Feb 1999 14:44:48 -0800 (PST)  
From: CIAC Mail User <[email protected]>  
To: [email protected]  
Subject: CIAC Bulletin J-030: Microsoft BackOffice Vulnerability   
  
[ For Public Release ]  
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__________________________________________________________  
  
The U.S. Department of Energy  
Computer Incident Advisory Capability  
___ __ __ _ ___  
/ | /_\ /  
\___ __|__ / \ \___  
__________________________________________________________  
  
INFORMATION BULLETIN  
  
Microsoft BackOffice Vulnerability  
  
February 16, 1999 19:00 GMT Number J-030  
______________________________________________________________________________  
PROBLEM: Microsoft has identified a vulnerability in the installer for   
BackOffice Server (R) 4.0.   
PLATFORM: Microsoft BackOffice Server 4.0   
DAMAGE: Users who can log into the server locally would be able to   
access name and password for the accounts associated with the   
services which are part of a BackOffice 4.0 installation.   
SOLUTION: The fix for this problem is to delete the file \Program   
Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after each BackOffice 4.0   
installation, whether successful or not.   
______________________________________________________________________________  
VULNERABILITY Risk is low. In most cases, the ability to access this file   
ASSESSMENT: would be granted to selected users such as administrators.   
______________________________________________________________________________  
  
[ Start Microsoft Advisory ]  
  
  
Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-005)  
- --------------------------------------  
  
BackOffice Server 4.0 Does Not Delete Installation Setup File  
  
Originally Posted: February 12, 1999  
  
Summary  
=======  
Microsoft (R) has learned of a potential vulnerability in the installer for  
BackOffice Server (R) 4.0. The installer asks the user to provide the  
account userid and password for selected services and writes these to a file  
in order to automate the installation process. However, the file is not  
deleted when the installation process completes. As detailed below,  
Microsoft recommends that BackOffice 4.0 customers delete this file.  
  
Microsoft has received no reports of customers being adversely affected by  
this problem. However, it is releasing this security bulletin in order to  
proactively provide customers with information about the problem in order to  
allow them to take steps to ensure their safe computing.  
  
Issue  
=====  
When a user chooses to install SQL Server (R), Exchange Server (R) or  
Microsoft Transaction Server (R) as part of a BackOffice 4.0 installation,  
the BackOffice installer program requests the name and password for the  
accounts associated with these services. Specifically, it asks for the  
account name and password for the SQL Executive Logon account, the Exchange  
Services Account, and the MTS Remote Administration Account. These values  
are stored in <systemdrive>\Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini,  
and used to install the associated services.  
  
BackOffice Server does not erase this file when the installation process is  
completed. This is true regardless of whether the installation process  
completes successfully or unsuccessfully. By default, the Microsoft  
BackOffice folder is not shared, so network access to reboot.ini generally  
does not pose a risk. Users who can log onto the server locally would be  
able to access the file, but in most cases this ability is granted only to  
selected users such as administrators.  
  
The fix for this problem is to delete the file <systemdrive>\Program  
Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after each BackOffice 4.0  
installation, whether successful or not. The file is created only by the  
installer, and, once deleted, will not be re-created unless BackOffice 4.0  
is re-installed.  
  
Affected Software Versions  
==========================  
The following software versions are affected:  
- Microsoft BackOffice Server 4.0  
  
What Microsoft is Doing  
=======================  
On February 12th, Microsoft sent this security  
bulletin to customers subscribing to the Microsoft  
Product Security Notification Service  
(see http://www.microsoft.com/security/services/bulletin.asp  
for more information about this free customer service).  
  
Microsoft has published the following Knowledge Base (KB) article on this  
issue:  
- Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q217004,  
BackOffice Installer Tool Does Not Delete Password Cache File.  
http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q217/0/04.asp  
(Note: It might take 24 hours from the original posting of this  
bulletin for the KB article to be visible in the Web-based  
Knowledge Base.)  
  
What customers Should Do  
========================  
Microsoft recommends that customers ensure that they delete the file  
<systemdrive>\Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after the  
installation program for BackOffice 4.0 completes  
  
More Information  
================  
Please see the following references for more information related to this  
issue.  
- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS99-005,  
BackOffice 4.0 Does Not Delete Installation Setup File  
(the Web-posted version of this bulletin),  
http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-005.asp.  
- Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q217004,  
BackOffice Installer Tool Does Not Delete Password Cache File.  
http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q217/0/04.asp  
(Note: It might take 24 hours from the original posting of this  
bulletin for the KB article to be visible in the Web-based  
Knowledge Base.)  
  
Obtaining Support on this Issue  
===============================  
If you require technical assistance with this issue, please contact  
Microsoft Technical Support. For information on contacting Microsoft  
Technical Support, please see  
http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp.  
  
Revisions  
=========  
- February 12, 1999: Bulletin Created  
  
  
For additional security-related information about Microsoft products, please  
visit http://www.microsoft.com/security  
  
  
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
- ----  
  
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(C) 1999 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Terms of Use.  
  
  
[ End Microsoft Advisory ]  
______________________________________________________________________________  
  
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft for the   
information contained in this bulletin.  
______________________________________________________________________________  
  
  
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