Mutt has a tempfile race condition leading to potential security issues in HTML message viewing.
`Date: Sun, 28 Feb 1999 09:28:43 +0100
From: Thomas Roessler <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: [mutt security] tempfile race in mutt
Parts/Attachments:
1.1 Shown ~39 lines Text
1.2 OK ~134 lines Text
2 475 bytes Application
----------------------------------------
An anonymous Debian developer forwarded the following message from
debian-private to me:
> Date: Sun, 28 Feb 1999 01:14:14 +1100
> From: Hamish Moffatt <[email protected]>
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: mutt viewing html
>
> On my hamm system, when viewing text/html messages, mutt writes the
> text to /tmp/mutt.html then calls lynx on that file.
>
> I found that if I made a symlink like
>
> /tmp/mutt.html -> /home/hamish/blah
>
> then viewing an HTML message, the file "blah" (which previously
> did not exist) contained 4k of nulls. Mutt also deleted the symlink
> afterwards.
The behaviour Hamish describes exhibits two different problems:
- The temporary file name generator we use when interpreting
nametemplates from the mailcap file was broken since it used
access(2) to check for the existance of a file. Obviously, this
doesn't detect dangling symlinks.
- There are some attachment-handling functions which don't avoid
race conditions by using our safe_fopen() function, but relied on
stock libc fopen(3) instead.
The attached patch against mutt 0.95.3 is supposed to fix these
problems. I plan to release mutt 0.95.4 tomorrow.
As a work-around, you can use a private $TMPDIR with mutt. (This
may be a good idea in general.)
tlr
--
http://home.pages.de/~roessler/
Index: attach.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/roessler/cvsroot/mutt/attach.c,v
retrieving revision 2.1.4.4
diff -u -u -r2.1.4.4 attach.c
--- attach.c 1999/02/10 22:02:02 2.1.4.4
+++ attach.c 1999/02/28 08:06:08
@@ -707,9 +707,11 @@
memset (&s, 0, sizeof (s));
if (flags == M_SAVE_APPEND)
- s.fpout = safe_fopen (path, "a");
- else
+ s.fpout = fopen (path, "a");
+ else if (flags == M_SAVE_OVERWRITE)
s.fpout = fopen (path, "w");
+ else
+ s.fpout = safe_fopen (path, "w");
if (s.fpout == NULL)
{
mutt_perror ("fopen");
@@ -771,9 +773,12 @@
s.flags = displaying ? M_DISPLAY : 0;
if (flags == M_SAVE_APPEND)
- s.fpout = safe_fopen (path, "a");
- else
+ s.fpout = fopen (path, "a");
+ else if (flags == M_SAVE_OVERWRITE)
s.fpout = fopen (path, "w");
+ else
+ s.fpout = safe_fopen (path, "w");
+
if (s.fpout == NULL)
{
perror ("fopen");
Index: lib.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/roessler/cvsroot/mutt/lib.c,v
retrieving revision 2.2.4.5
diff -u -u -r2.2.4.5 lib.c
--- lib.c 1999/02/10 22:02:04 2.2.4.5
+++ lib.c 1999/02/28 08:06:08
@@ -803,8 +803,10 @@
case 2: /* append */
*append = M_SAVE_APPEND;
+ break;
case 1: /* overwrite */
- ;
+ *append = M_SAVE_OVERWRITE;
+ break;
}
}
return 0;
Index: mutt.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/roessler/cvsroot/mutt/mutt.h,v
retrieving revision 2.1.4.6
diff -u -u -r2.1.4.6 mutt.h
--- mutt.h 1999/02/10 21:42:31 2.1.4.6
+++ mutt.h 1999/02/28 08:06:08
@@ -227,7 +227,8 @@
M_NEW_SOCKET,
/* Options for mutt_save_attachment */
- M_SAVE_APPEND
+ M_SAVE_APPEND,
+ M_SAVE_OVERWRITE
};
/* possible arguments to set_quadoption() */
Index: rfc1524.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/roessler/cvsroot/mutt/rfc1524.c,v
retrieving revision 2.0.4.4
diff -u -u -r2.0.4.4 rfc1524.c
--- rfc1524.c 1999/02/10 22:02:06 2.0.4.4
+++ rfc1524.c 1999/02/28 08:06:09
@@ -29,11 +29,14 @@
#include "mutt.h"
#include "rfc1524.h"
-#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
/* The command semantics include the following:
* %s is the filename that contains the mail body data
@@ -445,6 +448,7 @@
char tmp[_POSIX_PATH_MAX];
char *period;
size_t sl;
+ struct stat sb;
strfcpy (buf, NONULL (Tempdir), sizeof (buf));
mutt_expand_path (buf, sizeof (buf));
@@ -457,7 +461,7 @@
{
strfcpy (tmp, s, sizeof (tmp));
snprintf (s, l, "%s/%s", buf, tmp);
- if (access (s, F_OK) != 0)
+ if (lstat (s, &sb) == -1 && errno == ENOENT)
return;
if ((period = strrchr (tmp, '.')) != NULL)
*period = 0;
@@ -610,6 +614,11 @@
* This function returns 0 on successful move, 1 on old file doesn't exist,
* 2 on new file already exists, and 3 on other failure.
*/
+
+/* note on access(2) use: No dangling symlink problems here due to
+ * safe_fopen().
+ */
+
int mutt_rename_file (char *oldfile, char *newfile)
{
FILE *ofp, *nfp;
`
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