Reporter Travis Lee
Key Systems Electronic Key Lockers contain a command injection
vulnerability which may allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to
inject commands into the electronic key locker. Key Systems Electronic
Key Lockers also contains weak authentication which could allow an
attacker administrative access to the electronic key locker.
Key Systems Electronic Key Lockers run a management listener on
tcp/1010 which is used for communication between the electronic key
locker and the master authentication server. It is possible for an
attacker to send plaintext commands to tcp/1010 to have the electronic
key locker perform various functions such as unlock/lock the physical
device or change the device's configuration.
The Key Systems Electronic Key Locker also contains a web server which
is vulnerable to weak authentication. The authentication credentials
required to log into the web server are a username (default is
admin) and a 4 digit PIN number which can be easily brute-forced
using a HTTP GET request,
web interface allows for the user to unlock/lock the device and to
change the configuration.
An unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to the Key
Systems Electronic Key Locker can perform various functions such as
unlock/lock the physical device to gain physical access to the
contents of the locker, or change the device's configuration, or
brute-force web server management user accounts.
As a general good security practice, only allow connections from
trusted hosts and networks. Restricting access would prevent an
attacker from accessing a Key Systems Electronic Key Locker using
stolen credentials from a blocked network location.
NOTE: This was reported to CERT and was about to be published, but the
vendor stated that this is a non-standard, non-default configuration
so it was not published. The fact is that it can be configured and
used in this way and I think lots of clients probably do.