Rivettracker 1.03 SQL Injection

`# Exploit Title: Multiple SQL injections in rivettracker <=1.03  
# Date: 2/3/2012  
# Author: Ali Raheem  
# Software Link: http://www.rivetcode.com/software/rivettracker/  
# Version: <=1.03  
# Tested on: Linux guruplug-debian 3.1.7 #2 PREEMPT Tue Jan 3 20:19:54 MST 2012 armv5tel GNU/Linux  
# Greets: spyware, dividead  
  
RivetTracker is a php base torrent tracker. Though rivettracker is  
largely designed for a trusted user environment it does have 3 levels  
of access. Admin (add&delete torrents), uploader and unauthenticated  
(if $hiddentracker == false). However, vulnerable files such as  
torrent_functions.php can always be accessed by anyone since there is  
no $hiddentracker check (epic fail).  
  
Despite this high level of access few inputs are sanities and lines like this:  
$query = "SELECT filename FROM ".$prefix."namemap WHERE info_hash = '"  
. $_GET['hash'] . "'";  
  
Found in dltorrent.php (which can be accessed by any one if  
hiddentracker is false) is unforgivable.  
The only check performed is to insure $_GET['hash'] is 40 chars long.  
We can defeat this simply with padding with 0's if poison null bytes  
are not patched we can force the SQL query to return the filename of a  
file we want to view and download it.  
  
path_to_rivettracker/dltorrent.php?hash=00000' UNION ALL SELECT '../config.php\0  
  
With the PNB patch on php version >=5.3.4 (and backports) we still  
have arbitary SQL queries but no config.php. config.php contains  
passwords and usernames for admin, user and mysql database.  
Other files have unsanitised inputs such as torrent_functions.php,  
here we have no checks! Further more $hiddentracker isn't even  
checked! And anyone has access to this file and can run SQL commands  
via post.  
  
Here's my testbench for torrent_functions.php  
  
ali@Ali-PC:~$ cat test.htm  
<form action="http://127.0.0.1/rivettracker/torrent_functions.php"  
method="POST">  
<input type="test" name="hash" size="100"/>  
<input type="submit"/>  
</form>  
  
Depending on the privs of the database user you can raise all kinds of  
hell (shell creation and arbitrary code execution.)  
  
Enjoy.  
  
`