VOXTRONIC Voxlog Professional 3.7.2.729 SQL Injection / Disclosure

`SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20120220-0 >  
=======================================================================  
title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities  
product: VOXTRONIC voxlog professional - voice recording  
solution   
vulnerable version: VOXTRONIC voxlog professional <= 3.7.2.729  
(webclient version)  
fixed version: unknown  
impact: critical  
homepage: http://www.voxtronic.com  
found: 2010-08-24 && 2010-09-22  
by: J. Greil / SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab  
https://www.sec-consult.com  
=======================================================================  
  
Vendor description:  
-------------------  
"VOXTRONIC is a supplier and global leader in the field of digital  
speech and data recordings and their analysis, and as a developer is  
setting the standard for safety-relevant solutions for industry,  
commerce and local authorities."  
  
URL: http://www.voxtronic.com/en/Corporate-Overview  
  
  
Vulnerability overview/description:  
-----------------------------------  
Voxlog professional suffers from multiple critical vulnerabilities. The  
flaws have been confirmed at two independent installations. As only a  
very short test has been performed, many more flaws are to be expected:  
  
1) Unauthenticated file disclosure vulnerability  
The "get.php" functionality of the web interface of voxlog professional  
allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the operating system,  
such as config files or other sensitive voxlog files and voice  
recordings.  
  
A valid web interface user account is _not_ necessary to exploit this  
flaw!  
  
  
2) Unauthenticated SQL injection & command execution   
The web interface suffers from multiple SQL injection flaws, e.g. in  
"userlogdetail.php".  
As the voxlog professional installations use Microsoft SQL server with   
"sa" account, command execution through the "xp_cmdshell" stored  
procedure is possible.  
  
An attacker gains access to all stored sensitive voice recordings  
and is able to take over the whole OS with "SYSTEM" rights.  
  
A valid web interface user account is _not_ necessary to exploit this  
flaw!  
  
  
3) Weak default accounts for OS and web interface  
Two independent installations have been tested and the same standard   
user accounts were found.  
  
The operating system, where voxlog professional comes preinstalled,  
has three different accounts with very weak passwords, at least one  
of them with local administrative rights.  
  
The web interface has a default administrator account with a very weak  
password.  
  
An attacker gains access to all stored sensitive voice recordings  
through either that web interface or the OS accounts and is able  
to take over the whole OS with admin rights.  
  
  
Proof of concept:  
-----------------  
1) File disclosure, retrieve C:\boot.ini  
http://$host/voxlog/GET.PHP?v=ZmlsZT1DOi9ib290LmluaQ==  
  
Voxlog also uses a "session" and "user" parameter (besides the "file"  
parameter) base64-encoded within the "v" parameter for "GET.PHP",  
but those values are not checked and can be removed for exploitation.  
  
  
2) SQL injection  
http://$host/voxlog/sysstat/userlogdetail.php?load=1&idclient[1]=xxx);  
waitfor delay '0:0:5' --+  
http://$host/voxlog/sysstat/userlogdetail.php?load=1&idclient[1]=xxx);  
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'xxxxx' --+  
  
  
3) Default user accounts, usernames:  
OS: voxctadmin, voxctsystem, voxctuser  
Web interface: admin, user  
  
  
Vulnerable / tested versions:  
-----------------------------  
voxlog professional v3.7.2.729 (version of webclient)  
voxlog professional v3.7.0.633 (version of webclient)  
  
It is assumed that older or also newer versions are affected. Further  
version numbers couldn't be verified.  
  
  
Vendor contact timeline:  
------------------------  
2011-02-03: Contacting vendor through [email protected], asking for  
security contact, attaching responsible disclosure policy  
2011-02-11: Sent another email as no one replied. Proposing public   
disclosure date  
2011-02-12: Vendor replied  
2011-02-14: Sending security advisory to given contact  
2011-02-15: Vendor reply: checking vulnerabilities in latest version  
2011-03-18: Meeting  
2011-04-21: Contacting via telephone again  
2012-02-20: Release of advisory as vendor is not responsive  
  
  
Solution:  
---------  
Customers of Voxlog should contact the vendor regarding security  
patches as they are not publicly available.  
  
  
Workaround:  
-----------  
Restrict access to the whole server as much as possible. Only allow  
trusted IP addresses and users in order to minimise attack surface.  
  
Change the default accounts immediately and implement a strict  
password policy.  
  
  
Advisory URL:  
-------------  
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/advisories.html  
  
  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
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Office Vienna  
Mooslackengasse 17  
A-1190 Vienna  
Austria  
  
Tel.: +43 / 1 / 890 30 43 - 0  
Fax.: +43 / 1 / 890 30 43 - 25  
Mail: research at sec-consult dot com  
www.sec-consult.com  
  
EOF J. Greil / @2012  
`