ECHO-FBDF-61C2-28F4 CVE-2016-1000027 is published against `org.springframework:spring-web` and targets the Java-deserialization HTTP-Invoker family — specifically `org.springframework.remoting.httpinvoker.HttpInvokerServiceExporter` and its `RemoteInvocationSerializingExporter` base, which call `ObjectInputStream.readObject()` directly on incoming HTTP-Invoker payloads. Spring's stated remediation is feature removal: the exporters were deprecated in v5.3.0 and deleted entirely in v6.0.0. The 6.1.x `spring-web` JAR this spec re-publishes therefore ships zero `HttpInvoker*` classes — verifiable with `unzip -l spring-web-6.1.21-echo.1.jar | grep -i HttpInvoker`, which returns nothing. Pinning a customer's classpath to `spring-web-6.1.21-echo.1` carries the vulnerable code's removal forward. Upstream Spring closed the underlying report against the framework as `status: invalid` (issue #24434): HTTP-Invoker is opt-in native Java serialization by design and was never intended to be exposed to untrusted clients. Customers still on the 5.3.x line need to either configure an `ObjectInputFilter` on the exporter or stop exposing the endpoint; the 6.0.0+ class removal — which the 6.1.x line this spec ships is past — covers everyone else. Spec-dir note: this entry lives under `packages/specs/java/spring-context/` because spring-context is the multi-module umbrella owner — its echobuild.yaml runs `./gradlew assemble` at the spring-framework repo root and produces the `spring-web-6.1.21-echo.1.jar` sibling output that this `not_applicable` statement scopes to. The `name:` above is what determines the OpenVEX product PURL, not the directory name (same pattern as `junrar-0.7/security.yaml` → `name: com.github.junrar:junrar`).