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osvGoogleOSV:GHSA-P52G-CM5J-MJV4
HistoryFeb 08, 2023 - 10:31 p.m.

openssl-src subject to Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption

2023-02-0822:31:42
Google
osv.dev
32

0.002 Low

EPSS

Percentile

52.0%

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.

For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.