CVSS3
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
HIGH
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
CHANGED
Confidentiality Impact
NONE
Integrity Impact
HIGH
Availability Impact
HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
AI Score
Confidence
High
EPSS
Percentile
91.0%
According to the versions of the docker-engine packages installed, the EulerOS installation on the remote host is affected by the following vulnerabilities :
A maliciously crafted HTTP/2 stream could cause excessive CPU consumption in the HPACK decoder, sufficient to cause a denial of service from a small number of small requests. (CVE-2022-41723)
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd
), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as Docker. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet’s VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime’s 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or ensure that the xt_u32
kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. (CVE-2023-28840)
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd
), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd
and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay
network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32
iptables extension provided by the xt_u32
kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet’s VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, overlay
networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime’s 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the xt_u32
kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
(CVE-2023-28841)
Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd
), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd
and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay
network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32
iptables extension provided by the xt_u32
kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet’s VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The overlay
driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime’s 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi- node clusters, deploy a global pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in host
mode instead of ingress
mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the ingress
network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
(CVE-2023-28842)
A malicious HTTP/2 client which rapidly creates requests and immediately resets them can cause excessive server resource consumption. While the total number of requests is bounded by the http2.Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting, resetting an in-progress request allows the attacker to create a new request while the existing one is still executing. With the fix applied, HTTP/2 servers now bound the number of simultaneously executing handler goroutines to the stream concurrency limit (MaxConcurrentStreams). New requests arriving when at the limit (which can only happen after the client has reset an existing, in-flight request) will be queued until a handler exits. If the request queue grows too large, the server will terminate the connection. This issue is also fixed in golang.org/x/net/http2 for users manually configuring HTTP/2. The default stream concurrency limit is 250 streams (requests) per HTTP/2 connection. This value may be adjusted using the golang.org/x/net/http2 package; see the Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting and the ConfigureServer function. (CVE-2023-39325)
Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. The classic builder cache system is prone to cache poisoning if the image is built FROM scratch. Also, changes to some instructions (most important being HEALTHCHECK and ONBUILD) would not cause a cache miss. An attacker with the knowledge of the Dockerfile someone is using could poison their cache by making them pull a specially crafted image that would be considered as a valid cache candidate for some build steps. 23.0+ users are only affected if they explicitly opted out of Buildkit (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0 environment variable) or are using the /build API endpoint. All users on versions older than 23.0 could be impacted. Image build API endpoint (/build) and ImageBuild function from github.com/docker/docker/client is also affected as it the uses classic builder by default. Patches are included in 24.0.9 and 25.0.2 releases. (CVE-2024-24557)
Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the EulerOS security advisory. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional issues.
#%NASL_MIN_LEVEL 80900
##
# (C) Tenable, Inc.
##
include('compat.inc');
if (description)
{
script_id(195270);
script_version("1.0");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_modification_date", value:"2024/05/09");
script_cve_id(
"CVE-2022-41723",
"CVE-2023-28840",
"CVE-2023-28841",
"CVE-2023-28842",
"CVE-2023-39325",
"CVE-2024-24557"
);
script_name(english:"EulerOS 2.0 SP10 : docker-engine (EulerOS-SA-2024-1563)");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"synopsis", value:
"The remote EulerOS host is missing multiple security updates.");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"description", value:
"According to the versions of the docker-engine packages installed, the EulerOS installation on the remote host is
affected by the following vulnerabilities :
- A maliciously crafted HTTP/2 stream could cause excessive CPU consumption in the HPACK decoder, sufficient
to cause a denial of service from a small number of small requests. (CVE-2022-41723)
- Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,
Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component
(`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is
compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a
simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and
supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated
virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is
an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag
the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the
overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful
when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by
encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in
Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional
properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and
confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby
installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These
rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a
VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without
interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter
incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted
datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been
previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby
sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should
have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A
sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container's outbound
gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond
simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases
23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of
that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default,
UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or
ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. (CVE-2023-28840)
- Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,
Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component
(`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is
compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a
simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and
supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated
virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is
an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag
the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating
overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted
mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec
Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted
overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data
integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an
encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both
incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`
kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced
on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An
iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay
network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit
unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as
expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for
an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is
moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because
many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may
use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is
no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container
Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some
workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the
Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet,
and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
(CVE-2023-28841)
- Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,
Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component
(`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is
compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a
simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and
supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated
virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is
an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag
the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating
overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted
mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec
Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted
overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data
integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an
encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both
incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`
kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced
on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The
`overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each
node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for
destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay
networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to
communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the
VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into
the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be
quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available
in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered
differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-
node clusters, deploy a global pause' container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a
single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same
connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented
using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode
(allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay
networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
(CVE-2023-28842)
- A malicious HTTP/2 client which rapidly creates requests and immediately resets them can cause excessive
server resource consumption. While the total number of requests is bounded by the
http2.Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting, resetting an in-progress request allows the attacker to create
a new request while the existing one is still executing. With the fix applied, HTTP/2 servers now bound
the number of simultaneously executing handler goroutines to the stream concurrency limit
(MaxConcurrentStreams). New requests arriving when at the limit (which can only happen after the client
has reset an existing, in-flight request) will be queued until a handler exits. If the request queue grows
too large, the server will terminate the connection. This issue is also fixed in golang.org/x/net/http2
for users manually configuring HTTP/2. The default stream concurrency limit is 250 streams (requests) per
HTTP/2 connection. This value may be adjusted using the golang.org/x/net/http2 package; see the
Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting and the ConfigureServer function. (CVE-2023-39325)
- Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. The classic builder
cache system is prone to cache poisoning if the image is built FROM scratch. Also, changes to some
instructions (most important being HEALTHCHECK and ONBUILD) would not cause a cache miss. An attacker with
the knowledge of the Dockerfile someone is using could poison their cache by making them pull a specially
crafted image that would be considered as a valid cache candidate for some build steps. 23.0+ users are
only affected if they explicitly opted out of Buildkit (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0 environment variable) or are
using the /build API endpoint. All users on versions older than 23.0 could be impacted. Image build API
endpoint (/build) and ImageBuild function from github.com/docker/docker/client is also affected as it the
uses classic builder by default. Patches are included in 24.0.9 and 25.0.2 releases. (CVE-2024-24557)
Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the EulerOS security
advisory. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional
issues.");
# https://developer.huaweicloud.com/ict/en/site-euleros/euleros/security-advisories/EulerOS-SA-2024-1563
script_set_attribute(attribute:"see_also", value:"http://www.nessus.org/u?439b40e2");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"solution", value:
"Update the affected docker-engine packages.");
script_set_cvss_base_vector("CVSS2#AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C");
script_set_cvss_temporal_vector("CVSS2#E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C");
script_set_cvss3_base_vector("CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H");
script_set_cvss3_temporal_vector("CVSS:3.0/E:P/RL:O/RC:C");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"cvss_score_source", value:"CVE-2024-24557");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"cvss3_score_source", value:"CVE-2023-28840");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"exploitability_ease", value:"Exploits are available");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"exploit_available", value:"true");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"vuln_publication_date", value:"2023/02/15");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"patch_publication_date", value:"2024/05/09");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_publication_date", value:"2024/05/09");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"plugin_type", value:"local");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"cpe", value:"p-cpe:/a:huawei:euleros:docker-engine");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"cpe", value:"p-cpe:/a:huawei:euleros:docker-engine-selinux");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"cpe", value:"cpe:/o:huawei:euleros:2.0");
script_set_attribute(attribute:"generated_plugin", value:"current");
script_end_attributes();
script_category(ACT_GATHER_INFO);
script_family(english:"Huawei Local Security Checks");
script_copyright(english:"This script is Copyright (C) 2024 and is owned by Tenable, Inc. or an Affiliate thereof.");
script_dependencies("ssh_get_info.nasl");
script_require_keys("Host/local_checks_enabled", "Host/cpu", "Host/EulerOS/release", "Host/EulerOS/rpm-list", "Host/EulerOS/sp");
script_exclude_keys("Host/EulerOS/uvp_version");
exit(0);
}
include("rpm.inc");
if (!get_kb_item("Host/local_checks_enabled")) audit(AUDIT_LOCAL_CHECKS_NOT_ENABLED);
var _release = get_kb_item("Host/EulerOS/release");
if (isnull(_release) || _release !~ "^EulerOS") audit(AUDIT_OS_NOT, "EulerOS");
var uvp = get_kb_item("Host/EulerOS/uvp_version");
if (_release !~ "^EulerOS release 2\.0(\D|$)") audit(AUDIT_OS_NOT, "EulerOS 2.0 SP10");
var sp = get_kb_item("Host/EulerOS/sp");
if (isnull(sp) || sp !~ "^(10)$") audit(AUDIT_OS_NOT, "EulerOS 2.0 SP10");
if (!empty_or_null(uvp)) audit(AUDIT_OS_NOT, "EulerOS 2.0 SP10", "EulerOS UVP " + uvp);
if (!get_kb_item("Host/EulerOS/rpm-list")) audit(AUDIT_PACKAGE_LIST_MISSING);
var cpu = get_kb_item("Host/cpu");
if (isnull(cpu)) audit(AUDIT_UNKNOWN_ARCH);
if ("x86_64" >!< cpu && cpu !~ "^i[3-6]86$" && "aarch64" >!< cpu && "x86" >!< cpu) audit(AUDIT_LOCAL_CHECKS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "EulerOS", cpu);
if ("aarch64" >!< cpu) audit(AUDIT_ARCH_NOT, "aarch64", cpu);
var flag = 0;
var pkgs = [
"docker-engine-18.09.0-200.h82.40.30.eulerosv2r10",
"docker-engine-selinux-18.09.0-200.h82.40.30.eulerosv2r10"
];
foreach (var pkg in pkgs)
if (rpm_check(release:"EulerOS-2.0", sp:"10", reference:pkg)) flag++;
if (flag)
{
security_report_v4(
port : 0,
severity : SECURITY_HOLE,
extra : rpm_report_get()
);
exit(0);
}
else
{
var tested = pkg_tests_get();
if (tested) audit(AUDIT_PACKAGE_NOT_AFFECTED, tested);
else audit(AUDIT_PACKAGE_NOT_INSTALLED, "docker-engine");
}
cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-41723
cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-28840
cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-28841
cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-28842
cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-39325
cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-24557
www.nessus.org/u?439b40e2
CVSS3
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
HIGH
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
CHANGED
Confidentiality Impact
NONE
Integrity Impact
HIGH
Availability Impact
HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
AI Score
Confidence
High
EPSS
Percentile
91.0%