Our analysis of a recent version of a previously reported info-stealing Android malware, delivered through an ongoing SMS campaign, demonstrates the continuous evolution of mobile threats. Masquerading as a banking rewards app, this new version has additional remote access trojan (RAT) capabilities, is more obfuscated, and is currently being used to target customers of Indian banks. The SMS campaign sends out messages containing a link that points to the info-stealing Android malware. The malwareās RAT capabilities allow the attacker to intercept important device notifications such as incoming messages, an apparent effort to catch two-factor authentication (2FA) messages often used by banking and financial institutions. The malwareās ability to steal all SMS messages is also concerning since the data stolen can be used to further steal usersā sensitive info like 2FA messages for email accounts and other personally identifiable information (PII).
Figure 1. Typical SMS campaign attack flow
Our investigation of this new Android malware version started from our receipt of an SMS message containing a malicious link that led us to the download of a fake banking rewards app. The fake app, detected as TrojanSpy:AndroidOS/Banker.O, used a different bank name and logo compared to a similar malware reported in 2021. Moreover, we found that this fake appās command and control (C2) server is related to 75 other malicious APKs based on open-source intelligence. Some of the malicious APKs also use the same Indian bankās logo as the fake app that we investigated, which could indicate that the actors are continuously generating new versions to keep the campaign going.
This blog details our analysis of the recent versionās capabilities. We strongly advise users never to click on unknown links received in SMS messages, emails, or messaging apps. We also recommend seeking your bankās support or advice on digital options for your bank. Further, ensure that your banking apps are downloaded from official app stores to avoid installing malware.
We have seen other campaigns targeting Indian banksā customers based on the following app names:
Our investigation focused on icici_rewards.apk (package name: com.example.test_app), which presents itself as ICICI Rewards. The SMS campaign sends out messages containing a malicious link that leads to installing a malicious APK on a targetās mobile device. To lure users into accessing the link, the SMS claims that the user is being notified to claim a reward from a known Indian bank.
Figure 2. The text message with a malicious link sent to users
Upon user interaction, it displays a splash screen with the bank logo and proceeds to ask the user to enable specific permissions for the app.
Figures 3 and 4. App installed on the Android device. The app asks users to enable permissions on text messaging and contacts, to name a few
The fake app asks for credit card information upon being granted all permissions. This should raise usersā suspicions on the appās motive as apps typically ask for sensitive information only through user-driven transactions like paying for purchases.
The app displays another fake screen with further instructions to add to its legitimacy once users supply the information needed.
Figures 5 and 6. A fake page where the app asks users to provide information, and the resulting message once data is added
Analyzing the XML file AndroidManifest further identifies the entry points of the malware along with the permissions requested. It also defines services that can run in the background without user interaction. The app uses the following permissions:
The malware uses MainActivity, AutoStartService, and RestartBroadCastReceiverAndroid functions to carry out most of its routines. These three functions interact to ensure all the malwareās routines are up and running and allow the app to remain persistent on the mobile device.
MainActivity, also called the launcher activity, is defined under _com.example.test_app.MainActivity. _It is launched first after installation to display the fake appās ICICI splash screen. This launcher activity then calls OnCreate() method to check the deviceās internet connectivity and record the timestamp of the malwareās installation, and Permission_Activity to launch permission requests. Once the permissions are granted, Permission_Activity further calls _AutoStartService _and login_kotak.
_Figure 7. Actions under MainActivity _
The class login_kotak is responsible for stealing the userās card information. It shows the fake credit card input page (Figure 5) and temporarily stores the information in the device while waiting for commands from the attacker.
Figure 8. login_kotak class steals card information and other personally identifiable information (PII)
_AutoStartService, _themain handler of the malware, functions based on the commands it receives. The handler provides the malware with the following capabilities:
This malwareās new version adds several RAT capabilities that expands its information stealing. It enables the malware to add call log uploading, SMS message and calls interception, and card blocking checks.
Figure 9. Code comparison of 2021 (left) and 2022 (right) samples
These commands are described below.
Command Name | Description |
---|---|
all_sms_received | Flags to enable/disable SMS upload |
all_call_received | Flags to enable/disable call log upload |
silent | Put the mobile device on silent |
block | Checks if the userās card is blocked |
sms_filter | Filters SMS based on strings (defaults to āICICIā) |
online | Checks if the user has an active internet connection |
force_online | Uploads received SMS messages to the C2 server |
is_online | Checks if the device is connected to the C2 server |
force_calls | Uploads call logs to the C2 server |
The _silent _command, which the malware uses to keep the remote attackerās SMS sending activities undetected, stands out from the list of commands. Many banking apps require two-factor authentication (2FA), often sent through SMS messages. This malware enabling an infected deviceās silent mode allows attackers to catch 2FA messages undetected, further facilitating information theft.
Figure 10. This code is responsible for turning the mobile deviceās silent mode on
In addition to encrypting all data it sends to the attacker, the malware also encrypts the SMS commands it receives from the attacker. The malware decrypts the commands through its decryption and decoding modules. The malware uses a combination of Base64 encoding/decoding and AES encryption/decryption methods.
Figure 11. The malwareās encoding and decoding modules, as seen in its code
The malware steals all SMS messages from the mobile deviceās inbox. It collects all received, sent, read, and even unread messages. Collecting all SMS messages might allow attackers to use the data to expand their stealing range, especially if any messages contain other sensitive information such as SMS-based 2FA for email accounts, oneās personal identification like the Aadhar card commonly used in India, or other financial-related information.
Figure 12. Code used to steal all SMS messages
The malware also uploads call logs stored on the mobile device. This data may be used for the attackerās surveillance purposes.
Figure 13. The malware code for stealing call logs
This malware uses the open-source library socket.io to communicate with its C2 server.
Figure 14. Code showing the malwareās C2 server connection
The malware also uses the Android component _RestartBroadcastReceive_r, which functions based on the type of events received by the mobile device. This receiver launches a job scheduler named JobService, which eventually calls AutoStartService in the background. The receiver reacts when the device is restarted, if the device is connected to or disconnected from charging, when the deviceās battery status changes, and changes in the deviceās Wi-Fi state. RestartBroadcastReceiver ensures that the main command handler AutoStartService is always up and running.
Figure 15. How the Receiver starts AutoStartService
This malwareās continuing evolution highlights the need to protect mobile devices. Its wider SMS stealing capabilities might allow attackers to the stolen data to further steal from a userās other banking apps. Its ability to intercept one-time passwords (OTPs) sent over SMS thwarts the protections provided by banksā two-factor authentication mechanisms, which users and institutions rely on to keep their transactions safe. Its use of various banking and financial organizationsā logos could also attract more targets in the future.
App installation on Android is relatively easy due to the operating systemās open nature. However, this openness is often abused by attackers for their gain. Apart from exercising utmost care when clicking on links in messages and installing apps, we recommend that users follow these steps to protect their devices from fake apps and malware:
Indicator**** | Type**** | Description**** |
---|---|---|
734048bfa55f48a05326dc01295617d932954c02527b8cb0c446234e1a2ac0f7 | SHA-256 | icici_rewards.apk |
da4e28acdadfa2924ae0001d9cfbec8c8cc8fd2480236b0da6e9bc7509c921bd | SHA-256 | icici_rewards.apk |
65d5dea69a514bfc17cba435eccfc3028ff64923fbc825ff8411ed69b9137070 | SHA-256 | icici_rewards.apk |
3efd7a760a17366693a987548e799b29a3a4bdd42bfc8aa0ff45ac560a67e963 | SHA-256 | icici_rewards.apk (first reported by MalwareHunterTeam) |
hxxps://server4554ic[.]herokuapp[.]com/ | URL | C2 server |
Execution**** | Persistence**** | Defense Evasion**** | Credential Access**** | Collection**** | Command & Control**** | Exfiltration**** | Impact**** |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[T1603 Scheduled | |||||||
Task/Job](<http://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1603>) | T1624 Event Triggered Execution | T1406 Obfuscated files/information | T1417 Input capture | T1417 Input capture | T1437 Application Layer Protocol | T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | T1582 SMS Control |
T1603 Scheduled Task/Job | T1636 Protected User Data | T1521 Encrypted Channel |
Shivang Desai,Abhishek Pustakala, andHarshita Tripathi
Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team
The post Rewards plus: Fake mobile banking rewards apps lure users to install info-stealing RAT on Android devices appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.