Misconfigured Certificate Template Finder
🗓️ 07 Nov 2022 19:50:50Reported by Grant Willcox, Spencer McIntyre, jheysel-r7Type
metasploit🔗 www.rapid7.com👁 1004 Views
require 'winrm'
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary
include Msf::Auxiliary::Report
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::LDAP
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::LDAP::ActiveDirectory
include Msf::OptionalSession::LDAP
include Rex::Proto::MsDnsp
include Rex::Proto::Secauthz
include Rex::Proto::LDAP
include Rex::Proto::CryptoAsn1
include Rex::Proto::MsCrtd
class LdapWhoamiError < StandardError; end
ADS_GROUP_TYPE_BUILTIN_LOCAL_GROUP = 0x00000001
ADS_GROUP_TYPE_GLOBAL_GROUP = 0x00000002
ADS_GROUP_TYPE_DOMAIN_LOCAL_GROUP = 0x00000004
ADS_GROUP_TYPE_SECURITY_ENABLED = 0x80000000
ADS_GROUP_TYPE_UNIVERSAL_GROUP = 0x00000008
# https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/security-assessment-edit-vulnerable-ca-setting
EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 = 0x00040000
REFERENCES = {
'ESC1' => [ SiteReference.new('URL', 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2') ],
'ESC2' => [ SiteReference.new('URL', 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2') ],
'ESC3' => [ SiteReference.new('URL', 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2') ],
'ESC4' => [ SiteReference.new('URL', 'https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2') ],
'ESC9' => [ SiteReference.new('URL', 'https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-4-0-esc9-esc10-bloodhound-gui-new-authentication-and-request-methods-and-more-7237d88061f7') ],
'ESC10' => [ SiteReference.new('URL', 'https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-4-0-esc9-esc10-bloodhound-gui-new-authentication-and-request-methods-and-more-7237d88061f7') ],
'ESC13' => [ SiteReference.new('URL', 'https://posts.specterops.io/adcs-esc13-abuse-technique-fda4272fbd53') ],
'ESC15' => [ SiteReference.new('URL', 'https://trustedsec.com/blog/ekuwu-not-just-another-ad-cs-esc') ],
'ESC16' => [ SiteReference.new('URL', 'https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/wiki/06-%E2%80%90-Privilege-Escalation') ]
}.freeze
SID = Struct.new(:value, :name) do
def ==(other)
value == other.value
end
def to_s
name.present? ? "#{value} (#{name})" : value.to_s
end
def rid
value.split('-').last.to_i
end
end
attr_reader :certificate_details
def initialize(info = {})
super(
update_info(
info,
'Name' => 'Misconfigured Certificate Template Finder',
'Description' => %q{
This module allows users to query a LDAP server for vulnerable certificate
templates and will print these certificates out in a table along with which
attack they are vulnerable to and the SIDs that can be used to enroll in that
certificate template.
Additionally the module will also print out a list of known certificate servers
along with info about which vulnerable certificate templates the certificate server
allows enrollment in and which SIDs are authorized to use that certificate server to
perform this enrollment operation.
Currently the module is capable of checking for certificates that are vulnerable to ESC1, ESC2, ESC3, ESC4,
ESC13, and ESC15. The module is limited to checking for these techniques due to them being identifiable
remotely from a normal user account by analyzing the objects in LDAP.
The module can also check for ESC9, ESC10 and ESC16 but this requires an Administrative WinRM session to be
established to definitively check for these techniques.
},
'Author' => [
'Grant Willcox', # Original module author
'Spencer McIntyre', # ESC13 and ESC15 updates
'jheysel-r7' # ESC4, ESC9 and ESC10 update
],
'References' => (REFERENCES.values.flatten.map { |r| [ r.ctx_id, r.ctx_val ] }.uniq + [
['ATT&CK', Mitre::Attack::Technique::T1649_STEAL_OR_FORGE_AUTHENTICATION_CERTIFICATES]
]).uniq,
'DisclosureDate' => '2021-06-17',
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'DefaultOptions' => {
'SSL' => false
},
'Notes' => {
'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],
'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS],
'Reliability' => [],
'AKA' => [ 'Certifry', 'Certipy' ]
}
)
)
register_options([
OptString.new('BASE_DN', [false, 'LDAP base DN if you already have it']),
OptEnum.new('REPORT', [true, 'What templates to report (applies filtering to results)', 'vulnerable-and-published', %w[all published enrollable vulnerable vulnerable-and-published vulnerable-and-enrollable]]),
OptBool.new('RUN_REGISTRY_CHECKS', [true, 'Authenticate to WinRM to query the registry values to enhance reporting for ESC9, ESC10 and ESC16. Must be a privileged user in order to query successfully', false]),
OptInt.new('WINRM_TIMEOUT', [false, 'The WinRM timeout when running registry checks', 20], conditions: %w[RUN_REGISTRY_CHECKS == true]),
])
end
# TODO: Spencer to check all of these are still used and shouldn't be moved
# Constants Definition
CERTIFICATE_ATTRIBUTES = %w[cn name description nTSecurityDescriptor msPKI-Certificate-Policy msPKI-Enrollment-Flag msPKI-RA-Signature msPKI-Template-Schema-Version pkiExtendedKeyUsage msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag]
CERTIFICATE_TEMPLATES_BASE = 'CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration'.freeze
CONTROL_ACCESS = 0x00000100
# This returns a list of SIDs that have the CERTIFICATE_ENROLLMENT_EXTENDED_RIGHT or CERTIFICATE_AUTOENROLLMENT_EXTENDED_RIGHT for the given ACL
def enum_acl_aces(acl)
acl.aces.each do |ace|
if ace[:body][:access_mask].blank?
fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Encountered a DACL/SACL object without an access mask! Either data is an unrecognized type or we are reading it wrong!')
end
ace_type_name = Rex::Proto::MsDtyp::MsDtypAceType.name(ace[:header][:ace_type])
if ace_type_name.blank?
print_error("Skipping unexpected ACE of type #{ace[:header][:ace_type]}. Either the data was read incorrectly or we currently don't support this type.")
next
end
if ace[:header][:ace_flags][:inherit_only_ace] == 1
# ACE only affects those that inherit from it, not those that it is attached to. Ignoring this ACE, as its not relevant.
next
end
yield ace_type_name, ace
end
end
def get_sids_for_enroll(acl)
allowed_sids = []
enum_acl_aces(acl) do |_ace_type_name, ace|
matcher = SecurityDescriptorMatcher::MultipleAny.new([
SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.certificate_enrollment,
SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.certificate_autoenrollment
])
next if matcher.ignore_ace?(ace)
matcher.apply_ace!(ace)
next unless matcher.matches?
allowed_sids << ace[:body][:sid]
end
map_sids_to_names(allowed_sids)
end
# This will return a list of SIDs that can edit the template from which the ACL is derived
# The method checks the WriteOwner, WriteDacl and GenericWrite bits of the access_mask to see if the user or group has write permissions over the Certificate
def get_sids_for_write(acl)
allowed_sids = []
enum_acl_aces(acl) do |_ace_type_name, ace|
matcher = SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.any(%i[WO WD GW])
next if matcher.ignore_ace?(ace)
matcher.apply_ace!(ace)
next unless matcher.matches?
allowed_sids << ace[:body][:sid]
end
map_sids_to_names(allowed_sids)
end
def query_ldap_server(raw_filter, attributes, base_prefix: nil)
if base_prefix.blank?
full_base_dn = @base_dn.to_s
else
full_base_dn = "#{base_prefix},#{@base_dn}"
end
begin
filter = Net::LDAP::Filter.construct(raw_filter)
rescue StandardError => e
fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, "Could not compile the filter! Error was #{e}")
end
returned_entries = @ldap.search(base: full_base_dn, filter: filter, attributes: attributes, controls: [adds_build_ldap_sd_control])
query_result_table = @ldap.get_operation_result.table
validate_query_result!(query_result_table, filter)
returned_entries
end
def query_ldap_server_certificates(esc_raw_filter, esc_id, notes: [])
esc_entries = query_ldap_server(esc_raw_filter, CERTIFICATE_ATTRIBUTES, base_prefix: CERTIFICATE_TEMPLATES_BASE)
if esc_entries.empty?
print_warning("Couldn't find any vulnerable #{esc_id} templates!")
return
end
# Grab a list of certificates that contain vulnerable settings.
# Also print out the list of SIDs that can enroll in that server.
esc_entries.each do |entry|
certificate_symbol = entry[:cn][0].to_sym
certificate_details = @certificate_details[certificate_symbol]
certificate_details[:techniques] << esc_id
certificate_details[:notes] += notes
end
end
def map_sids_to_names(sids_array)
mapped = []
sids_array.each do |sid|
# these common SIDs don't always have an entry
case sid
when Rex::Proto::Secauthz::WellKnownSids::SECURITY_AUTHENTICATED_USER_SID
mapped << SID.new(sid, 'Authenticated Users')
next
when Rex::Proto::Secauthz::WellKnownSids::SECURITY_ENTERPRISE_CONTROLLERS_SID
mapped << SID.new(sid, 'Enterprise Domain Controllers')
next
when Rex::Proto::Secauthz::WellKnownSids::SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_SID
mapped << SID.new(sid, 'Local System')
next
end
sid_entry = get_object_by_sid(sid)
if sid_entry.nil?
print_warning("Could not find any details on the LDAP server for SID #{sid}!")
mapped << SID.new(sid, name)
elsif sid_entry[:samaccountname].present?
mapped << SID.new(sid, sid_entry[:samaccountname].first.to_s)
elsif sid_entry[:name].present?
mapped << SID.new(sid, sid_entry[:name].first.to_s)
end
end
mapped
end
def find_esc1_vuln_cert_templates
esc1_raw_filter = '(&'\
'(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)'\
'(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))'\
'(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))'\
'(|'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2)'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4)'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)'\
'(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))'\
')'\
'(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=1)'\
')'
notes = [
'ESC1: Request can specify a subjectAltName (msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag) and EKUs permit authentication'
]
query_ldap_server_certificates(esc1_raw_filter, 'ESC1', notes: notes)
end
def find_esc2_vuln_cert_templates
esc2_raw_filter = '(&'\
'(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)'\
'(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))'\
'(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))'\
'(|'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)'\
'(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))'\
')'\
')'
notes = [
'ESC2: Template defines the Any Purpose OID or no EKUs (PkiExtendedKeyUsage)'
]
query_ldap_server_certificates(esc2_raw_filter, 'ESC2', notes: notes)
end
def find_esc3_vuln_cert_templates
# Find the first vulnerable types of ESC3 templates, those that have the OID of the
# Certificate Request Agent which allows the template to be used for
# requesting other certificate templates on behalf of other principals.
esc3_template_1_raw_filter = '(&'\
'(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)'\
'(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))'\
'(|'\
'(mspki-ra-signature=0)'\
'(!(mspki-ra-signature=*))'\
')'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1)'\
')'
notes = [
'ESC3: Template defines the Certificate Request Agent OID (PkiExtendedKeyUsage)'
]
query_ldap_server_certificates(esc3_template_1_raw_filter, 'ESC3', notes: notes)
# Find the second vulnerable types of ESC3 templates, those that
# have the right template schema version and, for those with a template
# version of 2 or greater, have an Application Policy Insurance Requirement
# requiring the Certificate Request Agent EKU.
#
# Additionally, the certificate template must also allow for domain authentication
# and the CA must not have any enrollment agent restrictions.
esc3_template_2_raw_filter = '(&'\
'(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)'\
'(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))'\
'(|'\
'(mspki-template-schema-version=1)'\
'(&'\
'(mspki-template-schema-version>=2)'\
'(msPKI-RA-Application-Policies=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1)'\
')'\
')'\
'(|'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2)'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4)'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)'\
'(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))'\
')'\
')'
query_ldap_server_certificates(esc3_template_2_raw_filter, 'ESC3_TEMPLATE_2')
end
def find_esc4_vuln_cert_templates
esc_raw_filter = '(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)'
attributes = ['cn', 'description', 'ntSecurityDescriptor']
esc_entries = query_ldap_server(esc_raw_filter, attributes, base_prefix: CERTIFICATE_TEMPLATES_BASE)
return if esc_entries.empty?
current_user = adds_get_current_user(@ldap)[:samaccountname].first
esc_entries.each do |entry|
certificate_symbol = entry[:cn][0].to_sym
if adds_obj_grants_permissions?(@ldap, entry, SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.any(%i[WP]))
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:techniques] << 'ESC4'
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:notes] << "ESC4: The account: #{current_user} has edit permissions over the template #{certificate_symbol}."
end
end
end
def parse_registry_output(output, property_name)
return nil if output.stderr.present?
stdout = output.stdout if output.stdout.present?
return nil unless stdout
line_with_property = stdout.lines.find { |line| line.strip.match(/^#{Regexp.escape(property_name)}\s*:/) }
return nil unless line_with_property
line_with_property.split(':', 2).last&.strip
end
def run_registry_command(shell, path, property_name, dynamic_value = nil)
full_path = dynamic_value ? "#{path}\\#{dynamic_value}" : path
command = "Get-ItemProperty -Path '#{full_path}' -Name #{property_name}"
output = shell.run(command)
value = parse_registry_output(output, property_name)
if value.nil?
print_error("Registry property '#{property_name}' not found at path '#{full_path}'.")
end
value
end
def create_winrm_connection(host, domain, user, timeout)
endpoint = "http://#{host}:5985/wsman"
WinRM::Connection.new(
endpoint: endpoint,
domain: domain,
user: user,
password: datastore['LDAPPassword'],
transport: :negotiate,
operation_timeout: timeout
)
end
def query_ca_policy_values(shell)
active_policy_name = run_registry_command(shell, 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\CertSvc\\Configuration\\*\\PolicyModules', 'Active')
disable_ext = run_registry_command(shell, 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\CertSvc\\Configuration\\*\\PolicyModules', 'DisableExtensionList', active_policy_name)
edit_flags = run_registry_command(shell, 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\CertSvc\\Configuration\\*\\PolicyModules', 'EditFlags', active_policy_name).to_i
{ disable_extension_list: disable_ext, edit_flags: edit_flags }
end
def query_dc_reg_values(ca_name, ca_ip_address, domain, user)
conn = create_winrm_connection(datastore['RHOST'], domain, user, datastore['WINRM_TIMEOUT'])
handled_locally = false
conn.shell(:powershell) do |shell|
@registry_values[:certificate_mapping_methods] = run_registry_command(shell, 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\Schannel', 'CertificateMappingMethods').to_i
@registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement] = run_registry_command(shell, 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Kdc', 'StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement').to_i
if datastore['RHOST'] == ca_ip_address
@registry_values[ca_name.to_sym] = query_ca_policy_values(shell)
handled_locally = true
end
shell.close
end
return if handled_locally
query_ca_reg_values(ca_name, ca_ip_address, domain, user)
end
def query_ca_reg_values(ca_name, ca_ip_address, domain, user)
conn = create_winrm_connection(ca_ip_address, domain, user, datastore['WINRM_TIMEOUT'])
conn.shell(:powershell) do |shell|
@registry_values[ca_name.to_sym] = query_ca_policy_values(shell)
shell.close
end
end
def enum_registry_values
@registry_values ||= {}
domain = adds_get_domain_info(@ldap)[:dns_name]
user = adds_get_current_user(@ldap)[:sAMAccountName].first.to_s
ca_servers = adds_get_ca_servers(@ldap)
if ca_servers.empty?
print_warning('No Certificate Authority servers found in LDAP.')
return
end
ca_servers.each do |ca_server|
vprint_good("Found CA: #{ca_server[:name]} (#{ca_server[:dNSHostName]})")
ca_ip_address = Rex::Socket.getaddress(ca_server[:dNSHostName], false)
unless ca_ip_address
vprint_error("Unable to resolve the DNS Host Name of the CA server: #{ca_server[:dNSHostName]}. Checking registry values is unable to continue")
next
end
query_dc_reg_values(ca_server[:name], ca_ip_address, domain, user)
end
@registry_values
rescue StandardError => e
print_error("Failed to query all registry values. Ensure the user has sufficient privileges to query the Domain Controller and Certificate Authorities: #{e.message}.")
if @registry_values.key?(:certificate_mapping_methods) && @registry_values.key?(:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement)
print_error(' The user was able to query the Domain Controller but not the Certificate Authorities, meaning the user is likely an Admin but not a Domain Admin. ESC16 reporting will be inaccurate.')
return @registry_values
end
end
def resolve_group_memberships(user_dn)
filter = "(member:1.2.840.113556.1.4.1941:=#{ldap_escape_filter(user_dn)})"
attributes = ['distinguishedName', 'objectSID', 'sAMAccountName']
groups = query_ldap_server(filter, attributes)
groups.map do |group|
{
dn: group[:distinguishedname].first,
sid: Rex::Proto::MsDtyp::MsDtypSid.read(group[:objectsid].first).value,
name: group[:samaccountname].first
}
end
end
def fetch_group_members(group_dn)
filter = "(distinguishedName=#{ldap_escape_filter(group_dn)})"
attributes = ['member'] # Fetch the 'member' attribute which contains the group members
group_entry = query_ldap_server(filter, attributes)&.first
return [] unless group_entry && group_entry[:member]
group_entry[:member]
end
def find_users_with_write_and_enroll_rights(enroll_sids)
users = []
enroll_sids.each do |sid|
ldap_object = adds_get_object_by_sid(@ldap, sid.value)
if ldap_object && ldap_object[:objectclass]&.include?('user')
if (ldap_object[:ntsecuritydescriptor]) && adds_obj_grants_permissions?(@ldap, ldap_object, SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.any(%i[WP]))
users << ldap_object[:samaccountname].first
end
next
end
next unless ldap_object && ldap_object[:objectclass]&.include?('group')
member_objects = adds_query_group_members(@ldap, ldap_object[:dn].first, object_class: 'user', inherited: true).to_a
member_objects.each do |member_object|
next unless member_object[:ntsecuritydescriptor]
next if users.include?(member_object[:samaccountname].first)
if adds_obj_grants_permissions?(@ldap, member_object, SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.any(%i[WP]))
users << member_object[:samaccountname].first
end
end
end
users&.uniq
end
def find_esc9_vuln_cert_templates
esc9_raw_filter = '(&'\
'(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)'\
"(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION})"\
'(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))'\
'(|'\
"(pkiextendedkeyusage=#{OIDs::OID_KP_SMARTCARD_LOGON.value})"\
"(pkiextendedkeyusage=#{OIDs::OID_PKIX_KP_CLIENT_AUTH.value})"\
"(pkiextendedkeyusage=#{OIDs::OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE.value})"\
'(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))'\
')'\
'(|'\
"(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=#{CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN})"\
"(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=#{CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_DNS})"\
')'\
')'
esc9_templates = query_ldap_server(esc9_raw_filter, CERTIFICATE_ATTRIBUTES + ['msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag'], base_prefix: CERTIFICATE_TEMPLATES_BASE)
esc9_templates.each do |template|
certificate_symbol = template[:cn][0].to_sym
enroll_sids = @certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:enroll_sids]
users = find_users_with_write_and_enroll_rights(enroll_sids)
current_user = adds_get_current_user(@ldap)[:samaccountname].first
next if users.empty?
next unless users_compatible_with_template?(current_user, template['mspki-certificate-name-flag'], users)
user_plural = users.size > 1 ? 'accounts' : 'account'
has_plural = users.size > 1 ? 'have' : 'has'
note = "ESC9: The account: #{current_user} has edit permission over the #{user_plural}: #{users.join(', ')} which #{has_plural} enrollment rights for this template."
if @registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement].present?
note += " Registry value: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement=#{@registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement]}."
end
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:target_users] = users
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:certificate_name_flags] = template['mspki-certificate-name-flag']
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:techniques] << 'ESC9'
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:notes] << note
end
end
def find_esc10_vuln_cert_templates
esc10_raw_filter = '(&'\
'(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)'\
'(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))'\
'(|'\
"(pkiextendedkeyusage=#{OIDs::OID_KP_SMARTCARD_LOGON.value})"\
"(pkiextendedkeyusage=#{OIDs::OID_PKIX_KP_CLIENT_AUTH.value})"\
"(pkiextendedkeyusage=#{OIDs::OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE.value})"\
'(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))'\
')'\
'(|'\
"(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=#{CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN})"\
"(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=#{CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_DNS})"\
')'\
')'
esc10_templates = query_ldap_server(esc10_raw_filter, CERTIFICATE_ATTRIBUTES + ['msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag'], base_prefix: CERTIFICATE_TEMPLATES_BASE)
esc10_templates.each do |template|
certificate_symbol = template[:cn][0].to_sym
enroll_sids = @certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:enroll_sids]
users = find_users_with_write_and_enroll_rights(enroll_sids)
current_user = adds_get_current_user(@ldap)[:samaccountname].first
next if users.empty?
next unless users_compatible_with_template?(current_user, template['mspki-certificate-name-flag'], users)
user_plural = users.size > 1 ? 'accounts' : 'account'
has_plural = users.size > 1 ? 'have' : 'has'
note = "ESC10: The account: #{current_user} has edit permission over the #{user_plural}: #{users.join(', ')} which #{has_plural} enrollment rights for this template."
if @registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement].present? && @registry_values[:certificate_mapping_methods].present?
note += " Registry values: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement=#{@registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement]}, CertificateMappingMethods=#{@registry_values[:certificate_mapping_methods]}."
end
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:target_users] = users
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:certificate_name_flags] = template['mspki-certificate-name-flag']
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:techniques] << 'ESC10'
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:notes] << note
end
end
def find_esc13_vuln_cert_templates
esc_raw_filter = <<~FILTER
(&
(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)
(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))
(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))
(mspki-certificate-policy=*)
)
FILTER
esc_entries = query_ldap_server(esc_raw_filter, CERTIFICATE_ATTRIBUTES, base_prefix: CERTIFICATE_TEMPLATES_BASE)
if esc_entries.empty?
print_warning("Couldn't find any vulnerable ESC13 templates!")
return
end
# Grab a list of certificates that contain vulnerable settings.
# Also print out the list of SIDs that can enroll in that server.
esc_entries.each do |entry|
groups = []
entry['mspki-certificate-policy'].each do |certificate_policy_oid|
policy = get_pki_object_by_oid(certificate_policy_oid)
next if policy&.[]('msds-oidtogrouplink').blank?
# get the group and check it for two conditions
group = get_group_by_dn(policy['msds-oidtogrouplink'].first)
# condition 1: the group must be a universal group
next if (group['grouptype'].first.to_i & ADS_GROUP_TYPE_UNIVERSAL_GROUP) == 0
# condition 2: the group must have no members (this is enforced in the GUI but check it anyways)
next if group['member'].present?
groups << group['samaccountname'].first.to_s
end
next if groups.empty?
certificate_symbol = entry[:cn][0].to_sym
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:techniques] << 'ESC13'
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:notes] << "ESC13 groups: #{groups.join(', ')}"
end
end
def build_authority_details(ldap_object)
ca_server_fqdn = ldap_object[:dnshostname][0].to_s.downcase
return unless ca_server_fqdn.present?
ca_server_ip_address = get_ip_addresses_by_fqdn(ca_server_fqdn)&.first
if ca_server_ip_address
report_service_icertpassage(ca_server_ip_address, ca_name: ldap_object[:name][0])
report_host({
host: ca_server_ip_address,
name: ca_server_fqdn
})
end
begin
security_descriptor = Rex::Proto::MsDtyp::MsDtypSecurityDescriptor.read(ldap_object[:ntsecuritydescriptor][0])
rescue IOError => e
fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "Unable to read security descriptor! Error was: #{e.message}")
end
return unless security_descriptor.dacl
permissions = []
# The permissions on the CA server are a bit different than those on a template. While the UI also lists "Read", "Issue and Manage Certificates",
# and "Manage CA", only the "Request Certificates" permissions can be identified by this nTSecurityDescriptor. The certificateAuthority object
# under CN=Certificate Authorities,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local also does not have the extra permissions.
permissions << 'REQUEST CERTIFICATES' if adds_obj_grants_permissions?(@ldap, ldap_object, SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.certificate_enrollment)
{
fqdn: ca_server_fqdn,
ip_address: ca_server_ip_address,
enroll_sids: get_sids_for_enroll(security_descriptor.dacl),
permissions: permissions,
name: ldap_object[:name][0].to_s,
dn: ldap_object[:dn][0].to_s
}
end
def build_template_details(ldap_object)
security_descriptor = Rex::Proto::MsDtyp::MsDtypSecurityDescriptor.read(ldap_object[:ntsecuritydescriptor].first)
if security_descriptor.dacl
enroll_sids = get_sids_for_enroll(security_descriptor.dacl)
write_sids = get_sids_for_write(security_descriptor.dacl)
else
enroll_sids = nil
write_sids = nil
end
if adds_obj_grants_permissions?(@ldap, ldap_object, SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.full_control)
permissions = [ 'FULL CONTROL' ]
else
permissions = [ 'READ' ] # if we have the object, we can assume we have read permissions
permissions << 'WRITE' if adds_obj_grants_permissions?(@ldap, ldap_object, SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.new(:WP))
permissions << 'ENROLL' if adds_obj_grants_permissions?(@ldap, ldap_object, SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.certificate_enrollment)
permissions << 'AUTOENROLL' if adds_obj_grants_permissions?(@ldap, ldap_object, SecurityDescriptorMatcher::Allow.certificate_autoenrollment)
end
{
name: ldap_object[:cn][0].to_s,
techniques: [],
dn: ldap_object[:dn][0].to_s,
enroll_sids: enroll_sids,
write_sids: write_sids,
security_descriptor: security_descriptor,
permissions: permissions,
ekus: ldap_object[:pkiextendedkeyusage].map(&:to_s),
schema_version: ldap_object[%s(mspki-template-schema-version)].first,
ca_servers: {},
manager_approval: ([ldap_object[%s(mspki-enrollment-flag)].first.to_i].pack('l').unpack1('L') & Rex::Proto::MsCrtd::CT_FLAG_PEND_ALL_REQUESTS) != 0,
required_signatures: [ldap_object[%s(mspki-ra-signature)].first.to_i].pack('l').unpack1('L'),
notes: []
}
end
def find_esc15_vuln_cert_templates
esc_raw_filter = '(&'\
'(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)'\
'(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))'\
'(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=*)'\
'(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=1)'\
'(mspki-template-schema-version=1)'\
')'
notes = [
'ESC15: Request can specify a subjectAltName (msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag) and EKUs can be altered (msPKI-Template-Schema-Version)'
]
query_ldap_server_certificates(esc_raw_filter, 'ESC15', notes: notes)
end
# For ESC9, ESC10 and ESC16
def users_compatible_with_template?(current_user, flag_values, users = nil)
return false if flag_values.blank?
raw = flag_values.is_a?(Array) ? flag_values.first : flag_values
return false if raw.nil?
mask = raw.to_i & 0xffffffff
dns_required = (mask & CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_DNS) != 0
upn_required = (mask & CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN) != 0
if dns_required && current_user.to_s.end_with?('$') && (users.blank? || users.any? { |user| user.end_with?('$') })
true
elsif upn_required && !current_user.to_s.end_with?('$') && (users.blank? || users.any? { |user| !user.end_with?('$') })
true
else
false
end
end
def find_esc16_vuln_cert_templates
# if we were able to read the registry values and this OID is not explicitly disabled, then we know for certain the server is not vulnerable
esc16_raw_filter = '(&'\
'(|'\
"(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=#{CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN})"\
"(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=#{CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_DNS})"\
"(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=#{CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME})"\
')'\
'(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)'\
'(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))'\
'(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))'\
'(pkiextendedkeyusage=*)'\
')'
esc_entries = query_ldap_server(esc16_raw_filter, CERTIFICATE_ATTRIBUTES + ['msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag'], base_prefix: CERTIFICATE_TEMPLATES_BASE)
return if esc_entries.empty?
esc_entries.each do |entry|
certificate_symbol = entry[:cn][0].to_sym
# Get the CA servers that issue this template and we'll check their registry values
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:ca_servers].each_value do |ca_server|
ca_name = ca_server[:name].to_sym
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:certificate_name_flags] = entry['mspki-certificate-name-flag']
enroll_sids = @certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:enroll_sids]
users = find_users_with_write_and_enroll_rights(enroll_sids)
user_plural = users.size > 1 ? 'accounts' : 'account'
has_plural = users.size > 1 ? 'have' : 'has'
current_user = adds_get_current_user(@ldap)[:samaccountname].first
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:target_users] = users
# ESC16 revolves around the szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT being globally disabled on the CA server via the disable_extension_list. If it's not disabled, skip
if vulnerable_to_esc16_1?(ca_name)
next if users.empty?
next unless users_compatible_with_template?(current_user, entry['mspki-certificate-name-flag'], users)
note = "ESC16_1: The account: #{current_user} has edit permission over the #{user_plural}: #{users.join(', ')} which #{has_plural} enrollment rights for this template."
note += " Registry values: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement=#{@registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement]}, CertificateMappingMethods=#{@registry_values[:certificate_mapping_methods]}."
note += " The Certificate Authority: #{ca_name} has 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 defined in it's disabled extension list"
# Scenario 1 - StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 1 or 0 then it's the same as ESC9 - mark them all as vulnerable
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:techniques] << 'ESC16_1'
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:notes] << note
end
if vulnerable_to_esc16_2?(ca_name)
# Scenario 2 - StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 2 but the edit_flags contain EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 which re-enables the ability to exploit the certificate in the same way as ESC6
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:techniques] << 'ESC16_2'
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:notes] << "ESC16_2: Template is vulnerable due to the active policy EditFlags having: EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 set (which is essentially ESC6) on the Certificate Authority: #{ca_name}. Also the CA having 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 defined in it's disabled extension list"
end
next unless @registry_values.blank?
# We couldn't read the registry values - mark as potentially vulnerable
next unless users_compatible_with_template?(current_user, entry['mspki-certificate-name-flag'])
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:techniques] << 'ESC16_2'
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:notes] << 'ESC16_2: Template appears to be vulnerable (most templates do)'
next if users.empty?
next unless users_compatible_with_template?(current_user, entry['mspki-certificate-name-flag'], users)
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:techniques] << 'ESC16_1'
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol][:notes] << "ESC16_1: The account: #{current_user} has edit permission over the #{user_plural}: #{users.join(', ')} which #{has_plural} enrollment rights for this template."
end
end
end
def vulnerable_to_esc16_1?(ca_name)
@registry_values[ca_name]&.[](:disable_extension_list)&.include?('1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2') && @registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement] && (@registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement] == 0 || @registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement] == 1)
end
def vulnerable_to_esc16_2?(ca_name)
@registry_values[ca_name]&.[](:disable_extension_list)&.include?('1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2') && @registry_values[ca_name][:edit_flags] & EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 != 0 && @registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement] && @registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement] == 2
end
def find_enrollable_vuln_certificate_templates
# For each of the vulnerable certificate templates, determine which servers
# allows users to enroll in that certificate template and which users/groups
# have permissions to enroll in certificates on each server.
authority_details = {}
@certificate_details.each_key do |certificate_template|
certificate_enrollment_raw_filter = "(&(objectClass=pKIEnrollmentService)(certificateTemplates=#{ldap_escape_filter(certificate_template.to_s)}))"
attributes = ['cn', 'name', 'dnsHostname', 'ntsecuritydescriptor']
base_prefix = 'CN=Enrollment Services,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration'
enrollment_ca_data = query_ldap_server(certificate_enrollment_raw_filter, attributes, base_prefix: base_prefix)
next if enrollment_ca_data.empty?
enrollment_ca_data.each do |ldap_object|
ca_server_key = ldap_object[:dnshostname].first.to_s.downcase.to_sym
next if @certificate_details[certificate_template][:ca_servers].key?(ca_server_key)
authority_details[ca_server_key] = @certificate_details[certificate_template][:ca_servers][ca_server_key] = authority_details.fetch(ca_server_key) { build_authority_details(ldap_object) }
end
end
end
def reporting_split_techniques(template)
# these techniques are special in the sense that the exploit steps involve a different user performing the request
# meaning that whether or not we can issue them is irrelevant
enroll_by_proxy = %w[ESC9 ESC10 ESC16_1]
# technically ESC15 might be patched and we can't fingerprint that status but we leave it in the "vulnerable" category
# when we have the registry values, we can tell the vulnerabilities for certain
if @registry_values.present?
potentially_vulnerable = []
vulnerable = template[:techniques].dup
else
# ESC16_2 doesn't require a separate user to enroll, so it does not belong in the enroll_by_proxy array
# however should it should be reported as potentially vulnerable if we don't have registry data
potentially_vulnerable = template[:techniques] & (enroll_by_proxy + ['ESC16_2'])
vulnerable = template[:techniques] - potentially_vulnerable
end
if datastore['REPORT'] == 'vulnerable-and-enrollable'
vulnerable.keep_if do |technique|
enroll_by_proxy.include?(technique) || can_enroll?(template)
end
potentially_vulnerable.delete('ESC16_2') if potentially_vulnerable.include?('ESC16_2') && !can_enroll?(template)
end
[vulnerable, potentially_vulnerable]
end
def can_enroll?(template)
(template[:permissions].include?('FULL CONTROL') || template[:permissions].include?('ENROLL')) && (template[:ca_servers].empty? || template[:ca_servers].values.any? { _1[:permissions].include?('REQUEST CERTIFICATES') })
end
def print_vulnerable_cert_info
filtered_certificate_details = @certificate_details.sort.to_h.select do |_key, template|
case datastore['REPORT']
when 'all'
true
when 'published'
template[:ca_servers].present?
when 'enrollable'
can_enroll?(template)
when 'vulnerable'
template[:techniques].present?
when 'vulnerable-and-published'
template[:techniques].present? && template[:ca_servers].present?
when 'vulnerable-and-enrollable'
!reporting_split_techniques(template).flatten.empty?
end
end
any_esc3t1 = filtered_certificate_details.values.any? do |hash|
hash[:techniques].include?('ESC3')
end
filtered_certificate_details.each do |key, hash|
vulnerable_techniques, potentially_vulnerable_techniques = reporting_split_techniques(hash)
all_techniques = vulnerable_techniques + potentially_vulnerable_techniques
all_techniques.delete('ESC3_TEMPLATE_2') unless any_esc3t1 # don't report ESC3_TEMPLATE_2 if there are no instances of ESC3
next unless all_techniques.present? || datastore['REPORT'] == 'all'
if db
all_techniques.each do |vuln|
next if vuln == 'ESC3_TEMPLATE_2'
prefix = "#{vuln}:"
info = hash[:notes].select { |note| note.start_with?(prefix) }.map { |note| note.delete_prefix(prefix).strip }.join("\n")
info = nil if info.blank?
hash[:ca_servers].each_value do |ca_server|
service = report_service_icertpassage(ca_server[:ip_address], ca_name: ca_server[:name])
if ca_server[:ip_address].present?
vuln = report_vuln(
workspace: myworkspace,
host: ca_server[:ip_address],
port: 445,
proto: 'tcp',
name: vuln.to_s,
info: info,
refs: REFERENCES[vuln],
service: service,
resource: { template_name: key, ldap_dn: hash[:dn] }
)
else
vuln = nil
end
end
end
end
print_good("Template: #{key}")
print_status(" Distinguished Name: #{hash[:dn]}")
print_status(" Manager Approval: #{hash[:manager_approval] ? '%redRequired' : '%grnDisabled'}%clr")
print_status(" Required Signatures: #{hash[:required_signatures] == 0 ? '%grn0' : '%red' + hash[:required_signatures].to_s}%clr")
if vulnerable_techniques.present?
print_good(" Vulnerable to: #{vulnerable_techniques.join(', ')}")
else
print_status(' Vulnerable to: (none)')
end
if potentially_vulnerable_techniques.include?('ESC9')
print_warning(' Potentially vulnerable to: ESC9 (the template is in a vulnerable configuration but in order to exploit registry key StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement must not be set to 2)')
end
if potentially_vulnerable_techniques.include?('ESC10')
print_warning(' Potentially vulnerable to: ESC10 (the template is in a vulnerable configuration but in order to exploit registry key StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement must be set to 0 or CertificateMappingMethods must be set to 4)')
end
if potentially_vulnerable_techniques.include?('ESC16_1')
print_warning(' Potentially vulnerable to: ESC16_1 (the template is in a vulnerable configuration but in order to exploit registry key StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement must be set to either 0 or 1 and the CA must have the SID security extention OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 listed under the DisbaledExtensionlist registry key.')
end
if potentially_vulnerable_techniques.include?('ESC16_2')
print_warning(' Potentially vulnerable to: ESC16_2 (the template is in a vulnerable configuration but in order to exploit registry key StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement must be set to 2 and the CA must have the SID security extention OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 listed under the DisbaledExtensionlist registry key and EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 enabled in the EditFlags policy).')
end
print_status(" Permissions: #{hash[:permissions].join(', ')}")
if hash[:notes].present? && hash[:notes].length == 1
print_status(" Notes: #{hash[:notes].first}")
elsif hash[:notes].present? && hash[:notes].length > 1
print_status(' Notes:')
hash[:notes].each do |note|
print_status(" * #{note}")
end
end
if hash[:write_sids]
print_status(' Certificate Template Write-Enabled SIDs:')
hash[:write_sids].each do |sid|
print_status(" * #{highlight_sid(sid)}")
end
end
print_status(' Certificate Template Enrollment SIDs:')
hash[:enroll_sids].each do |sid|
print_status(" * #{highlight_sid(sid)}")
end
if hash[:ca_servers].any?
hash[:ca_servers].each do |ca_fqdn, ca_hash|
print_good(" Issuing CA: #{ca_hash[:name]} (#{ca_fqdn})")
# Don't print the permissions here because it can be misleading since not all can be detected
# see: #build_authority_details
print_status(' Enrollment SIDs:')
ca_hash[:enroll_sids].each do |sid|
print_status(" * #{highlight_sid(sid)}")
end
end
else
print_warning(' Issuing CAs: none (not published as an enrollable certificate)')
end
end
end
def highlight_sid(sid)
color = ''
color = '%grn' if sid.value == WellKnownSids::SECURITY_AUTHENTICATED_USER_SID
if sid.value.starts_with?("#{WellKnownSids::SECURITY_NT_NON_UNIQUE}-")
color = '%grn' if sid.rid == WellKnownSids::DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS
color = '%grn' if sid.rid == WellKnownSids::DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_GUESTS
color = '%grn' if sid.rid == WellKnownSids::DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_COMPUTERS
end
"#{color}#{sid.value} (#{sid.name})%clr"
end
def get_pki_object_by_oid(oid)
pki_object = @ldap_objects.find { |o| o['mspki-cert-template-oid']&.first == oid }
if pki_object.nil?
pki_object = query_ldap_server(
"(&(objectClass=msPKI-Enterprise-Oid)(msPKI-Cert-Template-OID=#{ldap_escape_filter(oid.to_s)}))",
nil,
base_prefix: 'CN=OID,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration'
)&.first
@ldap_objects << pki_object if pki_object
end
pki_object
end
def get_group_by_dn(group_dn)
group = @ldap_objects.find { |o| o['dn']&.first == group_dn }
if group.nil?
cn, _, base = group_dn.partition(',')
base.delete_suffix!(",#{@base_dn}")
group = query_ldap_server(
"(#{cn})",
nil,
base_prefix: base
)&.first
@ldap_objects << group if group
end
group
end
def get_object_by_sid(object_sid)
object_sid = Rex::Proto::MsDtyp::MsDtypSid.new(object_sid)
object = @ldap_objects.find { |o| o['objectSID']&.first == object_sid.to_binary_s }
if object.nil?
object = query_ldap_server("(objectSID=#{ldap_escape_filter(object_sid.to_s)})", nil)&.first
@ldap_objects << object if object
end
object
end
def get_ip_addresses_by_fqdn(host_fqdn)
return @fqdns[host_fqdn] if @fqdns.key?(host_fqdn)
vprint_status("Resolving addresses for #{host_fqdn} via DNS.")
begin
ip_addresses = Rex::Socket.getaddresses(host_fqdn)
rescue ::SocketError
print_warning("No IP addresses were found for #{host_fqdn} via DNS.")
else
@fqdns[host_fqdn] = ip_addresses
vprint_status("Found #{ip_addresses.length} IP address#{ip_addresses.length > 1 ? 'es' : ''} via DNS.")
return ip_addresses
end
vprint_status("Looking up DNS records for #{host_fqdn} in LDAP.")
hostname, _, domain = host_fqdn.partition('.')
begin
results = query_ldap_server(
"(&(objectClass=dnsNode)(DC=#{ldap_escape_filter(hostname)}))",
%w[dnsRecord],
base_prefix: "DC=#{ldap_escape_filter(domain)},CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones"
)
rescue Msf::Auxiliary::Failed
print_error('Encountered an error while querying LDAP for DNS records.')
@fqdns[host_fqdn] = nil
end
return nil if results.blank?
ip_addresses = []
results.first[:dnsrecord].each do |packed|
begin
unpacked = MsDnspDnsRecord.read(packed)
rescue ::EOFError
next
rescue ::IOError
next
end
next unless [ DnsRecordType::DNS_TYPE_A, DnsRecordType::DNS_TYPE_AAAA ].include?(unpacked.record_type)
ip_addresses << unpacked.data.to_s
end
@fqdns[host_fqdn] = ip_addresses
if ip_addresses.empty?
print_warning("No A or AAAA DNS records were found for #{host_fqdn} in LDAP.")
else
vprint_status("Found #{ip_addresses.length} IP address#{ip_addresses.length > 1 ? 'es' : ''} via A and AAAA DNS records.")
end
ip_addresses
end
def domain_controller_version_check
domain_info = adds_get_domain_info(@ldap)
return unless domain_info
user_info = adds_get_current_user(@ldap)
return unless user_info
user = user_info[:sAMAccountName].first.to_s
domain = domain_info[:dns_name]
print_status("user: #{user}, domain: #{domain}")
version_raw = nil
conn = create_winrm_connection(datastore['RHOSTS'], domain, user, datastore['WINRM_TIMEOUT'])
# Get the build number over WinRM by querying the Update Build Revision from the registry and appending it to the OS version.
# If there is no URB append 0 so we the string always ends in a numberical value
conn.shell(:powershell) do |shell|
ps = <<~PS
$os = Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -ErrorAction Stop
$ubr = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion' -Name UBR -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).UBR
if ($ubr -eq $null) { $ubr = 0 }
Write-Output ("{0}.{1}" -f $os.Version, $ubr)
PS
output = shell.run(ps)
version_raw = output.stdout&.lines&.first&.strip
shell.close
end
if version_raw.blank?
print_error("Could not retrieve Windows version string from #{datastore['RHOSTS']} via WinRM.")
end
version_obj = Rex::Version.new(version_raw)
print_status("Detected target Windows version: #{version_raw}")
# Product ranges: [ Product name, RTM version, Sept2025 patch version ]
# Replace the 'patch_version' entries with actual September 2025 version/build strings.
ranges = [
[Msf::WindowsVersion::ServerNameMapping[:Server2025], Msf::WindowsVersion::Server2025, Rex::Version.new('10.0.26100.6588')],
[Msf::WindowsVersion::ServerNameMapping[:Server2022], Msf::WindowsVersion::Server2022, Rex::Version.new('10.0.20348.4171')],
[Msf::WindowsVersion::ServerNameMapping[:Server2019], Msf::WindowsVersion::Server2019, Rex::Version.new('10.0.17763.7792')],
[Msf::WindowsVersion::ServerNameMapping[:Server2016], Msf::WindowsVersion::Server2016, Rex::Version.new('10.0.14393.8422')],
]
ranges.each do |product, rtm_version, patch_version|
if version_obj >= rtm_version && version_obj < patch_version
print_good("Detected #{product} version #{version_obj} — appears vulnerable (below Sept 2025 threshold #{patch_version}). Module will continue.")
return false
end
if version_obj >= patch_version
fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, "Detected #{product} version #{version_obj} which is at-or-above the September 2025 threshold (#{patch_version}). Target appears patched. Weak certificate mappings/ ESC techniques are not exploitable on this domain controller")
end
end
print_error("Could not map detected Windows version #{version_obj} to a known product range.")
end
def set_can_enroll_flags
@certificate_details.each_key do |certificate_template|
@certificate_details[certificate_template][:can_enroll] = can_enroll?(@certificate_details[certificate_template])
end
end
def validate
super
if (datastore['RUN_REGISTRY_CHECKS']) && !%w[auto plaintext ntlm].include?(datastore['LDAP::Auth'].downcase)
raise Msf::OptionValidateError, ["RUN_REGISTRY_CHECKS is incompatible with LDAP::Auth type '#{datastore['LDAP::Auth']}'. Supported types are: plaintext, NTLM."]
end
end
def run
# Define our instance variables real quick.
@base_dn = nil
@ldap_objects = []
@registry_values = {}
@fqdns = {}
@certificate_details = {} # Initialize to empty hash since we want to only keep one copy of each certificate template along with its details.
ldap_connect do |ldap|
validate_bind_success!(ldap)
if (@base_dn = datastore['BASE_DN'])
print_status("User-specified base DN: #{@base_dn}")
else
print_status('Discovering base DN automatically')
unless (@base_dn = ldap.base_dn)
fail_with(Failure::NotFound, "Couldn't discover base DN!")
end
end
@ldap = ldap
# If the domain controller is patched up to Sept 2025, the CA can still issue Certificates which appear
# vulnerable (ie. Subject Alt Names can be specified with UPN: Administrator) however the Domain controller no
# longer accepts weak certificate mappings regardless of the StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement/ CertificaateMappingMethod registry key.
begin
domain_controller_version_check
rescue WinRM::WinRMAuthorizationError => e
print_warning("Unable to determine the version of Window so these all might be false postives! WinRM authorization error: #{e.message}")
end
templates = query_ldap_server('(objectClass=pkicertificatetemplate)', CERTIFICATE_ATTRIBUTES, base_prefix: CERTIFICATE_TEMPLATES_BASE)
fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No certificate templates were found.') if templates.empty?
templates.each do |template|
certificate_symbol = template[:cn].first.to_sym
@certificate_details[certificate_symbol] = build_template_details(template)
end
registry_values = enum_registry_values if datastore['RUN_REGISTRY_CHECKS']
if registry_values&.any?
registry_values.each do |key, value|
vprint_good("#{key}: #{value.inspect}")
end
end
find_enrollable_vuln_certificate_templates
set_can_enroll_flags
find_esc1_vuln_cert_templates
find_esc2_vuln_cert_templates
find_esc3_vuln_cert_templates
find_esc4_vuln_cert_templates
if registry_values.blank?
find_esc9_vuln_cert_templates
find_esc10_vuln_cert_templates
else
if registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement] != 2
find_esc9_vuln_cert_templates
end
if registry_values[:strong_certificate_binding_enforcement] == 1 || registry_values[:certificate_mapping_methods] & 4 > 0
find_esc10_vuln_cert_templates
end
end
find_esc13_vuln_cert_templates
find_esc15_vuln_cert_templates
find_esc16_vuln_cert_templates
print_vulnerable_cert_info
@certificate_details
end
rescue Errno::ECONNRESET
fail_with(Failure::Disconnected, 'The connection was reset.')
rescue Rex::ConnectionError => e
fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, e.message)
rescue Rex::Proto::Kerberos::Model::Error::KerberosError => e
fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, e.message)
rescue Net::LDAP::Error => e
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "#{e.class}: #{e.message}")
end
def report_service_icertpassage(host, ca_name:)
common = {
host: host,
port: 445,
proto: 'tcp'
}
report_service({
name: ::Msf::Exploit::Remote::MsIcpr::ADCS_CA_SERVICE_NAME,
resource: {
'name' => ca_name
},
parents: {
name: 'icertpassage',
resource: {
'dcerpc' => {
'pipe' => 'cert'
}
},
parents: {
name: 'dcerpc',
resource: {
'smb' => {
'share' => 'IPC$'
}
},
parents: {
name: 'smb',
parents: {
name: 'tcp'
}
}.merge(common)
}.merge(common)
}.merge(common)
}.merge(common))
end
end
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08 Jul 2026 19:05Current
5.9Medium risk
Vulners AI Score5.9