In a previous blogpost we have already analyzed a token hijack on one OAuth integration between some Microsoft and Google service and seen what went wrong.
Now it is time to see yet another integration between Microsoft and xxxx (unluckily I can't disclose the name of the other company due the fact the haven't still fixed a related issue...) and see some fallacy.
But before to focus on the attack we might need a bit of introduction.
An HTTP referrer (misspelled as referer in the spec) is a special HTTP header field that browsers (and http clients in general) attach when surfing from a page to another. In this way the new webpage can see where the request originated. One extra thing to point out is that as per section 15.1.3 (Encoding Sensitive Information in URI's) of HTTP RFC [RFC 2616]:
Clients SHOULD NOT include a Referer header field in a (non-secure) HTTP request if the referring page was transferred with a secure protocol.
This is summarized in the image below:
Microsoft (of course) offers some service that allows you to have your Office document displayed online (similar to Google docs). For Microsoft Word the address is <https://word.office.live.com/> .
Now this service is also integrated with other partners and you can display document hosted to a partner website doing something like
The two things to note in the link above are (in bold):
The bad part of this is that if the document contains a link and if the victim clicks on the link the above mentioned referrer will leak the access token.
The attack might look like this:
- The attacker craft a special Word document containing a link to a website he owns (MUST be https though)
- The attacker upload the file to the PARTNER_WEBSITE
- The attacker shares this document with the victim
- The attacker waits for the victim to access the document and click to the link
And yep the Referrer will contain the victim's access token leaking it.
You might argue that the attacker would not gain anything by stealing this access token since it would allow to have access to a resource the attacker can already see. This indeed might be put in the bucket of the privacy issue rather than security vulnerability. From the other hand it is really matter of how good is the implementation at the PARTNER WEBSITE and how granular is the hijacked's access token.
In any case Microsoft fixed promptly the issue (fixing the referrer leakage) and rewarded me with a bounty (thanks MSFT).
While looking at this Microsoft endpoint I also found a stored XSS vulnerability (now also fixed :)) and Microsoft rewarded me as well for it (thanks MSFT)