Description

If you can jam some nasty code into a table-cell, you can force this script to perform arbitrary javascript when someone tries to export the table using this library. An example used against us was:

"&gt;<img src>

It looks like, if you don’t specify an onCellHtmlData function, the default one is used here:

https://github.com/hhurz/tableExport.jquery.plugin/blob/986adee1cfa1022e5f8b3d085c333b26782d6aca/tableExport.js#L2079-L2123

That one includes the line:

https://github.com/hhurz/tableExport.jquery.plugin/blob/986adee1cfa1022e5f8b3d085c333b26782d6aca/tableExport.js#L2084

Which, according to the JQuery folks, is definitely XSS-able - https://api.jquery.com/jQuery.parseHTML/ (scroll down to ‘Security Considerations’).

A user can route around the default implementation of onCellHtmlData by providing their own function for it, but I still think the default implementation should be ‘safe’ for all uses.

Users of this library who do not attempt to export tables of user-provided data are probably immune. But I would figure most table exports are going to be of some kind of dynamic data (why export a static table?), so I suspect that most uses of this library will be vulnerable to these attacks.

(I also think that Bug Bounty researchers are just finding implementations of this library and attacking them, as opposed to letting you know that there might be a problem, but that’s neither here nor there).

We were able to route around the problem by setting htmlContent to true- but our users hate that so I was looking for another workaround (and also trying to explain why it happened in the first place!) and then I figured out the onCellHtmlData problem.

Proof of Concept

Render a table with a cell with the value "&gt;<img src> and then export it as CSV or PDF (and probably a few others).