GitLab: Arbitrary file read via the UploadsRewriter when moving and issue
2020-03-23T10:54:31Type hackerone
Reporter vakzz
Modified 2020-04-27T16:15:59
Description
Summary
The UploadsRewriter does not validate the file name, allowing arbitrary files to be copied via directory traversal when moving an issue to a new project.
The pattern used to look for references is :
MARKDOWN_PATTERN = %r{\!?\[.*?\]\(/uploads/(?<secret>[0-9a-f]{32})/(?<file>.*?)\)}.freeze
This is used by the UploadsRewriter when copying an issue to also copy across the files:
```ruby @text.gsub(@pattern) do |markdown| file = find_file(@source_project, $~[:secret], $~[:file]) break markdown unless file.try(:exists?)
klass = target_parent.is_a?(Namespace) ? NamespaceFileUploader : FileUploader
moved = klass.copy_to(file, target_parent)
... def find_file(project, secret, file) uploader = FileUploader.new(project, secret: secret) uploader.retrieve_from_store!(file) uploader end ```
As there is no restriction on what file can be, path traversal can be used to copy any file.
Demo {F757226}
Steps to reproduce
- Create two projects
- Add an issue with the following description:
markdown
1. Move the issue to the second project
1. The file will have been copied to the project
Impact
Allows an attacker to read arbitrary files on the server, including tokens, private data, configs, etc
What is the current bug behavior?
The file name and path are not checked when copying an issue between projects
What is the expected correct behavior?
The file or path should be validated before copying files.
Output of checks
Results of GitLab environment info
``` System information System: Ubuntu 18.04 Proxy: no Current User: git Using RVM: no Ruby Version: 2.6.5p114 Gem Version: 2.7.10 Bundler Version:1.17.3 Rake Version: 12.3.3 Redis Version: 5.0.7 Git Version: 2.24.1 Sidekiq Version:5.2.7 Go Version: unknown
GitLab information Version: 12.8.7-ee Revision: 2643fd87200 Directory: /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails DB Adapter: PostgreSQL DB Version: 10.12 URL: http://gitlab-vm.local HTTP Clone URL: http://gitlab-vm.local/some-group/some-project.git SSH Clone URL: git@gitlab-vm.local:some-group/some-project.git Elasticsearch: no Geo: no Using LDAP: no Using Omniauth: yes Omniauth Providers:
GitLab Shell Version: 11.0.0 Repository storage paths: - default: /var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories GitLab Shell path: /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell Git: /opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git ```
Impact
Allows an attacker to read arbitrary files on the server, including tokens, private data, configs, etc
