Monero: Exploiting Network and Timing Side-Channels to Break Monero Receiver Anonymity

ID H1:713321
Type hackerone
Reporter ftramer
Modified 2019-11-15T14:10:41



We present various examples of side-channel leakage in the communication between a Monero wallet and P2P node. Communication patterns and timing leak whether the wallet is the payee of a transaction that is sent into the transaction pool or mined in a block—thereby breaking transaction privacy, as well as enabling linking of stealth addresses. If a user connects their Monero wallet to a remote node, the required leakage in commu- nication patterns and timing is observable by a malicious (yet passive) remote node provider, or by a passive network adversary that monitors the encrypted traffic between a wallet and a trusted node. Even if the wallet and node are both hosted locally and trusted, side-channel leakage can be observed by an active remote attacker with a P2P connection to the node.

Releases Affected:

  • Current release (v0.14.1.0) and previous ones of the main Monero node and wallet implementations

Steps To Reproduce:

The attached report (which we also sent to and via PGP) explains the different vulnerabilities and how they can be exploited.

Supporting Material/References:

[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]

  • Vulnerability disclose report


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XMR address: 45jPGGu9QPYSoNgZPuVpbaMcvrKEJ8TGMd4bPc9VVFKWKqmmfUuzEHDi6sremu2H2idVgySvCmam48RvhKCPRDtBTPj2be3


A remote attacker (either in control of a public node, or a network adversary monitoring communication to a remote node, or even a remote P2P participant connected to a wallet's local node) can infer when the wallet is the payee of a transaction added to the mempool or mined in a block.