Brave Software: `chrome://brave` available for navigation in Release build [-> RCE] + navigation to `chrome://*` using tab_helper ["Open in new tab"]

ID H1:395737
Type hackerone
Reporter metnew
Modified 2018-09-25T00:23:34



chrome://brave is available for navigation

Navigation to chrome://brave + <local_file_path> requires local file at <local_file_path>.

The file loaded in this context has access to private Muon APIs such as chrome.ipcRenderer/remote/webFrame/webViewRequest.

Muon API allows executing code on the device. (e.g. with chrome.remote.require('child_process').exec)

> In addition, Brave isn't sandboxed (on all OS).

That's clearly a vulnerability, not a feature: 1. it's in Release channel, not in Debug builds 2. Could lead to RCE

> Note: attacker knows the correct <local_file_path> after loading the file from file:// origin (window.location.pathname).

Navigation to chrome://brave

I've already shown the way to navigate to file:// URLs in #369218, which was fixed in 0.23.80.

> I mentioned in the report that it's possible navigating to chrome:// URLs too in #369218. However, the fix was incomplete. It only works for about: and file:URLs.


  1. Shows that <webview> works
  2. Launches on macOS

Products affected:

Brave: 0.23.79 (0.23.80 and 0.23.100 too, where #369218 is patched) V8: rev: 51b49051a779f0db94fbcfd0df5faca781299ea0 Muon: 8.0.7 OS Release: 17.7.0 Update Channel: Release OS Architecture: x64 OS Platform: macOS Node.js: 7.9.0 Brave Sync: v1.4.2 libchromiumcontent: 68.0.3440.84

Steps To Reproduce || Attack Scenario:

  1. Download exploit.html
  2. Open link in the file using "Open in new tab"
  3. The new tab opens with private <webview> tag + starts


Preventing navigation to chrome://brave origin seems ok.

Additional resources

Screencast attached.


Crafted HTML file allows executing code on the device.

> Requires user gesture - "Open in a new tab". Set impact to "High", because requires downloading the file.