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githubGitHub Advisory DatabaseGHSA-4MF2-F3WH-GVF2
HistoryMay 25, 2021 - 6:42 p.m.

Subdomain checking of whitelisted domains could allow unintended redirects in oauth2-proxy

2021-05-2518:42:20
CWE-601
GitHub Advisory Database
github.com
494

6.1 Medium

CVSS3

Attack Vector

NETWORK

Attack Complexity

LOW

Privileges Required

NONE

User Interaction

REQUIRED

Scope

CHANGED

Confidentiality Impact

LOW

Integrity Impact

LOW

Availability Impact

NONE

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

5.8 Medium

CVSS2

Access Vector

NETWORK

Access Complexity

MEDIUM

Authentication

NONE

Confidentiality Impact

PARTIAL

Integrity Impact

PARTIAL

Availability Impact

NONE

AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N

0.001 Low

EPSS

Percentile

47.1%

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
For users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect.

For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for .example.com, the intention is that subdomains of example.com are allowed.
Instead, example.com and badexample.com could also match.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain.

Original Issue Posted by @semoac:

Whitelist Domain feature is not working as expected because is not matching a dot to ensure the redirect is a subdomain.

Expected Behavior

If whitelist domain is set to .example.com , then hack.alienexample.com should be rejected as a valid redirect.

Current Behavior

The code is removing the dot from .example.com and only checking if the redirect string end with example.com

Possible Solution

Here
https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/blob/c377466411f2aee180a732187edb638f2f7e57fb/oauthproxy.go#L661

Include the dot when checking the string:

strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, "." + domainHostname)

Steps to Reproduce (for bugs)

package main

import (
	"fmt"
	"strings"
)

func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {
	if port == "" || port == ":*" {
		return true
	}
	if port[0] != ':' {
		return false
	}
	for _, b := range port[1:] {
		if b < '0' || b > '9' {
			return false
		}
	}
	return true
}

func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) {
	host = hostport

	colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':')
	if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) {
		host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:]
	}

	if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
		host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
	}

	return
}

func main() {
	domain := ".example.com"
	domainHostname, _ := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, "."))
	redirectHostname := "https://hack.alienexample.com"
	if (strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) { fmt.Println("This should not have happen.")}
}

Users of github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy are advised to update to github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7

6.1 Medium

CVSS3

Attack Vector

NETWORK

Attack Complexity

LOW

Privileges Required

NONE

User Interaction

REQUIRED

Scope

CHANGED

Confidentiality Impact

LOW

Integrity Impact

LOW

Availability Impact

NONE

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

5.8 Medium

CVSS2

Access Vector

NETWORK

Access Complexity

MEDIUM

Authentication

NONE

Confidentiality Impact

PARTIAL

Integrity Impact

PARTIAL

Availability Impact

NONE

AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N

0.001 Low

EPSS

Percentile

47.1%

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