Multiple implementations -- DoS via hash algorithm collision

oCERT reports:

A variety of programming languages suffer from a denial-of-service
(DoS) condition against storage functions of key/value pairs in
hash data structures, the condition can be leveraged by exploiting
predictable collisions in the underlying hashing algorithms.
The issue finds particular exposure in web server applications
and/or frameworks. In particular, the lack of sufficient limits
for the number of parameters in POST requests in conjunction with
the predictable collision properties in the hashing functions of
the underlying languages can render web applications vulnerable
to the DoS condition. The attacker, using specially crafted HTTP
requests, can lead to a 100% of CPU usage which can last up to
several hours depending on the targeted application and server
performance, the amplification effect is considerable and
requires little bandwidth and time on the attacker side.
The condition for predictable collisions in the hashing functions
has been reported for the following language implementations:
Java, JRuby, PHP, Python, Rubinius, Ruby. In the case of the
Ruby language, the 1.9.x branch is not affected by the
predictable collision condition since this version includes a
randomization of the hashing function.
The vulnerability outlined in this advisory is practically
identical to the one reported in 2003 and described in the paper
Denial of Service via Algorithmic Complexity Attacks which
affected the Perl language.