ImageMagick -- multiple vulnerabilities

Openwall reports:

Insufficient filtering for filename passed to delegate’s command
allows remote code execution during conversion of several file
formats. Any service which uses ImageMagick to process user
supplied images and uses default delegates.xml / policy.xml,
may be vulnerable to this issue.
It is possible to make ImageMagick perform a HTTP GET or FTP
request
It is possible to delete files by using ImageMagick’s ‘ephemeral’
pseudo protocol which deletes files after reading.
It is possible to move image files to file with any extension
in any folder by using ImageMagick’s ‘msl’ pseudo protocol.
msl.txt and image.gif should exist in known location - /tmp/
for PoC (in real life it may be web service written in PHP,
which allows to upload raw txt files and process images with
ImageMagick).
It is possible to get content of the files from the server
by using ImageMagick’s ‘label’ pseudo protocol.