Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=657
The following crash due to a heap-based out-of-bounds read can be observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):
--- cut ---
==6158==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200035b1df at pc 0x0000004aaf85 bp 0x7ffcdca29930 sp 0x7ffcdca290e0
READ of size 16 at 0x60200035b1df thread T0
#0 0x4aaf84 in __asan_memcpy llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cc:393
#1 0x7fc44e6a216a in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey wireshark/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c:454:5
#2 0x7fc44e6a0fd6 in AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake wireshark/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c:1405:21
#3 0x7fc44e698b78 in AirPDcapScanForKeys wireshark/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c:563:13
#4 0x7fc44e69749b in AirPDcapPacketProcess wireshark/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c:695:21
#5 0x7fc44f596013 in dissect_ieee80211_common wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211.c:17767:9
#6 0x7fc44f569dae in dissect_ieee80211 wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211.c:18375:10
#7 0x7fc44e4f8cc1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
#8 0x7fc44e4eb5ea in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
#9 0x7fc44e4f52be in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2662:8
#10 0x7fc44e4e6ccf in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2675:8
#11 0x7fc44f51c032 in dissect_wlan_radio wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211-radio.c:975:10
#12 0x7fc44e4f8cc1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
#13 0x7fc44e4eb5ea in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
#14 0x7fc44e4f52be in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2662:8
#15 0x7fc44e4e6ccf in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2675:8
#16 0x7fc44f52d965 in dissect_radiotap wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211-radiotap.c:1796:2
#17 0x7fc44e4f8cc1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
#18 0x7fc44e4eb5ea in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
#19 0x7fc44e4eadbd in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1148:9
#20 0x7fc44f1fa5f6 in dissect_frame wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:500:11
#21 0x7fc44e4f8cc1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
#22 0x7fc44e4eb5ea in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
#23 0x7fc44e4f52be in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2662:8
#24 0x7fc44e4e6ccf in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2675:8
#25 0x7fc44e4e633b in dissect_record wireshark/epan/packet.c:501:3
#26 0x7fc44e4943c9 in epan_dissect_run_with_taps wireshark/epan/epan.c:373:2
#27 0x5264eb in process_packet wireshark/tshark.c:3728:5
#28 0x51f960 in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3484:11
#29 0x515daf in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13
0x60200035b1df is located 0 bytes to the right of 15-byte region [0x60200035b1d0,0x60200035b1df)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4c0bc8 in malloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:40
#1 0x7fc446a1c610 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4e610)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cc:393 in __asan_memcpy
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c04800635e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c04800635f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0480063600: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0480063610: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0480063620: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x0c0480063630: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00[07]fa fa 00 00
0x0c0480063640: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00
0x0c0480063650: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00
0x0c0480063660: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa fd fd fa fa 01 fa
0x0c0480063670: fa fa 06 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 07
0x0c0480063680: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==6158==ABORTING
--- cut ---
The crash was reported at https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11826. Attached are two files which trigger the crash.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39077.zipData
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