ADH-Web Server IP-Cameras - Multiple Vulnerabilities

2015-09-20T00:00:00
ID EDB-ID:38245
Type exploitdb
Reporter Glaysson dos Santos
Modified 2015-09-20T00:00:00

Description

ADH-Web Server IP-Cameras - Multiple Vulnerabilities. Webapps exploit for hardware platform

                                        
                                            1. *Advisory Information*

Title: ADH-Web Server IP-Cameras Improper Access Restrictions
Date published: 2015-09-19
Date of last update: 2015-09-19
Vendors contacted: ADH-Web
Author: Glaysson dos Santos
Release mode: User release

2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Information Exposure [CWE-200]
Impact: Security bypass
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name:

3. *Vulnerabilities*

3.1 ADH-Web Server IP-Cameras Improper Access Restrictions

3.1.1 Description

Due to improper access restriction the ADH-Web (item 4) device [1] allows a
remote attacker to browse and access arbitrary files from the following
directorie '/hdd0/logs'. you can also get numerous information
(important for a fingerprint step) via the parameter "variable" in
variable.cgi script.

3.1.2 Vulnerability Details

Usually this directory can be protected against
unauthenticated access (401 Unauthorized), though, it can access all files
directly without requiring authentication.As in the statement below:

[401]
. 'http://<target_ip>/hdd0/logs'
        [200]
. 'http://<target_ip>/hdd0/logs/log.txt'

 Most common logfiles:

. 'bak.txt
. 'connect.txt'
. 'log.txt'
. 'seclog.log'
. 'startup.txt'
. 'DBGLOG.TXT'
. 'access.txt'
. 'security.txt'

3.1.3 Impact

This could allow a remote attacker to obtain valuable information such as
access credentials, Network configuration and other sensitive information
in plain text.

Another problem identified is an information exposure  via the parameter
"variable" in variable.cgi script. Knowing some variables can extract a
reasonable amount of information. For exemplo:

* DNS
. 'http://target_ip/variable.cgi?variable=dhcp_dns&slaveip=0.0.0.0'

* ftp master ftp console credenthials ((the development team said that this
credential is not used, then why does it exist?):
. '
http://target_ip/variable.cgi?variable=console_master_ftpuser&slaveip=0.0.0.0
'
. '
http://target_ip/variable.cgi?variable=console_master_ftppass&slaveip=0.0.0.0
'

(although the vast majority of servers have ftp / telnet with anonymous
access allowed.)

* alarms
. 'http://target_ip/variable.cgi?variable=alarm_title&slaveip=0.0.0.0'
* camconfig
. 'http://target_ip/variable.cgi?variable=camconfig[0]&slaveip=127.0.0.1'
(includes, but is not limited to) There are a lot of variables [an audit
tool is on the way].

This servers also sends credentials (and other sensitive data) via GET
parameters
This is poor practice as the URL is liable to be logged in any number of
places
between the customer and the camera. The credentials should be passed in
the body
of a POST request (under SSL of course, here is not the case). .
(Is possible to create, edit and delete users and other configurations in
this way, dangerous)

4. *Vulnerable Products and Packages*

   . The following products are affected:
- SD Advanced Closed IPTV
- SD Advanced
- EcoSense
- Digital Sprite 2
Other products/models are probably affected too, but they I not checked.

5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

The vendor found that some things are not vulnerabilities (sensitive
information via GET, for example)
and others are useless (hardcoded credentials) and others are not yet so
critical (access to server logs).
I think that at least this information can assist during an intrusion test,
as will be shown soon.

6. *Credits*
This vulnerability was discovered by Glaysson dos Santos.

7. *Report Timeline*

. 2015-08-31:
Vendor has been notified about the vulnerabilities (without details yet).

. 2015-09-01:
Vendor acknowledges the receipt of the email and asks for technical
details.

. 2013-09-01:
A email with technical details is sent to vendor.

. 2013-09-11:
Still no response, another email was sent to the Vendor requesting any
opinion on the reported problems.

the following points were highlighted in this email:
* 1. No unauthenticated access [No web pages/URL parameters on the cameras
should be accessible without credentials.]
* 2. Credentials (and other sensitive data) via GET parameters
* 4. Use of hard-coded password
* 3. no SSL

. 2013-09-11:
The vendor reported that the matter was passed on to the team developed
and that it would contact me the following week (2015-09-14).

. 2013-09-14:
The development team responded by passing its consideration of the points
and
reported in accordance with this response the impact of these
vulnerabilities
is low and are no longer available unauthenticated using recent software
release (version 10212).