SpagoBI 4.0 - Persistent Cross-Site Scripting

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01. ###  Advisory Information ###

Title: Persistent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in SpagoBI
Date published: 2014-03-01
Date of last update: 2014-03-01
Vendors contacted: Engineering Group
Discovered by: Christian Catalano
Severity: High


02. ###  Vulnerability Information ###

CVE reference: CVE-2013-6232
CVSS v2 Base Score: 4
CVSS v2 Vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:N)
Component/s: SpagoBI
Class: Input Manipulation


03. ### Introduction ###

SpagoBI[1] is an Open Source Business Intelligence suite, belonging to 
the free/open source SpagoWorld initiative, founded and supported by 
Engineering Group[2].
It offers a large range of analytical functions, a highly functional 
semantic layer often absent in other open source platforms and projects, 
and a respectable set of advanced data visualization features including 
geospatial analytics.
[3]SpagoBI is released under the Mozilla Public License, allowing its 
commercial use.
SpagoBI is hosted on OW2 Forge[4] managed by OW2 Consortium, an 
independent open-source software community.

[1] - http://www.spagobi.org
[2] - http://www.eng.it
[3] - 
http://www.spagoworld.org/xwiki/bin/view/SpagoBI/PressRoom?id=SpagoBI-ForresterWave-July2012
[4] - http://forge.ow2.org/projects/spagobi


04. ### Vulnerability Description ###

SpagoBI contains a flaw that allows persistent cross-site scripting 
(XSS) attacks. This flaw exists because the application does not 
validate certain unspecified input before returning it to the user. This 
may allow an attacker to create a specially crafted request that would 
execute arbitrary script code in a user's browser within the trust 
relationship between their browser and the server.


05. ### Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code ###

In execution page can be visible a toolbar with various icons useful for 
the user to perform actions related to the document runs.
The user can insert a note about the executed document.
The note is associated to the document with relative parameters value 
and to the user.
It can be public or private, so public notes are visible to all users 
while the private notes are visible only from the user creator.

An attacker  (a SpagoBI malicious user with a restricted account ) can 
insert a note with jasvascript code:

<object data="javascript:alert('XSS')"></object>

and save it in public mode.
The code execution happens when the victim (an unaware user)  click on 
annotate document detail.

This is not the only way to add malicious code in the SpagoBI web app.


06. ### Business Impact ###

Exploitation of the vulnerability requires low privileged application 
user account but low or medium user interaction.
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability results in session 
hijacking, client-side phishing, client-side external redirects or 
malware loads and client-side manipulation of the vulnerable module context.


07. ### Systems Affected ###

This vulnerability was tested against: SpagoBI 4.0
Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.


08. ### Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds ###

This issue is fixed in SpagoBI v4.1, which can be downloaded from:

http://forge.ow2.org/project/showfiles.php?group_id=204

Fixed by vendor [verified]


09. ### Credits ###

This vulnerability has been discovered by:
Christian Catalano aka wastasy ch(dot)catalano(at)gmail(dot)com


10.  ### Vulnerability History ###

October  08th, 2013: Vulnerability identification
October  22th, 2013: Vendor notification to  [SpagoBI Team]
November 05th, 2013: Vendor Response/Feedback  from  [SpagoBI Team]
December 16th, 2013: Vendor Fix/Patch [SpagoBI Team]
January  16th, 2014: Fix/Patch Verified
March    01st, 2014: Vulnerability disclosure


11. ### Disclaimer ###

The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
I accept no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of 
this information.

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