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exploitdbAdi CohenEDB-ID:19777
HistoryJul 12, 2012 - 12:00 a.m.

Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 / SharePoint / Lync - toStaticHTML HTML Sanitizing Bypass (MS12-037/MS12-039/MS12-050)

2012-07-1200:00:00
Adi Cohen
www.exploit-db.com
26

6.4 Medium

AI Score

Confidence

Low

4.3 Medium

CVSS2

Access Vector

NETWORK

Access Complexity

MEDIUM

Authentication

NONE

Confidentiality Impact

PARTIAL

Integrity Impact

NONE

Availability Impact

NONE

AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N

0.964 High

EPSS

Percentile

99.5%

toStaticHTML: The Second Encounter (CVE-2012-1858)

*HTML Sanitizing Bypass -
*CVE-2012-1858<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1858>

Original advisory -
http://blog.watchfire.com/wfblog/2012/07/tostatichtml-the-second-encounter-cve-2012-1858-html-sanitizing-information-disclosure-introduction-t.html

Introduction

The *toStaticHTML* component, which is found in Internet Explorer > 8,
SharePoint and Lync is used to sanitize HTML fragments from dynamic and
potentially malicious content.

If an attacker is able to break the filtering mechanism and pass malicious
code through this function, he/she may be able to perform HTML injection
based attacks (i.e. XSS).

It has been a year since the first
encounter<http://blog.watchfire.com/wfblog/2011/07/tostatichtml-html-sanitizing-bypass.html>
was
published, we've now returned with a new bypass method.

Vulnerability

An attacker is able to create a specially formed CSS that will overcome *
toStaticHTML*'s security logic; therefore, after passing the specially
crafted CSS string through the *toStaticHTML* function, it will contain an
expression that triggers a JavaScript call.

The following JavaScript code demonstrates the vulnerability:

*<script>document.write(toStaticHTML("<style>
div{font-family:rgb('0,0,0)'''}foo');color=expression(alert(1));{}
</style><div>POC</div>"))</script>*

In this case the function's return value would be JavaScript executable:

*<style>
div{font-family:rgb('0,0,0)''';}foo');color=expression(alert(1));{;}</style>
<div>POC</div>*



The reason this code bypasses the filter engine is due to two reasons:

   1. The filtering engine allows the string "expression(" to exists in
   "non-dangerous" locations within the CSS.
   2. A bug in Internet Explorer's CSS parsing engine doesn't properly
   terminate strings that are opened inside brackets and closed outside of
   them.

When combining these two factors the attacker is able to "confuse" the
filtering mechanism into "thinking" that a string is open when in fact it
is terminated and vice versa. With this ability the attacker can trick the
filtering mechanism into entering a state of the selector context which is
considered safer where in fact the code is just a new declaration of the
same selector, thus breaking the state machine and bypassing the filter.



Impact

Every application that relies on the *toStaticHTML* component to sanitize
user supplied data had probably been vulnerable to XSS.



Remediation

Microsoft has issued several updates to address this vulnerability.

MS12-037 - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-037

MS12-039 - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-039

MS12-050 - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/MS12-050

6.4 Medium

AI Score

Confidence

Low

4.3 Medium

CVSS2

Access Vector

NETWORK

Access Complexity

MEDIUM

Authentication

NONE

Confidentiality Impact

PARTIAL

Integrity Impact

NONE

Availability Impact

NONE

AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N

0.964 High

EPSS

Percentile

99.5%