In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: l2tp: pass correct message length to ip6_append_data l2tp_ip6_sendmsg needs to avoid accounting for the transport header twice when splicing more data into an already partially-occupied skbuff. To manage this, we check whether the skbuff contains data using skb_queue_empty when deciding how much data to append using ip6_append_data. However, the code which performed the calculation was incorrect: ulen = len + skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue) ? transhdrlen : 0; …due to C operator precedence, this ends up setting ulen to transhdrlen for messages with a non-zero length, which results in corrupted packets on the wire. Add parentheses to correct the calculation in line with the original intent.
OS | Version | Architecture | Package | Version | Filename |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Debian | 12 | all | linux | < 6.1.82-1 | linux_6.1.82-1_all.deb |
Debian | 11 | all | linux | < 5.10.216-1 | linux_5.10.216-1_all.deb |
Debian | 999 | all | linux | < 6.7.7-1 | linux_6.7.7-1_all.deb |
Debian | 13 | all | linux | < 6.7.7-1 | linux_6.7.7-1_all.deb |