An issue was discovered in GNOME GLib before 2.66.8. When g_file_replace() is used with G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION to replace a path that is a dangling symlink, it incorrectly also creates the target of the symlink as an empty file, which could conceivably have security relevance if the symlink is attacker-controlled. (If the path is a symlink to a file that already exists, then the contents of that file correctly remain unchanged.)
gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/2325
lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/06/msg00006.html
lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6RXTD5HCP2K4AAUSWWZTBKQNHRCTAEOF/
lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ICUTQPHZNZWX2DZR46QFLQZRHVMHIILJ/
security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-13
security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210416-0003/