[Lines of code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-12-initcapital/blob/main/contracts/core/InitCore.sol#L169-L213) # Vulnerability details ## Impact In the scenario where the mode's canRepay status is set to false, positions using that mode cannot be repaid and liquidated. However, users are allowed to change their position's mode to one where the canRepay status is currently set to false. This could be exploited when a position owner observes that their position's health is approaching the liquidation threshold, allowing them to prevent liquidation. ## Proof of Concept It can be observed that when setPosMode is called, it check that newModeStatus.canBorrow and currentModeStatus.canRepay is set to true. However, it doesn't the status of newModeStatus.canRepay flag. function setPosMode(uint _posId, uint16 _mode) public virtual onlyAuthorized(_posId) ensurePositionHealth(_posId) nonReentrant { IConfig _config = IConfig(config); // get current collaterals in the position (address[] memory pools,, address[] memory wLps, uint[][] memory ids,) = IPosManager(POS_MANAGER).getPosCollInfo(_posId); uint16 currentMode = _getPosMode(_posId); ModeStatus memory currentModeStatus = _config.getModeStatus(currentMode); ModeStatus memory newModeStatus = _config.getModeStatus(_mode); if (pools.length != 0 || wLps.length != 0) { _require(newModeStatus.canCollateralize, Errors.COLLATERALIZE_PAUSED); _require(currentModeStatus.canDecollateralize, Errors.DECOLLATERALIZE_PAUSED); } // check that each position collateral belongs to the _mode for (uint i; i < pools.length; i = i.uinc()) { _require(_config.isAllowedForCollateral(_mode, pools[i]), Errors.INVALID_MODE); } for (uint i; i < wLps.length; i = i.uinc()) { for (uint j; j < ids[i].length; j = j.uinc()) { _require(_config.isAllowedForCollateral(_mode, IBaseWrapLp(wLps[i]).lp(ids[i][j])), Errors.INVALID_MODE); } } // get current debts in the position uint[] memory shares; (pools, shares) = IPosManager(POS_MANAGER).getPosBorrInfo(_posId); IRiskManager _riskManager = IRiskManager(riskManager); // check that each position debt belongs to the _mode for (uint i; i < pools.length; i = i.uinc()) { _require(_config.isAllowedForBorrow(_mode, pools[i]), Errors.INVALID_MODE); _require(newModeStatus.canBorrow, Errors.BORROW_PAUSED); _require(currentModeStatus.canRepay, Errors.REPAY_PAUSED); // update debt on current mode _riskManager.updateModeDebtShares(currentMode, pools[i], -shares[i].toInt256()); // update debt on new mode _riskManager.updateModeDebtShares(_mode, pools[i], shares[i].toInt256()); } // update position mode IPosManager(POS_MANAGER).updatePosMode(_posId, _mode); emit SetPositionMode(_posId, _mode); } As mentioned before, if users see his position's health status is about to reach liquidation threshold and change the mode, this will allow users to prevent their positions from getting liquidated, as both liquidate and liquidateWLp will check the canRepay flag and revert if it's not allowed. /// @dev liquidation internal logic function _liquidateInternal(uint _posId, address _poolToRepay, uint _repayShares) internal returns (LiquidateLocalVars memory vars) { vars.config = IConfig(config); vars.mode = _getPosMode(_posId); // check position must be unhealthy vars.health_e18 = getPosHealthCurrent_e18(_posId); _require(vars.health_e18 < ONE_E18, Errors.POSITION_HEALTHY); >>> (vars.repayToken, vars.repayAmt) = _repay(vars.config, vars.mode, _posId, _poolToRepay, _repayShares); } function _repay(IConfig _config, uint16 _mode, uint _posId, address _pool, uint _shares) internal returns (address tokenToRepay, uint amt) { // check status >>> _require(_config.getPoolConfig(_pool).canRepay && _config.getModeStatus(_mode).canRepay, Errors.REPAY_PAUSED); // get position debt share uint positionDebtShares = IPosManager(POS_MANAGER).getPosDebtShares(_posId, _pool); uint sharesToRepay = _shares < positionDebtShares ? _shares : positionDebtShares; // get amtToRepay (accrue interest) uint amtToRepay = ILendingPool(_pool).debtShareToAmtCurrent(sharesToRepay); // take token from msg.sender to pool tokenToRepay = ILendingPool(_pool).underlyingToken(); IERC20(tokenToRepay).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, _pool, amtToRepay); // update debt on the position IPosManager(POS_MANAGER).updatePosDebtShares(_posId, _pool, -sharesToRepay.toInt256()); // call repay on the pool amt = ILendingPool(_pool).repay(sharesToRepay); // update debt on mode IRiskManager(riskManager).updateModeDebtShares(_mode, _pool, -sharesToRepay.toInt256()); emit Repay(_pool, _posId, msg.sender, _shares, amt); } ## Tools Used Manual review ## Recommended Mitigation Steps Add a canRepay check status inside setPosMode; if it is paused, revert the change. Besides that, the canRepay and canBorrow checks don't need to be inside the pools check loop. function setPosMode(uint _posId, uint16 _mode) public virtual onlyAuthorized(_posId) ensurePositionHealth(_posId) nonReentrant { IConfig _config = IConfig(config); // get current collaterals in the position (address[] memory pools,, address[] memory wLps, uint[][] memory ids,) = IPosManager(POS_MANAGER).getPosCollInfo(_posId); uint16 currentMode = _getPosMode(_posId); ModeStatus memory currentModeStatus = _config.getModeStatus(currentMode); ModeStatus memory newModeStatus = _config.getModeStatus(_mode); if (pools.length != 0 || wLps.length != 0) { _require(newModeStatus.canCollateralize, Errors.COLLATERALIZE_PAUSED); _require(currentModeStatus.canDecollateralize, Errors.DECOLLATERALIZE_PAUSED); } // check that each position collateral belongs to the _mode for (uint i; i < pools.length; i = i.uinc()) { _require(_config.isAllowedForCollateral(_mode, pools[i]), Errors.INVALID_MODE); } for (uint i; i < wLps.length; i = i.uinc()) { for (uint j; j < ids[i].length; j = j.uinc()) { _require(_config.isAllowedForCollateral(_mode, IBaseWrapLp(wLps[i]).lp(ids[i][j])), Errors.INVALID_MODE); } } // get current debts in the position uint[] memory shares; (pools, shares) = IPosManager(POS_MANAGER).getPosBorrInfo(_posId); IRiskManager _riskManager = IRiskManager(riskManager); // check that each position debt belongs to the _mode + _require(newModeStatus.canBorrow, Errors.BORROW_PAUSED); + _require(currentModeStatus.canRepay, Errors.REPAY_PAUSED); + _require(newModeStatus.canRepay, Errors.REPAY_PAUSED); for (uint i; i < pools.length; i = i.uinc()) { _require(_config.isAllowedForBorrow(_mode, pools[i]), Errors.INVALID_MODE); - _require(newModeStatus.canBorrow, Errors.BORROW_PAUSED); - _require(currentModeStatus.canRepay, Errors.REPAY_PAUSED); // update debt on current mode _riskManager.updateModeDebtShares(currentMode, pools[i], -shares[i].toInt256()); // update debt on new mode _riskManager.updateModeDebtShares(_mode, pools[i], shares[i].toInt256()); } // update position mode IPosManager(POS_MANAGER).updatePosMode(_posId, _mode); emit SetPositionMode(_posId, _mode); } ## Assessed type Invalid Validation --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions

setPosMode should not allow changing the mode when the new mode's canRepay status is disabled