Lines of code

Vulnerability details

Impact

Mistakes made on one chain can be re-applied to a new chain

There is no chain.id in the create2() function data

If a user does create2() using the wrong network, an attacker can replay the action on the correct chain, and steal the funds a-la the wintermute gnosis safe attack, where the attacker can create the same address that the user tried to, and steal the funds from there

<https://mirror.xyz/0xbuidlerdao.eth/lOE5VN-BHI0olGOXe27F0auviIuoSlnou_9t3XRJseY&gt;

Proof of Concept

ethereum/contracts/common/L2ContractHelper.sol:
  18  
  19:     function create2(
  20:         bytes32 _salt,
  21:         bytes32 _bytecodeHash,
  22:         bytes calldata _input
  23:     ) external;
  24  }

zksync/contracts/L2ContractHelper.sol:
   9  interface IContractDeployer {
  10:     function create2(
  11:         bytes32 _salt,
  12:         bytes32 _bytecodeHash,
  13:         bytes calldata _input
  14:     ) external;
  15  }

Tools Used

Manual Code Review

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Include the chain.id in create2() function

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